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s/Tucker S. Player
SC Bar # 16217
Player Law Firm, LLC
1415 Broad River Road
Columbia, SC 29210
803-315-6300
Tucker@playerlawfirm.com
Attorney for Plaintiffs
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Plaintiffs move this Court pursuant to Rule 56, SCRCP to grant summary judgment as to
its Second, Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action to void the sale of the real property involved in
this litigation, which is more specifically described below. There is no issue of material fact in
dispute as to whether the sale of September 3, 2015 was procured by fraud by all of the parties
involved and is void and/or voidable under South Carolina law. Therefore, Plaintiffs are entitled
This litigation focuses on the sale of certain properties owned by a family corporation,
Rabon & Rabon, Inc., which is owned by the Estate of Peggy Jo Rabon (hereinafter the “Estate”
(61%), Defendant Jack Rabon (13%), Plaintiff Kyle Mitchell (13%), and Plaintiff Karon
Mitchell (13%). The properties were purportedly sold to avoid pending foreclosures, although
only one of the properties was mortgaged [hereinafter referred to as the “September Sales”].
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All that certain piece, parcel or lot of land situate, lying and being in the
City of Myrtle Beach, Dogwood Neck Township, Horry County, South
Carolina, shown and designated as Lot Three (3) of Block Nineteen (19)
according to a map or plat of Hotel Section of Myrtle Beach, as made in
June and July if 1926, under the supervision of Stanley H. Wright,
Engineer, which map or plat is recorded in the Clerk of Court’s Office for
Horry County in Plat Book 1 at page 84, reference to which is hereby
made as a part and parcel of this description.
All that certain piece, parcel or lot of land, with improvements thereon,
situate, lying and being in the City of Myrtle Beach, Dogwood Neck
Township, Horry County, South Carolina, shown and designated as Lot
Number Two (2) of Block Nineteen (19), as shown on a map of the Hotel
Section of Myrtle Beach made in June and July 1926, under the
supervision of Stanley H. Wright, Engineer, and recorded in the office of
the RMC for Horry County, South Carolina, in Plat Book 1 at page 84,
reference to which is craved as forming a part of these presents.
It is with regard to these properties that the fraudulent schemes were perpetrated.
Essentially, Jack Rabon, Lane Jeffries (Rabon’s lawyer), and the Biderman Defendants
(collectively Defendants Friends of LBS, LLC, Atid Properties, LLC, Jacob Biderman, and
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owned by Rabon & Rabon, Inc., with $235,000.00 of that money being paid “under the table” to
Jack Rabon and others. There are actually two instances of fraud in the transaction. The most
obvious fraud lies in the specific representations of Mr. Jeffries and Mr. Rabon to Plaintiffs and
numerous courts that only $542,000.00 was being paid for the two properties. These allegations
pertinent to the fraud directly against Plaintiffs [hereinafter the “Direct Fraud”] are verified by
Michelle Cohen, (the real estate agent involved in the sale) Jack Rabon (the President and Vice-
President of the Corporation and primary benefactor of the illicit funds), and the Biderman
The second instance of fraud was only recently uncovered in discovery and deals with
fraud perpetrated by the lawyers, at the direction of the client, against the creditors of the
Corporation. McNair Law Firm intentionally withheld material information about the September
Sales from the two mortgage holders to conceal numerous assets in violation of federal and state
THE FACTS
The Beginning
Prior to her death, Peggy Jo Hardee Rabon was the majority shareholder in Rabon &
Rabon, Inc. [hereinafter the “Corporation”]. Her two children (Jack Rabon and Karon Mitchell),
along with her son-in-law (Kyle Mitchell) were the other shareholders in the Corporation. The
Corporation owned four hotels in Myrtle Beach, South Carolina (the Sea Palms hotels) and a small
home [the “Brick House”] along the 7th Avenue corridor. The hotels were each assigned a number
for reference, i.e. Sea Palms #1, Sea Palms #2, etc. The Corporation was a family business which
was originally operated by Peggy Jo and her husband, with Karon and Kyle Mitchell assisting in
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Peggy Jo got to an advanced age. In 2012, the family created a new limited liability company,
MB Boardwalk Entertainment, LLC [hereinafter MBBE]. MBBE was owned by all four
shareholders of the Corporation, with the Mitchells owning the majority of the shares. MBBE was
formed to build a miniature golf course and restaurant on three ocean front lots owned by the
family. To accomplish this goal, a $3.6 million loan was obtained through West Town Bank. This
loan was secured by the miniature golf course and restaurant, along with two of the Sea Palms
hotels (Sea Palms #3 and Sea Palms #4). The West Town loans were also personally guaranteed
In 2014, TD Bank filed a foreclosure action on three of the hotels. This led to an interfamily
conflict and litigation beginning in July 2014. McNair Law Firm was retained by Jack Rabon and
Peggy Jo Rabon to bring an action against Karon and Kyle Mitchell for mismanagement and
misappropriation of funds. Peggy Jo Rabon passed away on August 31, 2014. Jack Rabon was
In October 2014, Jack Rabon used his position as the personal representative of the Estate
to vote Peggy Jo’s shares in favor of himself being elected the President and Vice-President of the
Corporation over the direct objections of Karon Mitchell and Kyle Mitchell1. After October 1,
2014, the entirety of the operation of the Corporation was in the exclusive control of Jack Rabon.
From that point, the relationship between the parties further deteriorated, resulting in multiple
1
This act, presided over by McNair Law Firm, was itself a voidable transaction under S.C. Code § 62-3-713.
However, that particular issue will be addressed in a separate lawsuit.
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All of the shareholders of the Corporation were personal guarantors on the BB&T loan. West
Town Bank held a mortgage in second position on Sea Palms #3 securing its $3.6 million loan.
BB&T filed a foreclosure action on Sea Palms #3 in November 2014 and obtained a judgement in
the amount of $417,529.93 against the Corporation on May 27, 2015. Exhibit A, BB&T
Foreclosure Order. In addition, BB&T sought a deficiency judgment against the Corporation. Id.
West Town Bank filed a foreclosure action on its loan in April 2015, seeking to foreclose
on the MBBE property, Sea Palms #4, and Sea Palms #3. Exhibit B, West Town Foreclosure
Complaint. West Town Bank also sought a deficiency judgment against MBBE and all the
In January 2015, Jack Rabon executed a contract with Shai David for the sale of several
Rabon & Rabon, Inc. properties for $1 million. Rabon and David had a separate, unwritten
agreement that David would pay Rabon an additional $735,000.00 “off the record” for the
properties. Lane Jefferies was present at most of the meetings while these negotiations took place
(Exhibit H, Affidavit of Jack Rabon, Paragraphs 16-18) and actually discussed the illicit
payments in a text message exchange with Rabon on January 10, 2015. Exhibit AA, Text Message
from Jack Rabon 1/10/15. Officially, Sea Palms #1 was sold to David for $242,000.00 in February
2015 and Sea Palms #2 was sold for $175,000.00 in March 2015. These sales took place without
approval from the Probate Court or notice to the minority shareholders. The Sea Palms #2 sale
resulted in cash of $128,289.57 belonging to the Corporation that was deposited directly into the
McNair Law Firm Trust account. Once Plaintiffs discovered the sales, they filed suit against
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obtained from the sale of Sea Palms #2 was used “to preserve assets of the Corporation.” Exhibit
BB, Answer to Probate Complaint, Paragraph 31. In fact, McNair actually held more than
$120,000.00 in Rabon & Rabon, Inc. funds in its trust account at the time it made this
representation. Ultimately, only $48,460.30 the $128,289.57 was spent towards expenses for the
Corporation. The rest of the funds were either paid to McNair Law Firm (approximately
Asset Concealment Fraud Part 2 – Fraud Against BB&T and West Town
On or about August 2, 2015, Defendant Nicole Rabon informed McNair Law Firm via
email that an offer had been made for both Sea Palms #3 and the Brick House in the form of two
separate contracts. Exhibit C, 8/02/2015 Email. In this email, Rabon directly stated that she
wanted to conceal the sales price of the Brick House from BB&T because there was no mortgage
on that property. Lane Jefferies agreed to this strategy and copied Henrietta Golding with the
Over the next month, Lane Jefferies and Henrietta Golding negotiated with both BB&T
and West Town Bank without ever disclosing that the Brick House was being sold, or that the
Corporation was walking away with over $130,000.00 in cash from that sale. Exhibit D, Affidavit
of Riddick Skinner, Paragraphs 5-9. More importantly, McNair held more than $94,000.00 of
the Corporation’s cash in its trust account for “expenses” while these negotiations took place with
the banks. Exhibit E, McNair Ledger; Exhibit F, Deposition of Henrietta Golding, Pages 93-
102. As a result of these negotiations and the concealment of sale of the Brick House, BB&T
agreed to accept only $397,000.00 as full satisfaction of its judgment and West Town agreed to
accept only $7500.00 for the release of its $3.6 million mortgage on Sea Palms #3. In addition,
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HUD-1 Statement), and McNair continued to hold more than $67,000.00 of the Corporation’s
money in its trust account. Both BB&T and West Town Bank are FDIC insured financial
institutions and the sale of the Brick House was material to their decisions to accept the negotiated
terms offered by McNair Law Firm. Exhibit D, Affidavit of Riddick Skinner, Paragraphs 5-9.
Myrtle Beach through Friends of LBS, LLC. The original written contract with Friends of LBS,
LLC was for the sale of Sea Palms #3 and the Brick House for the total price of $542,000.00.
However, the actual deal was for Biderman to pay $777,000.00 for both properties, with the
additional $235,000.00 to be paid to Jack Rabon and others via a wire transfer and cash. Exhibit
H, Affidavit of Jack Rabon, Paragraph 2. Michelle Cohen was the realtor involved in the deal
and the primary representative of the Biderman Defendants. Ms. Cohen confirmed the conspiracy
to pay the additional illicit funds via affidavit. Exhibit I, Affidavit of Michelle Cohen,
Paragraphs 5-9. Jacob Biderman, Atid Properties, LLC, Friends of LBS, LLC and Sarah Ginsberg
admitted in their joint answer that the additional $235,000.00 was paid for the two properties
Therefore, the payment of the illicit and undisclosed $235,000.00 in funds is admitted by all of the
parties directly involved. There is a dispute as to who received $50,000.00 of the illicit funds, but
all parties agree that $185,000.00 went to Jack Rabon through Daisy Ridge, LLC and cash.
On August 20, 2015, Lane Jefferies made a motion in the Horry County Probate Court to
sell two properties owned by Rabon & Rabon, Inc. A copy of the motion is attached as Exhibit
K, Motion to Sell Estate Property. In the motion and in direct representations to Plaintiffs, Lane
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for the Brick House and $397,000.00 for Sea Palms #3, for a total of $542,000.00. See Exhibit
L, Consent Order of August 26, 2015. These representations were false. Jack Rabon and Lane
Jeffries knew the aforementioned representations were false at the time they were made to the
As a result of the fraudulent representations, Lane Jefferies obtained permission from the
Mitchells and the Probate Court for the sale to Biderman for the price $542,000.00. Both the
corporate resolution drafted by Jefferies and the Consent Motion signed by the Probate Court
represented that only $542,000.00 was being paid for the property as opposed to the actual agreed
upon price of $777,000.00. Due to the impending loss of the property to BB&T, and the false
understanding that no better offer existed, the Mitchells signed the Resolution and the Consent
Upon the executed Resolution and Consent Order, the final stages of the conspiracy were
set into motion. Biderman formed a new LLC, Atid Properties, LLC, for the sole purpose of taking
title to Sea Palms #3 and the Brick House. Jack and Nicole Rabon formed a new company, Daisy
Ridge, LLC, for the sole purpose of receiving the illicit funds via wire from Biderman. The
formation of Daisy Ridge, LLC was suggested by Lane Jefferies who referred the Rabons to Robert
Frenz, an attorney in Columbia, for its formation. Jefferies actually provided the fraudulent
address for Rabon to use as the office for Daisy Ridge, LLC via text message. Exhibit H, Affidavit
of Jack Rabon, Paragraph 24; Exhibit M, Text from Lane Jefferies to Jack Rabon on
8/26/2015; Exhibit N, Articles of Organization for Daisy Ridge, LLC; Exhibit O, Affidavit of
Robert Frenz; Exhibit P, Affidavit of Dan Joyner. After the LLCs were formed, the last piece
of the conspiracy involved the money. The money from Biderman would be transferred through
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The First Wire consisted of the legitimate funds under the contracts and transferred to the
Emery Law Firm Trust Account from a newly created Bank of America bank account in the name
of Atid Properties, LLC. This total of $527,627.77 arrived no later than September 2, 2015 Exhibit
The Second Wire in the amount of $100,000.00 was wired from Biderman’s account in
Austria to a bank account in Chile in the name of Gabby Yosef, Michelle Cohen’s brother. Exhibit
I, Affidavit of Michelle Cohen, Paragraph 11; Exhibit R, Email between Cohen and Biderman.
These funds were withdrawn in cash to be handed to Jack Rabon. Exhibit H, Affidavit of Jack
The Third Wire was in the amount of $135,000.00 and was transferred to a PNC Bank
Account in the name of Daisy Ridge, LLC. Exhibit S, Wire Confirmation from Bank of Austria.
Due to the anti-money laundering regulations in the U.S., the Third Wire had to go through a
clearinghouse in New York and it did not arrive by September 3, 2015. This caused a ripple in the
plan, resulting in Jack Rabon demanding that additional security be paid for the illicit funds in the
amount of $135,000.00. Biderman wrote three checks for $45,000.00 each that were given to Lane
Jefferies as security for the illicit funds. Lane Jefferies signed a receipt for these three checks on
September 3, 2015. Exhibit T, Signed Receipt by Lane Jefferies. Jefferies asserted that these
checks were for “security for the brick house,” but this is false. All funds necessary for the closing
of both properties arrived in the trust account of the Emery Law Firm no later than September 2,
2018, the day before the three checks were handed to Lane Jefferies.
On September 2, 2015, Lane Jefferies engaged in a series of texts with Jack and Nicole
Rabon. These texts are the proverbial “smoking gun” with regard to proving Lane Jefferies’
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Jack Rabon on 9/02/2015. These texts demonstrate his knowledge of both wires involving the
illicit monies from Biderman. The single text that conclusively proves Lane Jefferies’ direct
“Damn. Jack, can you get Michelle on the phone and see if gabby got his
wire?”
The only “gabby” involved was Gabby Yosef, the brother of Michelle Cohen. The only way
Gabby Yosef was involved with any party in general, or with the real estate transaction on
September 3, 2015 in particular, was through the wire of $100,000.00 to his bank account in Chile
[the “Second Wire” described above]. Lane Jefferies knew about and, more importantly, was
concerned about Gabby’s wire. This proves he knew about the illicit funds and was an active
participant in the conspiracy to defraud the banks, the Mitchells and Rabon & Rabon, Inc.
On September 3, 2015, Lane Jefferies was picked up by Jack Rabon after the closing was
complete. Exhibit V, Texts from Lane Jefferies to Jack Rabon on 9/03/2015. They travelled to
a parking lot off of 38th Avenue North in Myrtle Beach to meet with Michelle Cohen and Gabby
Yosef. Michelle then handed an envelope with $50,000.00 cash inside. In front of Michelle
Cohen, Jack Rabon immediately handed Lane Jefferies $10,000.00 of the cash. Exhibit H,
32. Over the course of the next seven weeks, Jack Rabon withdrew nearly all of the $135,000.00
from the Daisy Ridge, LLC account in cash. This excessive withdrawal activity caused PNC Bank
to initiate an investigation under its anti-money laundering guidelines. One of the investigators
working the file was named Jesse Cagle. Mr. Cagle was an employee at the PNC branch where
the Rabons opened the Daisy Ridge, LLC account. Exhibit W, PNC AML Investigation Notes.
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Rabon. Mr. Jefferies told Mr. Cagle that he didn’t know why Jack was withdrawing the cash. He
suggested that Jack Rabon had a gambling problem or a “girl on the side.” But it was his money
and he should be able to do what he wanted with it.2 Lane Jefferies actually billed the Rabons for
this phone call in the official billing records issued by McNair Law Firm. Exhibit X, McNair
Billing Record.
THE LAW
Pursuant to Rule 56(c), SCRCP, summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an
adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response,
by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial. Hall v. Fedor, 349 S.C. 169, 175, 561 S.E.2d 654, 657 (Ct. App.
2002). "In determining whether any triable issues of fact exist, the evidence and all inferences
which can be reasonably drawn from the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party." Hancock v. Mid-South Mgmt. Co., 381 S.C. 326, 329-30, 673 S.E.2d 801,
802 (2009). "Summary judgment is proper whe[n] plain, palpable, and indisputable facts exist on
which reasonable minds cannot differ." Rothrock v. Copeland, 305 S.C. 402, 405, 409 S.E.2d
2
Mr. Cagle resides out of state and counsel was unable to obtain an affidavit prior to filing this motion. Once an
affidavit is secured, this motion will be supplemented.
11 | P a g e
constituted extrinsic fraud on the respective courts under Rule 60, SCRCP, leading to the
vacation of two prior orders. Judge Culbertson rescinded his Order of February 8, 2016 based on
his finding that fraud on the court did occur with regard to the fraudulent sales prices reported by
Rabon and Jefferies. Exhibit Y, March 19, 2018 Order of Judge Culbertson. In addition, the
Horry County Probate Court vacated its Consent Order (Exhibit L above) based on its specific
finding that the representations regarding the September Sales constituted fraud on that Court.
Exhibit Z. Therefore, at the very least, the Rabon Defendants are barred by the doctrine of res
judicata from challenging any finding that the fraud complained of by Plaintiffs occurred. While
the remaining defendants were not parties to either proceeding before Judge Culbertson or the
Probate Court, these Orders, along with the 26 additional exhibits attached hereto, provide
conclusive evidence that fraud occurred with regard to the actual sales price paid in the
September Sales.
Two statutes under the South Carolina Probate Code dictate that summary judgment is
appropriate with regards to voiding the sale of September 3, 2015. S.C. Code § 62-1-106 states:
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1-106 states, Plaintiffs may recover from any party “whether innocent or not” that benefitted
from the fraud. Only a bona fide purchaser is excluded. The Biderman Defendants were not
bona fide purchasers as they all admitted to paying $235,000.00 outside the closing to parties
As described above, Jack Rabon was the direct beneficiary of at least $185,000.00 in illicit funds
from the Biderman Defendants. This was clearly a “conflict of interest on the part of the
personal representative” thus rendering the September Sales voidable under this statute.
Similar to S.C. Code § 62-3-713, transactions involving conflicts of interest with officers
While this statute does allow for the transaction to be ratified post hoc, such salvation is not
available in the current facts before this Court. Under the statute, if a party can demonstrate that
the transaction was fair to the Corporation, it is not voidable. However, in this case the illicit
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and wire transfer to the fraudulent company, Daisy Ridge, LLC. Thus, even if the sales price of
$777,000.00 was fair to the Corporation (which these Plaintiffs dispute), the transaction was not
as $235,000.00 of those funds were paid to the officer. Therefore, the September Sales are
S.C. Code §27-23-10, more commonly known as the Statute of Elizabeth, states:
In both the Direct Fraud and the Asset Concealment Fraud described above, substantial assets of
the Corporation were concealed from creditors and eventually converted for the benefit of the
Jack Rabon and others. The entire scheme of the September Sales was to defraud the creditors of
the Corporation, whether they were FDIC financial institutions, heirs of the Estate of Peggy Jo
Rabon, or the Shareholders of the Corporation itself. On September 3, 2015, the Corporation
possessed approximately $200,000.00 in cash from the September Sales and the retainage in the
McNair Law Firm trust account. Despite those cash reserves, BB&T agreed to accept a
substantial reduction in a recorded judgment against the Corporation, and West Town accepted a
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from the Direct Fraud are added to the computation, the Corporation and its President had at
their disposal over $310,000.00 to pay towards its creditors and shareholders on September 3,
2015. Not a single penny ever found its way to West Town Bank or any other shareholder of the
Corporation, despite the fact that the Corporation had no ongoing business expenses after the
September Sales. Thus, the September Sales were fraudulent transfers under the Statute of
Conclusion
The September Sales were fraudulent. There can be no real dispute about this fact.
Therefore, under South Carolina law, those transactions were void or voidable and must be
declared as such by this Court. No bona fide purchaser exists and a lis pendens protects from
any subsequent bona fide purchaser from taking the property without notice. Therefore, this
Court must grant Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment and declare the September 3,
2015 sale void and invalid. This will not, however, end the case against any Defendant as
additional compensable damages must be recovered, and all Defendants are subject to punitive
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Fwd: Rabon2 -- 062992.00002 RE: RABON -- offer on Building 3 and Middle Lot, and offer on House
Nicole –
Thanks. That makes sense. In that case, let’s see if Michelle will have Brad King dra two contracts that are idenc al but for the property
descripons. Br ad can make them evenhanded, so I won’t have to make a lot of revisions to provide R&R with the same protecon pr ovided to the
buyer. If Michelle wants to have Brad contact me (or me him) to discuss that would be fine. Please just let me know.
As soon as we have an agreement on paper (containing the conng ency for shareholder/court approval), I will contact Sco Hu o and/or the
Probate Court to a empt to get the sale approved.
Best regards,
Lane
The reason there are two contacts is because there isn't a mortgage on the house so we didn't want BB&T to get the sale price of both properes.
We will need the money from the sale of the house to pay capital gains.
Nicole
Nicole –
Three things:
1. See a ached agreements with my revisions, including the conng ency for a shareholder vote and Court approval.
2. Not sure why Michelle is using two (different) contracts when the sale of the house is conng ent on the sale of Building 3 and
the Middle lot. Since the buyer wants to buy them as a group, it would make a lot more sense for everybody concerned just to
use a single contract.
3. The two contracts are different, and each is somewhat one-sided in its own way. As a result, I have made a LOT of revisions as
you will see. Suggeson: Br ad King is represenng the Buy er as I understand it, and I’ve seen Brad write some very fair and
balanced agreements. Why doesn’t Michelle have Brad write a single evenhanded agreement that includes all the parcels?
That would be cleaner, and a lot easier to read.
Please let me know the feedback you get from Michelle, and encourage her to get Brad involved, as this will make the process go much
more smoothly.
Best,
Lane
From: Jack & Nicole [mailto:sourmug2love@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 31, 2015 12:50 PM
To: Jefferies, Lane
Subject: Re: RABON -- offer on Building 3 and Middle Lot, and offer on House
Lane -
Will you be able to add that conng ency to the contract today? How soon can we get this approved by the court? Also, we can give you
a copy of the tax noce on the house. It has the mark et value at $168,800 which isn't far of the sales price.
Nicole
Jack –
(1) Tell the buyers that you are glad to sign a. er the agreement is approved by the shareholders and/or the Probate
Court, OR
(2) Sign the agreement now a er I add a conng ency for shareholder/Court approval.
The second opon w ould probably give the buyers more comfort. Queson: do w e have anything (appraisal, tax value,
etc.) to suggest what a reasonable value for either of these properes is? Especially the house, since BB&T no doub t had
something regarding Building 3. Please let me know. Something to establish value will be one of the first things the Judge
will ask for if we don’t get the Mitchell’s consent.
Best,
Lane
Lane D. Jefferies
Associate
ljefferies@mcnair.net | 843 443 3059 Direct
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<1809_001.pdf>
<1836_001.pdf>
Selection Criteria
Trust Account: CCNB Trust Account Description: Myrtle Beach - CCNB
Trust Account Number.
File ID: 062992.00002 Client / Matter: Rabon & Rabon, Inc.
Responsible Party: LDJ Ledger Comment: Proceeds from sale of Bldg. 2, 317 17ti
Settlement Date: 03/26/15 Property:
Starting Date:
Ending Date:
Incoming Wires
03/26/15
I
Bellamy Rutenberg 03/31/15 $128,289.57
Proceeds of Sale - Bldg. 2 - 317 17th Avenue North, Myrtle Beach, SC
Total of 1 Incoming Wire: $128,289.57
Checks
1344 05/08/15
I
Horry County Treasurer 05/29/15 $1,537.92
Notice 277720-14-3
1345 05/08/15 Horry County Treasurer 05/29/15 $2,619.39
Notice 277721-14-3
1346 05/08/15 Horry County Treasurer 05/29/15 $5,718.47
Notice 277722-14-3
1347 05/08/15 Horry County Treasurer 05/29/15 $11,454.37
Notice 277718-14-3
1350 05/20/15 Michael E. Davis, CPA, P.A. 05/29/15 $2,625.00
Payment of Invoice 19231
1 357 06/04/15 Celtic Bank 06/30/15 $1,667.67
Loan payment
1373 10/06/15 McNair Law Firm Check 10/31/15 $10,000.00
Apply as retainer on 062992.4
1384 03/14/16 McNair Law Firm, PA Check 05/31/16 $10,000.00
Total of 8 Checks: $45,622.82
Miscellaneous
04/06/15
I
Celtic Bank wire out 04/30/15 $5,003.01
Rabon & Rabon Feb, Mar & Apr payments
07/08/15 Celtic Bank wire out 07/31/15 $3,335.34
J une & July Past Due Payments
09/01/15 Celtic Bank wire out 09/30/15 $3,335.34
Aug & Sept payments
09/03/15 Emery Law LLC IOLTA wire out 09/30/15 $23,845.35
Sale to ATID Properties of 17, 18 & 2, Blk 19 Hotel Section
10/28/15 Celtic Bank wire out 10/31/15 $1,667.67
October 2015 payment
12/01/15 Celtic Bank wire out 12/31/15 $1,667.67
Nov 2015 payment
01/04/16 Celtic Bank wire out 01/31/16 $1,667.67
December 2015 payment
McNAI R_004386
:
ms
s
McNAI R_004387
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· · · · · ·ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS
·9· · · · · · · ·MCNAIR LAW FIRM, PA, LANE JEFFRIES:
18
24
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Ginsburg and Jacob Biderman (hereinafter referred to as “Defendants”) by and through their
attorney, Thomas C. Brittain, and hereby answers the Second Amended Complaint of Karon
Mitchell, Kyle Mitchell and Rabon & Rabon, Inc (hereinafter “Plaintiffs”) as follows:
1. The Defendants answering the Second Amended Complaint of the Plaintiff would
respectfully show unto the Court, that each and every allegation not specifically admitted herein
is expressly denied, with strict proof required thereof, to the extent that it is appropriate in these
1
J
Motion to Void Sale - Page 0087
ELECTRONICALLY FILED - 2017 Dec 27 2:33 PM - HORRY - COMMON PLEAS - CASE#2017CP2605757
pleadings.
2. That the allegations of Paragraph 1 are, upon information and belief, admitted.
3. That the allegations of Paragraph 2 are, upon information and belief, admitted.
4. That the allegations of Paragraph 3 are, upon information and belief, admitted.
5. That the allegations of Paragraph 4 are, upon information and belief, admitted.
6. That the allegations of Paragraph 5 are, upon information and belief, admitted.
7. That the allegations of Paragraph 6 are, upon information and belief, admitted.
8. That the allegations of Paragraph 7 are, upon information and belief, admitted.
9. That the allegations of Paragraph 8 are, upon information and belief, admitted.
10. That the allegations of Paragraph 9 are denied insomuch as the proper name for this
11. That the allegations of Paragraph 10 are, upon information and belief, admitted.
12. That the allegations of Paragraph 11 are, upon information and belief, admitted.
13. That the allegations of Paragraph 12 are, upon information and belief, admitted.
14. That the allegations of Paragraph 13 are, upon information and belief, admitted.
15. That the allegations of Paragraph 14 are, upon information and belief, admitted.
16. That the allegations of Paragraph 15 are, upon information and belief, admitted.
17. That the allegations of Paragraph 16 are, upon information and belief, admitted.
18. That the allegations of Paragraph 17 are, upon information and belief, admitted.
19. That the allegations of Paragraph 18 are, upon information and belief, admitted.
20. That the allegations of Paragraph 19 are, upon information and belief, admitted.
21. That the allegations of Paragraph 20 are, upon information and belief, admitted.
2
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22. That the allegations of Paragraph 21 are, upon information and belief, admitted.
23. That the allegations of Paragraph 22 are denied with strict proof required thereof.
Defendant Friends of LBS, Inc. improperly identified in Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint
as Friends of LBS, LLC was established on request of the Lauder Business School in Vienna,
Austria; further, Defendant Jacob Biderman is a shareholder in Defendant Atid Properties, LLC
24. That these answering Defendants do not possess sufficient knowledge with which
25. That these answering Defendants do not possess sufficient knowledge with which
26. That the allegations of Paragraph 25 are, upon information and belief, admitted.
27. That the allegations of Paragraph 26 are, upon information and belief, admitted.
28. That the allegations of Paragraph 27 are, upon information and belief, admitted.
29. That the allegations of Paragraph 28 are denied with strict proof required thereof.
30. That the allegations of Paragraph 29 are denied with strict proof required thereof.
31. That the allegations of Paragraph 30 are denied with strict proof required thereof.
32. That the allegations of Paragraph 31 are denied with strict proof thereof. Plaintiff
Karon Mitchell visited with Defendant Sarah Ginsburg wherein she discussed her misgivings
surrounding the sale of the property and her brother, Defendant Jack Rabon, whom she indicated
did not have the proper authority to sell the property but there was no discussion as to the sales
price and, at the end of that meeting told Defendant Ginsburg she was impressed by her and that
if the property was to be sold she was happy it was being sold to good people. Further, Defendant
3
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33. That the allegations of Paragraph 32 are admitted insomuch as Plaintiffs’ execution
Inc.”; as to all remaining allegations contained in Paragraph 32, denied with strict proof thereof.
34. That the allegations of Paragraph 33 are, upon information and belief, admitted.
35. That the allegations of Paragraph 34 are denied with strict proof required thereof.
36. That the allegations of Paragraph 35 are, upon information and belief, admitted.
37. That these answering Defendants do not possess sufficient knowledge with which
38. That these answering Defendants do not possess sufficient knowledge with which
39. That these answering Defendants do not possess sufficient knowledge with which
40. That the allegations of Paragraph 39 are denied with strict proof required thereof.
41. That the allegations of Paragraph 40 are denied with strict proof required thereof.
42. That the allegations of Paragraph 41 are, upon information and belief, admitted.
43. That the allegations of Paragraph 42 are denied with strict proof required thereof.
44. That the allegations of Paragraph 43 are denied insomuch as these funds were
transferred by Esther Parshan who is the mother of Defendant Jacob Biderman upon receiving a
request from her son to borrow said funds. Further, that these answering Defendants do not possess
sufficient knowledge with which to respond to the remaining allegations contained in this
Paragraph.
45. That these answering Defendants do not possess sufficient knowledge with which
4
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46. That these answering Defendants do not possess sufficient knowledge with which
47. That these answering Defendants do not possess sufficient knowledge with which
48. That the allegations contained in Paragraph 47 are, upon information and belief,
admitted.
49. That the allegations contained in Paragraph 48 are, upon information and belief,
admitted.
50. That the allegations contained in Paragraph 49 are, upon information and belief,
admitted.
51. That the allegations contained in Paragraph 50 are admitted as to Defendants Atid
Properties, LLC and Biderman; denied with strict proof required thereof as to Defendant Ginsburg.
52. That the allegations contained in Paragraph 51 are admitted insomuch as said funds
were not listed on the HUD-1 Settlement Statement, however, Defendants do not possess sufficient
knowledge with which to respond to the remaining allegations contained in this Paragraph.
53. That the allegations contained in Paragraph 52 are, upon information and belief,
admitted.
54. That the allegations contained in Paragraph 53 are, upon information and belief,
admitted.
55. That the allegations contained in Paragraph 54 are, upon information and belief,
admitted.
56. That the allegations contained in Paragraph 55 are, upon information and belief,
admitted.
5
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57. That the allegations contained in Paragraph 56 are denied insomuch as these funds
were transferred from an account owned by Esther Parshan who is the mother of Defendant Jacob
Biderman upon receiving a request from her son to borrow said funds, which he did upon receiving
instructions to do so from Defendant Michelle Cohen for an investment fee she advised him was
58. That these answering Defendants do not possess sufficient knowledge with which
59. That the allegations contained in Paragraph 58 are denied with strict proof required
thereof.
60. That the allegations contained in Paragraph 59 are denied insomuch as Defendant
Jacob Biderman did not initiate the wire transfer. The transfer was done by his mother, Esther
61. That these answering Defendants do not possess sufficient knowledge with which
to respond to the allegations contained in Paragraph 60. All monies paid by these Defendants
relevant to this action were at the direct instruction of Defendant Michelle Cohen so to do; these
answering Defendants did not have direct contact with Defendants Jack Rabon, Nicole Rabon
62. That the allegations contained in Paragraph 61 are denied insomuch as Defendant
Biderman did not issue the three checks to McNair Law Firm, PA in the amount of $135,000.00;
these checks were issued by Defendant Sarah Ginsburg at the request of Defendant Biderman upon
receiving instructions from Defendant Michelle Cohen so to do. These answering Defendants do
not possess sufficient knowledge with which to respond to all remaining allegations contained in
Paragraph 61.
6
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63. That these answering Defendants do not possess sufficient knowledge with which
64. That the allegations of Paragraph 63 are admitted insomuch as to the signing of the
HUD-1 Statement by Defendants Ginsburg and Jack Rabon; as to all remaining allegations, denied
65. That these answering Defendants do not possess sufficient knowledge with which
66. That these answering Defendants do not possess sufficient knowledge with which
67. That these answering Defendants do not possess sufficient knowledge with which
68. That these answering Defendants do not possess sufficient knowledge with which
to respond to the allegations contained in Paragraph 67; further, that Defendant Biderman wired
this money to Daisy Ridge, LLC at the direct instruction of Defendant Michelle Cohen who
advised that this was a required investment fee that he had to pay.
69. That these answering Defendants do not possess sufficient knowledge with which
70. That these answering Defendants do not possess sufficient knowledge with which
71. That these answering Defendants do not possess sufficient knowledge with which
7
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72. That the allegations of Paragraph 71 are denied with strict proof required thereof as
Ginsburg.
73. That these answering Defendants do not possess sufficient knowledge with which
to respond to the allegations contained in Paragraph 72; further, to the extent these allegations
assert any negligent and/or fraudulent actions by these answering Defendants, denied with strict
74. That the allegations of Paragraph 73 do not require an affirmative response from
these answering Defendants. To the extent said allegations could be construed to form a cause of
action against Defendants, said allegations are denied with strict proof required thereof.
75. That the allegations of Paragraph 74 are denied with strict proof required thereof.
76. That the allegations of Paragraph 75 are denied with strict proof required thereof.
77. That the allegations of Paragraph 76 do not require an affirmative response from
these answering Defendants. To the extent said allegations could be construed to form a cause of
action against Defendants, said allegations are denied with strict proof required thereof.
78. That the allegations of Paragraph 77 are denied with strict proof required thereof.
79. That the allegations of Paragraph 78 are denied with strict proof required thereof.
80. That the allegations of Paragraph 79 are denied with strict proof required thereof.
81. That the allegations of Paragraph 80 are denied with strict proof required thereof.
82. That the allegations of Paragraph 81 are denied with strict proof required thereof.
83. That the allegations of Paragraph 82 do not require an affirmative response from
these answering Defendants. To the extent said allegations could be construed to form a cause of
action against Defendants, said allegations are denied with strict proof required thereof.
8
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84. That the allegations of Paragraph 83 are denied with strict proof required thereof.
85. That the allegations of Paragraph 84 are denied with strict proof required thereof.
86. That the allegations of Paragraph 85 are denied with strict proof required thereof.
87. That the allegations of Paragraph 86 are denied with strict proof required thereof.
88. That the allegations of Paragraph 87 are denied with strict proof required thereof.
89. That the allegations of Paragraph 88 do not require an affirmative response from
these answering Defendants. To the extent said allegations could be construed to form a cause of
action against Defendants, said allegations are denied with strict proof required thereof.
90. That the allegations of Paragraph 89 are denied with strict proof required thereof.
91. That the allegations of Paragraph 90 are denied with strict proof required thereof.
92. That the allegations of Paragraph 91 are denied with strict proof required thereof.
93. That the allegations of Paragraph 92 do not require an affirmative response from
these answering Defendants. To the extent said allegations could be construed to form a cause of
action against Defendants, said allegations are denied with strict proof required thereof.
94. That these answering Defendants do not possess sufficient knowledge with which
to respond to the allegations contained in Paragraph 93. To the extent said allegations could be
construed to form a cause of action against Defendants, said allegations are denied with strict proof
required thereof.
95. That the allegations of Paragraph 94 are denied with strict proof required thereof.
96. That the allegations of Paragraph 95 are denied with strict proof required thereof.
97. That the allegations of Paragraph 96 do not require an affirmative response from
these answering Defendants. To the extent said allegations could be construed to form a cause of
action against Defendants, said allegations are denied with strict proof required thereof.
9
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98. That these answering Defendants do not possess sufficient knowledge with which
to respond to the allegations contained in Paragraph 97. To the extent said allegations could be
construed to form a cause of action against Defendants, said allegations are denied with strict proof
required thereof.
99. That these answering Defendants do not possess sufficient knowledge with which
to respond to the allegations contained in Paragraph 98. To the extent said allegations could be
construed to form a cause of action against Defendants, said allegations are denied with strict proof
required thereof.
100. That these answering Defendants do not possess sufficient knowledge with which
to respond to the allegations contained in Paragraph 99. To the extent said allegations could be
construed to form a cause of action against Defendants, said allegations are denied with strict proof
required thereof.
101. That these answering Defendants do not possess sufficient knowledge with which
to respond to the allegations contained in Paragraph 100. To the extent said allegations could be
construed to form a cause of action against Defendants, said allegations are denied with strict proof
required thereof.
102. That these answering Defendants do not possess sufficient knowledge with which
to respond to the allegations contained in Paragraph 101. To the extent said allegations could be
construed to form a cause of action against Defendants, said allegations are denied with strict proof
required thereof.
CROSS-CLAIMS
Second Amended Complaint of the Plaintiffs would respectfully show unto the Court, that each
10
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and every allegation contained in the Answer is specifically set forth herein as if replead.
105. Cross Claimants reallege each and every allegation contained in Paragraphs 1
106. That Cohen is a real estate agent licensed and working in Horry County, South
Carolina.
107. That in 2011 or 2012, while in Horry County visiting his sister Sarah Ginsburg
(“Ginsburg”), Jacob Biderman (“Biderman”) met Cohen who advised him she had very cheap real
estate for sale in Myrtle Beach due to the 2009 crash and that he could make a very good return on
108. That Biderman, who is a Rabbi living in Vienna, Austria established Friends of
LBS, Inc. incorrectly identified in Plaintiffs’ Second Complaint as Friends of LBS, LLC in 2009
on request of Lauder Business School in Vienna, Austria (“LBS”) in his capacity as the school’s
109. That, following the establishment of this nonprofit corporation, Biderman met
Cohen while visiting his sister in Myrtle Beach, South Carolina who discussed potential real estate
110. That, following this initial meeting Cohen would contact Biderman, as the contact
person for LBS, with properties in Horry County for sale and Biderman would then present these
properties to the LBS board of directors and, if approved, would notify Cohen that the nonprofit
11
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111. That Cohen also managed several of the properties purchased by LBS and, through
112. That in 2014 and/or 2015 Cohen contacted Biderman with additional real estate
investments which the LBS board agreed to purchase and which were managed by Cohen.
113. That in 2015 Cohen contacted Biderman with another potential investment property
and advised that the purchase price would be no more than $650,000.00 and that there was an
investment fee of around $200,000.00 that would have to be reimbursed as well. Cohen further
informed Biderman that if he purchased this property he could expect a return of $25,000.00 per
month. That Cross Claimants relied upon the truthfulness of all representations which Cross
114. That, initially, the property was to be purchased on behalf of LBS; however, they
did not have the required funds so Biderman decided to establish Atid Properties, LLC (“Atid”)
and purchase the property through this corporation on behalf of himself, his wife and his children.
115. That Biderman’s sister Ginsburg was listed as the Registered Agent and manager
of Atid on the documents filed with the South Carolina Secretary of State due to the fact she resided
116. That Biderman did not have the funds needed to purchase this property nor the
investment reimbursement fee he was told by Cohen he would be required to pay and therefore
borrowed the money from his mother, Esther Parshan, and others.
fee to her brother in Chile and wire the remaining investment/renovation fee of $135,000.00 to
Daisy Ridge, LLC (“Daisy”). She further advised him that her brother would be assisting with the
12
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renovations. Biderman, who had complete trust in Cohen, requested his mother to wire the
necessary funds.
118. That Cohen never provided to these Cross Claimants any information regarding
Daisy other than the corporation’s name nor the names of the person(s) receiving the $235,000.00
investment/renovation fee.
119. That, prior to purchasing the property, Cohen advised Biderman that she would
likely need an additional $150,000.00 in order to renovate the property, which he agreed to.
However, after purchasing the property Biderman found out Cohen had misled him as to the
120. That Cohen never fully and sufficiently disclosed to the Cross Claimants how she
121. That, after spending over $1,000,000.00 on the property, Cohen advised Biderman
that Atid would receive closer to $20,000.00 per month from the property instead of the $25,000.00
122. That, under Cohen’s management, Atid received $20,000.00 per month from this
123. That Cohen advised Biderman the property was worth $3,000,000.00 and he agreed
124. That Cohen was never able to sell the property and, further, stopped making the
monthly payments to Atid for the rent she was collecting for the property’s tenants, in compliance
125. That Biderman later discovered the property was worth much less.
13
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126. That, as a result of Cohen’s fraudulent actions and negligent misrepresentations,
127. That, upon terminating the lease, demanded Biderman and/or Atid pay her
128. That, further, Biderman filed eviction proceedings against Cohen after the lease
was terminated.
129. That, in retaliation for being evicted from the property, Cohen painted the walls in
bizarre colors that had to be repainted at Atid’s expense and took all the keys and fire extinguishers,
which had to be replaced at Atid’s expense and emptied out a warehouse owned by Atid containing
several air conditioning units, refrigerators, etc. She further held herself out as the continued
tentant and collected rent from all the residential rentals and failed to provide any of those funds
to Atid.
130. Further, that upon information and belief, after being evicted by Atid, Cohen
contacted Karon Mitchell in retaliation and negligently misrepresented to her that Cross Claimants
131. That, upon information and belief, Cohen’s willful acts of making false accusations
132. That Cross Claimants are entitled to recovery of actual and treble damages in the
form of attorneys’ fees and costs in pursuing this action as well as punitive damages resulting from
133. Cross Claimants reallege each and every allegation contained in Paragraphs 1
14
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134. That on May 30, 2016, Cohen by and through her company Diverge Construction
& Management Group, LLC signed a commercial lease agreement with Atid for the recently
purchase property located at 600 Chester Street, Myrtle Beach, SC 29577 wherein Cohen agreed
135. That on November 1, 2016, Biderman met with Cohen and agreed to enter into a
new lease agreement with her wherein she would only be required to pay $16,000.00 per month to
Atid after she expressed to Biderman her inability to pay the amount required per month in the
original lease agreement. The new agreement also allowed for Cohen to list and try to sell the
property. Cross Claimants relied upon the truthfulness of all representations, which Cross
136. That, following the signing of this revised lease agreement, Cohen paid to Atid
137. That, eventually Cohen stopped making any payments to Atid at which time
Biderman terminated the lease. At the time of the termination, Cohen owed to Atid approximately
138. Further, that after being notified of the lease termination, Cohen caused damage to
the property and collected rent from the residential rentals of the property and failed to turn any of
139. That Atid has suffered actual damages in excess of $100,000.00 due to Cohen’s
negligent actions.
140. Cross Claimants reallege each and every allegation contained in Paragraphs 1
15
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141. That on May 30, 2016, Cohen by and through her company Diverge Construction
& Management Group, LLC signed a commercial lease agreement with Atid for the recently
purchase property located at 600 Chester Street, Myrtle Beach, SC 29577 wherein Cohen agreed
142. That on November 1, 2016, Biderman met with Cohen and agreed to enter into a
new lease agreement with her wherein she would only be required to pay $16,000.00 per month to
Atid after she expressed to Biderman her inability to pay the amount required per month in the
original lease agreement. The new agreement also allowed for Cohen to list and try to sell the
property. Cross Claimants relied upon the truthfulness of all representations, which Cross
143. That, following the signing of this revised lease agreement, Cohen paid to Atid
144. That, eventually Cohen stopped making any payments to Atid at which time
Biderman terminated the lease. At the time of the termination, Cohen owed to Atid approximately
145. That, at some point during this time period, Cohen disappeared for a few months
and, during that time, neglected the property and tenants and failed to timely pay the insurance,
thereby causing the policy to lapse. During the period of time when the policy had lapsed the
property was badly damaged by a hurricane and Atid was required to pay for the costly repairs.
146. Further, that after being notified of the lease termination, Cohen caused damage to
the property and collected rent from the residential rentals of the property and failed to turn any of
16
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147. That Atid has suffered actual damages in excess of $100,000.00 due to Cohen’s
negligent actions.
WHEREFORE having fully responded to the Second Amended Complaint and having
fully plead in the Cross Claims, Defendants and Cross Claimants would pray that:
a. This Court inquire into the matters set forth herein and grant to Cross Claimants the
c. That Cross Claimants be awarded costs and attorneys’ fees in an order and
e. That the Court award to Cross Claimants any such further relief as this Court may
s/Thomas C. Brittain
Thomas C. Brittain, Esq. (SC Bar#893)
4614 Oleander Drive
Myrtle Beach, SC 29577
(843) 449-8562
(843) 497-6124 (fax)
Attorney for Defendants and Cross Claimants
Atid Properties, LLC, Friends of LBS, LLC,
Sarah Ginsburg and Jacob Biderman
17
Motion to Void Sale - Page 0103
/
STATE OF soum CAROLINA ) IN TIlE PROBATE COURT
) FIFTEENTII JODICIAL CIRCUIT
COUN'rY OFHOltRy ) CASE NO. 2014-ES-26-01933
)
~
Estate ofPeggyJQ Hardee Rabon,
MOTION FOR OlIDER S:E;CUlUNG·
Petitioner; ) PROPER PERFORM.AN'.CEOF
) PERSONALREPRESENr.ATIVE'S
VB. ) DUT:mS, FORJUDICIALLY OJ.IDEIDm
) SALE OF~TATEASSETS, AND~OR
·~nMitc)i~l.l @d'KyleMitchell, ) ltMERGENcYlEXJ.lEDITED BEARING
) ... :PRIORTo.AUGPST31,.Z015
Respondents, )
)
,.Jack 1.. Rabon, Jr., both mdividually l'lS a beneficiary and interested party; and in his
official.capacityas.Personal.Representative ofthe.·Efitate of Peggy 10 Hardee RabQ~(hereinaft:er
cOlle~ti.ve~y "Personal Representative") herebymoves this Honorable Court to Order. a saleof the
The'Estate of Peggy -10 Hardee Ration ("Estate") owns 61% of the outstanding.stockof
Rabon &. Ra'bo.Q., .Inc, ("Company"). The Company has no significant assets other than real
estate. Two parcels of the Company's real estate commonly known as "BUilding Three?' and the
"Middle Lot" (collectively the "Mortgaged. Properties") are encumbered by afirst mortgage to
BB&T Bapkand a second Mortgage to West Town Bank (collectively the "Mortgages"). The
Mortgages are in foreclosure, Karon Mitchell and Kyle Mitchell (who are each beneficiaries of
the Estate) are personal guarantors. as is the Estate itself, of the promissory notes wQiyh the
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Mortgages also secure. The Mortgaged Properties are scheduled for judicial sal~se~m~
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judgment against the Company, and (2) pursuit of the personal guarantors for the deficiency.
A buyer has appeared and offered to purchase the Mortgaged Properties (along with an
adjoining property owned by the Company) for a large enough amount that BB&T and West
Town will waive their deficiency claims. Waiver of the deficiency claims is in the manifest best
interest of the Company, the Estate, the Estate's beneficiaries including Karon Mitchell and Kyle
Mitchell, and the creditors of the Estate. Proper performance of the Personal Representative's
BB&T has stated that despite the obvious benefits ofthe above-described sale, unless the
sale can be consummated before 5:00 p.m. on Friday, September 4,2015, BB&T will proceed
with the scheduled judicial sale on September 8, 2015. Upon information and belief, the result
of the judicial sale will be a large deficiency to the detriment of the Company, the Estate, the
Estate's creditors, and the Estate's beneficiaries including Karon Mitchell and Kyle Mitchell.
For reasons they have yet to explain, as of the date of this Motion Karon Mitchell and
Kyle Mitchell have not consented to the sale. Pursuant to s.C. Code Ann. § 62-3-607(a), upon
application of any interested person, the Probate Court may Order the Personal Representative to
"secure proper performance of his duty." Further, upon said application, the "matter shall be set
for hearing within ten days" S.C. Code Ann. § 62-3-607(b), which means that holding the
healing within ten days is mandatory. South Carolina Dep't of Highways & Public Transp. v.
Dickinson, 288 S.C. 189, 191 (1986) (holding that "the use of the word 'shall' in a statute means
requests that this Honorable Court set a hearing in this matter to be held not later than the tenth
day following the date of this Motion, which is Monday, August 3], 20]5. Personal
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made a party to this action and to any Order the COUlt may ss e.
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Motion to Void Sale - Page 0155
R
Page 7 of 11
The Order of this Court from February 8, 2016 is currently on appeal in the South Carolina
Court of Appeals. Defendants Karon and Kyle Mitchell moved the Court of Appeals for Leave to
File a Rule 60 Motion with this Court which was granted by the Court of Appeals on November
7, 2017. Defendants now move this Court pursuant to Rule 60, SCRCP, to vacate its order of
February 8, 2016 on the ground that the Order was procured by extrinsic fraud.
A hearing was held on February 27, 2018 at which time all parties appeared via counsel
and presented argument to this Court. No party presented testimony. After a thorough review of
the written submissions of the parties, the arguments of counsel, and the applicable law, the motion
is GRANTED and I hereby VACATE the Order of February 8, 2016 for the reasons set forth
below.
The February 8, 2016 Order at issue confirmed a mediation agreement which settled
numerous lawsuits arising from the administration of the Estate of Peggy Jo Hardee Rabon1 and
1
The Estate of Peggy Jo Hardee Rabon was opened on September 15, 2014, file number 2014-ES-
1|Page
Y
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the operation of several businesses involving the parties in Myrtle Beach, South Carolina. Plaintiff
and Defendants entered into the Mediation Settlement Agreement at issue (“Mediation
Agreement”) on October 31, 2015. If the Mediation Agreement had settled only Rabon & Rabon,
Inc. v. Karon Mitchell, et al., this Court would have denied Defendant’s Motion to Vacate.
However, the Mediation Agreement not only requires dismissal of Rabon & Rabon, Inc. v. Karon
Mitchell, et al., but it also requires dismissal of other cases, including "Rabon as Personal
probate cases.” Because Defendants asserted that allegations of fraud by Jack Rabon may have
played a part in securing the dismissal of those other actions, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion
Rabon & Rabon, Inc. v. Karon Mitchell, et al., deals exclusively with the corporation’s
accounting, and trespass by Defendants. The parties settled this lawsuit under two possible
scenarios. First, Defendants had the opportunity to own the subject properties and MB Boardwalk
Entertainment, LLC exclusively, provided they obtained financing that released Jack Rabon and
the Estate of Peggy Joe Hardy Rabon from any liability for the debt on the properties. If Defendants
failed to obtain financing within thirty (30) days, the alternate plan permitted Jack Rabon to sell
the subject properties and MB Boardwalk Entertainment, LLC to a private buyer. When
Defendants failed to obtain the necessary financing and releases under the first plan, Plaintiff,
through Jack Rabon, proceeded to implement the alternative plan. When that transpired,
26-01933. Defendant Karon Mitchell is an heir and beneficiary of the Estate of Peggy Jo Hardee
Rabon [hereinafter the “Estate”]. Defendant Kyle Mitchell is a shareholder of Plaintiff Rabon &
Rabon, Inc. Jack Rabon is currently the Personal Representative for the Estate and President and
Vice President of Rabon & Rabon, Inc.
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that Defendants executed it under duress. The Court found Defendants’ argument unpersuasive
and granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Settlement and denied Defendants’ Motion for Dismissal
of the Mediation Settlement Agreement on the grounds of coercion and mental distress. This
The Court reaffirms its finding that the settlement of Rabon & Rabon, Inc. v. Karon
Mitchell, et al., was not procured by fraud as now argued by Defendants. Had the Mediation
Agreement settled only Rabon & Rabon, Inc. v. Karon Mitchell, et al., this Court would deny the
Defendants’ Motion to Vacate because Defendants could have obtained exclusive ownership of
the properties under the settlement by simply refinancing the debt. The alleged fraud did not occur
until Defendants failed to exercise their right to obtain the properties and Plaintiff Jack Rabon sold
the properties under the alternative plan contained in the Mediation Agreement. However, based
on Defendants’ argument and allegations, the Court is persuaded that fraud in concealing the true
purchase price and/or value of the properties may have procured the settlement of some or all of
the other actions dismissed under the Mediation Settlement Agreement. It is for this reason that
the Court vacates the February 8, 2016 Order granting the plaintiff's Motion to Compel Settlement
and denying the defendants' Motion for Dismissal of the Mediation Settlement Agreement. The
Court’s findings contained herein are for purposes of this Order only, and none of the Court’s
findings in this Order have any preclusive consequences in any other matters pending between the
parties.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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________________________________
The Honorable Benjamin H. Culbertson
Resident Circuit Judge
Fifteenth Judicial Circuit
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