DOI: 10.1002/jhbs.

21962

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Reevaluating the initial impact of John Broadus

Watson on American psychology: The necessity
of comparative parameters

Saulo de Freitas Araujo1 | Fernando Tavares Saraiva2 |

2
Marcus Bentes de Carvalho Neto

1
Department of Psychology, Federal
University of Juiz de Fora, Juiz de Fora, Minas
Gerais, Brazil
2
Center for Behavioral Theory and Research
(CNTP) and Graduate Program in Behavioral
Theory and Research (PPGTPC), Federal
University of Pará, Belém, Pará, Brazil
Correspondence
Saulo Araujo, Federal University of Juiz de
Fora, Department of Psychology, Juiz de
Fora, Minas Gerais, Brazil.
Email: saulo.araujo@ufjf.edu.br
Funding information
National Council for Scientific and
Technological Development (CNPq);
Coordination for the Improvement of Higher
Education Personnel (CAPES)
Abstract
In recent decades, various studies have challenged the
traditional view that John Broadus Watson’s Behaviorist
Manifesto prompted a psychological revolution. However,
methodological hindrances underlie all these attempts to
evaluate the impact of Watson’s study, such as the absence
of comparative parameters. This article remedies this problem
by conducting a comparative citation analysis involving
Watson and eight other representative psychologists of the
time: J. R. Angell, H. Carr, J. M. Cattell, J. Dewey, G. S. Hall,
W. James, E. L. Thorndike, and E. B. Titchener. Eight important
American journals were scrutinized for the period between
1903 and 1923, a decade before and a decade after the
publication of Watson’s Manifesto. The results suggest that
even if Watson’s study cannot be taken as revolutionary, it had
an impact between 1914 and 1923 that was close to Dewey’s,
Titchener’s, and Thorndike’s and higher than Angell’s, Carr’s,
Cattell’s, and Hall’s, although distant from James’s. Finally,
some methodological implications of this study are discussed.

KEYWORDS
behaviorism, bibliometrics, citation analysis, history of psychology,
J. B. Watson

In the history of psychology, the year 1913 is significant. In hindsight, it can be associated with events that had an
impact on the development of scientific psychology in different countries. In Germany, for example, 107 German
philosophers signed a manifesto against the occupation of philosophy chairs by experimental psychologists, with
marked consequences for the institutionalization of German psychology (Gundlach, 2017). In France, Pierre Janet’s

J Hist Behav Sci. 2019;1–17. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/jhbs © 2019 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. | 1

2 | ARAUJO ET AL.

critique of Freudian psychoanalysis had a huge international impact and partially determined the reception and
transformation of psychoanalysis on French soil (Dagfal, 2013).
It is in the history of American psychology, however, that the year is usually celebrated. According to the
legend, it is the birth date of a new way of conceiving psychology: behaviorism (e.g., Buckley, 1989; Cohen, 1979;
Marx & Hillix, 1973; Moore, 2008). This celebration is associated with the publication of a manifesto, namely, the
article “Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It” (1913), by John Broadus Watson (1878–1958).
Above all, Watson wanted to challenge the traditional assumptions of American psychology of that period,
calling for a radical review of its subject matter and method (Wozniak, 1993). For that purpose, he built his proposal
around three central goals. First, he defended the methodological alignment of psychology with the natural
sciences: “Psychology as the behaviorist views it is a purely objective experimental branch of natural science”
(Watson, 1913, p. 158). Second, he refused the traditional definition of psychology as “the science of consciousness”
and proposed a new subject matter, namely, behavior: “… either psychology must change its viewpoint so as to take
in facts of behavior, whether or not they have bearings upon the problems of “consciousness,” or else behavior
must stand alone as a wholly separate and independent science” (p. 159). Third, he envisioned a new goal for
psychology, according to which it would promote its practical dimension, thus allowing for a direct intervention in
human affairs: “Its theoretical goal is the prediction and control of behavior” (p. 158).
Watson’s iconoclastic and combative style has been recognized and emphasized in the literature (e.g., Boakes,
1984; Buckley, 1989; Hergenhahn, 2009; Leahey, 2000; O’Donnell, 1985). Moreover, trying to put things into
context, historians of psychology have understood the Behaviorist Manifesto either against the background of
competing psychological schools of the period—such as functionalism and structuralism (e.g., Goodwin, 2005;
Hothersall, 2004; Marx & Hillix, 1973)1—or within the American culture and society of the period (e.g., Bakan,
1966; Burnham, 1960; Leahey, 2000; Morris & Todd, 1999; Pickren & Rutherford, 2010).
Following this path of contextualization, another aspect of Watson’s study is still open to debate and deserves
closer attention, namely, its actual impact on American psychology. Should Watson’s behaviorism be interpreted as
a revolutionary milestone? If not, what kind of impact did it actually have?
From a historiographical point of view, the idea that Watson’s proposal prompted a revolution in psychology
(Burnham, 1968; Gardner, 1985; Moore, 1999, 2008) can be contested on empirical and conceptual grounds. First,
if we invoke Watson’s contemporaries as historical witnesses, his behaviorism was hardly seen as truly
revolutionary even two decades after its launch (e.g., Hunter, 1923; Roback, 1923; Titchener, 1914; Woodworth,
1931). Here, Titchener’s view is paradigmatic: “My point is that Watson’s behaviorism is neither so revolutionary
nor so modern as a reader unversed in history might be led to imagine” (Titchener, 1914, p. 5). Contrary to
Watson’s intentions, so it seems, behaviorism was not received as a revolution, a radical break, by most of his
contemporaries.2
Second, it seems quite improper to apply the phrase “scientific revolution”—as a technical term used by
historians and philosophers of science (e.g., Cohen, 1985; Kuhn, 1962; Nickles, 2013)—to describe the emergence
of Watson’s behaviorism because the latter does not fulfill the basic criteria to be counted as a revolution, as
Leahey (1992) and Costall (2006), among others, have noted. Therefore, the so‐called behaviorist revolution turns
out to be a rhetorical device—or, as Leahey (2000) puts it, “a useful myth of origin” (p. 400)—rather than an
accurate conceptualization of a historical episode.3
If not as a revolution, then, how should we conceptualize the impact of Watson’s behaviorism on American
psychology? Notwithstanding the favorable scenario for the reception of his proposal, it is not clear at all whether
and how far it followed this path. At least according to his own expectations, the reception was not that fast, as he
admitted in his autobiography more than two decades later (Watson, 1936).
Authors such as Flugel (1964), Boring (1950), and Herrnstein and Boring (1966) have exalted the allegedly huge
repercussions of Watson’s proposal, followed by the rapid adherence of psychologists to it. As Boring (1950)
claimed, “for a while in the 1920s it seemed as if all America had gone behaviorist. Everyone (except the few
associated with Titchener) was a behaviorist…” (p. 645). In a similar vein, Watson’s two main biographers insisted
ARAUJO ET AL. | 3

on the instant impact of his program. Cohen (1979) speaks of an “immediate success” (p. 73), and Buckley (1989)
claims that “Watson’s declaration provoked a widespread response from social scientists and psychologists” (p. 78).
Contemporary psychology textbooks convey similar narratives: “the new behaviorism caught on rapidly, and many
younger psychologists in the United States called themselves behaviorists … it was Watson who was responsible for
behaviorism’s widespread influence” (Nolen‐Hoeksema, Fredrikson, Loftus, & Wagenaar, 2009, p. 9).
The problem with this received view is that it either lacks reliable historical sources or, at best, is based on a
selective use of them. It seems more like a retrospective story to legitimate either the success or the downfall of
behaviorism decades later, despite the fact that, in such contexts, the term “behaviorism” acquires such a broad
meaning that it becomes historically useless. Be that as it may, as Morris, Todd, Midgley, Schneider, and Johnson
(1990) have pointed out, “histories that selectively interpret the past as a justification for the inevitable fall from
favor of a particular perspective are … not uncommon in material on behaviorism” (p. 143).4
Beginning in the 1980s, new studies appeared that challenged the thesis of the generalized and immediate
impact of Watson's proposal (e.g., Coleman, 1988; García‐Penagos & Malone, 2013; Marr, 2013; Samelson, 1981,
1985; Todd, 1994; Tortosa, Delgado, & Garrído, 1991).
Samelson (1981) was the first study to present an in‐depth historical reevaluation of the reception of Watson's
ideas. Focusing on studies published in relevant journals from the period, he concluded that despite the existence of
brief debates following the publication of Watson’s Manifesto, it did not win hearts and minds in the first years. For
Samelson, “this rather detailed (though not exhaustive) account of recorded reactions to Watson stands in definite
contrast to some retrospective histories which claim or at least imply that Watson’s behaviorism … quickly swept
the field” (p. 410).5
Other studies have complemented Samelson’s qualitative approach and have equally refuted the huge and rapid
impact thesis. In this context, most of them have relied on bibliometric analyses as a methodological strategy. For
example, Coleman (1988) used references to Watson’s study in articles published in a single journal (Psychological
Review), comparing them with references to Pavlov. Tortosa et al. (1991) compared citations of Watson’s
publications in psychological journals published in two different periods, 1900–1945 and 1966–1985. Todd (1994)
analyzed handbooks and introductory textbooks of psychology to investigate how Watson’s psychological program
was presented. However, despite the merits and novelties of these studies, they lack methodological rigor: Either
the samples are not representative of the psychological production of the chosen period (e.g., Coleman, 1988; Todd,
1994) or the method is not presented in a clear way, so that it is impossible to understand how the results were
reached as well as to replicate their studies (e.g., Samelson, 1981; Tortosa et al., 1991).
Following this bibliometric tradition, Carvalho Neto, Araujo, and Silva (2015) investigated the impact of
Watson’s study on American psychology during the first decade after the publication of the Manifesto
(1913–1923). The authors tried to avoid the aforementioned methodological hindrances. Two bibliometric
analyses were carried out. In the first, the citation frequency of Watson’s Manifesto was determined for four
representative psychological journals of the time (American Journal of Psychology, Psychological Review, Psychological
Bulletin, and Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods/Journal of Philosophy). In the second, the
investigation was extended to include both Watson’s name and his other publications in the same database for
the same period. The results revealed that the Manifesto was cited 20 times during that period, with 60% of the
citations occurring in the first two years after its publication. However, it was only the third most cited item of
Watson’s publications. The most cited was Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist (1919), followed by
Behavior: An Introduction to Comparative Psychology (1914).
Although Carvalho Neto et al. (2015) introduced bibliometric parameters for assessing the impact of Watson’s
study that were more robust, the authors recognized the methodological limitations of their study. Most
importantly, it lacked clear and objective comparative parameters that could be used to evaluate the impact of a
given work. What is the meaning, for example, of a study being cited 20 times over 10 years? Is this a lot or a little?6
As a consequence, it was not possible to evaluate the impact of Watson’s study in terms that were more precise,
taking into account the broader context of the psychological publications of the time, including those of other
4 | ARAUJO ET AL.

prominent psychologists. In the end, the authors suggested three additional strategies that could be used to enrich
the obtained data: (a) a quantitative analysis of the publications of other representative psychologists, which would
serve as an external comparative parameter; (b) a qualitative citation analysis that could reveal the context, in
which the cited study appears; and (c) an extension of the analysis to other decades, so as to evaluate Watson’s
influence longitudinally.
Following Carvalho Neto et al. (2015), the goal of this study is to evaluate the impact of Watson’s study on
American psychology between 1903 and 1923, implementing the first methodological strategy described above,
that is, comparing the citations to Watson’s study with the references to other eminent psychologists of that time.

1 | METHOD

Bibliometrics, scientometrics, and informetrics are general terms used by information scientists to refer to the
measurement and evaluation of literary and scientific output and communication (e.g., Drake, 2005; Garfield, 2009;
Hood & Wilson, 2001; Moed, 2017; Todeschini & Baccini, 2016; Vinkler, 2010). Among the many tools for such
measurement, citation analysis has been widely used in different contexts and disciplines (e.g., Ardanuy, 2013;
de Bellis, 2009; Hammarfelt, 2011; Herubel & Buchanan, 1994; Lu, Ding, & Zhang, 2017; Nicolaisen, 2007; Peritz,
1992). Broadly speaking, “citation analysis is the generic expression indicating the construction of indicators by
using the number of citation as a basic information unit” (Todeschini & Baccini, 2016, p. 49). Applied to the
historiography of science, it has long been used, among other purposes, to evaluate the impact of a specific author,
text, or journal on a scientific field (e.g., de Bellis, 2009; Garfield, 2007; Herubel, 1999; Kryzhanovsky, 1988;
Scharnhorst & Garfield, 2010; Solla Price, 1965; Tejasen, 2016). In the same vein, historians of psychology have
relied on citation analysis to provide a historical account of intellectual activity and influences within the field
(e.g., Brozek, 1969a, 1969b, 1970, 1972, 1980; Carvalho Neto et al., 2015; Goodman, 1971; Simonton, 1992;
Walters, 2011).
Obviously, citation analysis also has its problems, as some critics have noted (e.g., Goldfinch & Yamamoto, 2012;
MacRoberts & MacRoberts, 1989, 2010; Phelan, 1999; Zuckerman, 1987). For example, MacRoberts and
MacRoberts (1989) claim that there is no consensus over the best way to deal with different types of citation
(self‐citation included) because simple counts do not distinguish between positive and negative citations, which may
have important implications for the historical interpretation in question. However, if used in a critical way, citation
analysis can offer the historian of psychology an invaluable tool for understanding patterns of influence and
relationship that otherwise would be invisible. It can provide the historian with a reliable measure, a starting point,
to be complemented by further analysis. As de Bellis (2009) has argued, citation analysis can supply

an additional tool for marking out the perimeter of potentially relevant sources and interpreting the
significance of their relationships. After all, before embarking on any complex interpretative job, a historian
must perform the preliminary operation of collecting all the relevant literature and trying to figure out the
genealogical connections among its units. Citation links are not the exclusive or necessarily the best possible
indicators of such relationships but, to the degree that they reflect the self‐perceived (or self‐constructed)
dependence of authors on previous study, they have to be taken into account, both for what they reveal and
for what they (intentionally or not) conceal. (p. 155)

Assuming the validity of citation analysis for historiographical purposes, we sought to evaluate the impact of
Watson’s study on American psychology, not only by quantifying the citations of his published study but also by
comparing them with citations of publications by eight other eminent psychologists of the time: Edward Bradford
Titchener (1867–1927), Edward Lee Thorndike (1874–1949), Granville Stanley Hall (1846–1924), James McKeen
Cattell (1860–1944), James Rowland Angell (1869–1949), Harvey A. Carr (1873–1954), John Dewey (1859–1952),
ARAUJO ET AL. | 5

and William James (1842–1910). These authors, besides being among the best representatives of American
psychology in the first decades of the 20th century (Annin, Boring, & Watson, 1968; Catania, 1999; Haggbloom
et al., 2002; Heidbreder, 1933; Knight, 1953; Simonton, 1992), were the target of Watson’s critique of what he
called the “old” psychology. In the specific case of Titchener, it is important to note that he published one of the first
criticisms of Watson's Manifesto (Titchener, 1914).
As a first step, we established a comparative baseline for quantifying the references to Watson and the other
eight psychologists between 1903 and 1923, a decade before and after the publication of the Manifesto, in eight
relevant journals of the time: Psychological Bulletin; Psychological Review; The American Journal of Psychology; Journal
of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods—which changed its name to Journal of Philosophy; Mind; The Monist;
The Philosophical Review; and Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society. These journals were among the main
vehicles for the publication of American psychological research at the time (Green & Feinerer, 2015, 2016, 2017;
Green, Feinerer, & Burman, 2015a; 2015b; Osier & Wozniak, 1984). Moreover, apart from its representativeness,
each journal had to be active during the whole period under investigation, which led us to exclude other important
journals, such as the Journal of Abnormal Psychology, the Journal of Educational Psychology, and the Journal of Animal
Behavior, which started in 1906, 1910, and 1911, respectively.7
Although the choice of the citation window (1903–1923) may appear arbitrary, it can be justified by its practical
advantages. First, it allows for a comparison with previous studies that used the same timeframe (e.g., Carvalho Neto et al.,
2015; Samelson, 1981). Second, it facilitates a later gradual extension of the present investigation decade by decade.
The data were collected from two electronic databases: Psycnet for Psychological Bulletin (1904–…) and
Psychological Review (1894–…), and JSTOR for The American Journal of Psychology (1887–…), Journal of Philosophy,
Psychology and Scientific Methods (1904–1920)/Journal of Philosophy (1921–…), Mind (1876–…), The Monist (1888–…),
The Philosophical Review (1892–…), and Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society (1838–2012).
For each journal, 18 keyword searches were made within the chosen citation window. The keywords were
associated with the names of the nine psychologists and their abbreviated forms: “Watson,” “J. B. W.,” “Angell,”
“J. R. A.,” “Carr,” “H. A. C.,” “Cattell,” “J. McK. C.,” “Dewey,” “J. D.,” “Hall,” “G. S. H.,” “James,” “W. J.,” “Thorndike,”
“E. L. T.,” “Titchener,” and “E. B. T.” The abbreviations were used as keywords because they appeared in many texts
at the time as a substitute for the author’s name, especially in reviews.
After the initial selection, the publications were saved to a computer for further analysis. For each one, we
checked the passage in which the keyword appeared. If the reference was to one of the nine psychologists,
the item was included as a research datum. Otherwise, it was discarded. For example, in the case of Watson
and James, we found different authors with the same surname, which led us to exclude the corresponding
items. In the end, we established nine data clusters: “Watson + J. B. W.,” “Angell + J. R. A.,” “Carr + H. A. C.,”
“Cattell + J. McK. C.,” “Dewey + J. D.,” “Hall + G. S. H.,” “James + W. J.,” “Thorndike + E. L. T.,” and
“Titchener + E. B. T.”
Only three types of publication were considered for analysis: articles, discussions (including replies,
rejoinders, comments, etc.), and reviews (book and articles reviews) with identifiable authorship.8 Even when
these reviews were not labeled as such in the journals, we included them in our analysis.9 To avoid
self‐citation count, while working on each of the nine clusters (“Watson + J. B. W.,” “Cattell + J. McK. C.,” etc.),
we excluded articles, discussions, and reviews by the author under analysis. However, when we moved to a
different cluster, we reintroduced those previously excluded publications for analysis. The other types of
publication (meeting reports, editorials, correspondence, notes, announcements, news, abstract collections,
etc.) were excluded as well. After such exclusions, the inclusion criterion was the presence, at least once in
the document, of one of the keywords of the clusters (“Watson” or “J. B. W,” and so on).
As for the data analysis, three measures were taken:

(a) Total citations: The total number of publications with at least one citation of the author under analysis; if any
publication had more than one reference to an author, only one was counted;
6 | ARAUJO ET AL.

(b) Citation rate: Average number of publications with at least one citation of the author under analysis, which was
obtained by dividing the total number of publications with citations to his study by the number of years under
consideration (1 for a year, 10 for a decade, or 21 for the whole period);
(c) Citation percentage: Number of publications with at least one citation of the author under analysis divided by
the total number of publications in all eight journals during the period under consideration (year by year, a
decade, or the whole period).

To evaluate the impact of Watson’s study, we adopted two levels of analysis. First, we compared those three
different measures for Watson at distinct moments within the 21‐year period (internal or Watson–Watson
analysis). Second, we compared them with the measures for the other eight authors (external or Watson–others
analysis). We also divided the whole period into two parts: The decades before and after the publication of the
Manifesto (1903–1912 and 1914–1923). Given the putatively revolutionary character of Watson’s study, it is
reasonable to expect an abrupt increase in the number of citations. Therefore, the decade before 1913 serves as
the baseline for a longitudinal comparison. In addition, we presented all three measures for the year 1913 alone to
facilitate the comparison (see Table 2).
As for the external analysis, citation percentages were presented year by year in three different graphs,
because to include all eight authors in the same graph would render it confused and overloaded. We then decided
to present Watson alongside the eight authors in descending order, from the highest to the lowest percentages, as
shown in Table 1. Thus, Figure 2 displays the percentages for Watson, James, and Dewey; Figure 3 for Watson,
Titchener, Thorndike, and Angell; and Figure 4 for Watson, Hall, Cattell, and Carr.

2 | RES U LTS

Considering the inclusion and exclusion criteria, we computed a total of 10,310 publications (articles, discussions,
and reviews) from all eight journals between 1903 and 1923. This number had a slight variance for each author,
depending on the number of excluded self‐authored publications. Table 1 presents the results of the three
measures for each author in the whole period, including the total number of publications considered in each case.
Table 1 shows that Watson occupies an intermediary position among all authors. His measures are higher than
those for Angell, Hall, Cattell, and Carr, but lower than those for James, Dewey, Titchener, and Thorndike. However, this
first indicator does not help us to address the central question of this study, namely, the impact of Watson’s work after
1913. For this, we need to introduce two levels of analysis (internal and external) in different periods.

T A B L E 1 Measures for each author (1903–1923)

Measures
Authors Total citations Citation rate Citation percentage
James 1,574 74.95 15.31% (out of 10,279)
Dewey 585 27.85 5.70% (out of 10,249)
Titchener 446 21.23 4.36% (out of 10,206)
Thorndike 299 14.23 2.90% (out of 10,279)
Watson 243 11.57 2.36% (out of 10,277)
Angell 173 8.23 1.68% (out of 10,288)
Hall 159 7.57 1.55% (out of 10,253)
Cattell 129 6.14 1.25% (out of 10,307)
Carr 43 2.04 0.41% (out of 10,278)
ARAUJO ET AL. | 7

2.1 | Internal analysis (Watson–Watson)

Table 2 displays the three measures for Watson in four different periods, including the specific year of the
Behaviorist Manifesto’s publication. In this way, it is possible to compare the citations of Watson’s study in the
decades before and after 1913, as well as in the whole period of analysis (1903–1923).

T A B L E 2 Measures for Watson in different periods

Measures

Periods Total citations Citation rate Citation percentage

1903–1923 243 11.57 2.36% (out of 10,277)
1903–1912 27 2.7 0.51% (out of 5,221)
1913 13 13 2.35% (out of 553)
1914–1923 203 20.3 4.50% (out of 4,503)

From a total of 243 citations in the whole period under analysis, 203 (83.54%) appeared after the Manifesto’s
publication. While in the decade before, Watson had a citation rate of 2.7 publications/year, this rate increased to
20.3 publications/year in the following decade. Watson’s citation percentage also increased from 0.51% to 4.50% in
the second decade. Thus, the first decade seems to be a reliable parameter for the following decade, indicating a
significant increase in Watson’s scores after 1913.
It is interesting to note that in 1913 alone, Watson was cited in 13 publications, which corresponds to 2.35% of
all 533 publications analyzed in that year. This is to say that within just one year, he had almost half of the citations
of the previous decade (13 compared to 27, which represents 48.14%).
Comparing Watson’s scores within different periods already shed more light on the issue of his impact on
American psychology after the Manifesto’s publication, as we see a relevant increase in his citation rates. However,
this internal analysis alone is subject to the same limitation that Carvalho Neto et al. (2015) found in their study:
Without external parameters, it is not possible to evaluate the impact of Watson’s study within the broader context
of North American psychology.
In the search for a more precise measure of such an impact, we adopted a second, external level of analysis,
comparing the citations to Watson’s study with the citations for eight eminent psychologists of the time.

2.2 | External analysis (Watson–others)

With a change in the level of analysis and division of the whole period in two parts (1903–1912 and 1914–1923),
further evidence for the impact of Watson’s study arises. For example, Table 1 shows that total citations for
Watson (243) in the 21‐year period were lower than those for James (1,574), Dewey (585), Titchener (446), and
Thorndike (299). However, if we consider only the decade after the publication of Watson’s Manifesto
(1914–1923), the difference is significantly reduced in the case of Dewey and Titchener (272 and 224, respectively,
against 203 for Watson) and even disappears in the case of Thorndike (203 for Watson against 176 for Thorndike).
Only James remains well‐above Watson in the second decade of analysis (665 against 203). These results suggest a
significant change and constitute a strong evidence for Watson’s impact.
Figure 1 offers an average citation count, a more refined measure than the mere total number of citations.
Considering both chronological periods, Watson had the highest increase in citation rates among all authors (from
2.7 to 20.3 publications/year). The difference of 17.6 points between both decades represents an increase of
651.85%.
8 | ARAUJO ET AL.

F I G U R E 1 Citation rates for Watson, Angell, Carr, Cattell, Dewey, Hall, James, Thorndike, and Titchener in two
chronological periods

It could be argued that three other authors also saw an increase in their rates between the two decades:
Titchener (from 19.3 to 22.4 publications/year, an increase of 16.06%), Thorndike (from 10.6 to 17.6, an increase of
66.03%), and Carr (from 1 to 3.1, an increase of 310%). However, for none of them was the increase as significant
as for Watson (from 2.7 to 20.3 publications/year, an increase of 651,85%). Even in the case of Carr, whose rate
jumped from 1 to 3.1 publications/year (an increase of 310%) in the second decade, this increase does not mean
much, given the low average scores. All other authors saw their rates decrease.
It is important to note that James constitutes a special case in this scenario. First, he had the highest rate during the
whole period, well above the other authors: 83.1 publications/year in the first decade and 66.5 in the second. Moreover,
even though his rate decreased by 19.97% in the second decade, it is so high in comparison to Watson’s (66.5
publications/year against 20.3) that this decrease does not mean much. It should also be noted that James was the most
cited author, despite his death in 1910. While all other authors had studies published during the whole period, James did
not. This is a very strong indicator of his influence on American psychology during the period under analysis.
The analysis of these citation rates leads us to three conclusions: (a) Comparing both chronological periods, Watson
had the highest increase of all the psychologists studied; (b) with this increase, his impact came very close to authors who
had previously had high rates; and (c) because the increase in Watson’s rates did not correlate with a decrease in the rates
of all other authors, it is not possible to infer that Watson’s higher popularity eclipsed that of other psychologists.’
Although citation rates are not the whole story. Figures 2–4 show year by year citation percentages for all nine
authors. From these figures, it is possible to evaluate the proportion of the citations of each author within a
universe of publications for each year.
Figure 2 presents the citation percentages for Watson, James, and Dewey. In the case of James, despite the
oscillations and a general decrease in his percentages for the second decade, they stand well above Watson’s
percentage in any given year. The situation is different in Dewey’s case. For the first decade, his percentages were
much higher than Watson’s, but things changed in the second decade. Watson’s percentages came close to
Dewey’s, and in 1922, his citations surpassed Dewey’s (10.21% to 3.94%). Again, this is evidence for Watson’s
growing impact on American psychology.
Figure 3 shows the year by year citation percentages for Watson, Angell, Thorndike, and Titchener. During the
first decade, Watson’s percentages were lower than those of the other authors. However, Watson’s percentages
surpassed Angell’s and came close to Thorndike’s and Titchener’s. Beginning in 1921, they became higher than
Thorndike’s, but they remained lower than Titchener’s, except for 1922, when his citations reached their peak
(10.21%) and surpassed Titchener’s (5.43%). Even considering the 2 years in which there was a reduction in
Watson's percentages, 1919 (3.54%) and 1923 (5.01%), they remained high for the whole decade. Despite the
reduction in 1919, his percentage was the same as Thorndike’s (3.54%) and higher than Titchener’s (2.08%), while
in 1923 it was higher than Thorndike’s (2.73%) and lower than Titchener’s (7.44%).
ARAUJO ET AL. | 9

FIGURE 2 Year by year citation percentages for Watson, Dewey, and James

FIGURE 3 Year by year citation percentages for Watson, Angell, Thorndike, and Titchener

Comparing Titchener’s percentages with Watson’s is a good way to visualize the impact of Watson’s study on
American psychology in the second decade of our study. After 1913, Watson’s percentages surpassed Titchener’s
twice (1919 and 1922), something that had never happened before. Moreover, in the remaining years of that
decade, although they were lower than Titchener’s, the difference was small (<2.5%). This shows that although
Titchener was influential throughout the 21‐year period under analysis, his impact did not change in any significant
way between the two decades. By contrast, Watson’s percentages were low in the first decade and increased
significantly in the second, coming close to and even surpassing Titchener’s.
Thorndike’s percentages also offer an interesting comparative parameter to evaluate the impact of Watson’s study.
During the first decade, they were always higher than Watson’s. In the second, although they also increased like Watson’s,
they did not maintain the proportional distance of the first decade. In other words, Watson’s percentages not only
increased but also did so by a greater amount than Thorndike’s, coming to surpass them significantly after 1920.
10 | ARAUJO ET AL.

Finally, Figure 4 presents the citation percentages for Watson, Carr, Cattell, and Hall. Here, there is something
new. In the first decade, Watson’s percentages were not significantly different from those of the others. However,
after 1913, the substantial increase in his percentages led to an unprecedented result: They surpassed those of all
three authors for the remaining years of that decade. In this case, both Cattell’s and Hall’s citation percentages
offer good comparative parameters. They did not change significantly between the two decades, showing a certain
level of influence of their study on American psychology. However, after 1913, Watson’s percentages increased so
significantly that they came to surpass by far the percentages of both Cattell and Hall.

FIGURE 4 Year by year citation percentages for Watson, Carr, Cattell, and Hall

3 | D IS C U S S IO N

In what sense can this study contribute to assessing the impact of Watson’s study on American psychology? We
believe that by introducing the above‐mentioned comparative parameters, we have reached a more reliable
measure of that impact in the first two decades of the 20th century, which allows us to review some old theses,
sometimes corroborating them, sometimes refuting them.
With regard to the thesis of a rapid and generalized adherence to Watson’s behaviorism, as defended by
Boring (1950) and others, our results do not corroborate it at all. A cursory analysis, taking into account only the
internal measures of Watson’s study during the same period, might suggest the idea of an immediate acceptance
by psychologists. However, the introduction of external comparative parameters allows for a refutation of that
very idea. Despite the significant increase in Watson’s citations (total citations, citation rate, and citation
percentage) after 1913, they are not higher than Titchener’s, James’s, or Dewey’s—who were among the best
representatives of American psychology at the time. Therefore, Watson’s increasing popularity did not change
the prestige of authors such as James, Dewey, and Titchener. In this sense, our results reinforce the thesis
defended by Carvalho Neto et al. (2015), according to which there seems to be a middle ground between Boring,
for whom “in the 1920s it seemed as if all America had gone behaviorist” (Boring, 1950, p. 645), and Samelson,
who did not find “any contemporary evidence for the conversion of a single individual to Watson’s position”
(Samelson, 1974, p. 404).
ARAUJO ET AL. | 11

The importance of external comparative parameters becomes still more visible in the case of Titchener. One
might be tempted to argue, based solely on the analysis of Watson’s citations, that after 1913, structuralism was no
longer a representative school in American psychology. However, our results indicate that there is no sign of any
weakening, because Titchener's citation patterns are very similar and relatively constant for both decades.
Therefore, it is not possible to infer a decline in his influence during the period under analysis, despite the evident
increase of Watson’s influence.
Samelson (1981) defends two general theses: (a) The initial reactions to Watson’s behaviorism were more often
criticisms or just partial acceptance, and (b) there was no immediate weakening of introspection as a method or of
mentalist vocabulary in the psychological literature after the publication of Watson’s Manifesto (pp. 400–413).
However, Samelson’s qualitative analysis was based on the selective use of sources. In this sense, our quantitative
approach allows us to complement and discuss Samelson’s theses. Our results reveal that, after 1913, the
references to Watson’s study changed abruptly and significantly, which indicates an immediate impact. It is worth
remembering that Watson’s citations (in all three measures) come very close to those of some of the best
representatives of American psychology in the second decade of the 20th century. At the very least, we can say
that Watson’s impact was as significant as was theirs. We concur with Samelson, though, that this does not mean a
generalized acceptance of behaviorism, as Boring and others have suggested. In addition, our results reinforce
Samelson’s second thesis, according to which references to introspection (in whatever form) and mental processes
were still very influential after 1913. In fact, the increase in Watson’s citations does not correlate with a decrease in
the citations of authors who were sympathetic to some form of introspection, such as James and Titchener.10
Tortosa et al. (1991) claim that Watson’s behaviorism never became hegemonic in American psychology, so that his
proposals cannot be considered an example of revolutionary change in psychology. Our results corroborate this thesis
as well, at least for the first 10 years after the publication of the Manifesto. In fact, citations of works by Dewey, James,
and Titchener remain not only high but also, in general, above the citations of Watson during the second decade. In this
context, it seems more appropriate to speak of the emergence of a new framework for psychology, which, at least in its
first decade, represented one among many possible ways of doing psychology in America.
In sum, the introduction of external comparative parameters, which were so far absent in the literature,
revealed a new, more reliable measure of Watson’s impact on American psychology. It is impossible to deny that,
after 1913, the citations to Watson’s study increased abruptly, indicating an immediate and significant impact.
However, in light of the comparative parameters, such an impact must be qualified, because Watson’s citations
during the second decade remained below those of prominent psychologists such as James, Titchener, and Dewey,
indicating the persistence of different and simultaneous trends in American psychology.

3.1 | Final remarks

The present study allows us to conclude two things. First, it is difficult to maintain the thesis that the Behaviorist
Manifesto marked a revolutionary milestone in the history of American psychology. As a technical term used in
both the history and philosophy of science, “scientific revolution” does not apply, as Leahey (1992) had already
shown. Second, it is possible to affirm that, despite not being revolutionary, Watson’s study had a significant impact
on American psychology immediately after 1913, as revealed by the comparative parameters introduced in our
analysis. However, in no way did his study find generalized acceptance nor was it hegemonic, because authors such
as James, Dewey, and Titchener continued to be cited at rates above Watson’s.
In spite of bringing a new tool to evaluate the impact of Watson’s study on American psychology, our study has
limitations that may affect our interpretation. For instance, we scrutinized only eight journals. It should be noted
that, after the first decade of the 20th century, many specialty psychology journals appeared on the American
scene, serving as new vehicles for psychologists to publish and to be cited.11 Thus, it may be the case that other
citation patterns arise when these journals are taken into account. However, because most of them did not appear
before the second decade of the 20th century, it would not be possible to form a baseline for the decade before the
12 | ARAUJO ET AL.

Manifesto’s publication, in which case the new citation patterns would have to serve a different purpose than ours
in this study. In any case, taking these journals into account would demand the creation of new bibliometric
measures and more sophisticated comparative analyses to compensate for the asymmetry in the databases, thus
opening up new possibilities for citation analysis in the historiography of psychology.
In addition, we did not discriminate between the citation of the individual studies of each author, nor did we
qualify each citation within its context, to evaluate, for example, the content being cited, the function (combative,
rhetorical, etc.), or the tone (positive or negative) of the citation. Doing so could be useful in two ways: First, many
references to James and Titchener may indicate a superficial mention of introductory psychology textbooks, rather
than a theoretical affiliation to their respective views. Titchener’s textbooks on experimental psychology, for
example, were widely used in psychology courses during the first two decades of the 20th century (Larson &
Sullivan, 1965). Moreover, in the case of James and Dewey, it is necessary to consider that the citations of their
respective studies oscillated between philosophy and psychology, so it would be interesting to separate these two
dimensions of their influence, thus correcting a potential bias in our interpretation. After all, it may be the case that
many references were made to James’s philosophy, but not to his psychology, in which case his impact on American
psychology would have to be reframed. The same goes for Dewey.
As for a qualitative analysis of the citations, this would bring a deeper understanding of the citation context,
allowing for a precise determination of their content, function, and tone. In this way, the nature of the impact of
each author would be better understood. Categorizing each reference to Watson, for example, would enable an
evaluation of Samelson’s (1981) claim, according to which those citations were “more often criticisms or partial
acceptance” (p. 420) of Watson’s ideas.
Therefore, our results suggest the need for further comparative parameters to achieve a more refined
evaluation of Watson’s impact. In this sense, suggestions by Carvalho Neto et al. (2015) regarding the introduction
of longitudinal studies (e.g., decade by decade) and qualitative analysis of the citations seem appropriate and
relevant. It is necessary to go beyond bibliometrics.

A C K N O W L E D GM E N T S

We thank two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article as well as the National
Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq) and the Coordination for the Improvement of Higher
Education Personnel (CAPES) for financial support.

E ND NO T ES

1
Despite its didactic advantages, this traditional historical narrative, based on schools of thought, introduced by
Woodworth (1931) and Heidbreder (1933), offers a simplified picture of psychology’s development in America, as recent
studies have shown (e.g., Green, Feinerer, & Burman, 2013, 2014, 2015a, 2015b). The central problem is that “much is
left out, such as the several traditions of psychological research that did not belong historically to any of those schools”
(Carvalho Neto, Araujo, & Silva, 2015, p. 438).
2
Samelson (1981) adds that “none of the autobiographies of prominent psychologists of the period have marked
(Watson’s Manifesto) as a red letter day” (p. 400). It is interesting to note that the first generation of historians of
American psychology, being closer to the historical events, did not consider the advent of behaviorism as a revolution,
either. Instead, they recognized many similarities and a certain continuity between Watson’s ideas and previous
psychological approaches, such as functionalism (e.g., Boring, 1929; Heidbreder, 1933; Murphy, 1929; Wood-
worth, 1931).
3
Since at least the 18th century, the search for a formula for a scientific psychology aligned with the natural sciences has
been a common feature among different stripes of psychologists, notwithstanding the discrepancies in their
understanding of how that relationship should be framed (Araujo, 2016; Hatfield, 1990; Sturm, 2009). Therefore, the
mere proposal of a new program for scientific psychology is not a sufficient criterion to justify the particularity of
Watson’s program.
ARAUJO ET AL. | 13

4
Samelson (1974) was one of the first to criticize this use of history by psychologists. Although his focus was the creation
of myths of origin in social psychology, the model he was attacking can be found in different historical accounts of
psychology to this day: “A quick survey of a dozen texts and articles in the history of psychology produces a similar
result; their bibliographies show no awareness of the field of history of science, except for a few, which refer to outdated
studies with an occasional passing reference to Kuhn's (1962) “revolutions” and “paradigms” thrown in for
up‐to‐dateness. Typically, their presentation of history, conceived as a mix of doxographic and biographic chronicle,
starts without any discussion of what the problems of history and history‐writing are” (Samelson, 1974, p. 223).
Samelson’s diagnostic is in line with Brush’s (1974) more general statement about the inevitable tension that exists
between professional and textbook histories of science. In the historiography of psychology, Ash (1983) and Danziger
(1994), among others, have called attention to this tension and recent debates about the nature of a professional history
of psychology show that there is no easy way to define the field (e.g., Araujo, 2017a, 2017b; Brock, 2017a, 2017b;
Burman, 2017; Danziger, 2013; Lovett, 2017; Robinson, 2013a, 2013b; Teo, 2013; Watrin, 2017). The central point here,
so it seems, is to avoid the pitfalls of what Butterfield (1931) called “the Whig interpretation of history.”
5
It should be noted, however, that despite his opposition to Boring’s thesis, Samelson was very optimistic about using
Kuhn’s ideas to interpret the advent of behaviorism, especially the concept of a paradigm shift: “Such a shift did occur in,
I believe, a fundamental way. It is most visible in the manner psychologists described their methods of observation. In the
earlier phase, we find again and again the statement that the introspective method constitutes direct and immediate
contact with the subject matter, while what we now mean by objective observation was then only an indirect or mediate
one. After the revolution, the meanings are reversed: objective observation is the direct contact, while information
obtained through introspection, if not altogether impossible or irrelevant, is at best indirect, a tenuous base for fragile
inferences from questionable verbal reports” (Samelson, 1981, p. 415). For Samelson, then, the revolution did happen,
but it was not rapid and immediate.
6
Madden (2013), for example, using the number of references to the Behaviorist Manifesto in Google Scholar, identified
2,406 citations. But what does this absolute number mean in historical terms? Is this a lot or a little? Without
comparative parameters, it is difficult, if not impossible, to know.
7
Although there were two exceptions: the Psychological Bulletin and the Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific
Methods, which started in 1904; however, given their representativeness, we decided to include them in our study.
8
At the time, the publication of anonymous or unauthored reviews was not unusual; these were excluded from our
analysis.
9
For example, reviews appeared as “New Books” in Mind and as “Summaries of Articles” in Philosophical Review.
10
We are not endorsing here a radical opposition between behaviorism and introspection, as Watson tried to establish
(Watson, 1913). Indeed, things are much more complicated (e.g., Araujo & Souza, 2016; Costall, 2006, 2013; Feest, 2014;
Kroker, 2003; Young, 2013). Our goal here is just to reinforce Samelson’s thesis with citation analysis data that were not
available to him. In other words, to say that citations of authors who used introspection did not decrease with the
increase of citations of Watson does not imply a dichotomy between behaviorism and introspection.
11
We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for bringing this point to our attention.

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ARAUJO ET AL. | 17

A U T H O R’ S B IOG RA P HIE S

Saulo de Freitas Araujo is Professor of the History and Philosophy of Psychology at the Federal University of Juiz
de Fora (Brazil), Department of Psychology. He is also director of the NUHFIP (Wilhelm Wundt Center for the
History and Philosophy of Psychology) at the same institution. His research is primarily concerned with the history
and philosophy of scientific psychology. Among other publications, he is the author of Wundt and the philosophical
foundations of psychology: A reappraisal (Springer, 2016).

Fernando Tavares Saraiva is a Ph.D. student in the Graduate Program in Behavioral Theory and Research
(PPGTPC) at the Federal University of Pará (Brazil). His research is primarily concerned with the history of
psychology and behaviorism.

Marcus Bentes de Carvalho Neto is Professor of Behavior Analysis at the Federal University of Pará (Brazil),
Center for Behavioral Theory and Research (NTPC). He is also director of the Graduate Program in Behavioral
Theory and Research (PPGTPC) at the same institution. His research is primarily concerned with the history and
theoretical foundations of behavior analysis.

How to cite this article: Araujo SdF, Saraiva FT, Carvalho Neto MBd. Reevaluating the initial impact of John
Broadus Watson on American psychology: The necessity of comparative parameters. J Hist Behav Sci.
2019;1–17. https://doi.org/10.1002/jhbs.21962