Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S.

814
May 10, 1880

"No legislature can bargain away the public health or the public morals."

Facts:
In 1867, the provisional state legislature of Mississippi chartered the Mississippi
Agricultural, Educational, and Manufacturing Aid Society. The Society was chartered to
run a lottery for the next 25 years; however, in 1868, a new constitution ratified by the
people outlawed lotteries in the state. John Stone and others associated with the Society
were arrested in 1874 for running a lottery. The Society claimed they were protected by
the provisions of their charter while the state declared that the subsequent enforcement
legislation had repealed the grant.

ISSUE:
W/N Mississippi violate the Contract Clause by repealing the Society's grant

HELD:
A unanimous Court found that the Mississippi classification of lotteries as outlawed
acts was valid. The State legislature do not have the power to bind the decisions of the
people and future legislatures. The Court stated that no legislation had the authority to
bargain away the public health and morals. The Court viewed the lottery as a vice that
threatened the public health and morals. The contracts protected in the Constitution are
property rights, not governmental rights. Therefore, one can only obtain temporary
suspension of the governmental rights (in this case, the right to outlaw actions) in a charter
which can be revoked by the will of the people.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs CARMEN M. VDA. DE CASTELLVI, ET AL.,

G.R. No. L-20620 August 15, 1974

FACTS:
After the owner of a parcel of land that has been rented and occupied by the
government in 1947 refused to extend the lease, the latter commenced expropriation
proceedings in 1959. During the assessment of just compensation, the government
argued that it had taken the property when the contract of lease commenced and not
when the proceedings begun. The owner maintains that the disputed land was not taken
when the government commenced to occupy the said land as lessee because the
essential elements of the “taking” of property under the power of eminent domain, namely
(1) entrance and occupation by condemnor upon the private property for more than a
momentary period, and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner
and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property, are not present.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the taking of property has taken place when the condemnor has
entered and occupied the property as lesse.

HELD:
No, the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation proceedings
commenced in 1959.

The essential elements of the taking are: (1) Expropriator must enter a private
property, (2) for more than a momentary period, (3) and under warrant of legal authority,
(4) devoting it to public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting
it in such a way as (5) substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial
enjoyment thereof.

In the case at bar, these elements were not present when the government entered
and occupied the property under a contract of lease.