Republic of the Philippines the "Regional Contest" in seven different regions.
The winning stubs of
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19650 September 29, 1966
CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE POSTMASTER
GENERAL, respondent-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent and appellant.
Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioner and appellee.
CASTRO, J.:
In the year 1960 the Caltex (Philippines) Inc. (hereinafter referred to as
Caltex) conceived and laid the groundwork for a promotional scheme
calculated to drum up patronage for its oil products. Denominated "Caltex
Hooded Pump Contest", it calls for participants therein to estimate the
actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will
dispense during a specified period. Employees of the Caltex (Philippines)
Inc., its dealers and its advertising agency, and their immediate families
excepted, participation is to be open indiscriminately to all "motor vehicle
owners and/or licensed drivers". For the privilege to participate, no fee or
consideration is required to be paid, no purchase of Caltex products
required to be made. Entry forms are to be made available upon request
at each Caltex station where a sealed can will be provided for the deposit
of accomplished entry stubs.
A three-staged winner selection system is envisioned. At the station level,
called "Dealer Contest", the contestant whose estimate is closest to the
actual number of liters dispensed by the hooded pump thereat is to be
awarded the first prize; the next closest, the second; and the next, the
third. Prizes at this level consist of a 3-burner kerosene stove for first; a
thermos bottle and a Ray-O-Vac hunter lantern for second; and an
Everready Magnet-lite flashlight with batteries and a screwdriver set for
third. The first-prize winner in each station will then be qualified to join in
the qualified contestants in each region will be deposited in a sealed can
from which the first-prize, second-prize and third-prize winners of that
region will be drawn. The regional first-prize winners will be entitled to
make a three-day all-expenses-paid round trip to Manila, accompanied by
their respective Caltex dealers, in order to take part in the "National
Contest". The regional second-prize and third-prize winners will receive
cash prizes of P500 and P300, respectively. At the national level, the
stubs of the seven regional first-prize winners will be placed inside a
sealed can from which the drawing for the final first-prize, second-prize
and third-prize winners will be made. Cash prizes in store for winners at
this final stage are: P3,000 for first; P2,000 for second; Pl,500 for third;
and P650 as consolation prize for each of the remaining four participants.
Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media
for publicizing the contest but also for the transmission of
communications relative thereto, representations were made by Caltex
with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for
mailing, having in view sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 of the Revised
Administrative Code, the pertinent provisions of which read as follows:
SECTION 1954. Absolutely non-mailable matter. — No matter
belonging to any of the following classes, whether sealed as first-
class matter or not, shall be imported into the Philippines through
the mails, or to be deposited in or carried by the mails of the
Philippines, or be delivered to its addressee by any officer or
employee of the Bureau of Posts:
Written or printed matter in any form advertising, describing, or in
any manner pertaining to, or conveying or purporting to convey
any information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar
scheme depending in whole or in part upon lot or chance, or any
scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining any money or
property of any kind by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises.
"SECTION 1982. Fraud orders.—Upon satisfactory evidence that
any person or company is engaged in conducting any lottery, gift
enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real
or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind, or that
any person or company is conducting any scheme, device, or
enterprise for obtaining money or property of any kind through the
mails by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations,
or promises, the Director of Posts may instruct any postmaster or
 other officer or employee of the Bureau to return to the person,
depositing the same in the mails, with the word "fraudulent"
plainly written or stamped upon the outside cover thereof, any
mail matter of whatever class mailed by or addressed to such
person or company or the representative or agent of such person
or company.
SECTION 1983. Deprivation of use of money order system and
telegraphic transfer service.—The Director of Posts may, upon
evidence satisfactory to him that any person or company is
engaged in conducting any lottery, gift enterprise or scheme for
the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by
lot, chance, or drawing of any kind, or that any person or
company is conducting any scheme, device, or enterprise for
obtaining money or property of any kind through the mails by
means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promise, forbid the issue or payment by any postmaster of any
postal money order or telegraphic transfer to said person or
company or to the agent of any such person or company, whether
such agent is acting as an individual or as a firm, bank,
corporation, or association of any kind, and may provide by
regulation for the return to the remitters of the sums named in
money orders or telegraphic transfers drawn in favor of such
person or company or its agent.
The overtures were later formalized in a letter to the Postmaster General,
dated October 31, 1960, in which the Caltex, thru counsel, enclosed a
copy of the contest rules and endeavored to justify its position that the
contest does not violate the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law.
Unimpressed, the then Acting Postmaster General opined that the
scheme falls within the purview of the provisions aforesaid and declined
to grant the requested clearance. In its counsel's letter of December 7,
1960, Caltex sought a reconsideration of the foregoing stand, stressing
that there being involved no consideration in the part of any contestant,
the contest was not, under controlling authorities, condemnable as a
lottery. Relying, however, on an opinion rendered by the Secretary of
Justice on an unrelated case seven years before (Opinion 217, Series of
1953), the Postmaster General maintained his view that the contest
involves consideration, or that, if it does not, it is nevertheless a "gift
enterprise" which is equally banned by the Postal Law, and in his letter of
December 10, 1960 not only denied the use of the mails for purposes of
the proposed contest but as well threatened that if the contest was
conducted, "a fraud order will have to be issued against it (Caltex) and all
its representatives".
Caltex thereupon invoked judicial intervention by filing the present petition
for declaratory relief against Postmaster General Enrico Palomar, praying
"that judgment be rendered declaring its 'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest'
not to be violative of the Postal Law, and ordering respondent to allow
petitioner the use of the mails to bring the contest to the attention of the
public". After issues were joined and upon the respective memoranda of
the parties, the trial court rendered judgment as follows:
In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court holds that the
proposed 'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest' announced to be
conducted by the petitioner under the rules marked as Annex B of
the petitioner does not violate the Postal Law and the respondent
has no right to bar the public distribution of said rules by the
mails.
The respondent appealed.
The parties are now before us, arrayed against each other upon two
basic issues: first, whether the petition states a sufficient cause of action
for declaratory relief; and second, whether the proposed "Caltex Hooded
Pump Contest" violates the Postal Law. We shall take these up in
seriatim.
1. By express mandate of section 1 of Rule 66 of the old Rules of Court,
which was the applicable legal basis for the remedy at the time it was
invoked, declaratory relief is available to any person "whose rights are
affected by a statute . . . to determine any question of construction or
validity arising under the . . . statute and for a declaration of his rights
thereunder" (now section 1, Rule 64, Revised Rules of Court). In
amplification, this Court, conformably to established jurisprudence on the
matter, laid down certain conditions sine qua non therefor, to wit: (1)
there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be
between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking
declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4)
the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination (Tolentino vs.
The Board of Accountancy, et al., G.R. No. L-3062, September 28, 1951;
Delumen, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, 50 O.G., No. 2, pp. 576,
578-579; Edades vs. Edades, et al., G.R. No. L-8964, July 31, 1956). The
gravamen of the appellant's stand being that the petition herein states no
sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief, our duty is to assay the
factual bases thereof upon the foregoing crucible.
As we look in retrospect at the incidents that generated the present
controversy, a number of significant points stand out in bold relief. The
appellee (Caltex), as a business enterprise of some consequence,
concededly has the unquestioned right to exploit every legitimate means,
and to avail of all appropriate media to advertise and stimulate increased
patronage for its products. In contrast, the appellant, as the authority
charged with the enforcement of the Postal Law, admittedly has the
power and the duty to suppress transgressions thereof — particularly thru
the issuance of fraud orders, under Sections 1982 and 1983 of the
Revised Administrative Code, against legally non-mailable schemes.
Obviously pursuing its right aforesaid, the appellee laid out plans for the
sales promotion scheme hereinbefore detailed. To forestall possible
difficulties in the dissemination of information thereon thru the mails,
amongst other media, it was found expedient to request the appellant for
an advance clearance therefor. However, likewise by virtue of his
jurisdiction in the premises and construing the pertinent provisions of the
Postal Law, the appellant saw a violation thereof in the proposed scheme
and accordingly declined the request. A point of difference as to the
correct construction to be given to the applicable statute was thus
reached. Communications in which the parties expounded on their
respective theories were exchanged. The confidence with which the
appellee insisted upon its position was matched only by the obstinacy
with which the appellant stood his ground. And this impasse was
climaxed by the appellant's open warning to the appellee that if the
proposed contest was "conducted, a fraud order will have to be issued
against it and all its representatives."
Against this backdrop, the stage was indeed set for the remedy prayed
for. The appellee's insistent assertion of its claim to the use of the mails
for its proposed contest, and the challenge thereto and consequent denial
by the appellant of the privilege demanded, undoubtedly spawned a live
controversy. The justiciability of the dispute cannot be gainsaid. There is
an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right on one side and a denial
thereof on the other, concerning a real — not a mere theoretical —
question or issue. The contenders are as real as their interests are
substantial. To the appellee, the uncertainty occasioned by the
divergence of views on the issue of construction hampers or disturbs its
freedom to enhance its business. To the appellant, the suppression of the
appellee's proposed contest believed to transgress a law he has sworn to
uphold and enforce is an unavoidable duty. With the appellee's bent to
hold the contest and the appellant's threat to issue a fraud order therefor
if carried out, the contenders are confronted by the ominous shadow of
an imminent and inevitable litigation unless their differences are settled
and stabilized by a tranquilizing declaration (Pablo y Sen, et al. vs.
Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-6868, April 30, 1955). And,
contrary to the insinuation of the appellant, the time is long past when it
can rightly be said that merely the appellee's "desires are thwarted by its
own doubts, or by the fears of others" — which admittedly does not
confer a cause of action. Doubt, if any there was, has ripened into a
justiciable controversy when, as in the case at bar, it was translated into a
positive claim of right which is actually contested (III Moran, Comments
on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., pp. 132-133, citing: Woodward vs. Fox
West Coast Theaters, 36 Ariz., 251, 284 Pac. 350).
We cannot hospitably entertain the appellant's pretense that there is here
no question of construction because the said appellant "simply applied
the clear provisions of the law to a given set of facts as embodied in the
rules of the contest", hence, there is no room for declaratory relief. The
infirmity of this pose lies in the fact that it proceeds from the assumption
that, if the circumstances here presented, the construction of the legal
provisions can be divorced from the matter of their application to the
appellee's contest. This is not feasible. Construction, verily, is the art or
process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the
authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where
that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact
that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law (Black,
Interpretation of Laws, p. 1). This is precisely the case here. Whether or
not the scheme proposed by the appellee is within the coverage of the
prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law inescapably requires an inquiry
into the intended meaning of the words used therein. To our mind, this is
as much a question of construction or interpretation as any other.
Nor is it accurate to say, as the appellant intimates, that a
pronouncement on the matter at hand can amount to nothing more than
an advisory opinion the handing down of which is anathema to a
declaratory relief action. Of course, no breach of the Postal Law has as
yet been committed. Yet, the disagreement over the construction thereof
is no longer nebulous or contingent. It has taken a fixed and final shape,
presenting clearly defined legal issues susceptible of immediate
resolution. With the battle lines drawn, in a manner of speaking, the
propriety — nay, the necessity — of setting the dispute at rest before it
accumulates the asperity distemper, animosity, passion and violence of a
full-blown battle which looms ahead (III Moran, Comments on the Rules
of Court, 1963 ed., p. 132 and cases cited), cannot but be conceded.
Paraphrasing the language in Zeitlin vs. Arnebergh 59 Cal., 2d., 901, 31
Cal. Rptr., 800, 383 P. 2d., 152, cited in 22 Am. Jur., 2d., p. 869, to deny
declaratory relief to the appellee in the situation into which it has been
cast, would be to force it to choose between undesirable alternatives. If it
cannot obtain a final and definitive pronouncement as to whether the anti-
lottery provisions of the Postal Law apply to its proposed contest, it would
be faced with these choices: If it launches the contest and uses the mails
for purposes thereof, it not only incurs the risk, but is also actually
threatened with the certain imposition, of a fraud order with its
concomitant stigma which may attach even if the appellee will eventually
be vindicated; if it abandons the contest, it becomes a self-appointed
censor, or permits the appellant to put into effect a virtual fiat of previous
censorship which is constitutionally unwarranted. As we weigh these
considerations in one equation and in the spirit of liberality with which the
Rules of Court are to be interpreted in order to promote their object
(section 1, Rule 1, Revised Rules of Court) — which, in the instant case,
is to settle, and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect
to, rights and duties under a law — we can see in the present case any
imposition upon our jurisdiction or any futility or prematurity in our
intervention.
The appellant, we apprehend, underrates the force and binding effect of
the ruling we hand down in this case if he believes that it will not have the
final and pacifying function that a declaratory judgment is calculated to
subserve. At the very least, the appellant will be bound. But more than
this, he obviously overlooks that in this jurisdiction, "Judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the law shall form a part of the legal system"
(Article 8, Civil Code of the Philippines). In effect, judicial decisions
assume the same authority as the statute itself and, until authoritatively
abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable,
the criteria which must control the actuations not only of those called
upon to abide thereby but also of those in duty bound to enforce
obedience thereto. Accordingly, we entertain no misgivings that our
resolution of this case will terminate the controversy at hand.
It is not amiss to point out at this juncture that the conclusion we have
herein just reached is not without precedent. In Liberty Calendar Co. vs.
Cohen, 19 N.J., 399, 117 A. 2d., 487, where a corporation engaged in
promotional advertising was advised by the county prosecutor that its
proposed sales promotion plan had the characteristics of a lottery, and
that if such sales promotion were conducted, the corporation would be
subject to criminal prosecution, it was held that the corporation was
entitled to maintain a declaratory relief action against the county
prosecutor to determine the legality of its sales promotion plan. In pari
materia, see also: Bunis vs. Conway, 17 App. Div. 2d., 207, 234 N.Y.S.
2d., 435; Zeitlin vs. Arnebergh, supra; Thrillo, Inc. vs. Scott, 15 N.J.
Super. 124, 82 A. 2d., 903.
In fine, we hold that the appellee has made out a case for declaratory
relief.
2. The Postal Law, chapter 52 of the Revised Administrative Code, using
almost identical terminology in sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983
thereof, supra, condemns as absolutely non-mailable, and empowers the
Postmaster General to issue fraud orders against, or otherwise deny the
use of the facilities of the postal service to, any information concerning
"any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of
any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind".
Upon these words hinges the resolution of the second issue posed in this
appeal.
Happily, this is not an altogether untrodden judicial path. As early as in
1922, in "El Debate", Inc. vs. Topacio, 44 Phil., 278, 283-284, which
significantly dwelt on the power of the postal authorities under the
abovementioned provisions of the Postal Law, this Court declared that —
While countless definitions of lottery have been attempted, the
authoritative one for this jurisdiction is that of the United States
Supreme Court, in analogous cases having to do with the power
of the United States Postmaster General, viz.: The term "lottery"
extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance,
such as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at
fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling. The three essential
elements of a lottery are: First, consideration; second, prize; and
third, chance. (Horner vs. States [1892], 147 U.S. 449; Public
Clearing House vs. Coyne [1903], 194 U.S., 497; U.S. vs. Filart
and Singson [1915], 30 Phil., 80; U.S. vs. Olsen and Marker
[1917], 36 Phil., 395; U.S. vs. Baguio [1919], 39 Phil., 962;
Valhalla Hotel Construction Company vs. Carmona, p. 233, ante.)
Unanimity there is in all quarters, and we agree, that the elements of
prize and chance are too obvious in the disputed scheme to be the
subject of contention. Consequently as the appellant himself concedes,
the field of inquiry is narrowed down to the existence of the element of
consideration therein. Respecting this matter, our task is considerably
lightened inasmuch as in the same case just cited, this Court has laid
down a definitive yard-stick in the following terms —
In respect to the last element of consideration, the law does not
condemn the gratuitous distribution of property by chance, if no
consideration is derived directly or indirectly from the party
 receiving the chance, but does condemn as criminal schemes in
which a valuable consideration of some kind is paid directly or
indirectly for the chance to draw a prize.
Reverting to the rules of the proposed contest, we are struck by the
clarity of the language in which the invitation to participate therein is
couched. Thus —
No puzzles, no rhymes? You don't need wrappers, labels or
boxtops? You don't have to buy anything? Simply estimate the
actual number of liter the Caltex gas pump with the hood at your
favorite Caltex dealer will dispense from — to —, and win
valuable prizes . . . ." .
Nowhere in the said rules is any requirement that any fee be paid, any
merchandise be bought, any service be rendered, or any value
whatsoever be given for the privilege to participate. A prospective
contestant has but to go to a Caltex station, request for the entry form
which is available on demand, and accomplish and submit the same for
the drawing of the winner. Viewed from all angles or turned inside out, the
contest fails to exhibit any discernible consideration which would brand it
as a lottery. Indeed, even as we head the stern injunction, "look beyond
the fair exterior, to the substance, in order to unmask the real element
and pernicious tendencies which the law is seeking to prevent" ("El
Debate", Inc. vs. Topacio, supra, p. 291), we find none. In our appraisal,
the scheme does not only appear to be, but actually is, a gratuitous
distribution of property by chance.
There is no point to the appellant's insistence that non-Caltex customers
who may buy Caltex products simply to win a prize would actually be
indirectly paying a consideration for the privilege to join the contest.
Perhaps this would be tenable if the purchase of any Caltex product or
the use of any Caltex service were a pre-requisite to participation. But it is
not. A contestant, it hardly needs reiterating, does not have to buy
anything or to give anything of value. 1aw phîl.nèt
Off-tangent, too, is the suggestion that the scheme, being admittedly for
sales promotion, would naturally benefit the sponsor in the way of
increased patronage by those who will be encouraged to prefer Caltex
products "if only to get the chance to draw a prize by securing entry
blanks". The required element of consideration does not consist of the
benefit derived by the proponent of the contest. The true test, as laid
down in People vs. Cardas, 28 P. 2d., 99, 137 Cal. App. (Supp.) 788, is
whether the participant pays a valuable consideration for the chance, and
not whether those conducting the enterprise receive something of value
in return for the distribution of the prize. Perspective properly oriented,
the standpoint of the contestant is all that matters, not that of the sponsor.
The following, culled from Corpus Juris Secundum, should set the matter
at rest:
The fact that the holder of the drawing expects thereby to receive,
or in fact does receive, some benefit in the way of patronage or
otherwise, as a result of the drawing; does not supply the element
of consideration. Griffith Amusement Co. vs. Morgan, Tex. Civ.
App., 98 S.W., 2d., 844" (54 C.J.S., p. 849).
Thus enlightened, we join the trial court in declaring that the "Caltex
Hooded Pump Contest" proposed by the appellee is not a lottery that may
be administratively and adversely dealt with under the Postal Law.
But it may be asked: Is it not at least a "gift enterprise, or scheme for the
distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance,
or drawing of any kind", which is equally prescribed? Incidentally, while
the appellant's brief appears to have concentrated on the issue of
consideration, this aspect of the case cannot be avoided if the remedy
here invoked is to achieve its tranquilizing effect as an instrument of both
curative and preventive justice. Recalling that the appellant's action was
predicated, amongst other bases, upon Opinion 217, Series 1953, of the
Secretary of Justice, which opined in effect that a scheme, though not a
lottery for want of consideration, may nevertheless be a gift enterprise in
which that element is not essential, the determination of whether or not
the proposed contest — wanting in consideration as we have found it to
be — is a prohibited gift enterprise, cannot be passed over sub silencio.
While an all-embracing concept of the term "gift enterprise" is yet to be
spelled out in explicit words, there appears to be a consensus among
lexicographers and standard authorities that the term is commonly
applied to a sporting artifice of under which goods are sold for their
market value but by way of inducement each purchaser is given a chance
to win a prize (54 C.J.S., 850; 34 Am. Jur., 654; Black, Law Dictionary,
4th ed., p. 817; Ballantine, Law Dictionary with Pronunciations, 2nd ed.,
p. 55; Retail Section of Chamber of Commerce of Plattsmouth vs. Kieck,
257 N.W., 493, 128 Neb. 13; Barker vs. State, 193 S.E., 605, 56 Ga.
App., 705; Bell vs. State, 37 Tenn. 507, 509, 5 Sneed, 507, 509). As thus
conceived, the term clearly cannot embrace the scheme at bar. As
already noted, there is no sale of anything to which the chance offered is
attached as an inducement to the purchaser. The contest is open to all
qualified contestants irrespective of whether or not they buy the
appellee's products.
Going a step farther, however, and assuming that the appellee's contest
can be encompassed within the broadest sweep that the term "gift
enterprise" is capable of being extended, we think that the appellant's
pose will gain no added comfort. As stated in the opinion relied upon,
rulings there are indeed holding that a gift enterprise involving an award
by chance, even in default of the element of consideration necessary to
constitute a lottery, is prohibited (E.g.: Crimes vs. States, 235 Ala 192,
178 So. 73; Russell vs. Equitable Loan & Sec. Co., 129 Ga. 154, 58 S.E.,
88; State ex rel. Stafford vs. Fox-Great Falls Theater Corporation, 132 P.
2d., 689, 694, 698, 114 Mont. 52). But this is only one side of the coin.
Equally impressive authorities declare that, like a lottery, a gift enterprise
comes within the prohibitive statutes only if it exhibits the tripartite
elements of prize, chance and consideration (E.g.: Bills vs. People, 157
P. 2d., 139, 142, 113 Colo., 326; D'Orio vs. Jacobs, 275 P. 563, 565, 151
Wash., 297; People vs. Psallis, 12 N.Y.S., 2d., 796; City and County of
Denver vs. Frueauff, 88 P., 389, 394, 39 Colo., 20, 7 L.R.A., N.S., 1131,
12 Ann. Cas., 521; 54 C.J.S., 851, citing: Barker vs. State, 193 S.E., 605,
607, 56 Ga. App., 705; 18 Words and Phrases, perm. ed., pp. 590-594).
The apparent conflict of opinions is explained by the fact that the specific
statutory provisions relied upon are not identical. In some cases, as
pointed out in 54 C.J.S., 851, the terms "lottery" and "gift enterprise" are
used interchangeably (Bills vs. People, supra); in others, the necessity for
the element of consideration or chance has been specifically eliminated
by statute. (54 C.J.S., 351-352, citing Barker vs. State, supra; State ex
rel. Stafford vs. Fox-Great Falls Theater Corporation, supra). The lesson
that we derive from this state of the pertinent jurisprudence is, therefore,
that every case must be resolved upon the particular phraseology of the
applicable statutory provision.
Taking this cue, we note that in the Postal Law, the term in question is
used in association with the word "lottery". With the meaning of lottery
settled, and consonant to the well-known principle of legal
hermeneutics noscitur a sociis — which Opinion 217 aforesaid also relied
upon although only insofar as the element of chance is concerned — it is
only logical that the term under a construction should be accorded no
other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the word
associated therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a
consideration, so also must the term "gift enterprise" be so construed.
Significantly, there is not in the law the slightest indicium of any intent to
eliminate that element of consideration from the "gift enterprise" therein
included.
This conclusion firms up in the light of the mischief sought to be remedied
by the law, resort to the determination thereof being an accepted extrinsic
aid in statutory construction. Mail fraud orders, it is axiomatic, are
designed to prevent the use of the mails as a medium for disseminating
printed matters which on grounds of public policy are declared non-
mailable. As applied to lotteries, gift enterprises and similar schemes,
justification lies in the recognized necessity to suppress their tendency to
inflame the gambling spirit and to corrupt public morals (Com. vs. Lund,
15 A. 2d., 839, 143 Pa. Super. 208). Since in gambling it is inherent that
something of value be hazarded for a chance to gain a larger amount, it
follows ineluctably that where no consideration is paid by the contestant
to participate, the reason behind the law can hardly be said to obtain. If,
as it has been held —
Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or chance does not
constitute "lottery", if it is not resorted to as a device to evade the
law and no consideration is derived, directly or indirectly, from the
party receiving the chance, gambling spirit not being cultivated or
stimulated thereby. City of Roswell vs. Jones, 67 P. 2d., 286, 41
N.M., 258." (25 Words and Phrases, perm. ed., p. 695, emphasis
supplied).
we find no obstacle in saying the same respecting a gift enterprise. In the
end, we are persuaded to hold that, under the prohibitive provisions of
the Postal Law which we have heretofore examined, gift enterprises and
similar schemes therein contemplated are condemnable only if, like
lotteries, they involve the element of consideration. Finding none in the
contest here in question, we rule that the appellee may not be denied the
use of the mails for purposes thereof.
Recapitulating, we hold that the petition herein states a sufficient cause of
action for declaratory relief, and that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest"
as described in the rules submitted by the appellee does not transgress
the provisions of the Postal Law.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. No costs.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17663 May 30, 1962
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ISAURO SANTIAGO, defendant-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.
Roces, Alidio and Ceguera for defendant-appellee.
CONCEPCION, J.:
The information herein alleges that defendant Isauro Santiago has
committed the crime of "libel" as follows:
That on or about the 5th day of October 1959, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused, for the evident purpose of
injuring the name and reputation of Arsenio H. Lacson, and of
impeaching and besmirching the latter's virtue, honesty, honor
and reputation, and with the malicious intent of exposing him to
public hatred, contempt and ridicule, did then and there wilfully,
feloniously, maliciously and publicly call said Mayor Arsenio H.
Lacson, in the course of a political speech delivered at 392
Fraternal, Quiapo, in said city, thru the medium of an amplifier
system and before a crowd of around a hundred persons, the
following, to wit: "Arsenio Hayop Lacson, pinakawalang hiyang
Alkalde, Mayor Lacson raped a woman at the Aroma Cafe and
another City Hall employee in Shellborne Hotel", which are false,
malicious and highly defamatory statements against Mayor
Arsenio H. Lacson, delivered with no good intentions or justifiable
motive, but solely for the purpose of injuring the name and
reputation of said Mayor Arsenio H. Lacson and to expose him to
public hatred, contempt and ridicule.
Defendant moved to quash this information upon the ground that the
crime charged therein is, not libel, but oral defamation, which has already
prescribed, it having been allegedly committed on October 5, 1959, or
more than six (6) months prior to the filing of the information on August
11, 1960. The Court of First Instance of Manila granted this motion and,
accordingly, quashed the information, with costs de oficio. Hence, this
appeal by the prosecution.
The only issue in this case is whether the crime charged in the
information is oral defamation, under Article 358 of the Revised Penal
Code, or libel, under Article 355, in relation to Article 353, of the same
Code. Said provisions read:
ART. 358. Slander. — Oral defamation shall be punished by
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period if it is of a serious and insulting nature; otherwise
the penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200
pesos".
ART. 355. Libel by means of writings or similar means. — A libel
committed by means of writing, printing, lithography, engraving,
radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition,
cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means, shall be
punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in
addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended
party.
ART. 353. Definition of libel. — A libel is a public and malicious
imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or
any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to
cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical
person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
The prosecution maintains that "the medium of an amplifier system", thru
which the defamatory statements imputed to the accused were allegedly
made, falls within the purview of the terms "writing, printing, lithography,
engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition,
cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means", appearing in said
Article 355, in the sense, at least, that in "amplifier system" is a means
"similar" to "radio".
This pretense is untenable. To begin with, as correctly stated in
defendant's brief, "radio as a means of publication is "the transmission
and reception of electromagnetic waves without conducting wires
intervening between transmitter and receiver" (Library of Universal
Knowledge)" (see, also, 18 Encyclopedia Britanica, p. 285), "while
transmission of words by means of an amplifier system", such as the one
mentioned in the information, "is not thru "electromagnetic waves" and is
with the use of "conducting wires" intervening between the transmitter . . .
and the receiver . . . .
Secondly, even the word "radio" used in said Article 355, should be
considered in relation to the terms with which it is associated — "writing,
printing, lithography, engraving . . . phonograph, painting, theatrical
exhibition or cinematographical exhibition" — all of which have a common
characteristic, namely, their permanent nature as a means of publication,
and this explains the graver penalty for libel than that prescribed for oral
defamation. Thus, it has been held that slanderous statements forming
part of a manuscript read by a speaker over the radio constitute libel
(Sorensen vs. Wood, 243 N.W. 82, 82 A.L.R. 1109; Nules vs. Wasner, 20
P. [2d] 487, 104 A.L.R. 877), whereas the rules governing such offense
were declared inapplicable to extemporaneous remarks of scurrilous
nature, made ad libitum in the course of a radio broadcast by a person
hired to read a prepared text, but not appearing thereon (Summit Hotel
Co. vs. National Broadcasting Co., PA-124 A.L.R. 963). 1äw phï1.ñët
IN SHORT, the facts alleged in the information constitute the crime of oral
defamation punished in Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code, which
prescribed six (6) months after its commission, or on April 5, 1960
(Articles 90 and 91, Revised Penal Code), over four (4) months before
the filing of said information, in view of which the order appealed from is
affirmed, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-32717 November 26, 1970
AMELITO R. MUTUC, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Amelito R. Mutuc in his own behalf.
Romulo C. Felizmena for respondent.
FERNANDO, J.:
The invocation of his right to free speech by petitioner Amelito Mutuc,
then a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention, in this
special civil action for prohibition to assail the validity of a ruling of
respondent Commission on Elections enjoining the use of a taped jingle
for campaign purposes, was not in vain. Nor could it be considering the
conceded absence of any express power granted to respondent by the
Constitutional Convention Act to so require and the bar to any such
implication arising from any provision found therein, if deference be paid
to the principle that a statute is to be construed consistently with the
fundamental law, which accords the utmost priority to freedom of
expression, much more so when utilized for electoral purposes. On
November 3, 1970, the very same day the case was orally argued, five
days after its filing, with the election barely a week away, we issued a
minute resolution granting the writ of prohibition prayed for. This opinion
is intended to explain more fully our decision.
In this special civil action for prohibition filed on October 29, 1970,
petitioner, after setting forth his being a resident of Arayat, Pampanga,
and his candidacy for the position of delegate to the Constitutional
Convention, alleged that respondent Commission on Elections, by a
telegram sent to him five days previously, informed him that his certificate
of candidacy was given due course but prohibited him from using jingles
in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers, an
order which, according to him, is "violative of [his] constitutional right ... to
freedom of speech."1 There being no plain, speedy and adequate
remedy, according to petitioner, he would seek a writ of prohibition, at the
same time praying for a preliminary injunction. On the very next day, this
Court adopted a resolution requiring respondent Commission on
Elections to file an answer not later than November 2, 1970, at the same
time setting the case for hearing for Tuesday November 3, 1970. No
preliminary injunction was issued. There was no denial in the answer filed
by respondent on November 2, 1970, of the factual allegations set forth in
the petition, but the justification for the prohibition was premised on a
provision of the Constitutional Convention Act,2which made it unlawful for
candidates "to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or
electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever
nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts,
hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign
origin."3 It was its contention that the jingle proposed to be used by
petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a
tangible propaganda material, under the above statute subject to
confiscation. It prayed that the petition be denied for lack of merit. The
case was argued, on November 3, 1970, with petitioner appearing in his
behalf and Attorney Romulo C. Felizmena arguing in behalf of
respondent.
This Court, after deliberation and taking into account the need for
urgency, the election being barely a week away, issued on the afternoon
of the same day, a minute resolution granting the writ of prohibition,
setting forth the absence of statutory authority on the part of respondent
to impose such a ban in the light of the doctrine of ejusdem generis as
well as the principle that the construction placed on the statute by
respondent Commission on Elections would raise serious doubts about
its validity, considering the infringement of the right of free speech of
petitioner. Its concluding portion was worded thus: "Accordingly, as
prayed for, respondent Commission on Elections is permanently
restrained and prohibited from enforcing or implementing or demanding
compliance with its aforesaid order banning the use of political jingles by
candidates. This resolution is immediately executory."4
1. As made clear in our resolution of November 3, 1970, the question
before us was one of power. Respondent Commission on Elections was
called upon to justify such a prohibition imposed on petitioner. To repeat,
no such authority was granted by the Constitutional Convention Act. It did
contend, however, that one of its provisions referred to above makes
unlawful the distribution of electoral propaganda gadgets, mention being
made of pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods or materials,
wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, and cigarettes, and concluding
with the words "and the like."5 For respondent Commission, the last three
words sufficed to justify such an order. We view the matter differently.
What was done cannot merit our approval under the well-known principle
of ejusdem generis, the general words following any enumeration being
applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically
referred to.6 It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act
was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of
inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its
distribution.
The more serious objection, however, to the ruling of respondent
Commission was its failure to manifest fealty to a cardinal principle of
construction that a statute should be interpreted to assure its being in
consonance with, rather than repugnant to, any constitutional command
or prescription.7 Thus, certain Administrative Code provisions were given
a "construction which should be more in harmony with the tenets of the
fundamental law."8 The desirability of removing in that fashion the taint of
constitutional infirmity from legislative enactments has always
commended itself. The judiciary may even strain the ordinary meaning of
words to avert any collision between what a statute provides and what
the Constitution requires. The objective is to reach an interpretation
rendering it free from constitutional defects. To paraphrase Justice
Cardozo, if at all possible, the conclusion reached must avoid not only
that it is unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon that score.9
2. Petitioner's submission of his side of the controversy, then, has in its
favor obeisance to such a cardinal precept. The view advanced by him
that if the above provision of the Constitutional Convention Act were to
lend itself to the view that the use of the taped jingle could be prohibited,
then the challenge of unconstitutionality would be difficult to meet. For, in
unequivocal language, the Constitution prohibits an abridgment of free
speech or a free press. It has been our constant holding that this
preferred freedom calls all the more for the utmost respect when what
may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more
meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. What respondent
Commission did, in effect, was to impose censorship on petitioner, an evil
against which this constitutional right is directed. Nor could respondent
Commission justify its action by the assertion that petitioner, if he would
not resort to taped jingle, would be free, either by himself or through
others, to use his mobile loudspeakers. Precisely, the constitutional
guarantee is not to be emasculated by confining it to a speaker having his
say, but not perpetuating what is uttered by him through tape or other
mechanical contrivances. If this Court were to sustain respondent
Commission, then the effect would hardly be distinguishable from a WHEREFORE, as set forth in our resolution of November 3, 1970,
previous restraint. That cannot be validly done. It would negate indirectly respondent Commission is permanently restrained and prohibited from
what the Constitution in express terms assures. 10 enforcing or implementing or demanding compliance with its aforesaid
order banning the use of political taped jingles. Without pronouncement
3. Nor is this all. The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law, as to costs.
setting forth the criterion for the validity of any public act whether
proceeding from the highest official or the lowest functionary, is a
postulate of our system of government. That is to manifest fealty to the
rule of law, with priority accorded to that which occupies the topmost rung
in the legal hierarchy. The three departments of government in the
discharge of the functions with which it is entrusted have no choice but to
yield obedience to its commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be
observed. Congress in the enactment of statutes must ever be on guard
lest the restrictions on its authority, whether substantive or formal, be
transcended. The Presidency in the execution of the laws cannot ignore
or disregard what it ordains. In its task of applying the law to the facts as
found in deciding cases, the judiciary is called upon to maintain inviolate
what is decreed by the fundamental law. Even its power of judicial review
to pass upon the validity of the acts of the coordinate branches in the
course of adjudication is a logical corollary of this basic principle that the
Constitution is paramount. It overrides any governmental measure that
fails to live up to its mandates. Thereby there is a recognition of its being
the supreme law.

To be more specific, the competence entrusted to respondent

Commission was aptly summed up by the present Chief Justice thus:
"Lastly, as the branch of the executive department — although
independent of the President — to which the Constitution has given the
'exclusive charge' of the 'enforcement and administration of all laws
relative to the conduct of elections,' the power of decision of the
Commission is limited to purely 'administrative questions.'" 11 It has been
the constant holding of this Court, as it could not have been otherwise,
that respondent Commission cannot exercise any authority in conflict with
or outside of the law, and there is no higher law than the
Constitution. 12Our decisions which liberally construe its powers are
precisely inspired by the thought that only thus may its responsibility
under the Constitution to insure free, orderly and honest elections be
adequately fulfilled. 13 There could be no justification then for lending
approval to any ruling or order issuing from respondent Commission, the
effect of which would be to nullify so vital a constitutional right as free
speech. Petitioner's case, as was obvious from the time of its filing, stood
on solid footing.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-47757-61 January 28, 1980
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ABUNDIO R. ELLO, As 4th
Assistant of Provincial Bohol VICENTE DE LA SERNA. JR., as
complainant all private prosecutor, petitioners,
vs.
HON. VICENTE B. ECHAVES, JR., as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Bohol Branch II, ANO DACULLO, GERONIMO OROYAN,
MARIO APARICI, RUPERTO CAJES and MODESTO S
SUELLO, respondents.
AQUINO, J.:p
The legal issue in this case is whether Presidential Decree No. 772, which penalizes squatting and
similar acts, applies to agricultural lands. The decree (which took effect on August 20, 1975) provides:
SECTION 1. Any person who, with the use of force, intimidation
or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the
landowner, succeeds in occupying or possessing the property of
the latter against his will for residential, commercial or any other
purposes, shall be punished by an imprisonment ranging from six
months to one year or a fine of not less than one thousand nor
more than five thousand pesos at the discretion of the court, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. (2nd paragraph is
omitted.)
The record shows that on October 25, 1977 Fiscal Abundio R. Ello filed
with the lower court separate informations against sixteen persons
charging them with squatting as penalized by Presidential Decree No.
772. The information against Mario Aparici which is similar to the other
fifteen informations, reads:
That sometime in the year 1974 continuously up to the present at
barangay Magsaysay, municipality of Talibon, province of Bohol,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with stealth and strategy, enter into,
occupy and cultivate a portion of a grazing land physically
occupied, possessed and claimed by Atty. Vicente de la Serna,
Jr. as successor to the pasture applicant Celestino de la Serna of
Pasture Lease Application No. 8919, accused's entrance into the
area has been and is still against the win of the offended party;
did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously squat and
cultivate a portion of the said grazing land; said cultivating has
rendered a nuisance to and has deprived the pasture applicant
from the full use thereof for which the land applied for has been
intended, that is preventing applicant's cattle from grazing the
whole area, thereby causing damage and prejudice to the said
applicant-possessor-occupant, Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr. (sic)
Five of the informations, wherein Ano Dacullo, Geronimo Oroyan, Mario
Aparici, Ruperto Cajes and Modesto Suello were the accused, were
raffled to Judge Vicente B. Echaves, Jr. of Branch II (Criminal Cases
Nos. 1824, 1828, 1832, 1833 and 1839, respectively).
Before the accused could be arraigned, Judge Echaves motu
proprio issued an omnibus order dated December 9, 1977 dismissing the
five informations on the grounds (1) that it was alleged that the accused
entered the land through "stealth and strategy", whereas under the
decree the entry should be effected "with the use of force, intimidation or
threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner",
and (2) that under the rule of ejusdem generis the decree does not apply
to the cultivation of a grazing land.
Because of that order, the fiscal amended the informations by using in
lieu of "stealth and strategy" the expression "with threat, and taking
advantage of the absence of the ranchowner and/or tolerance of the said
ranchowner". The fiscal asked that the dismissal order be reconsidered
and that the amended informations be admitted.
The lower court denied the motion. It insisted that the phrase "and for
other purposes" in the decree does not include agricultural purposes
because its preamble does not mention the Secretary of Agriculture and
makes reference to the affluent class.
From the order of dismissal, the fiscal appealed to this Court under
Republic Act No. 5440. The appeal is devoid of merit.
We hold that the lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not
apply to pasture lands because its preamble shows that it was intended
to apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to illegal
constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals. The
squating complained of involves pasture lands in rural areas.
the of public agriculture lands in the Philippines and are duly
covered by the corresponding applications for the notwithstanding
standing the fact that title thereto still remains in the Government
or for any person, natural or judicial to investigate induce or force
another to commit such acts.

The preamble of the decree is quoted below:
WHEREAS, it came to my knowledge that despite the issuance of
Letter of Instruction No. 19 dated October 2, 1972, directing the
Secretaries of National Defense, Public Work. 9 and
communications, Social Welfare and the Director of Public Works,
the PHHC General Manager, the Presidential Assistant on
Housing and Rehabilitation Agency, Governors, City and
Municipal Mayors, and City and District Engineers, "to remove an
illegal constructions including buildings on and along esteros and
river banks, those along railroad tracks and those built without
permits on public and private property." squatting is still a major
problem in urban communities all over the country;
Violations of the law are punished by a fine of not exceeding one
thousand or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both such fine
and imprisonment in the discretion of the court, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. (See People vs. Lapasaran 100 Phil.
40.)
The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) invoked by the
trial court does not apply to this case. Here, the intent of the decree is
unmistakable. It is intended to apply only to urban communities,
particularly to illegal constructions. The rule of ejusdem generis is merely
a tool of statutory construction which is resorted to when the legislative
intent is uncertain (Genato Commercial Corp. vs. Court of Tax Appeals,
104 Phil. 615,618; 28 C.J.S. 1049-50).

WHEREAS, many persons or entities found to have been WHEREFORE, the trial court's order of dismissal is affirmed. No costs.
unlawfully occupying public and private lands belong to the
affluent class; SO ORDERED.

WHEREAS, there is a need to further intensify the government's

drive against this illegal and nefarious practice.

It should be stressed that Letter of Instruction No. 19 refers to illegal

constructions on public and private property. It is complemented by Letter
of Instruction No. 19-A which provides for the relocation of squatters in
the interest of public health, safety and peace and order.

On the other hand, it should be noted that squatting on public agricultural

lands, like the grazing lands involved in this case, is punished by
Republic Act No. 947 which makes it unlawful for any person, corporation
or association to forcibly enter or occupy public agricultural lands. That
law provides:

SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person corporation or

association to enter or occupy, through force, intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth, any public agriculture land including such
public lands as are granted to private individuals under the
provision of the Public Land Act or any other laws providing for
 Republic of the Philippines law for appeals from that court and (b) because the appeal was frivolous,
SUPREME COURT interposed obviously for delay.
Manila
Noting that the 15-day period expired on September 22, and that the
EN BANC appeal papers were actually received on September 24, the judge of first
instance declared the appeal was late and dismissed it for lack of
G.R. No. L-5558 April 29, 1953 jurisdiction. He expressly refused to apply section 1 Rule 27 of the Rules
of Court on which the Manabats relied to sustain the timeliness of their
ENRIQUE D. MANABAT and RUFINA S. MANABAT, petitioners, move. That section provides that "the date of the mailing" of the court
vs. papers "as shown by the post-office registry receipt shall be considered
THE HON. BERNABE DE AQUINO, Judge of First Instance of Tarlac, as the date of their filing" in court. His honor opined that this section does
and ALEJANDRA L. DE ROXAS and CLAUDIO ROXAS, respondent. not regulate inferior courts, since it is found only among rules governing
courts of first instance, and, unlike other rules, it is not extended to
inferior courts — and therefore excluded — by section 19 Rule 4, which
Luciano V. Bonicilio for petitioners.
for convenience is quoted hereunder:
Ruben L. Roxas for respondents.
Bernabe de Aquino in his own behalf.
SEC. 19. Application of certain rules. — Rules 10, 12, 13, 14, 18,
28, 29, 30, and 39 are applicable in inferior courts in cases falling
BENGZON, J.:
within their jurisdictions and in so far as they are not inconsistent
with the provisions of this rule.
The case: This is a petition for mandamus to require the respondent
judge of first instance to give due course to, and hear the petitioners'
Hence this petition for mandamus, appeal being inadequate, because the
appeal from the decision of a justice of the peace which he dismissed
defendants in the case, (petitioners herein) have not introduced evidence.
believing it had not been perfected in due time.
The question is whether the appeal had been perfected within fifteen
The facts: Sued on a promissory note in the peace court of Tarlac,
days as required by section 2 Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. If it was, this
Tarlac, Enrique S. Manabat and his wife, denied liability, alleging usury.
petition should be granted. 1 Otherwise it will be denied. That question, in
Having failed to appear and present evidence at the hearing, they were
turn, depends upon the issue whether the appeal papers are deemed
ordered to pay the amount of P1,261.74 plus interest, upon the proofs
filed in court on September 22 when they were deposited in the mails by
and introduced by the plaintiffs, Alejandra L. de Roxas and her husband
registered mail, or on September 24 when they were actually received. If
Claudio Roxas.
the first, the appeal was timely; otherwise it was belated.
Notified of the decision on September 7, 1951, the Manabats sent on
Discussion: If section 1 Rule 27 is applied, the appeal papers would be
September 22, 1951 their notice of appeal by registered mail together
deemed filed on September 22, and therefore the appeal would have
with a postal money order payable to the justice of the peace for P16 as
been seasonably perfected. His Honor, however, and the other
docket fees and a surety bond in the sum of P30 as appeal bond. These
respondents, maintain that Rule 27 is not applicable because it is not
papers were actually received at the peace court of Tarlac, Tarlac, on
mentioned in section 19 Rule 4 hereinbefore quoted, and inclusio unius
September 24, 1951.
est exclusio alterius, enumeration of certain rules, excludes others.
Forwarded to the court of instance, the appeal was docketed as civil case
That legal maxim is well-known, and respondents' position seems at first
No. 638. Subsequently, however, the Roxas couple submitted a motion to
blush tenable. But the maxim is not more than an auxiliary rule of
dismiss the appeal of the Manabats on the grounds: (a) that the appeal
interpretation to be ignored where other circumstances indicate the
documents had been received by the inferior court of Tarlac, on
enumeration was not intended to be exclusive.
September 24, i.e., two days after the expiration of the time prescribed by
Now, if section 19 Rule 4 is exclusive, justices of the peace may
disregard, (a) the principles of evidence prescribed in Rule 123, (b) Rule
131 as to costs and (c) the fundamental principles about splitting or
joinder of causes of action in Rule 2, and the theories about parties in
interest, necessary parties, married women etc. in Rule 3.
These undesirable consequences could not have been overlooked by the
framers of the Rules. They could not have intended, therefore, to make
the enumeration in section 19 Rule 4 as all-inclusive and exclusive.
As a matter of fact this Court applied to litigations in inferior courts
Rules other than those enumerated in Rule 4, section 19. Thus in Viola
Fernando vs. Aragon,* 43 Off. Gaz., 145 we applied Rule 17 to a
municipal court saying "Although Rule 17 has not been made applicable
to justice of the peace courts, such omission (from the enumeration in
section 19 Rule 4), can not be interpreted as a prohibition to apply it."
The first objection was not raised in the court of first instance, wherein the
time of the appeal — not the form — was discussed. Any way there was
substantial compliance of the deposit requirement. 2
The second point was ignored by the respondent judge. Rightly, we
believe, because at this stage we are not prepared to deprive the
Manabats of their day in court, usury being contrary to the policies of our
system of legislation.
Judgment: Wherefore, the writ will be issued for the respondent judge to
hear and thereafter decide the appeal interposed by herein petitioners.
Costs against the Roxases. So ordered.

In Beltran vs. Cabrera (73 Phil., 666), Rule 124 was considered
applicable to the Manila municipal court.

In Co Tiamco vs. Diaz (75 Phil., 672), Rules 8, 16, 17, 20, 21, 22, and the
appendix of forms after Rule 133 were deemed binding on inferior courts,
over the objection that they were excluded by section 19 Rule 4.

Consequently, there can be no legal obstacle to the application of Rule

27 section 1 to the justice of the peace court of Tarlac. And it should be
applied, to uphold the uniform principle that "the date of deposit in the
post-office by registered mail" of court papers is "the date of filing" not
only in the Supreme Court, the appellate court, and the superior courts
but also in inferior courts. Uniformity of rules is to be desired to simplify
procedure (Cf. Henning vs. Western Equipment, 62 Phil., 886).

Conclusion: Hence, this Court's opinion is that the Manabats appealed on

time.

The Roxas spouses interpose here two other points: (a) instead of
delivering a certificate of the municipal treasurer showing deposit of the
docket fees, the Manabats sent only a postal money order payable to the
justice of the peace; and (b) the appeal was unmeritorious and merely for
delay.