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Case Digest: Special Proceedings

Reyes vs. Rosenstock, 47 Phil. 784

Facts: Petitioner Reyes obtained judgment against Henry Elser, who was then still living and for foreclosure of
real estate mortgage and its sale for the satisfaction of the judgment. When Elser died, respondent
Rosenstock was appointed executor. But before the death of Elser, a sale of mortgaged was confirmed
and no appeal was taken. Petitioner now filed his proof of claim which the defendant objected.
Petitioner’s claim was allowed by the committee, respondent filed for reconsideration which the trial
court denied.

Issue: Whether the estate of Elser is a contingent claim?

Ruling : No. A subsisting demand against the estate of a deceased person which matured and being enforced
when he was still alive is not a contingent claim as in this case. The defendant’s contention is
untenable, because the claim was rendered by the court when Ester was still living, and pending the
appeal of Rosenstock, as executor, on his own motion, was made defendant as such, and the final
judgment upon which the property was sold was rendered against defendant as an executor.

BPI vs. Concepcion, 53 Phil. 806

Facts: Defendant Concepcion executed a promissory note in favor to petitioner BPI for P 342,372.64 , payable
on demand and as security, they deposited 700 shares of PNB as collaterals and also mortgaged 5,680
square meter of land. When the defendants defaulted in their payments, the bank initiated a
foreclosure sale. Henry Elser entered into negotiations with the defendants. The Concepcions agreed
to the negotiation on the condition that they be relief from liability. Elser sent letters to the bank, but
the latter did not reply. On last time, Elser wrote to the bank with the understanding that the bank
would bid in the land at the foreclosure sale for the full amount of the judgment and sell to him for
the same price, still nothing happened.

Issue: Whether the claim on the mortgaged property is a contingent claim?


Ruling: Yes. The foreclosure of a mortgaged property pertaining to the estate of a deceased person, the
deficiency cannot be determined before the foreclosure sale and the demand for its payment is a
contingent claim This deficiency must be presented to the committee whom appointed by the court.
If the contingent claim is valid, the executor or administrator may be required to retain in his
possession sufficient assets to pay the claim.

Comparative Case Analysis: Special Proceedings


(Re: Reyes vs. Rosenstock and BPI vs. Concepcion)

Both cases deal with a contingent claim. In Reyes vs. Rosenstock, the claim is not considered as
contingent, as it would nullify the second provision of Sec. 708 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the claim
arising from the judgment against Elser prior to his death, and which was enforced when he was still living.
In BPI vs. Concepcion, the claim was contingent. The amount of the deficiency must be determined before
the foreclosure sale. Demand for payment is now contingent dependent to the foreclosure sale.
TITLE: FELIX BAUTISTA VS. AQUILINA TIONGSONCITATION: 11 PHIL 579 NOVEM
BER 7, 1908FACTS:

Felix Bautista, administrator of the intestate estate of Ciriaco Tiongson, alleged that the deceasedand Aquilina
Tiongson, were the owners

pro indiviso

of five parcels of land located in the Province ofBulacan. One-half of the said land appertained to said
intestate estate, and the other half to thedefendant, Aquilina Tiongson. The latter and her husband were the only
parties who had administeredthe aforesaid property, having collected the rentals thereof without rendering an
accounting of theiradministration to anyone. Bautista prayed to the court to order that the same be partitioned
inaccordance with the law, and that the defendants be instructed to render an accounting of
theiradministration and deliver the balance to the plaintiff. But such allegations were denied by the
defendantssaying that the only land held jointly by the deceased and Aquilina Tiongson was the
lot located in thetown of Baliuag, while the other 4 lots were owned exclusively by the defendants who had
purchased thesame from the late Ciriaco Tiongson. They also averred that Ciriaco Tiongson, while living, together
withthe defendants, administered the undivided lands, and that, after his death, his widow,
Marciana deZulueta, as the administratrix of the property of her seven minor children, received
that portion of thecrops from the land in Baliuag belonging to the intestate estate until the
year 1903

Defendants alleged that the plaintiff lacked the capacity to bring this action because the legaladministration
of the property of the late Ciriaco Tiongson, pertained to his widow who lived with herminor
children, acting on behalf of the latter. Moreso, the rentals received by the widow of Ciriaco,
onseveral occasions, took from the defendants, on account of the rentals of the said land, the
sum ofP1,402.45 pesos, and that the deceased, before his death, personally owed the defendants the sum
of143,75 pesos. Hence, defendants prayed that the appointment of the administrator of the intestate estateof
Ciriaco Tiongson, be annulled, and that the complaint be dismissed entirely.

ISSUES:

1.

Is the administrator authorized to bring an action to demand partition of the subject lots?2.

Was the demand of rendering accounts proper?

RULING:

1.

NO.An action to enforce the partition of real estate must be brought and proceeded with in
accordancewith the provisions of sections 181 to 196 of the Code of Civil Procedure.The law refers to a
coparcener, coheir, or other person interested in the undivided property held,because any one of such persons is a
real party concerned in the partition. In cases like the present,where the property is held by a person, not as a
coheir but as the exclusive owner, the right of actionfor partition, which supposes joint ownership or community of
property, pertains only to the heirs ofthe late Ciriaco Tiongson, not to the administrator who, when
claiming the division of real estate notincluded in the inventory, or which he did not take charge of on
commencing to exercise office, butwhich is alleged to belong to the estate, is not authorized to represent the
intestate succession of theproperty administered by him; neither is he authorized to represent the heirs, because
the latter, as

successors to the deceased, are the only parties who may maintain such an action for partition
of realestate held pro indiviso by coheirs or owners in common.2.

NO.With regard to the rendering of accounts, the demand presupposes that the action for partitionbrought by
the administrator was in accordance with the law and that the same could be granted bythe court below. Once the
latter is dismissed, it follows that the former should likewise be denied

TITLE: FELIX BAUTISTA VS. AQUILINA TIONGSON CITATION: 11 PHIL 579 NOVEMBER 7, 1908 FACTS:

Felix Bautista, administrator of the intestate estate of Ciriaco Tiongson, alleged that the deceased
and Aquilina Tiongson, were the owners

pro indiviso

of five parcels of land located in the Province of Bulacan. One-half of the said land appertained to
said intestate estate, and the other half to the defendant, Aquilina Tiongson. The latter and her
husband were the only parties who had administered the aforesaid property, having collected the
rentals thereof without rendering an accounting of their administration to anyone. Bautista prayed
to the court to order that the same be partitioned in accordance with the law, and that the
defendants be instructed to render an accounting of their administration and deliver the balance to
the plaintiff. But such allegations were denied by the defendants saying that the only land held
jointly by the deceased and Aquilina Tiongson was the lot located in the town of Baliuag, while the
other 4 lots were owned exclusively by the defendants who had purchased the same from the late
Ciriaco Tiongson. They also averred that Ciriaco Tiongson, while living, together with the defendants,
administered the undivided lands, and that, after his death, his widow, Marciana de Zulueta, as the
administratrix of the property of her seven minor children, received that portion of the crops from
the land in Baliuag belonging to the intestate estate until the year 1903

Defendants alleged that the plaintiff lacked the capacity to bring this action because the legal
administration of the property of the late Ciriaco Tiongson, pertained to his widow who lived with
her minor children, acting on behalf of the latter. Moreso, the rentals received by the widow of
Ciriaco, on several occasions, took from the defendants, on account of the rentals of the said land,
the sum of P1,402.45 pesos, and that the deceased, before his death, personally owed the
defendants the sum of 143,75 pesos. Hence, defendants prayed that the appointment of the
administrator of the intestate estate of Ciriaco Tiongson, be annulled, and that the complaint be
dismissed entirely.

ISSUES:

1.

Is the administrator authorized to bring an action to demand partition of the subject lots? 2.

Was the demand of rendering accounts proper?

RULING:

1.

NO. An action to enforce the partition of real estate must be brought and proceeded with in
accordance with the provisions of sections 181 to 196 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The law refers
to a coparcener, coheir, or other person interested in the undivided property held, because any one
of such persons is a real party concerned in the partition. In cases like the present, where the
property is held by a person, not as a coheir but as the exclusive owner, the right of action for
partition, which supposes joint ownership or community of property, pertains only to the heirs of
the late Ciriaco Tiongson, not to the administrator who, when claiming the division of real estate not
included in the inventory, or which he did not take charge of on commencing to exercise office, but
which is alleged to belong to the estate, is not authorized to represent the intestate succession of
the property administered by him; neither is he authorized to represent the heirs, because the
latter, as

successors to the deceased, are the only parties who may maintain such an action for partition of
real estate held pro indiviso by coheirs or owners in common. 2.

NO. With regard to the rendering of accounts, the demand presupposes that the action for partition
brought by the administrator was in accordance with the law and that the same could be granted by
the court below. Once the latter is dismissed, it follows that the former should likewise be denied
ALBANO V AGTARAP

ARELLANO; March 25, 1912

FACTS

-Lucio Agtarap owned several parcels of agricultural land and at his death left four sons, one of whom,
Silverio, died. Upon the death of Silverio Agtarap, his widow, Juana Domingo, began special
proceedings for settlement of the intestate estate of her deceased husband by petitioning for an
administrator and Rodrigo Albano was appointed.

-As such administrator Rodrigo Albano instituted a civil action against the other three heirs of Lucio
Agtarap.

-The following are pertinent facts in this case: (1) It is proven that Lucio Agtarap is the legitimate father
of Silverio, Cornelio, and Nicolas Agtarap and the grandfather of Melecio Agtarap; (2) it is admitted
that Lucio Agtarap died leaving property; (3) it is proven that the property left at his death by Lucio
Agtarap has been seized by his said descendants, now the defendants, without giving Silverio his
share; (4) it is proven that, at the least, the property was left by Lucio Agtarap.

-According to law, one-fourth of this property belongs to Silverio Agtarap.

-The judgment of the court directs that one-fourth part of this property be delivered to the
administrator of the intestate estate of the late Silverio Agtarap, as his legacy, so that, after proper
proceedings, their respective portions may be adjudicated to the widow and other heirs of the said
Silverio.

ISSUE

WON the heirs of Silverio should receive ¼ of the estate of Lucio and what is the proper procedure

HELD

-Yes he should through a special proceeding.

The necessary procedure of a special proceedings in the intestate estate of Silverio Agtarap, in which
may properly be presented the claim of the administrator of the said intestate estate on behalf of
Juana Domingo for her "legal portion as widow," as well as the proceedings for proving that Eugenia
Agtarap is a legitimate daughter in order to have her declared the sole heir of the whole of the said
fourth part of the property which corresponds to him whom she calls her legitimate father.

-A trial held for such purpose it will determine who are the heirs of the intestate estate of Silverio
Agtarap; whether she who calls herself his legitimate daughter, Eugenia Agtarap; or his brothers
Cornelio and Nicolas and his nephew Melecio, all surnamed Agtara.

The lawful usufruct pertaining to the widow will depend upon whether the alleged daughter or the
brothers and nephew of the deceased are entitled to the inheritance, for if she who claims to be the
daughter, Eugenia Agtarap, be declared the sole heir of the deceased Silverio Agtarap, the widows
share would be different from what it would if the defendants in this case, as brothers and nephew of
the deceased Silverio Agtarap, are declared to be the sole heirs ---- in accordance with the various
provisions of the Civil Code in this respect.

Only in such special proceedings, wherein the necessary orders can be issued and executed, can
findings be made as to who are the heirs and what portions to them, the nature of their titles, and in
case of usufruct what part pertains to each.

Disposition: Affirmed

MORELAND, DISSENTING

Nowhere in the law of these Islands is an administrator given power to bring an action for the partition
of real estate. The persons and the only persons authorized to bring such an action are those
mentioned in section 181 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The Civil Code does not authorize such an action as the present.

EUGEN MARSCHALL, as judicial administrator of the estate of Walter Toehl, deceased, plaintiff-appellant, vs. CARL
ANTHOLTZ, ET AL., defendants. CARL ANTHOLTZ, appellant.
The manager of the oil mill who applies the proceeds of sales to the payment of debts contracted in running the factory does
not become liable for double the value of the property sold, as for embezzlement or alienation of property pertaining to the
estate of a deceased person under section 711 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This section contemplates an embezzlement
or alienation which causes the estate to lose the property converted by the wrongdoer; and it is not applicable to the acts of a
manger of a going concern who applies the proceeds of the manufactured product to the expenses incurred in running the
business.
FACTS: This action was instituted in the CFI-Manila by Eugen Marschall, as administrator of Walter Toehl, deceased, against
Carl Antholtz and A. Murray & Co., Ltd., for the purpose of recovering a parcel of land in Santa Ana, Manila, with the buildings,
improvements, and machinery thereon, consisting of an oil mill with its appurtenances, and to obtain a decree annulling the
Torrens title covering said land and improvements, with pronouncement to the effect that said property pertains to the estate
of Walter Toehl, deceased, subject to a certain mortgage thereon, and to recover the value of the reasonable use and
occupation of said property from October 2, 1926, as well as to obtain an accounting from the defendant Carl Antholtz for the
use of said property and the proceeds of oil mill products sold by him, with further appropriate general relief. The defendants
answered with a general denial and cross-complaint wherein.
Toehl was the Manila Manager of Behn Meyer & Co. Antholtz was a chemist and oil technologist. Toehl owns a parcel of land
in Sta. Ana, and in order to use the property in some profitable way, Toehl entered into an agreement with Antholtz. The
agreement between them was that Toehl would furnish the capital necessary for the business, which was estimated at
P25,000, and Antholtz would act as Toehl's agent and manger at a salary of P500 per month. Toehl, being then employed by
Behn Meyer, chose not to use his name in his business with Antholtz; he instead allowed Antholtz to operate the business
under Antholtz’s own name. Antholtz installed for Toehl a factory for the manufacture of coconut oil on the property mentioned,
and he proceeded thereafter to operate the concern in his own name. On different dates in the early months of 1926 Antholtz
received from Toehl the sum of P13,000 which was invested in the concern.
The business was apparently undercapitalized, and it became necessary to borrow money. Toehl decided to establish the
business in corporate from with a capital, consisting of the land and building, already registered in the name of Toehl, and the
machinery, then being used in the business by Antholtz. At this time Antholtz happened to be the owner and holder of all the
certificates of stock of a corporation known as A. Murray & Co., Ltd., a concern without capital, which had totally ceased to
function. Its shares, therefore, were no longer of any value. With the consent of Antholtz, Toehl assumed possession of the
documents relating to this corporation with a view to reviving it as corporate owner of the oil plant above-mentioned. Having
obtained possession of the certificates of stock issued in the name of Antholtz, Toehl marked said shares as canceled and
prepared a new certificate of stock for 496 shares in the name of his wife, Josefa Toehl. Four other several shares were either
issued, or intended to be issued, in blank, to four directors of the intended corporation, but they were endorsed and delivered
to Mrs. Toehl. In order to start this old corporation on its way as a solvent concern, Toehl transferred to it the parcel of land
above-mentioned, with the factory and machinery established thereon. For the purposes of this step the factory was valued
at P30,000, and the machinery at P20,000. That Toehl was the prime mover and actor in these steps is clearly apparent from
the uncontradicted testimony of Antholtz and documents introduced in evidence as exhibits. Toehl died before the
rehabilitation of A. Murray & Co., Ltd., was completed, but a conveyance was executed by Toehl placing the land, with
improvements, in the name of A. Murray & Co., Ltd., and the Torrens title to the property now stands in the name of said
company. Meanwhile Antholtz was operating the oil mill under his contract with Toehl.
After Toehl's death, or shortly prior thereto, it was found that he was short in his accounts with Behn, Meyer & Co., H. Mij., to
the extent of about P150,000; and a claim for approximately this amount has been allowed by the committee on claims in the
estate of Toehl in administration. There appears to have been only one other creditor of his estate, whose claim is small in
amount. After Toehl's death the then manager of Behn, Meyer & Co., H. Mij., procured Eugen Marschall to be appointed
administrator of the estate, and the present action was instituted by him to recover possession of the oil mill property above-
mentioned and to hold Antholtz personally liable for certain personal property pertaining to the oil mill and products of the
same which have been sold by Antholtz in the continuation of his duties as manger.
The plaintiff's case supposes that Toehl and Antholtz were in collusion and that the latter was cognizant of the fact that the
money which Toehl had put into the oil business in Santa Ana had been feloniously embezzled by Toehl from his employer.
As a consequence of this supposed collusion, it is insisted for the plaintiff that Antholtz is liable for everything which Toehl had
taken from Behn, Meyer & Co., H. Mij., and placed in the oil mill business, as well as for the proceeds of the things sold by
Antholtz after the death of Toehl. The trial court found, and we concur in this conclusion, that there is no sufficient proof of
collusion between Antholtz and Toehl in the matter of the misappropriation of any of the funds of Behn, Meyer & Co., H. Mij.
ISSUE: Whether Antholtz is liable for the proceeds proceeds of certain effects sold by him after the death of Toehl, as well as
the proceeds of the output of the mill while Antholtz continued in the management.
HELD: No.
In section 711 of the Code of Civil Procedure it is declared that if any person, before the granting of letters testamentary or of
administration on the estate of a deceased person, embezzles, or alienates, any of the effects of such deceased person, such
person shall be liable to an action in favor of the executor or administrator of such estate for double the value of the property
sold, embezzled, or alienated, to be recovered for the benefit of the estate.
But this provision has reference primarily to funds that are lost by embezzlement or alienation, and it cannot be understood
as making the manger of a going concern liable for proceeds of sales applied by him to the proper uses of the business, as
occurred in this case. The proof shows that the personal property other than the products of the mill, sold by Antholtz in the
manner mentioned, was sold with the consent of the manager of Behn, Meyer & Co., H. Mij., and with the consent of the
administrator of Walter Toehl, and the proceeds of these sales, as well as the proceeds of the products of the mill, were
applied by Antholtz to the obligations incurred by him in running the business, without the improper diversion of a single cent.
It certainly would have been astonishing for Toehl to have communicated to his own employee the fact that the capital
advanced for the use in the oil mill business had been abstracted by Toehl from the coffers of Behn, Meyer & CO., H. Mij. It
seems to us that the slightest that Toehl would be particularly careful not to put himself at the mercy of his manager by
revealing to him the fact that the capital invested was being wrongfully obtained by Toehl; and a review of the evidence leads
us to believe, as the trial judge found, that Antholtz was wholly innocent of any guilty participation in the embezzlements
committed by Toehl.
FRANK B. INGERSOLL, administrator of the estate of Jose Carlos Chung Muy Co, plaintiff-
appellant,
vs.
VENTURA CHUI-TIAN LAY, ET AL.,

The plaintiff, as administrator of the estate of Jose Carlos Chung Muy Co, brought this action in
this Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, alleging in his complaint that after the death of
the said Jose Carlos, and on the same day, the defendants embezzled and appropriated to their
own use P53,140 which belonged to the estate, and he asked that, in accordance with the
provision of section 711 of the Code of Civil Procedure, judgment be entered against them for
double that amount, or P106,280. The defendants denied all the allegations in the complaint.

The court below acquitted the defendants Ventura Chui-Tian Lay and Lim Ki of the complaint,
and ordered judgment against the defendant Chun Gun Pan for P2,174.16, double the amount of
P1,087.08 which the court said belonged to the estate and which this defendant had converted to
his own use and for which he had failed to account to the estate. The plaintiff and Chun Gun Pan
have appealed.

So far as the appeal of the plaintiff is concerned, the question presented is purely one of fact.
Three witnesses for the plaintiff testified that about four days before the death of Jose Carlos, his
son, Chung Kiat, at their request of the deceased, opened the safe in the room where they were
and took therefrom a sum of money which he, Chung Kiat, counted and which amounted to
P53,000, and that he then replaced the money in the safe. Jose Carlos died about 4 o'clock in
the morning of October 19, 1905. Two witnesses testified that the defendants came there during
that forenoon, opened the safe, took this amount of money therefrom, wrapped up the bills,
amounting to P50,000 in a handkerchief, and carried away. These two witnesses and four other
testified that as the defendant Chun Gun Pan, who had the bills wrapped in a handkerchief, got
into the vehicle which was waiting for them in the street, the handkerchief struck against a post of
the carromata and the bills fell into the ground.

ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants are liable?

Held:

Section 711 of the Code of Civil Procedure, under which this action is brought is as follows:

If a person, before the granting of letters testamentary or of administration on the estate


of a deceased person, embezzles, or alienates any of the money, goods, chattels, or
effects of such deceased person, such person shall be liable to an action in favor of the
executor or administrator of such estate for double the value of the property sold,
embezzled or alienated, to be recovered for the benefit of such estate.

The court below found, "that Chun Gun Pan took possession of the estated of the deceased
Chung Muy Co at the time of his death and in doing so that took possession of the money in the
safe, and that this amount is admittedly the sum of P1,087.08, and that he has converted it to his
own use and has alienated it from the estate and has failed to account to the estate for that
account, or any part of it." It may be doubted whether even under this finding of fact the case
would be brought under section 711. But however that may be, we think that the evidence does
not show any conversion of this money by Chun Gun Pan to his own use or any alienation of it by
him. Upon the question as to what became of the money after it had been taken from the safe
and counted, we reject as the court below rejected, the evidence of the plaintiffs' witnesses to the
effect that the defendants carried it away. When the testimony of the other witnesses is
examined, it is seen that no one of them states that Chun Gun Pan carried away this money or
any part of it. On the contrary, the witness Hermenegildo Alvarez Chong Idong testified that after
it had been counted, all of it, including the other property, was returned to the safe; that the safe
was locked, and that the defendant Chun Gun Pan kept the key thereof. Chun Gun Pan testified
that he had never taken any amount of money belonging to the deceased and appropriated it to
his own use.

It does appear, however, that Chun Gun Pan took possession of the business and carried it on
for sometime, until an administrator was appointed, but that he did this at the request of the
deceased made the day before his death. The property that he thus took in charge included not
only the money in the safe but that connected with the foundry business. There is no evidence to
show that he appropriated any part of this property, either the money in the safe or that
connected in the foundry, to his own use. It appears on the contrary that he was holding the
same merely as the agent of the person interested therein. If he is guilty of embezzlement with
reference to this money in the safe, he is also guilty of embezzlement with reference to all the
personal property used in connection with the foundry. But it is apparent from what has been said
that no embezzlement can be charged against him for those acts. He is of course, bound to
account to the administrator for his management of the business and for all the property received
by him. That accounting can be secured in a proper proceeding brought by the administrator for
that purpose, and the acquittal of the defendant of a complaint founded upon section 711 will be
no bar to such a proceeding.

Echaus v, Blanco, G.R. No. L-30453, December 4, 1989

Facts:

Petitioner, Angelina Puentevella Echaus, Administratrix of the intestate estate of her deceased father,
Luis Puentevella, instituted a complaint against Charles Newton Hodges (C.N. Hodges) praying among
others the recovery of her share in the profits and remaining assets of their business covering Ba-Ta
subdivision. During its pendency and before a decision could be rendered by the RTC, Hodges died.
As there was no motion to dismiss filed by Hodges’ counsel upon his death, he was substituted by
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB) as administrator of his estate. A petition for the
settlement of the estate of C. N. Hodges was instituted in 1962. On March 1963, a notice to creditors
was published in "Yuhum".

The RTC of Iloilo City rendered a judgment of Echaus and subsequently issued a writ of execution
against PCIB on January 1967. However the writ was not enforced because petitioner opted to file a
motion in Special Proceedings (estate proceedings of deceased C.N. Hodges) on February 20, 1967,
for the payment of the judgment. Avelina Magno, administratrix of the estate of Linnie Hodges (C.N.
Hodges’ wife) opposed the said motion and averred that the claim of Echaus was already barred for
she filed it more than 4 years from the publication of notice.

Issue:

Whether or not the claim presented in the estate proceedings is already barred by the statute of non-
claims.

Held:

No. The Rules of Court allows a creditor to file his claim after the period set by the court in the notice to
creditors, provided the conditions stated in the rules are present. The rule provides:

Sec. 2. Time within which claims shall be filed.-... . However, at any time before an order of
distribution is entered, on application of a creditor who has failed to file his claim within the time
previously limited, the court may, for cause shown and on such terms as are equitable, allow
such claim to be filed within a time not exceeding one (1) month. (Rule 86)

The period prescribed in the notice to creditors is not exclusive; that money claims against the estate
may be allowed any time before an order of distribution is entered, at the discretion of the court for
cause and upon such terms as are equitable. At the time of petitioner’s motion to direct payment of the
judgment credit was filed, no order of distribution was issued yet.
LOPEZ v. GARCIA
On March 31, 1901, Joaquin Garcia Guerrero leaving a surviving widow, Maria Lopez y
Coejilo, and seven children as heirs, to-wit: Joaquin, Rosa Ignacio, Maria, Leonor, Mercedes,
and Ricardo, all of the surname Garcia y Lopez. Many years prior to his death, to wit, on March
5, 1892, the deceased had executed a Will. However, nothing was done for many years after
his death. On the contrary the parties in interest, the widow and children of the deceased,
desiring to keep the property together, entered into an agreement, dated February 15 1902
wherein they recognized their common ownership of the property and all agreed not to seek
a division for two years from that date. Thereafter, the property being still undivided, Maria
Garcia Lopez (hija) and Ignacio Garcia Lopez sold their interest in her father’s estate to her
coheirs for the sum of P13,186.

On March 31, 1905, another document was executed by the widow and heirs, except Maria
Garcia Lopez (hija), agreeing to postpone the division for a period of five years from March
31, 1905. On March 15, 1911, Ignacio Garcia Lopez sold his interest as heir to his coheirs for
the sum of P24,500.

On December 15, 1914, the widow, Maria Lopez y Coejilo, a petition for the probate of her
husband’s will, which was duly proved and allowed by the court, the applicant being appointed
administratrix of the decedent s estate.
On January 22, 1915, the widow, Maria Lopez, and all the heirs except the two who had parted
with their interest executed a document by which they transferred to Leonor Lopez Garcia
certain properties described in the document in payment of her share in the undivided
property; and in return Leonor Lopez Garcia renounced her right to intervene in the settlement
of the estate of the testator. It was, however, also stipulated in said document that the widow
should render an accounting of the administration of the property from the death of the testator,
i.e from March 31, 1901, to December 31, 1914, the accounts to be presented in the course
of the testamentary proceedings, and that she should pay to Leonor Lopez Garcia what the
court might find to be still due her from the estate.
On January 31, 1916, Leonor Lopez Garcia filed certain objections, or exceptions, to the
account thus presented. At the hearing upon these exceptions, the attorney for the
administratrix took the position that the court was without jurisdiction to pass upon the account
and was incompetent to entertain the objections. The trial court acceded to his view and
ordered the account to be returned to the administratrix. From this order Leonor Garcia Lopez
appealed.

Issue: Whether the court wherein an administration is pending has the power to require a
judicial administrator to account for acts done in the capacity of manager or administrator,
during the period elapsing between the death of the decedent and the formal qualification of
the administrator.
Held:
The court has jurisdiction and that it was error in the present case for the trial court to refuse
to consider the account in question in connection with the exceptions presented thereto. It is
of no moment that during the period covered by this accounting the accountable party, now
formal administratrix, was acting as manager of the estate by agreement among all the parties
then having an interest in the estate. When the estate of a deceased person is brought into
judicial administration every person having any of the property of the decedent in his hands is
required to surrender it to the lawful executor or administrator, and any one who may have
squandered assets of the estate or converted the same to his own use is liable to answer for
the value thereof. There can in the nature of things be absolutely no exception to this rule for
it is inherent in the general jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance "in all matters relating to
the settlement of estates." (Sec. 599, Code Civ. Proc.)
In the present case the will of the deceased was not proved until the year 1914 or 1915, and
the fact that Judicial proceeding was pending at the time the account in question was
presented is evident from the circumstance that in disposing of said account the trial court saw
fit to make a declaration terminating the administration proceedings and relieving Maria Lopez
of further responsibility as administratrix, at the same time declaring her bond as such to be
cancelled.

As already stated it is expressly stipulated in the contract of January 22, 1916, between Leonor
Lopez Garcia, of the one part, and her mother and coheirs, of the other, that the mother should
render an account in the administration proceedings for the period of her management from
March 31, 1901, to December 31, 1914. As correctly observed by the trial judge this
agreement for an accounting over that period would not have conferred jurisdiction upon the
court if jurisdiction had in fact been wanting; since jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon a
court by consent of the parties. (Molina v. De la Riva, 6 Phil. Rep., 12.)
Maria Lopez, widow, acted as manager of the property in question by consent of the heirs in
interest, who have acquiesced in her management and expressly or tacitly conceded to her a
scale of remuneration different from or greater than that which the law would allow to a duly
authorized administrator, said heirs would necessarily be bound thereby. In other words, the
extent of the accountant’s responsibility is, in the absence of bad faith, to be discovered in the
agreement of the parties in interest deducible from their contract, in relation with all the
circumstances of the case
The failure of the heirs during so great a period to attempt to hold their mother accountable in
court is, to say the least, indicative of their acquiescence in the general character of her
administration; and the stipulation in the contract of January 22, 1915, that she should be liable
to account is not to be taken as depriving her of any defense, arising from agreement or
acquiescence of the parties or from lapse of time, which she would be otherwise entitled to
interpose.

In the matter of the Intestate Estate of the deceased Emeterio Lopez.

CONCEPCION LOPEZ, petitioner-appellee,

vs.

ADELA LOPEZ, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.

In the matter of the Intestate Estate of the deceased Emeterio Lopez. CONCEPCION LOPEZ,
petitioner and appellee, vs. ADELA LOPEZ ET AL., oppositors and appellants. 68 PHIL 227, G. R. No.
45736. May 26, 1939]

FACTS:

Concepcion Lopez filed a petition in the intestate proceedings of the deceased Emeterio Lopez,
claiming to be an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased and praying that she be declared
his universal heiress entitled to a summary award of his estate, same being valued at less than six
thousand pesos (P6,000), The oppositors thru Attorney Simplicio B. Peña, filed an opposition,
denying petitioner's claim and praying that, as they are nephews and nieces of the deceased, they
be adjudged entitled to the property left by him. Petitioner filed later an amended petition, alleging
that, according to a new assessment, the estate was worth nine thousand pesos (P9,000) and 'that,
therefore, its distribution could not be made summarily but thru regular administration proceedings.
Accordingly, an administrator was appointed who, thru Attorney Simplicio B. Peña, filed later a
motion for a declaration of heirs and prayed that the oppositors-appellants be so adjudged. After
hearing, the court issued an order declaring the petitioner an acknowledged natural daughter of the
deceased entitled to the rights accorded her by law. The oppositors appealed that the petition filed
by the petitioner in the intestate proceedings is alleged insufficient.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Concepcion Lopez is an acknowledged natural daughter of Emeterio Lopez who died
intestate, leaving no legitimate descendants, ascendants or widow?

HELD:

Yes. Inasmuch as the recognition of the status of petitioner as a natural child is a prerequisite to her
right to heirship, her prayer that she be declared universal heirs implies a like prayer that she be
recognized as an acknowledged natural child. Furthermore, it is a well-settled rule of pleadings,
applicable to motions or petitions, that the prayer for relief, though part of the pleading, is not part
of the cause of action or defense alleged therein, and the pleader is entitled to as much relief as the
facts duly pleaded may warrant.In the motion for reconsideration filed by them, for lack of notice is
alleged; but the motion is not even verified. Besides, according to the record Attorney S. B. B. was
the counsel for both the administrator and the oppositors-appellants. The petition for declaration of
heirs, although signed by Attorney S. B. P. as "abogado del administrador', was, in fact, a petition
filed in behalf of the oppositors-appellants as their right to succession is therein asserted and prayed
for and there exists sufficient ground for holding that the oppositors-appellants had notice of the
petition as well as of the hearing where the said attorney was present.