QUEBEC, RALPH M.

SUPREME COURT THIRD DIVISION, G.R. No. 214667, December 03, 2018

LINGNAM RESTAURANT, Petitioner, v. SKILLS & TALENT EMPLOYMENT POOL, INC., AND JESSIE COLASTE,
Respondents.

PONENTE: PERALTA, J.:

FACTS:

Skills & Talent Employment Pool, Inc. (STEP) is a domestic corporation engaged in manpower management and
technical services, and one of its clients is petitioner Lingnam Restaurant, a business enterprise owned and operated by
Liberty C. Nacion. In a contract2 of employment, respondent Jessie Colaste is a project employee of respondent STEP
assigned to work with petitioner Lingnam Restaurant as assistant cook.

On May 21, 2008, Jessie Colaste filed with the Labor Arbiter an Amended Complaint3 for illegal dismissal against
Lingnam Restaurant and STEP.

Jessie Colaste alleged that on December 21, 2006, he started working at Lingnam Restaurant as an assistant
cook/general utility with a salary of P350.00 a day. He worked six days a week, eight hours a day on two shifts.

On March 5, 2008, at about 10:00 a.m., Colaste reported to the main office of STEP at Ortigas Center, Pasig City. He was
informed by one Katherine R. Barrun that his contract with Lingnam Restaurant had expired. He was given a clearance
form to be signed by his supervisor at Lingnam Restaurant. However, he reported for work as usual at Lingnam
Restaurant from 2:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m.

On March 6, 2008, he was on day-off. On March 7, 2008, he reported for work at Lingnam Restaurant at Greenhills, San
Juan City, Metro Manila. However, the Chief Cook told him not to punch in his time card because he was already
terminated from work. After a few minutes, the Chief Cook handed him the telephone, and Supervisor Philipp Prado of the
main office of Lingnam Restaurant was on the line and told him, "finish contract ka na, hindi kana pwede pumasok sa
trabaho mo, tanggal ka na." Hence, Jessie Colaste filed this case for illegal dismissal against Lingnam Restaurant and
STEP, and prayed for reinstatement, payment of backwages and other employment benefits, moral and exemplary
damages and ten percent (10%) attorney's fees based on his total judgment award.

ISSUE:

STEP is engaged in labor-only contracting; hence, petitioner Lingnam Restaurant is the employer of complainant-
respondent Jessie Colaste and it is liable for Colaste's illegal dismissal.

HELD:

YES, STEP is engaged in labor-only contracting, the principal, petitioner Lingnam Restaurant, shall be deemed the
employer of respondent Jessie Colaste, in accordance with Section 7, Rule VIII-A, Book III of the Amended Rules To
Implement The Labor Code. Colaste started working with petitioner since 2006 and he should be considered a regular
employee of petitioner.

The reason for the termination of Jessie Colaste was his contract with petitioner Lingnam Restaurant through respondent
STEP had .expired. Lingnam Restaurant explained that Colaste's real employer is STEP. But since respondent STEP is
engaged in labor-only contracting, petitioner Lingnam Restaurant is deemed the employer of Colaste. Thus, the reason for
Colaste's termination is not a just or authorized cause for his dismissal under Articles 282 to 284 of the Labor Code.
Moreover, Colaste was not afforded procedural que process, since petitioner failed to comply with the written¬ notice
requirement under Article 277(b) of the Labor Code. The lack of valid cause for dismissal and petitioner's failure to comply
with the twin-notice requirement rendered the dismissal of respondent Colaste illegal.

As respondent Colaste was illegally dismissed, the Court of Appeals correctly held that he is entitled to reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other
benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of
his actual reinstatement

SUPREME COURT THIRD DIVISION - G.R. No. 217362, November 19, 2018

HENRY DIONIO, Petitioner, v. TRANS-GLOBAL MARITIME AGENCY, INC., GOODWOOD SHIPMANAGEMENT PTE
LTD., AND MICHAEL ESTANIEL, Respondents.

PONENTE: J. REYES, JR., J.:

FACTS:

Henry Dionio (Dionio) was engaged by Trans-Global Maritime Agency, Inc. (Trans-Global) as Bosun on board the vessel
MIT "Samco Asia" for and in behalf of Goodwood Shipmanagement, PTE, Ltd. (Goodwood). His Contract of Employment
with Trans-Global provided that he shall earn a basic monthly salary of US$730.00.

He embarked on February 2, 2011. On February 25, 2011, Dionio experienced dizziness, slurred speech, chest pain,
difficulty in breathing, repeated vomiting and minor loss of strength in his right hand. He was brought to a hospital in Cape
Town, South Africa on March 7, 2011 where he was diagnosed with a "possible transient Ischaemic Attack/Labyrinthitis."
On March 8, 2011, he was repatriated to the Philippines and was referred to the Metropolitan Medical Center (MMC) for
further evaluation and treatment.

On November 10, 2011, Dionio filed a complaint against Trans--Global, Goodwood and Michael Estaniel (hereafter
"respondents") for permanent disability benefits, as well as actual, moral and exemplary damages, plus attorney's fees.

On March 14, 2012, Dionio consulted Dr. Antonio Pascual of the Philippine Heart Center who diagnosed him with "S/P
Cerebrovascular Disease, Bilateral Cerebellar Infarct" and concluded that he was medically unfit to work as seaman.

Dionio also consulted Dr. Enrique Puentespina of The Lord's Hospital in Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan whose undated
neurological assessment stated that Dionio had "Vertebro Bassilar Insufficiency."

ISSUE:

Whether the CBA is indeed applicable in this case, based on Sec. 20.1.4 thereof, the seafarer must be certified
permanently unfit for further sea service in any capacity by the company doctor for the medical unfitness clause to apply.
They also assert that mere inability to work does not justify total and permanent disability compensation.

HELD:

NO. It is the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and full protection to labor. Thus, the Court has applied the
Labor Code concept of disability to Filipino seafarers. Case law has held that "the notion of disability is intimately related
to the worker's capacity to earn, and what is compensated is not his injury or illness but his inability to work resulting in the
impairment of his earning capacity. Thus, disability has been construed less on its medical significance but more on the
loss of earning capacity."

It has been held that there is total disability when the employee is unable to earn wages in the same kind of work or work
of similar nature that he or she was trained for, or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his or her
mentality and attainments could do. Meanwhile, there is permanent disability when the worker is unable to perform his or
her job for more than 120 or 240 days, as the case may be, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of
his or her body.

In this case, while much weight is given to the company-designated doctor's findings, as a result of Dionio's failure to
initiate the referral to a third doctor, an assessment of the medical certificate issued by the company doctor itself shows
that Dionio's claim for permanent and total disability is in order.

SUPREME COURT THIRD DIVISION - G.R. No. 210791, November 19, 2018

DAYLINDA ALBARRACIN,* Petitioner, v. PHILIPPINE TRANSWORLD SHIPPING AND/OR UNIX LIN PTE LTD.**
AND/OR ERLINDO M. SALVADOR, Respondents.

PONENTE: REYES, JR., J.:

FACTS:

Philippine Transworld Shipping Corp. (Transworld) is a domestic corporation engaged in the recruitment of seafarers for
its foreign principal, respondent Unix Lin Pte. Ltd. (Unix).

On September 5, 2006, Rex Miguelito Albarracin (Albarracin) was hired by Transworld, acting for and in behalf of Unix, as
Second Officer on board the latter's tanker-type vessel, M/T Eastern Neptune, under a Philippine Overseas Employment
Agency-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC)

Prior to his employment, Albarracin was made to undergo a rigorous pre-employment medical examination (PEME).
Despite the fact that his Treadmill Stress Test showed that he had an Abnormal Resting ECG and was found to have
"uninterpretable STT wave changes for ischemia due to left ventricular hypertrophy x x x," he was nonetheless declared
"fit for sea duty." Thus, in October 2006, Albarracin left the Philippines and joined the complement of M/T Eastern
Neptune.

Upon completion of his contract, Albarracin disembarked in Thailand and returned to the Philippines on May 22, 2007.
Thereafter, he reported to Transworld but only for debriefing and to signify his interest to be rehired.

In line with Albarracin's desire for reemployment, he underwent PEME on July 18, 2007. It was then discovered that he is
suffering from Hepatitis Band was suspected of having Hepatocellular Carcinoma (HCC).

On March 31, 2008, Albarracin died leaving behind his wife, Daylinda (petitioner), and minor child Rexlyn.

On December 11, 2008, the petitioner filed the complaint below against Transworld, Unix, and Transworld's president,
Erlindo M. Salvador (hereafter, respondents). She alleged, in essence, that Albarracin's work constantly subjected the
latter to mental and physical pressure and exposed him to gases, fumes, and vapors from chemicals and other
substances that are toxic to the heart, lungs, kidneys, and liver such that, while Albarracin was on board M/T Eastern
Neptune, the latter experienced pain in his stomach, suffered headaches, lost his appetite, and had difficulty standing and
walking. Despite the same, nobody brought him to a hospital or took care of him. When Albarracin arrived in Manila after
repatriation, he considerably lost weight, began having fever at night, and had dry cough. Albarracin requested the
respondents to refer him to the company doctor for medical examination and treatment but the respondents initially denied
the request and acceded only on July 16 and 17, 2007. When an examination was conducted on Albarracin, it was then
discovered that he has liver parenchymal disease with a mass on his right lobe.

The petitioner averred that, despite the above findings, the respondents did not give Albarracin any medical treatment
and, thus, the latter was left without a choice but to go home to the province. Examinations conducted on him by the
Chong Hua Hospital revealed that he has suspected HCC. He was then referred to the Cebu Doctors University for further
evaluation and treatment where he was diagnosed with "Liver: Hepatocellular Carcinoma, Grade 1" and underwent Right
Hepatic Lobectomy. The treatment, however, proved futile as he subsequently succumbed to his illness. The petitioner
claimed that, after Albarracin's death, she requested respondents to pay Albarracin's death benefits and burial expenses
but the latter refused to do so. Asserting that the respondents' refusal is unjust, malicious, and in bad faith, she prayed
that the respondents be held liable not only for death benefits and burial expenses but also for reimbursement of medical
expenses and for damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the illness and death of Albarracin is compensable?

HELD:

NO, petitioner presented substantial evidence that his wife suffered impaired nutrition and was exposed to hepatic
carcinogens during her employment and worked under conditions which predisposed her thereto; hence, it was decreed
that her liver cancer developed during her employment and while working under conditions which predisposed her thereto.
In contrast and as previously explained herein, the petitioner failed to present substantial evidence that her husband's
HCC developed by reason of or was aggravated by his work conditions.

There is no documentation whatsoever that Albarracin suffered any illness while on board M/T Eastern Neptune. There is
also no evidence, much less a categorical allegation by the petitioner, that Albarracin underwent a post-employment
examination within three days from disembarkation.

There is, therefore, no factual premise from which it could reasonably be concluded that Albarracin's work involved
considerable exposure to the risks of contracting liver cancer. Needless to stress, by failing to prove the nature of the work
of the seafarer, logically, the claimants would not be able to prove the work-relatedness of his illness.

Medical discussions that are merely lifted from medical sources without an expert witness to evaluate and explain how
said statements contained in such medical sources actually relate to the facts surrounding the case are not sufficient to
establish a nexus to support herein claim for death benefits.

All told, in the absence of substantial evidence for the grant of the death benefits prayed, this Court is left with no choice
but to deny the petition and affirm the CA's ruling reinstating the dismissal by the Labor Arbiter of the petitioner's
complaint for, truly, "whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his rights to the benefits
by substantial evidence."
SUPREME COURT THIRD DIVISION - G.R. No. 227098, November 14, 2018

JULIUS Q. APELANIO, Petitioner, v. ARCANYS, INC. AND CEO ALAN DEBONNEVILLE, Respondent.

PONENTE: PERALTA, J.:

FACTS:

On April 10, 2012, petitioner Julius Q. Apelanio was hired by respondents Arcanys, Inc. and Chief Executive Officer
(CEO) Alan Debonneville as a Usability/Web Design Expert. He was placed on a "probationary status" for a period of six
months. During the said period, respondent corporation evaluated his performance in terms of his dependability,
efficiency, initiative, cooperation, client responsiveness, judgment, punctuality, quality and quantity of work,
professionalism, and attitude towards customers, colleagues, and respondent corporation as a whole. Although petitioner
was aware that he was undergoing evaluation, he was allegedly not informed of what the passing grade was or what
constituted as "reasonable standards of satisfactory performance."

During his second (2nd) month evaluation on July 3, 2012, petitioner received a rating of 3.06. On his fourth (4th) month
evaluation, he received a rating of 2.99. On October 3, 2012, his sixth (6th) month evaluation, he received a rating of 2.77.
Respondents then served petitioner a letter7 informing him that they were not converting his status into a regular
employee since his performance fell short of the stringent requirements and standards set by respondent corporation.
Petitioner was given his final pay8 and he signed a Waiver, Release and Quitclaim9 in favor of respondents.

Petitioner averred that when his probationary contract was terminated, he was immediately offered a retainership
agreement lasting from October 10, 2012 until October 24, 2012, which involved a similar scope of work and
responsibilities. He was told that he did not meet the "reasonable standards of satisfactory performance," but was
nevertheless offered said retainership agreement with identical requirements on a project basis, without security of tenure,
with lesser pay, and without any labor standard benefits. Petitioner was confused with the arrangement, but agreed since
he had a family to support. He believed that he was still undergoing respondents' evaluation.

On October 26, 2012, after the lapse of the retainership agreement, petitioner was offered another retainership
agreement, from October 25, 2012 to November 12, 2012, again with an identical scope of work but at a reduced daily
rate of P857.14, down from the daily rate of P1,257.15 from the initial agreement.

As a result, petitioner became suspicious of the respondent corporation's motives and consulted with a lawyer, who
informed him that said practice was illegal. He then refused to sign the second retainership agreement, and questioned
why they offered him another retainership agreement if he was deemed unqualified for the position. Petitioner alleged that
respondents found him qualified for the position, but opted to hire his services on a per project basis, justifying the lesser
pay and the lack of security of tenure and labor standard benefits.

On the other hand, respondents stated that they hired petitioner as a web designer and was made aware that he would be
placed on probationary status, and that his failure to meet the stringent requirements and standards set forth would
terminate his employment contract.

As a matter of fact, several days before the end of petitioner's probationary contract on October 5, 2012, respondents
requested petitioner to sign the termination notice. Petitioner signed the termination notice; and respondents released and
paid petitioner his final pay on October 23, 2012. Petitioner also executed a Waiver, Release, and Quitclaim dated
November 16, 201210 in favor of respondents, indicating therein that he had no further claim whatsoever against the
company and that he had received his full pay.

When respondents stopped transacting with petitioner, he sued them before the Labor Arbiter for unfair labor practice,
illegal dismissal, and damages. Respondents vehemently deny that they violated petitioner's right to organize; and that
the charge of unfair labor practice is baseless, misleading, and irrelevant.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Arcany’s is a regular employee.

HELD:

YES. The retainership agreements indicates that petitioner was merely engaged as a consultant, in relation to the hacking
incidents endured by respondents. Petitioner merely alleged that he was hired as an employee under said retainership
agreements, but has yet to provide evidence to support such claim. "It is a basic rule in evidence that each party must
prove his affirmative allegations."25 Therefore, Article 281 of the Labor Code finds no application in this case, absent any
evidence to prove that petitioner worked beyond his probationary employment.

Thus, the Court of Appeals suitably found grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in ordering respondents to
pay petitioner the total amount of THREE HUNDRED TWENTY-SEVEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SIXTY PESOS
(P327,360.00) when he was validly terminated at the end of his probationary employment. "To sanction such action would
not only be unjust, but oppressive on the part of the employer as emphasized in Pampanga Bus Co., Inc., v. Pambusco
Employer Union, Inc. (68 Phil. 541 [1939])."

SUPREME COURT THIRD DIVISION-G.R. No. 222523, October 03, 2018

JOSE JOHN C. GUERRERO, Petitioner, v. PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC., CELEBRITY CRUISES,
AND CARLOS C. SALINAS, Respondents.

PONENTE: PERALTA, J.:

FACTS:

sometime in January 2012 during a gastro--intestinal outbreak in the ship, he and other crew members were tasked and
ordered to bring elderly guests out of the ship through wheelchairs; since the platform was not levelled with the ship's door
exit, and the bridge connecting the platform and the door exit was too steep, they decided that the best way to move and
transfer the elderly passengers was by pulling the wheelchairs; while he was pulling a wheelchair with a passenger, a
sudden motion occurred which caused him to lose his balance but managed to prevent the wheelchair, the passenger and
himself from falling; in order to keep the passenger safe, he had to push the wheelchair really hard to gain control over it;
after said incident, he started experiencing back pains which he just ignored due to the demands of his work as a casino
dealer; to manage his back pain, he took mefenamic acid tablets and applied pain relieving liniment and hot water on the
painful area; and later, his back pain became unbearable prompting him to consult the doctor of the vessel who
prescribed him pain reliever medication and sleeping pills.

While his vessel was docked at a port in the Caribbean, Guerrero underwent a Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI)
procedure at the Isle Imaging Center of St. George, Caribbean, and after which, the attending physician made the
following Impression: Findings revealed changes of Lumbar Spondylosis involving L2-3, L3-4, L4-5 disc causing of
compression of left L5 and bilateral L4 roots as described. No cords conus abnormality seen.5 In view of his medical
condition, he was recommended for medical repatriation. Upon his arrival in Manila on March 26, 2012, Guerrero
immediately reported to respondents and was referred to the Manila Doctors Hospital and the Philippine General Hospital
(PGH) for post-employment medical examination and for further treatment. He underwent a series of physical therapy
sessions at the Orthopedics Department of the PGH under the supervision of the company-designated physician/surgeon,
Dr. Adrian Catbagan (Dr. Catbagan). On October 19, 2012, a major surgery called Transforaminal Lumbar Interbody
Fusion L3-L4 & L4-L5 was performed on Guerrero by Dr. Catbagan at the Manila Doctors Hospital. On November 19,
2012, Dr. Catbagan issued a Medical Certificate6 stating that Guerrero was confined at the Manila Doctors Hospital on
October 19, 2012 and was discharged on November 9, 2012 with the following final diagnosis: Degenerative Disc Disease
& Disc Herniation L3-L4 & L4-L5 Moyamoya Disease, resolved. After Guerrero's surgery, he continued his therapy
sessions with Dr. Catbagan until January 15, 2013.
Guerrero alleged that since the pain still persisted notwithstanding the medical procedures performed on him, he
consulted, on January 17, 2013, Dr. Cesar H. Garcia (Dr. Garcia), an orthopedic surgeon/bone and joint disease, who
issued on even date a medical certificate7 declaring him "UNFIT for further sea service in whatever capacity as a
SEAFARER." Guerrero alleged that despite his permanent unfitness for further sea service as determined by his
physician, respondents failed to compensate him of permanent and total disability benefits. He maintained that he
sustained a spinal injury due to an accident arising out, and in the course of, his employment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Guerrero is entitled to disability benefits as well as to the award of damages and attorney's fees?

HELD:

NO. Nowhere in any of his pleadings filed before the labor tribunals and the CA was there any mention that Guerrero
accidentally fell with his back hitting the metal floor during the wheelchair incident. His conflicting and inconsistent
statements cast serious doubt on the veracity of his wheelchair theory. Obviously, Guerrero willfully made such false
statements in his futile attempt to deceive the labor tribunals, the CA and this Court that he suffered a work-related injury
so as to obtain a favorable judgment. Thus, for not coming to court with clean hands and in order to prevent him from
profiting from his own deception, basic rules of fair play dictate that we should deny his claim for disability benefits all the
more.

Guerrero failed to demonstrate that the dismissal of his complaint by the NLRC was tainted with grave abuse of discretion
or that the NLRC had no jurisdiction to order the same. On the contrary, the dismissal was proper and warranted since
Guerrero has no cause of action against the respondents. We are so mindful that the respondents have exerted real
efforts to extend medical assistance and even paid for all the expenses incurred in the course of the treatment of
Guerrero. There is nothing on record that would justify a compensation on top of the aid and assistance already extended
to him.

Let it be underscored that the constitutional policy to afford full protection to labor is never meant to be a sword to oppress
employers. While the Court is committed to the cause of the labor, the same would not deter us from sustaining the
employer when it is correct and proper. It must be emphasized that justice is, in every case, for the deserving and must be
dispensed with after a thorough scrutiny and circumspect evaluation of the established facts, the applicable law/s and
the·prevailing jurisprudence.