1.

Rules of Special Proceedings (Rule 72, Rules of COurt)

1 Hagans vs. Wislizenus, 42 Phil., 880 , No. 16680 September 13, 1920

Facts:

This is a case of special proceeding where the judge appointed assessors for the
purpose of fixing the amount due to an administrator or executor for his services and expenses
in the care, management and settlement of the estate of a deceased person.

Issue:

Whether or not the Judge is authorized by law in a special proceeding to appoint

assessors for purposes mentioned above?

Ruling:

No. The judge is not authorized to appoint assessors in special proceedings. Supreme
Court made a distinction on what is the difference of action and special proceeding. The former
means an ordinary suit in a court of justice while the latter is every other remedy furnished by
law. An action is a formal demand of one’s legal rights in a court of justice in the manner
prescribed by the court or by law. It is a method of applying legal remedies according to definite
established rules. While a special proceeding may be defined as an application or proceedings,
no formal pleadings are required, unless the statute expressly so provides. The remedy in
special proceedings is generally granted upon an application or motion.

Being different in nature, the Supreme Court held that the judge is not authorized by law
to appoint assessors because such authority is properly given to the judge in an ordinary action
and not in a special proceeding.

2 Vda. de Manalo vs. Court of Appeals, 349 SCRA 135 , G.R. No. 129242 January 16, 2001

Facts:

Troadio Manalo died intestate and was survived by his wife and eleven (11) children. He
left several properties which is the source of controversy because eight out of eleven children
filed in the RTC of Manila for the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father and for
appointment of their brother Romeo Manalo as administrator thereof.
The trial court issued an order of default. However this order was set aside by the trial
court upon motion of three (3) children of Manalo who did not join in filing a case for judicial
settlement made by their other brothers and sisters. Several pleadings were filed by the three
children of Manalo in opposition to the present petition.
RTC rendered decision in favor of the eight children.
Issue:
Whether or not this case is an ordinary action or special proceeding
Whether or not compromise agreement is applicable in special proceedings

Ruling:

It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding,

the averments and the character of the relief sought in the complaint or petition shall be
controlling. In the case at bar, SC noted the jurisdictional facts of the petition such as the fact of
death of their father, enumerations of the name of legal heirs including tentative properties left
by the deceased which are sought to be settled in a probate proceedings. Further, the rule has
always been to the effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the concomitant nature of an
action is determined by the averments of the complaint and not by the defenses contained in the
answer. Thus, considering all of those mentioned the eight heirs of Manalo seek judicial
settlement of the estate of their late father which makes their petition a special proceeding and
not just an ordinary action.

Being a special proceeding, a compromise agreement which is a condition precedent

before filing an action is not applicable to this case because there is no defendant impleaded
therein. SC pronounced in several cases that an action is different from a special proceeding.
Thus, the petition for issuance of letters of administration, settlement and distribution of estate is
a special proceeding where the petitioners (eight children) therein seek to establish a status, a
right or a particular fact. The three children who are the oppositors merely seek to establish the
fact of death of their father and subsequently to be duly recognized as among the heirs of the
said deceased so that they can validly exercise their right to participate in the settlement and
liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with the limited and special jurisdiction of the
probate court. Petition DENIED.

3 Natcher vs. Court of Appeals, 366 SCRA 385 , G.R. No. 133000 October 02, 2001

Facts:

Spouses Graciano and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel of land.
Upon the death of Graciana their six children entered in an extrajudicial settlement of Graciana’s
estate. Before Graciano contracted his second marriage to herein petitioner, he first donated his
pieces of properties to his children leaving only enough for himself. That lot which is left for him
was subdivided into two where the first lot was sold to a third person and the second one was
still in his ownership. Then when Graciano married Patricia Natcher, he sold the second lot to
her. Graciano died. Here comes the controversy that rooted from the sale of the second lot by
their father to herein petitioner. The six children of Graciano want that the sale be annulled
because it was through fraud, misrepresentation and forgery that the second lot was sold to
Natcher. The RTC issued a decision, among which is the declaration that the deed of sale
cannot be regarded as donation it may however be regarded as an extension of advance
inheritance of Patricia Natcher being a compulsory heir. CA reversed the decision of RTC.

Issue:
 Whether or Not RTC acting on its general jurisdiction could render adjudication and
resolve the issue of advancement of real property

Ruling:

No. RTC is devoid of authority to render adjudication and resolved the issue of
advancement of real property. Matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of
the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited
jurisdiction. SC contended that RTC Manila was not properly constituted to be a probate court
when it decides on these matters.
In a train of decisions, SC has consistently enunciated the long standing principle that
although generally a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership yet if the
interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties
consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are
not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership.

4 Matute vs. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 768 , G.R. No. L-26751, No.L-26085, No. L-26106
January 31, 1969

Facts:

Carlos Matute one of the Matute heirs and a full-blood brother of Matias Matute filed in a
special proceeding for the removal of Matias as co-administrator and his (Carlos) appointment
in such capacity. Carlos alleged that for two years Matias was not able to properly perform his
job for being incompetent and negligent in his management of the estate and that allegations
are supported by documents which was not properly identified by the court. Matias filed
oppositions thereto contending that the allegations against him are all hearsay, self-serving and
without a basis. Hence, he filed a motion to dismiss/ or demurrer to evidence which avers that
there is no sufficient evidence on record to justify and support for the removal of the Matias. In
the same motion, said counsel reserved the right to introduce evidence in behalf of his client
should the foregoing motion be denied. Then the probate court issued an order removing Matias
as a co-administrator.

Issue:

Whether or Not motion to dismiss/ or demurrer to evidence is applicable in a special

proceeding

Ruling:
Yes. This application of the above cited rule in special proceedings, like the case at bar,
is authorized by section 2 of rule 72 which direct that in the absence of special provisions, the
rules provided for ordinary civil actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special
proceedings. According to the SC, what is patently censurable is the actuation of the probate
judge in removing the respondent, not on the strength of the evidence adduced by the movants
but on the basis of his (judge) findings, which he motu propio gleaned from the records of
special proceeding without affording the Matias an opportunity to controvert said findings or in
the very least to explain why he should not be removed on the basis thereof. Evidently, Matias
was not afforded due process of law.

5 Guy vs. Court of Appeals, 502 SCRA 151 , G.R. No. 163707 September 15, 2006

Facts:

Private respondent-minors, represented by their mother, filed a petition for letters of

administration before the RTC of Makati entitled Intestate Estate of Sima Wei. Petitioner, as one
of the known heirs of the deceased, opposed the said petition. Moreover, the petitioner stressed
that the filiation of the respondents was not duly established and it cannot be done together with
the settlement of the estate of the deceased. The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents. The
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue:

May the court before which a petition for letters of administration is pending accept
evidence on a person’s filiation?

Held:

 The SC denied the petition

 The jurisdiction of the courts extends to matter incidental and collateral to the
exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate, including
the determination of the status of each heir and two causes of action, one to compel
recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one complaint.

6 Reyes vs. Sotero, 482 SCRA 520 , G.R. No. 167405 February 16, 2006

Facts:

Chichioco filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration and settlement of
estate of the late Elena Lising before the RTC of Paniqui, Tarlac. She claimed that was the niece
and heir of Lising who died intestate. Reyes file an opposition to the petition, claiming that she
was an adopted child of Lising and she submitted public documents to support her claim.
Chichioco seeked the annulment of the adoption decree.

Issue:

May the adoption decree be assailed collaterally in a proceeding for the settlement of a
decedent’s estate?

Held:

 The SC granted the petition

  The decree of adoption cannot be assailed collaterally in the petition for letters of
administration.
 Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty
by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

7 Lasam vs. Umengan, 510 SCRA 496

Facts:

Petitioners file a complaint for unlawful detainer before the before the MTCC, alleging
that they are the owners of the subject lots. They anchored their claim on the purported last will
and testament of Isabel Cuntapay. In her answer, respondent alleged that she acquired said lots
through sale and donation inter vivos from an heir of Isabel Cuntapay. The MTCC ruled in favor
of the petitioners by giving credence to the will even if it was not probated. The CA reversed the
ruling of the MTCC.

Issue:

Is the will reliable to establish the petitioner’s claim even if it was not probated?

Held:

 The SC denied the petition

 Under RULE 75, Sec. 1: No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is
proved and allowed in the proper court. Subject to the right of appeal, such
allowance shall be conclusive as to its due execution.

8 Ancheta vs. Guersey-Dalaygon, 490 SCRA 140 , G.R. No. 139868 June 08, 2006

Facts:

Spouses Audrey O’Neill and Richard Guersey were American citizens who have resided
in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter Kyle. In 1979, Audrey died
leaving a will. In it, she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard. The will was admitted to
probate before the Court of Baltimore, Maryland, USA. Such court named petitioner as ancillary
administrator. In 1981, Richard married respondent with whom he had two children. In 1982,
Audrey’s will was also admitted to probate by the CFI of Rizal. In 1984, Richard died, leaving a
will, wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, save for his rights and interests
over the A/G Interiors, Inc., shares, which he left to Kyle. In 1987, petitioner a project of partition
of Audrey’s estate, with Richard being apportioned the ¾ and Kyle the ¼ of the Makati property.
Meanwhile, the petitioner also filed a project of partition wherein 2/5 of Richard’s 3/4 share in
the Makati property was allocated to respondent, while 3/5 thereof were allocated to Richard’s
three children. This was opposed by respondent on the ground that under the law of the State of
Maryland, “a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property
subject of the legacy.” Since Richard left his entire estate to respondent, his entire ¾ share in
the Makati property should be given to respondent. The CFI ruled in favor of the respondent and
such ruling was affirmed by the CA.

Issues:

What law shall govern in the settlement of property located in the Philippines but owned
by foreigners?

Did the petitioner committed fraud in ignoring the applicability of the foreign law in the
settlement of the estate of the decedent?

Held:

 The SC denied the petition

 Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audrey’s will, especially with regard
as to who are her heirs, is governed by her national law, that is, the law of the State
of Maryland, as provided in Article 16 of the Civil Code. While laws do not prove
themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice
of them; however, petitioner, as ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate, was duty-
bound to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland. Thus, the
failure of the petitioner to introduce such law is tantamount to an extrinsic fraud.

9 Domingo vs. Landicho, 531 SCRA 606 G.R. No. 170015 , August 29, 2007

Facts:

Petitioner filed with the RTC of Tagaytay Cuty an application for registration of five
parcels of land. He claimed that he bought the lots from Genoveva and has since been in
continuous, open, public, adverse and uninterrupted possession thereof in the concept of an
owner. He further claimed that prior to his purchase of the lots, Genoveva had been in
possession thereof in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years. Herein respondents filed
an opposition to the application, claiming that they have been in continuous, open, public,
adverse and actual possession and cultivation of the lots in the concept of an owner and have
been paying real estate taxes thereon. During the pendency of his application, petitioner died.
His counsel, did not, however, inform the RTC of his death. The RTC granted the application.
The CA reversed the decision of the RTC.

Issues:

Can the court render judgment in an action that survives even if there’s no substitution of
the deceased applicant?

Held:

 The SC denied the petition

 Under the Rules of Court, it is the counsel’s duty to inform the court promptly of the
death of his client so that the court can make an order substituting a legal
representative or heir in place of the deceased.
 When a party dies in an action that survives and no order is issued by the court for
the appearance of the legal representative or of the heirs of the deceased in
substitution of the deceased, and as a matter of fact no substitution has ever been
effected, the proceedings held by the court without such legal representatives or
heirs and the judgment rendered after such trial are null and void because the court
acquired no jurisdiction over the person of the legal representative or of the heirs
upon whom the trial and judgment would be binding.
 Settlement of Estates of Deceased Persons (Rules 73-90, Rules of Court)

10 Eusebio vs. Eusebio, et al., 100 Phil. 593 , No. L-8409 December 28, 1956

Facts:

Petitioner Eugenio Eusebio filed with the CFI of Rizal a petition for his appointment as
administrator of the estate of his father, Andres Eusebio. He alleged that his father, who died on
November 28, 1952, resided in Quezon City. Eugenio’s siblings (Amanda, Virginia, Juan, Delfin,
Vicente and Carlos), stating that they are illegitimate children of Andres, opposed the petition
and alleged that Andres was domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga. They prayed that the case
be dismissed upon the ground that venue had been improperly laid.

The CFI of Rizal granted Eugenio’s petition and overruled his siblings’ objection.

Issue: Whether venue had been properly laid in Rizal?

Held: No. Don Andres Eusebio up to October 29, 1952, was and had always been domiciled in
San Fernando, Pampanga. He only bought a house and lot at 889-A Espana Extension,
Quezon City because his son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who treated him, resided at No. 41 P.
Florentino St., Quezon City. Even before he was able to transfer to the house he bought,
Andres suffered a stroke and was forced to live in his son’s residence. It is well settled that
“domicile is not commonly changed by presence in a place merely for one own’s health” even if
coupled with “knowledge that one will never again be able, on account of illness, to return home.
Having resided for over seventy years in Pampanga, the presumption is that Andres retained
such domicile.

Andres had no intention of staying in Quezon City permanently. There is no direct evidence of
such intent – Andres did not manifest his desire to live in Quezon City indefinitely; Eugenio did
not testify thereon; and Dr. Jesus Eusebio was not presented to testify on the matter. Andres did
not part with, or alienate, his house in San Fernando, Pampanga. Some of his children
remained in that municipality. In the deed of sale of his house at 889 – A Espana Ext., Andres
gave San Fernando, Pampanga, as his residence. The marriage contract signed by Andres
when he was married in articulo mortis to Concepcion Villanueva two days prior to his death
stated that his residence is San Fernando, Pampanga.

The requisites for a change of domicile include (1) capacity to choose and freedom of choice,
(2) physical presence at the place chosen, (3) intention to stay therein permanently. Although
Andres complied with the first two requisites, there is no change of domicile because the third
requisite is absent.

Anent the contention that appellants submitted themselves to the authority of the CFI of Rizal
because they introduced evidence on the residence of the decedent, it must be noted that
appellants specifically made of record that they were NOT submitting themselves to the
jurisdiction of the court, except for the purpose only of assailing the same.

In sum, the Court found that Andres was, at the time of his death, domiciled in San Fernando,
Pampanga; that the CFI of Rizal had no authority, therefore, to appoint an administrator of the
estate of the deceased, the venue having been laid improperly.

Doctrine: Domicile once acquired is retained until a new domicile is gained. It is not changed by
presence in a place for one’s own health.

11 Maloles II vs. Phillips, 324 SCRA 172 , G.R. No. 129505, G.R. No. 133359 January 31,
2000

Facts:

A, during his lifetime, filed a petition for probate of his will in Branch 61, claiming that hehad no
compulsory heirs and left all his properties to a foundation. He named D as executrix.The will
was allowed and A subsequently died. P filed a motion for intervention claiming to beA’s
nephew while D filed a motion for issuance of letters testamentary which D later withdrew.D
refiled her motion with Branch 65. Branch 65 appointed D as special administrator but
later ordered the transfer of D’s case to Branch 61. However, Branch 61 remanded the second caseback to
Branch 65.

Issue:
Whether Branch 65 has jurisdiction.

Held:

Yes.After Branch 61 allowed the will of A, it had nothing else to do except to issue a certificate
of allowance of the will pursuant to Rule 73 §12 of the Rules of Court. After A’s death, insofar
asthe venue of the petition for probate of the will of A is concerned, it does not bar
other branchesof the same court from taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the
testator after hisdeath. Thus, Branch 65 has jurisdiction.

12 Malig vs. Bush, 28 SCRA 449 , No. L-22761 May 31, 1969

Facts: the plaintiffs filed the complaint, alleging that they were the acknowledged natural
children and the only heirs in the direct line of the deceased John T. Bush. They prayed that
They prayed that the project of partition be annulled; that the defendant be ordered to submit a
complete inventory and accounting of all the properties left by the deceased and another project
of partition adjudicating to the plaintiffs their legal participation in the said estate and/or in the
event that the defendant had disposed of all or part of the estate, that she be ordered to pay
them the market value thereof; and that the defendant be ordered to pay for the value of the
fruits received, damages and attorney's fees.

The defendant moved to dismiss, alleging lack of cause of action, res judicata and statute of
limitations.

After the issues were joined the case was set for hearing, but on the date thereof the hearing
was postponed upon the defendant's manifestation that she would file a written motion to
dismiss. The motion, when filed, challenged the jurisdiction of the court, stating that since the
action was one to annul a project of partition duly approved by the probate court it was that
court alone which could take cognizance of the case, citing Rule 75, Section 1, of the Rules of
Court. On October 31, 1963 the lower court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint,
not on the ground relied upon by the defendant but because the action had prescribed. The
plaintiffs moved to reconsider but were turned down; hence, this appeal.

Issue: The procedural question posed by appellants is: May the lower court dismiss an action
on a ground not alleged in the motion to dismiss?

Held: No. The Court should not dismiss a case based on a ground not alleged in the motion to
dismiss because it is tantamount to depriving the opposing party of their right to respond or
argue the case.

13 Vda. de Manalo vs. Court of Appeals, 349 SCRA 135 , G.R. No. 129242 January 16,
2001
FACTS:

- Troadio Manalo died intestate survived by wife and 11 children left several properties in Manila
and Tarlac.- 8 children (resps) pet for the judicial settlement of the estate in RTC Manila &
appointment of bro Romeo as admin- TC order “declaring the whole world in default, except the
government.”- order of general default set aside upon motion of pets (wife & remaining 3
children)- TC order admitting the petition for judicial settlement of estate.- Pets pet for certiorari
under Rule 65- absence of earnest efforts towards compromise among members of the same
family; and no certification of nonforum shopping was attached to the petition.- CA denied the
petition & MFR- Pets – petition claiming Pet for issuance of letters of admin, settlement &
distribution of estate is an ordinary civil actionthus should be dismissed under

Rule 16, Sec 1(j) of the ROC on the ground that a condition precedent for filing the claimhas not
been complied with as there was failure to comply with the requirement in Art 222 CC.

ISSUE:

Is the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate an
ordinary civil action, thusRule 16, Sec 1(j) Rules of Court vis-a-vis Article 222 CC apply as a
ground for the dismissal of the petition

HELD: NO

Rule: In the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averment and the
character of the relief soughtin the complaint, or petition, shall be controlling. Scrutiny of the
Petition for ILASD of Estate belies herein petitioner’s claim that the same is in the nature of
anordinary civil action petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition
for the settlement of estate:

1. fact of death
2. residence at the time of his said death
3. enumeration of the names of his legal heirs
4. tentative list of the properties left w/c are sought to be settled in the probate
proceedings.

Reliefs prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as regard the intention to seek
judicialsettlement of the estate of their deceased father. Petition contains certain averments
which may be typical of an ordinary civil action & so petitioners, as oppositors took advantage of
such in anapparent effort to make out a case of an ordinary civil action and ultimately seek its
dismissal under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Courtvis-à-vis, Article 222 of the
Civil Code.

- action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues another for the enforcement of a right, or
theprotection or redress of a wrong. Art 222 applicable only to ordinary civil actions
Use of term “suit” excerpt from the report of the Code Commission to make it applicable only to
civil actions which are essentially adversarial and involve members of the same family.

Special proceedings

– remedy where petitioner seeks to establish a status, right or particular fact.

Pet for ILASD of Estate = special proc

14 Rodriguez, et al. vs. Borja, et al., 17 SCRA 418, June 21, 1966

FACTS:

Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died on Feb. 12, 1963. On March 4, 1963, Apolonia Pangilinan
and Adelaida Jacalan (respondents) delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported last
will and testatment of Fr. Rodriguez. On March 9, 1963, Maria Rodriguez and Angela
Rodriquez (petitioners), through counsel filed a petition for leave of court to allow them to
examine the alleged will. On March 11, 1963, before the Court could act on the petition, the
same was withdrawn. On March 12, 1963, petitioners filed before the CIF of Rizal a petition for
the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez. On same day, (March 12), defendants
filed a petition for the probation of the will delivered by them on March 4.-petitioners contend
that the intestate proceedings in the CIF of Rizal was filed at 8:00AM on March 12, while the
petition for probate in the CIF of Bulacan at 11AM, so the latter Court has no jurisdiction to
entertain the petition for probate.-defendants contend that CIF of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction
over the case upon delivery of the will, hence the case in this court has precedence over
petitioners’.-CIF of Bulacan denied MD of petitioners. MR denied.

ISSUE: Which court has jurisdiction?

HELD:

The jurisdiction of the CIF of Bulacan became vested upon the delivery of the will of the
Fr. Rodriquez on March 4 even if no petition for its allowance was filed yet because upon the
will being deposited, the court could, motu proprio have taken steps to fix the time and place for
proving the will, and issued the corresponding notices to what is prescribed by Sec. 3, Rule 76
of the Revised Rules of Court, to wit: “When a will is deliver to, or a petition for the allowance of
a will is filed in, the Court having jurisdiction, such Court shall fix a time and place for proving
the will xxx and shall cause notice of such time and place to be published xxx” where the
petition for probate is made after the deposit of the will, the petition is deemed to relate back to
the time when the will was delivered. Since the will was delivered to the court of Bulacan on
March 4 while petitioners initiated intestate proceedings in court of Rizal only on March 12, the
precedence and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan court is incontestable. As to petitioners
objection that the Bulacan court did not have jurisdiction because the decedent was domiciled in
Rizal, court ruled that the power to settle the decedent;s estates is conferred by law upon all
CIFs, and the domicile of the testator only affects the venue but not the jurisdiction of the court.
Furthermore, the estate proceedings having been initiated in Bulacan court ahead of any other,
that court is entitled to assume jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, even if it were a
case of wron venue by express provisions of Rule 73. Court also held that petitioners, in
commencing intestate proceedings in Rizal, were in bad faith, patently done to divest the
Bulacan court of the precedence awarded it by the Rules. Lastly, intestate succession is only
subsidiary or subordinate to testate, since intestacy only takes place in the absence of a valid
and operative will.

15 Eusebio vs. Eusebio supra

FACTS:
Petitioner Eugenio Eusebio filed with the CFI of Rizal a petition for his appointment as
administrator of the estate of his father, Andres Eusebio. He alleged that his father, who died on
November 28, 1952, resided in Quezon City. Eugenio’s siblings (Amanda, Virginia, Juan, Delfin,
Vicente and Carlos), stating that they are illegitimate children of Andres, opposed the petition
and alleged that Andres was domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga. They prayed that the case
be dismissed upon the ground that venue had been improperly laid.
The CFI of Rizal granted Eugenio’s petition and overruled his siblings’ objection.

ISSUE: Whether venue had been properly laid in Rizal?

HELD:
No. Don Andres Eusebio up to October 29, 1952, was and had always been domiciled in
San Fernando, Pampanga. He only bought a house and lot at 889-A Espana Extension,
Quezon City because his son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who treated him, resided at No. 41 P.
Florentino St., Quezon City. Even before he was able to transfer to the house he bought,
Andres suffered a stroke and was forced to live in his son’s residence. It is well settled that
“domicile is not commonly changed by presence in a place merely for one own’s health” even if
coupled with “knowledge that one will never again be able, on account of illness, to return home.
Having resided for over seventy years in Pampanga, the presumption is that Andres retained
such domicile.

Andres had no intention of staying in Quezon City permanently. There is no direct evidence of
such intent – Andres did not manifest his desire to live in Quezon City indefinitely; Eugenio did
not testify thereon; and Dr. Jesus Eusebio was not presented to testify on the matter. Andres did
not part with, or alienate, his house in San Fernando, Pampanga. Some of his children
remained in that municipality. In the deed of sale of his house at 889 – A Espana Ext., Andres
gave San Fernando, Pampanga, as his residence. The marriage contract signed by Andres
when he was married in articulo mortis to Concepcion Villanueva two days prior to his death
stated that his residence is San Fernando, Pampanga.
The requisites for a change of domicile include (1) capacity to choose and freedom of choice,
(2) physical presence at the place chosen, (3) intention to stay therein permanently. Although
Andres complied with the first two requisites, there is no change of domicile because the third
requisite is absent.
Anent the contention that appellants submitted themselves to the authority of the CFI of Rizal
because they introduced evidence on the residence of the decedent, it must be noted that
appellants specifically made of record that they were NOT submitting themselves to the
jurisdiction of the court, except for the purpose only of assailing the same.
In sum, the Court found that Andres was, at the time of his death, domiciled in San Fernando,
Pampanga; that the CFI of Rizal had no authority, therefore, to appoint an administrator of the
estate of the deceased, the venue having been laid improperly.