G.R. No.

74431 November 6, 1989

PURITA MIRANDA VESTIL and AGUSTIN VESTIL, petitioners,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, DAVID UY and TERESITA UY, respondents.

Pablo P. Garcia for petitioners.

Roberto R. Palmares for private respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

Little Theness Tan Uy was dead at the age of three. Her parents said she died because she was
bitten by a dog of the petitioners, but the latter denied this, claiming they had nothing to do with
the dog. The Uys sued the Vestils, who were sustained by the trial court. On appeal, the decision
of the court a quo was reversed in favor of the Uys. The Vestils are now before us. They ask us
to set aside the judgment of the respondent court and to reinstate that of the trial court.

On July 29, 1915, Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of the
petitioners in the house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil, at F. Ramos
Street in Cebu City. She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital, where she was treated for
"multiple lacerated wounds on the forehead" 1 and administered an anti-rabies vaccine by Dr.
Antonio Tautjo. She was discharged after nine days but was readmitted one week later due to
"vomiting of saliva." 2 The following day, on August 15, 1975, the child died. The cause of death
was certified as broncho-pneumonia. 3

Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils were liable to them as the
possessors of "Andoy," the dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter. The Vestils rejected
the charge, insisting that the dog belonged to the deceased Vicente Miranda, that it was a tame
animal, and that in any case no one had witnessed it bite Theness. After trial, Judge Jose R.
Ramolete of the Court of First Instance of Cebu sustained the defendants and dismissed the
complaint. 4

The respondent court arrived at a different conclusion when the case was appealed. 5 It found
that the Vestils were in possession of the house and the dog and so should be responsible under
Article 2183 of the Civil Code for the injuries caused by the dog. It also held that the child had
died as a result of the dog bites and not for causes independent thereof as submitted by the
appellees. Accordingly, the Vestils were ordered to pay the Uys damages in the amount of
P30,000.00 for the death of Theness, P12,000.00 for medical and hospitalization expenses, and
P2,000.00 as attorney's fees.

In the proceedings now before us, Purita Vestil insists that she is not the owner of the house or of
the dog left by her father as his estate has not yet been partitioned and there are other heirs to the
property. Pursuing the logic of the Uys, she claims, even her sister living in Canada would be
held responsible for the acts of the dog simply because she is one of Miranda's heirs. However,
that is hardly the point. What must be determined is the possession of the dog that admittedly
was staying in the house in question, regardless of the ownership of the dog or of the house.

Article 2183 reads as follows:

The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible
for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. 'This
responsibility shall cease only in case the damages should come from force
majeure from the fault of the person who has suffered damage.

Thus, in Afialda v. Hisole, 6 a person hired as caretaker of a carabao gored him to death and his
heirs thereupon sued the owner of the animal for damages. The complaint was dismissed on the
ground that it was the caretaker's duty to prevent the carabao from causing injury to any one,
including himself.

Purita Vestil's testimony that she was not in possession of Miranda's house is hardly credible.
She said that the occupants of the house left by her father were related to him ("one way or the
other") and maintained themselves out of a common fund or by some kind of arrangement (on
which, however, she did not elaborate ). 7 She mentioned as many as ten of such relatives who
had stayed in the house at one time or another although they did not appear to be close kin. 8 She
at least implied that they did not pay any rent, presumably because of their relation with Vicente
Miranda notwithstanding that she herself did not seem to know them very well.

There is contrary evidence that the occupants of the house, were boarders (or more of boarders
than relatives) who paid the petitioners for providing them with meals and accommodations. It
also appears that Purita Vestil had hired a maid, Dolores Jumao-as, who did the cooking and
cleaning in the said house for its occupants. 9 Her mother, Pacita, who was a nursemaid of Purita
herself, categorically declared that the petitioners were maintaining boarders in the house where
Theness was bitten by a dog.10 Another witness, Marcial Lao, testified that he was indeed a
boarder and that the Vestils were maintaining the house for business purposes. 11 And although
Purita denied paying the water bills for the house, the private respondents submitted
documentary evidence of her application for water connection with the Cebu Water District,
which strongly suggested that she was administering the house in question. 12

While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still part of Vicente
Miranda's estate, there is no doubt that she and her husband were its possessors at the time of the
incident in question. She was the only heir residing in Cebu City and the most logical person to
take care of the property, which was only six kilometers from her own house. 13 Moreover, there
is evidence showing that she and her family regularly went to the house, once or twice weekly,
according to at least one witness, 14 and used it virtually as a second house. Interestingly, her
own daughter was playing in the house with Theness when the little girl was bitten by the
dog. 15 The dog itself remained in the house even after the death of Vicente Miranda in 1973 and
until 1975, when the incident in question occurred. It is also noteworthy that the petitioners
offered to assist the Uys with their hospitalization expenses although Purita said she knew them
only casually. 16
The petitioners also argue that even assuming that they were the possessors of the dog that bit
Theness there was no clear showing that she died as a result thereof. On the contrary, the death
certificate 17 declared that she died of broncho-pneumonia, which had nothing to do with the dog
bites for which she had been previously hospitalized. The Court need not involve itself in an
extended scientific discussion of the causal connection between the dog bites and the certified
cause of death except to note that, first, Theness developed hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies, as
a result of the dog bites, and second, that asphyxia broncho-pneumonia, which ultimately caused
her death, was a complication of rabies. That Theness became afraid of water after she was bitten
by the dog is established by the following testimony of Dr. Tautjo:

COURT: I think there was mention of rabies in the report in the second
admission?

A: Now, the child was continuously vomiting just before I referred to Dr. Co
earlier in the morning and then the father, because the child was asking for water,
the father tried to give the child water and this child went under the bed, she did
not like to drink the water and there was fright in her eyeballs. For this reason,
because I was in danger there was rabies, I called Dr. Co.

Q: In other words, the child had hydrophobia?

A: Yes, sir. 18

As for the link between rabies and broncho-pneumonia, the doctor had the following to say under
oath:

A: Now, as 1 said before, broncho-pneumonia can result from physical, chemical

and bacterial means. ... It can be the result of infection, now, so if you have any
other disease which can lower your resistance you can also get pneumonia.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Would you say that a person who has rabies may die of complication which is
broncho-pneumonia?

A: Yes.

Q: For the record, I am manifesting that this book shown the witness is know as
CURRENT DIANOSIS & TREATMENT, 1968 by Henry Brainerd, Sheldon
Margen and Milton Chaton. Now, I invite your attention, doctor, to page 751 of
this book under the title "Rabies." There is on this page, "Prognosis" as a result of
rabies and it says: Once the symptoms, have appeared death inevitably occurs
after 2-3 days as a result of cardiac or respiratory failure or generalized paralysis.
After a positive diagnosis of rabies or after a bite by a suspected animal if the
animal cannot be observed or if the bite is on the head, give rabies vaccine (duck
embryo). Do you believe in this statement?
 A: Yes.

Q: Would you say therefore that persons who have rabies may die of respiratory
failure which leave in the form of bronco-pneumonia?

A: Broncho-pneumonia can be a complication of rabies. 19

On the strength of the foregoing testimony, the Court finds that the link between the dog bites
and the certified cause of death has beep satisfactorily established. We also reiterate our ruling
in Sison v. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, 20 that the death certificate is not conclusive
proof of the cause of death but only of the fact of death. Indeed, the evidence of the child's
hydrophobia is sufficient to convince us that she died because she was bitten by the dog even if
the death certificate stated a different cause of death. The petitioner's contention that they could
not be expected to exercise remote control of the dog is not acceptable. In fact, Article 2183 of
the Civil Code holds the possessor liable even if the animal should "escape or be lost" and so be
removed from his control. And it does not matter either that, as the petitioners also contend, the
dog was tame and was merely provoked by the child into biting her. The law does not speak only
of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for the alleged
provocation, the petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at the time she was
attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to the animal.

It is worth observing that the above defenses of the petitioners are an implied rejection of their
original posture that there was no proof that it was the dog in their father's house that bit
Theness.

According to Manresa the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on
the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal
causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he
who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such
animal may cause. 21

We sustain the findings of the Court of Appeals and approve the monetary awards except only as
to the medical and hospitalization expenses, which are reduced to P2,026.69, as prayed for in the
complaint. While there is no recompense that can bring back to the private respondents the child
they have lost, their pain should at least be assuaged by the civil damages to which they are
entitled.

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is AFFIRMED as above modified. The petition is

DENIED, with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. L-36858 March 6, 1933

JUSTA AFABLE and the minors POTENCIANO MADLANGBAYAN and ROSA

MADLANGBAYAN, by JUSTA AFABLE, as guardian ad litem, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
SINGER SEWING MACHINE COMPANY, defendant-appellee.

Bernabe Butalid and Teofilo Mendoza for appellants.

William F. Mueller for appellee.

VICKERS, J.:

This is an appeal by the plaintiffs from a decision of Judge Pedro Concepcion of the Court of
First Instance of Manila dismissing the complaint, without a special finding as to costs.

The appellants make the following assignments of error:

I. El Juzgado a quo incurrio en error al considerar que los hechos probados por los demandantes
caen fuera de las disposiciones del articulo 2 de dicha Ley No. 3428 tal como ha sido enmendada
por la Ley No. 3812 de la Legislatura Filipina;

II. Erro tambien al sobreseer de una manera definitiva la demandada;

III. Incurrio finalmente en error al no conceder la compensacion reclamada en la demanda a que

tienen derecho los demandantes, segun las disposiciones de dicha Ley.

It appears from the evidence that Leopoldo Madlangbayan was a collector for the Singer Sewing
Machine Company in the district of San Francisco del Monte, outside of the limits of the City of
Manila, and he was supposed to be residing in his district according to the records of the
company. His compensation was a commission of eight per cent of all collections made by him.
On the afternoon of Sunday, November 16, 1930, Leopoldo Madlangbayan while riding a
bicycle was run over and fatally injured at the corner of O'Donnel and Zurbaran streets in the
City of Manila by a truck driven by Vitaliano Sumoay. It appears that Madlangbayan had moved
to Teodora Alonso Street in Manila without notifying the company, and that at the time of his
death he was returning home after making some collections in San Francisco del Monte.
According to the practice of the company, if collectors made collections on Sunday they were
required to deliver the amount collected to the company the next morning.

On November 21, 1930, Vitaliano Sumoay, the driver of the truck within caused the death of
Leopoldo Madlangbayan, was convicted for the crime of homicide through reckless negligence,
and was sentenced to imprisonment for one year and one day, and to indemnify the heirs of
Leopoldo Madlangbayan in the sum of P1,000.

On February 19, 1931, the widow and children of Leopoldo Madlangbayan brought the present
action to recover from the defendant corporation under Act No. 3428, as amended by Act. No.
3812, P100 for burial expenses and P1,745.12 for compensation. Plaintiffs' complaint was
subsequently amended, and they sought to recover under sections 8 and 10 of Act No. 3428 fifty
per cent of P16.78 for 208 weeks of P1,745.12 plus P100 for burial expenses.

In its answer to the plaintiffs' last amended complaint, the defendant denied all the allegations
thereof, and as special defenses alleged that prior to the filing of this complaint the plaintiffs had
obtained a judgment against Vitaliano Sumoay for the damages caused by him; that Leopoldo
Madlangbayan at the time that he sustained the injuries resulting in his death was violating an
ordinance of the City of Manila which prohibits work on Sunday; and that Act No. 3428, as
amended, is unconstitutional and void because it denies the defendant the equal protection of the
law, and impairs the obligation of the contract between the defendant and Leopoldo
Madlangbayan, and deprives the Courts of First Instance of their probate jurisdiction over the
estate of deceased persons and nullifies Chapters XXIX, XXX, XXXI, XXXII, XXXIII, and
XXXIV of the Civil Code Procedure and related articles of the Civil Code. As the deceased
Leopoldo Madlangbayan was killed on November 16, 1930 and Act No. 3812 was not approved
until December 8, 1930, it is apparent that the law which is applicable is Act No. 3428, section
23 of which reads as follows:

When any employee receives a personal injury from any accident due to in the pursuance of the
employment, or contracts any illness directly caused by such employment or the result of the
nature of such employment, his employer shall pay compensation in the sums and to the persons
hereinafter specified.

The accident which caused the death of the employee was not due to and in pursuance of his
employment. At the time that he was over by the truck Leopoldo Madlangbayan was not in the
pursuance of his employment with the defendant corporation, but was on his way home after he
had finished his work for the day and had left the territory where he was authorized to take
collections for the defendant. The employer is not an insurer "against all accidental injuries
which might happen to an employee while in the course of the employment", and as a general
rule an employee is not entitled to recover from personal injuries resulting from an accident that
befalls him while going to or returning from his place of employment, because such an accident
does no arise out of and in the course of his employment.

The phrase "due to and in the pursuance of" used in section 2 of Act No. 3428 was changed in
Act No. 3812 to "arising out of and in the course of". Discussing this phrase, the Supreme Court
of Illinois in the case of Mueller Construction Co. vs. Industrial Board (283 III., 148; 118 N.E.,
1028; 1 W.C.L., 943), said:

The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident, and are descriptive of its
character, while the words "in the course of" refer to the time, place, and circumstances under
which the accident takes place. (Fitzgerald vs. Clarke & Sons, 1 B.W.C.C., 197; Dietzen Co. vs.
Industrial Board, 279 Ill., 11; 116 N.E., 684.) By the use of these words it was not the intention
of the legislature to make the employer an insurer against all accidental injuries which might
happen to an employee while in the course of the employment, but only for such injuries arising
from or growing out of the risks peculiar to the nature of the work in the scope of the workman's
employment of incidental to such employment, and accidents in which it is possible to trace the
injury to some risk or hazard to which the employee is exposed in a special degree by reason of
such employment. Risks to which all persons similarly situated are equally exposed and not
traceable in some special degree to the particular employment are excluded.

Although some courts have held otherwise, we think the better rule is as we have stated it. We do
not of course mean to imply that an employee can never recover for injuries suffered while of his
way to or from work. That depends on the nature of his employment. In the case at bar, if the
deceased had been killed while going from house to house in San Francisco del Monte in the
pursuance of his employment, the plaintiffs would undoubtedly have the right, prima facie, to
recover.

The appellants cite the syllabus in Stacy's case (225 Mass., 174), in support of their contention,
but an examination of that case shows that it differs materially from the case at the bar. Stacy
was drowned by reason of breaking through the ice of Colburn's Pond while of his way home
from work. Up to the time of his death he had been employed in the ice-house, in the work of
storing ice which was cut from the pond. The ice-house was situated at the southerly end of the
pond and the deceased lived directly north from the ice-house, across the pond. He followed the
reasonable and customary way of leaving his employer's premises. The path around the pond was
not used in winter. He was on his employer's premises when he met his death and was leaving
those premises by a reasonable way. There was no other convenient way of going home. The
pond was the premises of his employer, under his employer's control. It was as a result of the
working operations of his employer that he met his death. The court said. "The finding that the
pond was in the control of the employer and that crossing over it upon the ice was the
"reasonable and customary way" for the deceased to reach his home, and that he and other
employees who lived in the same direction "crossed by this way regularly", warranted the further
finding that the injury occurred in the course of the employment." The court added: "It also could
have been found that the death of the employee was due to his employment as a contributing
proximate cause, incidental to the nature of the work in which he was engaged. There was
evidence from which the board could have found that Stacy's death occurred by reason of the
special hazard incident to the work which it was his duty to perform ." The court said that Stacy's
case was clearly distinguishable from Fumiciello's case (219 Mass., 488):

Fumiciello was employed by Lathrop & Shea, who were doing some contract work for the
Boston & Albany Railroad Company near Middlefield. He lived about one mile west where he
was employed, and it was necessary for him to pass over the tracks of the Boston & Albany
Railroad Company to go from his work to his home. While returning home at the close of the
day's work, Fumiciello entered upon the railroad track where he was struck by a train and killed.
The question for decision was whether the injury arose out of and in the course of his
employment. The court said: "It is plain that if, as the record states, it was necessary for him to
pass over the railroad location, it formed no part of the employers' plant; nor was it in any way
connected therewith or in their control as was the common stairway used by employees in
Sundine's Case, 218 Mass., 1. The contract of employment did not provide for transportation or
that the employee should be paid for the time taken in going and returning to his place of
employment, and when the day's work had ended the employee was free to do as he pleased. If
he had chosen to use the public ways and had been injured by a defect or passing vehicle the
administrator could not recover against the employer because there would be no causal
connection between the conditions of employment and the injuries suffered."
This subject is considered at length in Workmen's Compensation Law by Schneider, Second
Edition, pp. 745 et seq.

In the case at bar the deceased was going from work in his own conveyance.

An employee quit work, mounted his motorcycle and started for home. When riding down the
street he collided with an automobile driven by another employee. He sustained injuries which
resulted in his death. In holding that the accident did not arise out of in the course of the
employment, the court said: "To come within the term "injury received in the course of
employment " it must be shown that the injury originated in the work, and, further, that it was
received the employee while engaged in or about the furtherance of the affairs of the employer.
If it be conceded that the injury originated in the work, it would still be necessary, in our opinion,
to show that the employee was engaged in the furtherance of his employer's business."
(Indemnity Co. vs. Dinkins [Tex. Civ. App.], 211 S.W., 949 [1919]; 18 N.C.C.A., 1034; 4
W.C.L.J., 294; In re Peter S. Winchester, 2nd A.R.U.S.C. C., 262; In re Julius Rosenberg, 2nd
A.R.U.S.C.C., 263; Kirby Lumber Co. vs. Scurlock, Tex. Civ. App.- [1921], 229 S.W., 975.)

An employee who was paid by the hour was furnished a bicycle for his work, and while riding
home one evening on the main road he was run into and killed by a motor lorry. It was held that,
since it was no part of his duty to ride home on the bicycle the accident did not arise in the
course of his employment. (Edwards vs. Wingham Agriculture & Imp. Co. [1913], W.C. & Ins.
Rep., 642; 109 L.T. Rep. 50; 82 L.J.K.B., 998; 6 B.W.C.C., 511; 4 N.C.C.A., 115; Cook vs.
Owners of "Montreal," 108 L.T. Rep., 164; 29 T. L. Rep. 233; 6 B. B.C.C., 220 [1913], 4 N.
C.C.A., 115.)

An employee had quit work and left the promises. He was sitting in his buggy waiting for his
son, when the horse took fright and ran away. It was held that the injury sustained in the runaway
did not arise out of or in the course of the employment. (In re McCall, Ohio I. C. No. 121401,
Nov. 4, 1915; Hilding vs. Dept. of Labor & Ind.[Wash.], 298 Pac., 321 [1931].)

Furthermore, it appears that the deceased had never notified the defendant corporation of his
removal from San Francisco del Monte of Manila, and that the company did not know that he
was living in Manila on the day of the accident; that the defendant company did not require its
employees to work on Sunday, or furnish or require its agents to use bicycles. These are
additional reasons for holding that the accident was not due to and pursuance of the employment
of the deceased. If the deceased saw fit to change his residence from San Francisco del Monte to
Manila and to make use a bicycle in going back and forth, he did so at his own risk, as the
defendant company did not furnish him a bicycle or require him to use one; and if he made
collections on Sunday, he did not do so in pursuance of his employment, and his employer is not
liable for any injury sustained by him.

For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with the costs against the
appellants.
G.R. No. 110295 October 18, 1993

COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC.,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Fifth Division) and MS. LYDIA GERONIMO,
respondents.

Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz Law Offices for petitioner.

Alejandro M. Villamil for private respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This case concerns the proprietress of a school canteen which had to close down as a
consequence of the big drop in its sales of soft drinks triggered by the discovery of foreign
substances in certain beverages sold by it. The interesting issue posed is whether the subsequent
action for damages by the proprietress against the soft drinks manufacturer should be treated as
one for breach of implied warranty against hidden defects or merchantability, as claimed by the
manufacturer, the petitioner herein which must therefore be filed within six months from the
delivery of the thing sold pursuant to Article 1571 of the Civil Code, or one for quasi-delict, as
held by the public respondent, which can be filed within four years pursuant to Article 1146 of
the same Code.

On 7 May 1990, Lydia L. Geronimo, the herein private respondent, filed a complaint for
damages against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City. 1 The case
was docketed as Civil Case No. D-9629. She alleges in her complaint that she was the
proprietress of Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen docketed as located in Dagupan City, an
enterprise engaged in the sale of soft drinks (including Coke and Sprite) and other goods to the
students of Kindergarten Wonderland and to the public; on or about 12 August 1989, some
parents of the students complained to her that the Coke and Sprite soft drinks sold by her
contained fiber-like matter and other foreign substances or particles; he then went over her stock
of softdrinks and discovered the presence of some fiber-like substances in the contents of some
unopened Coke bottles and a plastic matter in the contents of an unopened Sprite bottle; she
brought the said bottles to the Regional Health Office of the Department of Health at San
Fernando, La Union, for examination; subsequently, she received a letter from the Department of
Health informing her that the samples she submitted "are adulterated;" as a consequence of the
discovery of the foreign substances in the beverages, her sales of soft drinks severely plummeted
from the usual 10 cases per day to as low as 2 to 3 cases per day resulting in losses of from
P200.00 to P300.00 per day, and not long after that she had to lose shop on 12 December 1989;
she became jobless and destitute; she demanded from the petitioner the payment of damages but
was rebuffed by it. She prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her P5,000.00 as
actual damages, P72,000.00 as compensatory damages, P500,000.00 as moral damages,
P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, the amount equal to 30% of the damages awarded as
attorney's fees, and the costs. 2
The petitioner moved to dismiss 3 the complaint on the grounds of failure to exhaust
administrative remedies and prescription. Anent the latter ground, the petitioner argued that since
the complaint is for breach of warranty under Article 1561 of the said Code. In her Comment 4
thereto, private respondent alleged that the complaint is one for damages which does not involve
an administrative action and that her cause of action is based on an injury to plaintiff's right
which can be brought within four years pursuant to Article 1146 of the Civil Code; hence, the
complaint was seasonably filed. Subsequent related pleadings were thereafter filed by the parties.
5

In its Order of 23 January 1991, 6 the trial court granted the motion to dismiss. It ruled that the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply as the existing administrative
remedy is not adequate. It also stated that the complaint is based on a contract, and not on quasi-
delict, as there exists pre-existing contractual relation between the parties; thus, on the basis of
Article 1571, in relation to Article 1562, the complaint should have been filed within six months
from the delivery of the thing sold.

Her motion for the reconsideration of the order having been denied by the trial court in its Order
of 17 April 1991, 7 the private respondent came to this Court via a petition for review on
certiorari which we referred to the public respondent "for proper determination and disposition. 8
The public respondent docketed the case as CA-G.R. SP No. 25391.

In a decision promulgated on 28 January 1992, 9 the public respondent annulled the questioned
orders of the RTC and directed it to conduct further proceedings in Civil Case No. D-9629. In
holding for the private respondent, it ruled that:

Petitioner's complaint being one for quasi-delict, and not for breach of warranty as respondent
contends, the applicable prescriptive period is four years.

It should be stressed that the allegations in the complaint plainly show that it is an action or
damages arising from respondent's act of "recklessly and negligently manufacturing adulterated
food items intended to be sold or public consumption" (p. 25, rollo). It is truism in legal
procedure that what determines the nature of an action are the facts alleged in the complaint and
those averred as a defense in the defendant's answer (I Moran 126; Calo v. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445;
Alger Electric, Inc. v. CA, 135 SCRA 340).

Secondly, despite the literal wording of Article 2176 of the Civil code, the existence of
contractual relations between the parties does not absolutely preclude an action by one against
the other for quasi-delict arising from negligence in the performance of a contract.

In Singson v. Court of Appeals (23 SCRA 1117), the Supreme Court ruled:

It has been repeatedly held: that the existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the
commission of a tort by the one against the other and the consequent recovery of damages
therefor
. . . . Thus in Air France vs. Carrascoso, . . . (it was held that) although the relation between a
passenger and a carrier is "contractual both in origin and in nature the act that breaks the contract
may also be a tort.

Significantly, in American jurisprudence, from which Our law on Sales was taken, the authorities
are one in saying that he availability of an action or breach of warranty does not bar an action for
torts in a sale of defective goods. 10

Its motion for the reconsideration of the decision having been denied by the public respondent in
its Resolution of 14 May 1993, 11 the petitioner took his recourse under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court. It alleges in its petition that:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE

ERROR IN RULING THAT ARTICLE 2176, THE GENERAL PROVISION ON QUASI-
DELICTS, IS APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE WHEN THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE
COMPLAINT CLEARLY SHOW THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S CAUSE OF ACTION IS
BASEDON BREACH OF A SELLER'S IMPLIED WARRANTIES UNDER OUR LAW ON
SALES.

II.

CORROLARILY, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE

AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN OVERRULING PETITIONER'S ARGUMENT THAT
PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S CAUSE OF ACTION HAD PRESCRIBED UNDER ARTICLE
1571 OF THE CIVIL CODE. 12

The petitioner insists that a cursory reading of the complaint will reveal that the primary legal
basis for private respondent's cause of action is not Article 2176 of the Civil Code on quasi-delict
— for the complaint does not ascribe any tortious or wrongful conduct on its part — but Articles
1561 and 1562 thereof on breach of a seller's implied warranties under the law on sales. It
contends the existence of a contractual relation between the parties (arising from the contract of
sale) bars the application of the law on quasi-delicts and that since private respondent's cause of
action arose from the breach of implied warranties, the complaint should have been filed within
six months room delivery of the soft drinks pursuant to Article 171 of the Civil Code.

In her Comment the private respondent argues that in case of breach of the seller's implied
warranties, the vendee may, under Article 1567 of the Civil Code, elect between withdrawing
from the contract or demanding a proportionate reduction of the price, with damages in either
case. She asserts that Civil Case No. D-9629 is neither an action for rescission nor for
proportionate reduction of the price, but for damages arising from a quasi-delict and that the
public respondent was correct in ruling that the existence of a contract did not preclude the action
for quasi-delict. As to the issue of prescription, the private respondent insists that since her cause
of action is based on quasi-delict, the prescriptive period therefore is four (4) years in accordance
with Article 1144 of the Civil Code and thus the filing of the complaint was well within the said
period.

We find no merit in the petition. The public respondent's conclusion that the cause of action in
Civil Case No. D-9629 is found on quasi-delict and that, therefore, pursuant to Article 1146 of
the Civil Code, it prescribes in four (4) years is supported by the allegations in the complaint,
more particularly paragraph 12 thereof, which makes reference to the reckless and negligent
manufacture of "adulterated food items intended to be sold for public consumption."

The vendee's remedies against a vendor with respect to the warranties against hidden defects of
or encumbrances upon the thing sold are not limited to those prescribed in Article 1567 of the
Civil Code which provides:

Art. 1567. In the case of Articles 1561, 1562, 1564, 1565 and 1566, the vendee may elect
between withdrawing from the contract and demanding a proportionate reduction of the price,
with damages either
case. 13

The vendee may also ask for the annulment of the contract upon proof of error or fraud, in which
case the ordinary rule on obligations shall be applicable. 14 Under the law on obligations,
responsibility arising from fraud is demandable in all obligations and any waiver of an action for
future fraud is void. Responsibility arising from negligence is also demandable in any obligation,
but such liability may be regulated by the courts, according to the circumstances. 15 Those guilty
of fraud, negligence, or delay in the performance of their obligations and those who in any
manner contravene the tenor thereof are liable for damages. 16

The vendor could likewise be liable for quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, and an
action based thereon may be brought by the vendee. While it may be true that the pre-existing
contract between the parties may, as a general rule, bar the applicability of the law on quasi-
delict, the liability may itself be deemed to arise from quasi-delict, i.e., the acts which breaks the
contract may also be a quasi-delict. Thus, in Singson vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands, 17 this
Court stated:

We have repeatedly held, however, that the existence of a contract between the parties does not
bar the commission of a tort by the one against the other and the consequent recovery of
damages therefor. 18 Indeed, this view has been, in effect, reiterated in a comparatively recent
case. Thus, in Air France vs. Carrascoso, 19 involving an airplane passenger who, despite hi
first-class ticket, had been illegally ousted from his first-class accommodation and compelled to
take a seat in the tourist compartment, was held entitled to recover damages from the air-carrier,
upon the ground of tort on the latter's part, for, although the relation between the passenger and a
carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature . . . the act that breaks the contract may also be a
tort.

Otherwise put, liability for quasi-delict may still exist despite the presence of contractual
relations. 20
Under American law, the liabilities of a manufacturer or seller of injury-causing products may be
based on negligence, 21 breach of warranty, 22 tort, 23 or other grounds such as fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation. 24 Quasi-delict, as defined in Article 2176 of the Civil Code, (which is known
in Spanish legal treaties as culpa aquiliana, culpa extra-contractual or cuasi-delitos) 25 is
homologous but not identical to tort under the common law, 26 which includes not only
negligence, but also intentional criminal acts, such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and
deceit. 27

It must be made clear that our affirmance of the decision of the public respondent should by no
means be understood as suggesting that the private respondent's claims for moral damages have
sufficient factual and legal basis.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit,
with costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-9356 February 18, 1915

C. S. GILCHRIST, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
E. A. CUDDY, ET AL., defendants.
JOSE FERNANDEZ ESPEJO and MARIANO ZALDARRIAGA, appellants.

C. Lozano for appellants.

Bruce, Lawrence, Ross and Block for appellee.

TRENT, J.:

An appeal by the defendants, Jose Fernandez Espejo and Mariano Zaldarriaga, from a judgment
of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, dismissing their cross-complaint upon the merits for
damages against the plaintiff for the alleged wrongful issuance of a mandatory and a preliminary
injunction.

Upon the application of the appellee an ex parte mandatory injunction was issued on the 22d of
May, 1913, directing the defendant, E. A. Cuddy, to send to the appellee a certain cinematograph
film called "Zigomar" in compliance with an alleged contract which had been entered into
between these two parties, and at the time an ex parte preliminary injunction was issued
restraining the appellants from receiving and exhibiting in their theater the Zigomar until further
orders of the court. On the 26th of that month the appellants appeared and moved the court to
dissolve the preliminary injunction. When the case was called for trial on August 6, the appellee
moved for the dismissal of the complaint "for the reason that there is no further necessity for the
maintenance of the injunction." The motion was granted without objection as to Cuddy and
denied as to the appellants in order to give them an opportunity to prove that the injunction were
wrongfully issued and the amount of damages suffered by reason thereof.

The pertinent part of the trial court's findings of fact in this case is as follows:

It appears in this case that Cuddy was the owner of the film Zigomar and that on the 24th of
April he rented it to C. S. Gilchrist for a week for P125, and it was to be delivered on the 26th of
May, the week beginning that day. A few days prior to this Cuddy sent the money back to
Gilchrist, which he had forwarded to him in Manila, saying that he had made other arrangements
with his film. The other arrangements was the rental to these defendants Espejo and his partner
for P350 for the week and the injunction was asked by Gilchrist against these parties from
showing it for the week beginning the 26th of May.

It appears from the testimony in this case, conclusively, that Cuddy willfully violated his
contract, he being the owner of the picture, with Gilchrist because the defendants had offered
him more for the same period. Mr. Espejo at the trial on the permanent injunction on the 26th of
May admitted that he knew that Cuddy was the owner of the film. He was trying to get it through
his agents Pathe Brothers in Manila. He is the agent of the same concern in Iloilo. There is in
evidence in this case on the trial today as well as on the 26th of May, letters showing that the
Pathe Brothers in Manila advised this man on two different occasions not to contend for this film
Zigomar because the rental price was prohibitive and assured him also that he could not get the
film for about six weeks. The last of these letters was written on the 26th of April, which showed
conclusively that he knew they had to get this film from Cuddy and from this letter that the agent
in Manila could not get it, but he made Cuddy an offer himself and Cuddy accepted it because he
was paying about three times as much as he had contracted with Gilchrist for. Therefore, in the
opinion of this court, the defendants failed signally to show the injunction against the defendant
was wrongfully procured.

The appellants duly excepted to the order of the court denying their motion for new trial on the
ground that the evidence was insufficient to justify the decision rendered. There is lacking from
the record before us the deposition of the defendant Cuddy, which apparently throws light upon a
contract entered into between him and the plaintiff Gilchrist. The contents of this deposition are
discussed at length in the brief of the appellants and an endeavor is made to show that no such
contract was entered into. The trial court, which had this deposition before it, found that there
was a contract between Cuddy and Gilchrist. Not having the deposition in question before us, it
is impossible to say how strongly it militates against this findings of fact. By a series of decisions
we have construed section 143 and 497 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure to require the
production of all the evidence in this court. This is the duty of the appellant and, upon his failure
to perform it, we decline to proceed with a review of the evidence. In such cases we rely entirely
upon the pleadings and the findings of fact of the trial court and examine only such assigned
errors as raise questions of law. (Ferrer vs. Neri Abejuela, 9 Phil. Rep., 324; Valle vs. Galera, 10
Phil. Rep., 619; Salvacion vs. Salvacion, 13 Phil. Rep., 366; Breta vs. Smith, Bell & Co., 15 Phil.
Rep., 446; Arroyo vs. Yulo, 18 Phil. Rep., 236; Olsen & Co. vs. Matson, Lord & Belser Co., 19
Phil. Rep., 102; Blum vs. Barretto, 19 Phil. Rep., 161; Cuyugan vs. Aguas, 19 Phil. Rep., 379;
Mapa vs. Chaves, 20 Phil. Rep., 147; Mans vs. Garry, 20 Phil. Rep., 134.) It is true that some of
the more recent of these cases make exceptions to the general rule. Thus, in Olsen & Co. vs.
Matson, Lord & Belser Co., (19 Phil. Rep., 102), that portion of the evidence before us tended to
show that grave injustice might result from a strict reliance upon the findings of fact contained in
the judgment appealed from. We, therefore, gave the appellant an opportunity to explain the
omission. But we required that such explanation must show a satisfactory reason for the
omission, and that the missing portion of the evidence must be submitted within sixty days or
cause shown for failing to do so. The other cases making exceptions to the rule are based upon
peculiar circumstances which will seldom arise in practice and need not here be set forth, for the
reason that they are wholly inapplicable to the present case. The appellants would be entitled to
indulgence only under the doctrine of the Olsen case. But from that portion of the record before
us, we are not inclined to believe that the missing deposition would be sufficient to justify us in
reversing the findings of fact of the trial court that the contract in question had been made. There
is in the record not only the positive and detailed testimony of Gilchrist to this effect, but there is
also a letter of apology from Cuddy to Gilchrist in which the former enters into a lengthy
explanation of his reasons for leasing the film to another party. The latter could only have been
called forth by a broken contract with Gilchrist to lease the film to him. We, therefore, fail to
find any reason for overlooking the omission of the defendants to bring up the missing portion of
the evidence and, adhering to the general rule above referred to, proceed to examine the
questions of law raised by the appellants.

From the above-quoted findings of fact it is clear that Cuddy, a resident of Manila, was the
owner of the "Zigomar;" that Gilchrist was the owner of a cinematograph theater in Iloilo; that in
accordance with the terms of the contract entered into between Cuddy and Gilchrist the former
leased to the latter the "Zigomar" for exhibition in his (Gilchrist's) theater for the week beginning
May 26, 1913; and that Cuddy willfully violate his contract in order that he might accept the
appellant's offer of P350 for the film for the same period. Did the appellants know that they were
inducing Cuddy to violate his contract with a third party when they induced him to accept the
P350? Espejo admitted that he knew that Cuddy was the owner of the film. He received a letter
from his agents in Manila dated April 26, assuring him that he could not get the film for about
six weeks. The arrangement between Cuddy and the appellants for the exhibition of the film by
the latter on the 26th of May were perfected after April 26, so that the six weeks would include
and extend beyond May 26. The appellants must necessarily have known at the time they made
their offer to Cuddy that the latter had booked or contracted the film for six weeks from April 26.
Therefore, the inevitable conclusion is that the appellants knowingly induced Cuddy to violate
his contract with another person. But there is no specific finding that the appellants knew the
identity of the other party. So we must assume that they did not know that Gilchrist was the
person who had contracted for the film.

The appellants take the position that if the preliminary injunction had not been issued against
them they could have exhibited the film in their theater for a number of days beginning May 26,
and could have also subleased it to other theater owners in the nearby towns and, by so doing,
could have cleared, during the life of their contract with Cuddy, the amount claimed as damages.
Taking this view of the case, it will be unnecessary for us to inquire whether the mandatory
injunction against Cuddy was properly issued or not. No question is raised with reference to the
issuance of that injunction.
The right on the part of Gilchrist to enter into a contract with Cuddy for the lease of the film
must be fully recognized and admitted by all. That Cuddy was liable in an action for damages for
the breach of that contract, there can be no doubt. Were the appellants likewise liable for
interfering with the contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy, they not knowing at the time the
identity of one of the contracting parties? The appellants claim that they had a right to do what
they did. The ground upon which the appellants base this contention is, that there was no valid
and binding contract between Cuddy and Gilchrist and that, therefore, they had a right to
compete with Gilchrist for the lease of the film, the right to compete being a justification for their
acts. If there had been no contract between Cuddy and Gilchrist this defense would be tenable,
but the mere right to compete could not justify the appellants in intentionally inducing Cuddy to
take away the appellee's contractual rights.

Chief Justice Wells in Walker vs. Cronin (107 Mass., 555), said: "Everyone has a right to enjoy
the fruits and advantages of his own enterprise, industry, skill and credit. He has no right to be
free from malicious and wanton interference, disturbance or annoyance. If disturbance or loss
come as a result of competition, or the exercise of like rights by others, it is damnum absque
injuria, unless some superior right by contract or otherwise is interfered with."

In Read vs. Friendly Society of Operative Stonemasons ([1902] 2 K. B., 88), Darling, J., said: "I
think the plaintiff has a cause of action against the defendants, unless the court is satisfied that,
when they interfered with the contractual rights of plaintiff, the defendants had a sufficient
justification for their interference; . . . for it is not a justification that `they acted bona fide in the
best interests of the society of masons,' i. e., in their own interests. Nor is it enough that `they
were not actuated by improper motives.' I think their sufficient justification for interference with
plaintiff's right must be an equal or superior right in themselves, and that no one can legally
excuse himself to a man, of whose contract he has procured the breach, on the ground that he
acted on a wrong understanding of his own rights, or without malice, or bona fide, or in the best
interests of himself, or even that he acted as an altruist, seeking only good of another and
careless of his own advantage." (Quoted with approval in Beekman vs. Marsters, 195 Mass.,
205.)

It is said that the ground on which the liability of a third party for interfering with a contract
between others rests, is that the interference was malicious. The contrary view, however, is taken
by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Angle vs. Railway Co. (151 U. S., 1).
The only motive for interference by the third party in that case was the desire to make a profit to
the injury of one of the parties of the contract. There was no malice in the case beyond the desire
to make an unlawful gain to the detriment of one of the contracting parties.

In the case at bar the only motive for the interference with the Gilchrist — Cuddy contract on the
part of the appellants was a desire to make a profit by exhibiting the film in their theater. There
was no malice beyond this desire; but this fact does not relieve them of the legal liability for
interfering with that contract and causing its breach. It is, therefore, clear, under the above
authorities, that they were liable to Gilchrist for the damages caused by their acts, unless they are
relieved from such liability by reason of the fact that they did not know at the time the identity of
the original lessee (Gilchrist) of the film.
The liability of the appellants arises from unlawful acts and not from contractual obligations, as
they were under no such obligations to induce Cuddy to violate his contract with Gilchrist. So
that if the action of Gilchrist had been one for damages, it would be governed by chapter 2, title
16, book 4 of the Civil Code. Article 1902 of that code provides that a person who, by act or
omission, causes damages to another when there is fault or negligence, shall be obliged to repair
the damage do done. There is nothing in this article which requires as a condition precedent to
the liability of a tort-feasor that he must know the identity of a person to whom he causes
damages. In fact, the chapter wherein this article is found clearly shows that no such knowledge
is required in order that the injured party may recover for the damage suffered.

But the fact that the appellants' interference with the Gilchrist contract was actionable did not of
itself entitle Gilchrist to sue out an injunction against them. The allowance of this remedy must
be justified under section 164 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which specifies the circumstance
under which an injunction may issue. Upon the general doctrine of injunction we said in Devesa
vs. Arbes (13 Phil. Rep., 273):

An injunction is a "special remedy" adopted in that code (Act No. 190) from American practice,
and originally borrowed from English legal procedure, which was there issued by the authority
and under the seal of a court of equity, and limited, as in order cases where equitable relief is
sought, to cases where there is no "plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law," which "will not
be granted while the rights between the parties are undetermined, except in extraordinary cases
where material and irreparable injury will be done," which cannot be compensated in damages,
and where there will be no adequate remedy, and which will not, as a rule, be granted, to take
property out of the possession of one party and put it into that of another whose title has not been
established by law.

We subsequently affirmed the doctrine of the Devesa case in Palafox vs. Madamba (19 Phil.,
Rep., 444), and we take this occasion of again affirming it, believing, as we do, that the
indiscriminate use of injunctions should be discouraged.

Does the fact that the appellants did not know at the time the identity of the original lessee of the
film militate against Gilchrist's right to a preliminary injunction, although the appellant's incurred
civil liability for damages for such interference? In the examination of the adjudicated cases,
where in injunctions have been issued to restrain wrongful interference with contracts by
strangers to such contracts, we have been unable to find any case where this precise question was
involved, as in all of those cases which we have examined, the identity of both of the contracting
parties was known to the tort-feasors. We might say, however, that this fact does not seem to
have a controlling feature in those cases. There is nothing in section 164 of the Code of Civil
Procedure which indicates, even remotely, that before an injunction may issue restraining the
wrongful interference with contrast by strangers, the strangers must know the identity of both
parties. It would seem that this is not essential, as injunctions frequently issue against municipal
corporations, public service corporations, public officers, and others to restrain the commission
of acts which would tend to injuriously affect the rights of person whose identity the respondents
could not possibly have known beforehand. This court has held that in a proper case injunction
will issue at the instance of a private citizen to restrain ultra vires acts of public officials.
(Severino vs. Governor-General, 16 Phil. Rep., 366.) So we proceed to the determination of the
main question of whether or not the preliminary injunction ought to have been issued in this
case.

As a rule, injunctions are denied to those who have an adequate remedy at law. Where the choice
is between the ordinary and the extraordinary processes of law, and the former are sufficient, the
rule will not permit the use of the latter. (In re Debs, 158 U. S., 564.) If the injury is irreparable,
the ordinary process is inadequate. In Wahle vs. Reinbach (76 Ill., 322), the supreme court of
Illinois approved a definition of the term "irreparable injury" in the following language: "By
`irreparable injury' is not meant such injury as is beyond the possibility of repair, or beyond
possible compensation in damages, nor necessarily great injury or great damage, but that species
of injury, whether great or small, that ought not to be submitted to on the one hand or inflicted on
the other; and, because it is so large on the one hand, or so small on the other, is of such constant
and frequent recurrence that no fair or reasonable redress can be had therefor in a court of law."
(Quoted with approval in Nashville R. R. Co. vs. McConnell, 82 Fed., 65.)

The case at bar is somewhat novel, as the only contract which was broken was that between
Cuddy and Gilchrist, and the profits of the appellee depended upon the patronage of the public,
for which it is conceded the appellants were at liberty to complete by all fair does not deter the
application of remarked in the case of the "ticket scalpers" (82 Fed., 65), the novelty of the facts
does not deter the application of equitable principles. This court takes judicial notice of the
general character of a cinematograph or motion-picture theater. It is a quite modern form of the
play house, wherein, by means of an apparatus known as a cinematograph or cinematograph, a
series of views representing closely successive phases of a moving object, are exhibited in rapid
sequence, giving a picture which, owing to the persistence of vision, appears to the observer to
be in continuous motion. (The Encyclopedia Britanica, vol. 6, p. 374.) The subjects which have
lent themselves to the art of the photographer in this manner have increased enormously in recent
years, as well as have the places where such exhibition are given. The attendance, and,
consequently, the receipts, at one of these cinematograph or motion-picture theaters depends in
no small degree upon the excellence of the photographs, and it is quite common for the
proprietor of the theater to secure an especially attractive exhibit as his "feature film" and
advertise it as such in order to attract the public. This feature film is depended upon to secure a
larger attendance that if its place on the program were filled by other films of mediocre quality. It
is evident that the failure to exhibit the feature film will reduce the receipts of the theater.

Hence, Gilchrist was facing the immediate prospect of diminished profits by reason of the fact
that the appellants had induced Cuddy to rent to them the film Gilchrist had counted upon as his
feature film. It is quite apparent that to estimate with any decree of accuracy the damages which
Gilchrist would likely suffer from such an event would be quite difficult if not impossible. If he
allowed the appellants to exhibit the film in Iloilo, it would be useless for him to exhibit it again,
as the desire of the public to witness the production would have been already satisfied. In this
extremity, the appellee applied for and was granted, as we have indicated, a mandatory
injunction against Cuddy requiring him to deliver the Zigomar to Gilchrist, and a preliminary
injunction against the appellants restraining them from exhibiting that film in their theater during
the weeks he (Gilchrist) had a right to exhibit it. These injunction saved the plaintiff harmless
from damages due to the unwarranted interference of the defendants, as well as the difficult task
which would have been set for the court of estimating them in case the appellants had been
allowed to carry out their illegal plans. As to whether or not the mandatory injunction should
have been issued, we are not, as we have said, called upon to determine. So far as the preliminary
injunction issued against the appellants is concerned, which prohibited them from exhibiting the
Zigomar during the week which Gilchrist desired to exhibit it, we are of the opinion that the
circumstances justified the issuance of that injunction in the discretion of the court.

We are not lacking in authority to support our conclusion that the court was justified in issuing
the preliminary injunction against the appellants. Upon the precise question as to whether
injunction will issue to restrain wrongful interference with contracts by strangers to such
contracts, it may be said that courts in the United States have usually granted such relief where
the profits of the injured person are derived from his contractual relations with a large and
indefinite number of individuals, thus reducing him to the necessity of proving in an action
against the tort-feasor that the latter was responsible in each case for the broken contract, or else
obliging him to institute individual suits against each contracting party and so exposing him to a
multiplicity of suits. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. vs. Mechanics' Clothing Co. (128 Fed., 800);
Sperry & Hutchinson Co. vs. Louis Weber & Co. (161 Fed., 219); Sperry & Hutchinson Co. vs.
Pommer (199 Fed., 309); were all cases wherein the respondents were inducing retail merchants
to break their contracts with the company for the sale of the latters' trading stamps. Injunction
issued in each case restraining the respondents from interfering with such contracts.

In the case of the Nashville R. R. Co. vs. McConnell (82 Fed., 65), the court, among other things,
said: "One who wrongfully interferes in a contract between others, and, for the purpose of gain to
himself induces one of the parties to break it, is liable to the party injured thereby; and his
continued interference may be ground for an injunction where the injuries resulting will be
irreparable."

In Hamby & Toomer vs. Georgia Iron & Coal Co. (127 Ga., 792), it appears that the respondents
were interfering in a contract for prison labor, and the result would be, if they were successful,
the shutting down of the petitioner's plant for an indefinite time. The court held that although
there was no contention that the respondents were insolvent, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in granting a preliminary injunction against the respondents.

In Beekman vs. Marsters (195 Mass., 205), the plaintiff had obtained from the Jamestown Hotel
Corporation, conducting a hotel within the grounds of the Jamestown Exposition, a contract
whereby he was made their exclusive agent for the New England States to solicit patronage for
the hotel. The defendant induced the hotel corporation to break their contract with the plaintiff in
order to allow him to act also as their agent in the New England States. The court held that an
action for damages would not have afforded the plaintiff adequate relief, and that an injunction
was proper compelling the defendant to desist from further interference with the plaintiff's
exclusive contract with the hotel company.

In Citizens' Light, Heat & Power Co. vs. Montgomery Light & Water Power Co. (171 Fed., 553),
the court, while admitting that there are some authorities to the contrary, held that the current
authority in the United States and England is that:
The violation of a legal right committed knowingly is a cause of action, and that it is a violation
of a legal right to interfere with contractual relations recognized by law, if there be no sufficient
justification for the interference. (Quinn vs. Leatham, supra, 510; Angle vs. Chicago, etc., Ry.
Co., 151 U. S., 1; 14 Sup. Ct., 240; 38 L. Ed., 55; Martens vs. Reilly, 109 Wis., 464, 84 N. W.,
840; Rice vs. Manley, 66 N. Y., 82; 23 Am. Rep., 30; Bitterman vs. L. & N. R. R. Co., 207 U. S.,
205; 28 Sup. Ct., 91; 52 L. Ed., 171; Beekman vs. Marsters, 195 Mass., 205; 80 N. E., 817; 11 L.
R. A. [N. S.] 201; 122 Am. St. Rep., 232; South Wales Miners' Fed. vs. Glamorgan Coal Co.,
Appeal Cases, 1905, p. 239.)

See also Nims on Unfair Business Competition, pp. 351- 371.

In 3 Elliot on Contracts, section 2511, it is said: "Injunction is the proper remedy to prevent a
wrongful interference with contract by strangers to such contracts where the legal remedy is
insufficient and the resulting injury is irreparable. And where there is a malicious interference
with lawful and valid contracts a permanent injunction will ordinarily issue without proof of
express malice. So, an injunction may be issued where the complainant to break their contracts
with him by agreeing to indemnify who breaks his contracts of employment may be adjoined
from including other employees to break their contracts and enter into new contracts with a new
employer of the servant who first broke his contract. But the remedy by injunction cannot be
used to restrain a legitimate competition, though such competition would involve the violation of
a contract. Nor will equity ordinarily enjoin employees who have quit the service of their
employer from attempting by proper argument to persuade others from taking their places so
long as they do not resort to force or intimidations on obstruct the public thoroughfares."

Beekman vs. Marster, supra, is practically on all fours with the case at bar in that there was only
one contract in question and the profits of the injured person depended upon the patronage of the
public. Hamby & Toomer vs. Georgia Iron & Coal Co., supra, is also similar to the case at bar in
that there was only one contract, the interference of which was stopped by injunction.

For the foregoing reasons the judgment is affirmed, with costs, against the appellants.

G.R. No. 120554 September 21, 1999

SO PING BUN, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, TEK HUA ENTERPRISES CORP. and MANUEL C. TIONG,
respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for certiorari challenges the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated October 10,
1994, and the Resolution 2 dated June 5, 1995, in CA-G.R. CV No. 38784. The appellate court
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 35, except for the award of
attorney's fees, as follows:

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appeal of respondent-appellant So Ping Bun for lack
of merit is DISMISSED. The appealed decision dated April 20, 1992 of the court a quo is
modified by reducing the attorney's fees awarded to plaintiff Tek Hua Enterprising Corporation
from P500,000.00 to P200,000.00. 3

The facts are as follows:

In 1963, Tek Hua Trading Co, through its managing partner, So Pek Giok, entered into lease
agreements with lessor Dee C. Chuan & Sons Inc. (DCCSI). Subjects of four (4) lease contracts
were premises located at Nos. 930, 930-Int., 924-B and 924-C, Soler Street, Binondo, Manila.
Tek Hua used the areas to store its textiles. The contracts each had a one-year term. They
provided that should the lessee continue to occupy the premises after the term, the lease shall be
on a month-to-month basis.

When the contracts expired, the parties did not renew the contracts, but Tek Hua continued to
occupy the premises. In 1976, Tek Hua Trading Co. was dissolved. Later, the original members
of Tek Hua Trading Co. including Manuel C. Tiong, formed Tek Hua Enterprising Corp., herein
respondent corporation.

So Pek Giok, managing partner of Tek Hua Trading, died in 1986. So Pek Giok's grandson,
petitioner So Ping Bun, occupied the warehouse for his own textile business, Trendsetter
Marketing.

On August 1, 1989, lessor DCCSI sent letters addressed to Tek Hua Enterprises, informing the
latter of the 25% increase in rent effective September 1, 1989. The rent increase was later on
reduced to 20% effective January 1, 1990, upon other lessees' demand. Again on December 1,
1990, the lessor implemented a 30% rent increase. Enclosed in these letters were new lease
contracts for signing. DCCSI warned that failure of the lessee to accomplish the contracts shall
be deemed as lack of interest on the lessee's part, and agreement to the termination of the lease.
Private respondents did not answer any of these letters. Still, the lease contracts were not
rescinded.

On March 1, 1991, private respondent Tiong sent a letter to petitioner which reads as follows:

March 1, 1991

Mr. So Ping Bun

930 Soler Street

Binondo, Manila

Dear Mr. So,

Due to my closed (sic) business associate (sic) for three decades with your late grandfather Mr.
So Pek Giok and late father, Mr. So Chong Bon, I allowed you temporarily to use the warehouse
of Tek Hua Enterprising Corp. for several years to generate your personal business.

Since I decided to go back into textile business, I need a warehouse immediately for my stocks.
Therefore, please be advised to vacate all your stocks in Tek Hua Enterprising Corp. Warehouse.
You are hereby given 14 days to vacate the premises unless you have good reasons that you have
the right to stay. Otherwise, I will be constrained to take measure to protect my interest.

Please give this urgent matter your preferential attention to avoid inconvenience on your part.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd) Manuel C. Tiong

MANUEL C. TIONG

President 4

Petitioner refused to vacate. On March 4, 1992, petitioner requested formal contracts of lease
with DCCSI in favor Trendsetter Marketing. So Ping Bun claimed that after the death of his
grandfather, So Pek Giok, he had been occupying the premises for his textile business and
religiously paid rent. DCCSI acceded to petitioner's request. The lease contracts in favor of
Trendsetter were executed.

In the suit for injunction, private respondents pressed for the nullification of the lease contracts
between DCCSI and petitioner. They also claimed damages.

After trial, the trial court ruled:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered:

1. Annulling the four Contracts of Lease (Exhibits A, A-1 to A-3, inclusive) all dated March
11, 1991, between defendant So Ping Bun, doing business under the name and style of
"Trendsetter Marketing", and defendant Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc. over the premises located at
Nos. 924-B, 924-C, 930 and 930, Int., respectively, Soler Street, Binondo Manila;

2. Making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court on June 21,
1991;

3. Ordering defendant So Ping Bun to pay the aggrieved party, plaintiff Tek Hua
Enterprising Corporation, the sum of P500,000.00, for attorney's fees;

4. Dismissing the complaint, insofar as plaintiff Manuel C. Tiong is concerned, and the
respective counterclaims of the defendant;
5. Ordering defendant So Ping Bun to pay the costs of this lawsuit;

This judgment is without prejudice to the rights of plaintiff Tek Hua Enterprising Corporation
and defendant Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc. to negotiate for the renewal of their lease contracts
over the premises located at Nos. 930, 930-Int., 924-B and 924-C Soler Street, Binondo, Manila,
under such terms and conditions as they agree upon, provided they are not contrary to law, public
policy, public order, and morals.

SO ORDERED. 5

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the above decision was denied.

On appeal by So Ping Bun, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court. On motion for
reconsideration, the appellate court modified the decision by reducing the award of attorney's
fees from five hundred thousand (P500,000.00) pesos to two hundred thousand (P200,000.00)
pesos.

Petitioner is now before the Court raising the following issues:

I. WHETHER THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL

COURT'S DECISION FINDING SO PING BUN GUILTY OF TORTUOUS INTERFERENCE
OF CONTRACT?

II. WHETHER THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S

FEES OF P200,000.00 IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.

The foregoing issues involve, essentially, the correct interpretation of the applicable law on
tortuous conduct, particularly unlawful interference with contract. We have to begin, obviously,
with certain fundamental principles on torts and damages.

Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from injury, and damages are the recompense or
compensation awarded for the damage suffered. 6 One becomes liable in an action for damages
for a nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of asset if (a)
the other has property rights and privileges with respect to the use or enjoyment interfered with,
(b) the invasion is substantial, (c) the defendant's conduct is a legal cause of the invasion, and (d)
the invasion is either intentional and unreasonable or unintentional and actionable under general
negligence rules. 7

The elements of tort interference are: (1) existence of a valid contract; (2) knowledge on the part
of the third person of the existence of contract; and (3) interference of the third person is without
legal justification or excuse. 8

A duty which the law of torts is concerned with is respect for the property of others, and a cause
of action ex delicto may be predicated upon an unlawful interference by one person of the
enjoyment by the other of his private
property.9 This may pertain to a situation where a third person induces a party to renege on or
violate his undertaking under a contract. In the case before us, petitioner's Trendsetter Marketing
asked DCCSI to execute lease contracts in its favor, and as a result petitioner deprived
respondent corporation of the latter's property right. Clearly, and as correctly viewed by the
appellate court, the three elements of tort interference above-mentioned are present in the instant
case.

Authorities debate on whether interference may be justified where the defendant acts for the sole
purpose of furthering his own financial or economic interest. 10 One view is that, as a general
rule, justification for interfering with the business relations of another exists where the actor's
motive is to benefit himself. Such justification does not exist where his sole motive is to cause
harm to the other. Added to this, some authorities believe that it is not necessary that the
interferer's interest outweigh that of the party whose rights are invaded, and that an individual
acts under an economic interest that is substantial, not merely de minimis, such that wrongful
and malicious motives are negatived, for he acts in self-protection. 11 Moreover justification for
protecting one's financial position should not be made to depend on a comparison of his
economic interest in the subject matter with that of others. 12 It is sufficient if the impetus of his
conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives. 13

As early as Gilchrist vs. Cuddy, 14 we held that where there was no malice in the interference of
a contract, and the impulse behind one's conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in
wrongful motives, a party cannot be a malicious interferer. Where the alleged interferer is
financially interested, and such interest motivates his conduct, it cannot be said that he is an
officious or malicious intermeddler. 15

In the instant case, it is clear that petitioner So Ping Bun prevailed upon DCCSI to lease the
warehouse to his enterprise at the expense of respondent corporation. Though petitioner took
interest in the property of respondent corporation and benefited from it, nothing on record
imputes deliberate wrongful motives or malice on him.

Sec. 1314 of the Civil Code categorically provides also that, "Any third person who induces
another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party."
Petitioner argues that damage is an essential element of tort interference, and since the trial court
and the appellate court ruled that private respondents were not entitled to actual, moral or
exemplary damages, it follows that he ought to be absolved of any liability, including attorney's
fees.

It is true that the lower courts did not award damages, but this was only because the extent of
damages was not quantifiable. We had a similar situation in Gilchrist, where it was difficult or
impossible to determine the extent of damage and there was nothing on record to serve as basis
thereof. In that case we refrained from awarding damages. We believe the same conclusion
applies in this case.

While we do not encourage tort interferers seeking their economic interest to intrude into
existing contracts at the expense of others, however, we find that the conduct herein complained
of did not transcend the limits forbidding an obligatory award for damages in the absence of any
malice. The business desire is there to make some gain to the detriment of the contracting parties.
Lack of malice, however, precludes damages. But it does not relieve petitioner of the legal
liability for entering into contracts and causing breach of existing ones. The respondent appellate
court correctly confirmed the permanent injunction and nullification of the lease contracts
between DCCSI and Trendsetter Marketing, without awarding damages. The injunction saved
the respondents from further damage or injury caused by petitioner's interference.

Lastly, the recovery of attorney's fees in the concept of actual or compensatory damages, is
allowed under the circumstances provided for in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. 16 One such
occasion is when the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third
persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest. 17 But we have consistently held that the
award of considerable damages should have clear factual and legal bases. 18 In connection with
attorney's fees, the award should be commensurate to the benefits that would have been derived
from a favorable judgment. Settled is the rule that fairness of the award of damages by the trial
court calls for appellate review such that the award if far too excessive can be reduced. 19 This
ruling applies with equal force on the award of attorney's fees. In a long line of cases we said, "It
is not sound policy to place in penalty on the right to litigate. To compel the defeated party to
pay the fees of counsel for his successful opponent would throw wide open the door of
temptation to the opposing party and his counsel to swell the fees to undue proportions."20

Considering that the respondent corporation's lease contract, at the time when the cause of action
accrued, ran only on a month-to-month basis whence before it was on a yearly basis, we find
even the reduced amount of attorney's fees ordered by the Court of Appeals still exorbitant in the
light of prevailing jurisprudence. 21 Consequently, the amount of two hundred thousand
(P200,000.00) awarded by respondent appellate court should be reduced to one hundred
thousand (P100,000.00) pesos as the reasonable award or attorney's fees in favor of private
respondent corporation.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 38784 are hereby AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION
that the award of attorney's fees is reduced from two hundred thousand (P200,000.00) to one
hundred thousand (P100,000.00) pesos. No pronouncement as to costs.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 61516 March 21, 1989

FLORENTINA A. GUILATCO, petitioner,

vs.
CITY OF DAGUPAN, and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Nolan R. Evangelista for petitioner.

The City Legal Officer for respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.:

In a civil action 1 for recovery of damages filed by the petitioner Florentina A. Guilatco, the
following judgment was rendered against the respondent City of Dagupan:

xxx

(1) Ordering defendant City of Dagupan to pay plaintiff actual damages in the amount of P
15,924 (namely P8,054.00 as hospital, medical and other expenses [Exhs. H to H-60], P 7,420.00
as lost income for one (1) year [Exh. F] and P 450.00 as bonus). P 150,000.00 as moral damages,
P 50,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P 3,000.00 as attorney's fees, and litigation expenses,
plus costs and to appropriate through its Sangguniang Panglunsod (City Council) said amounts
for said purpose;

(2) Dismissing plaintiffs complaint as against defendant City Engr. Alfredo G. Tangco; and

(3) Dismissing the counterclaims of defendant City of Dagupan and defendant City Engr.
Alfredo G. Tangco, for lack of merit. 2

The facts found by the trial court are as follows: 3

It would appear from the evidences that on July 25, 1978, herein plaintiff, a Court Interpreter of
Branch III, CFI--Dagupan City, while she was about to board a motorized tricycle at a sidewalk
located at Perez Blvd. (a National Road, under the control and supervision of the City of
Dagupan) accidentally fell into a manhole located on said sidewalk, thereby causing her right leg
to be fractured. As a result thereof, she had to be hospitalized, operated on, confined, at first at
the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital, from July 25 to August 3, 1978 (or for a period of 16 days).
She also incurred hospitalization, medication and other expenses to the tune of P 8,053.65 (Exh.
H to H-60) or a total of P 10,000.00 in all, as other receipts were either lost or misplaced; during
the period of her confinement in said two hospitals, plaintiff suffered severe or excruciating pain
not only on her right leg which was fractured but also on all parts of her body; the pain has
persisted even after her discharge from the Medical City General Hospital on October 9, 1978, to
the present. Despite her discharge from the Hospital plaintiff is presently still wearing crutches
and the Court has actually observed that she has difficulty in locomotion. From the time of the
mishap on July 25, 1978 up to the present, plaintiff has not yet reported for duty as court
interpreter, as she has difficulty of locomotion in going up the stairs of her office, located near
the city hall in Dagupan City. She earns at least P 720.00 a month consisting of her monthly
salary and other means of income, but since July 25, 1978 up to the present she has been
deprived of said income as she has already consumed her accrued leaves in the government
service. She has lost several pounds as a result of the accident and she is no longer her former
jovial self, she has been unable to perform her religious, social, and other activities which she
used to do prior to the incident.

Dr. Norberto Felix and Dr. Dominado Manzano of the Provincial Hospital, as well as Dr.
Antonio Sison of the Medical City General Hospital in Mandaluyong Rizal (Exh. I; see also
Exhs. F, G, G-1 to G-19) have confirmed beyond shadow of any doubt the extent of the fracture
and injuries sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the mishap. On the other hand, Patrolman
Claveria, De Asis and Cerezo corroborated the testimony of the plaintiff regarding the mishap
and they have confirmed the existence of the manhole (Exhs. A, B, C and sub-exhibits) on the
sidewalk along Perez Blvd., at the time of the incident on July 25, 1978 which was partially
covered by a concrete flower pot by leaving gaping hole about 2 ft. long by 1 1/2 feet wide or 42
cms. wide by 75 cms. long by 150 cms. deep (see Exhs. D and D-1).

Defendant Alfredo Tangco, City Engineer of Dagupan City and admittedly ex-officio Highway
Engineer, City Engineer of the Public Works and Building Official for Dagupan City, admitted
the existence of said manhole along the sidewalk in Perez Blvd., admittedly a National Road in
front of the Luzon Colleges. He also admitted that said manhole (there are at least 11 in all in
Perez Blvd.) is owned by the National Government and the sidewalk on which they are found
along Perez Blvd. are also owned by the National Government. But as City Engineer of Dagupan
City, he supervises the maintenance of said manholes or drainage system and sees to it that they
are properly covered, and the job is specifically done by his subordinates, Mr. Santiago de Vera
(Maintenance Foreman) and Engr. Ernesto Solermo also a maintenance Engineer. In his answer
defendant Tangco expressly admitted in par. 7-1 thereof, that in his capacity as ex-officio
Highway Engineer for Dagupan City he exercises supervision and control over National roads,
including the Perez Blvd. where the incident happened.

On appeal by the respondent City of Dagupan, the appellate court 4 reversed the lower court
findings on the ground that no evidence was presented by the plaintiff- appellee to prove that the
City of Dagupan had "control or supervision" over Perez Boulevard. 5

The city contends that Perez Boulevard, where the fatal drainage hole is located, is a national
road that is not under the control or supervision of the City of Dagupan. Hence, no liability
should attach to the city. It submits that it is actually the Ministry of Public Highways that has
control or supervision through the Highway Engineer which, by mere coincidence, is held
concurrently by the same person who is also the City Engineer of Dagupan.

After examination of the findings and conclusions of the trial court and those of the appellate
court, as well as the arguments presented by the parties, we agree with those of the trial court and
of the petitioner. Hence, we grant the petition.
In this review on certiorari, we have simplified the errors assigned by the petitioner to a single
issue: whether or not control or supervision over a national road by the City of Dagupan exists,
in effect binding the city to answer for damages in accordance with article 2189 of the Civil
Code.

The liability of public corporations for damages arising from injuries suffered by pedestrians
from the defective condition of roads is expressed in the Civil Code as follows:

Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or
injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges,
public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision.

It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the province, city or
municipality for liability to attach. The article only requires that either control or supervision is
exercised over the defective road or street. 6

In the case at bar, this control or supervision is provided for in the charter of Dagupan and is
exercised through the City Engineer who has the following duties:

Sec. 22. The City Engineer--His powers, duties and compensation-There shall be a city engineer,
who shall be in charge of the department of Engineering and Public Works. He shall receive a
salary of not exceeding three thousand pesos per annum. He shall have the following duties:

xxx

(j) He shall have the care and custody of the public system of waterworks and sewers, and
all sources of water supply, and shall control, maintain and regulate the use of the same, in
accordance with the ordinance relating thereto; shall inspect and regulate the use of all private
systems for supplying water to the city and its inhabitants, and all private sewers, and their
connection with the public sewer system.

xxx

The same charter of Dagupan also provides that the laying out, construction and improvement of
streets, avenues and alleys and sidewalks, and regulation of the use thereof, may be legislated by
the Municipal Board . 7 Thus the charter clearly indicates that the city indeed has supervision
and control over the sidewalk where the open drainage hole is located.

The express provision in the charter holding the city not liable for damages or injuries sustained
by persons or property due to the failure of any city officer to enforce the provisions of the
charter, can not be used to exempt the city, as in the case at bar.8

The charter only lays down general rules regulating the liability of the city. On the other hand
article 2189 applies in particular to the liability arising from "defective streets, public buildings
and other public works." 9
The City Engineer, Mr. Alfredo G. Tangco, admits that he exercises control or supervision over
the said road. But the city can not be excused from liability by the argument that the duty of the
City Engineer to supervise or control the said provincial road belongs more to his functions as an
ex-officio Highway Engineer of the Ministry of Public Highway than as a city officer. This is
because while he is entitled to an honorarium from the Ministry of Public Highways, his salary
from the city government substantially exceeds the honorarium.

We do not agree.

Alfredo G. Tangco "(i)n his official capacity as City Engineer of Dagupan, as Ex- Officio
Highway Engineer, as Ex-Officio City Engineer of the Bureau of Public Works, and, last but not
the least, as Building Official for Dagupan City, receives the following monthly compensation: P
1,810.66 from Dagupan City; P 200.00 from the Ministry of Public Highways; P 100.00 from the
Bureau of Public Works and P 500.00 by virtue of P.D. 1096, respectively." 10 This function of
supervision over streets, public buildings, and other public works pertaining to the City Engineer
is coursed through a Maintenance Foreman and a Maintenance Engineer.11 Although these last
two officials are employees of the National Government, they are detailed with the City of
Dagupan and hence receive instruction and supervision from the city through the City Engineer.

There is, therefore, no doubt that the City Engineer exercises control or supervision over the
public works in question. Hence, the liability of the city to the petitioner under article 2198 of the
Civil Code is clear.

Be all that as it may, the actual damages awarded to the petitioner in the amount of P 10,000.00
should be reduced to the proven expenses of P 8,053.65 only. The trial court should not have
rounded off the amount. In determining actual damages, the court can not rely on "speculation,
conjecture or guess work" as to the amount. Without the actual proof of loss, the award of actual
damages becomes erroneous. 12

On the other hand, moral damages may be awarded even without proof of pecuniary loss,
inasmuch as the determination of the amount is discretionary on the court.13 Though incapable
of pecuniary estimation, moral damages are in the nature of an award to compensate the claimant
for actual injury suffered but which for some reason can not be proven. However, in awarding
moral damages, the following should be taken into consideration:

(1) First, the proximate cause of the injury must be the claimee's acts.14

(2) Second, there must be compensatory or actual damages as satisfactory proof of the
factual basis for damages.15

(3) Third, the award of moral damages must be predicated on any of the cases enumerated in
the Civil Code. 16

In the case at bar, the physical suffering and mental anguish suffered by the petitioner were
proven. Witnesses from the petitioner's place of work testified to the degeneration in her
disposition-from being jovial to depressed. She refrained from attending social and civic
activities.17

Nevertheless the award of moral damages at P 150,000.00 is excessive. Her handicap was not
permanent and disabled her only during her treatment which lasted for one year. Though
evidence of moral loss and anguish existed to warrant the award of damages,18 the moderating
hand of the law is called for. The Court has time and again called attention to the reprehensible
propensity of trial judges to award damages without basis,19 resulting in exhorbitant amounts.20

Although the assessment of the amount is better left to the discretion of the trial court 21 under
preceding jurisprudence, the amount of moral damages should be reduced to P 20,000.00.

As for the award of exemplary damages, the trial court correctly pointed out the basis:

To serve as an example for the public good, it is high time that the Court, through this case,
should serve warning to the city or cities concerned to be more conscious of their duty and
responsibility to their constituents, especially when they are engaged in construction work or
when there are manholes on their sidewalks or streets which are uncovered, to immediately cover
the same, in order to minimize or prevent accidents to the poor pedestrians.22

Too often in the zeal to put up "public impact" projects such as beautification drives, the end is
more important than the manner in which the work is carried out. Because of this obsession for
showing off, such trivial details as misplaced flower pots betray the careless execution of the
projects, causing public inconvenience and inviting accidents.

Pending appeal by the respondent City of Dagupan from the trial court to the appellate court, the
petitioner was able to secure an order for garnishment of the funds of the City deposited with the
Philippine National Bank, from the then presiding judge, Hon. Willelmo Fortun. This order for
garnishment was revoked subsequently by the succeeding presiding judge, Hon. Romeo D.
Magat, and became the basis for the petitioner's motion for reconsideration which was also
denied. 23

We rule that the execution of the judgment of the trial court pending appeal was premature. We
do not find any good reason to justify the issuance of an order of execution even before the
expiration of the time to appeal .24

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the
respondent Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the
trial court, dated March 12, 1979 and amended on March 13, 1979, is hereby REINSTATED
with the indicated modifications as regards the amounts awarded:

(1) Ordering the defendant City of Dagupan to pay the plaintiff actual damages in the amount
of P 15,924 (namely P 8,054.00 as hospital, medical and other expenses; P 7,420.00 as lost
income for one (1) year and P 450.00 as bonus); P 20,000.00 as moral damages and P 10,000.00
as exemplary damages. The attorney's fees of P 3,000.00 remain the same. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-5932 February 27, 1912

DEAN C. WORCESTER, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARTIN OCAMPO, TEODORO M. KALAW, LOPE K. SANTOS, FIDEL A. REYES,
FAUSTINO AGUILAR, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Felipe Agoncillo for appellants.

W. A. Kincaid and Thos. L. Hartigan for appellee.

JOHNSON, J.:

On the 23rd day of January, 1909, the plaintiff commenced an action against the defendants in
the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, for the purpose of recovering damages resulting
from an alleged libelous publication. The complaint was in the following language:

COMPLAINT.

I.

That the plaintiff as well as the defendants are residents of the city of Manila, Philippine Islands.

II.

That for a long time before the 30th of October, 1908, the defendants, Martin Ocampo, Teodoro
M. Kalaw, Lope K. Santos, Fidel A. Reyes, Faustino Aguilar, Leoncio G. Liquete , Manuel
Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio M. Cansipit,
were the owners, directors, writers (redactores), editors (editores) and administrators of a certain
daily newspaper known as "El Renacimiento" and "Muling Pagsilang," which newspaper during
all the time mentioned in this complaint was published and circulated daily in the Spanish and
Tagalog languages in the city of Manila, having a large circulation throughout the Philippine
Islands.

III.

That for a long time the defendants have been maliciously persecuting and attacking the plaintiff
in said newspaper, until at last on the 30th of October, 1908, with the malicious intention of
injuring the plaintiff, who on said date was, and still is a member of the Civil Commission of the
Philippines and Secretary of the Interior in the Government of the Philippines, they attacked the
honesty and reviled the fame of the plaintiff, not only as a private person but also as an official of
the Government of the Philippine Islands, and with the object of exposing him to the odium,
contempt, and ridicule of the public, printed, wrote (redactaron), and published in said
newspaper in its ordinary number of the 30th of October, 1908, a malicious defamation and false
libel which was injurious (injurioso) to the plaintiff, said libel reading as follows:

"EDITORIAL.
"BIRDS OF PREY.

"On the surface of the globe some were born to eat and devour, others to be eaten and devoured.

"Now and then the latter have bestirred themselves, endeavoring to rebel against an order of
things which makes them the prey and food of the insatiable voracity of the former. At times
they have been fortunate, putting to flight the eaters and devourers, but in the majority of cases
they did not obtain but a change of name or plumage.

"The situation is the same in all the spheres of creation: the relation between the ones and the
others is that dictated by the appetite and the power to satisfy it at the fellow-creatures' expense.

"Among men it is very easy to observe the development of this daily phenomenon. And for some
psychological reason the nations who believe themselves powerful have taken the fiercest and
most harmful creatures as emblems; it is either the lion, or the eagle, or the serpent. Some have
done so by a secret impulse of affinity and others in the nature of simulation, of infatuated
vanity, making themselves appear that which they are not nor ever can be.

"The eagle, symbolizing liberty and strength, is the bird that has found the most adepts. And
men, collectively and individually, have desired to copy and imitate the most rapacious bird in
order to triumph in the plundering of their fellow-men.

"There are men who, besides being eagles, have the characteristics of the vulture, the owl and the
vampire.

"Ascending the mountains of Benguet to classify and measure the skulls of the Igorots and study
and civilize them and to espy in his flight, with the eye of the bird of prey, where are the large
deposits of gold, the prey concealed amidst the lonely mountains, to appropriate them to himself
afterwards, thanks to legal facilities made and unmade at will, but always for his own benefit.

"Authorizing, despite laws and ordinances, an illegal slaughtering of diseased cattle in order to
derive benefit from the infected and putrid meat which he himself was obliged to condemn by
virtue of his official position.

"Presenting himself on all occasions with the wrinkled brow of the scientist who consumes his
life in the mysteries of the laboratory of science, when his whole scientific labor is confined o
dissecting insects and importing fish eggs, as if the fish eggs of this country were less nourishing
and less savory, so as to make it worth the while replacing them with species coming from other
climes.

"Giving an admirable impulse to the discovery of wealthy lodes in Mindoro, in Mindanao, and in
other virgin regions of the Archipelago, with the money of the people, and under the pretext of
the public good, when, as a strict matter of truth, the object is to possess all the data and the key
to the national wealth for his essentially personal benefit, as is shown by the acquisition of
immense properties registered under he names of others.
"Promoting, through secret agents and partners, the sale to the city of worthless land at fabulous
prices which the city fathers dare not refuse, from fear of displeasing the one who is behind the
motion, and which they do not refuse for their own good.

"Patronizing concessions for hotels on filled-in-land, with the prospects of enormous profits, at
the expense of the blood of the people.

"Such are the characteristics of the man who is at the same time an eagle who surprises and
devours, a vulture who gorges himself on the dead and putrid meats, an owl who affects a
petulent omniscience and a vampire who silently sucks the blood of the victim until he leaves it
bloodless.

"It is these birds of prey who triumph. Their flight and their aim are never thwarted.

"Who will detain them?

"Some share in the booty and the plunder. Others are too weak to raise a voice of protest. And
others die in the disconsolating destruction of their own energies and interests.

"And then there appears, terrifying, the immortal legend:

"MANE, TECEL, PHARES."

IV.

That the plaintiff was, on the date of said publication, and still is, well known to the officials of
the Government of the Philippine Islands, and to the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands, and to
public in general, personally as well as a member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and
as Secretary of the Interior, and the defamation and libel, and the words, terms and language
used in said defamation and libel were employed by the said defendants with the intention of
indicating the said plaintiff, and that should be understood, as in effect they were understood, by
the public officials of the Government and the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands in general, as
referring to the plaintiff, by reason of the publicly known fact that said plaintiff in compliance
with his duties in his position as such member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and as
such Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Islands, ascended on a previous occasion the
mountains of the Province of Benguet to study the native tribe known as Igorot, residing in said
region; by reason of the publicly known fact that in the said mountains of Benguet there exist
large deposits of gold, and for the reason that, as member of the Civil Commission of the
Philippines, which is the legislative body of the Philippine Islands, the plaintiff takes part in the
enactment and repealing of laws in said Islands; by reason furthermore of the fact, publicly
known, that the plaintiff, as such Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Islands, has had under
his direction and control the enforcement of the laws of the Philippine Islands and the ordinances
of the city of Manila relating to the slaughtering of cattle; by reason furthermore of the fact,
publicly known that said plaintiff, as such Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Islands, had
under his direction and control the Bureau of Science of the Government of the Philippine
Islands, and he is generally known as a man devoted to the study of science; by reason
furthermore of the publicly known fact that the said plaintiff, as such Secretary of the Interior of
the Philippine Islands, at a previous time, caused the importation into the Philippine Islands of
fish eggs for the purpose of supplying the mountain streams of the Philippine Islands with fish-
hatcheries; by reason furthermore of the publicly known fact that said plaintiff, as such Secretary
of the Interior of the Philippine Islands, has journeyed to and explored the Islands of Mindoro,
Mindanao, and other regions of the Philippine Archipelago; by reason furthermore of the
publicly known fact that said plaintiff, as such Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Islands,
at one time investigated and prepared a report for the Civil Commission of the Philippines in
regard to a certain proposition for the purchase of a parcel of land for the city of Manila; by
reason furthermore of the publicly known fact that said plaintiff, as member of said Civil
Commission of the Philippines together with the other members of said legislative body, once
opened negotiations with a certain firm engaged in the hotel business in regard to the location of
a prospective hotel on one of the filled-in lands of the city of Manila.

That said defendants charged said plaintiff with the prostitution of his office as member of the
Civil Commission of the Philippines and as Secretary of the Interior of said Islands, for personal
ends; with wasting public funds for the purpose of promoting his personal welfare; with the
violation of the laws of the Philippine Islands and the ordinances of the city of Manila; with
taking part in illegal combinations for the purpose of robbing the people; with the object of gain
for himself and for others; and lastly with being "a bird of prey;" and that said defamation should
be understood, as in effect it was understood, by the public officials of the Government and the
people of the Philippine Islands in general, as charging the said plaintiff with the conduct,
actions and things above specified; all of which allegations relating to the character and conduct
of the said plaintiff, as above stated, were and are false and without any foundation whatsoever.

That said defamation and libel were published by the defendants under a heading in large and
showy type, and every effort made by said defendants to see that said defamation and libel
should attract the attention of the public and be read by all the subscribers to said newspaper and
the readers of the same.

V.

Besides assailing the integrity and reviling the reputation of the plaintiff, said defendants, in
publishing the said libel, did so with the malicious intention of inciting the Filipino people to
believe that the plaintiff was a vile despot and a corrupt person, unworthy of the position which
he held, and for this reason to oppose his administration of the office in his charge as Secretary
of the Interior, and in this way they endeavored to create enormous difficulties for him in the
performance of his official duties, and to make him so unpopular that he would have to resign his
office as member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and Secretary of the Interior.

In fact said defendants, by means of said libel and other false statements in said mentioned
newspaper, have been deliberately trying to destroy the confidence of the public in the plaintiff
and to incite the people to place obstacles in his way in the performance of his official duties, in
consequence of which the plaintiff has met with a great many difficulties which have increased
to a great extent his labors as a public official in every one of the Departments.
VI.

And for all these reasons the plaintiff alleges: That he has been damaged and is entitled to an
indemnity for the additional work to which he has been put, by the said defendants, in the
compliance of his duties, both in the past and the future, as well as for the injuries to his
reputation and feelings, in the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) Philippine currency, and
besides this said amount he is entitled to collect from the defendants the additional sum of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000) Philippine currency, in the way of punitive damages, as a warning to
the defendants.

Wherefore the plaintiff files this complaint, praying the court:

(1) That the defendants be summoned according to law.

(2) That judgment be rendered ordering the defendants to pay the damages as above stated, and
the costs of the action.

On the 23d of February, 1909, the defendants presented the following demurrer to the said
complaint:

DEMURRER.

Now come the defendants, through their undersigned attorney, and demur to the complaint filed
herein, upon the following grounds:

First, That the complaint is vague and unintelligible.

Second. That the facts alleged in the complaint do not constitute a cause or right of action.

Third. That there is another action pending between the plaintiff and several of the defendants for
the same cause; and

Fourth. That some of the defendants have been erroneously included therein.

Therefore, they respectfully ask the court to dismiss the complaint, with costs against the
plaintiff.

On the 27th of February, 1909, the Honorable Charles S. Lobingier, judge, overruled said
demurrer in the following decision, to which the defendants duly excepted:

ORDER.

The defendant demur upon several grounds:

(1) The first ground is that the complaint is vague and unintelligible and this is directed
principally to paragraph 2, in which it is alleged that the defendants were "dueños, directores,
redactores", etc., but it is not alleged that they were such simultaneously. If this were the sole
averment of the defendants' connection with the alleged libel, the objection might be well taken,
but paragraph 3 of the complaint alleges that the defendants "imprimieron, redactaron y
publicaron", etc., the article complained of. Under section 2 of Act 277 "every person" who
"publishes or procures to be published any belief is made responsible. (Cf. U.S. vs. Ortiz, 8 Phil.
Rep., 752.) We think, therefore, that the connection of the defendants with the publication
complained of is sufficiently charged.

(2) It is also claimed that the facts alleged are not sufficient to state a cause of action and it is
urged in support of this that the article complained of and which is copied in the complaint, fails
to mention the plaintiff or to show on its face that it refers to him. It is, however, specifically
alleged in paragraph 4 that the article was intended to refer to the plaintiff and was so understood
by the public, and this allegation is admitted by the demurrer. Under the rule announced in
Causin vs. Jakosalem (5 Phil. Rep., 155), where the words complained of do refer to the plaintiff
"an action for libel may be maintained even though the defamatory publication does not refer to
the plaintiff by name."

(3) It is further argued that there is another action pending between the parties for the same
cause. This, it is true, is made a ground for demurrer by the Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 91 (3),
but like all grounds therein mentioned, it must "appear upon the face" of the pleading objected
to, and where it does not so appear "the objection can only be taken by answer." (Code C. P., sec.
92.) There is no averment in the complaint which indicates that there is no another action
pending.

The fourth ground of the demurrer is not one recognized by law (Code C. P., sec. 91) nor do we
find anything in Sanidad vs. Cabotaje (5 Phil. Rep., 204) which would necessitate any change in
the views already expressed.

The demurrer is, therefore, overruled and defendants are given the usual five days to answer.

On the 15th day of November, 1909, the defendants presented their amended answer, which was
as follows:

ANSWER.

The defendants in the above-entitled cause, through their undersigned attorney, by their answer
to the complaint, state:

That the defendants deny generally the allegation of the complaint.

As a special defense, the defendants allege:

First. That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to institute this action, as it clearly appears from the
allegations of the complaint and which the defendants hereby deny.
Second. That the facts are set out as constituting cause of action in the complaint, are insufficient
to constitute such cause of action in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants.

Third. That the said complaint is manifestly improper, for the reason that there is now pending in
the Court of First Instance of this city a criminal cause, No. 4295, for the crime of libel against
the defendants herein, Martin Ocampo, Teodoro M. Kalaw, and Fidel A. Reyes, both actions,
criminal and civil, being based upon the same facts which the plaintiffs herein, who is also a
party to the said criminal action, now alleges as the basis of his action.

Fourth. That the civil action in the above-entitled cause has been extinguished for the reason that
plaintiff did not expressly reserve the right to enforce the same in the aforesaid cause 4295, for
the crime of libel, after the said criminal cause had been finally disposed of.

Fifth. That the defendants, Lope K. Santos, Faustino Aguilar, Leoncio G. Liquete, Manuel
Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio M. Cansipit,
were erroneously included in the complaint for the simple reason that the first two were acquitted
in said criminal cause No. 4295, for libel, the third was used as a witness for the prosecution in
the said criminal cause, and the others have no interest, either directly or indirectly, in the
newspaper "El Renacimiento" in which it is alleged by the plaintiff the editorial, which is the
basis of the complaint, and which it is claimed to be libelous, was published.

Wherefore the defendants pray that they be acquitted of the complaint, with the costs against the
plaintiff.

After hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause, the arguments if the respective
attorneys, the Honorable James C. Jenkins, judge, on the 14th of January, 1910, rendered the
following decision:

DECISION.

This is a civil action sounding in damages to the amount of P100,000 for an alleged libel of the
plaintiff by the defendants.

The plaintiff is the Honorable Dean C. Worcester, a member of the Civil Commission of the
Philippine Islands, and Secretary of the Interior of Insular Government. The defendants are
twelve persons designated by name in the complaint and alleged therein to be the owners,
directors, writers (redactores), editors (editores), and administrators of a certain daily newspaper
known as "El Renacimiento" and "Muling Pagsilang," which defendants, as well as the plaintiff,
are residents of the city of Manila, Philippine Islands.

It is further alleged in the complaint that for a long time prior to the 30th of October, 1908, the
defendants were the owners, directors, writers, editors, and administrators of said daily
newspaper, and that said newspaper, during all the time mentioned in the complaint, was
published and circulated daily in the Spanish and Tagalog languages in the city of Manila,
having a large circulation throughout the Philippine Islands.
It is also alleged that for a long time the defendants had been maliciously persecuting and
attacking the plaintiff in said newspaper, until at last, on said date, with the malicious intention
of injuring the plaintiff who then was still is a member of the Civil Commission of the
Philippines and Secretary of the Interior in the Government of the Philippines, they attacked the
integrity and reviled the reputation of the plaintiff, not only as a private citizen, but also as an
official of the Government of the Philippine Islands; and with the object of exposing him to the
odium, contempt, and ridicule of the public, they wrote, printed, and published in said newspaper
in its ordinary number of the said 30th of October, 1908, a malicious defamation and false libel,
which was injurious to the plaintiff, said libel, as translated from the Spanish, reading as follows:

"EDITORIAL.

"BIRDS OF PREY.

"On the surface of the globe some were born to eat and devour, others to be eaten and devoured.

"Now and then the latter have bestirred themselves, endeavoring to rebel against an order of
things which makes them the prey and food of the insatiable voracity of the former. At times
they have been fortunate, putting to flight the eaters and devourers, but in a majority of cases
they do not obtain anything but a change of name or plumage.

"The situation is the same in all spheres of creation; the relation between the ones and the others
is that dictated by the appetite and the power to satisfy it at the fellow-creature's expense.

"Among men it is easy to observe the development of this daily phenomenon. And for some
psychological reason the nations who believe themselves powerful have taken the fiercest and
most harmful creatures as emblems; it is either the lion, or the eagle, or the serpent. Some have
done so by a secret impulse of affinity and others in the nature of simulation, of infatuated
vanity, making themselves appear that which they are not nor ever will be.

"The eagle, symbolizing liberty and strength, is the bird that has found the most adepts. And
men, collectively and individually, have desired to copy and imitate the most rapacious bird in
order to triumph in the plundering if their fellow-men.

"There are men who, besides being eagles, have the characteristics of the vulture, the owl and the
vampire.

"Ascending the mountains of Benguet to classify and measure the skulls of the Igorots and study
and civilize them, and to espy in his flight with the eye of the bird of prey, where are the large
deposits of gold, the prey concealed amongst the lonely mountains, to appropriate them to
himself afterwards, thanks to legal facilities made and unmade at will, but always for his own
benefit.
"Authorizing, despite laws and ordinances an illegal slaughtering of diseased cattle in order to
derive benefit from the infected and putrid meat which he himself was obliged to condemn by
virtue of his official position.

"Presenting himself on all occasions with the wrinkled brow of the scientist who consumes his
life in the mysteries of the laboratory of science, when his whole scientific labor is confined to
dissecting insects and importing fish eggs, as if the fish eggs of this country were less nourishing
and savory, so as to make it worth the while replacing them with species coming from other
climes.

"Giving an admirable impulse to the discovery of wealthy lodes in Mindanao, in Mindoro, and in
other virgin regions of the archipelago, with the money of the people, and under the pretext of
the public good, when, as a strict matter of truth, the object is to possess all the data and the key
to the national wealth for his essentially personal benefit, as is shown by the acquisition of
immense properties registered under the names of others.

"Promoting through secret agents and partners, the sale of the city worthless land at fabulous
prices which the city fathers dare not refuse from fear of displeasing the one who is behind the
motion, and which they do not refuse to their own good.

"Patronizing concessions for hotels on filled-in lands, with the prospects of enormous profits, at
the expense of the blood of the people.

"Such are the characteristics of the man who is at the same time an eagle who surprises and
devours, a vulture who gorges himself on the dead and putrid meats, an owl who affects a
petulant omniscience and a vampire who silently sucks the blood of the victim until he leaves it
bloodless.

"It is these birds of prey who triumph. Their flight and aim are never thwarted.

"Who will detain them?

"Some share in the body and plunder, Others are too weak to raise a voice to protest. And others
die in the disconsolating destruction of their own energies and interests.

"And then there appears, terrifying, the immortal legend:

"MANE, TECEL, PHARES."

It is alleged, among other things, in paragraph four of the complaint, that the plaintiff was on the
date of said publication, and still is, well known to the officials of the Government of the
Philippine Islands, and to the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands, and to the public generally,
personally as well as a member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and as a Secretary of
the Interior; and the defamation and libel, and the words, terms, and language used in said
defamation and libel were employed by the said defendants with the intention of indicating the
said plaintiff, and that they should be understood, as in fact they were understood, by the public
officials of the Government and the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands in general, as referring
to the plaintiff. (Here follow the reasons for saying the editorial referred to plaintiff and why the
public understood it as referring to him.)

The said defendants charged plaintiff with the prostitution of his office as a member of the Civil
Commission of the Philippines and as Secretary of the Interior of said Islands, for personal ends;
with wasting public funds for the purpose of promoting his personal welfare; and with the
violation of the laws of the Philippine Islands and the ordinances of the city of Manila; with
taking part in illegal combination of the purpose of robbing the people, with the object of gain
for himself and for others; and lastly, with being a bird of prey, and that said defamation should
be understood, as in effect it was understood by the public officials of the Government and the
people of the Philippine Islands in general, as charging the said plaintiff with the conduct,
actions and things above specified; all of which allegations relating to the character and conduct
of the said plaintiff, as above stated, were and are false and without any foundation whatever.
That said defamation and libel were published by the defendants under a heading in large and
showy type, and every effort was made by said defendant to see that said defamation and libel
should attract the attention of the public and be read by all the subscribers to said newspaper and
the readers of the same.

In paragraph five of the complaint it is further alleged that, besides assailing the integrity and
reviling the reputation of the plaintiff, said defendants, in publishing said libel, did so with the
malicious intention of inciting the Filipino to believe that the plaintiff was a vile despot and a
corrupt person, unworthy of the position which he held, and for this reason to oppose of his
administration of the office in his charge as Secretary of the Interior, and in this way they
endeavored to create enormous difficulties for him in the performance of his official duties, and
to make him so unpopular that he would have to resign his office as a member of the Civil
Commission of the Philippines and Secretary of the Interior. In fact, said defendants, by means
of said libel and other false statements in said mentioned newspaper, have been deliberately
trying to destroy the confidence of the public in the plaintiff, and to in incite the people to place
obstacles in his way in the performance of his official duties, in consequence of which said
plaintiff has met with a great many difficulties which have increased to a great extent his labors
as a public official in every one of the Departments.

And the allegations end with paragraph six, in which the plaintiff states that for all these reasons
has been damaged and is entitled to an indemnity for the additional work to which he has been
put by said defendants in compliance with his duties, both in the past and in the future, as well as
for the injuries to his reputation and feelings, in the sum, of P50,000, and that besides this said
amount he is entitled to collect from the defendants the additional sum of fifty thousand pesos in
the way of punitive damages, as a warning to the defendants.

The complaint concludes with a prayer, among other things, that judgment be rendered ordering
the defendants to pay the damages as above stated and the costs of the action; and is dated and
signed, Manila, P.I., January 23, 1909, Hartigan and Rohde, Kincaid and Hurd, attorneys for
plaintiff.
A demurrer to this complaint was filed by the defendants, through their attorney, Sr. Felipe
Agoncillo, which demurrer was heretofore heard and overruled by the Court, and the defendants
required to answer. Accordingly, the defendants within the prescribed time, filed their answer;
and on November 16, 1909, through their attorney, filed and amended answer, which is as
follows (after stating the case):

The defendants in the above-entitled action, through their undersigned attorney, answering the
complaint, state: That they make a general denial of the allegations in the complaint, and as a
special defense allege:

"(1) That the plaintiff lacks the necessary personality to institute the complaint in question, as
evidently appears from the allegations in the same, and which the defendants deny;

"(2) That the facts set forth as a cause of action in the complaint are insufficient to constitute a
cause of action in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants;

"(3) That the said complaint is in every sense contrary to law, criminal case No. 4295, for libel,
against the defendants Martin Ocampo, Teodoro M. Kalaw, and Fidel A. Reyes, in the Court of
First Instance of this city, being still pending, inasmuch as both causes, criminal and civil, are
based upon the same facts which the plaintiff, who is also interested in said criminal cause,
considers a cause of action;

"(4) That the civil action in the above-entitled cause has been destroyed as a consequence of the
fact that the plaintiff did not expressly reserve his right to the same in the said mentioned cause
No. 4295 for libel, in order to exercise it after the termination of said criminal cause:

"(5) That the defendants Lope K. Santos, Faustino Aguilar, Leoncio G. Liquete, Manuel Palma,
Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio M. Cansipit have
been erroneously included in the complaint, for the simple reason that the first two were
acquitted in said cause No. 4295 for libel, the third was used as a witness by the prosecution in
the same cause, and the latter ones have no interest, directly or indirectly, in the newspaper "El
Renacimiento," in which the plaintiff presumes, was published the editorial which forms the
basis of the complaint, and which is said to be libelous; and concluding with a prayer to the court
to dismiss the case, with cost against the plaintiff."

The second paragraph of this "special defense" is nothing other than a general demurrer to the
complaint, which has been overruled, as already stated.

The first paragraph is not clearly stated, but the court construes it as meaning a simple denial that
the plaintiff is the person referred to in the alleged libelous article "Birds of Prey," which issue is
sufficiently raised by the general denial of the allegations in the complaint.

The third paragraph is not a valid defense in law, for the simple reason that section 11 of Act 277
of the Philippine Commission, under which this suit is brought, especially provides for a separate
civil action for damages, as well as for a criminal prosecution. (See Mr. Justice Johnson's recent
decision.) This third paragraph is therefore without merit; and the same may be said of the fourth
paragraph thereof. As to paragraph five, it contains no material averment which could not have
been set up and insisted upon under the general issue.

One part if this so-called special defense is therefore a demurrer already and adjudicated, another
part is covered by the general issue, and the residue is without merit as a legal defense, and might
have been stricken out. The defense is therefore tantamount to the general issue only, there being
no special plea that these charges are true, nor any plea of justification.

The trial of this case on its merits began November 16, and ended December 10, 1909, and the
proceedings and evidence introduced are to be found in the exhibits and stenographic notes taken
by the court's official reporter. At the trial Judge Kincaid said Major Hartigan appeared for the
plaintiff and Señores Agoncillo, Cruz Herrera, and Ferrer for the defendants.

After hearing the testimony and arguments of counsel and a due consideration of the case, the
court finds the following facts established by the admissions and a decided preponderance of the
evidence:

That the defendants Martin Ocampo, Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo
Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio M. Cansipit, seven in number, are the proprietors and
owners of the said daily newspaper known as "El Renacimiento" and "Muling Pagsilang," and
that "El Renacimiento" and "Muling Pagsilang," are one and the same newspaper, owned,
managed, printed and published by the same persons; that Teodoro M. Kalaw and Lope K.
Santos were the editors in chief of directors of this paper on the 30th of October, 1908, and that
said nine defendants named were the owners, editors, proprietors, managers and publishers of
said newspaper on said 30th of October, 1908, for a long time prior thereto, and during all the
time mentioned in the complaint.

As to the defendants, Reyes, Aguilar, and Liquete, they appear from the evidence to have been
editors of said paper, but in subordinate position to the chief editors or directors, Kalaw and
Santos, and to have acted under the direction of their latter two defendants.

The court further finds that every essential or material allegation of the complaint is true
substantially as therein stated, with the exception noted to Fidel A. Reyes, Faustino Aguilar, and
Leoncio G. Liquete, and as may be hereinafter indicated. The case is therefore dismissed as to
these three defendants.

The only serious contention of the defense is (1) that the editorial "Birds of Prey" does not refer
to a determinate person; and (2) that, conceding that it does refer to the plaintiff, none of the
defendants, except Teodoro M. Kalaw, is responsible for the writing, printing, or publication of
the alleged libelous article of the damages to the plaintiff resulting therefrom.

In the opinion of the court this article so indubitably refers to the plaintiff, and was so easily and
well understood by the readers of said paper as indicating the plaintiff, that it would be an act of
superrogation to elaborately discuss the evidence adduced in support of or against the
proposition. It is as clear to the court from the evidence adduced as the noonday sun, that the
plaintiff is the identical and only person meant and referred to in said article "Birds and Prey;"
and it requires no argument to prove that it does mean and refer to him and was so intended by
the writer, and therefore by said nine defendants, and could not have been otherwise understood
by any intelligent reader or subscriber of said paper, in view of the reasons assigned in the
complaint, which reasons are clearly disclosed and fully established by the evidence. And it may
be added that much valuable time was needlessly consumed by the defense at trial in an effort to
establish the contrary.

It seems to the court a reflection upon the intelligence of the subscribers and readers of "El
Renacimiento" to contend that this editorial was not well understood by them as referring to the
plaintiff, and as fully as if his name had been mentioned in every paragraph thereof. And
assuredly the omission of his name from the editorial has made the libel less hurtful and
disastrous in its results to the reputation and feelings of the plaintiff.

Much time was consumed also in adducing evidence to show that none of the twelve defendants
were the owners of "El Renacimiento" and "Muling Pagsilang," but that six of them had
originally contributed their money as a partriotic donation to the Filipino people, and that Martin
Ocampo simply held the money and property of the paper as trustees for this people, and that the
paper was being devoted exclusively to philanthropic and patriotic ends, and that Galo and
Lichauco had agreed to contribute to the same ends, but had not done so.

This proposition in the light of evidence is so preposterous as to entitle it to little, if any, serious
consideration. To ask the court to believe it is tantamount to asking the court to stultify reason
and common sense. That those seven defendants named contributed their respective sums of
money, as shown by the evidence, to the foundation of said newspaper in 1901 for their own
personal benefit and profit is fully and unmistakably established. It is equally well established
that Martin Ocampo is and was, not only a part owner, but that he has been and is still the
administrator or business manager of said newspaper, and that the other six persons named are
shareholders, part owners and proprietors thereof, and were such on said 30th of October, 1908.

Arcadio Arellano testified positively that Galo Lichauco was one of the seven founders, and that
Lichauco contributed P1,000. Martin Ocampo testified that Galo Lichauco promised to
contribute an amount which he (the witness) did not remember but that Lichauco did not keep his
promise. (See pp. 107, 108, and 231 of the evidence.)

The other evidence and circumstances strongly corroborate Arcadio Arellano, and the court is
constrained to believe that Arellano told the truth and Ocampo did not. See Exhibit B-J, a copy
of "El Renacimiento" containing the article "Infamy Among Comrades," page 87 of the
evidence, in which there was published that these seven persons named are the shareholders of
the paper.

Furthermore, Galo Lichauco failed to appear and testify, so as to enlighten the court as to which
witness, Arellano or Ocampo, told the truth, or whether chief editor Kalaw had his authority to
publish in said paper, as he did in November 22, 1907, that he, Galo Lichauco, was one of the
shareholders. The presumptions are therefore against Galo Lichauco. See S.S. Co. vs. Brancroft-
Whitney Co. (36 C. C. A., 136 and 153).
It also appears from the evidence that Teodoro M. Kalaw was the chief editor or director of the
Spanish section of said paper, and that Lope K. Santos was the chief editor or director of the
Tagalog section on said 30th of October, 1908, and that the Spanish and Tagalog sections are,
and then were, one and the same newspaper, but printed and published in different languages.

It is alleged that said newspaper has a large circulation throughout the Philippine Islands, and
was published and circulated daily in the Spanish and Tagalog languages in the city of Manila.
Not only are these allegations true, but it is also true that said newspaper has a daily circulation
and subscribers in other parts of the world, notably in the United States and Spain; and it has
subscribers numbering in toto not less than 5,200, and a daily issue of 6,000 copies.

It is also true as alleged, and the court so finds that since the year 1906 to said 30th of October,
1908, these nine defendants had been maliciously persecuting and attacking the plaintiff in their
said newspapers, until at last, on said 30th of October, 1908 with the malicious intention of
injuring the plaintiff, who on said date was and still is a member of the Civil Commission and
Secretary of the Interior in the Government of the Philippine Islands; and with the object of
exposing him to the odium, contempt, and ridicule of the public, they wrote, printed, and
published in their said newspaper, in its ordinary number of said 30th of October, 1908, the
malicious defamation and false libel of and concerning the plaintiff, entitled and herein alluded
to as the editorial "Birds of Prey," which libel was and is highly injurious to the plaintiff and
from which the plaintiff has sustained serious damage.

This editorial, when properly interpreted and read between the lines, means, besides other things,
and was intended by the writer to mean and be understood by the readers thereof as meaning
substantially the following:

That the plaintiff, Dean C. Worcester, was born on the surface of the globe to eat and devour,
like a bird of prey, and that others, born to be eaten and devoured, are the prey and the food of
the insatiable voracity of the plaintiff; that the plaintiff had a desire to copy and imitate the most
rapacious bird, the eagle, in order to triumph in plundering his fellowman; that the plaintiff
besides being an eagle, has the characteristics of the vulture, the owl, and the vampire.

That the plaintiff ascended the mountains of Benguet to classify and measure the skulls of the
Igorots, and study and civilize them and to espy in his flight with the eye of the bird of prey the
large deposits of gold-the prey concealed amidst the mountains-and to appropriate them to
himself afterwards, and that to this end the plaintiff had the legal facilities, made and unmade at
his own will, and that this is always done for his own benefit.

That the plaintiff authorized, inspite of laws and ordinances, the illegal slaughtering is diseased
cattle in order to derive benefit from the infected and putrid meant which he himself was obliged
to condemn by virtue of his official position; that while the plaintiff presents himself on all
occasions with the wrinkled brow of the scientist who consumes his life in the mysteries of the
laboratory of science, his whole scientific labor is confined to dissecting insects and importing
fish eggs.
That although the plaintiff gave an admirable impulse to the discovery of wealthy lodes in
Mindanao and Mindoro, and in other virgin regions of the Archipelago, with the money of the
people, under the pretext of the public good, as a strict matter of truth his object was to possess
all the data and the key to the national wealth for his essentially personal benefit, and that this is
shown by his acquisition of immense properties registered under the names of others.

That the plaintiff promoted, through secret agents and partners, the sale to the city of Manila of
worthless land at fabulous prices, which the city fathers dared not refuse from fear of displeasing
the plaintiff, who was behind the project, and which they did not refuse for their own good; that
the plaintiff favored concessions for hotels in Manila on filled-in land; with the prospect of
enormous profits, at the expense of the blood of the people.

That such are the characteristics of the plaintiff, who is at the same time an eagle that surprises
and devours, a vulture that gorges his self on deed and rotten meats, an owl that affects a petulant
omniscience, and a vampire that sucks the blood of the victim until he leaves it bloodless. And
this libelous article concludes with the asseveration in substance that the plaintiff has been
"weighed in the balance and found wanting" — "Mane, Tecel, Phares."

That this editorial is malicious and injurious goes without saying. Almost every line thereof
teems with malevolence, ill will, and wanton and reckless disregard of the rights and feelings of
the plaintiff; and from the very nature and the number of the charges therein contained the
editorial is necessarily very damaging to the plaintiff.

That this editorial, published as it was by the nine defendants, tends to impeach the honesty and
reputation of the plaintiff and publishes his alleged defects, and thereby exposes him to public
hatred, contempt, and ridicule is clearly seen by a bare reading of the editorial.

It suffices to say that not a line is to be found in all the evidence in support of these malicious,
defamatory and injurious charges against the plaintiff; and there was at the trial no pretense
whatever by the defendants that any of them are true, nor the slightest evidence introduced to
show the truth of a solitary charge; nor is there any plea of justification or that the charges are
true, much less evidence to sustain a plea.

In the opinion of the court "Birds of Prey," when read and considered in its relation to and
connection with the other articles libelous and defamatory in nature, published of and concerning
the plaintiff by these nine defendants anterior and subsequent to the publication of this article,
and having reference to the same subject matter as shown by the evidence, is one of the worst
libels of record. It is safe to say that in all the court reports to the Philippine Islands, or of Spain,
or the United States, there is not to be found a libel case in which there is a more striking
exemplification of the spirit of hatred, bad faith, evil motive, mischievous intent, actual malice,
nefarious purpose, base malignity, or gross malevolence.

It is proper to observe also that since the beginning of this attack on the plaintiff in the year 1906
down almost to the present time, so far from there being any apology, retraction, or effort to
repair the injury already done as far as lay in the power of the defendants, the persecution,
wrong, and tortious injury to the plaintiff had been steadily kept up and persisted in, without the
slightest abatement of the malevolent spirit.

There has been neither retraction, apology, nor reparation; per contra, the libel has been repeated,
reiterated, and accentuated, and widely and extensively propagated by these nine defendants
through the columns of their said paper and otherwise; and it appears from the evidence that
especial effort has been made by these same defendants to give as much publicity as possible to
the libelous and defamatory words used of and concerning the plaintiff in said editorial.

Through their instrumentality and persistency in asserting and reasserting its truth, this diabolical
libel has been spread broadcast over the Philippine Islands and to other parts of the world. In said
criminal case No. 4295 some of these nine defendants pleaded the truth of the charges; and in
Exhibit A-Q is to be found this language: "The defense will adduce its evidence demonstrating
the truth of every one of the facts published."

In their said paper of the 11th of January, 1909, there is published statement:

"The brief period of time allowed us by the court, at the request of the counsel, to gather
evidence which we are to adduce in our effort to demonstrate the truth of the accusation that we
have formulated in the article which is the subject of the agitation against us, having expired, the
trial of the case against our director had been resumed." (See pp. 63 and 67 of the evidence.)

And about the same time they also declared in their said paper that "there is more graft than fish
in the rivers of Benguet." And this in the year of our Lord 1909! the persecution having begun in
1905; thus indicating that there is to be no "let-up" or cessation of the hostile attitude toward the
plaintiff or the vilification of his name and assaults upon his character, much less a retraction or
an apology, unless drastic means and measures are made use of to the end that there may be no
further propagation of the libel, or asseveration, or reiteration of its truth.

This article "Birds of Prey" charges the plaintiff with malfeasance in office and criminal acts,
and is therefore libelous per se. It in substance charges the plaintiff with the prostitution of his
office as a member of the Civil Commission of the Philippine Islands and Secretary of the
Interior of said Islands for personal ends. It is charged also substantially that plaintiff in his
official capacity wasted the public funds for the purpose of promoting his own personal welfare,
and that he violated the laws of the Philippine Islands and the ordinances of the city of Manila.

In its essence he is charged with taking part in illegal combinations for the purpose of robbing
the people with the object of gain for himself and for others; with being a bird of prey, a vulture
(buzzard), an owl, and a vampire that sucks the blood of the victim (meaning the people) until he
leaves it bloodless, that is to say, robs the people, until he leaves them wretched and poverty-
stricken, deprived of all worldly possessions; and lastly, that he, the plaintiff, like Belshazzar,
has been weighed in the balance and found wanting as a high Government functionary; all of
which charges are false and malicious and without and foundation whatever in fact, as the
evidence fully demonstrates.
It is also a matter of fact, and the court so finds, that said defamation was written and published
that it might be understood, and it was understood, by the public officials of the Government and
the people of the Philippine Islands in general, and wherever else said newspaper may have
circulated and been read, as charging the plaintiff with the tortious and criminal acts and conduct
charged in said editorial as hereinbefore specified and interpreted.

The court finds it also true that, besides assailing the integrity and reviling the reputation of the
plaintiff, said nine defendants, in publishing said libel, did so with the malicious intention of
inciting the Filipino people to believe that the plaintiff was despotic and corrupt and unworthy of
the position which he held, and for this reason to oppose his administration of the office in his
charge as Secretary of the Interior, and in this way they endeavored to create enormous
difficulties for him in the performance of his official duties, and to make him so unpopular that
he would have to resign his office as a member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and
Secretary of the Interior.

It is also true that the said nine defendants, by means of said libel, and other like false statements
in their said newspaper, have been deliberately trying to destroy the confidence of the public in
the plaintiff and to incite the people to place obstacles in his way in the performance of his
official duties, in consequence of which the plaintiff has met with many difficulties which have
greatly increased his labors as a public official.

It further appears from the evidence that not only has an effort been made by these nine
defendants to give as much publicity as possible to the charges, but in order that said defamation
should attract the attention of the public, they published the same under a heading in large, bold
and showy type, so that it might be easily seen and read by all the subscribers and readers of said
paper.

In full view of all the evidence, therefore, it is clearly seen that every essential allegation of the
complaint is true substantially as therein claimed, and that the whole of the said editorial relating
to the misconduct and bad character of the plaintiff is false and without the slightest foundation
in fact. Not a scintilla of evidence was introduced in support of any injurious charge made
therein against the plaintiff, to say nothing of the plaintiff's evidence that each and every charge
of malfeasance therein contained is false, and without reference to whether a failure to plead the
truth admits the falsity of the charge.

The evidence shows no "special" or "actual pecuniary damage," and none is alleged in the
complaint. Two other kinds of damages, however are claimed, to wit, general damages for
injuries to the feelings and reputation of the plaintiff and additional work to which he has been
put by the conduct of the defendants, which are laid in the sum of P50,000, and "punitive,"
exemplary, or vindictive damages, "as a warning to the defendants," or as expressed in Act 277
of the Philippine Commission, as a just punishment to the libelers and an example to others,"
which are laid in the same sum of P50,000.

The nine defendants being liable to the plaintiff for damages, the next question to be decided is
what amount of damages should be awarded the plaintiff for the injury to his reputation and
feelings and his being a proper case for punitive damages, the further question is, what sum shall
be awarded as a just punishment to these nine libelers and as an example to others. In neither of
these cases is there any precise measure of damages.

In determining the amount to be awarded in the first instance it is proper to consider the previous
character, influence, reputation, standing, official position, hope of advancement, prospect of
promotion, and social status of the plaintiff and his family, and all the circumstances connected
with the case.

The plaintiff is a man in the prime of life, holding, as he has held for the last ten years an
important, responsible, lucrative, high and exalted position of trust and honor in the service of
the Government of the United States, in the Philippine Islands, without a blotch on his family
escutcheon, so far as the evidence shows, and with an untarnished reputation as a man, as a
citizen, and as a Government official.

He is a man of honesty, integrity, and high social position; a man of learning, famous as a
scientist, and scientific achievements and scholarly attainments, a man of industrious habits,
genuine worth, and intellectual force. He has read, studied, traveled and learned much, and is an
author of merit and distinction. He was for a long while a professor in one of the largest and most
renowned institutions of learning in the world; he is a man of vast experience, broad and liberal
views, and an extensive acquaintanceship, not only in the Philippine Islands, but in the United
States and other countries of the world. He was well and favorably received by the people
wherever he journeyed previous to this atrocious libel upon his integrity and reputation.

He has discharged the duties of his lofty official position in a manner that reflects credit upon
himself as well as the Government which he represents, and apparently with entire satisfaction to
all of his superiors in office and the people generally; and but for this pernicious, outrageous, and
highly reprehensible assault upon his good name, fame and reputation, there were prospects of
promotion to higher honors. And so far as his personal and private record is concerned it was
without a blemish anterior to the time when these unfounded and dastardly aspersions were cast
upon it by these nine defendants.

Indeed, it is only necessary to advert to the testimony of the defense itself to ascertain that the
plaintiff is an honorable man, and without a stain upon his character, officially or otherwise. It
would be interesting to note here in parallel columns and compare the charges made in "Birds of
Prey" and the testimony of one of the witnesses for the defendants.

Felipe Buencamino, an intelligent witness for the defense, in his testimony (p. 240) when asked
the question, Do you know Mr. Worcester?" he answers, "Yes, sir: I know him as an honorable
man. I also know him as an honest, honorable public official." In answer to another question he
says, "As I have said, I know Mr. Worcester as a private citizen and as a public official, and my
opinion of him is that of honorable man and an upright official." And no other witness testified
anything to the contrary.

"A good name is rather to be chosen than great riches and loving favor rather than silver of
gold."
"Who steals my purse steals trash;

xxx xxx xxx

But he that filches from me my good name,

Robs me of that which not enriches him
And makes me poor indeed."

The enjoyment of a private reputation is as much a constitutional right as the possession of life,
liberty or property. It is one of those rights necessary to human society that underlie the whole
scheme of human civilization.

"The respect and esteem of his fellows are among the highest rewards of a well-spent life
vouchsafed to man in this existence. The hope of it is the inspiration of youth, and their
possession the solace of later years. A man of affairs, a business man, who has been seen and
known of his fellowmen in the active pursuits of life for many years, and who has developed a
great character and an unblemished reputation, has secured a possession more useful, and more
valuable than lands, or houses, or silver, or gold . . .

"The law recognizes the value of such a reputation, and constantly strives to give redress for its
injury. It imposes upon him who attacks it by slanderous words, or libelous publication, a
liability to make full compensation for the damage to the reputation, for the shame and obloquy,
and for the injury to the feelings of the owner, which are caused by the publication of the slander
or the libel.

"It goes further. If the words are spoken, or the publication is made, with the intent to injure the
victim, or with the criminal indifference to civil obligation, it imposes such damages as a jury (in
this case the judge), in view of all the circumstances of the particular case adjudge that the
wrongdoer ought to pay as an example to the public, to deter others from committing like
offenses, and as a punishment for the infliction of the injury.

"In the ordinary acceptance of the term, malice signifies ill will, evil intent, or hatred, while it is
legal signification is defined to be "a wrongful act done intentionally, without legal justification."
(36 C. C. A., 475.)

Surely in the case at bar there was a wrongful or tortious act done intentionally and without the
semblance of justification or excuse, or proof that the libelous charges against the plaintiff were
"published and good motives and justifiable ends."

But the Legislature and the highest judicial authority of these Islands have spoken in no
uncertain words with regard to the rights of the plaintiff in this case; and we need not necessarily
turn to the law of libel elsewhere, or the decision of the courts in other jurisdictions to ascertain
or determine his rights.

In sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 11 of the Libel Law (Act 277, Philippine Commission) is to be found
the law of these Islands especially applicable to this case. Section 1 thereof defines libel. Section
2 provides that every person who willfully and with a malicious intent to injure another
publishes, or procures to be published, any libel shall be punished as therein provided. Section 3
provides that an injurious publication is presumed to have been malicious if no justifiable motive
for making it is shown. Section 4 provides, among other things, that in all criminal prosecutions
the truth may be given in evidence; but to establish this defense, not only must the truth of the
matter charged as libelous be proven, but also that it was published with good motives and for
justifiable ends; and the presumptions, rules of evidence, and special defenses are equally
applicable in civil and criminal actions, according to section 11 of said Act.

Section 6 is as follows:

"Every author, editor, or proprietor of any book, newspaper, or serial publication is chargeable
with the publication of any words contained in any part of such book or number of each
newspaper or serial as fully as if he were the author of the same."

And section 11 provides as follows:

"In addition to such criminal action, any person libeled as hereinbefore set forth shall have a
right to a civil action against the person libeling him for damages sustained by reason of such
libel, and the person so libeled shall be entitled to recover in such civil action not only the actual
pecuniary damages sustained by him, but also damages for injury to his feelings and reputation,
and in addition such punitive damages as the court may think will be a just punishment to the
libeler and an example to others. Suit may be brought in any Court of First Instance having
jurisdiction of the parties. The presumptions, rules or evidence and special defenses provided for
in this chapter for criminal prosecutions shall be equally applicable in civil actions under this
section."

"The proprietor of a printing plant is responsible for publishing a libel. According to the legal
doctrines and jurisprudence of the United States, the printer of a publication containing libelous
matter is liable for the same." (Mr. Justice Torres, in U.S. vs. Ortiz, 8 Phil. Rep., 757.) But said
section 6 plainly fixes the liability of editors and proprietors of newspapers, and is clear enough
for all the purposes of this case.

Mr. Justice Carson (5 Phil. Rep. 1551), speaking for our Supreme Court, says:

"When there is an averment in the complaint that the defamatory words used refer to the
plaintiff, and it is proven that the words do in fact refer to him and are capable of bearing such
special application, an action for libel may be maintained even though the defamatory
publication does not refer to the plaintiff by name."

And Mr. Justice Willard (12 Phil. Rep., 4282), for the same high authority, says:

"In an action for libel damages for injury to feelings and reputation may be recovered though no
actual pecuniary damages are proven.
"Punitive damages cannot be recovered unless the tort is aggravated by evil motive, actual
malice, deliberate violence or oppression."

That is to say, if there is evil motive, or actual malice or deliberate violence, or oppression then
punitive damages, or "smart money," may be recovered.

And Justice Carson (U.S. vs. Sedano, 14 Phil., Rep., 338), also says:

"Actual or express malice of an alleged libelous publication may be inferred from the style and
tone of the publication.

"The publication of falsehood and calumny against public officers and candidates for public
office is specially reprehensible and is an offense most dangerous to the people and to the public
welfare.

"The interest of society require that immunity should be granted to the discussion of public
affairs, and that all acts and matters of a public nature may be freely published with fitting
comments and strictures; but they do not require that the right to criticise public officers shall
embrace the right to base such criticism under false statements of fact, or attack the private
character of the officer, or to falsely impute to him malfeasance or misconduct in office."

And there are almost numberless English and American authorities in perfect harmony with
these decisions of our Supreme Court too numerous indeed to be cited here; and it is not
necessary.

Among the leading cases, however, in the United States, is that of Scott vs. Donald (165 U.S.,
58) and cases therein cited. In this case the court says: "Damages have been defined to be the
compensation which law will allow for an injury done, and are said to be exemplary and
allowable in excess of the actual loss when the tort is aggravated by evil motive, actual malice,
deliberate violence or oppression," which is in entire harmony with Justice Willard's decision
hereinbefore cited.

And quoting from the decision in Day vs. Woodworth (13 Howard, 371) the same high court
says:

"In actions of trespass, where the injury has been wanton and malicious, or gross or outrageous,
courts permit juries (here the court) to add to the measured compensation of the plaintiff which
he would have been entitled to recover, had the injury been inflicted without design or intention,
something further by way of punishment or example, which has sometimes been called "smart
money." "

It thus clearly appears that the facts established in the case at bar are more than sufficient to bring
it within the rule of law here laid down by the highest judicial authority.

Section 11 of the Libel Law expressly allows general damages; and Mr. Justice Willard, in
Macleod vs. Philippine Publishing Company,3 says:
"The general damages which are allowed in actions of libel are not for mental suffering alone,
but they are allowed for injury to the standing and reputation of the person libeled, and the
common law of England and America presumed that such damages existed without proof thereof
from the mere fact of publication of the libel."

In Day vs. Woodworth, the Supreme Court of the United States recognized the power of a jury in
certain actions in tort to assess against the tort feasor punitive damages. Where the injury has
been inflicted maliciously or wantonly, and with circumstances of contumely, or indignity, the
judge or jury, as the case may be, is not limited to the ascertainment of a simple compensation
for the wrong committed against the aggrieved person.

"The public position of the plaintiff, as an officer of the Government, and the evil example of
libels, are considerations with the jury (here the judge) for increasing damages." (Tillotson vs.
Cheetham, 3 Johns, 56.)

"The character, condition and influence of the plaintiff are relevant on the matter of the extent of
damages." (Littlejohn vs. Greely, 22 How. Prac., 345; 13 Abb. Prac., 41, 311.)

"Where the publication is libelous, the law presumes that it was made with malice — technical,
legal malice, but not malice in fact — and the amount of damages depends in a large degree
upon the motives which actuated the defendants in its publication; and in such cases the law
leaves it to the jury (here the judge) to find a return such damages as they think right and just, by
a sound, temperate, deliberate, and reasonable exercise of their functions as jurymen." (Erber vs.
Dun. (C. C.) 12 Fed., 526.)

"Actions of libel, so far as they involve questions of exemplary damages, and the law of
principal and agent, are controlled by the same rules as are other actions of tort. The right of a
plaintiff to recover exemplary damages exists wherever a tortious injury has been inflicted
recklessly or wantonly, and it is not limited to cases where the injury resulted from personal
malice or recklessness of the defendant. It follows that the owner of a newspaper is as
responsible for all the acts of omission and commission of those he employs to edit it and
manage its affairs, as he would be if personally managing the same.' (Malloy vs. Bennett, (C. C.)
15 Fed., 371.)

"The fact that a publication, libelous per se, was made without any attempt to ascertain its
correctness is sufficient to justify a finding that defendant committed libel client with a wanton
indifference, and with actual malice sufficient to sustain exemplary damages." (Van Ingen vs.
Star Co., 1 App. Div., 429, 37 N.Y., 114.)

"The court is not authorized to set aside a verdict for $45,000 in an action for libel, where it
appears that plaintiff was persistently persecuted in the columns of defendant's newspaper, and
that he and his family were held up to public contempt and ridicule, and defendants withdraw
from the case after failing to establish a plea of justification." (Smith vs. Times Co., (Com. p. 1)
4 Pa. Dist. Rep., 399.)
"In considering the amount with the defendant shall pay, on this account (exemplary damages)
the turpitude of his conduct and his financial ability are only considered; and such consideration
is not in view of the injury or distress of the plaintiff, but in behalf of the public; the wrongful act
is regarded as an indication of the actor's vicious mind — an overt deed of vindictive or wanton
wrong, offensive and dangerous to the public good. This is the view of those damages which
generally prevails." (Sutherland on Damages, vol. 2, p. 1092. title Exemplary Damages.)

"Punitive damages are recoverable not to compensate the plaintiff, but solely to punish the
defendant. This legal motive would suffer defeat if punitive damages could not be given for a
malicious attack on a reputation too well established to receive substantial injury at the hands of
a libeler." (Judge Bond in Ferguson vs. Pub. Co., 72 Mo. App., 462.)

It may be suggested that the reputation of the plaintiff in this case is too well established to be
seriously affected by the defamatory words used of and concerning him in "Birds of Prey," but it
would not be proper to gravely consider this suggestion.

The conditions in these Islands are peculiar. The minds, thoughts, and opinions of the people are
easily molded, and the public is credulous and perhaps frequently too ready to believe anything
that may be said in derogation of an American official, especially when it is published and
vouched for by the editorial and business management and proprietors if a newspaper of the
prominence, pretensions, circulation and influence if "El Renacimiento," which paper is
everlastingly proclaiming in its columns that it is being conducted and published solely in the
interests of the Filipino people — pro bono publico. There is stronger disposition to give
credence to what is said in a newspaper here in the Islands the elsewhere, and when abuse,
vilification, and defamation are persistently practiced for a period of several years, without
modification or retraction, but with renewed emphasis, the people naturally come to believe in its
verity and authenticity.

It is apparent from the evidence that as an effect of the persecution of the plaintiff by "El
Renacimiento" and the libel published in its columns, the minds of the major part of the Filipino
people have been poisoned and prejudiced against the plaintiff to such an extent that he is
regarded by these people as odious, dishonest, unscrupulous and tyrannical.

It may be that his reputation has not suffered so severely with those of his own race, but when it
is considered that his vocation has tenfold more to do with the Filipinos than with his own
people, that his official duties place him in constant contact with them, and that his success in his
chosen career is largely dependent upon their good will and support, it is manifest that the
damage to his reputation has been very great and that a large sum of money should be awarded to
indemnify him, as far as money can indemnify, for the loss of his good name with the Filipino
people.

The plaintiff came to the Philippine Islands when a young man, full of hope and ambition. Since
his arrival he has devoted himself incessantly and indefatigably to the uplifting of the inhabitants
of the Archipelago and to the faithful performance, as far as he was able, of the pledges and
promises of the Government to the Filipino people. The duties of his particular office were such
as brought him in more immediate and constant contract with the people than any other official
of the same category in these Islands.

It is clearly shown that the plaintiff faithfully endeavored to perform, and did efficiently perform,
all of these duties, doing everything that he could in an unselfish and disinterested manner of the
welfare and development of the country and its people, knowing full well that his career, as well
as his advancement, depended largely upon the good will of these people, and that by incurring
their censure or displeasure he would have little hope of success in his chosen work.

Imagine, therefore, the chagrin, disappointment, mortification, mental suffering, and distress, and
perturbation of spirit that would necessarily be occasioned him when he discovered that through
the nefarious, studied, and practiced persecution of the paper in question, these high hopes were
blasted, and that, instead of having gained the respect and gratitude of the people for the
assiduous labors devoted to their uplifting, they had been made to believe that, instead of being a
benefactor, he was a vampire that was sucking their life blood, a corrupt politician who was
squandering the money wrung from the people by means of taxation, in schemes for his own
personal aggrandizement and enrichment.

That instead of developing the mineral wealth of the Islands he was taking up all the rich veins
and appropriating them in the names of subservient tools, to his own personal use, benefit and
profit. That instead of protecting the people from disease, he was, by means of infected meat and
for his own personal gain, spreading contagion among them.

That he united in his person all the bad qualities of the vulture, the eagle, and the vampire; that,
in short, he was a "bird of prey," with all that is implied in that term in its worst acceptation; that
he was a corrupt tyrant, who never lost an opportunity to do the people hurt; that instead of
wishing them well and seeking their advancement, he was their enemy, who never lost an
opportunity to degrade and humiliate them; that instead of preferring them for office and
positions of official trust, he treated them with all sorts of contempt and indifference.

It is difficult to appreciate the feelings of a refined soul in its contemplation of a result so

disastrous, so unjust, and so unmerited.

It is furthermore shown that when the plaintiff came to these Islands a young scientist he had
already won fame in his own country; that he is a fellow of the important scientific associations
in the world. His election as a fellow or member of these scientific bodies shows that his labors
in the Philippines were the object of solicitude by the prominent scientific and learned men not
only of his own race, but in many other civilized countries of the world. Important results were
evidently expected of him by them, and it can not be doubted that they expected of him of life
honestly devoted to the conscientious discharge of his duties as a trusted public functionary of
the American Government in the Philippine Islands.

And yet he is falsely denounced in the columns of said newspaper to his fellows of these
societies as a man who is so absolutely corrupt, so inordinately selfish and avaricious that he has
not considered for a moment the duties incumbent upon him; that he has been oblivious to every
obligation of trust and confidence, and that he is unworthy of the respect of honest men.
One witness testified that he read this libel in the public library of the city of Boston. It is
furthermore shown that copies of this paper went to Spain, England, and to different parts of the
United States; and inasmuch as the plaintiff is a man of prominence in the scientific world, it is
to be inferred that his fellows became more or less aware of these heinous charges.

Thus we find that the plaintiff is here confronted with disappointed ambition and frustrated
hopes, and placed in the humiliating attitude of having to explain to his fellows that the charges
are untrue, of adducing evidence to clear himself, perhaps never with complete success, of the
stain that has been cast upon his reputation by the libelous and defamatory declarations contained
in "Birds of Prey."

In view of the foregoing findings of fact and circumstances of the case and the law applicable
thereto,

It is the opinion of the court, and the court so finds, that the plaintiff has sustained damages on
account of wounded feelings and mental suffering and injuries to his standing and reputation in
the sum of thirty-five thousand (P35,000) pesos, and that he is entitled to recover this sum of the
nine defendants named, as being responsible for having written, printed, and published said libel;
and that the plaintiff is entitled to recover of them the further sum of twenty-five thousand
(P25,000) pesos, as punitive damages, which the court thinks will be a just punishment to these
nine libelers and an example to others.

Wherefore, it is so ordered and adjudged that the plaintiff, Dean C. Worcester, have and recover
of the defendants, Martin Ocampo, Teodoro M. Kalaw, Lope K. Santos, Manuel Palma, Arcadio
Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio M. Cansipit, jointly and
severally, the sum of sixty thousand (P60,000) pesos, and the costs of suit, for which execution
may issue.

It is ordered. At Manila, P.I., this 14th day of January , 1910.

From said decision the defendants appealed and made the following assignments of error in this
court:

I.

The court erred in overruling our motions for suspension of this case, in its present state, until
final judgment should be rendered in criminal case No. 4295 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, pending appeal in the Honorable Supreme Court, for libel based also on the editorial,
"Birds of Prey."

II.

The court erred in admitting as evidence mere opinion adduced by counsel for the plaintiff with
the intention of demonstrating to whom the editorial, alleged to the libelous, refers.
III.

The court erred in giving greater preponderance to the opinions of the witnesses for the plaintiff
than to the expert testimony of the defense.

IV.

The court erred in declaring the editorial on which the complaint is based to be libelous per se
and to refer necessarily to the plaintiff, Dean C. Worcester.

V.

The court erred in declaring the defendants Martin Ocampo, Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano,
Angel Jose, Felipe Barretto, Gregorio M. Cansipit, and Galo Lichauco to be owners of "El
Renacimiento."

VI.

The court erred in not admitting Exhibits 1 and 3 presented by counsel for the defendants.

VII.

The court erred in rendering judgment against the defendants.

VIII.

The court erred in sentencing the defendants jointly "and severally" to pay to the plaintiff, Dean
C. Worcester, the sum of P60,000.

IX.

The court erred in not ordering that execution of the judgment to be confined to the business
known as "El Renacimiento" and to the defendant Teodoro M. Kalaw, without extending to
property of the alleged owners of said newspaper which was not invested therein by them at its
establishment.

X.

The court erred in granting damages to the plaintiff by virtue of the judgment rendered against
the defendants.

XI.

The court, finally, erred in granting to the plaintiff punitive damages against the alleged owners
of "El Renacimiento," admitting the hypothesis that said editorial is libelous per se and refers to
the Honorable Dean C. Worcester.
The theory of the defendants, under the first assignment of error, is that the civil action could not
proceed until the termination of the criminal action, relying upon the provisions of the Penal
Code in support of such theory. This court, however, has decided in the case of Ocampo et al. vs.
Jenkins (14 Phil. Rep., 681) that a judgment in a criminal prosecution for libel, under the
provisions of Act 277 of the Civil commission, constitutes no bar or estoppel in a civil action
based upon the same acts or transactions. The reason most often given for this doctrine is that the
two proceedings are not between the same parties. Different rule as to the competency of
witnesses and the weight of evidence necessary to the findings in the two proceedings always
exist. As between civil and criminal actions under said Act (No. 277) a judgment in one is no bar
or estoppel to the prosecution of the other. A judgment in a criminal cause, under said Act, can
not be pleaded as res adjudicata in a civil action. (Stone vs. U.S., 167 U.S., 178; Boyd vs. U.S.,
616 U. S., 616, 634; Lee vs. U.S., 150 U.S., 476, 480; U.S. vs. Jaedicke, 73 Fed. Rep., 100; U.S.
vs. Schneider, 35 Fed. Rep., 107; Chamberlain vs. Pierson, 87 Fed. Rep., 420; Steel vs. Cazeaux,
8 Martin (La.), 318, 13 American Decisions, 288; Betts vs. New Hartford, 25 Conn., 185.)

In a criminal action for libel the State must prove its case by evidence which shows the guilt of
the defendant, beyond a reasonable doubt, while in a civil action it is sufficient for the plaintiff to
sustain his cause by a preponderance of evidence only. (Ocampo vs. Jenkins (supra); Reilly vs.
Norton, 65 Iowa, 306; Sloane vs. Gilbert, 27 American decisions, 708; Cooley on Torts, sec.
208; Greenleaf on Evidence, 426; Wigmore on Evidence, secs. 2497, 2498.)

With reference to the second assignment of error above noted, we find that this court has already
decided the question raised thereby, in the case of U. S. vs. Ocampo et al. (18 Phil. Rep., 1).

During the trial of the cause the plaintiff called several witnesses for the purpose of showing that
the statements made in said alleged libelous editorial were intended to apply to the Honorable
Dean C. Worcester, Secretary of the Interior. The defendants duly objected to these questions
and excepted to the ruling of the court admitting them.

In the case of Russell vs. Kelley (44 Cal., 641, 642) the same question was raised and the court,
in its decision, said:

The rule laid down in 2 Stockey on Slander (p. 51) is that the application of the slanderous words
to the plaintiff and the extrinsic matters alleged in the declaration may be shown by the
testimony of witnesses who knew the parties and circumstances and who can state their judgment
and opinion upon the application and meaning of the terms used by the defendant. It is said that
where the words are ambiguous on the face of the libel, to whom it was intended to be applied,
the judgment and opinion of witnesses, who from their knowledge of the parties and
circumstances are able to form a conclusion as to the defendant's intention and application of the
libel is evidence for the information of the jury.

Mr. Odgers, in his work on Libel and Slander (p. 567), says:

The plaintiff may also call at the trial his friends or others acquainted with the circumstances, to
state that, in reading the libel, they at once concluded it was aimed at the plaintiff. It is not
necessary that all the world should understand the libel. It is sufficient if those who know the
plaintiff can make out that he is the person meant. (See also Falkard's Stockey on Libel and
Slander, 4th English edition, 589.)

The correctness of this rule is not only established by the weight of authority but is supported by
every consideration of justice and sound policy. The lower court committed no error in admitting
the opinion of witnesses offered during the trial of the cause. One's reputation is the sum or
composite of the impressions spontaneously made by him from time to time, and in one way or
another, upon his neighbors and acquaintances. The effect of a libelous publication upon the
understanding of such persons, involving necessarily the identity of the person libeled is of the
very essence of the wrong. The issue in a libel case concerns not only the sense of the
publication, but, in a measure its effect upon a reader acquainted with the person referred to. The
correctness of the opinion of the witnesses as to the identity of the person meant in the libelous
publication may always be tested by cross-examination. (Enquirer Co. vs. Johnston, 72 Fed.
Rep., 443; 2nd Greenleaf on Evidence, 417; Nelson vs. Barchenius, 52 Ill., 236; Smith vs. Miles,
15 Vt., 245; Miller vs. Butler, 6 Cushing (Mass.), 71.)

It is true that some of the courts have established a different rule. We think, however, that a large
preponderance of the decisions of the supreme courts of the different States is in favor of the
doctrine which we have announced here.

We are of the opinion that assignments of error Nos. 3, 4, and 7 may fairly be considered
together, the question being whether or not the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause in
the lower court shows, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the said editorial was libelous in
its character. Here again we find that this question has been passed upon by this court in the case
of U. S. vs. Ocampo et al. (18 Phil. Rep., 1), and we deem it unnecessary to discuss this question
again, for the reason that the evidence adduced in the present cause was practically the same, or
at least to the same effect, as the evidence adduced in the cause of U.S. vs. Ocampo et al. It is
sufficient here to say that the evidence adduced during the trial of the present cause shows, by a
large preponderance of the evidence, that said editorial was one of the most pernicious and
malicious libels upon a just, upright and honorable official, which the courts have ever been
called upon to consider. There is not a scintilla of evidence in the entire record, notwithstanding
the fact that the defendants from time to time attempted to make a show of proving the
truthfulness of the statements made in said editorial, which in any way reflects upon the
character and high ideals of Mr. Dean C. Worcester, in the administration of his department of
the Government.

With reference to the fifth assignment of error, to wit: That the court erred in holding that the
defendants, Martin Ocampo, Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Felipe Barretto,
Gregorio M. Cansipit, and Galo Lichauco, were the proprietors of "El Renacimiento," the lower
court said:

Much time was consumed also in adducing evidence to show that none of the twelve defendants
were the owners of "El Renacimiento" and "Muling Pagsilang," but that six of them had
originally contributed their money as a patriotic donation to the Filipino people, and that Martin
Ocampo simply held the money and property of the paper as trustee for this people, and that the
paper was being devoted exclusively to philanthropic and patriotic ends, and that Galo Lichauco
had agreed to contribute to the same ends but had not done so.

"This proposition," said the lower court, "in the light of the evidence, is so preposterous as to
entitle it to little, if any, serious consideration. To ask the court to believe it is tantamount to
asking the court to stultify reason and common sense. That those seven defendants named
contributed their respective sums of money, as shown by the evidence, to the foundation of said
newspaper in 1901, for their own personal benefit and profit, is fully and unmistakably
established. It is equally well established that Martin Ocampo is and was, not only a part owner,
but that he has been and is still the administrator or business manager of said newspaper, and that
the other six persons named are shareholders, part owners and proprietors thereof and were such
on the said 30th of October, 1908."

Examining the evidence adduced during the cause in the lower court, we find, sometime before
the commencement of the present action and before any question was raised with reference to
who were the owners of the said newspaper, that the defendant, Arcadio Arellano, in the case of
United States vs. Jose Sedano (14 Phil. Rep., 338), testified upon that question as follows:

Q. Who are the proprietors of "El Renacimiento"?

A. I, Martin Ocampo, Gregorio Mariano (Cansipit), Mr. Barretto, and Galo Lichauco.

Q. Who else?

A. No one else.

Q. And Rafael Palma — is not so?

A. No, sir; Manuel Palma, the brother of Rafael Palma.

During the trial of the present cause, Arcadio Arellano testified that his declarations in other
cause were true.

It also appears from the record (Exhibit B-J) that in the month of November, 1907, long before
the commencement of the present action, "El Renacimiento," in reply to an article which was
published in "El Comercio," published the following statement:

They (it) say (s) that this enterprise" (evidently meaning the publication of "El Renacimiento")
"is sustained by Federal money; that we are inspired by Federal personages. We declare that this,
besides being false, is calumnious. The shareholders of this company are persons well known by
the public, and never at any moment of their lives have they acted with masks on--those masks
for which "El Comercio" seems to have so great an affection. They are, as the public knows:
Señores Martin Ocampo, Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe
Barretto, and Gregorio Cansipit.
Arcadio Arellano also testified during the trial of the present cause that he contributed P750 to
the establishment of "El Renacimiento;" that Martin Ocampo contributed the sum of P500; that
Mariano Cansipit, Felipe Barretto and Angel Jose contributed the sum of P250 or P500 each; that
Galo Lichauco contributed the sum of P1,000 and that Manuel Palma contributed P3,000.

During the trial of the present cause Arcadio Arellano, Martin Ocampo, and Angel Jose testified
as witnesses, relating to the ownership of the newspaper called "El Renacimiento." They testified
that whatever money they gave for the purpose of establishing said newspaper, was given as a
donation, and that they were neither the owners nor coowners of said periodical. The defendants,
Manuel Palma, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio Cansipit, did not testify as
witnesses during the trial of the cause in the lower court. No reason is given for their failure to
appear and give testimony in their own behalf. The record does not disclose whether or not the
declarations of Arcadio Arellano, in the case of U. S. vs. Sedano (14 Phil. Rep., 338) at the time
they were made, were called to the attention of Manuel Palma, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto,
and Gregorio Cansipit, as well as the reply to "El Comercio," above noted. Proof of said
declarations and publication was adduced during the trial of the cause in the present case, and the
attorney of these particular defendants well knew the purpose and effect of such evidence, if not
disputed; but, notwithstanding the fact that said declarations and publication were presented in
evidence, and notwithstanding the fact that the attorney for the defendants knew of the purpose
of such proof, the defendants, Palma, Lichauco, Barretto, and Cansipit, were not called as
witnesses for the purpose of rebutting the same. It is a well settled rule of evidence, that when the
circumstances in proof tend to fix the liability on a party who has it in his power to offer
evidence of all the facts as they existed and rebut the inferences which the circumstances in proof
tend to establish, and he fails to offer such proof, the natural conclusion is that the proof, if
produced, instead of rebutting would support the inferences against him, and the court is justified
in acting upon that conclusion. (Railway Company vs. Ellis, C. C. A. Reports, vol. 4, p. 454;
Commonwealth vs. Webster, 5 Cush. (Mass.), 295; People vs. McWhorter 4 Barb. (N. Y.), 438.)

Lord Mansfield, in the case of Blatch vs. Archer (Cowper, 63, 65) said:

It is certainly a maxim that all the evidence is to be weighed according to the proof which it was
in the power of one side to have produced, and in the power of the other side to have
contradicted.

Mr. Starkey, in his valuable work on evidence (vol. 1, p. 64), lays down the rule that:

The conduct of a party in omitting to produce evidence in elucidation of the subject matter in
dispute, which is within his power and which rests peculiarly within his own knowledge,
frequently offers occasion for presumptions against him, since it raises the strong suspicion that
such evidence, if adduced, would operate to his prejudice. (Pacific Coast et al. Co. vs. Bancroft-
Whitney Co., 36 C. C. A. Reports, 136, 153.)

At the time of the said declarations of Arcadio Arellano in the case of Sedano and at the time of
the said publication in reply to "El Comercio," there was no reason for stating anything except
the truth: neither does there seem to have been any reason for publishing the fact that the
defendants were the owners of "El Renacimiento" unless it was true.
At the time there seemed to be no reason to have it appear that they were donors and public
benefactors only. They seemed to be proud of the fact that they were the owners. The editors,
publishers, and managers of "El Renacimiento," at the time the reply to "El Comercio" was
published, seemed to be anxious to announce to the public who its owners were. It ("El
Renacimiento") had not then realized that it belonged to no one; that it had been born into the
community without percentage; that it had been created a terrible machine for the purpose of
destroying the good character and reputation of men without having any one to respond for its
malicious damage occasioned to honorable men; that it was a cast-off, without a past or the hope
of a future; that it was liable to be kicked and buffetted about the persecuted and destroyed
without any one to protect it; that its former friends and creators had scattered hither and thither
and had disappeared like feathers before a cyclone, declaring, under oath, that they did not know
their offspring and were not willing to recognize it in public. It seems to have been a Moses
found in the bulrushes, destined by its creators to be a great good among the Filipino people, in
teaching them to respect the rights of persons and property; but, unlike its Biblical prototype, it
became, by reason of its lack of parentage, an engine of destruction let loose in the State, to enter
the private abode of lawabiding citizens and to take from them their honor and reputation, which
neither it nor the State could restore. To rob a man of his wealth is to rob him of trash, but to take
from him his good name and reputation is to rob him of that which does not make the robber
richer and leaves the person robbed poor indeed.

The appellants tried to make it appear that the money which they gave for the establishment of
"El Renacimiento" was a pure donation. They claim that it was a donation to the Filipino people.
They do not state, however, or attempt to show what particular persons were to manage, control,
and direct the enterprise for which the donation was made. A donation must be made to definite
persons or associations. A donation to an indefinite person or association is an anomaly in law,
and we do not believe, in view of all of the facts, that it was in fact made. A donation must be
made to some definite person or association and the donee must be some ascertained or
ascertainable person or association.

A donation may be made for the benefit of the public, but it must be made, in the very nature of
things, to some definite person or association. A donation made to no person or association could
not be regarded as a donation in law. It could not be more than an abandonment of property. Of
course where a donation is in fact made, without reservation to a particular person or association,
the donor is no longer the owner of the thing donated nor responsible, in any way, for its use,
provided that the object, for which the donation was made, was legal. A person does not become
an owner or part owner of a church, for example, to the construction of which he has made a
donation; neither is he responsible for the use to which said edifice may be applied. No one
disputes the fact that donations may be made for the public use, but they must be made to
definite persons or associations, to be administered in accordance with the purpose of the gift.

We can not believe, in the light of the whole record, that the defendants and appellants, at the
time they presented the defense that they were donors simply and not owners, had a reasonable
hope that their declarations as to said donation, given in the manner alleged, would be believed
by the court.
After a careful examination of the evidence brought to this court and taking into consideration
the failure of the other defendants to testify, we are of the opinion that a preponderance of such
evidence shows that the defendants, Martin Ocampo, Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel
Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio M. Cansipit, were the coowners of the
newspaper known as "El Renacimiento," at the time of the publication of the said alleged libel.

With reference to the sixth assignment of error above noted, to wit: That the lower court
committed an error in not admitting in evidence the judgment of acquittal of the defendant, Lope
K. Santos, rendered in the criminal cause, we are of the opinion that the refusal to admit said
evidence in the civil cause was not an error. The fact that the evidence in the criminal cause was
insufficient to show that Lope K. Santos was guilty of the crime charged, in no way barred the
right of the person injured by said alleged libel to maintain the present civil action against him.
(Ocampo vs. Jenkins, 14 Phil. Rep., 681.) The criminal action had to be sustained by evidence
showing the culpability of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, while in the civil action it is
sufficient to show that the defendants injured the plaintiff by the alleged libelous publication, by
a preponderance of the evidence only. (Greenleaf on Evidence, sec. 426; Cooley on Torts, 208;
Reilley vs. Norton, 65 Iowa, 306; Sloane vs. Gilbert, 23 Am. Dec., 708.)

In the case of Steel vs. Cazeaux (8 Martin, La., 318; 13 American Decisions, 288), the supreme
court of Louisiana said:

A judgment of conviction in a criminal prosecution can not be given in evidence in a civil action.

In the case of Betts et al. vs. New Hartford (25 Conn., 180) Mr. Justice Ellsworth said (in a case
where a judgment in a criminal case was offered in evidence):

A conviction in a criminal case is not evidence of facts upon which the judgment was rendered,
when those facts come up in a civil case, for this evidence would not be material; and so the law
is perfectly well settled. (1 Greenleaf on Evidence, secs. 536, 524; 1 Phillips on Evidence, 231;
Hutchinson vs. Bank of Wheeling, 41 Pa. St., 42; Beausoleil vs. Brown, 12 La. Ann., 543;
McDonald vs. Stark, 176 Ill., 456, 468.)

While we believe that the lower court committed no error in refusing to admit the sentence
acquitting Lope K. Santos in the criminal case, we are of the opinion, after a careful examination
of the record brought to this court, that it is insufficient to show that Lope K. Santos was
responsible, in any way, for the publication of the alleged libel, and without discussing the
question whether or not the so-called Tagalog edition of "El Renacimiento" and "El
Renacimiento" constituted one and the same newspaper, we find that the evidence is insufficient
to show that Lope K. Santos is responsible in damages, in any way, for the publication of the
said alleged libel.

The appellants discussed the eight and ninth assignments of error together, and claim that the
lower court committed an error in rendering a judgment jointly and severally against the
defendants and in allowing an execution against the individual property of said owners, and cite
provisions of the Civil and Commercial Codes in support of their contention. The difficulty in
the contention of the appellants is that they fail to recognize that the basis of the present action is
a tort. They fail to recognize the universal doctrine that each joint tort feasor is not only
individually liable for the tort in which he participates, but is also jointly liable with his tort
feasors. The defendants might have been sued separately for the commission of the tort. They
might have been sued jointly and severally, as they were. (Nicoll vs. Glennie, 1 M. & S. (English
Common Law Reports), 558.) If several persons jointly commit a tort, the plaintiff or person
injured, has his election to sue all or some of the parties jointly, or one of them separately,
because the tort is in its nature a separate act of each individual. (1 Chiddey, Common Law
Pleadings, 86.) It is not necessary that the cooperation should be a direct, corporeal act, for, to
give an example, in a case of assault and battery committed by various persons, under the
common law all are principals. So also is the person who counsels, aids or assists in any way he
commission of a wrong. Under the common law, he who aided or assisted or counseled, in any
way, the commission of a crime, was as much a principal as he who inflicted or committed the
actual tort. (Page vs. Freeman, 19 Mo., 421.)

It may be stated as a general rule, that the joint tort feasors are all the persons who command,
instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a
tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit. They are each liable as
principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as if they had performed the wrongful act
themselves. (Cooley on Torts, 133; Moir vs. Hopkins, 16 Ill., 313 (63 Am. Dec., 312 and note);
Berry vs. Fletch, 1st Dill., 67; Smithwick vs. Ward, 7 Jones L. 64; Smith vs. Felt, 50 Barb. (N.
Y.), 612; Shepard vs. McQuilkin, 2 W. Va., 90; Lewis vs. Johns, 34 Cal., 269.)

Joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. The person
injured may sue all of them, or any number less than all. Each is liable for the whole damage
caused by all, and all together are jointly liable for the whole damage. It is no defense for one
sued alone, that the others who participated in the wrongful act are not joined with him as
defendants; nor is it any excuse for him that his participation in the tort was insignificant as
compared with that of the others. (Forebrother vs. Ansley, 1 Campbell (English Reports), 343;
Pitcher vs. Bailey, 8 East, 171; Booth vs. Hodgson, 6 Term Reports, 405; Vose vs. Grant, 15
Mass., 505; Acheson vs. Miller, 18 Ohio, 1; Wallace vs. Miller, 15 La. Ann., 449; Murphy vs.
Wilson, 44 Mo., 313; Bishop vs. Ealey, 9 Johnson (N. Y.), 294.)

Joint tort feasors are not liable pro rata. The damages can not be apportioned among them, except
among themselves. They can no insist upon an apportionment, for the purpose of each paying an
aliquot part. They are jointly and severally liable for the full amount. (Pardrige vs. Brady, 7 Ill.
App., 639; Carney vs. Read, 11 Ind., 417; Lee vs. Black, 27 Ark., 337; Bevins vs. McElroy, 52
Am. Dec., 258.)

A payment in full of the damage done, by one of the joint tort feasors, of course satisfies any
claim which might exist against the others. There can be but one satisfaction. The release of one
of the joint tort feasors by agreement, generally operates to discharge all. (Wright vs. Lathrop, 2
Ohio, 33; Livingston vs. Bishop, 1 Johnson (N.Y.), 290; Brown vs. Marsh, 7 Vt., 327; Ayer vs.
Ashmead, 31 Conn., 447; Eastman vs. Grant, 34 Vt., 387; Turner vs. Hitchcock, 20 Iowa, 310;
Ellis vs. Esson, 50 Wis., 149.)
Of course the courts during the trial may find that some of the alleged joint tort feasors are liable
and that others are not liable. The courts may release some for lack of evidence while
condemning others of the alleged tort feasors. And this is true even though they are charged
jointly and severally. (Lansing vs. Montgomery, 2 Johnson (N. Y.), 382; Drake vs. Barrymore,
14 Johnson, 166; Owens vs. Derby, 3 Ill., 126.)

This same principle is recognized by Act 277 of the Philippine Commission. Section 6 provides
that:

Every author, editor or proprietor . . . is chargeable with the publication of any words in any part
. . . or number of each newspaper, as fully as if he were the author of the same.

In our opinion the lower court committed no error in rendering a joint and several judgment
against the defendants and allowing an execution against their individual property. The
provisions of the Civil and Commercial Codes cited by the defendants and appellants have no
application whatever to the question presented in the present case.

The tenth assignment of error above noted relates solely to the amount of damages suffered on
account of wounded feelings, mental suffering and injury to the good name and reputation of Mr.
Worcester, by reason of the alleged libelous publication. The lower court found that the damages
thus suffered by Mr. Worcester amounted to P35,000. This assignment of error presents a most
difficult question. The amount of damages resulting from a libelous publication to a man's good
name and reputation is difficult of ascertainment. It is nor difficult to realize that the damage thus
done is great and almost immeasurable. The specific amount the damages to be awarded must
depend upon the facts in each case and the sound discretion of the court. No fixed or precise
rules can be laid down governing the amount of damages in cases of libel. It is difficult to
include all of the facts and conditions which enter into the measure of such damages. A man's
good name and reputation are worth more to him than all the wealth which he can accumulate
during a lifetime of industrious labor. To have them destroyed may be eminently of more
damage to him personally than the destruction of his physical wealth. The loss is immeasurable.
No amount of money can compensate him for his loss. Notwithstanding the great loss which he,
from his standpoint, sustains, the courts must have some tangible basis upon which to estimate
such damages.

In discussing the elements of damages in a case of libel, the Honorable James C. Jenkins, who
tried the present case in the court below, correctly said that, "The enjoyment of a private
reputation is as much a constitutional right as the possession of life, liberty or property. It is one
of those rights necessary to human society, that underlie the whole scheme of human civilization.
The respect and esteem of his fellows are among the highest rewards of a wellspent life
vouchsafed to man in this existence. The hope of it is the inspiration of youth and its possession
is a solace in later years. A man of affairs, a business man, who has been seen known by his
fellowmen in the active pursuits of life for many years, and who has developed a great character
and an unblemished reputation, has secured a possession more useful and more valuable than
lands or houses or silver or gold. The law recognizes the value of such a reputation and
constantly strives to give redress for its injury. It imposes upon him who attacks it by slanderous
words or libelous publications, the liability to make full compensation for the damage to the
reputation, for the shame, obloquy and for the injury to the feelings of its owner, which are
caused by the publication of the slander or libel. The law goes further. If the words are spoken or
the publication is made with the intent to injure the victim or with criminal indifference to civil
obligation, it imposes such damages as the jury, in view of all the circumstances of the particular
case, adjudge that the wrongdoer ought to pay as an example to the public and to deter others
from doing likewise, and for punishment for the infliction of the injury."

As was said above, the damages suffered by Mr. Worcester to his good name and reputation are
most difficult of ascertainment. The attorney for the appellants, in his brief, lends the court but
little assistance in reaching a conclusion upon this question. The appellants leaves the whole
question to the discretion of the court, without any argument whatever.

After a careful examination, we are of the opinion that part of the judgment of the lower court
relating to the damages suffered by the Honorable Dean C. Worcester, should be modified, and
that a judgment should be rendered in favor of Mr. Dean C. Worcester and against the
defendants, jointly and severally, for the sum of P15,000, with interest at 6 per cent from the 23d
of January, 1909.

With reference to the eleventh assignment of error above noted, to wit: That the court erred in
imposing punitive damages upon the defendants, we are of the opinion, after a careful
examination of the evidence, and in view of all of the facts and circumstances and the malice
connected with the publication of said editorial and the subsequent publications with relation to
said editorial, that the lower court, by virtue of the provisions of Act No. 277 of the Philippine
Commission, was justified in imposing punitive damages upon the defendants.

Section 11 of Act No. 277 allows the court, in an action for libel, to render a judgment for
punitive damages, in an amount which the court may think will be a just punishment to the
libeler and an example to others.

Exemplary damages in civil actions for libel may always be recovered if the defendant or
defendants are actuated by malice. In the present case there was not the slightest effort on the
part of the defendants to show the existence of probable cause or foundation whatever for the
facts contained in said editorial. Malice, hatred, and ill will against the plaintiff are seen
throughout the record. The said editorial not only attempted to paint the plaintiff as a villain, but
upon every occasion, the defendants resorted to ridicule of the severest kind.

Here again we find difficulty in arriving at a conclusion relating to the damages which should be
imposed upon the defendants for the purpose of punishment. Upon this question the courts must
be governed in each case by the evidence, the circumstances and their sound discretion. Taking
into consideration the fact that some of the defendants have been prosecuted criminally and have
been sentenced, and considering that fact as a part of the punitive damages, we have arrived at
the conclusion that the judgment of the lower court should be modified, and that a judgment
should be rendered against the defendants, jointly and severally, and in favor of the plaintiff, the
Honorable Dean C. Worcester, in the sum of P10,000, as punitive damages, with interest at 6 per
cent from the 23d day of January, 1909.
Therefore, after a full consideration of all the facts contained in the record and the errors
assigned by the appellants in this court, we are of the opinion that the judgment of the lower
court should be modified and that a judgment should be rendered in favor of Dean C. Worcester
and against the defendants Martin Ocampo, Teodoro M. Kalaw, Manuel Palma, Arcadio
Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio M. Cansipit, jointly and
severally, for the sum of P25,000 with interest at 6 per cent from the 23d of January, 1909, with
costs, and that a judgment should be entered absolving Lope K. Santos from any liability under
said complaint. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-20392 December 18, 1968

MARCIAL T. CAEDO, JUANA SANGALANG CAEDO, and the Minors, EPHRAIM CAEDO,
EILEEN CAEDO, ROSE ELAINE CAEDO, suing through their father, MARCIAL T. CAEDO,
as guardian ad litem, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
YU KHE THAI and RAFAEL BERNARDO, defendants-appellants.

Norberto J. Quisumbing for plaintiffs-appellants.

De Joya, Lopez, Dimaguila, Hermoso and Divino for defendants-appellants

MAKALINTAL, J.:

As a result of a vehicular accident in which plaintiff Marcial Caedo and several members of his
family were injured they filed this suit for recovery of damages from the defendants. The
judgment, rendered by the Court of First Instance of Rizal on February 26, 1960 (Q-2952),
contains the following disposition:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the court renders a judgment, one in favor of the plaintiffs
and against the defendants, Yu Khe Thai and Rafael Bernardo, jointly and severally, to pay to
plaintiffs Marcial Caedo, et al., the sum of P1,929.70 for actual damages; P48,000.00 for moral
damages; P10,000.00 for exemplary damages; and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, with costs
against the defendants. The counterclaim of the defendants against the plaintiffs is hereby
ordered dismissed, for lack of merits.

On March 12, 1960 the judgment was amended so as to include an additional award of P3,705.11
in favor of the plaintiffs for the damage sustained by their car in the accident.

Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified the case to us in view of the total
amount of the plaintiffs' claim.

There are two principal questions posed for resolution: (1) who was responsible for the accident?
and (2) if it was defendant Rafael Bernardo, was his employer, defendant Yu Khe Thai,
solidarily liable with him? On the first question the trial court found Rafael Bernardo negligent;
and on the second, held his employer solidarily liable with him.
The mishap occurred at about 5:30 in the morning of March 24, 1958 on Highway 54 (now E. de
los Santos Avenue) in the vicinity of San Lorenzo Village. Marcial was driving his Mercury car
on his way from his home in Quezon City to the airport, where his son Ephraim was scheduled to
take a plane for Mindoro. With them in the car were Mrs. Caedo and three daughters. Coming
from the opposite direction was the Cadillac of Yu Khe Thai, with his driver Rafael Bernardo at
the wheel, taking the owner from his Parañaque home to Wack Wack for his regular round of
golf. The two cars were traveling at fairly moderate speeds, considering the condition of the road
and the absence of traffic — the Mercury at 40 to 50 kilometers per hour, and the Cadillac at
approximately 30 to 35 miles (48 to 56 kilometers). Their headlights were mutually noticeable
from a distance. Ahead of the Cadillac, going in the same direction, was a caretella owned by a
certain Pedro Bautista. The carretela was towing another horse by means of a short rope coiled
around the rig's vertical post on the right side and held at the other end by Pedro's son, Julian
Bautista.

Rafael Bernardo testified that he was almost upon the rig when he saw it in front of him, only
eight meters away. This is the first clear indication of his negligence. The carretela was provided
with two lights, one on each side, and they should have given him sufficient warning to take the
necessary precautions. And even if he did not notice the lights, as he claimed later on at the trial,
the carretela should anyway have been visible to him from afar if he had been careful, as it must
have been in the beam of his headlights for a considerable while.

In the meantime the Mercury was coming on its own lane from the opposite direction. Bernardo,
instead of slowing down or stopping altogether behind the carretela until that lane was clear,
veered to the left in order to pass. As he did so the curved end of his car's right rear bumper
caught the forward rim of the rig's left wheel, wrenching it off and carrying it along as the car
skidded obliquely to the other lane, where it collided with the oncoming vehicle. On his part
Caedo had seen the Cadillac on its own lane; he slackened his speed, judged the distances in
relation to the carretela and concluded that the Cadillac would wait behind. Bernardo, however,
decided to take a gamble — beat the Mercury to the point where it would be in line with the
carretela, or else squeeze in between them in any case. It was a risky maneuver either way, and
the risk should have been quite obvious. Or, since the car was moving at from 30 to 35 miles per
hour (or 25 miles according to Yu Khe Thai) it was already too late to apply the brakes when
Bernardo saw the carretela only eight meters in front of him, and so he had to swerve to the left
in spite of the presence of the oncoming car on the opposite lane. As it was, the clearance
Bernardo gave for his car's right side was insufficient. Its rear bumper, as already stated, caught
the wheel of the carretela and wrenched it loose. Caedo, confronted with the unexpected
situation, tried to avoid the collision at the last moment by going farther to the right, but was
unsuccessful. The photographs taken at the scene show that the right wheels of his car were on
the unpaved shoulder of the road at the moment of impact.

There is no doubt at all that the collision was directly traceable to Rafael Bernardo's negligence
and that he must be held liable for the damages suffered by the plaintiffs. The next question is
whether or not Yu Khe Thai, as owner of the Cadillac, is solidarily liable with the driver. The
applicable law is Article 2184 of the Civil Code, which reads:
ART. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the
former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of due diligence, prevented the
misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of
reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two
months.

Under the foregoing provision, if the causative factor was the driver's negligence, the owner of
the vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the
exercise of due diligence. The rule is not new, although formulated as law for the first time in the
new Civil Code. It was expressed in Chapman vs. Underwood (1914), 27 Phil. 374, where this
Court held:

... The same rule applies where the owner is present, unless the negligent acts of the driver are
continued for such a length of time as to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe
them and to direct his driver to desist therefrom. An owner who sits in his automobile, or other
vehicle, and permits his driver to continue in a violation of the law by the performance of
negligent acts, after he has had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct that the
driver cease therefrom, becomes himself responsible for such acts. The owner of an automobile
who permits his chauffeur to drive up the Escolta, for example, at a speed of 60 miles an hour,
without any effort to stop him, although he has had a reasonable opportunity to do so, becomes
himself responsible, both criminally and civilly, for the results produced by the acts of the
chauffeur. On the other hand, if the driver, by a sudden act of negligence, and without the owner
having a reasonable opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance, injures a person or violates
the criminal law, the owner of the automobile, although present therein at the time the act was
committed, is not responsible, either civilly or criminally, therefor. The act complained of must
be continued in the presence of the owner for such a length of time that the owner, by his
acquiescence, makes his driver act his own.

The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not respondent superior but rather the
relationship of paterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant, if known
to the master and susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own negligence if he fails
to correct it in order to prevent injury or damage.

In the present case the defendants' evidence is that Rafael Bernardo had been Yu Khe Thai's
driver since 1937, and before that had been employed by Yutivo Sons Hardware Co. in the same
capacity for over ten years. During that time he had no record of violation of traffic laws and
regulations. No negligence for having employed him at all may be imputed to his master.
Negligence on the part of the latter, if any, must be sought in the immediate setting and
circumstances of the accident, that is, in his failure to detain the driver from pursuing a course
which not only gave him clear notice of the danger but also sufficient time to act upon it. We do
not see that such negligence may be imputed. The car, as has been stated, was not running at an
unreasonable speed. The road was wide and open, and devoid of traffic that early morning. There
was no reason for the car owner to be in any special state of alert. He had reason to rely on the
skill and experience of his driver. He became aware of the presence of the carretela when his car
was only twelve meters behind it, but then his failure to see it earlier did not constitute
negligence, for he was not himself at the wheel. And even when he did see it at that distance, he
could not have anticipated his driver's sudden decision to pass the carretela on its left side in
spite of the fact that another car was approaching from the opposite direction. The time element
was such that there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved
and warn the driver accordingly. The thought that entered his mind, he said, was that if he
sounded a sudden warning it might only make the other man nervous and make the situation
worse. It was a thought that, wise or not, connotes no absence of that due diligence required by
law to prevent the misfortune.

The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of the Civil Code is, to a great degree,
necessarily subjective. Car owners are not held to a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence
as are professional drivers. In many cases they refrain from driving their own cars and instead
hire other persons to drive for them precisely because they are not trained or endowed with
sufficient discernment to know the rules of traffic or to appreciate the relative dangers posed by
the different situations that are continually encountered on the road. What would be a negligent
omission under aforesaid Article on the part of a car owner who is in the prime of age and knows
how to handle a motor vehicle is not necessarily so on the part, say, of an old and infirm person
who is not similarly equipped.

The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure of skill or proficiency
either in the mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic rules before he may own a
motor vehicle. The test of his intelligence, within the meaning of Article 2184, is his omission to
do that which the evidence of his own senses tells him he should do in order to avoid the
accident. And as far as perception is concerned, absent a minimum level imposed by law, a
maneuver that appears to be fraught with danger to one passenger may appear to be entirely safe
and commonplace to another. Were the law to require a uniform standard of perceptiveness,
employment of professional drivers by car owners who, by their very inadequacies, have real
need of drivers' services, would be effectively proscribed.

We hold that the imputation of liability to Yu Khe Thai, solidarily with Rafael Bernardo, is an
error. The next question refers to the sums adjudged by the trial court as damages. The award of
P48,000 by way of moral damages is itemized as follows:

1. Marcial Caedo

P 20,000.00

2. Juana S. Caedo

15,000.00

3. Ephraim Caedo

3,000.00

4. Eileen Caedo
4,000.00

5. Rose Elaine Caedo

3,000.00

6. Merilyn Caedo

3,000.00

Plaintiffs appealed from the award, claiming that the Court should have granted them also actual
or compensatory damages, aggregating P225,000, for the injuries they sustained. Defendants, on
the other hand maintain that the amounts awarded as moral damages are excessive and should be
reduced. We find no justification for either side. The amount of actual damages suffered by the
individual plaintiffs by reason of their injuries, other than expenses for medical treatment, has
not been shown by the evidence. Actual damages, to be compensable, must be proven. Pain and
suffering are not capable of pecuniary estimation, and constitute a proper ground for granting
moral, not actual, damages, as provided in Article 2217 of the Civil Code.

The injuries sustained by plaintiffs are the following:

MARCIAL T. CAEDO:

A. Contusion, with hematoma, scalp, frontal left; abrasions, chest wall, anterior;
B. Multiple fractures, ribs, right, lst to 5th inclusive. Third rib has a double fracture;
Subparieto-plaural hematoma; Basal disc atelectasis, lung, right lower lobe, secondary;
C. Pseudotosis, left, secondary to probable basal fracture, skull.

JUANA SANGALANG CAEDO:

A. Abrasions, multiple:
(1)frontal region, left; (2) apex of nose; (3) upper eyelid, left; (4) knees.
B. Wound, lacerated, irregular, deep, frontal;
C. Fracture, simple, 2nd rib posterior, left with displacement.
D. Fracture, simple, base, proximal phalanx right, big toe.
E. Fracture, simple, base, metatarsals III and V right.
F. Concussion, cerebral.

EPHRAIM CAEDO:

A. Abrasions, multiple:
(1) left temporal area; (2) left frontal; (3) left supraorbital

EILEEN CAEDO:

A. Lacerated wound (V-shaped), base, 5th finger, right, lateral aspect.

B. Abrasions, multiple:
(1) dorsum, proximal phalanx middle finger; (2) Knee, anterior, bilateral; (3) shin, lower 1/3.

ROSE ELAINE CAEDO:

A. Abrasions, multiple: (1) upper and lower lids; (2) left temporal; (3) nasolabial region; (4) leg,
lower third, anterior.

MARILYN CAEDO:

A. Abrasions, multiple: (1)shin, lower 1/3 right; (2) arm, lower third
C. Contusion with hematoma, shin, lower 1/3, anterior aspect, right. (See Exhibits D, D-1, D-2,
D-3, D-4, and D- 5)

It is our opinion that, considering the nature and extent of the above-mentioned injuries, the
amounts of moral damages granted by the trial court are not excessive.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is modified in the sense of declaring defendant-
appellant Yu Khe Thai free from liability, and is otherwise affirmed with respect to defendant
Rafael Bernardo, with costs against the latter.

G.R. No. L-10134 June 29, 1957

SABINA EXCONDE, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
DELFIN CAPUNO and DANTE CAPUNO, defendants-appellees.

Magno T. Bueser for appellant.

Alver Law Offices and Edon B. Brion and Vencedor A. Alimario for appellees.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Dante Capuno, son of Delfin Capuno, was accused of double homicide through reckless
imprudence for the death of Isidoro Caperina and Amado Ticzon on March 31, 1949 in the Court
of First Instance of Laguna (Criminal Case No. 15001). During the trial, Sabina Exconde, as
mother of the deceased Isidoro Caperina, reserved her right to bring a separate civil action for
damages against the accused. After trial, Dante Capuno was found guilty of the crime charged
and, on appeal, the Court Appeals affirmed the decision. Dante Capuno was only (15) years old
when he committed the crime.

In line with her reservation, Sabina Exconde filed the present action against Delfin Capuno and
his son Dante Capuno asking for damages in the aggregate amount of P2,959.00 for the death of
her son Isidoro Caperiña. Defendants set up the defense that if any one should be held liable for
the death of Isidoro Caperina, he is Dante Capuno and not his father Delfin because at the time
of the accident, the former was not under the control, supervision and custody, of the latter. This
defense was sustained by the lower court and, as a consequence it only convicted Dante Capuno
to pay the damages claimed in the complaint. From decision, plaintiff appealed to the Court of
Appeals but the case was certified to us on the ground that the appeal only involves questions of
law.

It appears that Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts Organization and a student of the
Bilintawak Elementary School situated in a barrio in the City of San Pablo and on March 31,
1949 he attended a parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal in said city upon instruction of the city
school's supervisor. From the school Dante, with other students, boarded a jeep and when the
same started to run, he took hold of the wheel and drove it while the driver sat on his left side.
They have not gone far when the jeep turned turtle and two of its passengers, Amado Ticzon and
Isidore Caperiña, died as a consequence. It further appears that Delfin Capuno, father of Dante,
was not with his son at the time of the accident, nor did he know that his son was going to attend
a parade. He only came to know it when his son told him after the accident that he attended the
parade upon instruction of his teacher.

The only issue involved in this appeal is whether defendant Delfin Capuno can be held civilly
liable, jointly and severally with his son Dante, for damages resulting from the death of Isidoro
Caperiña caused by the negligent act of minor Dante Capuno.

The case comes under Article 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code, paragraph 1 and 5, which
provides:

ART. 1903. The obligation impossed by the next preceding articles is enforceable not only for
personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible.

The father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any damages caused
by the minor children who live with them.

xxx xxx xxx

Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils
or apprentices while they are under their custody.

Plaintiff contends that defendant Delfin Capuno is liable for the damages in question jointly and
severally with his son Dante because at the time the latter committed the negligent act which
resulted in the death of the victim, he was a minor and was then living with his father, and
inasmuch as these facts are not disputed, the civil liability of the father is evident. And so,
plaintiff contends, the lower court erred in relieving the father from liability.

We find merit in this claim. It is true that under the law above quoted, "teachers or directors of
arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are
under their custody", but this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to
any academic educational institution (Padilla, Civil Law, 1953, Ed., Vol. IV, p. 841; See 12
Manresa, 4th Ed., p. 557). Here Dante capuno was then a student of the Balintawak Elementary
School and as part of his extra-curricular activity, he attended the parade in honor of Dr. Jose
Rizal upon instruction of the city school's supervisor. And it was in connection with that parade
that Dante boarded a jeep with some companions and while driving it, the accident occurred. In
the circumstances, it is clear that neither the head of that school, nor the city school's supervisor,
could be held liable for the negligent act of Dante because he was not then a student of an
institute of arts and trades as provided by law.

The civil liability which the law impose upon the father, and, in case of his death or incapacity,
the mother, for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with them, is
obvious. This is necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which
imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them, keeping them in their company,
educating them and instructing them in proportion to their means", while, on the other hand,
gives them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation" (Articles 154 and 155, Spanish
Civil Code). The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove
that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage(Article
1903, last paragraph, Spanish Civil Code). This defendants failed to prove.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is modified in the sense that defendants Delfin
Capuno and Dante Capuno shall pay to plaintiff, jointly and severally, the sum of P2,959.00 as
damages, and the costs of action.

G.R. No. L-62988 February 28, 1985

FELINA RODRIGUEZ-LUNA, JOSE R. LUNA and ROBERTO R. LUNA, JR., petitioners,

vs.
THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JOSE E. DELA ROSA and LUIS DELA
ROSA, respondents.

Ezequiel S. Consulta for petitioners.

David M. Castro for respondents.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

This is a petition to review a decision of the defunct Court of Appeals. The petitioners are the
heirs of Roberto R. Luna who was killed in a vehicular collision. The collision took place on
January 18, 1970, at the go-kart practice area in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. Those
involved were the go-kart driven by the deceased, a business executive, and a Toyota car driven
by Luis dela Rosa, a minor of 13 years who had no driver's license.

In a suit for damages brought by the heirs of Roberto R. Luna against Luis dela Rosa and his
father Jose dela Rosa, the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 81078, rendered
the following judgment:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered sentencing the defendants Luis dela Rosa and Jose
dela Rosa to pay, jointly and severally, to the plaintiffs the sum of P1,650,000.00 as unearned net
earnings of Roberto Luna, P12,000.00 as compensatory damages, and P50,000.00 for the loss of
his companionship, with legal interest from the date of this decision; plus attorney's fees in the
sum of P50,000.00, and the costs of suit. (Record on Appeal, p. 35.)

The defendants appealed to the defunct Court of Appeals which in a decision dated May 22,
1979, affirmed in toto that of the trial court. (Rollo, p. 48.) However, upon a motion for
reconsideration filed by the defendants-appellants, the Court of Appeals, in a resolution dated
June 19, 1981, modified its judgment thus:

WHEREFORE, the decision rendered in this case is hereby modified insofar as the judgment
ordering the defendants to pay, jointly and severally, the sum of P 1,650,000.00 to plaintiffs with
legal interest from July 5, 1973, is concerned. In lieu thereof, defendants are hereby ordered to
pay plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the sum of Four Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P450,000.00) as unearned net earnings of Roberto R. Luna, with legal interest thereon from the
date of the filing of the complaint until the whole amount shall have been totally paid.

The rest of the other dispositions in the judgment a quo stand. (Rollo, pp. 33-34.)

Both parties filed separate petitions for review of the appellate court's decision.

In G.R. No. 57362, the petition for review of Jose and Luis dela Rosa was denied for lack of
merit on October 5, 1981. Subsequently, they informed that the decision sought to be reviewed
was not yet final because the Lunas had a pending motion for reconsideration. For prematurity,
this Court set aside all previous resolutions. On February 16, 1983, acting upon the motion and
manifestation of the petitioners, they were required to file an amended petition within thirty days
from notice. On June 20, 1983, this Court resolved: "For failure of the petitioners to file an
amended petition as required, this case is hereby DISMISSED and the dismissal is final."

The instant case — G.R. No. 62988 — is the separate appeal of the Lunas. Their petition
contains the following prayer:

1. That the petition be given due course;

2. That after notice and hearing, judgment be rendered, setting aside or modifying the
RESOLUTION of respondent Court of Appeals dated June 19, 1981, attached as Annex "A" to
the petition, only insofar as it reduced the unearned net earnings to P450,000.00, s• as to affirm
the trial court's finding as to the unearned net earnings of the deceased in the amount of
P1,650,000.00;

3. Ordering that the award of attorney's fees shall also be with interest, at the legal rate.
(Rollo, p. 27.)

On June 27, 1983, the petition was given due course. (Rollo, pp. 122-123.)
In the light of the foregoing, the resolution stated:

It thus appears that the questions in esse are with respect to the award for unearned net earnings
— should the award be P450,000.00 only or should it be P1,650,000.00 as originally adjudged;
and whether the award for attorney's fees shall also be with interest at the legal rate.

The Court takes notice that the wrongful death occurred as early as January 18, 1970, and that
until now the process of litigation is not yet over. In the meantime the value of the Philippine
peso has been seriously eroded so that the heirs of the deceased may ultimately have a greatly
depreciated judgment. In the interest of justice, the private respondents are hereby ordered to
PAY to the petitioners within thirty (30) days from notice the following amounts adjudged
against them: P450,000.00 for unearned net earnings of the deceased; (P12,000.00 as
compensatory damages; P50,000.00 for the loss of his companionship with legal interest from
July 3, 1973; and P50,000.00 as attorney's fees.

Still to be resolved shall be the following: whether the award for unearned net earnings shall be
increased to P1,650,000.00; and whether the award for attorney's fees shall also be with interest
at the legal rate. The costs will be adjudged as a matter of course. (Rollo, p. 123.)

The private respondents failed to pay the amounts and when required to explain they said that
they had no cash money. Accordingly, this Court directed the trial court to issue a writ of
execution but the attempt of the special sheriff to enter the private respondent's premises so that
he could make an inventory of personal properties was thwarted by guards and this Court had to
direct the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary to assist in enforcing the writ of execution. The
execution yielded only a nominal amount. In the meantime, Luis dela Rosa is now of age,
married with two children, and living in Madrid, Spain with an uncle but only casually
employed. It is said: "His compensation is hardly enough to support his family. He has no assets
of his own as yet." (Rollo, p. 208.)

1. On the amount of the award.

The award of P1,650,000.00 was based on two factors, namely: (a) that the deceased Roberto R.
Luna could have lived for 30 more years; and (b) that his annual net income was P55,000.00,
computed at P75,000.00 annual gross income less P20,000.00 annual personal expenses.

This is what the trial court said on Luna's life expectancy:

According to the American Experience Table of Mortality, at age 33 the life expectancy of
Roberto Luna was 33.4 years, and under the Commissioner Standard Ordinary, used by our
domestic insurance companies since 1968 for policies above P5,000.00 his life expectancy was
38.51 years. Dr. Vicente Campa, medical director of San Miguel Corporation, testified that he
was the regular physician of Roberto Luna since his marriage to Felina Rodriguez in 1957. He
said that except for a slight anemia which he had ten years earlier, Roberto Luna was of good
health. Allowing for this condition, he could reasonably expect to have a life expectancy of 30
years. (Record on Appeal, p. 33.)
The Court of Appeals in sustaining the trial court's conclusion said:

We have not been persuaded to disturb the conclusion that the deceased had a life expectancy of
thirty years. At the time of Luna's death, he was only thirty-three years old and in the best of
health. With his almost perfect physical condition and his sound mind, the expectation that he
could have lived for another thirty years is reasonable, considering that with his educational
attainment, his social and financial standing, he had the means of staying fit and preserving his
health and well-being. That he could have lived at least until the age of sixty-three years is an
assessment which is more on the conservative side in view of the testimony of Dr. Vicente
Campa that the general life expectancy nowadays had gone up to seventy years. (Rollo, p. 45.)

The Court of Appeals likewise sustained the trial court in respect of Luna's annual income and
expense. This is what the trial court said:

Roberto Luna was 33 years old when he died, and was survived by his wife Felina Rodriguez-
Luna, and two children, Roberto Jr., 13 years, and Jose, 12 years. His wife was 35 years old at
the time. He declared a gross income of P16,900.00 for 1967 (Exhibit I), P29,700,000 for 1968
(Exhibit H) and P45,117.69 for 1969 (Exhibit G). He had investments in various corporations
amounting to P136,116.00 (Exhibits K, M, M-1, N, N-1 to N-3, O, O-1, P, Q and R) and was the
president and general manager of Rodlum Inc.; general manager of Esso Greenhills Service
Center; Assistant manager of Jose Rodriguez Lanuza Sons; director of Steadfast Investment
Corporation; chairman and treasurer of Greenhills Industrial Corporation; vice-president of
Oasis, Inc.; director of Nation Savings Association; director of Arlun Taxi; and treasurer of
National Association of Retired Civil Employees.

... . His income tax returns show an increase in his income in the short period of three years. It is
reasonable to expect that it would still go higher for the next fifteen years and reach a minimum
of P75,000.00 a year. The potential increase in the earning capacity of a deceased person is
recognized by the Supreme Court. ... the court believes that the expected gross earnings of
Roberto Luna should be fixed in the sum of P75,000.00 a year for the period of his life
expectancy of 30 years, but deducting his personal expenses which, because of his business and
social standing the court in the amount of P20,000.00 a year, in accordance with the rulings of
the Supreme Court. (Record on Appeal, pp. 32-34.)

Acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by the dela Rosas, the Court of Appeals took into
account the fact "that the deceased Roberto R. Luna had been engaged in car racing as a sport,
having participated in tournaments both here and abroad;" it said that Luna's habit and manner of
life should be "one of the factors affecting the value of mortality table in actions for damages;"
and, consequently, concluded that Luna could not have lived beyond 43 years. The result was
that the 30-year life expectancy of Luna was reduced to 10 years only.

Further on the motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals ruled in respect of Luna's annual
personal expenses:
... . Considering the escalating price of automobile gas which is a key expenditure in Roberto R.
Luna's social standing, We should increase that amount to P30,000.00 as the would be personal
expenses of the deceased per annum. (Rollo, p. 33.)

The Court of Appeals then determined the amount of the award thus: P75,000.00 annual gross
income less P30,000.00 annual personal expenses leaves P45,000.00 multiplied by 10 years of
life expectancy and the product is P450,000.00.

The petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred when by its resolution of June 19, 1981,
it reduced Luna's life expectancy from 30 to 10 Years and increased his annual personal
expenses from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00. We sustain the petitioners.

The Court of Appeals, in reducing Luna's life expectancy from 30 to 10 years said that his habit
and manner of life should be taken into account, i.e. that he had been engaged in car racing as a
sport both here and abroad - a dangerous and risky activity tending to shorten his life expectancy.
That Luna had engaged in car racing is not based on any evidence on record. That Luna was
engaged in go-kart racing is the correct statement but then go-kart racing cannot be categorized
as a dangerous sport for go-karts are extremely low slung, low powered vehicles, only slightly
larger than foot-pedalled four wheeled conveyances. It was error on the part of the Court of
Appeals to have disturbed the determination of the trial court which it had previously affirmed.

Similarly, it was error for the Court of Appeals to reduce the net annual income of the deceased
by increasing his annual personal expenses but without at the same time increasing his annual
gross income. It stands to reason that if his annual personal expenses should increase because of
the "escalating price of gas which is a key expenditure in Roberto R. Luna's social standing" [a
statement which lacks complete basis], it would not be unreasonable to suppose that his income
would also increase considering the manifold sources thereof.

In short, the Court of Appeals erred in modifying its original decision.

2. Attorney's fees — with or without interest at the legal rate.

The trial court awarded attorney's fees to the petitioners in the sum of P50,000.00. This award
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its decision of May 22, 1979. The resolution of June 19,
1981, reaffirmed the award. The two decisions as well as the resolution do not provide for
interest at the legal rate to be tacked to the award.

The petitioners now pray that the award of attorney's fees be with interest at the legal rate from
the date of the filing of the complaint. There is merit in this prayer. The attorney's fees were
awarded in the concept of damages in a quasi-delict case and under the circumstances interest as
part thereof may be adjudicated at the discretion of the court. (See Art. 2211, Civil Code.) As
with the other damages awarded, the interest should accrue only from the date of the trial court's
decision.

The private respondents invoke Elcano vs. Hill, L-24803, May 26,1977; 77 SCRA 98, where it
was held that Article 2180 of the Civil Code applied to Atty. Marvin Hill notwithstanding the
emancipation by marriage of Reginald Hill, his son but since Reginald had attained age, as a
matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill had become merely subsidiary to that of his son. It is
now said that Luis dela Rosa, is now married and of legal age and that as a matter of equity the
liability of his father should be subsidiary only.

We are unwilling to apply equity instead of strict law in this case because to do so will not serve
the ends of justice. Luis dela Rosa is abroad and beyond the reach of Philippine courts.
Moreover, he does not have any property either in the Philippines or elsewhere. In fact his
earnings are insufficient to support his family.

WHEREFORE, the resolution of the Court of Appeals dated June 19, 1981, is hereby set aside;
its decision dated May 22, 1979, is reinstated with the sole modification that the award for
attorney's fees shall earn interest at the legal rate from July 5, 1973, the date of the trial court's
decision. Costs against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 70890. September 18, 1992.]

CRESENCIO LIBI * and AMELIA YAP LIBI, Petitioners, v. HON. INTERMEDIATE

APPELLATE COURT, FELIPE GOTIONG and SHIRLEY GOTIONG, Respondents.

Alex Y. Tan, for Petitioners.

Mario D. Ortiz and Danilo V. Ortiz for Private Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; QUASI DELICT; LIABILITY OF PARENTS

FOR CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM CRIMINAL OFFENSES COMMITTED BY THEIR
MINOR CHILDREN; RULE. — The parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil
liability arising from criminal offenses committed by their minor children under their legal
authority or control, or who live in their company, unless it is proven that the former acted with
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent such damages. That primary liability is
premised on the provisions of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code with respect to damages ex
delicto caused by their children 9 years of age or under, or over 9 but under 15 years of age who
acted without discernment; and, with regard to their children over 9 but under 15 years of age
who acted with discernment, or 15 years or over but under 21 years of age, such primary liability
shall be imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Under said Article 2180, the
enforcement of such liability shall be effected against the father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother. This was amplified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code which provides
that the same shall devolve upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, upon the
mother or, in case of her death or incapacity, upon the guardian, but the liability may also be
voluntarily assumed by a relative or family friend of the youthful offender. However, under the
Family Code, this civil liability is now, without such alternative qualification, the responsibility
of the parents and those who exercise parental authority over the minor offender. For civil
liability arising from quasi-delicts committed by minors, the same rules shall apply in accordance
with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code, as so modified.

DECISION

REGALADO, J.:

One of the ironic verities of life, it has been said, is that sorrow is sometimes a touchstone of
love. A tragic illustration is provided by the instant case, wherein two lovers died while still in
the prime of their years, a bitter episode for those whose lives they have touched. While we
cannot expect to award complete assuagement to their families through seemingly prosaic legal
verbiage, this disposition should at least terminate the acrimony and rancor of an extended
judicial contest resulting from the unfortunate occurrence.

In this final denouement of the judicial recourse the stages whereof were alternately initiated by
the parties, petitioners are now before us seeking the reversal of the judgment of respondent
court promulgated on January 2, 1985 in AC-G.R. CV No. 69060 with the following decretal
portion:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court dismissing plaintiff’s complaint is hereby
reversed; and instead, judgment is hereby rendered sentencing defendants, jointly and solidarily,
to pay to plaintiffs the following amounts:chanrobles.com : virtual law library

1. Moral damages, P30,000.000;

2. Exemplary damages, P10,000.00;

3. Attorney’s fees, P20,000.00, and costs.

However, denial of defendants-appellees’ counterclaims is affirmed." 1

Synthesized from the findings of the lower courts, it appears that respondent spouses are the
legitimate parents of Julie Ann Gotiong who, at the time of the deplorable incident which took
place and from which she died on January 14, 1979, was an 18-year old first year commerce
student of the University of San Carlos, Cebu City; while petitioners are the parents of Wendell
Libi, then a minor between 18 and 19 years of age living with his aforesaid parents, and who also
died in the same event on the same date.
For more than two (2) years before their deaths, Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were
sweethearts until December, 1978 when Julie Ann broke up her relationship with Wendell after
she supposedly found him to be sadistic and irresponsible. During the first and second weeks of
January, 1979, Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with demands for reconciliation but the latter
persisted in her refusal, prompting the former to resort to threats against her. In order to avoid
him, Julie Ann stayed in the house of her best friend, Malou Alfonso, at the corner of Maria
Cristina and Juana Osmeña Streets, Cebu City, from January 7 to 13, 1978.

On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a single gunshot wound inflicted
with the same firearm, a Smith and Wesson revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio
Libi, which was recovered from the scene of the crime inside the residence of private
respondents at the corner of General Maxilom and D. Jakosalem streets of the same city.

Due to the absence of an eyewitness account of the circumstances surrounding the death of both
minors, their parents, who are the contending parties herein, posited their respective theories
drawn from their interpretation of circumstantial evidence, available reports, documents and
evidence of physical facts.

Private respondents, bereaved over the death of their daughter, submitted that Wendell caused
her death by shooting her with the aforesaid firearm and, thereafter, turning the gun on himself to
commit suicide. On the other hand, Petitioners, puzzled and likewise distressed over the death of
their son, rejected the imputation and contended that an unknown third party, whom Wendell
may have displeased or antagonized by reason of his work as a narcotics informer of the
Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), must have caused Wendell’s death and then shot
Julie Ann to eliminate any witness and thereby avoid identification.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

As a result of the tragedy, the parents of Julie Ann filed Civil Case No. R-17774 in the then
Court of First Instance of Cebu against the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from
the latter’s vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. After trial, the court below
rendered judgment on October 20, 1980 as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, premises duly considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing plaintiffs’

complaint for insufficiency of the evidence. Defendants’ counterclaim is likewise denied for lack
of sufficient merit." 2

On appeal to respondent court, said judgment of the lower court dismissing the complaint of
therein plaintiffs-appellants was set aside and another judgment was rendered against
defendants-appellees who, as petitioners in the present appeal by certiorari, now submit for
resolution the following issues in this case:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. Whether or not respondent court correctly reversed the trial court

in accordance with established decisional laws; and

2. Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly

interpreted by respondent court to make petitioners liable for vicarious liability. 3
In the proceedings before the trial court, Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, Police Medico-Legal Officer of
Cebu, submitted his findings and opinions on some postulates for determining whether or not the
gunshot wound was inflicted on Wendell Libi by his own suicidal act. However, undue emphasis
was placed by the lower court on the absence of gunpowder or tattooing around the wound at the
point of entry of the bullet. It should be emphasized, however, that this is not the only
circumstance to be taken into account in the determination of whether it was suicide or not.

It is true that said witness declared that he found no evidence of contact or close-contact of an
explosive discharge in the entrance wound. However, as pointed out by private respondents, the
body of deceased Wendell Libi must have been washed at the funeral parlor, considering the
hasty interment thereof a little after eight (8) hours from the occurrence wherein he died. Dr.
Cerna himself could not categorically state that the body of Wendell Libi was left untouched at
the funeral parlor before he was able to conduct his autopsy. It will also be noted that Dr. Cerna
was negligent in not conducting a paraffin test on Wendell Libi, hence possible evidence of
gunpowder residue on Wendell’s hands was forever lost when Wendell was hastily
buried.cralawnad

More specifically, Dr. Cerna testified that he conducted an autopsy on the body of Wendell Libi
about eight (8) hours after the incident or, to be exact, eight (8) hours and twenty (20) minutes
based on the record of death; that when he arrived at the Cosmopolitan Funeral Homes, the body
of the deceased was already on the autopsy table and in the stage of rigor mortis; and that said
body was not washed, but it was dried. 4 However, on redirect examination, he admitted that
during the 8-hour interval, he never saw the body nor did he see whether said body was wiped or
washed in the area of the wound on the head which he examined because the deceased was
inside the morgue. 5 In fact, on cross-examination, he had earlier admitted that as far as the
entrance of the wound, the trajectory of the bullet and the exit of the wound are concerned, it is
possible that Wendell Libi shot himself. 6

He further testified that the muzzle of the gun was not pressed on the head of the victim and that
he found no burning or singeing of the hair or extensive laceration on the gunshot wound of
entrance which are general characteristics of contact or near-contact fire. On direct examination,
Dr. Cerna nonetheless made these clarification:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Q Is it not a fact that there are certain guns which are so made that
there would be no black residue or tattooing that could result from these guns because they are
what we call clean?

A Yes, sir. I know that there are what we call smokeless powder.

ATTY. ORTIZ:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Q Yes. So, in cases, therefore, of guns where the powder is

smokeless, those indications that you said may not rule out the possibility that the gun was closer
than 24 inches, is that correct?
A If the . . . assuming that the gun used was .. the bullet used was a
smokeless powder.

Q At any rate, doctor, from . . . disregarding those other matters that

you have noticed, the singeing, etc., from the trajectory, based on the trajectory of the bullet as
shown in your own sketch, is it not a fact that the gun could have been fired by the person
himself, the victim himself, Wendell Libi, because it shows a point of entry a little above the
right ear and point of exit a little above that, to be very fair and on your oath?

A As far as the point of entrance is concerned and as far as the

trajectory of the bullet is concerned and as far as the angle or the manner of fire is concerned, it
could have been fired by the victim." 7

As shown by the evidence, there were only two used bullets 8 found at the scene of the crime,
each of which were the bullets that hit Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi, respectively. Also,
the sketch prepared by the Medico-Legal Division of the National Bureau of Investigation, 9
shows that there is only one gunshot wound of entrance located at the right temple of Wendell
Libi. The necropsy report prepared by Dr. Cerna states:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x x x

"Gunshot wound, ENTRANCE, ovaloid, 0.5 x 0.4 cm., with contusion collar widest inferiorly by
0.2 cm., edges inverted, oriented upward, located at the head, temporal region, right, 2.8 cms.
behind and 5.5 cms. above right external auditory meatus, directed slightly forward, upward and
to the left, involving skin and soft tissues, making a punch-in fracture on the temporal bone,
right, penetrating cranial cavity, lacerating extensively along its course the brain tissues,
fracturing parietal bone, left, and finally making an EXIT wound, irregular, 2.0 x 1.8 cms., edges
(e)verted, parietal region, left, 2.0 cms. behind and 12.9 cms. above left external auditory
meatus.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

x x x

"Evidence of contact or close-contact fire, such as burning around the gunshot wound of
entrance, gunpowder tatooing (sic), smudging, singeing of hair, extensive laceration or bursting
of the gunshot wound of entrance, or separation of the skin from the underlying tissue, are
absent." 10

On cross-examination, Dr. Cerna demonstrated his theory which was made of record,
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Q Now, will you please use yourself as Wendell Libi, and following
the entrance of the wound, the trajectory of the bullet and the exit of the wound, and measuring
yourself 24 inches, will you please indicate to the Honorable Court how would it have been
possible for Wendell Libi to kill himself? Will you please indicate the 24 inches?
WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

A Actually, sir, the 24 inches is approximately one arm’s length.

ATTY. SENINING:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I would like to make of record that the witness has demonstrated by extending his right arm
almost straight towards his head." 11

Private respondents assail the fact that the trial court gave credence to the testimonies of
defendants’ witnesses Lydia Ang and James Enrique Tan, the first being a resident of an
apartment across the street from the Gotiongs and the second, a resident of the house adjacent to
the Gotiong residence, who declared having seen a "shadow" of a person at the gate of the
Gotiong house after hearing shots therefrom.

On cross-examination, Lydia Ang testified that the apartment where she was staying faces the
gas station; that it is the second apartment; that from her window she can see directly the gate of
the Gotiongs and, that there is a firewall between her apartment and the gas station. 12 After
seeing a man jump from the gate of the Gotiongs to the rooftop of the Tans, she called the police
station but the telephone lines were busy. Later on, she talked with James Enrique Tan and told
him that she saw a man leap from the gate towards his rooftop. 13

However, James Enrique Tan testified that he saw a "shadow" on top of the gate of the Gotiongs,
but denied having talked with anyone regarding what he saw. He explained that he lives in a
duplex house with a garden in front of it; that his house is next to Felipe Gotiong’s house; and he
further gave the following answers to these questions:chanrobles.com : virtual law library

"ATTY. ORTIZ: (TO WITNESS).

Q What is the height of the wall of the Gotiong’s in relation to your

house?

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

A It is about 8 feet.

ATTY. ORTIZ: (TO WITNESS)

Q And where were you looking from?

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

A From upstairs in my living room.

ATTY. ORTIZ (TO WITNESS)

Q From Your living room window, is that correct?

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

A Yes, but not very clear because the wall is high." 14

Analyzing the foregoing testimonies, we agree with respondent court that the same do not inspire
credence as to the reliability and accuracy of the witnesses’ observations, since the visual
perceptions of both were obstructed by high walls in their respective houses in relation to the
house of herein private respondents. On the other hand, witness Manolo Alfonso, testifying on
rebuttal, attested without contradiction that he and his sister, Malou Alfonso, were waiting for
Julie Ann Gotiong when they heard her scream; that when Manolo climbed the fence to see what
was going on inside the Gotiong house, he heard the first shot; and, not more than five (5)
seconds later, he heard another shot. Consequently, he went down from the fence and drove to
the police station to report the incident. 15 Manolo’s direct and candid testimony establishes and
explains the fact that it was he whom Lydia Ang and James Enrique Tan saw as the "shadow" of
a man at the gate of the Gotiong house.

We have perforce to reject petitioners’ effete and unsubstantiated pretension that it was another
man who shot Wendell and Julie Ann. It is significant that the Libi family did not even point to
or present any suspect in the crime nor did they file any case against any alleged "John Doe."
Nor can we sustain the trial court’s dubious theory that Wendell Libi did not die by his own hand
because of the overwhelming evidence — testimonial, documentary and pictorial — the
confluence of which point to Wendell as the assailant of Julie Ann, his motive being revenge for
her rejection of his persistent pleas for a reconciliation.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

Petitioners’ defense that they had exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family, hence
they should not be civilly liable for the crime committed by their minor son, is not borne out by
the evidence on record either.

Petitioner Amelita Yap Libi, mother of Wendell, testified that her husband, Cresencio Libi, owns
a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of these
petitioners holds a key to the safety deposit box and Amelita’s key is always in her bag, all of
which facts were known to Wendell. They have never seen their son Wendell taking or using the
gun. She admitted, however, that on that fateful night the gun was no longer in the safety deposit
box. 16 We, accordingly, cannot but entertain serious doubts that petitioner spouses had really
been exercising the diligence of a good father of a family by safely locking the fatal gun away.
Wendell could not have gotten hold thereof unless one of the keys to the safety deposit box was
negligently left lying around or he had free access to the bag of his mother where the other key
was.

The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and child relationship
consists, to a large extent, of the instruction and supervision of the child. Petitioners were gravely
remiss in their duties as parents in not diligently supervising the activities of their son, despite his
minority and immaturity, so much so that it was only at the time of Wendell’s death that they
allegedly discovered that he was a CANU agent and that Cresencio’s gun was missing from the
safety deposit box. Both parents were sadly wanting in their duty and responsibility in
monitoring and knowing the activities of their children who, for all they know, may be engaged
in dangerous work such as being drug informers, 17 or even drug users. Neither was a plausible
explanation given for the photograph of Wendell, with a handwritten dedication to Julie Ann at
the back thereof, 18 holding upright what clearly appears as a revolver and on how or why he
was in possession of that firearm.

In setting aside the judgment of the court a quo and holding petitioners civilly liable, as
explained at the start of this opinion, respondent court waved aside the protestations of diligence
on the part of petitioners and had this to say:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . It is still the duty of parents to know the activity of their children who may be engaged in
this dangerous activity involving the menace of drugs. Had the defendants-appellees been
diligent in supervising the activities of their son, Wendell, and in keeping said gun from his
reach, they could have prevented Wendell from killing Julie Ann Gotiong. Therefore, appellants
are liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code which provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘The father, and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages
caused by their minor children who live in their company.’

"Having been grossly negligent in preventing Wendell Libi from having access to said gun
which was allegedly kept in a safety deposit box, defendants-appellees are subsidiarily liable for
the natural consequence of the criminal act of said minor who was living in their company. This
vicarious liability of herein defendants-appellees has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in
many cases, prominent of which is the case of Fuellas v. Cadano, et. al. (L-14409, Oct. 31, 1961,
3 SCRA 361-367), which held that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed by
Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and
criminal offenses.’

‘The subsidiary liability of parent’s arising from the criminal acts of their minor children who
acted with discernment is determined under the provisions of Article 2180, N.C.C. and under
Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, because to hold that the former only covers obligations
which arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from criminal offenses, would
result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or
mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damages caused by his or her son, no liability would
attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent.’ (3 SCRA 361-362).

". . . In the instant case, minor son of herein defendants-appellees, Wendell Libi somehow got
hold of the key to the drawer where said gun was kept under lock without defendant-spouses
ever knowing that said gun had been missing from that safety box since 1978 when Wendell Libi
had) a picture taken wherein he proudly displayed said gun and dedicated this picture to his
sweetheart, Julie Ann Gotiong; also since then, Wendell Libi was said to have kept said gun in
his car, in keeping up with his supposed role of a CANU agent . . ." chanrobles lawlibrary :
rednad

x x x

"Based on the foregoing discussions of the assigned errors, this Court holds that the lower court
was not correct in dismissing herein plaintiffs-appellants’ complaint because as preponderantly
shown by evidence, defendants-appellees utterly failed to exercise all the diligence of a good
father of the family in preventing their minor son from committing this crime by means of the
gun of defendants-appellees which was freely accessible to Wendell Libi for they have not
regularly checked whether said gun was still under lock, but learned that it was missing from the
safety deposit box only after the crime had been committed." (Emphases ours.) 19

We agree with the conclusion of respondent court that petitioners should be held liable for the
civil liability based on what appears from all indications was a crime committed by their minor
son. We take this opportunity, however, to digress and discuss its ratiocination therefor on
jurisprudential dicta which we feel require clarification.

In imposing sanctions for the so-called vicarious liability of petitioners, respondent court cites
Fuellas v. Cadano, Et. Al. 20 which supposedly holds that" (t)he subsidiary liability of parents
for damages caused by their minor children imposed by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code
covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses," followed by an
extended quotation ostensibly from the same case explaining why under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code and Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code parents should assume subsidiary liability for
damages caused by their minor children. The quoted passages are set out two paragraphs back,
with pertinent underscoring for purposes of the discussion hereunder.chanrobles law library

Now, we do not have any objection to the doctrinal rule holding, the parents liable, but the
categorization of their liability as being subsidiary, and not primary, in nature requires a hard
second look considering previous decisions of this court on the matter which warrant
comparative analyses. Our concern stems from our readings that if the liability of the parents for
crimes or quasi-delicts of their minor children is subsidiary, then the parents can neither invoke
nor be absolved of civil liability on the defense that they acted with the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent damages. On the other hand, if such liability imputed to the parents is
considered direct and primary, that diligence would constitute a valid and substantial defense.

We believe that the civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their minor children, as
contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, is primary and not subsidiary. In fact, if we
apply Article 2194 of said code which provides for solidary liability of joint tortfeasors, the
persons responsible for the act or omission, in this case the minor and the father and, in case of
his death of incapacity, the mother, are solidarily liable. Accordingly, such parental liability is
primary and not subsidiary, hence the last paragraph of Article 2180 provides that" (t)he
responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that
they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages."cralaw
virtua1aw library
We are also persuaded that the liability of the parents for felonies committed by their minor
children is likewise primary, not subsidiary. Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"ARTICLE 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. —

x x x

First. In cases of subdivisions . . . 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability for acts committed by .
. . a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has
acted without discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal
authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on their part."
(Emphasis supplied.) 21

Accordingly, just like the rule in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, under the foregoing provision
the civil liability of the parents for crimes committed by their minor children is likewise direct
and primary, and also subject to the defense of lack of fault or negligence on their part, that is,
the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family.

That in both quasi-delicts and crimes the parents primarily respond for such damages is
buttressed by the corresponding provisions in both codes that the minor transgressor shall be
answerable or shall respond with his own property only in the absence or in case of insolvency of
the former. Thus, for civil liability ex quasi delicto of minors, Article 2182 of the Civil Code
states that" (i)f the minor causing damage has no parents or guardian, the minor . . . shall be
answerable with his own property in an action against him where a guardian ad litem shall be
appointed." For civil liability ex delicto of minors, an equivalent provision is found in the third
paragraph of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Should there be no person having such . . . minor under his authority, legal guardianship or
control, or if such person be insolvent, said . . . minor shall respond with (his) own property,
excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance with civil law."cralaw virtua1aw
library

The civil liability of parents for felonies committed by their minor children contemplated in the
aforesaid rule in Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil
Code has, aside from the aforecited case of Fuellas, been the subject of a number of cases
adjudicated by this Court, viz.: Exconde v. Capuno, Et Al., 22 Araneta v. Arreglado, 23 Salen,
Et. Al. v. Balce, 24 Paleyan, etc., Et. Al. v. Bangkili, Et Al., 25 and Elcano, et al, v. Hill, Et. Al.
26 Parenthetically, the aforesaid cases were basically on the issue of the civil liability of parents
for crimes committed by their minor children over 9 but under 15 years of age, who acted with
discernment, and also of minors 15 years of aye or over, since these situations are not covered by
Article 101, Revised Penal Code. In both instances, this Court held that the issue of parental civil
liability should be resolved in accordance with the provisions of Article 2180 of the Civil Code
for the reasons well expressed in Salen and adopted in the cases hereinbefore enumerated that to
hold that the civil liability under Article 2180 would apply only to quasi-delicts and not to
criminal offenses would result in the absurdity that in an act involving mere negligence the
parents would be liable but not where the damage is caused with criminal intent. In said cases,
however, there are unfortunate variances resulting in a regrettable inconsistency in the Court’s
determination of whether the liability of the parents, in cases involving either crimes or quasi-
delicts of their minor children, is primary or subsidiary.

In Exconde, where the 15-year old minor was convicted of double homicide through reckless
imprudence, in a separate civil action arising from the crime the minor and his father were held
jointly and severally liable for failure of the latter to prove the diligence of a good father of a
family. The same liability in solidum and, therefore, primary liability was imposed in a separate
civil action in Araneta on the parents and their 14-year old son who was found guilty of
frustrated homicide, but on the authority of Article 2194 of the Civil Code providing for solidary
responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict.

However, in Salen, the father was declared subsidiarily liable for damages arising from the
conviction of his son, who was over 15 but less than 18 years of age, by applying Article 2180
but, this time, disregarding Article 2194 of the Civil Code. In the present case, as already
explained, the petitioners herein were also held liable but supposedly in line with Fuellas which
purportedly declared the parents subsidiarily liable for the civil liability for serious physical
injuries committed by their 13-year old son. On the other hand, in Paleyan, the mother and her
19-year old son were adjudged solidarily liable for damages arising from his conviction for
homicide by the application of Article 2180 of the Civil Code since this is likewise not covered
by Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code. Finally, in Elcano, although the son was acquitted in a
homicide charge due to "lack of intent, coupled with mistake," it was ruled that while under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code there should be solidary liability for damages, since the son,
"although married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the
occurrence," but "is now of age, as a matter of equity" the father was only held subsidiarily
liable.

It bears stressing, however, that the Revised Penal Code provides for subsidiary liability only for
persons causing damages under the compulsion of irresistible force or under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear; 27 innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments; 28
employers, teachers, persons and corporations engaged in industry; 29 and principals,
accomplices and accessories for the unpaid civil liability of their co-accused in the other classes.
30

Also, coming back to respondent court’s reliance on Fuellas in its decision in the present case, it
is not exactly accurate to say that Fuellas provided for subsidiary liability of the parents therein.
A careful scrutiny shows that what respondent court quoted verbatim in its decision now on
appeal in the present case, and which it attributed to Fuellas, was the syllabus on the law report
of said case which spoke of "subsidiary" liability. However, such categorization does not
specifically appear in the text of the decision in Fuellas. In fact, after reviewing therein the cases
of Exconde, Araneta and Salen and the discussions in said cases of Article 101 of the Revised
Penal Code in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, this Court concluded its decision in this
wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Moreover, the case at bar was decided by the Court of Appeals on the basis of evidence
submitted therein by both parties, independent of the criminal case. And responsibility for fault
or negligence under Article 2176 upon which the present action was instituted, is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from fault or negligence under the Penal Code
(Art. 2177), and having in mind the reasons behind the law as heretofore stated, any discussion
as to the minor’s criminal responsibility is of no moment."cralaw virtua1aw library

Under the foregoing considerations, therefore, we hereby rule that the parents are and should be
held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses committed by their
minor children under their legal authority or control, or who live in their company, unless it is
proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent such
damages. That primary liability is premised on the provisions of Article 101 of the Revised Penal
Code with respect to damages ex delicto caused by their children 9 years of age or under, or over
9 but under 15 years of age who acted without discernment; and, with regard to their children
over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted with discernment, or 15 years or over but under 21
years of age, such primary liability shall be imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
31

Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be effected against the father
and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother. This was amplified by the Child and Youth
Welfare Code which provides that the same shall devolve upon the father and, in case of his
death or incapacity, upon the mother or, in case of her death or incapacity, upon the guardian, but
the liability may also be voluntarily assumed by a relative or family friend of the youthful
offender. 32 However, under the Family Code, this civil liability is now, without such alternative
qualification, the responsibility of the parents and those who exercise parental authority over the
minor offender. 33 For civil liability arising from quasi-delicts committed by minors, the same
rules shall apply in accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code, as so modified.

In the case at bar, whether the death of the hapless Julie Ann Gotiong was caused by a felony or
a quasi-delict committed by Wendell Libi, respondent court did not err in holding petitioners
liable for damages arising therefrom. Subject to the preceding modifications of the premises
relied upon by it therefor and on the bases of the legal imperatives herein explained, we conjoin
in its findings that said petitioners failed to duly exercise the requisite diligentissimi patris
familias to prevent such damages.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent
Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 85044 June 3, 1992

MACARIO TAMARGO, CELSO TAMARGO and AURELIA TAMARGO, petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. ARISTON L. RUBIO, RTC Judge, Branch 20,
Vigan, Ilocos Sur; VICTOR BUNDOC; and CLARA BUNDOC, respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:

On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo
with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for
damages was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, docketed as
Civil Case No. 3457-V, by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent, and
petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents against respondent
spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living at the
time of the tragic incident. In addition to this case for damages, a criminal information or
Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was filed [Criminal Case No. 1722-V] against
Adelberto Bundoc. Adelberto, however, was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability on
the ground that he bad acted without discernment.

Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a
petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedings No. 0373-T before the then
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. This petition for adoption was grunted on, 18 November
1982, that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.

In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the result of
the foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting parents, namely
the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the action since parental
authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful petition for
adoption was filed.

Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with
his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing
and granting of a petition for adoption.

The trial court on 3 December 1987 dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that respondent
natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the action.

Petitioners received a copy of the trial court's Decision on 7 December 1987. Within the 15-day
reglementary period, or on 14 December 1987, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
followed by a supplemental motion for reconsideration on 15 January 1988. It appearing,
however, that the motions failed to comply with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised
Rules of Court — that notice of the motion shall be given to all parties concerned at least three
(3) days before the hearing of said motion; and that said notice shall state the time and place of
hearing — both motions were denied by the trial court in an Order dated 18 April 1988. On 28
April 1988, petitioners filed a notice of appeal. In its Order dated 6 June 1988, the trial court
dismissed the notice at appeal, this time ruling that the notice had been filed beyond the 15-day
reglementary period ending 22 December 1987.
Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for mandamus and certiorari questioning
the trial court's Decision dated 3 December 1987 and the Orders dated 18 April 1988 and 6 June
1988, The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, ruling that petitioners had lost their right to
appeal.

In the present Petition for Review, petitioners once again contend that respondent spouses
Bundoc are the indispensable parties to the action for damages caused by the acts of their minor
child, Adelberto Bundoc. Resolution of this Petition hinges on the following issues: (1) whether
or not petitioners, notwithstanding loss of their right to appeal, may still file the instant Petition;
conversely, whether the Court may still take cognizance of the case even through petitioners'
appeal had been filed out of time; and (2) whether or not the effects of adoption, insofar as
parental authority is concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make the adopting
parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against their adopted child, for acts
committed by the latter, when actual custody was yet lodged with the biological parents.

1. It will be recalled that, petitioners' motion (and supplemental

motion) for reconsideration filed before the trial court, not having complied with the
requirements of Section 13, Rule 41, and Section 4, Rule 15, of the Revised Rules of Court, were
considered pro forma and hence did not interrupt and suspend the reglementary period to appeal:
the trial court held that the motions, not having contained a notice of time and place of hearing,
had become useless pieces of paper which did not interrupt the reglementary period. 1 As in fact
repeatedly held by this Court, what is mandatory is the service of the motion on the opposing
counsel indicating the time and place of hearing. 2

In view, however, of the nature of the issue raised in the instant. Petition, and in order that
substantial justice may be served, the Court, invoking its right to suspend the application of
technical rules to prevent manifest injustice, elects to treat the notice of appeal as having been
seasonably filed before the trial court, and the motion (and supplemental motion) for
reconsideration filed by petitioner in the trial court as having interrupted the reglementary period
for appeal. As the Court held in Gregorio v. Court of Appeals: 3

Dismissal of appeal; purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the courts
is to encourage hearings of appeal on their merits. The rules of procedure ought not be applied in
a very rigid technical sense, rules of procedure are used only to help secure not override,
substantial justice. if d technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made their aim would be
defeated. 4

2. It is not disputed that Adelberto Bundoc's voluntary act of

shooting Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-delict against
him. As Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides:

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict . . .
Upon the other hand, the law imposes civil liability upon the father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by a minor child who lives with
them. Article 2180 of the Civil Code reads:

The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions,
but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages
caused by the minor children who live in their company.

xxx xxx xxx

The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (Emphasis
supplied)

This principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently designated as vicarious

liability, or the doctrine of "imputed negligence" under Anglo-American tort law, where a person
is not only liable for torts committed by himself, but also for torts committed by others with
whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsible. Thus, parental liability is
made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of parents — their
parental authority — which includes the instructing, controlling and disciplining of the child. 5
The basis for the doctrine of vicarious liability was explained by the Court in Cangco v. Manila
Railroad Co. 6 in the following terms:

With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence, whether of act or omission,
it is competent for the legislature to elect — and our Legislature has so elected — to limit such
liability to cases in which the person upon whom such an obligation is imposed is morally
culpable or, on the contrary, for reasons of public policy. to extend that liability, without regard
to the lack of moral culpability, so as to include responsibility for the negligence of those persons
whose acts or omissions are imputable, by a legal fiction, to others who are in a position to
exercise an absolute or limited control over them. The legislature which adopted our Civil Code
has elected to limit extra-contractual liability — with certain well-defined exceptions — to cases
in which moral culpability can be directly imputed to the persons to be charged. This moral
responsibility may consist in having failed to exercise due care in one's own acts, or in having
failed to exercise due care in the selection and control of one's agent or servants, or in the control
of persons who, by reasons of their status, occupy a position of dependency with respect to the
person made liable for their conduct. 7 (Emphasis Supplied)

The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor children living with them,
may be seen to be based upon the parental authority vested by the Civil Code upon such parents.
The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child living with its parents commits a
tortious acts, the parents were negligent in the performance of their legal and natural duty closely
to supervise the child who is in their custody and control. Parental liability is, in other words,
anchored upon parental authority coupled with presumed parental dereliction in the discharge of
the duties accompanying such authority. The parental dereliction is, of course, only presumed
and the presumption can be overtuned under Article 2180 of the Civil Code by proof that the
parents had exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.

In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occured when parental
authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the minor
Adelberto. It would thus follow that the natural parents who had then actual custody of the minor
Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.

The natural parents of Adelberto, however, stoutly maintain that because a decree of adoption
was issued by the adoption court in favor of the Rapisura spouses, parental authority was vested
in the latter as adopting parents as of the time of the filing of the petition for adoption that is,
before Adelberto had shot Jennifer which an air rifle. The Bundoc spouses contend that they
were therefore free of any parental responsibility for Adelberto's allegedly tortious conduct.

Respondent Bundoc spouses rely on Article 36 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code 8 which
reads as follows:

Art. 36. Decree of Adoption. — If, after considering the report of the
Department of Social Welfare or duly licensed child placement agency and the evidence
submitted before it, the court is satisfied that the petitioner is qualified to maintain, care for, and
educate the child, that the trial custody period has been completed, and that the best interests of
the child will be promoted by the adoption, a decree of adoption shall be entered, which shall be
effective he date the original petition was filed. The decree shall state the name by which the
child is thenceforth to be known. (Emphasis supplied)

The Bundoc spouses further argue that the above Article 36 should be read in relation to Article
39 of the same Code:

Art. 39. Effect of Adoption. — The adoption shall:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the natural parents, except where
the adopter is the spouse of the surviving natural parent;

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied)

and urge that their Parental authority must be deemed to have been dissolved as of the time the
Petition for adoption was filed.

The Court is not persuaded. As earlier noted, under the Civil Code, the basis of parental liability
for the torts of a minor child is the relationship existing between the parents and the minor child
living with them and over whom, the law presumes, the parents exercise supervision and control.
Article 58 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, re-enacted this rule:
Article 58 Torts — Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage
caused by the child under their parental authority in accordance with the civil Code. (Emphasis
supplied)

Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines 9 has similarly insisted upon the requisite that
the child, doer of the tortious act, shall have beer in the actual custody of the parents sought to be
held liable for the ensuing damage:

Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be
civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated
children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate
defenses provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)

We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having been retroactively
transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle
shooting happened. We do not consider that retroactive effect may be giver to the decree of
adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when adopting
parents had no actual or physically custody over the adopted child. Retroactive affect may
perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the
accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, however,
to hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to
burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they
could not have prevented (since they were at the time in the United States and had no physical
custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a result, moreover,
would be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of
vicarious liability. Put a little differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of
the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact
subject to their control at the time the tort was committed.

Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code fortifies the conclusion reached above. Article
35 provides as follows:

Art. 35. Trial Custody. — No petition for adoption shall be finally

granted unless and until the adopting parents are given by the courts a supervised trial custody
period of at least six months to assess their adjustment and emotional readiness for the legal
union. During the period of trial custody, parental authority shall be vested in the adopting
parents. (Emphasis supplied)

Under the above Article 35, parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents
during the period of trial custody, i.e., before the issuance of a decree of adoption, precisely
because the adopting parents are given actual custody of the child during such trial period. In the
instant case, the trial custody period either had not yet begun or bad already been completed at
the time of the air rifle shooting; in any case, actual custody of Adelberto was then with his
natural parents, not the adopting parents.
Accordingly, we conclude that respondent Bundoc spouses, Adelberto's natural parents, were
indispensable parties to the suit for damages brought by petitioners, and that the dismissal by the
trial court of petitioners' complaint, the indispensable parties being already before the court,
constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED DUE
COURSE and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 6 September 1988, in C.A.-G.R. No.
SP-15016 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners' complaint filed before the trial
court is hereby REINSTATED and this case is REMANDED to that court for further
proceedings consistent with this Decision. Costs against respondent Bundoc spouses. This
Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-14342 May 30, 1960

CIRIACO L. MERCADO, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, MANUEL QUISUMBING, JR., ET AL., respondents.

Abad Santos and Pablo for petitioner.

Sycip, Quisumbing, Salazar and Associates for respondents.

LABRADOR, J.:

This is a petition to review a decision of the Court of Appeals, which condemned petitioner to
pay P2,000 as moral damages and P50 for medical expenses, for a physical injury caused by the
son of petitioner, Augusto Mercado, on a classmate, Manuel Quisumbing, Jr., both pupils of the
Lourdes Catholic School, Kanlaon, Quezon City. The case had originated in the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan, presiding, which dismissed the complaint filed by
Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. and his father against petitioner, father of the above-mentioned
Mercado. The facts found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:

Plaintiff-appellant Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. is the son of his co-plaintiff-appellants Ana Pineda
and Manuel L. Quisumbing, while Augusto Mercado is the son of defendant-appellee Ciriaco L.
Mercado, Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. and Augusto Mercado were classmates in the Lourdes
Catholic School on Kanlaon, Quezon City. A "pitogo", which figures prominently in this case,
may be described as an empty nutshell used by children as a piggy bank. On February 22, 1956,
Augusto Mercado and Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. quarrelled over a "pitogo". As a result, Augusto
wounded Manuel, Jr. on the right cheek with a piece of razor.

xxx xxx xxx

The facts of record clearly show that it was Augusto Mercado who started the aggression.
Undeniably, the "pitogo" belonged to Augusto Mercado but he lent it to Benedicto P. Lim and in
turn Benedicto lent it to Renato Legaspi. Renato was not aware that the "pitogo" belonged to
Augusto, because right after Benedicto gave it to him, Benedicto ran away to get a basket ball
with which they could play. Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. was likewise unaware that the "pitogo"
belonged to Augusto. He thought it was the "pitogo" of Benedicto P. Lim, so that when Augusto
attempted to get the "pitogo" from Renato, Manuel, Jr. told him not to do so because Renato was
better at putting the chain into the holes of the "pitogo". However, Augusto resented Manuel,
Jr.'s remark and he aggresively pushed the latter. The fight started then. After Augusto gave
successive blows to Manuel, Jr., and the latter was clutching his stomach which bore the brunt of
Augusto's anger, Augusto seeing that Manuel, Jr. was in a helpless position, cut him on the right
check with a piece of razor.

xxx xxx xxx

Although the doctor who treated Manuel Quisumbing, Jr., Antonio B. Past, testified for
plaintiffs-appellants, he did not declare as to the amount of fees he collected from plaintiff-
appellants for the treatment of Manuel, Jr. the child was not even hospitalized for the wound. We
believe that the sum of P50.00 is a fair approximation of the medical expenses incurred by
plaintiffs-appellants.

xxx xxx xxx

The damages specified in paragraphs C and D of the aforequoted portion of plaintiffs-appellant's

complaint come under the class of moral damages. The evidence of record shows that the child
suffered moral damages by reason of the wound inflicted by Augusto Mercado. Though such
kind of damages cannot be fully appreciated in terms of money, we believe that the sum of
P2,000.00 would fully compensate the child.

As second cause of action, plaintiffs-appellants pray for P5,000.00 covering the moral damages
they allegedly suffered due to their son's being wounded; and the sum of P3,000.00 as attorney's
fees. The facts of record do not warrant the granting of moral damages to plaintiffs-appellants
Manuel Quisumbing and Ana Pineda. "In law mental anguish is restricted, as a rule, to such
mental pain or suffering as arises from an injury or wrong to the person himself, as distinguished
from that form of mental suffering which is the accompaniment of sympathy or sorrow for
another's suffering of which arises from a contemplation of wrong committed on the person of
another. Pursuant to the rule stated, a husband or wife cannot recover for mental suffering caused
by his or her sympathy for the other's suffering. Nor can a parent recover for mental distress and
anxiety on account of physical injury sustained by a child or for anxiety for the safety of his child
placed in peril by the negligence of another." (15 Am. Jur. 597). Plaintiffs-appellants are not
entitled to attorney's fees, it not appearing that defendant-appellee had wantonly disregarded
their claim for damages.

In the first, second and third assignments of error, counsel for petitioner argues that since the
incident of the inflicting of the wound on respondent occurred in a Catholic School (during
recess time), through no fault of the father, petitioner herein, the teacher or head of the school
should be held responsible instead of the latter. This precise question was brought before this
Court in Exconde vs. Capuno and Capuno, 101 Phil., 843, but we held, through Mr. Justice
Bautista:

We find merit in this claim. It is true that under the law above-quoted, "teachers or directors of
arts and trades are liable for any damage caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are
under their custody", but this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to
any academic educational institution (Padilla, Civil Law, 1953 Ed., Vol. IV, p. 841; See 12
Manresa, 4th Ed., p. 557)

The last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, upon which petitioner rests his claim that
the school where his son was studying should be made liable, is as follows:

ART. 2180. . . .

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused
by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

It would be seem that the clause "so long as they remain in their custody," contemplates a
situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction and
influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. In these circumstances the control or
influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the
teacher; and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil. Such a situation does not
appear in the case at bar; the pupils appear to go to school during school hours and go back to
their homes with their parents after school is over. The situation contemplated in the last
paragraph of Article 2180 does not apply, nor does paragraph 2 of said article, which makes
father or mother responsible for the damages caused by their minor children. The claim of
petitioner that responsibility should pass to the school must, therefore, be held to be without
merit.

We next come to the claim of petitioner that the moral damages fixed at P2,000 are excessive.
We note that the wound caused to respondent was inflicted in the course of an ordinary or
common fight between boys in a grade school. The Court of Appeals fixed the medical expenses
incurred in treating and curing the wound at P50. Said court stated that the wound did not even
require hospitalization. Neither was Mercado found guilty of any offense nor the scar in
Quisumbing's face pronounced to have caused a deformity, unlike the case of Araneta, et al. vs.
Arreglado, et al., 104 Phil., 529; 55 Off. Gaz. (9) 1561. Petitioner's counsel argues that if death
call for P3,000 to P6,000, certainly the incised wound could cause mental pain and suffering to
the tune of P2,000.

In the decision of the Court of Appeals, said court pronounces that the child Quisumbing
suffered moral damages "by reason of the wound inflicted by Augusto Mercado." While moral
damages included physical suffering, which must have been caused to the wounded boy
Quisumbing (Art. 2217, Civil Code), the decision of the court below does not declare that any of
the cases specified in Article 2219 of the Civil Code in which moral damages may be recovered,
has attended or occasioned the physical injury. The only possible circumstance in the case at bar
in which moral damages are recoverable would be if a criminal offense or a quasi-delict has been
committed.

It does not appear that a criminal action for physical injuries was ever presented. The offender,
Augusto Mercado, was nine years old and it does not appear that he had acted with discernment
when he inflicted the physical injuries on Manuel Quisumbing, Jr.

It is possible that the Court of Appeals may have considered Augusto Mercado responsible for or
guilty, of a quasi-delict causing physical injuries, within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article
2219. Even if we assume that said court considered Mercado guilty of a quasi-delict when it
imposed the moral damages, yet the facts found by said court indicate that Augusto's resentment,
which motivated the assault, was occasioned by the fact that Manuel, Jr. had tried to intervene in
or interfere with the attempt of Mercado to get "his pitogo from Renato." This is, according to
the decision appealed from, the reason why Mercado was incensed and pushed Quisumbing who,
in turn, also pushed Mercado. It is, therefore, apparent that the proximate cause of the injury
caused to Quisumbing was Quisumbing's own fault or negligence for having interfered with
Mercado while trying to get the pitogo from another boy. (Art. 2179, Civil Code.)

After considering all the facts as found by the Court of Appeals, we find that none of the cases
mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, which authorizes the grant of moral damages, was
shown to have existed. Consequently, the grant of moral damages is not justified.

For the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the
petitioner is declared exempt or free from the payment of moral damages. The award of P50 for
medical expenses, however, is hereby affirmed. Without costs.

G.R. No. L-29025 October 4, 1971

Spouses MOISES P. PALISOC and BRIGIDA P. PALISOC, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
ANTONIO C. BRILLANTES and TEODOSIO V. VALENTON, owner and President,
respectively, of a school of arts and trades, known under the name and style of "Manila
Technical Institute" (M.I.T.), VIRGILIO L. DAFFON and SANTIAGO M. QUIBULUE,
defendants-appellees.

Leovillo C. Agustin for plaintiffs-appellants. .

Honorato S. Reyes for appellee Brillantes, et al. .

Villareal, Almacen Navarra & Amores for appellee Daffon. .

TEEHANKEE, J.:
An appeal in forma pauperis on pure questions of law from a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Manila. .

Plaintiffs-appellants as parents of their sixteen-year old son, Dominador Palisoc, and a student in
automotive mechanics at the Manila Technical Institute, Quezon Boulevard, Manila, had filed on
May 19, 1966, the action below for damages arising from the death on March 10, 1966 of their
son at the hands of a fellow student, defendant Virgilio L. Daffon, at the laboratory room of the
said Institute. .

Defendants, per the trial court's decision, are: "(T)he defendant Antonio C. Brillantes, at the time
when the incident which gave rise to his action occurred was a member of the Board of Directors
of the institute;1 the defendant Teodosio Valenton, the president thereof; the defendant Santiago
M. Quibulue, instructor of the class to which the deceased belonged; and the defendant Virgilio
L. Daffon, a fellow student of the deceased. At the beginning the Manila Technical Institute was
a single proprietorship, but lately on August 2, 1962, it was duly incorporated."

The facts that led to the tragic death of plaintiffs' son were thus narrated by the trial court: "(T)he
deceased Dominador Palisoc and the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon were classmates, and on the
afternoon of March 10, 1966, between two and three o'clock, they, together with another
classmate Desiderio Cruz were in the laboratory room located on the ground floor. At that time
the classes were in recess. Desiderio Cruz and Virgilio L. Daffon were working on a machine
while Dominador Palisoc was merely looking on at them. Daffon made a remark to the effect
that Palisoc was acting like a foreman. Because of this remark Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on
the face. Daffon, in retaliation, gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face, which was followed
by other fist blows on the stomach. Palisoc retreated apparently to avoid the fist blows, but
Daffon followed him and both exchanged blows until Palisoc stumbled on an engine block which
caused him to fall face downward. Palisoc became pale and fainted. First aid was administered to
him but he was not revived, so he was immediately taken to a hospital. He never regained
consciousness; finally he died. The foregoing is the substance of the testimony of Desiderio
Cruz, the lone witness to the incident."

The trial court expressly gave credence to this version of the incident, as testified to by the lone
eyewitness, Desiderio Cruz, a classmate of the protagonists, as that of a disinterested witness
who "has no motive or reason to testify one way or another in favor of any party" and rejected
the self-exculpatory version of defendant Daffon denying that he had inflicted any fist blows on
the deceased. .

With the postmortem findings of Dr. Angelo Singian of the Manila Police Department who
performed the autopsy re "Cause of death: shock due to traumatic fracture of theribs (6th and 7th,
left, contusion of the pancreas and stomach with intra-gastric hemorrhage and slight
subarachnoid hemorrhage on the brain," and his testimony that these internal injuries of the
deceased were caused "probably by strong fist blows," the trial court found defendant Daffon
liable for the quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.3 It held that "(T)he act, therefore,
of the accused Daffon in giving the deceased strong fistblows in the stomach which ruptured his
internal organs and caused his death falls within the purview of this article of the Code."4
The trial court, however, absolved from liability the three other defendants-officials of the
Manila Technical Institute, in this wise:

... Their liabilities are based on the provisions of Article 2180 of the New Civil Code which
reads:

Art. 2180. ... .

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused
by their pupils and students and apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

In the opinion of the Court, this article of the Code is not applicable to the case at bar, since this
contemplates the situation where the control or influence of the teachers and heads of school
establishments over the conduct and actions by the pupil supersedes those of the parents.

CIVIL LAW: DAMAGES ART 2180. NEW CIVIL CODE CONSTRUED: — The clause "so
long as they remain in their custody" contained in Article 2180 of the new civil code
contemplated a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control
or influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. In those circumstances the control or
influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil as well as the responsibilities for their sort
would pass from the father and mother to the teachers. (Ciriaco L. Mercado, Petitioner vs. the
Court of Appeals, Manuel Quisumbing, Jr., et al., respondents, G.R. No. L-14862, May 30,
1960).5

There is no evidence that the accused Daffon lived and boarded with his teacher or the other
defendant officials of the school. These defendants cannot therefore be made responsible for the
tort of the defendant Daffon.

Judgment was therefore rendered by the trial court as follows:

1. Sentencing the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon to pay the plaintiffs

as heirs of the deceased Dominador Palisoc (a) P6,000.00 for the death of Dominador Palisoc;
(b) P3,375.00 for actual and compensatory expenses; (c) P5,000.00 for moral damages; (d)
P10,000.00 for loss of earning power, considering that the deceased was only between sixteen
and seventeen years, and in good health when he died, and (e) P2,000.00 for attorney's fee, plus
the costs of this action. .

2. Absolving the other defendants. .

3. Dismissing the defendants' counterclaim for lack of merit.

Plaintiffs' appeal raises the principal legal question that under the factual findings of the trial
court, which are now beyond review, the trial court erred in absolving the defendants-school
officials instead of holding them jointly and severally liable as tortfeasors, with defendant
Daffon, for the damages awarded them as a result of their son's death. The Court finds the
appeal, in the main, to be meritorious. .
1. The lower court absolved defendants-school officials on the
ground that the provisions of Article 2180, Civil Code, which expressly hold "teachers or heads
of establishments of arts and trades ... liable for damages caused by their pupils and students and
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody," are not applicable to to the case at bar,
since "there is no evidence that the accused Daffon [who inflicted the fatal fistblows]6 lived and
boarded with his teacher or the other defendants-officials of the school. These defendants cannot
therefore be made responsible for the tort of the defendant Daffon."

The lower court based its legal conclusion expressly on the Court's dictum in Mercado vs. Court
of Appeals,7 that "(I)t would seem that the clause "so long as they remain in their custody,"
contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control,
direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. In these circumstances the
control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and
mother to the teacher; and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil. Such a situation
does not appear in the case at bar; the pupils appear to go to school during school hours and go
back to their homes with their parents after school is over." This dictum had been made in
rejecting therein petitioner father's contention that his minor son's school, Lourdes Catholic
School at Kanlaon, Quezon City [which was not a party to the case] should be held responsible,
rather than him as father, for the moral damages of P2,000.00 adjudged against him for the
physical injury inflicted by his son on a classmate. [A cut on the right cheek with a piece of razor
which costs only P50.00 by way of medical expenses to treat and cure, since the wound left no
scar.] The moral damages award was after all set aside by the Court on the ground that none of
the specific cases provided in Article 2219, Civil Code, for awarding moral damages had been
established, petitioner's son being only nine years old and not having been shown to have "acted
with discernment" in inflicting the injuries on his classmate. .

The dictum in Mercado was based in turn on another dictum in the earlier case of Exconde vs.
Capuno,8 where the only issue involved as expressly stated in the decision, was whether the
therein defendant-father could be civilly liable for damages resulting from a death caused in a
motor vehicle accident driven unauthorizedly and negligently by his minor son, (which issue was
resolved adversely against the father). Nevertheless, the dictum in such earlier case that "It is true
that under the law abovequoted, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damage
caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody, but this provision only
applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution" was
expressly cited and quoted in Mercado. .

2. The case at bar was instituted directly against the school officials
and squarely raises the issue of liability of teachers and heads of schools under Article 2180,
Civil Code, for damages caused by their pupils and students against fellow students on the school
premises. Here, the parents of the student at fault, defendant Daffon, are not involved, since
Daffon was already of age at the time of the tragic incident. There is no question, either, that the
school involved is a non-academic school,9 the Manila Technical Institute being admittedly a
technical vocational and industrial school. .
The Court holds that under the cited codal article, defendants head and teacher of the Manila
Technical Institute (defendants Valenton and Quibulue, respectively) are liable jointly and
severally for damages to plaintiffs-appellants for the death of the latter's minor son at the hands
of defendant Daffon at the school's laboratory room. No liability attaches to defendant Brillantes
as a mere member of the school's board of directors. The school itself cannot be held similarly
liable, since it has not been properly impleaded as party defendant. While plaintiffs sought to so
implead it, by impleading improperly defendant Brillantes, its former single proprietor, the lower
court found that it had been incorporated since August 2, 1962, and therefore the school itself, as
thus incorporated, should have been brought in as party defendant. Plaintiffs failed to do so,
notwithstanding that Brillantes and his co-defendants in their reply to plaintiffs' request for
admission had expressly manifested and made of record that "defendant Antonio C. Brillantes is
not the registered owner/head of the "Manila Technical Institute" which is now a corporation and
is not owned by any individual person."10

3. The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for

the tortious acts of their pupils and students, so long as they remain in their custody, is that they
stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils and students, in loco parentis and are called upon to
"exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child."11 This is expressly provided for
in Articles 349, 350 and 352 of the Civil Code.12 In the law of torts, the governing principle is
that the protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of
the parents, and hence, it becomes their obligation as well as that of the school itself to provide
proper supervision of the students' activities during the whole time that they are at attendance in
the school, including recess time, as well as to take the necessary precautions to protect the
students in their custody from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated,
including injuries that some student themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence on
their fellow students. .

4. As tersely summarized by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in his

dissenting opinion in Exconde, "the basis of the presumption of negligence of Art. 1903 [now
2180] is some culpa in vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to have incurred in
the exercise of their authority" 13 and "where the parent places the child under the effective
authority of the teacher, the latter, and not the parent, should be the one answerable for the torts
committed while under his custody, for the very reason that the parent is not supposed to
interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher
while the child is under instruction." The school itself, likewise, has to respond for the fault or
negligence of its school head and teachers under the same cited article.14

5. The lower court therefore erred in law in absolving defendants-

school officials on the ground that they could be held liable under Article 2180, Civil Code, only
if the student who inflicted the fatal fistblows on his classmate and victim "lived and boarded
with his teacher or the other defendants officials of the school." As stated above, the phrase used
in the cited article — "so long as (the students) remain in their custody" means the protective and
supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and
students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time. There is
nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach the pupil or student who commits
the tortious act must live and board in the school, as erroneously held by the lower court, and the
dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it relied, must now be deemed to have been
set aside by the present decision. .

6. Defendants Valenton and Quibulue as president and teacher-in-

charge of the school must therefore be held jointly and severally liable for the quasi-delict of
their co-defendant Daffon in the latter's having caused the death of his classmate, the deceased
Dominador Palisoc. The unfortunate death resulting from the fight between the protagonists-
students could have been avoided, had said defendants but complied with their duty of providing
adequate supervision over the activities of the students in the school premises to protect their
students from harm, whether at the hands of fellow students or other parties. At any rate, the law
holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability, in compliance with the last
paragraph of Article 2180, Civil Code, by "(proving) that they observed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent damage." In the light of the factual findings of the lower
court's decision, said defendants failed to prove such exemption from liability. .

7. Plaintiffs-appellees' contention that the award of P6,000.00 as

indemnity for the death of their son should be increased to P12,000.00 as set by the Court in
People vs. Pantoja,15 and observed in all death indemnity cases thereafter is well taken. The
Court, in Pantoja, after noting the decline in the purchasing power of the Philippine peso, had
expressed its "considered opinion that the amount of award of compensatory damages for death
caused by a crime or quasi-delict should now be P12,000.00." The Court thereby adjusted the
minimum amount of "compensatory damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict" as per
Article 2206, Civil Code, from the old stated minimum of P3,000.00 to P12,000.00, which
amount is to be awarded "even though there may have been mitigating circumstances" pursuant
to the express provisions of said codal article. .

8. Plaintiffs-appellees' other claims on appeal that the lower court

should have awarded exemplary damages and imposed legal interest on the total damages
awarded, besides increasing the award of attorney's fees all concern matters that are left by law
to the discretion of the trial court and the Court has not been shown any error or abuse in the
exercise of such discretion on the part of the trial court.16 Decisive here is the touchstone
provision of Article 2231, Civil Code, that "In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted
if the defendant acted with gross negligence." No gross negligence on the part of defendants was
found by the trial court to warrant the imposition of exemplary damages, as well as of interest
and increased attorney's fees, and the Court has not been shown in this appeal any compelling
reason to disturb such finding. .

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is modified so as to provide as follows: .

1. Sentencing the defendants Virgilio L. Daffon, TeodosioV.

Valenton and Santiago M. Quibulue jointly and severally to pay plaintiffs as heirs of the
deceased Dominador Palisoc (a) P12,000.00 for the death of Dominador Palisoc; (b) P3,375.00
for actual and compensatory expenses; (c) P5,000.00 for moral, damages; (d) P10,000.00 for loss
of earning power and (e) P2,000.00 for attorney's fee, plus the costs of this action in both
instances; 2. absolving defendant Antonio C. Brillantes from the complaint; and 3. dismissing
defendants' counterclaims.
G.R. No. 82465 February 25, 1991

ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL, as represented by SPS. FERNANDO NANTES AND

ROSARIO LACANDULA, BENJAMIN ILUMIN, TIRSO DE CHAVEZ, LUISITO VINAS,
CONNIE ARQUIO AND PATRIA CADIZ, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ELEVENTH DIVISION and DR. ROMULO
CASTILLO and LILIA CADIZ, respondents.

Jose C. Flores, Jr. for petitioners.

Jovito E. Talabong for private respondents.

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision * of the Court of Appeals, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby affirmed, with the following modifications:
(1) Exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00 are hereby awarded to plaintiffs, in addition
to the actual damages of P30,000.00, moral damages of P20,000.00 and attorney's fees in the
amount of P15,000.00 awarded to plaintiffs in the decision under appeal; (2) St. Francis High
School, represented by the Spouses Fernando Nantes and Rosario Lacandula, and Benjamin
Illumin, are hereby held jointly and severally liable with defendants Connie Arquio, Tirso de
Chaves, Luisito Vinas and Patria Cadis for the payment to plaintiffs of the abovementioned
actual damages, moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees, and for costs; and (3)
Defendants Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones are hereby absolved from liability, and the case against
them, together with their respective counterclaims, is hereby ordered dismissed.

SO ORDERED. (p. 60, Rollo)

The complaint alleged that Ferdinand Castillo, then a freshman student of Section 1-C at the St.
Francis High School, wanted to join a school picnic undertaken by Class I-B and Class I-C at
Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon. Ferdinand's parents, respondents spouses Dr. Romulo Castillo
and Lilia Cadiz Castillo, because of short notice, did not allow their son to join but merely
allowed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic, with the directive that he should go back
home after doing so. However, because of persuasion of the teachers, Ferdinand went on with
them to the beach.

During the picnic and while the students, including Ferdinand, were in the water, one of the
female teachers was apparently drowning. Some of the students, including Ferdinand, came to
her rescue, but in the process, it was Ferdinand himself who drowned. His body was recovered
but efforts to resuscitate him ashore failed. He was brought to a certain Dr. Luna in Sariaya,
Quezon and later to the Mt. Cannel General Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival.
Thereupon, respondent spouses filed a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 8834, in the
Regional Trial Court, Branch LVIII of Lucena City, against the St. Francis High School,
represented by the spouses Fernando Nantes and Rosario Lacandula, Benjamin Illumin (its
principal), and the teachers: Tirso de Chaves, Luisito Vinas, Connie Arquio, Nida Aragones,
Yoly Jaro, and Patria Cadiz, for Damages which respondents allegedly incurred from the death
of their 13-year old son, Ferdinand Castillo. Contending that the death of their son was due to the
failure of the petitioners to exercise the proper diligence of a good father of the family in
preventing their son's drowning, respondents prayed of actual, moral and exemplary damages,
attorney's fees and expenses for litigation.

The trial court found in favor of the respondents and against petitioners-teachers Arquio, de
Chaves, Vinas, Aragones, Jaro and Cadiz, ordering all of them jointly and severally to pay
respondents the sum of P30,000.00 as actual damages, P20,000.00 as moral damages,
P15,000.00 as attorney's fees, and to pay the costs. The court a quo reasoned:

Taking into consideration the evidence presented, this Court believes that the defendant teachers
namely: Connie Arquio, Luisito Vinas, Tirso de Chaves, Yoly Jaro, Nida Aragones and Patria
Cadiz had failed to exercise the diligence required of them by law under the circumstances to
guard against the harm they had foreseen. (pp. 2930, Rollo)

xxx xxx xxx

While it is alleged that when defendants Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones arrived at the picnic site,
the drowning incident had already occurred, such fact does not and cannot excuse them from
their liability. In fact, it could be said that by coming late, they were remiss in their duty to
safeguard the students. (p. 30, Rollo)

The students, young as they were then (12 to 13 years old), were easily attracted to the sea
without aforethought of the dangers it offers. Yet, the precautions and reminders allegedly
performed by the defendants-teachers definitely fell short of the standard required by law under
the circumstances. While the defendants-teachers admitted that some parts of the sea where the
picnic was held are deep, the supposed lifeguards of the children did not even actually go to the
water to test the depth of the particular area where the children would swim. And indeed the
fears of the plaintiffs that the picnic area was dangerous was confirmed by the fact that three
persons during the picnic got drowned at the same time. Had the defendant teachers made an
actual and physical observation of the water before they allowed the students to swim, they could
have found out that the area where the children were swimming was indeed dangerous. And not
only that, the male teachers who according to the female teachers were there to supervise the
children to ensure their safety were not even at the area where the children were swimming.
They were somewhere and as testified to by plaintiffs' witness they were having a drinking spree.
(pp. 55-56, Rollo)

On the other hand, the trial court dismissed the case against the St. Francis High School,
Benjamin Illumin and Aurora Cadorna. Said the court a quo:
As shown and adverted to above, this Court cannot find sufficient evidence showing that the
picnic was a school sanctioned one. Similarly no evidence has been shown to hold defendants
Benjamin Illumin and Aurora Cadorna responsible for the death of Ferdinand Castillo together
with the other defendant teachers. It has been sufficiently shown that Benjamin Illumin had
himself not consented to the picnic and in fact he did not join it. On the other hand, defendant
Aurora Cadorna had then her own class to supervise and in fact she was not amongst those
allegedly invited by defendant Connie Arquio to supervise class I-C to which Ferdinand Castillo
belongs. (p. 30, Rollo)

Both petitioners and respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. Respondents-spouses

assigned the following errors committed by the trial court:

1. The lower court erred in not declaring the defendant St. Francis High School and its
administrator/principal Benjamin Illumin as equally liable not only for its approved co-curricular
activities but also for those which they unreasonably failed to exercise control and supervision
like the holding of picnic in the dangerous water of Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon.

2. The lower court erred in not declaring the St. Francis High School and principal
Benjamin Illumin as jointly and solidarily liable with their co-defendants-teachers Rosario
Lacandula, et als., for the tragic death of Ferdinand Castillo in a picnic at Talaan Beach, Sariaya,
Quezon, last March 20, 1982.

3. The lower court erred in not declaring higher amount for actual and moral damages for
the untimely and tragic death of Ferdinand Castillo in favor of plaintiffs-appellants against all the
defendants. (pp. 56-57, Rollo)

The Court of Appeals ruled:

We find plaintiffs-appellants' submission well-taken.

Even were We to find that the picnic in question was not a school-sponsored activity,
nonetheless it cannot be gainsaid that the same was held under the supervision of the teachers
employed by the said school, particularly the teacher in charge of Class I-C to whom the victim
belonged, and those whom she invited to help her in supervising the class during the picnic.
Considering that the court a quo found negligence on the part of the six defendants-teachers who,
as such, were charged with the supervision of the children during the picnic, the St. Francis High
School and the school principal, Benjamin Illumin, are liable under Article 2176 taken together
with the 1st, 4th and 5th paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code. They cannot escape
liability on the mere excuse that the picnic was not an "extra-curricular activity of the St. Francis
High School." We find from the evidence that, as claimed by plaintiffs-appellants, the school
principal had knowledge of the picnic even from its planning stage and had even been invited to
attend the affair; and yet he did not express any prohibition against undertaking the picnic, nor
did he prescribe any precautionary measures to be adopted during the picnic. At the least, We
must find that the school and the responsible school officials, particularly the principal,
Benjamin Illumin, had acquiesced to the holding of the picnic.
Under Article 2180, supra, the defendant school and defendant school principal must be found
jointly and severally liable with the defendants-teachers for the damages incurred by the
plaintiffs as a result of the death of their son. It is the rule that in cases where the above-cited
provisions find application, the negligence of the employees in causing the injury or damage
gives rise to a presumption of negligence on the part of the owner and/or manager of the
establishment (in the present case, St. Francis High School and its principal); and while this
presumption is not conclusive, it may be overthrown only by clear and convincing proof that the
owner and/or manager exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and/or supervision of the employee or employees causing the injury or damage (in this
case, the defendants-teachers). The record does not disclose such evidence as would serve to
overcome the aforesaid presumption and absolve the St. Francis High School and its principal
from liability under the above-cited provisions.

As to the third assigned error interposed by plaintiffs-appellants, while We cannot but

commiserate with the plaintiffs for the tragedy that befell them in the untimely death of their son
Ferdinand Castillo and understand their suffering as parents, especially the victim's mother who,
according to appellants, suffered a nervous breakdown as a result of the tragedy, We find that the
amounts fixed by the court a quo as actual damages and moral damages (P30,000.00 and
P20,000.00, respectively) are reasonable and are those which are sustained by the evidence and
the law.

However, We believe that exemplary or corrective damages in the amount of P20,000.00 may
and should be, as it is hereby, imposed in the present case by way of example of correction for
the public good, pursuant to Article 2229 of the Civil Code. (pp. 57-59, Rollo)

On the other hand, petitioners-teachers assigned the following errors committed by the trial
court:

1. ". . . in finding the defendants Connie Arquio, Tirso de Chavez, Luisito Vinas, Nida
Aragones, Yoly Jaro and Patria Cadiz guilty of negligence and jointly and severally liable for
damages such finding not being supported by facts and evidence.

2. ". . . in dismissing the counterclaim interposed by the defendants. (p. 59, Rollo)

On this score, respondent Court ruled:

The main thrust of defendants-appellants appeal is that plaintiffs, the parents of the victim
Ferdinand Castillo, were not able to prove by their evidence that they did not give their son
consent to join the picnic in question. However, We agree with the trial court in its finding that
whether or not the victim's parents had given such permission to their son was immaterial to the
determination of the existence of liability on the part of the defendants for the damage incurred
by the plaintiffs-appellants as a result of the death of their son. What is material to such a
determination is whether or not there was negligence on the part of defendants vis-a-vis the
supervision of the victim's group during the picnic; and, as correctly found by the trial court, an
affirmative reply to this question has been satisfactorily established by the evidence, as already
pointed out.
However, We sustain defendants-appellants insofar as two of the defendants-teachers, Yoly Jaro
and Nida Aragones, are concerned. As to them, the trial court found:

While it is alleged that when defendants Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones arrived at the picnic site,
the drowning incident had already occurred, such fact does not and cannot excuse them from
their liability. In fact, it could be said that by coming late, they were remiss in their duty to
safeguard the students.

The evidence shows that these two defendants had satisfactorily explained why they were late in
going to the picnic site, namely, that they had to attend to the entrance examination being
conducted by the school which is part of their duty as teachers thereof. Since they were not at the
picnic site during the occurrence in question, it cannot be said that they had any participation in
the negligence attributable to the other defendants-teachers who failed to exercise diligence in
the supervision of the children during the picnic and which failure resulted in the drowning of
plaintiffs' son. Thus, We may not attribute any act or omission to the two teachers, Yoly Jaro and
Nida Aragones, as to make them liable for the injury caused to the plaintiffs because of the death
of their son resulting from his drowning at the picnic. Accordingly, they must be absolved from
any liability.

As to the second assigned error raised by defendants-appellants, We agree with the court a quo
that the counterclaim must be dismissed for lack of merit. (pp. 59-60, Rollo)

Hence, this petition.

The issues presented by petitioners are:

A) Whether or not there was negligence attributable to the defendants which will warrant the
award of damages to the plaintiffs;

B) Whether or not Art. 2180, in relation to Art. 2176 of the New Civil Code is applicable to
the case at bar;

C) Whether or not the award of exemplary and moral damages is proper under the
circumstances surrounding the case at bar. (pp. 81-82, Rollo)

In the resolution of January 16, 1989, We gave due course to the petition and required the parties
to submit their respective memoranda.

The petition is impressed with merit.

If at all petitioners are liable for negligence, this is because of their own negligence or the
negligence of people under them. In the instant case however, as will be shown hereunder,
petitioners are neither guilty of their own negligence or guilty of the negligence of those under
them.
Hence, it cannot be said that they are guilty at all of any negligence. Consequently they cannot
be held liable for damages of any kind.

At the outset, it should be noted that respondent spouses, parents of the victim Ferdinand,
allowed their son to join the excursion.

Testimony of Dr. Castillo on cross exam. by Atty. Flores

Q Now, when your son asked you for money to buy food, did you not ask him where he will
bring this?

A I asked him where he was going, he answered, I am going to the picnic, and when I asked
him where, he did not answer, sir.

Q And after giving the money, you did not tell him anything more?

A No more, sir.

Q And after that you just learned that your son join the picnic?

A Yes, sir.

Q And you came to know of it after the news that your son was drowned in the picnic came
to you, is that correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q From 8:00 o'clock in the morning up to 12:00 o'clock noon of March 20, 1982, you did
not know that your son join the picnic?

A No, sir, I did not know.

Q Did you not look for your son during that time?

A I am too busy with my profession, that is why I was not able, sir.

Q You did not ask your wife?

A I did not, sir.

Q And neither did your wife tell you that your son join the picnic?

A Later on after 12:00, sir.

Q And during that time you were too busy that you did not inquire whether your son have
joined that picnic?
A Yes, sir.

(TSN, pp. 16-17, hearing of April 2, 1984 witness Romulo Castillo)

The fact that he gave money to his son to buy food for the picnic even without knowing where it
will be held, is a sign of consent for his son to join the same. Furthermore.

Testimony of Dr. Lazaro on cross examination:

Q How did you conduct this mental and physical examination?

A I have interviewed several persons and the patient herself She even felt guilty about the
death of her son because she cooked adobo for him so he could join the excursion where her son
died of drowning.

Q Why were you able to say she was feeling guilty because she was the one who personally
cooked the adobo for her son?

A It was during the interview that I had gathered it from the patient herself. She was very
sorry had she not allowed her son to join the excursion her son would have not drowned. I don't
know if she actually permitted her son although she said she cooked adobo so he could join.
(Emphasis Supplied) (TSN, p. 19, hearing of April 30, 1984, Dr. Lazaro — witness).

Respondent Court of Appeals committed an error in applying Article 2180 of the Civil Code in
rendering petitioner school liable for the death of respondent's son.

Article 2180, par. 4 states that:

The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions,
but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

xxx xxx xxx

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.

Under this paragraph, it is clear that before an employer may be held liable for the negligence of
his employee, the act or omission which caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while
an employee was in the performance of his assigned tasks.

In the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners were not in the actual performance of their assigned
tasks. The incident happened not within the school premises, not on a school day and most
importantly while the teachers and students were holding a purely private affair, a picnic. It is
clear from the beginning that the incident happened while some members of the I-C class of St.
Francis High School were having a picnic at Talaan Beach. This picnic had no permit from the
school head or its principal, Benjamin Illumin because this picnic is not a school sanctioned
activity neither is it considered as an extra-curricular activity.

As earlier pointed out by the trial court, mere knowledge by petitioner/principal Illumin of the
planning of the picnic by the students and their teachers does not in any way or in any manner
show acquiescence or consent to the holding of the same. The application therefore of Article
2180 has no basis in law and neither is it supported by any jurisprudence. If we were to affirm
the findings of respondent Court on this score, employers wig forever be exposed to the risk and
danger of being hailed to Court to answer for the misdeeds or omissions of the employees even if
such act or omission he committed while they are not in the performance of their duties.

Finally, no negligence could be attributable to the petitioners-teachers to warrant the award of

damages to the respondents-spouses.

Petitioners Connie Arquio the class adviser of I-C, the section where Ferdinand belonged, did her
best and exercised diligence of a good father of a family to prevent any untoward incident or
damages to all the students who joined the picnic.

In fact, Connie invited co-petitioners Tirso de Chavez and Luisito Vinas who are both P.E.
instructors and scout masters who have knowledge in First Aid application and swimming.
Moreover, even respondents' witness, Segundo Vinas, testified that "the defendants (petitioners
herein) had life savers especially brought by the defendants in case of emergency." (p. 85, Rollo)
The records also show that both petitioners Chavez and Vinas did all what is humanly possible to
save the child.

Testimony of Luisito Vinas on cross examination,

Q And when you saw the boy, Ferdinand Castillo, you approached the boy and claim also
having applied first aid on him?

A Yes, sir.

Q And while you were applying the so called first aid, the children were covering you up or
were surrounding you?

A Yes, sir.

Q You were rattled at that time, is it not?

A No, sir.

Q You mean you were in calm and peaceful condition?

A Yes, sir.
Q Despite the fact that the boy was no longer responding to your application of first aid?

A Yes, sir.

Q You have never been disturbed, "nababahala" in the process of your application of the
first aid on the body of Ferdinand Castillo?

A No, sir, because we were attending to the application of first aid that we were doing, sir.

Q After you have applied back to back pressure and which you claimed the boy did not
respond, were you not disturb anyway?

A I was disturbed during that time, sir.

Q For how many minutes have you applied the back to back pressure?

A From 9 to 11 times, sir.

Q You mean 9 to 11 times of having applied the pressure of your body on the body of
Ferdinand Castillo?

A Yes, sir.

Q Will you please describe how you applied a single act of back to back pressure?

A This has been done by placing the boy lay first downwards, then the face was a little bit
facing right and doing it by massaging the back of the child, sir." (TSN, pp. 32-35, hearing of
July 30, 1984)

Testimony of Tirso de Chavez on direct examination

ATTY. FLORES:

Q Who actually applied the first aid or artificial respiration to the child?

A Myself, sir.

Q How did you apply the first aid to the guy?

A The first step that I took, with the help of Mr. Luisito Vinas, was I applied back to back
pressure and took notice of the condition of the child. We placed the feet in a higher position,
that of the head of the child, sir.

Q After you have placed the boy in that particular position, where the feet were on a higher
level than that of the head, what did you do next?
A The first thing that we did, particularly myself, was that after putting the child in that
position, I applied the back to back pressure and started to massage from the waistline up, but I
noticed that the boy was not responding, sir.

Q For how long did you apply this back to back pressure on the boy?

A About 10 seconds, sir.

Q What about Mr. Vinas?

A Almost the same a little longer, for 15 seconds, sir.

Q After you noticed that the boy was not responding, what did you do?

A When we noticed that the boy was not responding, we changed the position of the boy by
placing the child facing upwards laying on the sand then we applied the mouth to mouth
resuscitation, sir. (pp. 92-93, Rollo)

With these facts in mind, no moral nor exemplary damages may be awarded in favor of
respondents-spouses. The case at bar does not fall under any of the grounds to grant moral
damages.

Art. 2217. Moral Damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar
injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are
the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission.

Moreover, as already pointed out hereinabove, petitioners are not guilty of any fault or
negligence, hence, no moral damages can be assessed against them.

While it is true that respondents-spouses did give their consent to their son to join the picnic, this
does not mean that the petitioners were already relieved of their duty to observe the required
diligence of a good father of a family in ensuring the safety of the children. But in the case at bar,
petitioners were able to prove that they had exercised the required diligence. Hence, the claim for
moral or exemplary damages becomes baseless.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision dated November 19, 1987, finding
petitioners herein guilty of negligence and liable for the death of Ferdinand Castillo and
awarding the respondents damages, is hereby SET ASIDE insofar as the petitioners herein are
concerned, but the portion of the said decision dismissing their counterclaim, there being no
merit, is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 84698 February 4, 1992

PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, JUAN D. LIM, BENJAMIN P.

PAULINO, ANTONIO M. MAGTALAS, COL. PEDRO SACRO and LT. M. SORIANO,
petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGINA ORDOÑEZ-BENITEZ, in her capacity as Presiding
Judge of Branch 47, Regional Trial Court, Manila, SEGUNDA R. BAUTISTA and ARSENIA
D. BAUTISTA, respondents.

Balgos and Perez for petitioners.

Collantes, Ramirez & Associates for private respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985 which caused the death of Carlitos Bautista while on the
second-floor premises of the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA) prompted the
parents of the deceased to file suit in the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 47) presided
over by Judge (now Court of Appeals justice) Regina Ordoñez-Benitez, for damages against the
said PSBA and its corporate officers. At the time of his death, Carlitos was enrolled in the third
year commerce course at the PSBA. It was established that his assailants were not members of
the school's academic community but were elements from outside the school.

Specifically, the suit impleaded the PSBA and the following school authorities: Juan D. Lim
(President), Benjamin P. Paulino (Vice-President), Antonio M. Magtalas (Treasurer/Cashier),
Col. Pedro Sacro (Chief of Security) and a Lt. M. Soriano (Assistant Chief of Security).
Substantially, the plaintiffs (now private respondents) sought to adjudge them liable for the
victim's untimely demise due to their alleged negligence, recklessness and lack of security
precautions, means and methods before, during and after the attack on the victim. During the
proceedings a quo, Lt. M. Soriano terminated his relationship with the other petitioners by
resigning from his position in the school.

Defendants a quo (now petitioners) sought to have the suit dismissed, alleging that since they are
presumably sued under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the complaint states no cause of action
against them, as jurisprudence on the subject is to the effect that academic institutions, such as
the PSBA, are beyond the ambit of the rule in the afore-stated article.

The respondent trial court, however, overruled petitioners' contention and thru an order dated 8
December 1987, denied their motion to dismiss. A subsequent motion for reconsideration was
similarly dealt with by an order dated 25 January 1988. Petitioners then assailed the trial court's
disposition before the respondent appellate court which, in a decision * promulgated on 10 June
1988, affirmed the trial court's orders. On 22 August 1988, the respondent appellate court
resolved to deny the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
At the outset, it is to be observed that the respondent appellate court primarily anchored its
decision on the law of quasi-delicts, as enunciated in Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. 1
Pertinent portions of the appellate court's now assailed ruling state:

Article 2180 (formerly Article 1903) of the Civil Code is an adoption from the old Spanish Civil
Code. The comments of Manresa and learned authorities on its meaning should give way to
present day changes. The law is not fixed and flexible (sic); it must be dynamic. In fact, the
greatest value and significance of law as a rule of conduct in (sic) its flexibility to adopt to
changing social conditions and its capacity to meet the new challenges of progress.

Construed in the light of modern day educational system, Article 2180 cannot be construed in its
narrow concept as held in the old case of Exconde vs. Capuno 2 and Mercado vs. Court of
Appeals; 3 hence, the ruling in the Palisoc 4 case that it should apply to all kinds of educational
institutions, academic or vocational.

At any rate, the law holds the teachers and heads of the school staff liable unless they relieve
themselves of such liability pursuant to the last paragraph of Article 2180 by "proving that they
observed all the diligence to prevent damage." This can only be done at a trial on the merits of
the case. 5

While we agree with the respondent appellate court that the motion to dismiss the complaint was
correctly denied and the complaint should be tried on the merits, we do not however agree with
the premises of the appellate court's ruling.

Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule of in loco
parentis. This Court discussed this doctrine in the afore-cited cases of Exconde, Mendoza,
Palisoc and, more recently, in Amadora vs. Court of Appeals. 6 In all such cases, it had been
stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly provides that the damage should have been caused or
inflicted by pupils or students of he educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of
its pupils or students while in its custody. However, this material situation does not exist in the
present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for
whose acts the school could be made liable.

However, does the appellate court's failure to consider such material facts mean the exculpation
of the petitioners from liability? It does not necessarily follow.

When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract
between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. 7
For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would
presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or
a profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school's academic
requirements and observe its rules and regulations.

Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in" obligation of providing their
students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of
imparting knowledge. Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher
mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or
grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat
to life and limb. Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain
peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.

Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the PSBA
and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. 8 A perusal of Article 2176
shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual
obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or
implied. However, this impression has not prevented this Court from determining the existence
of a tort even when there obtains a contract. In Air France vs. Carrascoso (124 Phil. 722), the
private respondent was awarded damages for his unwarranted expulsion from a first-class seat
aboard the petitioner airline. It is noted, however, that the Court referred to the petitioner-airline's
liability as one arising from tort, not one arising from a contract of carriage. In effect, Air France
is authority for the view that liability from tort may exist even if there is a contract, for the act
that breaks the contract may be also a tort. (Austro-America S.S. Co. vs. Thomas, 248 Fed. 231).

This view was not all that revolutionary, for even as early as 1918, this Court was already of a
similar mind. In Cangco vs. Manila Railroad (38 Phil. 780), Mr. Justice Fisher elucidated thus:

The field of non-contractual obligation is much broader than that of contractual obligation,
comprising, as it does, the whole extent of juridical human relations. These two fields,
figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a person is bound to another by
contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person. When such a
contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same
act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an extra-
contractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties.

Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations,
particularly Article 21, which provides:

Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good custom or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. (emphasis supplied).

Air France penalized the racist policy of the airline which emboldened the petitioner's employee
to forcibly oust the private respondent to cater to the comfort of a white man who allegedly "had
a better right to the seat." In Austro-American, supra, the public embarrassment caused to the
passenger was the justification for the Circuit Court of Appeals, (Second Circuit), to award
damages to the latter. From the foregoing, it can be concluded that should the act which breaches
a contract be done in bad faith and be violative of Article 21, then there is a cause to view the act
as constituting a quasi-delict.

In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding that the
contract between the school and Bautista had been breached thru the former's negligence in
providing proper security measures. This would be for the trial court to determine. And, even if
there be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual
obligation only. Using the test of Cangco, supra, the negligence of the school would not be
relevant absent a contract. In fact, that negligence becomes material only because of the
contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In other words, a contractual relation is a
condition sine qua non to the school's liability. The negligence of the school cannot exist
independently of the contract, unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in
Article 21 of the Civil Code.

This Court is not unmindful of the attendant difficulties posed by the obligation of schools,
above-mentioned, for conceptually a school, like a common carrier, cannot be an insurer of its
students against all risks. This is specially true in the populous student communities of the so-
called "university belt" in Manila where there have been reported several incidents ranging from
gang wars to other forms of hooliganism. It would not be equitable to expect of schools to
anticipate all types of violent trespass upon their premises, for notwithstanding the security
measures installed, the same may still fail against an individual or group determined to carry out
a nefarious deed inside school premises and environs. Should this be the case, the school may
still avoid liability by proving that the breach of its contractual obligation to the students was not
due to its negligence, here statutorily defined to be the omission of that degree of diligence
which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of
persons, time and place. 9

As the proceedings a quo have yet to commence on the substance of the private respondents'
complaint, the record is bereft of all the material facts. Obviously, at this stage, only the trial
court can make such a determination from the evidence still to unfold.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The court of origin
(RTC, Manila, Br. 47) is hereby ordered to continue proceedings consistent with this ruling of
the Court. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 66207 May 18, 1992

MAXIMINO SOLIMAN, JR., represented by his judicial guardian VIRGINIA C. SOLIMAN,

petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE RAMON TUAZON, Presiding Judge of Branch LXI, Regional Trial Court of
Region III, Angeles City, and the REPUBLIC CENTRAL COLLEGES, represented by its
President, respondents.

Mariano Y. Navarro for Republic Central Colleges.

RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:

On 22 March 1983, petitioner Soliman, Jr. filed a civil complaint for damages against private
respondent Republic Central Colleges ("Colleges"), the R.L. Security Agency Inc. and one
Jimmy B. Solomon, a security guard, as defendants. The complaint alleged that:

. . . on 13 August 1982, in the morning thereof, while the plaintiff was in the campus ground and
premises of the defendant, REPUBLIC CENTRAL COLLEGES, as he was and is still a regular
enrolled student of said school taking his morning classes, the defendant, JIMMY B.
SOLOMON, who was on said date and hour in the premises of said school performing his duties
and obligations as a duly appointed security guard under the employment, supervision and
control of his employer-defendant R.L. SECURITY AGENCY, INC., headed by Mr. Benjamin
Serrano, without any provocation, in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent
manner, with intent to kill, attack, assault, strike and shoot the plaintiff on the abdomen with a
.38 Caliber Revolver, a deadly weapon, which ordinarily such wound sustained would have
caused plaintiff's death were it not for the timely medical assistance given to him. The plaintiff
was treated and confined at Angeles Medical Center, Angeles City, and, as per doctor's opinion,
the plaintiff may not be able to attend to his regular classes and will be incapacitated in the
performance of his usual work for a duration of from three to four months before his wounds
would be completely healed. 1

Private respondent Colleges filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the complaint stated no
cause of action against it. Private respondent argued that it is free from any liability for the
injuries sustained by petitioner student for the reason that private respondent school was not the
employer of the security guard charged, Jimmy Solomon, and hence was not responsible for any
wrongful act of Solomon. Private respondent school further argued that Article 2180, 7th
paragraph, of the Civil Code did not apply, since said paragraph holds teachers and heads of
establishment of arts and trades liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, while security guard Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil, student or apprentice of the
school.

In an order dated 29 November 1983, respondent Judge granted private respondent school's
motion to dismiss, holding that security guard Jimmy Solomon was not an employee of the
school which accordingly could not be held liable for his acts or omissions. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration, without success.

In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, it is contended that respondent trial judge
committed a grave abuse of discretion when he refused to apply the provisions of Article 2180,
as well as those of Articles 349, 350 and 352, of the Civil Code and granted the school's motion
to dismiss.

Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the obligation to respond for damage inflicted by one
against another by fault or negligence exists not only for one's own act or omission, but also for
acts or omissions of a person for whom one is by law responsible. Among the persons held
vicariously responsible for acts or omissions of another person are the following:
xxx xxx xxx

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.

xxx xxx xxx

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused
by their pupils, their students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

xxx xxx xxx

The first paragraph quoted above offers no basis for holding the Colleges liable for the alleged
wrongful acts of security guard Jimmy B. Solomon inflicted upon petitioner Soliman, Jr. Private
respondent school was not the employer of Jimmy Solomon. The employer of Jimmy Solomon
was the R.L. Security Agency Inc., while the school was the client or customer of the R.L.
Security Agency Inc. It is settled that where the security agency, as here, recruits, hires and
assigns the work of its watchmen or security guards, the agency is the employer of such guards
or watchmen. 2 Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches to
the employer agency, and not to the clients or customers of such agency. 3 As a general rule, a
client or customer of a security agency has no hand in selecting who among the pool of security
guards or watchmen employed by the agency shall be assigned to it; the duty to observe the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of the guards cannot, in the ordinary course
of events, be demanded from the client whose premises or property are protected by the security
guards. The fact that a client company may give instructions or directions to the security guards
assigned to it, does not, by itself, render the client responsible as an employer of the security
guards concerned and liable for their wrongful acts or omissions. Those instructions or directions
are ordinarily no more than requests commonly envisaged in the contract for services entered
into with the security agency. There being no employer-employee relationship between the
Colleges and Jimmy Solomon, petitioner student cannot impose vicarious liability upon the
Colleges for the acts of security guard Solomon.

Since there is no question that Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil or student or an apprentice of the
Colleges, he being in fact an employee of the R.L. Security Agency Inc., the other above-quoted
paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code is similarly not available for imposing liability upon
the Republic Central Colleges for the acts or omissions of Jimmy Solomon.

The relevant portions of the other Articles of the Civil Code invoked by petitioner are as follows:

Art. 349. The following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Teachers and professors;

xxx xxx xxx

(4) Directors of trade establishments with regard to apprentices;

xxx xxx xxx

Art. 350. The persons named in the preceding article shall exercise reasonable supervision
over the conduct of the child.

xxx xxx xxx

Art. 352. The relations between teacher and pupil, professor and student are fixed by
government regulations and those of each school or institution. In no case shall corporal
punishment be countenanced. The teacher or professor shall cultivate the best potentialities of the
heart and mind of the pupil or student.

In Palisoc v. Brillantes, 4 invoked by petitioner, the Court held the owner and president of a
school of arts and trades known as the "Manila Technical Institute," Quezon Blvd., Manila,
responsible in damages for the death of Dominador Palisoc, a student of Institute, which resulted
from fist blows delivered by Virgilio L. Daffon, another student of the Institute. It will be seen
that the facts of Palisoc v. Brillantes brought it expressly within the 7th paragraph of Article
2180, quoted above; but those facts are entirely different from the facts existing in the instant
case.

Persons exercising substitute parental authority are made responsible for damage inflicted upon a
third person by the child or person subject to such substitute parental authority. In the instant
case, as already noted, Jimmy Solomon who committed allegedly tortious acts resulting in injury
to petitioner, was not a pupil, student or apprentice of the Republic Central Colleges; the school
had no substitute parental authority over Solomon.

Clearly, within the confines of its limited logic, i.e., treating the petitioner's claim as one based
wholly and exclusively on Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the order of the respondent trial judge
was correct. Does it follow, however, that respondent Colleges could not be held liable upon any
other basis in law, for or in respect of the injury sustained by petitioner, so as to entitle
respondent school to dismissal of petitioner's complaint in respect of itself?

The very recent case of the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA) v. Court of
Appeals, 5 requires us to give a negative answer to that question.

In PSBA, the Court held that Article 2180 of the Civil Code was not applicable where a student
had been injured by one who was an outsider or by one over whom the school did not exercise
any custody or control or supervision. At the same time, however, the Court stressed that an
implied contract may be held to be established between a school which accepts students for
enrollment, on the one hand, and the students who are enrolled, on the other hand, which contract
results in obligations for both parties:
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract
between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which parties are bound to comply with. For its
part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably
suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a
profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school's academic
requirements and observe its rules and regulations.

Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in" obligation of providing their
students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of
imparting knowledge. Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher
mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or
grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat
to life and limb. Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain
peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof. 6

In that case, the Court was careful to point out that:

In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding that the
contract between the school and Bautista had been breached thru the former's negligence in
providing proper security measures. This would be for the trial court to determine. And, even if
there be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual
obligation only. Using the test of Cangco, supra, the negligence of the school would not be
relevant absent a contract. In fact, that negligence becomes material only because of the
contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In other words, a contractual relation is a
condition sine qua non to the school's liability. The negligence of the school cannot exist
independently of the contract, unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in
Article 21 of the Civil Code.

The Court is not unmindful of the attendant difficulties posed by the obligation of schools,
above-mentioned, for conceptually a school, like a common carrier, cannot be an insurer of its
students against all risks. This is specially true in the populous student communities of the so-
called "university belt" in Manila where there have been reported several incidents ranging from
gang wars to other forms of hooliganism. It would not be equitable to expect of schools to
anticipate all types of violent trespass upon their premises, for notwithstanding the security
measures installed, the same may still fail against an individual or group determined to carry out
a nefarious deed inside school premises and environs. Should this be the case, the school may
still avoid liability by proving that the breach of its contractual obligation to the students was not
due to its negligence, here statutorily defined to be the omission of that degree of diligence
which is required by the nature of obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of person,
time and place. 7

In the PSBA case, the trial court had denied the school's motion to dismiss the complaint against
it, and both the Court of Appeals and this Court affirmed the trial court's order. In the case at bar,
the court a quo granted the motion to dismiss filed by respondent Colleges, upon the assumption
that petitioner's cause of action was based, and could have been based, only on Article 2180 of
the Civil Code. As PSBA, however, states, acts which are tortious or allegedly tortious in
character may at the same time constitute breach of a contractual, or other legal, obligation.
Respondent trial judge was in serious error when he supposed that petitioner could have no cause
of action other than one based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Respondent trial judge should
not have granted the motion to dismiss but rather should have, in the interest of justice, allowed
petitioner to prove acts constituting breach of an obligation ex contractu or ex lege on the part of
respondent Colleges.

In line, therefore, with the most recent jurisprudence of this Court, and in order to avoid a
possible substantial miscarriage of justice, and putting aside technical considerations, we
consider that respondent trial judge committed serious error correctible by this Court in the
instant case.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to GRANT DUE COURSE to the Petition, to TREAT the
comment of respondent Colleges as its answer, and to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Order
dated 29 November 1983. This case is REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings
consistent with this Resolution.

G.R. No. 143363 February 6, 2002

ST. MARY'S ACADEMY, petitioner,

vs.
WILLIAM CARPITANOS and LUCIA S. CARPITANOS, GUADA DANIEL, JAMES
DANIEL II, JAMES DANIEL, SR., and VIVENCIO VILLANUEVA, respondents.

DECISION

PARDO, J.:

The Case

The case is an appeal via certiorari from the decision1 of the Court of Appeals as well as the
resolution denying reconsideration, holding petitioner liable for damages arising from an
accident that resulted in the death of a student who had joined a campaign to visit the public
schools in Dipolog City to solicit enrollment.

The Facts

The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

"Claiming damages for the death of their only son, Sherwin Carpitanos, spouses William
Carpitanos and Lucia Carpitanos filed on June 9, 1995 a case against James Daniel II and his
parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St.
Mary’s Academy before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City.
"On 20 February 1997, Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City rendered its
decision the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

"‘WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in the following

manner:

1. Defendant St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City, is hereby ordered to pay plaintiffs William
Carpitanos and Luisa Carpitanos, the following sums of money:

a. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) indemnity for the loss of life of Sherwin S.
Carpitanos;

b. FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00) actual damages incurred by plaintiffs for burial
and related expenses;

c. TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) for attorney’s fees;

d. FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) for moral damages; and to pay costs.

2. Their liability being only subsidiary, defendants James Daniel, Sr. and Guada Daniel are
hereby ordered to pay herein plaintiffs the amount of damages above-stated in the event of
insolvency of principal obligor St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City;

3. Defendant James Daniel II, being a minor at the time of the commission of the tort and who
was under special parental authority of defendant St. Mary’s Academy, is ABSOLVED from
paying the above-stated damages, same being adjudged against defendants St. Mary’s Academy,
and subsidiarily, against his parents;

4. Defendant Vivencio Villanueva is hereby ABSOLVED of any liability. His counterclaim not
being in order as earlier discussed in this decision, is hereby DISMISSED.

IT IS SO ORDERED."’ (Decision, pp. 32-33; Records, pp. 205-206)."

"From the records it appears that from 13 to 20 February 1995, defendant-appellant St. Mary’s
Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. A facet
of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from where prospective enrollees were
studying. As a student of St. Mary’s Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the campaigning
group. Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other high school students were
riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan
Elementary School, Larayan, Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years
old and a student of the same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner
and as a result the jeep turned turtle.

"Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident."2

In due time, petitioner St. Mary’s academy appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals.3
On February 29, 2000, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision reducing the actual damages
to P25,000.00 but otherwise affirming the decision a quo, in toto.4

On February 29, 2000, petitioner St. Mary’s Academy filed a motion for reconsideration of the
decision. However, on May 22, 2000, the Court of Appeals denied the motion.5

Hence, this appeal.6

The Issues

1) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding the petitioner liable for damages for the death
of Sherwin Carpitanos.

2) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the award of moral damages against the
petitioner.

The Court’s Ruling

We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals held petitioner St. Mary’s Academy liable for the death of Sherwin
Carpitanos under Articles 2187 and 2198 of the Family Code, pointing out that petitioner was
negligent in allowing a minor to drive and in not having a teacher accompany the minor students
in the jeep.

Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental authority over a
minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the school, its
administrators and teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care. This
special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities, whether inside or
outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. Thus, such authority and responsibility
applies to field trips, excursions and other affairs of the pupils and students outside the school
premises whenever authorized by the school or its teachers.9

Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those exercising
special parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or
omissions of the unemancipated minor while under their supervision, instruction, or custody.10

However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered
as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence must have a
causal connection to the accident.11

"In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the ‘injury
for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the
connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of
events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes.’ In other words, the negligence must be the
proximate cause of the injury. For, ‘negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot create a
right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of.’ And ‘the proximate
cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.’"12

In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner was the proximate
cause of the death of the victim.

Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the accident
was not the negligence of petitioner or the reckless driving of James Daniel II, but the
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.

In their comment to the petition, respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted the
documentary exhibits establishing that the cause of the accident was the detachment of the
steering wheel guide of the jeep. Hence, the cause of the accident was not the recklessness of
James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva. Respondents,
including the spouses Carpitanos, parents of the deceased Sherwin Carpitanos, did not dispute
the report and testimony of the traffic investigator who stated that the cause of the accident was
the detachment of the steering wheel guide that caused the jeep to turn turtle.

Significantly, respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate cause of the
accident was the negligence of the school authorities, or the reckless driving of James Daniel II.
Hence, the respondents’ reliance on Article 219 of the Family Code that "those given the
authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable
for damages caused by acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor" was unfounded.

Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive
the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva, grandson of respondent
Vivencio Villanueva, who had possession and control of the jeep. He was driving the vehicle and
he allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the time of the accident.

Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or
mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minor’s
parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St. Mary’s Academy was only a remote cause of
the accident. Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of the
minor’s parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.

"The proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred."13

Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel
guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St. Mary’s
Academy had no control, and which was the proximate cause of the accident, petitioner may not
be held liable for the death resulting from such accident.
Consequently, we find that petitioner likewise cannot be held liable for moral damages in the
amount of P500,000.00 awarded by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission.14 In this case, the proximate cause
of the accident was not attributable to petitioner.

For the reason that petitioner was not directly liable for the accident, the decision of the Court of
Appeals ordering petitioner to pay death indemnity to respondent Carpitanos must be deleted.
Moreover, the grant of attorney’s fees as part of damages is the exception rather than the rule.15
The power of the court to award attorney’s fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands
factual, legal and equitable justification.16 Thus, the grant of attorney’s fees against the
petitioner is likewise deleted.

Incidentally, there was no question that the registered owner of the vehicle was respondent
Villanueva. He never denied and in fact admitted this fact.1âwphi1 We have held that the
registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be
responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was
being driven on the highways or streets."17 Hence, with the overwhelming evidence presented
by petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses that the accident occurred because of the
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the school, but the registered owner
of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.

The Fallo

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals18
and that of the trial court.19 The Court remands the case to the trial court for determination of
the liability of defendants, excluding petitioner St. Mary’s Academy, Dipolog City. No costs. SO
ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-25142 March 25, 1975

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. and FELIX PANGALANGAN, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
PHIL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS, INC., ARCHIMEDES J. BALINGIT and FERNANDO
PINEDA, defendants-appellees.

Angel A. Sison for plaintiffs-appellants.

Fidel Zosimo U. Canilao for defendants-appellees.

AQUINO, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1

Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and Felix Pangalangan appealed on pure questions of law from
the order of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, dismissing their complaint against Archimedes
J. Balingit.

The dismissal was based on the ground that Balingit as the manager of Phil-American
Forwarders, Inc., which together with Fernando Pineda and Balingit, was sued for damages in an
action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, is not the manager of an establishment
contemplated in article 2180 of the Civil Code (Civil Case No. 3865).

In the complaint for damages filed by the bus company and Pangalangan against Phil-American
Forwarders, Inc., Balingit and Pineda, it was alleged that on November 24, 1962, Pineda drove
recklessly a freight truck, owned by Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., along the national highway
at Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. The truck bumped the bus driven by Pangalangan, which was owned
by Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. As a result of the bumping, Pangalangan suffered injuries
and the bus was damaged and could not be used for seventy-nine days, thus depriving the
company of earnings amounting to P8,665.51. Balingit was the manager of Phil-American
Forwarders, Inc.

Among the defenses interposed by the defendants in their answer was that Balingit was not
Pineda's employer.

Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the ground that the bus company
and the bus driver had no cause of action against him. As already stated, the lower court
dismissed the action as to Balingit. The bus company and its driver appealed.

The Civil Code provides:têñ.£îhqwâ£

ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.

ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts
or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

xxx xxx xxx

The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages
caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on
the occasion of their functions.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a)

The novel and unprecedented legal issue in this appeal is whether the terms "employers" and
"owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise" (dueños o directores de un
establicimiento o empresa) used in article 2180 of the Civil Code, formerly article 1903 of the
old Code, embrace the manager of a corporation owning a truck, the reckless operation of which
allegedly resulted in the vehicular accident from which the damage arose.

We are of the opinion that those terms do not include the manager of a corporation. It may be
gathered from the context of article 2180 that the term "manager" ("director" in the Spanish
version) is used in the sense of "employer".

Hence, under the allegations of the complaint, no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be
fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., in connection with the
vehicular accident already mentioned because he himself may be regarded as an employee or
dependiente of his employer, Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.

Thus, it was held "que es dependiente, a los efectos de la responsabilidad subsidiaria establecida
en el num 3.0 del (art.) 1903, el director de un periodico explotado por una sociedad, porque
cualquiera que sea su jerarquia y aunque Ileve la direccion de determinadas convicciones
politicas no por eso deja de estar subordinado a la superior autoridad de la Empresa" (Decision
of Spanish Supreme Court dated December 6, 1912 cited in 12 Manresa, Codigo Civil Español
5th Ed. 662; 1913 Enciclopedia Juridica Española 992).

The bus company and its driver, in their appellants' brief, injected a new factual issue which was
not alleged in their complaint. They argue that Phil- American Forwarders, Inc. is merely a
business conduit of Balingit because out of its capital stock with a par value of P41,200, Balingit
and his wife had subscribed P40,000 and they paid P10,000 on their subscription, while the other
incorporators, namely, Rodolfo Limjuco, Ponciano Caparas and Rafael Suntay paid P250.25 and
P25, respectively.

That argument implies that the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced and that Phil-American
Forwarders, Inc. and Balingit and his wife should be treated as one and the same civil
personality.

We cannot countenance that argument in this appeal. It was not raised in the lower court. The
case has to be decided on the basis of the pleadings filed in the trial court where it was assumed
that Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. has a personality separate and distinct from that of the
Balingit spouses.
The legal issue, which the plaintiffs-appellants can ventilate in this appeal, is one which was
raised in the lower court and which is within the issues framed by the parties (Sec. 18, Rule 46,
Rules of Court).

When a party deliberately adopts a certain theory and the case is decided upon that theory in the
court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal because, to permit him to do
so, could be unfair to the adverse party (2 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed. p.
505).

WHEREFORE, the lower court's order of dismissal is affirmed. Costs against the plaintiffs-
appellants.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 132266 December 21, 1999

CASTILEX INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
VICENTE VASQUEZ, JR. and LUISA SO VASQUEZ, and CEBU DOCTORS' HOSPITAL,
INC., respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

The pivotal issue in this petition is whether an employer may be held vicariously liable for the
death resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued
vehicle.

The antecedents, as succinctly summarized by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

On 28 August 1988, at around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, Romeo So Vasquez, was driving a
Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmeña Rotunda. He was traveling counter-clockwise, (the
normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without any protective helmet or goggles. He was also
only carrying a Student's Permit to Drive at the time. Upon the other hand, Benjamin Abad [was
a] manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation, registered owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux
Pick-up with plate no. GBW-794. On the same date and time, Abad drove the said company car
out of a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmeña rotunda he made a short cut against
[the] flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St. or to Belvic St.

In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with each other
causing severe injuries to the former. Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the
Southern Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctor's Hospital.
On September 5, 1988, Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctor's Hospital. It was there that Abad
signed an acknowledgment of Responsible Party (Exhibit K) wherein he agreed to pay whatever
hospital bills, professional fees and other incidental charges Vasquez may incur.

After the police authorities had conducted the investigation of the accident, a Criminal Case was
filed against Abad but which was subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute. So, the present
action for damages was commenced by Vicente Vasquez, Jr. and Luisa So Vasquez, parents of
the deceased Romeo So Vasquez, against Jose Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial
Corporation. In the same action, Cebu Doctor's Hospital intervened to collect unpaid balance for
the medical expense given to Romeo So Vasquez.1

The trial court ruled in favor of private respondents Vicente and Luisa Vasquez and ordered Jose
Benjamin Abad (hereafter ABAD) and petitioner Castilex Industrial Corporation (hereafter
CASTILEX) to pay jointly and solidarily (1) Spouses Vasquez, the amounts of P8,000.00 for
burial expenses; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; and P778,752.00
for loss of earning capacity; and (2) Cebu Doctor's Hospital, the sum of P50,927.83 for unpaid
medical and hospital bills at 3% monthly interest from 27 July 1989 until fully paid, plus the
costs of litigation.2

CASTILEX and ABAD separately appealed the decision.

In its decision3 of 21 May 1997, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court
holding ABAD and CASTILEX liable but held that the liability of the latter is "only vicarious
and not solidary" with the former. It reduced the award of damages representing loss of earning
capacity from P778,752.00 to P214,156.80; and the interest on the hospital and medical bills,
from 3% per month to 12% per annum from 5 September 1988 until fully paid.

Upon CASTILEX's motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals modified its decision by (1)
reducing the award of moral damages from P50,000 to P30,000 in view of the deceased's
contributory negligence; (b) deleting the award of attorney's fees for lack of evidence; and (c)
reducing the interest on hospital and medical bills to 6% per annum from 5 September 1988 until
fully paid.4

Hence, CASTILEX filed the instant petition contending that the Court of Appeals erred in (1)
applying to the case the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, instead of the fourth
paragraph thereof; (2) that as a managerial employee, ABAD was deemed to have been always
acting within the scope of his assigned task even outside office hours because he was using a
vehicle issued to him by petitioner; and (3) ruling that petitioner had the burden to prove that the
employee was not acting within the scope of his assigned task.

Jose Benjamin ABAD merely adopted the statement of facts of petitioner which holds fast on the
theory of negligence on the part of the deceased.

On the other hand, respondents Spouses Vasquez argue that their son's death was caused by the
negligence of petitioner's employee who was driving a vehicle issued by petitioner and who was
on his way home from overtime work for petitioner; and that petitioner is thus liable for the
resulting injury and subsequent death of their son on the basis of the fifth paragraph of Article
2180. Even if the fourth paragraph of Article 2180 were applied, petitioner cannot escape
liability therefor. They moreover argue that the Court of Appeals erred in reducing the amount of
compensatory damages when the award made by the trial court was borne both by evidence
adduced during the trial regarding deceased's wages and by jurisprudence on life expectancy.
Moreover, they point out that the petition is procedurally not acceptable on the following
grounds: (1) lack of an explanation for serving the petition upon the Court of Appeals by
registered mail, as required under Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2)
lack of a statement of the dates of the expiration of the original reglementary period and of the
filing of the motion for extension of time to file a petition for review.

For its part, respondent Cebu Doctor's Hospital maintains that petitioner CASTILEX is indeed
vicariously liable for the injuries and subsequent death of Romeo Vasquez caused by ABAD,
who was on his way home from taking snacks after doing overtime work for petitioner. Although
the incident occurred when ABAD was not working anymore "the inescapable fact remains that
said employee would not have been situated at such time and place had he not been required by
petitioner to do overtime work." Moreover, since petitioner adopted the evidence adduced by
ABAD, it cannot, as the latter's employer, inveigle itself from the ambit of liability, and is thus
estopped by the records of the case, which it failed to refute.

We shall first address the issue raised by the private respondents regarding some alleged
procedural lapses in the petition.

Private respondent's contention of petitioner's violation of Section 11 of Rule 13 and Section 4 of

Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure holds no water.

Sec. 11 of Rule 13 provides:

Sec. 11. Priorities in modes of services and filing. — Whenever practicable, the service
and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be done personally. Except with respect to papers
emanating from the court, a resort to other modes must be accompanied by a written explanation
why the service or filing was not done personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause to
consider the paper as not filed.

The explanation why service of a copy of the petition upon the Court of Appeals was done by
registered mail is found on Page 28 of the petition. Thus, there has been compliance with the
aforequoted provision.

As regards the allegation of violation of the material data rule under Section 4 of Rule 45, the
same is unfounded. The material dates required to be stated in the petition are the following: (1)
the date of receipt of the judgment or final order or resolution subject of the petition; (2) the date
of filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any; and (3) the date of receipt of the
notice of the denial of the motion. Contrary to private respondent's claim, the petition need not
indicate the dates of the expiration of the original reglementary period and the filing of a motion
for extension of time to file the petition. At any rate, aside from the material dates required under
Section 4 of Rule 45, petitioner CASTILEX also stated in the first page of the petition the date it
filed the motion for extension of time to file the petition.

Now on the merits of the case.

The negligence of ABAD is not an issue at this instance. Petitioner CASTILEX presumes said
negligence but claims that it is not vicariously liable for the injuries and subsequent death caused
by ABAD.

Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code should only apply
to instances where the employer is not engaged in business or industry. Since it is engaged in the
business of manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore not covered by said provision.
Instead, the fourth paragraph should apply.

Petitioner's interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate. The phrase "even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry" found in the fifth paragraph should be
interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business or
industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the scope of his
assigned task.5

A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine what is applicable. Both
provisions apply to employers: the fourth paragraph, to owners and managers of an establishment
or enterprise; and the fifth paragraph, to employers in general, whether or not engaged in any
business or industry. The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of employees committed either
in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions, while the fifth paragraph
encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of their assigned task. The
latter is an expansion of the former in both employer coverage and acts included. Negligent acts
of employees, whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or industry, are covered so
long as they were acting within the scope of their assigned task, even though committed neither
in the service of the branches nor on the occasion of their functions. For, admittedly, employees
oftentimes wear different hats. They perform functions which are beyond their office, title or
designation but which, nevertheless, are still within the call of duty.

This court has applied the fifth paragraph to cases where the employer was engaged in a business
or industry such as truck operators6 and banks.7 The Court of Appeals cannot, therefore, be
faulted in applying the said paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code to this case.

Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not engaged in any business or industry, an
employer is liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope of his assigned tasks.
But it is necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship; once this is done, the
plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that the employee was acting within the scope
of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. It is only then that the employer
may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of
the employee.8
It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager of petitioner CASTILEX at the time of
the tort occurrence. As to whether he was acting within the scope of his assigned task is a
question of fact, which the court a quo and the Court of Appeals resolved in the affirmative.

Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals
are entitled to great respect, and even finality at times. This rule is, however, subject to
exceptions such as when the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises, or conjectures.9
Such exception obtain in the present case to warrant review by this Court of the finding of the
Court of Appeals that since ABAD was driving petitioner's vehicle he was acting within the
scope of his duties as a manager.

Before we pass upon the issue of whether ABAD was performing acts within the range of his
employment, we shall first take up the other reason invoked by the Court of Appeals in holding
petitioner CASTILEX vicariously liable for ABAD's negligence, i.e., that the petitioner did not
present evidence that ABAD was not acting within the scope of his assigned tasks at the time of
the motor vehicle mishap. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, it was not incumbent
upon the petitioner to prove the same. It was enough for petitioner CASTILEX to deny that
ABAD was acting within the scope of his duties; petitioner was not under obligation to prove
this negative averment. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (He who asserts, not he who
denies, must prove). The Court has consistently applied the ancient rule that if the plaintiff, upon
whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner facts
which he bases his claim, the defendant is under no obligation to prove his exception or defense.
10

Now on the issue of whether the private respondents have sufficiently established that ABAD
was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks.

ABAD, who was presented as a hostile witness, testified that at the time of the incident, he was
driving a company-issued vehicle, registered under the name of petitioner. He was then leaving
the restaurant where he had some snacks and had a chat with his friends after having done
overtime work for the petitioner.

No absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will furnish the complete answer to the
problem of whether at a given moment, an employee is engaged in his employer's business in the
operation of a motor vehicle, so as to fix liability upon the employer because of the employee's
action or inaction; but rather, the result varies with each state of facts. 11

In Filamer Christian Institute v. Intermediate Appellant Court, 12 this Court had the occasion to
hold that acts done within the scope of the employee's assigned tasks includes "any act done by
an employee in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at
the time of the infliction of the injury or damages."

The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the driving by a manager of a
company-issued vehicle is within the scope of his assigned tasks regardless of the time and
circumstances.
We do not agree. The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of the
injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the negligent
operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or
scope of his employment.

The following are principles in American Jurisprudence on the employer's liability for the
injuries inflicted by the negligence of an employee in the use of an employer's motor vehicle:

I. Operation of Employer's Motor Vehicle in Going to

or from Meals

It has been held that an employee who uses his employer's vehicle in going from his work to a
place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within
the scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the
employer. Evidence that by using the employer's vehicle to go to and from meals, an employee is
enabled to reduce his time-off and so devote more time to the performance of his duties supports
the finding that an employee is acting within the scope of his employment while so driving the
vehicle. 13

II. Operation of Employer's Vehicle in Going to

or from Work

In the same vein, traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or
concern of the employee, and not a part of his services to his employer. Hence, in the absence of
some special benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the services available at
the place where he is needed, the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment
even though he uses his employer's motor vehicle. 14

The employer may, however, be liable where he derives some special benefit from having the
employee drive home in the employer's vehicle as when the employer benefits from having the
employee at work earlier and, presumably, spending more time at his actual duties. Where the
employee's duties require him to circulate in a general area with no fixed place or hours of work,
or to go to and from his home to various outside places of work, and his employer furnishes him
with a vehicle to use in his work, the courts have frequently applied what has been called the
"special errand" or "roving commission" rule, under which it can be found that the employee
continues in the service of his employer until he actually reaches home. However, even if the
employee be deemed to be acting within the scope of his employment in going to or from work
in his employer's vehicle, the employer is not liable for his negligence where at the time of the
accident, the employee has left the direct route to his work or back home and is pursuing a
personal errand of his own.

III. Use of Employer's Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours

An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latter's personal use outside of
regular working hours is generally not liable for the employee's negligent operation of the
vehicle during the period of permissive use, even where the employer contemplates that a
regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as business
purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer. Even where the employee's
personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he has started the return trip to
his house where the vehicle is normally kept, it has been held that he has not resumed his
employment, and the employer is not liable for the employee's negligent operation of the vehicle
during the return trip. 15

The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our jurisdiction albeit based on the
doctrine of respondent superior, not on the principle of bonus pater familias as in ours. Whether
the fault or negligence of the employee is conclusive on his employer as in American law or
jurisprudence, or merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of
the employer as in ours, it is indispensable that the employee was acting in his employer's
business or within the scope of his assigned task. 16

In the case at bar, it is undisputed that ABAD did some overtime work at the petitioner's office,
which was located in Cabangcalan, Mandaue City. Thereafter, he went to Goldie's Restaurant in
Fuente Osmeña, Cebu City, which is about seven kilometers away from petitioner's place of
business. 17 A witness for the private respondents, a sidewalk vendor, testified that Fuente
Osmeña is a "lively place" even at dawn because Goldie's Restaurant and Back Street were still
open and people were drinking thereat. Moreover, prostitutes, pimps, and drug addicts littered
the place. 18

At the Goldie's Restaurant, ABAD took some snacks and had a chat with friends. It was when
ABAD was leaving the restaurant that the incident in question occurred. That same witness for
the private respondents testified that at the time of the vehicular accident, ABAD was with a
woman in his car, who then shouted: "Daddy, Daddy!" 19 This woman could not have been
ABAD's daughter, for ABAD was only 29 years old at the time.

To the mind of this Court, ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a
personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident. It was
then about 2:00 a.m. of 28 August 1988, way beyond the normal working hours. ABAD's
working day had ended; his overtime work had already been completed. His being at a place
which, as petitioner put it, was known as a "haven for prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and
addicts," had no connection to petitioner's business; neither had it any relation to his duties as a
manager. Rather, using his service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe
benefit or one of the perks attached to his position.

Since there is paucity of evidence that ABAD was acting within the scope of the functions
entrusted to him, petitioner CASTILEX had no duty to show that it exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in providing ABAD with a service vehicle. Thus, justice and equity
require that petitioner be relieved of vicarious liability for the consequences of the negligence of
ABAD in driving its vehicle. 20
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the appealed decision and resolution of the Court
of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the modification that petitioner Castilex Industrial Corporation
be absolved of any liability for the damages caused by its employee, Jose Benjamin Abad.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 119121 August 14, 1998

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, Fifteenth Division and PHESCO INCORPORATED, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

On July 22, 1979, a convoy of four (4) dump trucks owned by the National Power Corporation
(NPC) left Marawi city bound for Iligan city. Unfortunately, enroute to its destination, one of the
trucks with plate no RFT-9-6-673 driven by a certain Gavino Ilumba figured in a head-on-
collision with a Toyota Tamaraw. The incident resulted in the death of three (3) persons riding in
the Toyota Tamaraw, as well as physical injuries to seventeen other passengers.

On June 10, 1980, the heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages against National Power
Corporation (NPC) and PHESCO Incorporated (PHESCO) before the then Court of First
Instance of Lanao del Norte, Marawi City. When defendant PHESCO filed its answer to the
complaint it contended that it was not the owner of the dump truck which collided with the
Toyota Tamaraw but NPC. Moreover, it asserted that it was merely a contractor of NPC with the
main duty of supplying workers and technicians for the latter's projects. On the other hand, NPC
denied any liability and countered that the driver of the dump truck was the employee of
PHESCO.

After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a decision dated July 25, 1988 absolving NPC of
any liability. The dispositive portion reads:

Consequently, in view of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered ordering

PHESCO, Inc. and Gavino Ilumba upon receipt hereof:

1. To pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs thru the Dansalan College the sum of
P954,154.55 representing the actual or compensatory damages incurred by the plaintiffs; and

2. To pay the sum of P50,000.00 representing Attorney's fees.

SO ORDERED.
Dissatisfied, PHESCO appealed to the Court of Appeals, which on November 10, 1994 reversed
the trial court's judgment. We quote the pertinent portion of the decision:

A "labor only" contractor is considered merely as an agent of the employer (Deferia vs. National
Labor Relations Commission, 194 SCRA 525). A finding that a contractor is a "labor only"
contractor is equivalent to a finding that there is an employer-employee relationship between the
owner of the project and the employees of the "labor only" contractor (Industrial Timer
Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 202 SCRA 465). So, even if Phesco
hired driver Gavino Ilumba, as Phesco is admittedly a "labor only" contractor of Napocor the
statute itself establishes an employer-employee relationship between the employer (Napocor) and
the employee (driver Ilumba) of the labor only contractor (Phesco). (Ecal vs. National Labor
Relations Commission, 195 SCRA 224).

Consequently, we hold Phesco not liable for the tort of driver Gavino Ilumba, as there was no
employment relationship between Phesco and driver Gavino Ilumba. Under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, to hold the employer liable for torts committed by his employees within the scope of
their assigned task, there must exist an employer-employee relationship. (Martin vs. Court of
Appeals, 205 SCRA 591).

WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the appealed decision. In lieu thereof, the Court renders judgment
sentencing defendant National Power Corporation to pay plaintiffs the sum of P174,889.20 plus
P20,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs.

SO ORDERED.

Chagrined by the sudden turnaround, NPC filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision
which was, however, denied on February 9, 1995. 1 Hence, this petition.

The principal query to be resolved is, as between NPC and PHESCO, who is the employer of
Ilumba, driver of the dumptruck which figured in the accident and which should, therefore,
would be liable for damages to the victims. Specifically, NPC assigns the sole error that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION FINDING THAT PETITIONER NPC AS THE

EMPLOYER OF THE DRIVER GAVINO ILUMBA, AND CONSEQUENTLY SENTENCING
IT TO PAY THE ACTUAL AND COMPENSATORY DAMAGES SUSTAINED BY
COMPLAINTS, IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE
RULINGS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT. 2

As earlier stated, NPC denies that the driver of the dump truck was its employee. It alleges that it
did not have the power of selection and dismissal nor the power of control over Ilumba. 3
PHESCO, meanwhile, argues that it merely acted as a "recruiter" of the necessary workers for
and in behalf of NPC. 4

Before we decide who is the employer of Ilumba, it is evidently necessary to ascertain the
contractual relationship between NPC and PHESCO. Was the relationship one of employer and
job (independent) contractor or one of employer and "labor only" contractor?
Job (independent) contracting is present if the following conditions are met: (a) the contractor
carries on an independent business and undertakes the contract work on his own account under
his own responsibility according to his own manner and method, free from the control and
direction of his employer or principal in all matters connected with the performance of the work
except to the result thereof; and (b) the contractor has substantial capital or investments in the
form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises and other materials which are necessary in
the conduct of his business. 5 Absent these requisites, what exists is a "labor only" contract under
which the person acting as contractor is considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the
principal who is responsible to the workers in the same manner and to the same extent as if they
had been directly employed by him. 6 Taking into consideration the above distinction and the
provisions of the "Memorandum of Understanding" entered into by PHESCO and NPC, we are
convinced that PHESCO was engaged in "labor only" contracting.

It must be noted that under the Memorandum, NPC had mandate to approve the "critical path
network and rate of expenditure to be undertaken by PHESCO. 7 Likewise, the manning
schedule and pay scale of the workers hired by PHESCO were subject to confirmation by NPC. 8
Then too, it cannot be ignored that if PHESCO enters into any sub-contract or lease, again NPC's
concurrence is needed. 9 Another consideration is that even in the procurement of tools and
equipment that will be used by PHESCO, NPC's favorable recommendation is still necessary
before these tools and equipment can be purchased. 10 Notably, it is NPC that will provide the
money or funding that will be used by PHESCO to undertake the project. 11 Furthermore, it
must be emphasized that the project being undertaken by PHESCO, i.e., construction of power
energy facilities, is related to NPC's principal business of power generation. In sum, NPC's
control over PHESCO in matters concerning the performance of the latter's work is evident. It is
enough that NPC has the right to wield such power to be considered as the employer. 12

Under this factual milieu, there is no doubt that PHESCO was engaged in "labor-only"
contracting vis-à-vis NPC and as such, it is considered merely an agent of the latter. In labor-
only contracting, an employer-employee relationship between the principal employer and the
employees of the "labor-only" contractor is created. Accordingly, the principal employer is
responsible to the employees of the "labor-only" contractor as if such employees had been
directly employed by the principal employer. 13 Since PHESCO is only a "labor-only"
contractor, the workers it supplied to NPC, including the driver of the ill-fated truck, should be
considered as employees of NPC. 14 After all, it is axiomatic that any person (the principal
employer) who enters into an agreement with a job contractor, either for the performance of a
specified work or for the supply of manpower, assumes responsibility over the employees of the
latter. 15

However, NPC maintains that even assuming that a "labor only" contract exists between it and
PHESCO, its liability will not extend to third persons who are injured due to the tortious acts of
the employee of the "labor-only" contractor. 16 Stated otherwise, its liability shall only be
limited to violations of the Labor Code and not quasi-delicts.

To bolster its position, NPC cites Section 9(b), Rule VII, Book III of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code which reads:
(b) Labor only contracting as defined herein is hereby prohibited and the person acting as
contractor shall be considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the employer who shall be
responsible to the workers in the same manner and extent as if the latter were directly employed
by him.

In other words, NPC posits the theory that its liability is limited only to compliance with the
substantive labor provisions on working conditions, rest periods, and wages and shall not extend
to liabilities suffered by third parties, viz.:

Consequently, the responsibilities of the employer contemplated in a "labor only" contract,

should, consistent with the terms expressed in the rule, be restricted "to the workers." The same
can not be expanded to cover liabilities for damages to third persons resulting from the
employees' tortious acts under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. 17

The reliance is misplaced. It bears stressing that the action was premised on the recovery of
damages as a result of quasi-delict against both NPC and PHESCO, hence, it is the Civil Code
and not the Labor Code which is the applicable law in resolving this case.

To be sure, the pronouncement of this Court in Filamer Christian Institute v. IAC, 18 is most
instructive:

The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of employment between an
alleged employee and an alleged employer. It invokes a claim brought by one for damages for
injury caused by the patently negligent acts of a person, against both doer-employee and his
employer. Hence, the reliance on the implementing rule on labor to disregard the primary
liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is misplaced. An implementing rule
on labor cannot be used by an employer as a shield to avoid liability under the substantive
provisions of the Civil Code.

Corollarily from the above doctrine, the ruling in Cuison v. Norton & Harrison Co., 19 finds
applicability in the instant case, viz.:

It is well to repeat that under the civil law an employer is only liable for the negligence of his
employees in the discharge of their respective duties. The defense of independent contractor
would be a valid one in the Philippines just as it would be in the United States. Here Ora was a
contractor, but it does not necessarily follow that he was an independent contractor. The reason
for this distinction is that the employer retained the power of directing and controlling the work.
The chauffeur and the two persons on the truck were the employees of Ora, the contractor, but
Ora, the contractor, was an employee of Norton & Harrison Co., charged with the duty of
directing the loading and transportation of the lumber. And it was the negligence in loading the
lumber and the use of minors on the truck which caused the death of the unfortunate boy. On the
facts and the law, Ora was not an independent contractor, but was the servant of the defendant,
and for his negligence defendant was responsible.
Given the above considerations, it is apparent that Article 2180 of the Civil Code and not the
Labor Code will determine the liability of NPC in a civil suit for damages instituted by an
injured person for any negligent act of the employees of the "labor only" contractor. This is
consistent with the ruling that a finding that a contractor was a "labor-only" contractor is
equivalent to a finding that an employer-employee relationship existed between the owner
(principal contractor) and the "labor-only" contractor, including the latter's workers. 20

With respect to the liability of NPC as the direct employer, Article 2180 of the Civil Code
explicitly provides:

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.

In this regard, NPC's liability is direct, primary and solidary with PHESCO and the driver. 21 Of
course, NPC, if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it, shall have recourse against PHESCO
and the driver who committed the negligence which gave rise to the action. 22

Finally, NPC, even if it truly believed that it was not the employer of the driver, could still have
disclaimed any liability had it raised the defense of due diligence in the selection or supervision
of PHESCO and Ilumba. 23 However, for some reason or another, NPC did not invoke said
defense. Hence, by opting not to present any evidence that it exercised due diligence in the
supervision of the activities of PHESCO and Ilumba, NPC has foreclosed its right to interpose
the same on appeal in conformity with the rule that points of law, theories, issues of facts and
arguments not raised in the proceedings below cannot be ventilated for the first time on appeal.
24 Consequently, its liability stands.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated
November 10, 1994 and its accompanying resolution dated February 9, 1995 are AFFIRMED
without prejudice to the right of NPC to demand from PHESCO and Ilumba reimbursement of
the damages it would be adjudged to pay to complainants. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 145804 February 6, 2003

LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN, petitioners,

vs.
MARJORIE NAVIDAD, Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD & PRUDENT SECURITY
AGENCY, respondents.

DECISION

VITUG, J.:

The case before the Court is an appeal from the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals,
promulgated on 27 April 2000 and 10 October 2000, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 60720,
entitled "Marjorie Navidad and Heirs of the Late Nicanor Navidad vs. Rodolfo Roman, et. al.,"
which has modified the decision of 11 August 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 266,
Pasig City, exonerating Prudent Security Agency (Prudent) from liability and finding Light Rail
Transit Authority (LRTA) and Rodolfo Roman liable for damages on account of the death of
Nicanor Navidad.

On 14 October 1993, about half an hour past seven o’clock in the evening, Nicanor Navidad,
then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a "token" (representing payment of
the fare). While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the
security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad. A misunderstanding or an altercation
between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. No evidence, however, was adduced to
indicate how the fight started or who, between the two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad
later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by
petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was
killed instantaneously.

On 08 December 1994, the widow of Nicanor, herein respondent Marjorie Navidad, along with
her children, filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the
LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death of her
husband. LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against
Escartin and Prudent. Prudent, in its answer, denied liability and averred that it had exercised due
diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards.

The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin, instead of
presenting evidence, filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin
was negligent in his assigned task. On 11 August 1998, the trial court rendered its decision; it
adjudged:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendants Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordering the latter to pay jointly and severally
the plaintiffs the following:

"a) 1) Actual damages of P44,830.00;

2) Compensatory damages of P443,520.00;

3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P50,000.00;

"b) Moral damages of P50,000.00;

"c) Attorney’s fees of P20,000;

"d) Costs of suit.

"The complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman are dismissed for lack of merit.

"The compulsory counterclaim of LRTA and Roman are likewise dismissed."1

Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 27 August 2000, the appellate court promulgated
its now assailed decision exonerating Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad
and, instead, holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable thusly:

"WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is hereby MODIFIED, by exonerating the appellants

from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad, Jr. Instead, appellees Rodolfo Roman and
the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) are held liable for his death and are hereby directed to
pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs-appellees, the following amounts:

a) P44,830.00 as actual damages;

b) P50,000.00 as nominal damages;

c) P50,000.00 as moral damages;

d) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the deceased; and

e) P20,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees."2

The appellate court ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the
train, a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place
where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token
therefor. In exempting Prudent from liability, the court stressed that there was nothing to link the
security agency to the death of Navidad. It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin
inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the evidence merely established the fact of death of
Navidad by reason of his having been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and
operated at the time by Roman. The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present
expert evidence to establish the fact that the application of emergency brakes could not have
stopped the train.
The appellate court denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10 October
2000.

In their present recourse, petitioners recite alleged errors on the part of the appellate court; viz:

"I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED BY DISREGARDING THE

FINDINGS OF FACTS BY THE TRIAL COURT

"II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT

PETITIONERS ARE LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD, JR.

"III.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT

RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA."3

Petitioners would contend that the appellate court ignored the evidence and the factual findings
of the trial court by holding them liable on the basis of a sweeping conclusion that the
presumption of negligence on the part of a common carrier was not overcome. Petitioners would
insist that Escartin’s assault upon Navidad, which caused the latter to fall on the tracks, was an
act of a stranger that could not have been foreseen or prevented. The LRTA would add that the
appellate court’s conclusion on the existence of an employer-employee relationship between
Roman and LRTA lacked basis because Roman himself had testified being an employee of
Metro Transit and not of the LRTA.

Respondents, supporting the decision of the appellate court, contended that a contract of carriage
was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the
premises of the latter, entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual
relation, and that the appellate court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of
Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier.

Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its business and for
reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty of exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the
safety of passengers.4 The Civil Code, governing the liability of a common carrier for death of or
injury to its passengers, provides:

"Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care
and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard
for all the circumstances.
"Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755."

"Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the
negligence or willful acts of the former’s employees, although such employees may have acted
beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.

"This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees."

"Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account
of the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier’s
employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have
prevented or stopped the act or omission."

The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances.5 Such duty of a common carrier to
provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for so
long as the passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to the
contract of carriage.6 The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or
injury to passengers (a) through the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or b) on account of
wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the common carrier’s employees
through the exercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.7 In
case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent, and8
by simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or
negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that
the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure.9 In the absence of satisfactory
explanation by the carrier on how the accident occurred, which petitioners, according to the
appellate court, have failed to show, the presumption would be that it has been at fault,10 an
exception from the general rule that negligence must be proved.11

The foundation of LRTA’s liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the
victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high
diligence required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety
of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an
outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not
relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage.

Should Prudent be made likewise liable? If at all, that liability could only be for tort under the
provisions of Article 217612 and related provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180,13 of the
Civil Code. The premise, however, for the employer’s liability is negligence or fault on the part
of the employee. Once such fault is established, the employer can then be made liable on the
basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris
families in the selection and supervision of its employees. The liability is primary and can only
be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee, a factual
matter that has not been shown. Absent such a showing, one might ask further, how then must
the liability of the common carrier, on the one hand, and an independent contractor, on the other
hand, be described? It would be solidary. A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and
when the same act or omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other
in culpa aquiliana, Article 219414 of the Civil Code can well apply.15 In fine, a liability for tort
may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract.16 Stated
differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the
source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between the parties, the contract can
be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.17

Regrettably for LRT, as well as perhaps the surviving spouse and heirs of the late Nicanor
Navidad, this Court is concluded by the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that "there is
nothing to link (Prudent) to the death of Nicanor (Navidad), for the reason that the negligence of
its employee, Escartin, has not been duly proven x x x." This finding of the appellate court is not
without substantial justification in our own review of the records of the case.

There being, similarly, no showing that petitioner Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any
culpable act or omission, he must also be absolved from liability. Needless to say, the contractual
tie between the LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation between the latter and Roman;
thus, Roman can be made liable only for his own fault or negligence.

The award of nominal damages in addition to actual damages is untenable. Nominal damages are
adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the
defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff
for any loss suffered by him.18 It is an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist
with compensatory damages.19

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the appellate court is AFFIRMED with

MODIFICATION but only in that (a) the award of nominal damages is DELETED and (b)
petitioner Rodolfo Roman is absolved from liability. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 115024 February 7, 1996

MA. LOURDES VALENZUELA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, RICHARD LI and ALEXANDER COMMERCIAL, INC., respondents.

x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x

G.R. No. 117944 February 7, 1996

RICHARD LI, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LOURDES VALENZUELA, respondents.

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J.:

These two petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court stem
from an action to recover damages by petitioner Lourdes Valenzuela in the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City for injuries sustained by her in a vehicular accident in the early morning of June
24, 1990. The facts found by the trial court are succinctly summarized by the Court of Appeals
below:

This is an action to recover damages based on quasi-delict, for serious physical injuries sustained
in a vehicular accident.

Plaintiff's version of the accident is as follows: At around 2:00 in the morning of June 24, 1990,
plaintiff Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving a blue Mitsubishi lancer with Plate No. FFU 542
from her restaurant at Marcos highway to her home at Palanza Street, Araneta Avenue. She was
travelling along Aurora Blvd. with a companion, Cecilia Ramon, heading towards the direction
of Manila. Before reaching A. Lake Street, she noticed something wrong with her tires; she
stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to
solicit help if needed. Having been told by the people present that her rear right tire was flat and
that she cannot reach her home in that car's condition, she parked along the sidewalk, about 1-1/2
feet away, put on her emergency lights, alighted from the car, and went to the rear to open the
trunk. She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man who
will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped by a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by
defendant Richard Li and registered in the name of defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc.
Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the windshield of the car of the defendant,
which was destroyed, and then fell to the ground. She was pulled out from under defendant's car.
Plaintiff's left leg was severed up to the middle of her thigh, with only some skin and sucle
connected to the rest of the body. She was brought to the UERM Medical Memorial Center
where she was found to have a "traumatic amputation, leg, left up to distal thigh (above knee)".
She was confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days and was eventually fitted with an artificial
leg. The expenses for the hospital confinement (P120,000.00) and the cost of the artificial leg
(P27,000.00) were paid by defendants from the car insurance.

In her complaint, plaintiff prayed for moral damages in the amount of P1 million, exemplary
damages in the amount of P100,000.00 and other medical and related expenses amounting to a
total of P180,000.00, including loss of expected earnings.

Defendant Richard Li denied that he was negligent. He was on his way home, travelling at 55
kph; considering that it was raining, visibility was affected and the road was wet. Traffic was
light. He testified that he was driving along the inner portion of the right lane of Aurora Blvd.
towards the direction of Araneta Avenue, when he was suddenly confronted, in the vicinity of A.
Lake Street, San Juan, with a car coming from the opposite direction, travelling at 80 kph, with
"full bright lights". Temporarily blinded, he instinctively swerved to the right to avoid colliding
with the oncoming vehicle, and bumped plaintiff's car, which he did not see because it was
midnight blue in color, with no parking lights or early warning device, and the area was poorly
lighted. He alleged in his defense that the left rear portion of plaintiff's car was protruding as it
was then "at a standstill diagonally" on the outer portion of the right lane towards Araneta
Avenue (par. 18, Answer). He confirmed the testimony of plaintiff's witness that after being
bumped the car of the plaintiff swerved to the right and hit another car parked on the sidewalk.
Defendants counterclaimed for damages, alleging that plaintiff was reckless or negligent, as she
was not a licensed driver.

The police investigator, Pfc. Felic Ramos, who prepared the vehicular accident report and the
sketch of the three cars involved in the accident, testified that the plaintiff's car was "near the
sidewalk"; this witness did not remember whether the hazard lights of plaintiff's car were on, and
did not notice if there was an early warning device; there was a street light at the corner of
Aurora Blvd. and F. Roman, about 100 meters away. It was not mostly dark, i.e. "things can be
seen" (p. 16, tsn, Oct. 28, 1991).

A witness for the plaintiff, Rogelio Rodriguez, testified that after plaintiff alighted from her car
and opened the trunk compartment, defendant's car came approaching very fast ten meters from
the scene; the car was "zigzagging". The rear left side of plaintiff's car was bumped by the front
right portion of defendant's car; as a consequence, the plaintiff's car swerved to the right and hit
the parked car on the sidewalk. Plaintiff was thrown to the windshield of defendant's car, which
was destroyed, and landed under the car. He stated that defendant was under the influence of
liquor as he could "smell it very well" (pp. 43, 79, tsn, June 17, 1991).

After trial, the lower court sustained the plaintiff's submissions and found defendant Richard Li
guilty of gross negligence and liable for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The trial
court likewise held Alexander Commercial, Inc., Li's employer, jointly and severally liable for
damages pursuant to Article 2180. It ordered the defendants to jointly and severally pay the
following amounts:

1. P41,840.00, as actual damages, representing the miscellaneous expenses of the plaintiff

as a result of her severed left leg;
2. The sums of (a) P37,500.00, for the unrealized profits because of the stoppage of
plaintiff's Bistro La Conga restaurant three (3) weeks after the accident on June 24, 1990; (b)
P20,000.00, a month, as unrealized profits of the plaintiff in her Bistro La Conga restaurant, from
August, 1990 until the date of this judgment and (c) P30,000.00, a month for unrealized profits in
plaintiff's two (2) beauty salons from July, 1990 until the date of this decision;

3. P1,000,000.00, in moral damages;

4. P50,000.00, as exemplary damages;

5. P60,000.00, as reasonable attorney's fees; and

6. Costs.

As a result of the trial court's decision, defendants filed an Omnibus Motion for New Trial and
for Reconsideration, citing testimony in Criminal Case O.C. No. 804367 (People vs. Richard Li),
tending to show that the point of impact, as depicted by the pieces of glass/debris from the
parties' cars, appeared to be at the center of the right lane of Aurora Blvd. The trial court denied
the motion. Defendants forthwith filed an appeal with the respondent Court of Appeals. In a
Decision rendered March 30, 1994, the Court of Appeals found that there was "ample basis from
the evidence of record for the trial court's finding that the plaintiff's car was properly parked at
the right, beside the sidewalk when it was bumped by defendant's car."1 Dismissing the
defendants' argument that the plaintiff's car was improperly parked, almost at the center of the
road, the respondent court noted that evidence which was supposed to prove that the car was at
or near center of the right lane was never presented during the trial of the case.2 The respondent
court furthermore observed that:

Defendant Li's testimony that he was driving at a safe speed of 55 km./hour is self serving; it was
not corroborated. It was in fact contradicted by eyewitness Rodriguez who stated that he was
outside his beerhouse located at Aurora Boulevard after A. Lake Street, at or about 2:00 a.m. of
June 24, 1990 when his attention was caught by a beautiful lady (referring to the plaintiff)
alighting from her car and opening the trunk compartment; he noticed the car of Richard Li
"approaching very fast ten (10) meters away from the scene"; defendant's car was zigzagging",
although there were no holes and hazards on the street, and "bumped the leg of the plaintiff" who
was thrown against the windshield of defendant's care, causing its destruction. He came to the
rescue of the plaintiff, who was pulled out from under defendant's car and was able to say
"hurting words" to Richard Li because he noticed that the latter was under the influence of
liquor, because he "could smell it very well" (p. 36, et. seq., tsn, June 17, 1991). He knew that
plaintiff owned a beerhouse in Sta. Mesa in the 1970's, but did not know either plaintiff or
defendant Li before the accident.

In agreeing with the trial court that the defendant Li was liable for the injuries sustained by the
plaintiff, the Court of Appeals, in its decision, however, absolved the Li's employer, Alexander
Commercial, Inc. from any liability towards petitioner Lourdes Valenzuela and reduced the
amount of moral damages to P500,000.00. Finding justification for exemplary damages, the
respondent court allowed an award of P50,000.00 for the same, in addition to costs, attorney's
fees and the other damages. The Court of Appeals, likewise, dismissed the defendants'
counterclaims.3

Consequently, both parties assail the respondent court's decision by filing two separate petitions
before this Court. Richard Li, in G.R. No. 117944, contends that he should not be held liable for
damages because the proximate cause of the accident was Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela's own
negligence. Alternatively, he argues that in the event that this Court finds him negligent, such
negligence ought to be mitigated by the contributory negligence of Valenzuela.

On the other hand, in G.R. No. 115024, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela assails the respondent court's
decision insofar as it absolves Alexander Commercial, Inc. from liability as the owner of the car
driven by Richard Li and insofar as it reduces the amount of the actual and moral damages
awarded by the trial court.4

As the issues are intimately related, both petitions are hereby consolidated.

It is plainly evident that the petition for review in G.R. No. 117944 raises no substantial
questions of law. What it, in effect, attempts to have this Court review are factual findings of the
trial court, as sustained by the Court of Appeals finding Richard Li grossly negligent in driving
the Mitsubishi Lancer provided by his company in the early morning hours of June 24, 1990.
This we will not do. As a general rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding and
conclusive upon us, and this Court will not normally disturb such factual findings unless the
findings of fact of the said court are palpably unsupported by the evidence on record or unless
the judgment itself is based on a misapprehension of facts.5

In the first place, Valenzuela's version of the incident was fully corroborated by an uninterested
witness, Rogelio Rodriguez, the owner-operator of an establishment located just across the scene
of the accident. On trial, he testified that he observed a car being driven at a "very fast" speed,
racing towards the general direction of Araneta Avenue.6 Rodriguez further added that he was
standing in front of his establishment, just ten to twenty feet away from the scene of the accident,
when he saw the car hit Valenzuela, hurtling her against the windshield of the defendant's
Mitsubishi Lancer, from where she eventually fell under the defendant's car. Spontaneously
reacting to the incident, he crossed the street, noting that a man reeking with the smell of liquor
had alighted from the offending vehicle in order to survey the incident.7 Equally important,
Rodriguez declared that he observed Valenzuela's car parked parallel and very near the
sidewalk,8 contrary to Li's allegation that Valenzuela's car was close to the center of the right
lane. We agree that as between Li's "self-serving" asseverations and the observations of a witness
who did not even know the accident victim personally and who immediately gave a statement of
the incident similar to his testimony to the investigator immediately after the incident, the latter's
testimony deserves greater weight. As the court emphasized:

The issue is one of credibility and from Our own examination of the transcript, We are not
prepared to set aside the trial court's reliance on the testimony of Rodriguez negating defendant's
assertion that he was driving at a safe speed. While Rodriguez drives only a motorcycle, his
perception of speed is not necessarily impaired. He was subjected to cross-examination and no
attempt was made to question .his competence or the accuracy of his statement that defendant
was driving "very fast". This was the same statement he gave to the police investigator after the
incident, as told to a newspaper report (Exh. "P"). We see no compelling basis for disregarding
his testimony.

The alleged inconsistencies in Rodriguez' testimony are not borne out by an examination of the
testimony. Rodriguez testified that the scene of the accident was across the street where his
beerhouse is located about ten to twenty feet away (pp. 35-36, tsn, June 17, 1991). He did not
state that the accident transpired immediately in front of his establishment. The ownership of the
Lambingan se Kambingan is not material; the business is registered in the name of his mother,
but he explained that he owns the establishment (p. 5, tsn, June 20, 1991). Moreover, the
testimony that the streetlights on his side of Aurora Boulevard were on the night the accident
transpired (p. 8) is not necessarily contradictory to the testimony of Pfc. Ramos that there was a
streetlight at the corner of Aurora Boulevard and F. Roman Street (p. 45, tsn, Oct. 20, 1991).

With respect to the weather condition, Rodriguez testified that there was only a drizzle, not a
heavy rain and the rain has stopped and he was outside his establishment at the time the accident
transpired (pp. 64-65, tsn, June 17, 1991). This was consistent with plaintiff's testimony that it
was no longer raining when she left Bistro La Conga (pp. 10-11, tsn, April 29, 1991). It was
defendant Li who stated that it was raining all the way in an attempt to explain why he was
travelling at only 50-55 kph. (p. 11, tsn, Oct. 14, 1991). As to the testimony of Pfc. Ramos that it
was raining, he arrived at the scene only in response to a telephone call after the accident had
transpired (pp. 9-10, tsn, Oct. 28, 1991). We find no substantial inconsistencies in Rodriguez's
testimony that would impair the essential integrity of his testimony or reflect on his honesty. We
are compelled to affirm the trial court's acceptance of the testimony of said eyewitness.

Against the unassailable testimony of witness Rodriguez we note that Li's testimony was
peppered with so many inconsistencies leading us to conclude that his version of the accident
was merely adroitly crafted to provide a version, obviously self-serving, which would exculpate
him from any and all liability in the incident. Against Valenzuela's corroborated claims, his
allegations were neither backed up by other witnesses nor by the circumstances proven in the
course of trial. He claimed that he was driving merely at a speed of 55 kph. when "out of
nowhere he saw a dark maroon lancer right in front of him, which was (the) plaintiff's car". He
alleged that upon seeing this sudden "apparition" he put on his brakes to no avail as the road was
slippery.9

One will have to suspend disbelief in order to give credence to Li's disingenuous and patently
self-serving asseverations. The average motorist alert to road conditions will have no difficulty
applying the brakes to a car traveling at the speed claimed by Li. Given a light rainfall, the
visibility of the street, and the road conditions on a principal metropolitan thoroughfare like
Aurora Boulevard, Li would have had ample time to react to the changing conditions of the road
if he were alert - as every driver should be - to those conditions. Driving exacts a more than usual
toll on the senses. Physiological "fight or flight" 10 mechanisms are at work, provided such
mechanisms were not dulled by drugs, alcohol, exhaustion, drowsiness, etc.11 Li's failure to
react in a manner which would have avoided the accident could therefore have been only due to
either or both of the two factors: 1) that he was driving at a "very fast" speed as testified by
Rodriguez; and 2) that he was under the influence of alcohol.12 Either factor working
independently would have diminished his responsiveness to road conditions, since normally he
would have slowed down prior to reaching Valenzuela's car, rather than be in a situation forcing
him to suddenly apply his brakes. As the trial court noted (quoted with approval by respondent
court):

Secondly, as narrated by defendant Richard Li to the San Juan Police immediately after the
incident, he said that while driving along Aurora Blvd., out of nowhere he saw a dark maroon
lancer right in front of him which was plaintiff's car, indicating, again, thereby that, indeed, he
was driving very fast, oblivious of his surroundings and the road ahead of him, because if he was
not, then he could not have missed noticing at a still far distance the parked car of the plaintiff at
the right side near the sidewalk which had its emergency lights on, thereby avoiding forcefully
bumping at the plaintiff who was then standing at the left rear edge of her car.

Since, according to him, in his narration to the San Juan Police, he put on his brakes when he
saw the plaintiff's car in front of him, but that it failed as the road was wet and slippery, this goes
to show again, that, contrary to his claim, he was, indeed, running very fast. For, were it
otherwise, he could have easily completely stopped his car, thereby avoiding the bumping of the
plaintiff, notwithstanding that the road was wet and slippery. Verily, since, if, indeed, he was
running slow, as he claimed, at only about 55 kilometers per hour, then, inspite of the wet and
slippery road, he could have avoided hitting the plaintiff by the mere expedient or applying his
brakes at the proper time and distance.

It could not be true, therefore, as he now claims during his testimony, which is contrary to what
he told the police immediately after the accident and is, therefore, more believable, that he did
not actually step on his brakes but simply swerved a little to the right when he saw the on-
coming car with glaring headlights, from the opposite direction, in order to avoid it.

For, had this been what he did, he would not have bumped the car of the plaintiff which was
properly parked at the right beside the sidewalk. And, it was not even necessary for him to
swerve a little to the right in order to safely avoid a collision with the on-coming car, considering
that Aurora Blvd. is a double lane avenue separated at the center by a dotted white paint, and
there is plenty of space for both cars, since her car was running at the right lane going towards
Manila on the on-coming car was also on its right lane going to Cubao.13

Having come to the conclusion that Li was negligent in driving his company-issued Mitsubishi
Lancer, the next question for us to determine is whether or not Valenzuela was likewise guilty of
contributory negligence in parking her car alongside Aurora Boulevard, which entire area Li
points out, is a no parking zone.

We agree with the respondent court that Valenzuela was not guilty of contributory negligence.

Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause
to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform
for his own protection.14 Based on the foregoing definition, the standard or act to which,
according to petitioner Li, Valenzuela ought to have conformed for her own protection was not
to park at all at any point of Aurora Boulevard, a no parking zone. We cannot agree.
Courts have traditionally been compelled to recognize that an actor who is confronted with an
emergency is not to be held up to the standard of conduct normally applied to an individual who
is in no such situation. The law takes stock of impulses of humanity when placed in threatening
or dangerous situations and does not require the same standard of thoughtful and reflective care
from persons confronted by unusual and oftentimes threatening conditions.15

Under the "emergency rule" adopted by this Court in Gan vs. Court of Appeals,16 an individual
who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to
consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a
better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence.17

Applying this principle to a case in which the victims in a vehicular accident swerved to the
wrong lane to avoid hitting two children suddenly darting into the street, we held, in Mc Kee vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court,18 that the driver therein, Jose Koh, "adopted the best means
possible in the given situation" to avoid hitting the children. Using the "emergency rule" the
Court concluded that Koh, in spite of the fact that he was in the wrong lane when the collision
with an oncoming truck occurred, was not guilty of negligence.19

While the emergency rule applies to those cases in which reflective thought, or the opportunity to
adequately weigh a threatening situation is absent, the conduct which is required of an individual
in such cases is dictated not exclusively by the suddenness of the event which absolutely negates
thoroughful care, but by the over-all nature of the circumstances. A woman driving a vehicle
suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night will not be faulted for stopping at a point which
is both convenient for her to do so and which is not a hazard to other motorists. She is not
expected to run the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn on a dark street or alley
where she would likely find no one to help her. It would be hazardous for her not to stop and
assess the emergency (simply because the entire length of Aurora Boulevard is a no-parking
zone) because the hobbling vehicle would be both a threat to her safety and to other motorists. In
the instant case, Valenzuela, upon reaching that portion of Aurora Boulevard close to A. Lake
St., noticed that she had a flat tire. To avoid putting herself and other motorists in danger, she did
what was best under the situation. As narrated by respondent court: "She stopped at a lighted
place where there were people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed.
Having been told by the people present that her rear right tire was flat and that she cannot reach
her home she parked along the sidewalk, about 1 1/2 feet away, behind a Toyota Corona Car."20
In fact, respondent court noted, Pfc. Felix Ramos, the investigator on the scene of the accident
confirmed that Valenzuela's car was parked very close to the sidewalk.21 The sketch which he
prepared after the incident showed Valenzuela's car partly straddling the sidewalk, clear and at a
convenient distance from motorists passing the right lane of Aurora Boulevard. This fact was
itself corroborated by the testimony of witness Rodriguez.22

Under the circumstances described, Valenzuela did exercise the standard reasonably dictated by
the emergency and could not be considered to have contributed to the unfortunate circumstances
which eventually led to the amputation of one of her lower extremities. The emergency which
led her to park her car on a sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard was not of her own making, and it was
evident that she had taken all reasonable precautions.

Obviously in the case at bench, the only negligence ascribable was the negligence of Li on the
night of the accident. "Negligence, as it is commonly understood is conduct which creates an
undue risk of harm to others."23 It is the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution, and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.24
We stressed, in Corliss vs. Manila Railroad Company,25 that negligence is the want of care
required by the circumstances.

The circumstances established by the evidence adduced in the court below plainly demonstrate
that Li was grossly negligent in driving his Mitsubishi Lancer. It bears emphasis that he was
driving at a fast speed at about 2:00 A.M. after a heavy downpour had settled into a drizzle
rendering the street slippery. There is ample testimonial evidence on record to show that he was
under the influence of liquor. Under these conditions, his chances of effectively dealing with
changing conditions on the road were significantly lessened. As Presser and Keaton emphasize:

[U]nder present day traffic conditions, any driver of an automobile must be prepared for the
sudden appearance of obstacles and persons on the highway, and of other vehicles at
intersections, such as one who sees a child on the curb may be required to anticipate its sudden
dash into the street, and his failure to act properly when they appear may be found to amount to
negligence.26

Li's obvious unpreparedness to cope with the situation confronting him on the night of the
accident was clearly of his own making.

We now come to the question of the liability of Alexander Commercial, Inc. Li's employer. In
denying liability on the part of Alexander Commercial, the respondent court held that:

There is no evidence, not even defendant Li's testimony, that the visit was in connection with
official matters. His functions as assistant manager sometimes required him to perform work
outside the office as he has to visit buyers and company clients, but he admitted that on the night
of the accident he came from BF Homes Paranaque he did not have "business from the
company" (pp. 25-26, ten, Sept. 23, 1991). The use of the company car was partly required by
the nature of his work, but the privilege of using it for non-official business is a "benefit",
apparently referring to the fringe benefits attaching to his position.

Under the civil law, an employer is liable for the negligence of his employees in the discharge of
their respective duties, the basis of which liability is not respondeat superior, but the relationship
of pater familias, which theory bases the liability of the master ultimately on his own negligence
and not on that of his servant (Cuison v. Norton and Harrison Co., 55 Phil. 18). Before an
employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee, the act or omission which
caused damage must have occurred while an employee was in the actual performance of his
assigned tasks or duties (Francis High School vs. Court of Appeals, 194 SCRA 341). In defining
an employer's liability for the acts done within the scope of the employee's assigned tasks, the
Supreme Court has held that this includes any act done by an employee, in furtherance of the
interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the
injury or damage (Filamer Christian Institute vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 212 SCRA 637).
An employer is expected to impose upon its employees the necessary discipline called for in the
performance of any act "indispensable to the business and beneficial to their employer" (at p.
645).

In light of the foregoing, We are unable to sustain the trial court's finding that since defendant Li
was authorized by the company to use the company car "either officially or socially or even
bring it home", he can be considered as using the company car in the service of his employer or
on the occasion of his functions. Driving the company car was not among his functions as
assistant manager; using it for non-official purposes would appear to be a fringe benefit, one of
the perks attached to his position. But to impose liability upon the employer under Article 2180
of the Civil Code, earlier quoted, there must be a showing that the damage was caused by their
employees in the service of the employer or on the occasion of their functions. There is no
evidence that Richard Li was at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of the
company's business or its interests, or at least for its benefit. The imposition of solidary liability
against defendant Alexander Commercial Corporation must therefore fail.27

We agree with the respondent court that the relationship in question is not based on the principle
of respondeat superior, which holds the master liable for acts of the servant, but that of pater
familias, in which the liability ultimately falls upon the employer, for his failure to exercise the
diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of his employees. It is up
to this point, however, that our agreement with the respondent court ends. Utilizing the bonus
pater familias standard expressed in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, 28 we are of the opinion that
Li's employer, Alexander Commercial, Inc. is jointly and solidarily liable for the damage caused
by the accident of June 24, 1990.

First, the case of St. Francis High School vs. Court of Appeals29 upon which respondent court
has placed undue reliance, dealt with the subject of a school and its teacher's supervision of
students during an extracurricular activity. These cases now fall under the provision on special
parental authority found in Art. 218 of the Family Code which generally encompasses all
authorized school activities, whether inside or outside school premises.

Second, the employer's primary liability under the concept of pater familias embodied by Art
2180 (in relation to Art. 2176) of the Civil Code is quasi-delictual or tortious in character. His
liability is relieved on a showing that he exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in
the selection and supervision of its employees. Once evidence is introduced showing that the
employer exercised the required amount of care in selecting its employees, half of the employer's
burden is overcome. The question of diligent supervision, however, depends on the
circumstances of employment.

Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has exercised diligent supervision of its
employee during the performance of the latter's assigned tasks would be enough to relieve him of
the liability imposed by Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The employer
is not expected to exercise supervision over either the employee's private activities or during the
performance of tasks either unsanctioned by the former or unrelated to the employee's tasks. The
case at bench presents a situation of a different character, involving a practice utilized by large
companies with either their employees of managerial rank or their representatives.

It is customary for large companies to provide certain classes of their employees with courtesy
vehicles. These company cars are either wholly owned and maintained by the company itself or
are subject to various plans through which employees eventually acquire their vehicles after a
given period of service, or after paying a token amount. Many companies provide liberal "car
plans" to enable their managerial or other employees of rank to purchase cars, which, given the
cost of vehicles these days, they would not otherwise be able to purchase on their own.

Under the first example, the company actually owns and maintains the car up to the point of
turnover of ownership to the employee; in the second example, the car is really owned and
maintained by the employee himself. In furnishing vehicles to such employees, are companies
totally absolved of responsibility when an accident involving a company-issued car occurs
during private use after normal office hours?

Most pharmaceutical companies, for instance, which provide cars under the first plan, require
rigorous tests of road worthiness from their agents prior to turning over the car (subject of
company maintenance) to their representatives. In other words, like a good father of a family,
they entrust the company vehicle only after they are satisfied that the employee to whom the car
has been given full use of the said company car for company or private purposes will not be a
threat or menace to himself, the company or to others. When a company gives full use and
enjoyment of a company car to its employee, it in effect guarantees that it is, like every good
father, satisfied that its employee will use the privilege reasonably and responsively.

In the ordinary course of business, not all company employees are given the privilege of using a
company-issued car. For large companies other than those cited in the example of the preceding
paragraph, the privilege serves important business purposes either related to the image of success
an entity intends to present to its clients and to the public in general, or - for practical and
utilitarian reasons - to enable its managerial and other employees of rank or its sales agents to
reach clients conveniently. In most cases, providing a company car serves both purposes. Since
important business transactions and decisions may occur at all hours in all sorts of situations and
under all kinds of guises, the provision for the unlimited use of a company car therefore
principally serves the business and goodwill of a company and only incidentally the private
purposes of the individual who actually uses the car, the managerial employee or company sales
agent. As such, in providing for a company car for business use and/or for the purpose of
furthering the company's image, a company owes a responsibility to the public to see to it that
the managerial or other employees to whom it entrusts virtually unlimited use of a company
issued car are able to use the company issue capably and responsibly.

In the instant case, Li was an Assistant Manager of Alexander Commercial, Inc. In his testimony
before the trial court, he admitted that his functions as Assistant Manager did not require him to
scrupulously keep normal office hours as he was required quite often to perform work outside
the office, visiting prospective buyers and contacting and meeting with company clients. 30
These meetings, clearly, were not strictly confined to routine hours because, as a managerial
employee tasked with the job of representing his company with its clients, meetings with clients
were both social as well as work-related functions. The service car assigned to Li by Alexander
Commercial, Inc. therefore enabled both Li - as well as the corporation - to put up the front of a
highly successful entity, increasing the latter's goodwill before its clientele. It also facilitated
meeting between Li and its clients by providing the former with a convenient mode of travel.

Moreover, Li's claim that he happened to be on the road on the night of the accident because he
was coming from a social visit with an officemate in Paranaque was a bare allegation which was
never corroborated in the court below. It was obviously self-serving. Assuming he really came
from his officemate's place, the same could give rise to speculation that he and his officemate
had just been from a work-related function, or they were together to discuss sales and other work
related strategies.

In fine, Alexander Commercial, inc. has not demonstrated, to our satisfaction, that it exercised
the care and diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li. No
allegations were made as to whether or not the company took the steps necessary to determine or
ascertain the driving proficiency and history of Li, to whom it gave full and unlimited use of a
company car.31 Not having been able to overcome the burden of demonstrating that it should be
absolved of liability for entrusting its company car to Li, said company, based on the principle of
bonus pater familias, ought to be jointly and severally liable with the former for the injuries
sustained by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela during the accident.

Finally, we find no reason to overturn the amount of damages awarded by the respondent court,
except as to the amount of moral damages. In the case of moral damages, while the said damages
are not intended to enrich the plaintiff at the expense of a defendant, the award should
nonetheless be commensurate to the suffering inflicted. In the instant case we are of the opinion
that the reduction in moral damages from an amount of P1,000,000.00 to P800,000,00 by the
Court of Appeals was not justified considering the nature of the resulting damage and the
predictable sequelae of the injury.

As a result of the accident, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela underwent a traumatic amputation of her left
lower extremity at the distal left thigh just above the knee. Because of this, Valenzuela will
forever be deprived of the full ambulatory functions of her left extremity, even with the use of
state of the art prosthetic technology. Well beyond the period of hospitalization (which was paid
for by Li), she will be required to undergo adjustments in her prosthetic devise due to the
shrinkage of the stump from the process of healing.

These adjustments entail costs, prosthetic replacements and months of physical and occupational
rehabilitation and therapy. During her lifetime, the prosthetic devise will have to be replaced and
re-adjusted to changes in the size of her lower limb effected by the biological changes of middle-
age, menopause and aging. Assuming she reaches menopause, for example, the prosthetic will
have to be adjusted to respond to the changes in bone resulting from a precipitate decrease in
calcium levels observed in the bones of all post-menopausal women. In other words, the damage
done to her would not only be permanent and lasting, it would also be permanently changing and
adjusting to the physiologic changes which her body would normally undergo through the years.
The replacements, changes, and adjustments will require corresponding adjustive physical and
occupational therapy. All of these adjustments, it has been documented, are painful.
The foregoing discussion does not even scratch the surface of the nature of the resulting damage
because it would be highly speculative to estimate the amount of psychological pain, damage and
injury which goes with the sudden severing of a vital portion of the human body. A prosthetic
device, however technologically advanced, will only allow a reasonable amount of functional
restoration of the motor functions of the lower limb. The sensory functions are forever lost. The
resultant anxiety, sleeplessness, psychological injury, mental and physical pain are inestimable.

As the amount of moral damages are subject to this Court's discretion, we are of the opinion that
the amount of P1,000,000.00 granted by the trial court is in greater accord with the extent and
nature of the injury - physical and psychological - suffered by Valenzuela as a result of Li's
grossly negligent driving of his Mitsubishi Lancer in the early morning hours of the accident.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of Appeals is modified

with the effect of REINSTATING the judgment of the Regional Trial Court.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-11154 March 21, 1916

E. MERRITT, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, defendant-appellant.

Crossfield and O'Brien for plaintiff.

Attorney-General Avanceña for defendant..

TRENT, J.:

This is an appeal by both parties from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P14,741, together with the costs of the cause.

Counsel for the plaintiff insist that the trial court erred (1) "in limiting the general damages
which the plaintiff suffered to P5,000, instead of P25,000 as claimed in the complaint," and (2)
"in limiting the time when plaintiff was entirely disabled to two months and twenty-one days and
fixing the damage accordingly in the sum of P2,666, instead of P6,000 as claimed by plaintiff in
his complaint."

The Attorney-General on behalf of the defendant urges that the trial court erred: (a) in finding
that the collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital
was due to the negligence of the chauffeur; (b) in holding that the Government of the Philippine
Islands is liable for the damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the collision, even if it be
true that the collision was due to the negligence of the chauffeur; and (c) in rendering judgment
against the defendant for the sum of P14,741.
The trial court's findings of fact, which are fully supported by the record, are as follows:

It is a fact not disputed by counsel for the defendant that when the plaintiff, riding on a
motorcycle, was going toward the western part of Calle Padre Faura, passing along the west side
thereof at a speed of ten to twelve miles an hour, upon crossing Taft Avenue and when he was
ten feet from the southwestern intersection of said streets, the General Hospital ambulance, upon
reaching said avenue, instead of turning toward the south, after passing the center thereof, so that
it would be on the left side of said avenue, as is prescribed by the ordinance and the Motor
Vehicle Act, turned suddenly and unexpectedly and long before reaching the center of the street,
into the right side of Taft Avenue, without having sounded any whistle or horn, by which
movement it struck the plaintiff, who was already six feet from the southwestern point or from
the post place there.

By reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was so severely injured that, according to Dr.
Saleeby, who examined him on the very same day that he was taken to the General Hospital, he
was suffering from a depression in the left parietal region, a would in the same place and in the
back part of his head, while blood issued from his nose and he was entirely unconscious.

The marks revealed that he had one or more fractures of the skull and that the grey matter and
brain was had suffered material injury. At ten o'clock of the night in question, which was the
time set for performing the operation, his pulse was so weak and so irregular that, in his opinion,
there was little hope that he would live. His right leg was broken in such a way that the fracture
extended to the outer skin in such manner that it might be regarded as double and the would be
exposed to infection, for which reason it was of the most serious nature.

At another examination six days before the day of the trial, Dr. Saleeby noticed that the
plaintiff's leg showed a contraction of an inch and a half and a curvature that made his leg very
weak and painful at the point of the fracture. Examination of his head revealed a notable
readjustment of the functions of the brain and nerves. The patient apparently was slightly deaf,
had a light weakness in his eyes and in his mental condition. This latter weakness was always
noticed when the plaintiff had to do any difficult mental labor, especially when he attempted to
use his money for mathematical calculations.

According to the various merchants who testified as witnesses, the plaintiff's mental and physical
condition prior to the accident was excellent, and that after having received the injuries that have
been discussed, his physical condition had undergone a noticeable depreciation, for he had lost
the agility, energy, and ability that he had constantly displayed before the accident as one of the
best constructors of wooden buildings and he could not now earn even a half of the income that
he had secured for his work because he had lost 50 per cent of his efficiency. As a contractor, he
could no longer, as he had before done, climb up ladders and scaffoldings to reach the highest
parts of the building.

As a consequence of the loss the plaintiff suffered in the efficiency of his work as a contractor,
he had to dissolved the partnership he had formed with the engineer. Wilson, because he was
incapacitated from making mathematical calculations on account of the condition of his leg and
of his mental faculties, and he had to give up a contract he had for the construction of the Uy
Chaco building."

We may say at the outset that we are in full accord with the trial court to the effect that the
collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital was due
solely to the negligence of the chauffeur.

The two items which constitute a part of the P14,741 and which are drawn in question by the
plaintiff are (a) P5,000, the award awarded for permanent injuries, and (b) the P2,666, the
amount allowed for the loss of wages during the time the plaintiff was incapacitated from
pursuing his occupation. We find nothing in the record which would justify us in increasing the
amount of the first. As to the second, the record shows, and the trial court so found, that the
plaintiff's services as a contractor were worth P1,000 per month. The court, however, limited the
time to two months and twenty-one days, which the plaintiff was actually confined in the
hospital. In this we think there was error, because it was clearly established that the plaintiff was
wholly incapacitated for a period of six months. The mere fact that he remained in the hospital
only two months and twenty-one days while the remainder of the six months was spent in his
home, would not prevent recovery for the whole time. We, therefore, find that the amount of
damages sustained by the plaintiff, without any fault on his part, is P18,075.

As the negligence which caused the collision is a tort committed by an agent or employee of the
Government, the inquiry at once arises whether the Government is legally-liable for the damages
resulting therefrom.

Act No. 2457, effective February 3, 1915, reads:

An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and
authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit.

Whereas a claim has been filed against the Government of the Philippine Islands by Mr. E.
Merritt, of Manila, for damages resulting from a collision between his motorcycle and the
ambulance of the General Hospital on March twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred and thirteen;

Whereas it is not known who is responsible for the accident nor is it possible to determine the
amount of damages, if any, to which the claimant is entitled; and

Whereas the Director of Public Works and the Attorney-General recommended that an Act be
passed by the Legislature authorizing Mr. E. Merritt to bring suit in the courts against the
Government, in order that said questions may be decided: Now, therefore,

By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Legislature, that:

SECTION 1. E. Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in the Court of First Instance of the
city of Manila against the Government of the Philippine Islands in order to fix the responsibility
for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital, and to
determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of
said collision, and the Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and
directed to appear at the trial on the behalf of the Government of said Islands, to defendant said
Government at the same.

SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect on its passage.

Enacted, February 3, 1915.

Did the defendant, in enacting the above quoted Act, simply waive its immunity from suit or did
it also concede its liability to the plaintiff? If only the former, then it cannot be held that the Act
created any new cause of action in favor of the plaintiff or extended the defendant's liability to
any case not previously recognized.

All admit that the Insular Government (the defendant) cannot be sued by an individual without
its consent. It is also admitted that the instant case is one against the Government. As the consent
of the Government to be sued by the plaintiff was entirely voluntary on its part, it is our duty to
look carefully into the terms of the consent, and render judgment accordingly.

The plaintiff was authorized to bring this action against the Government "in order to fix the
responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General
Hospital and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled
on account of said collision, . . . ." These were the two questions submitted to the court for
determination. The Act was passed "in order that said questions may be decided." We have
"decided" that the accident was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur, who was at the
time an employee of the defendant, and we have also fixed the amount of damages sustained by
the plaintiff as a result of the collision. Does the Act authorize us to hold that the Government is
legally liable for that amount? If not, we must look elsewhere for such authority, if it exists.

The Government of the Philippine Islands having been "modeled after the Federal and State
Governments in the United States," we may look to the decisions of the high courts of that
country for aid in determining the purpose and scope of Act No. 2457.

In the United States the rule that the state is not liable for the torts committed by its officers or
agents whom it employs, except when expressly made so by legislative enactment, is well
settled. "The Government," says Justice Story, "does not undertake to guarantee to any person
the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since that would involve it in all its
operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of the
public interest." (Claussen vs. City of Luverne, 103 Minn., 491, citing U. S. vs. Kirkpatrick, 9
Wheat, 720; 6 L. Ed., 199; and Beers vs. States, 20 How., 527; 15 L. Ed., 991.)

In the case of Melvin vs. State (121 Cal., 16), the plaintiff sought to recover damages from the
state for personal injuries received on account of the negligence of the state officers at the state
fair, a state institution created by the legislature for the purpose of improving agricultural and
kindred industries; to disseminate information calculated to educate and benefit the industrial
classes; and to advance by such means the material interests of the state, being objects similar to
those sought by the public school system. In passing upon the question of the state's liability for
the negligent acts of its officers or agents, the court said:

No claim arises against any government is favor of an individual, by reason of the misfeasance,
laches, or unauthorized exercise of powers by its officers or agents. (Citing Gibbons vs. U. S., 8
Wall., 269; Clodfelter vs. State, 86 N. C., 51, 53; 41 Am. Rep., 440; Chapman vs. State, 104
Cal., 690; 43 Am. St. Rep., 158; Green vs. State, 73 Cal., 29; Bourn vs. Hart, 93 Cal., 321; 27
Am. St. Rep., 203; Story on Agency, sec. 319.)

As to the scope of legislative enactments permitting individuals to sue the state where the cause
of action arises out of either fort or contract, the rule is stated in 36 Cyc., 915, thus:

By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby
concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to
any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability
and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful
defense.

In Apfelbacher vs. State (152 N. W., 144, advanced sheets), decided April 16, 1915, the Act of
1913, which authorized the bringing of this suit, read:

SECTION 1. Authority is hereby given to George Apfelbacher, of the town of Summit,

Waukesha County, Wisconsin, to bring suit in such court or courts and in such form or forms as
he may be advised for the purpose of settling and determining all controversies which he may
now have with the State of Wisconsin, or its duly authorized officers and agents, relative to the
mill property of said George Apfelbacher, the fish hatchery of the State of Wisconsin on the
Bark River, and the mill property of Evan Humphrey at the lower end of Nagawicka Lake, and
relative to the use of the waters of said Bark River and Nagawicka Lake, all in the county of
Waukesha, Wisconsin.

In determining the scope of this act, the court said:

Plaintiff claims that by the enactment of this law the legislature admitted liability on the part of
the state for the acts of its officers, and that the suit now stands just as it would stand between
private parties. It is difficult to see how the act does, or was intended to do, more than remove
the state's immunity from suit. It simply gives authority to commence suit for the purpose of
settling plaintiff's controversies with the estate. Nowhere in the act is there a whisper or
suggestion that the court or courts in the disposition of the suit shall depart from well established
principles of law, or that the amount of damages is the only question to be settled. The act
opened the door of the court to the plaintiff. It did not pass upon the question of liability, but left
the suit just where it would be in the absence of the state's immunity from suit. If the Legislature
had intended to change the rule that obtained in this state so long and to declare liability on the
part of the state, it would not have left so important a matter to mere inference, but would have
done so in express terms. (Murdock Grate Co. vs. Commonwealth, 152 Mass., 28; 24 N.E., 854;
8 L. R. A., 399.)
In Denning vs. State (123 Cal., 316), the provisions of the Act of 1893, relied upon and
considered, are as follows:

All persons who have, or shall hereafter have, claims on contract or for negligence against the
state not allowed by the state board of examiners, are hereby authorized, on the terms and
conditions herein contained, to bring suit thereon against the state in any of the courts of this
state of competent jurisdiction, and prosecute the same to final judgment. The rules of practice in
civil cases shall apply to such suits, except as herein otherwise provided.

And the court said:

This statute has been considered by this court in at least two cases, arising under different facts,
and in both it was held that said statute did not create any liability or cause of action against the
state where none existed before, but merely gave an additional remedy to enforce such liability
as would have existed if the statute had not been enacted. (Chapman vs. State, 104 Cal., 690; 43
Am. St. Rep., 158; Melvin vs. State, 121 Cal., 16.)

A statute of Massachusetts enacted in 1887 gave to the superior court "jurisdiction of all claims
against the commonwealth, whether at law or in equity," with an exception not necessary to be
here mentioned. In construing this statute the court, in Murdock Grate Co. vs. Commonwealth
(152 Mass., 28), said:

The statute we are discussing disclose no intention to create against the state a new and
heretofore unrecognized class of liabilities, but only an intention to provide a judicial tribunal
where well recognized existing liabilities can be adjudicated.

In Sipple vs. State (99 N. Y., 284), where the board of the canal claims had, by the terms of the
statute of New York, jurisdiction of claims for damages for injuries in the management of the
canals such as the plaintiff had sustained, Chief Justice Ruger remarks: "It must be conceded that
the state can be made liable for injuries arising from the negligence of its agents or servants, only
by force of some positive statute assuming such liability."

It being quite clear that Act No. 2457 does not operate to extend the Government's liability to
any cause not previously recognized, we will now examine the substantive law touching the
defendant's liability for the negligent acts of its officers, agents, and employees. Paragraph 5 of
article 1903 of the Civil Code reads:

The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage
should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in
which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.

The supreme court of Spain in defining the scope of this paragraph said:

That the obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person causes to another by his fault
or negligence is based, as is evidenced by the same Law 3, Title 15, Partida 7, on that the person
obligated, by his own fault or negligence, takes part in the act or omission of the third party who
caused the damage. It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not
responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by
its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor
even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of
public service and in the appointment of its agents; on the contrary, we must presuppose all
foresight humanly possible on its part in order that each branch of service serves the general weal
an that of private persons interested in its operation. Between these latter and the state, therefore,
no relations of a private nature governed by the civil law can arise except in a case where the
state acts as a judicial person capable of acquiring rights and contracting obligations. (Supreme
Court of Spain, January 7, 1898; 83 Jur. Civ., 24.)

That the Civil Code in chapter 2, title 16, book 4, regulates the obligations which arise out of
fault or negligence; and whereas in the first article thereof. No. 1902, where the general principle
is laid down that where a person who by an act or omission causes damage to another through
fault or negligence, shall be obliged to repair the damage so done, reference is made to acts or
omissions of the persons who directly or indirectly cause the damage, the following articles
refers to this persons and imposes an identical obligation upon those who maintain fixed
relations of authority and superiority over the authors of the damage, because the law presumes
that in consequence of such relations the evil caused by their own fault or negligence is
imputable to them. This legal presumption gives way to proof, however, because, as held in the
last paragraph of article 1903, responsibility for acts of third persons ceases when the persons
mentioned in said article prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to avoid the damage, and among these persons, called upon to answer in a direct and not a
subsidiary manner, are found, in addition to the mother or the father in a proper case, guardians
and owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise, the state, but not always, except when
it acts through the agency of a special agent, doubtless because and only in this case, the fault or
negligence, which is the original basis of this kind of objections, must be presumed to lie with
the state.

That although in some cases the state might by virtue of the general principle set forth in article
1902 respond for all the damage that is occasioned to private parties by orders or resolutions
which by fault or negligence are made by branches of the central administration acting in the
name and representation of the state itself and as an external expression of its sovereignty in the
exercise of its executive powers, yet said article is not applicable in the case of damages said to
have been occasioned to the petitioners by an executive official, acting in the exercise of his
powers, in proceedings to enforce the collections of certain property taxes owing by the owner of
the property which they hold in sublease.

That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a
special agent (and a special agent, in the sense in which these words are employed, is one who
receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his
office if he is a special official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an
agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him. This concept does not apply to any executive
agent who is an employee of the acting administration and who on his own responsibility
performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are
regulated by law and the regulations." (Supreme Court of Spain, May 18, 1904; 98 Jur. Civ., 389,
390.)

That according to paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code and the principle laid down in a
decision, among others, of the 18th of May, 1904, in a damage case, the responsibility of the
state is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite
order or commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise
to the claim, and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official
charged with some administrative or technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility
in the manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility. Consequently, the trial court in not so
deciding and in sentencing the said entity to the payment of damages, caused by an official of the
second class referred to, has by erroneous interpretation infringed the provisions of articles 1902
and 1903 of the Civil Code. (Supreme Court of Spain, July 30, 1911; 122 Jur. Civ., 146.)

It is, therefore, evidence that the State (the Government of the Philippine Islands) is only liable,
according to the above quoted decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents,
officers and employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of
article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such
an agent.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be reversed, without costs in this
instance. Whether the Government intends to make itself legally liable for the amount of
damages above set forth, which the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one
of its employees, by legislative enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds therefor, we are
not called upon to determine. This matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with the
courts.

G.R. No. L-55963 December 1, 1989

SPOUSES JOSE FONTANILLA AND VIRGINIA FONTANILLA, petitioners,

vs.
HONORABLE INOCENCIO D. MALIAMAN and NATIONAL IRRIGATION
ADMINISTRATION, respondents.

G.R. No. L-61045 December 1, 1989

NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION, appellant,

vs.
SPOUSES JOSE FONTANILLA and VIRGINIA FONTANILLA, appellees.

Cecilio V. Suarez, Jr. for Spouses Fontanilla.

Felicisimo C. Villaflor for NIA.

PARAS, J.:

In G.R. No. L-55963, the petition for review on certiorari seeks the affirmance of the decision
dated March 20, 1980 of the then Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch VIII, at San
Jose City and its modification with respect to the denial of petitioner's claim for moral and
exemplary damages and attorneys fees.

In G.R. No. 61045, respondent National Irrigation Administration seeks the reversal of the
aforesaid decision of the lower court. The original appeal of this case before the Court of
Appeals was certified to this Court and in the resolution of July 7, 1982, it was docketed with the
aforecited number. And in the resolution of April 3, this case was consolidated with G.R. No.
55963.

It appears that on August 21, 1976 at about 6:30 P.M., a pickup owned and operated by
respondent National Irrigation Administration, a government agency bearing Plate No. IN-651,
then driven officially by Hugo Garcia, an employee of said agency as its regular driver, bumped
a bicycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla, son of herein petitioners, and Restituto Deligo, at
Maasin, San Jose City along the Maharlika Highway. As a result of the impact, Francisco
Fontanilla and Restituto Deligo were injured and brought to the San Jose City Emergency
Hospital for treatment. Fontanilla was later transferred to the Cabanatuan Provincial Hospital
where he died.

Garcia was then a regular driver of respondent National Irrigation Administration who, at the
time of the accident, was a licensed professional driver and who qualified for employment as
such regular driver of respondent after having passed the written and oral examinations on traffic
rules and maintenance of vehicles given by National Irrigation Administration authorities.

The within petition is thus an off-shot of the action (Civil Case No. SJC-56) instituted by
petitioners-spouses on April 17, 1978 against respondent NIA before the then Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch VIII at San Jose City, for damages in connection with the death
of their son resulting from the aforestated accident.

After trial, the trial court rendered judgment on March 20, 1980 which directed respondent
National Irrigation Administration to pay damages (death benefits) and actual expenses to
petitioners. The dispositive portion of the decision reads thus:

. . . . . Judgment is here rendered ordering the defendant National Irrigation Administration to

pay to the heirs of the deceased P12,000.00 for the death of Francisco Fontanilla; P3,389.00
which the parents of the deceased had spent for the hospitalization and burial of the deceased
Francisco Fontanilla; and to pay the costs. (Brief for the petitioners spouses Fontanilla, p. 4;
Rollo, p. 132)

Respondent National Irrigation Administration filed on April 21, 1980, its motion for
reconsideration of the aforesaid decision which respondent trial court denied in its Order of June
13, 1980. Respondent National Irrigation Administration thus appealed said decision to the Court
of Appeals (C.A.-G.R. No. 67237- R) where it filed its brief for appellant in support of its
position.

Instead of filing the required brief in the aforecited Court of Appeals case, petitioners filed the
instant petition with this Court.

The sole issue for the resolution of the Court is: Whether or not the award of moral damages,
exemplary damages and attorney's fees is legally proper in a complaint for damages based on
quasi-delict which resulted in the death of the son of herein petitioners.

Petitioners allege:

1. The award of moral damages is specifically allowable. under paragraph 3 of Article 2206
of the New Civil Code which provides that the spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants
and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the
death of the deceased. Should moral damages be granted, the award should be made to each of
petitioners-spouses individually and in varying amounts depending upon proof of mental and
depth of intensity of the same, which should not be less than P50,000.00 for each of them.

2. The decision of the trial court had made an impression that respondent National Irrigation
Administration acted with gross negligence because of the accident and the subsequent failure of
the National Irrigation Administration personnel including the driver to stop in order to give
assistance to the, victims. Thus, by reason of the gross negligence of respondent, petitioners
become entitled to exemplary damages under Arts. 2231 and 2229 of the New Civil Code.

3. Petitioners are entitled to an award of attorney's fees, the amount of which (20%) had
been sufficiently established in the hearing of May 23, 1979.

4. This petition has been filed only for the purpose of reviewing the findings of the lower
court upon which the disallowance of moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees
was based and not for the purpose of disturbing the other findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The Solicitor General, taking up the cudgels for public respondent National Irrigation
Administration, contends thus:

1. The filing of the instant petition is rot proper in view of the appeal taken by respondent
National Irrigation Administration to the Court of Appeals against the judgment sought to be
reviewed. The focal issue raised in respondent's appeal to the Court of Appeals involves the
question as to whether or not the driver of the vehicle that bumped the victims was negligent in
his operation of said vehicle. It thus becomes necessary that before petitioners' claim for moral
and exemplary damages could be resolved, there should first be a finding of negligence on the
part of respondent's employee-driver. In this regard, the Solicitor General alleges that the trial
court decision does not categorically contain such finding.

2. The filing of the "Appearance and Urgent Motion For Leave to File Plaintiff-Appellee's
Brief" dated December 28, 1981 by petitioners in the appeal (CA-G.R. No. 67237-R; and G. R.
No.61045) of the respondent National Irrigation Administration before the Court of Appeals, is
an explicit admission of said petitioners that the herein petition, is not proper. Inconsistent
procedures are manifest because while petitioners question the findings of fact in the Court of
Appeals, they present only the questions of law before this Court which posture confirms their
admission of the facts.

3. The fact that the parties failed to agree on whether or not negligence caused the vehicular
accident involves a question of fact which petitioners should have brought to the Court of
Appeals within the reglementary period. Hence, the decision of the trial court has become final
as to the petitioners and for this reason alone, the petition should be dismissed.

4. Respondent Judge acted within his jurisdiction, sound discretion and in conformity with
the law.

5. Respondents do not assail petitioners' claim to moral and exemplary damages by reason
of the shock and subsequent illness they suffered because of the death of their son. Respondent
National Irrigation Administration, however, avers that it cannot be held liable for the damages
because it is an agency of the State performing governmental functions and driver Hugo Garcia
was a regular driver of the vehicle, not a special agent who was performing a job or act foreign to
his usual duties. Hence, the liability for the tortious act should. not be borne by respondent
government agency but by driver Garcia who should answer for the consequences of his act.

6. Even as the trial court touched on the failure or laxity of respondent National Irrigation
Administration in exercising due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employee, the
matter of due diligence is not an issue in this case since driver Garcia was not its special agent
but a regular driver of the vehicle.

The sole legal question on whether or not petitioners may be entitled to an award of moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees can very well be answered with the application of Arts.
2176 and 2180 of theNew Civil Code.

Art. 2176 thus provides:

Whoever by act omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing cotractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter

Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Art. 21 80 read as follows:

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even the though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.

The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent.; but not when the
damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case
what is provided in Art. 2176 shall be applicable.
The liability of the State has two aspects. namely:

1. Its public or governmental aspects where it is liable for the tortious acts of special agents
only.

2. Its private or business aspects (as when it engages in private enterprises) where it
becomes liable as an ordinary employer. (p. 961, Civil Code of the Philippines; Annotated,
Paras; 1986 Ed. ).

In this jurisdiction, the State assumes a limited liability for the damage caused by the tortious
acts or conduct of its special agent.

Under the aforequoted paragrah 6 of Art. 2180, the State has voluntarily assumed liability for
acts done through special agents. The State's agent, if a public official, must not only be specially
commissioned to do a particular task but that such task must be foreign to said official's usual
governmental functions. If the State's agent is not a public official, and is commissioned to
perform non-governmental functions, then the State assumes the role of an ordinary employer
and will be held liable as such for its agent's tort. Where the government commissions a private
individual for a special governmental task, it is acting through a special agent within the meaning
of the provision. (Torts and Damages, Sangco, p. 347, 1984 Ed.)

Certain functions and activities, which can be performed only by the government, are more or
less generally agreed to be "governmental" in character, and so the State is immune from tort
liability. On the other hand, a service which might as well be provided by a private corporation,
and particularly when it collects revenues from it, the function is considered a "proprietary" one,
as to which there may be liability for the torts of agents within the scope of their employment.

The National Irrigation Administration is an agency of the government exercising proprietary

functions, by express provision of Rep. Act No. 3601. Section 1 of said Act provides:

Section 1. Name and domicile.-A body corporate is hereby created which shall be known as the
National Irrigation Administration, hereinafter called the NIA for short, which shall be organized
immediately after the approval of this Act. It shall have its principal seat of business in the City
of Manila and shall have representatives in all provinces for the proper conduct of its business.

Section 2 of said law spells out some of the NIA's proprietary functions. Thus-

Sec. 2. Powers and objectives.-The NIA shall have the following powers and objectives:

(a) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

(b) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
(c) To collect from the users of each irrigation system constructed by it such fees as may be
necessary to finance the continuous operation of the system and reimburse within a certain
period not less than twenty-five years cost of construction thereof; and

(d) To do all such other tthings and to transact all such business as are directly or indirectly
necessary, incidental or conducive to the attainment of the above objectives.

Indubitably, the NIA is a government corporation with juridical personality and not a mere
agency of the government. Since it is a corporate body performing non-governmental functions,
it now becomes liable for the damage caused by the accident resulting from the tortious act of its
driver-employee. In this particular case, the NIA assumes the responsibility of an ordinary
employer and as such, it becomes answerable for damages.

This assumption of liability, however, is predicated upon the existence of negligence on the part
of respondent NIA. The negligence referred to here is the negligence of supervision.

At this juncture, the matter of due diligence on the part of respondent NIA becomes a crucial
issue in determining its liability since it has been established that respondent is a government
agency performing proprietary functions and as such, it assumes the posture of an ordinary
employer which, under Par. 5 of Art. 2180, is responsible for the damages caused by its
employees provided that it has failed to observe or exercise due diligence in the selection and
supervision of the driver.

It will be noted from the assailed decision of the trial court that "as a result of the impact,
Francisco Fontanilla was thrown to a distance 50 meters away from the point of impact while
Restituto Deligo was thrown a little bit further away. The impact took place almost at the edge of
the cemented portion of the road." (Emphasis supplied,) [page 26, Rollo]

The lower court further declared that "a speeding vehicle coming in contact with a person causes
force and impact upon the vehicle that anyone in the vehicle cannot fail to notice. As a matter of
fact, the impact was so strong as shown by the fact that the vehicle suffered dents on the right
side of the radiator guard, the hood, the fender and a crack on the radiator as shown by the
investigation report (Exhibit "E"). (Emphasis supplied) [page 29, Rollo]

It should be emphasized that the accident happened along the Maharlika National Road within
the city limits of San Jose City, an urban area. Considering the fact that the victim was thrown 50
meters away from the point of impact, there is a strong indication that driver Garcia was driving
at a high speed. This is confirmed by the fact that the pick-up suffered substantial and heavy
damage as above-described and the fact that the NIA group was then "in a hurry to reach the
campsite as early as possible", as shown by their not stopping to find out what they bumped as
would have been their normal and initial reaction.

Evidently, there was negligence in the supervision of the driver for the reason that they were
travelling at a high speed within the city limits and yet the supervisor of the group, Ely Salonga,
failed to caution and make the driver observe the proper and allowed speed limit within the city.
Under the situation, such negligence is further aggravated by their desire to reach their
destination without even checking whether or not the vehicle suffered damage from the object it
bumped, thus showing imprudence and reckelessness on the part of both the driver and the
supervisor in the group.

Significantly, this Court has ruled that even if the employer can prove the diligence in the
selection and supervision (the latter aspect has not been established herein) of the employee, still
if he ratifies the wrongful acts, or take no step to avert further damage, the employer would still
be liable. (Maxion vs. Manila Railroad Co., 44 Phil. 597).

Thus, too, in the case of Vda. de Bonifacio vs. B.L.T. Bus Co. (L-26810, August 31, 1970, 34
SCRA 618), this Court held that a driver should be especially watchful in anticipation of others
who may be using the highway, and his failure to keep a proper look out for reasons and objects
in the line to be traversed constitutes negligence.

Considering the foregoing, respondent NIA is hereby directed to pay herein petitioners-spouses
the amounts of P12,000.00 for the death of Francisco Fontanilla; P3,389.00 for hospitalization
and burial expenses of the aforenamed deceased; P30,000.00 as moral damages; P8,000.00 as
exemplary damages and attorney's fees of 20% of the total award.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-23052 January 29, 1968

CITY OF MANILA, petitioner,

vs.
GENARO N. TEOTICO and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

City Fiscal Manuel T. Reyes for petitioner.

Sevilla, Daza and Associates for respondents.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.

On January 27, 1958, at about 8:00 p.m., Genaro N. Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta
and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney to
take him down town. After waiting for about five minutes, he managed to hail a jeepney that
came along to a stop. As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney, and took a few
steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue.
Due to the fall, his head hit the rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses and causing broken
pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid. As blood flowed therefrom, impairing his vision, several
persons came to his assistance and pulled him out of the manhole. One of them brought Teotico
to the Philippine General Hospital, where his injuries were treated, after which he was taken
home. In addition to the lacerated wound in his left upper eyelid, Teotico suffered contusions on
the left thigh, the left upper arm, the right leg and the upper lip apart from an abrasion on the
right infra-patella region. These injuries and the allergic eruption caused by anti-tetanus
injections administered to him in the hospital, required further medical treatment by a private
practitioner who charged therefor P1,400.00.

As a consequence of the foregoing occurrence, Teotico filed, with the Court of First Instance of
Manila, a complaint — which was, subsequently, amended — for damages against the City of
Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief of police. As stated
in the decision of the trial court, and quoted with approval by the Court of Appeals,

At the time of the incident, plaintiff was a practicing public accountant, a businessman and a
professor at the University of the East. He held responsible positions in various business firms
like the Philippine Merchandising Co., the A.U. Valencia and Co., the Silver Swan
Manufacturing Company and the Sincere Packing Corporation. He was also associated with
several civic organizations such as the Wack Wack Golf Club, the Chamber of Commerce of the
Philippines, Y's Men Club of Manila and the Knights of Rizal. As a result of the incident,
plaintiff was prevented from engaging in his customary occupation for twenty days. Plaintiff has
lost a daily income of about P50.00 during his incapacity to work. Because of the incident, he
was subjected to humiliation and ridicule by his business associates and friends. During the
period of his treatment, plaintiff was under constant fear and anxiety for the welfare of his minor
children since he was their only support. Due to the filing of this case, plaintiff has obligated
himself to pay his counsel the sum of P2,000.00.

On the other hand, the defense presented evidence, oral and documentary, to prove that the
Storm Drain Section, Office of the City Engineer of Manila, received a report of the uncovered
condition of a catchbasin at the corner of P. Burgos and Old Luneta Streets, Manila, on January
24, 1958, but the same was covered on the same day (Exhibit 4); that again the iron cover of the
same catch basin was reported missing on January 30, 1958, but the said cover was replaced the
next day (Exhibit 5); that the Office of the City Engineer never received any report to the effect
that the catchbasin in question was not covered between January 25 and 29, 1968; that it has
always been a policy of the said office, which is charged with the duty of installation, repair and
care of storm drains in the City of Manila, that whenever a report is received from whatever
source of the loss of a catchbasin cover, the matter is immediately attended to, either by
immediately replacing the missing cover or covering the catchbasin with steel matting that
because of the lucrative scrap iron business then prevailing, stealing of iron catchbasin covers
was rampant; that the Office of the City Engineer has filed complaints in court resulting from
theft of said iron covers; that in order to prevent such thefts, the city government has changed the
position and layout of catchbasins in the City by constructing them under the sidewalks with
concrete cement covers and openings on the side of the gutter; and that these changes had been
undertaken by the city from time to time whenever funds were available.

After appropriate proceedings the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered the aforementioned
decision sustaining the theory of the defendants and dismissing the amended complaint, without
costs.
On appeal taken by plaintiff, this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, except insofar
as the City of Manila is concerned, which was sentenced to pay damages in the aggregate sum of
P6,750.00. 1 Hence, this appeal by the City of Manila.

The first issue raised by the latter is whether the present case is governed by Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 409 (Charter of the City of Manila) reading:

The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property arising from the
failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other city officer, to enforce the provisions of
this chapter, or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board,
or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions.

or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides:

Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries
suffered by, any person by reason of defective conditions of road, streets, bridges, public
buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision.

Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the latter, because Republic Act
409, is a special law, intended exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a
general law, applicable to the entire Philippines.

The Court of Appeals, however, applied the Civil Code, and, we think, correctly. It is true that,
insofar as its territorial application is concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special law and the
Civil Code a general legislation; but, as regards the subject-matter of the provisions above
quoted, Section 4 of Republic Act 409 establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the
City of Manila for: "damages or injury to persons or property arising from the failure of" city
officers "to enforce the provisions of" said Act "or any other law or ordinance, or from
negligence" of the city "Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting
to enforce said provisions." Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a
particular prescription making "provinces, cities and municipalities . . . liable for damages for the
death of, or injury suffered by any person by reason" — specifically — "of the defective
condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other-public works under their control
or supervision." In other words, said section 4 refers to liability arising from negligence, in
general, regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to "defective
streets," in particular. Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a
road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.

It is urged that the City of Manila cannot be held liable to Teotico for damages: 1) because the
accident involving him took place in a national highway; and 2) because the City of Manila has
not been negligent in connection therewith.

As regards the first issue, we note that it is based upon an allegation of fact not made in the
answer of the City. Moreover, Teotico alleged in his complaint, as well as in his amended
complaint, that his injuries were due to the defective condition of a street which is "under the
supervision and control" of the City. In its answer to the amended complaint, the City, in turn,
alleged that "the streets aforementioned were and have been constantly kept in good condition
and regularly inspected and the storm drains and manholes thereof covered by the defendant City
and the officers concerned" who "have been ever vigilant and zealous in the performance of their
respective functions and duties as imposed upon them by law." Thus, the City had, in effect,
admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was and is under its control and supervision.

Moreover, the assertion to the effect that said Avenue is a national highway was made, for the
first time, in its motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Such
assertion raised, therefore, a question of fact, which had not been put in issue in the trial court,
and cannot be set up, for the first time, on appeal, much less after the rendition of the decision of
the appellate court, in a motion for the reconsideration thereof.

At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein
established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or
municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province,
city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or road. Even if P.
Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily
detract from its "control or supervision" by the City of Manila, under Republic Act 409. In fact
Section 18(x) thereof provides:

Sec. 18. Legislative powers. — The Municipal Board shall have the following legislative
powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(x) Subject to the provisions of existing law to provide for the laying out, construction and
improvement, and to regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, wharves, piers, parks,
cemeteries, and other public places; to provide for lighting, cleaning, and sprinkling of streets
and public places; . . . to provide for the inspection of, fix the license fees for and regulate the
openings in the same for the laying of gas, water, sewer and other pipes, the building and repair
of tunnels, sewers, and drains, and all structures in and under the same and the erecting of poles
and the stringing of wires therein; to provide for and regulate cross-works, curbs, and gutters
therein, . . . to regulate traffic and sales upon the streets and other public places; to provide for
the abatement of nuisances in the same and punish the authors or owners thereof; to provide for
the construction and maintenance, and regulate the use, of bridges, viaducts and culverts; to
prohibit and regulate ball playing, kite-flying, hoop rolling, and other amusements which may
annoy persons using the streets and public places, or frighten horses or other animals; to regulate
the speed of horses and other animals, motor and other vehicles, cars, and locomotives within the
limits of the city; to regulate the lights used on all vehicles, cars, and locomotives; . . . to provide
for and change the location, grade, and crossing of railroads, and compel any such railroad to
raise or lower its tracks to conform to such provisions or changes; and to require railroad
companies to fence their property, or any part thereof, to provide suitable protection against
injury to persons or property, and to construct and repair ditches, drains, sewers, and culverts
along and under their tracks, so that the natural drainage of the streets and adjacent property shall
not be obstructed.
This authority has been neither withdrawn nor restricted by Republic Act No. 917 and Executive
Order No. 113, dated May 2, 1955, upon which the City relies. Said Act governs the disposition
or appropriation of the highway funds and the giving of aid to provinces, chartered cities and
municipalities in the construction of roads and streets within their respective boundaries, and
Executive Order No. 113 merely implements the provisions of said Republic Act No. 917,
concerning the disposition and appropriation of the highway funds. Moreover, it provides that
"the construction, maintenance and improvement of national primary, national secondary and
national aid provincial and city roads shall be accomplished by the Highway District Engineers
and Highway City Engineers under the supervision of the Commissioner of Public Highways and
shall be financed from such appropriations as may be authorized by the Republic of the
Philippines in annual or special appropriation Acts."

Then, again, the determination of whether or not P. Burgos Avenue is under the control or
supervision of the City of Manila and whether the latter is guilty of negligence, in connection
with the maintenance of said road, which were decided by the Court of Appeals in the
affirmative, is one of fact, and the findings of said Court thereon are not subject to our review.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against
the City of Manila. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. L-20322 May 29, 1968

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. PERFECTO R. PALACIO, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur,
MACARIO M. OFILADA, as ex-officio Sheriff of Manila, and ILDEFONSO ORTIZ,
respondents.

Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.

Luis Contreras for respondents.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals (in CA-G.R. No. 30915),
dismissing the original action for certiorari and prohibition filed with said Court by herein
petitioner Republic of the Philippines, to restrain the enforcement of a writ of execution (issued
by the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur in its Civil Case No. 4886) on the trust fund in
the account of the Irrigation Service Unit with the Philippine National Bank.

There is no controversy as to the following facts:

On April 2, 1960, Ildefonso Ortiz instituted in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur Civil
Case No. 4886, against the Handong Irrigation Association, Inc., a corporation with principal
place of business in Libmanan, Camarines Sur, and the Irrigation Service Unit, an office or
agency under the Department of Public Works and Communications, to recover possession, with
damages, of a 958 square meter-lot located in Handong, San Juan, Libmanan, Camarines Sur,
which the Irrigation Association allegedly entered and occupied, at the instance of its co-
defendant. For failure to appear and answer the complaint, therein defendant Irrigation Service
Unit was declared in default.

On June 3, 1960, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, moved for the
dismissal of the complaint, claiming that defendant Irrigation Service Unit has no juridical
personality to sue and be sued. By order of June 11, 1960, this motion was denied, on the ground
that the said defendant although a mere agency of the Republic of the Philippines, is engaged in
the private business of selling irrigation pumps and construction materials on installment plan.
The Solicitor General's motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order was also denied on July
19, 1960. No appeal appears to have been taken.

On January 29, 1962, the Solicitor General was served with copy of the writ of execution issued
by the court against the defendants in the above-mentioned civil case; and, on February 16, 1962,
an order of garnishment was served by the Sheriff of Manila against the deposits and/or pump
irrigation trust fund in the account of the Irrigation Service Unit at the Philippine National Bank,
Manila, to cover the sum of P14,874.40.1

On March 8, 1962, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, filed with
the lower court an urgent motion to lift the order of garnishment, for the reason that the funds
subject matter thereof are public funds and exempt from attachment or execution. Upon denial of
this motion, as well as of the motion for reconsideration of said denial, the Solicitor General
commenced the present certiorari and prohibition proceeding in the Court of
Appeals.1ªvvphi1.nêt

In its decision of August 21, 1962, the appellate court sustained the propriety of the disputed
garnishment-order, and dismissed the Government's petition, on the basis of the finding by the
trial court that the Irrigation Service Unit, "formerly an office under the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources created by virtue of a 'Memorandum of Agreement on the
Irrigation Pump Program of the Philippines', signed by the Chairman of the PHILCUSA (now
NEC), Chief of the MSA Mission (now AID) and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, and presently under the Department of Public Works and Communications to which
it was transferred", is engaged in a private business of purchase and sale of irrigation pumps and
systems. Consequently, according to the Court of Appeals, and following the ruling in the case of
National Airports Corporation vs. Teodoro, et al., L-5122, April 30, 1952 (91 Phil. 203), by thus
engaging in private business, the Government, through the Irrigation Service Unit, had actually
consented to the suit. Hence, the present petition for review filed by the Republic of the
Philippines.

The issue presented by this case is whether or not the pump irrigation trust fund, deposited with
the Philippine National Bank in the account of the Irrigation Service Unit, may be garnished to
satisfy a money-judgment against the latter. This issue in turn calls for a determination of the
nature of said trust fund, i.e., whether it is a fund belonging to the National Government (which
was not a party to Civil Case No. 4886), as maintained by herein petitioner, or purely the
proceeds of a private venture by the government, as claimed by the respondents.

For a better understanding of the nature, function and operation of the Irrigation Service Unit
(ISU) which is necessary for the proper resolution of the issue herein involved, it is worthwhile
to recall that this office was originally created under the Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources by virtue of a Memorandum Agreement between the governments of the Philippines
and the United States, dated August 13, 1952. It was later transferred to the Department of Public
Works and Communications as an office directly under the Office of the Secretary, "to prosecute
to completion the rehabilitation of pump systems transferred from the former Irrigation Pump
Administration of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources,2 including the
settlement of the obligations of said administration." The budgetary requirements to carry out the
objectives of the project were to be financed by withdrawals from the Counterpart Fund-Special
Account. (Memorandum Agreement of June, 1954.)

This Counterpart Fund-Special Account referred to above was established in the Central Bank by
the Government of the Philippines and made up of deposits in pesos commensurate with the
indicated dollar cost to the Government of the United States of economic and technical
assistance made available to the Philippines, pursuant to the Bilateral Agreement between the
Philippines and the United States of April 27, 1951; of deposits accruing to it (Philippine
government) from the sale of commodities or services supplied under the Agreement or
otherwise accruing to it as a result of the import of such commodities or service; and of any
advance deposits which the Philippine government may make in the Special Account (Sec. 1,
paragraphs 2[a], [b] and [c], Annex to Memo. Agreement of April 27, 1951). Later, on the basis
of a supplemental agreement (No. 2, Counterpart Project No. 409 — Pump Irrigation), the Pump
Irrigation Trust Fund was established in the Philippine National Bank, to which all authorized
releases to the ISU3 from the Counterpart Fund — Special Account, to finance the peso-cost of
the Irrigation Pump Project, were transferred. This is the fund on which the disputed writ of
execution for money judgment rendered against the ISU, is being enforced.

A reading of the records and documents submitted to the Court of Appeals will readily show that
the sales of irrigation pumps to farmers by ISU are governed by the terms of the Supplemental
Agreement No. 2 to Counterpart Project No. 409 (signed by representatives of the Philippine and
U. S. governments) hereunder copied in full:

C. Disposition of Proceeds from Payments under Contracts of Sale

1. Under the Guiding Principles of the Irrigation Pump Project, pumps are sold to farmers'
associations under conditional sales contracts. Periodic payments to ISU by each association are
required. The total payment required under the contract is stated in the contract and is equal to
the sum of (a) the landed cost of equipment at the installation site, (b) the cost of installation and
construction including survey and design, (c) the cost of fuel and oil financed for the first crop
season, if any, (d) ten per cent of the total of a and b to cover the cost of administration, technical
assistance furnished by the ISU, inspection and collection, and (e) the compensating use tax to
the Philippine Government. Interest is also payable under each contract at the rate of six percent
per annum on any unpaid balance of the total amount of the contract.
2. All principal and interest payments received by the ISU from farmers' associations shall be
deposited immediately in the Trust Fund. The separate account established by the project
agreement for Counterpart Project 409, entitled "Irrigation Pump Sales Proceeds Account" is
hereby abolished and any deposits therein will be immediately transferred to the Trust Fund.

3. Whenever the total value of all deposits made to the Trust Fund from contract principal and
interest payments exceeds the value of total releases made to the Trust Fund from the
Counterpart Fund-Special Account, these excess deposits shall be transferred from the Trust
Fund to the Counter Fund-Special Account. Such transfers shall be considered as "proceeds of
sale" and "advance deposits" as provided in Annex Section 1, (b) and (c) of the Bilateral
Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America.

It was also provided therein that the payments by the farmers' associations on conditional sales
agreements specified in paragraph C-2, above, will be considered in the preparation, and shall
form part, of the ISU annual budget, which will finance the costs of supply and equipment
purchases, the installation and construction of pump units, and the operating expenses of ISU for
which appropriated funds are not available. (Para. B-1).

It is clear from the foregoing that the ISU is not only an office in the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines, created to promote a specific economic policy of said government,
but also that its activity (of selling irrigation pumps to farmers on installment basis) is not
intended to earn profit or financial gain to its operator. The mere fact that interests are being
collected on the balance of the unpaid cost of the purchased pumps does not convert this
economic project of the government into a corporate activity. As previously pointed out, the
installment payments and interests receivable from the farmers are to be used to replenish the
counterpart funds utilized in furtherance of the operation of the project.

Although evidently acknowledging the nature of the Pump Irrigation Trust Fund as a public
fund, the Court of Appeals nevertheless sustained the garnishment order, on the ground that the
ISU, by engaging in the private business of purchasing and selling irrigation pumps on
installment basis, has waived its governmental immunity and, by implication, consented to the
suit.

It is apparent that this decision of the Court of Appeals suffers from the erroneous assumption
that because the State has waived its immunity, its property and funds become liable to seizure
under the legal process. This emphatically is not the law (Merritt vs. Insular Government, 34
Phil. 311).

Even though the rule as to immunity of a state from suit is relaxed, the power of the courts ends
when the judgment is rendered. Although the liability of the state has been judicially ascertained,
the state is at liberty to determine for itself whether to pay the judgment or not, and execution
can not issue on a judgment against the state. Such statutes do not authorize a seizure of state
property to satisfy judgments recovered, and only convey implication that the legislature will
recognize such judgment as final and make provision for the satisfaction thereof. (49 Am. Jur.,
Sec. 104, pp. 312-320.)
Judgments against a state, in cases where it has consented to be sued, generally operate merely to
liquidate and establish plaintiff's claim in the absence of express provision; otherwise they can
not be enforced by processes of law; and it is for the legislature to provide for their payment in
such manner as it sees fit. (59 C.J. sec. 501, p. 331; 81 C.J.S., sec. 232, p. 1343.)

It needs no stressing that to allow the levying under execution of the ISU funds would amount to
diverting them from the purpose originally contemplated by the P.I.U.S. Bilateral Agreement,
and would amount to a disbursement without any proper appropriation as required by law.

A second infirmity of the decision under appeal originates from its ignoring the fact that the
initial complaint against the Irrigation Service Unit was that it had induced the Handong
Irrigation Association, Inc., to invade and occupy the land of the plaintiff Ildefonso Ortiz. The
ISU liability thus arose from tort and not from contract; and it is a well-entrenched rule in this
jurisdiction, embodied in Article 2180 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that the State is liable
only for torts caused by its special agents, specially commissioned to carry out the acts
complained of outside of such agent's regular duties (Merritt vs. Insular Government, supra;
Rosete vs. Auditor General, 81 Phil. 453). There being no proof that the making of the tortious
inducement was authorized, neither the State nor its funds can be made liable therefor.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals under review is reversed and set aside, and
the order of garnishment issued by the Sheriff of Manila on the Pump Irrigation Trust Fund in
the account of the Irrigation Service Unit, with the Philippine National Bank, is hereby declared
null and void. The writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is made permanent. No costs.

G.R. No. L-53064 September 25, 1980

FELIX LANUZO, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SY BON PING and SALVADOR MENDOZA, defendants-appellants.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Appeal certified to Us by the Court of Appeals 1 as it involves pure legal questions.

On November 25, 1969, a Complaint for damages was instituted in the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur (Civil Case No. 6847) by plaintiff Felix Lanuzo against Sy Bon Ping, the owner
and operator of a freight truck bearing Plate No. T-57266, and his driver, Salvador Mendoza. As
alleged therein, at about five o'clock in the afternoon of July 24, 1969, while Salvador Mendoza
was driving the truck along the national highway in the Barrio of San Ramon, Nabua, Camarines
Sur, and because of his reckless negligence, we rammed into the residential house and store of
plaintiff. As a result, the house and store were completely razed to the ground causing damage to
plaintiff in the total amount of P13,000.00. Plaintiff averred that by reason thereof he became
destitute as he lost his means of livelihood from the store which used to give him a monthly
income of P300.00.

The defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that another action, Criminal Case No. 4250 for
Damage to Property through Reckless Imprudence, was pending in the Municipal Court of
Nabua, Camarines Sur, between the same parties for the same cause. Plaintiff opposed the
dismissal stressing that he had made an express reservation in the criminal case to institute a civil
action for damages separate and distinct from the criminal suit.

The lower Court denied the Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit.

On August 13, 1970, the trial Court rendered a default judgment in plaintiff's favor, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered (a) ordering the defendants to pay jointly and
severally the amount of P13,000.00 as damages, resulting to the loss of the store including the
merchandise for sale therein, the residential house of mixed materials, furnitures, clothing and
households fixtures; (b) ordering the said defendants to pay jointly and severally P300.00
monthly from July 24, 1969 which represents plaintiff's monthly income from his store until the
whole amount of P13,000.00 is fully paid; and (c) for attorney's fees an amount equivalent to
20% of the total amount claimed by the plaintiff, plus the costs of this suit.

Defendants' "Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial and To Set Aside Order of Default"
was denied.

Upon elevation by the defendants of the case to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 48399-R)
they urged that the civil action was prematurely instituted in view of Rule 111, section 3,
providing in part that "after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be
instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action." Additionally, they
contended that even assuming their liability, the lower Court nevertheless committed an error in
holding them jointly and severally liable.

On February 20, 1980, the Court of Appeals certified the case to this instance on pure questions
of law.

We start from the fundamental premise, clearly enunciated as early as the case of Barredo vs.
Garcia, et al., 2 that:

A distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for
cuasi-delitos or culpa-extracontractual. The same negligent act causing damages may produce
civil liability arising from a crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an
action for cuasi-delito or culpa extracontractual under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
Plaintiffs were free to choose which remedy to enforce.

Plaintiff's reservation before the Municipal Court in the criminal case of his right to institute a
civil action separately is quoted hereunder in full:
UNDERSIGNED offended party in the above-entitled case before this Honorable Court
respectfully alleges:

1. That this action which was commenced by the Chief of Police included in the complaint the
claim of the undersigned for civil liability;

2. That the undersigned is reserving his right to institute the civil action for damages, docketed as
Civil Case No. 6847 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, against accused herein and
his employer;

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that reservation be made of record therein and that the
civil aspect of the above-entitled case be not included herein.

xxx xxx xxx 3

The terms of plaintiff's reservation clearly and unmistakably make out a case for quasi-delict.
This is also evident from the recitals in plaintiff's Complaint averring the employer-employee
relationship between the appellants, alleging that damages to the house and store were caused by
the fact that Salvador Mendoza had driven the truck "recklessly, with gross negligence and
imprudence, without observance of traffic rules and regulations and without regard to the safety
of persons and property", and praying that appellants be held jointly and solidarity liable for
damages. These are, basically, what should be alleged in actions based on quasi-delict. 4

As it is quite apparent that plaintiff had predicated his present claim for damages on quasi-delict,
he is not barred from proceeding with this independent civil suit. The institution of a criminal
action cannot have the effect of interrupting the civil action based on quasi-delict. 5 And the
separate civil action for quasi-delict may proceed independently and regardless of the result of
the criminal case, 6 except that a plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
commission of the defendant. 7

The civil action referred to in Sections 3(a) and (b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which
should be suspended after the institution of the criminal action, is that arising from delict, and not
the civil action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.

We come now to the subject of liability of the appellants herein. For his own negligence in
recklessly driving the truck owned and operated by his employer, the driver, Salvador Mendoza,
is primarily liable under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. On the other hand, the liability of his
employer, Sy Bon Ping, is also primary and direct under Article 2180 of the same Code, which
explicitly provides:

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
For failure of the appellant Sy Bon Ping to rebut the legal presumption of his negligence in the
selection and supervision of this employee, 8 he is likewise responsible for the damages caused
by the negligent act of his employee (driver) Salvador Mendoza, and his liability is primary and
solidary.

... What needs only to be alleged under the aforequoted provision (Article 2180, Civil Code) is
that the employee (driver) has, by his negligence (quasi-delict) caused damage to make the
employer, likewise, responsible for the tortious act of the employee, and his liability is, as earlier
observed, primary and solidary 9

But although the employer is solidarity liable with the employee for damages, the employer may
demand reimbursement from his employee (driver) for whatever amount the employer will have
to pay the offended party to satisfy the latter's claim. 10

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed. Costs against defendants-appellants.

SO ORDERED.