People of the Philippines vs Jose Vera

65 Phil. 56 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Bill of Rights – Equal Protection – Probation Law
Separation of Powers – Undue Delegation of Powers – Power to Pardon
Constitutionality of Laws – May the State Question Its Own Laws
In 1934, Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted in a criminal case filed against him by the Hongkong
and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC). In 1936, he filed for probation. The matter was
referred to the Insular Probation Office which recommended the denial of Cu Unjieng’s petition
for probation. A hearing was set by Judge Jose Vera concerning the petition for probation. The
Prosecution opposed the petition. Eventually, due to delays in the hearing, the Prosecution
filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court alleging that courts like the Court of First
Instance of Manila (which is presided over by Judge Vera) have no jurisdiction to place accused
like Cu Unjieng under probation because under the law (Act No. 4221 or The Probation Law),
probation is only meant to be applied in provinces with probation officers; that the City of
Manila is not a province, and that Manila, even if construed as a province, has no designated
probation officer – hence, a Manila court cannot grant probation.
Meanwhile, HSBC also filed its own comment on the matter alleging that Act 4221 is
unconstitutional for it violates the constitutional guarantee on equal protection of the laws.
HSBC averred that the said law makes it the prerogative of provinces whether or nor to apply
the probation law – if a province chooses to apply the probation law, then it will appoint a
probation officer, but if it will not, then no probation officer will be appointed – hence, that
makes it violative of the equal protection clause.
Further, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an undue delegation of power because it gave
the option to the provincial board to whether or not to apply the probation law – however, the
legislature did not provide guidelines to be followed by the provincial board.
Further still, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an encroachment of the executive’s power
to grant pardon. They say that the legislature, by providing for a probation law, had in effect
encroached upon the executive’s power to grant pardon. (Ironically, the Prosecution agreed
with the issues raised by HSBC – ironic because their main stance was the non-applicability of
the probation law only in Manila while recognizing its application in provinces).
For his part, one of the issues raised by Cu Unjieng is that, the Prosecution, representing the
State as well as the People of the Philippines, cannot question the validity of a law, like Act
4221, which the State itself created. Further, Cu Unjieng also castigated the fiscal of Manila
who himself had used the Probation Law in the past without question but is now questioning
the validity of the said law (estoppel).
ISSUE:
1. May the State question its own laws?
2. Is Act 4221 constitutional?
HELD:
1. Yes. There is no law which prohibits the State, or its duly authorized representative, from
questioning the validity of a law. Estoppel will also not lie against the State even if it had been
using an invalid law.
2. No, Act 4221 or the [old] Probation Law is unconstitutional.
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause
The contention of HSBC and the Prosecution is well taken on this note. There is violation of the
equal protection clause. Under Act 4221, provinces were given the option to apply the law by
simply providing for a probation officer. So if a province decides not to install a probation
officer, then the accused within said province will be unduly deprived of the provisions of the
Probation Law.
Undue Delegation of Legislative Power
There is undue delegation of legislative power. Act 4221 provides that it shall only apply to
provinces where the respective provincial boards have provided for a probation officer. But
nowhere in the law did it state as to what standard (sufficient standard test) should provincial
boards follow in determining whether or not to apply the probation law in their province. This
only creates a roving commission which will act arbitrarily according to its whims.
Encroachment of Executive Power
Though Act 4221 is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court recognized the power of Congress to
provide for probation. Probation does not encroach upon the President’s power to grant
pardon. Probation is not pardon. Probation is within the power of Congress to fix penalties
while pardon is a power of the president to commute penalties.

Randolf David vs President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo

November 7, 2010

489 SCRA 160 – Political Law – The Executive Branch – Presidential Proclamation 1017 – Take
Care Clause – Take Over Power – Calling Out Power
Bill of Rights – Freedom of Speech – Overbreadth
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan
(Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA)
issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented by General Order No.
5 (GO 5). The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to
bring down the government.
Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked
all permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the
cancellation of their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf David proceeded to
rally which led to his arrest.
Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG
and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known
anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of
Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued
way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because
of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.
In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency ceased to
exist. David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it
has no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for such power is reposed
in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also
averred that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities
and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it
encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has
become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP
1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the president’s calling out power, take care
power and take over power.
ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.
HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly unconstitutional.
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned
PP. It is still in fact operative because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation
of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is
constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The
SC ruled in the following way;
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO
5. A reading of the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a
detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports
forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious
threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine
Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the
Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the
growing alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute
such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President
was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the
incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress
what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such
power or duty must not stifle liberty.
Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing ‘on their
faces’ statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily ‘freedom
of speech’ cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to
speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress
all forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the
validity of a law that ‘reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control
over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Undoubtedly, lawless violence,
insurrection and rebellion are considered ‘harmful’ and ‘constitutionally unprotected conduct.’
Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their
terms, seek to regulate only ‘spoken words’ and again, that ‘overbreadth claims, if entertained
at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be
applied to protected conduct.’ Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a
spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.
Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine
On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered the
President’s ‘calling-out’ power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed
that ‘this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within
permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave
abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution
grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a ‘sequence’ of graduated powers. From the
most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the
exercise of the calling-out power is that ‘whenever it becomes necessary,’ the President may
call the armed forces ‘to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.’ And such
criterion has been met.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine
Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws
be faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017
however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the
President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause ‘to enforce obedience to all
the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction.’ The SC noted that such provision is similar to the power that granted former
President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP
1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate
‘decrees.’ Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6
categorically states that ‘[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.’ To be sure, neither
Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify GMA’[s exercise of
legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can only “take care” of the carrying out of
laws but cannot create or enact laws.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine
The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as
the Daily Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word
emergency contemplated in the constitution is not limited to natural calamities but rather it
also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can declare the state of
national emergency but her exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it
for such exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority from Congress must be based
on the following:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by
Congress.
Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a
valid exercise of the calling out power of the president by the president.