XI.
SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
Section 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his
political beliefs and aspirations.
(2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except
as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted.
FIRST PARAGRAPH
The first Part speaks of the freedom of conscience or the freedom of
thoughts. What is protected by this section are the political beliefs (the
principles are similar to freedom of religion).
Political Prisoner – a person detained solely for what he believes in
(caveat: not a definite meaning).
Under Amnesty International - the definition is broader such that they
are those represented for acts done pursuant to his political
beliefs.
SECOND PARAGRAPH
Freedom from Involuntary Servitude
- It is the liberty not to be compelled against your will
to work whether paid or not.
NOTE: There is no law authorizing as a penalty for a crime to be
suffered to work. If in any case, the judge has to embody in the decision
the order to work.
INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE
It is every condition of enforced or compulsory service of one to
another no matter under what form such servitude may be disguised.
SECTION 18 CANNOT BE INVOKED IN THE FOLLOWING:
1. In times of war, citizens can be forced to render military
service or civil service as required by the Constitution [Art. II
Sec. 4];
2. In return-to-work orders;
 If an employee participates in a strike, the employer can
force him to resume work, otherwise he is deemed
resigned.
 This NOT compulsion because if this is not allowed the
employer would be prejudiced because employees refuse to
work for flimsy reasons.
3. If you are appointed as counsel de officio of the accused;
4. Punishment for a crime for which the party has been
duly convicted
5. When he is enlisted in the services of a merchant vessel;
(ROBERTSON vs. BALDWIN)
6. Posse Comitatus for the apprehension of criminals. The state
may require some groups of people to assist in the pursuit of some
criminals under the Police power
7. "Patria Potestas" unemancipated minors under parental
power. (They must be minors under parental authority)
Q: Can a person who ate in a restaurant and did not pay, be
compelled to render service for the establishment?
A: No. He can still invoke section 18 which prohibits involuntary
servitude.
A. What acts cannot be criminalized
1. Mere beliefs and aspirations
Art. III, sec. 18(1)
Section 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his
political beliefs and aspirations.
2. Debts and civil obligations
Art. III, sec. 20
LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ, 146 SCRA 323 (1986)
PEOPLE VS. NITAFAN, 202 SCRA 726 (1992)
VERGARA VS. GEDORIO, JR. 402 SCRA 520 (2003)
3. Acts which when done were innocent (Ex Post Facto Laws)
Art. III, sec. 22
KAY VILLEGAS KAMI, 35 SCRA 429 (1970)
SALVADOR VS. MAPA 539 SCRA 37 (2007)
PEOPLE VS. CASTA 565 SCRA 341 (2008)
NASI-VILLAR VS. PEOPLE 571 SCRA 202 (2008)
Bills of attainder – Legislative adjudications of guilt
CASE – PEOPLE VS. FERRER, 48 SCRA 382 (1972)
REPUBLIC VS. RMDC 426 SCRA 517 (2004)
B. What punishments cannot be imposed
1. Involuntary servitude
Art. III, sec. 18(2)
SARMIENTO vs. TUICO
162 SCRA 676 (1988)
Facts: Petition for certiorari to review the order of the NLRC. Asian
Transmission Corporation terminated the services of the petitioner for
allegedly carrying deadly weapon in the premises. The striking workers
were ordered to return to work immediately.
Issue: Whether the return to work order results to involuntary
servitude.
Ruling: while one purpose of the return-to-work order is to protect the
workers who might otherwise be locked out by the employer for
threatening or waging the strike, the more important reason is to
prevent impairment of the national interest in case the operations of
the company are disrupted by a refusal of the strikers to return to work
as directed. The return to work order imposes a duty. It is not
considered violative of the right against involuntary servitude.
2. Excessive fines
Art. III, sec. 19(1)
Section 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death
penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death
penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or
degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use
of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman
conditions shall be dealt with by law.
*Section 19 is not self-executing.
5 RIGHTS GUARANTEED BY SECTION 19:
1. Right to be protected against cruel and inhuman punishments;
2. Excessive fines shall not be imposed;
Yardstick to measure that the fine imposed is not excessive.
(What the judge must consider when imposing a fine)
1
 a. The financial condition of the convict;
b. The amount fixed should be within the limit
established by law;
c. The mitigating and aggravating circumstances
attending the crime
3. Death penalty unless for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes;
4. Right to be protected against physical, psychological or degrading
punishment;
5. That any prisoner or detainee shall be entitled to adequated,
standard penal facilities.
I. Excessive fines shall not be imposed. What is a fine? Fine is a
penalty. So for example A was convicted of Arson with homicide. And
the court awarded moral damages of 500 million, can A invoke his
rights against excessive fines? No. Fines are provided by RPC, damages
are not fines. Damages are civil liability.
So this only applies to criminal cases because fines are imposed only in
criminal cases. And it only applies to the fine imposed. If the court goes
beyond the range provided for by law, then that is excessive fines. So
what is the yardstick to measure that the fine imposed is not excessive.
(what must the judge consider when imposing a fine)
1. The financial condition of the convict;
2. The amount fixed should be within the limit established by law;
3. The mitigating and aggravating circumstances attending the
crime
II. Cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment. So when is punishment
considered cruel, inhuman or degrading? If it is flagrantly and plainly
oppressive, wholly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the
moral sense of the community. When it involves torture or lingering
death.
2 CONCEPTS OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT:
1. Those which public sentiment would regard as cruel and
obsolete to law, refers to form, not on the severity or seriousness of
the punishment. An example – crucifixion
2. Those which are disproportionate to the offense as to shock
the moral senses.
CRUEL, DEGRADING and INHUMAN PUNISHMENT
 To be cruel and unusual or excessive punishment w/i the meaning
of the constitution, the penalty must be flagrantly disproportionate to
the offense no matter under what circumstances the offense may be
committed.
 If the punishment involves torture or lingering death.
 Unconstitutional punishment implies something inhuman and
barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life.
INSTANCES WHEN PUNISHMENT MAY ALSO BE DEEMED CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL:
1. If it inherently involves so much pain and suffering that
civilized people cannot tolerate it.
2. If in the sense of being previously unknown it is imposed for
a given offense
3. If it is excessive and serves a legislative purpose.
4. If popular sentiments abhors it even if not excessive or with a
legislative purpose.
DEATH PENALTY
 Congress can re-impose death penalty (conditions):
a. by enacting a law;
b. for heinous crimes;
c. there must be compelling reason.
 SC: If a crime is heinous, it is compelling reason enough to impose
the death penalty
EXCESSIVE FINE
A fine is excessive, when under any circumstance, it is disproportionate
to the offense.
Note: Fr. Bernas says that the accused cannot be convicted of the
crime to which the punishment is attached if the court finds that the
punishment is cruel, degrading or inhuman.
Reason: Without a valid penalty, the law is not a penal law.
STANDARDS USED
1. The punishment must not be so severe as to be degrading to
the dignity of human beings.
2. It must not be applied arbitrarily.
3. It must not be unacceptable to contemporary society
4. It must not be excessive, i.e. it must serve a penal purpose
more effectively than a less severe punishment would.
 Penalty is cruel, degrading and inhuman if it is flagrantly and
plainly oppressive, wholly disproportionate to the offense as to shock
the moral sense of the community. When it involves torture or
lingering death.
Q: What is the yardstick to measure if the penalty is justified?
A: The penalty imposed should be proportional to the offense
committed. Take note that public officers may be meted out graver
penalties because of public office is a public trust.
LIM vs. CA: Estafa under PD 818 is punished as severely as reclusion
perpetua.
Q: Is the penalty disproportionate to the offense committed?
A: No, because this kind of penalty is actually prescribed by law. It is
actually provided for in PD 818 that for this kind of estafa, this is the
penalty. Punishment authorized by a statute is not cruel, degrading or
disproportionate to the nature of the offense unless it is flagrantly and
plainly oppressive.
ZALDIVAR vs. SANDIGANBAYAN: indefinite suspension is not cruel,
degrading or inhuman.
III. Death Penalty. Under the Constitution, there is no death penalty.
When the Constitution was ratified in 1987, it had no death penalty.
But it had a provision that said that: Neither shall the death penalty be
imposed, so that is the general rule, unless for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. So the
Congress enacts a law providing for the death penalty. (RA 7659)
The first person sentenced to die under RA 7659 was Echegaray. His
lawyers questioned the death penalty claiming that this is cruel and
inhuman punishment. The SC said that all punishments are cruel. What
the Constitution means is something inhuman, and barbarous.
Something more than just extinguishment of life. The death penalty is
not cruel and inhuman because cruelty should be inherent in the
method and not the punishment itself. The death penalty requires two
reasons: so there must be a compelling reason and it only involves
heinous crimes. So when is a crime considered heinous? They are
crimes that by their nature are despicable. There are other crimes like
bribery, destructive arson and drug offenses, the abomination lies in
the significance and the implication of the subject criminal act in the
scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context. (What is the
implication or the effect on society). What is this compelling reason?
2
That the crime is heinous is reason compelling enough to bring back the
death penalty. Heinous crime=compelling reason = death penalty
justified. Kasi diba sabi ng SC it is not the penalty, it is the method. So
balik na naman ang lawyers ni Echegaray saying that lethal injection is
cruel and inhuman daw. The SC said that any infliction of pain in the
lethal injection is incidental to the execution of the death penalty.
CASES - PEOPLE VS. DELA CRUZ, 92 Phil. 906 (1953)
PEOPLE VS. DACUYCUY, 173 SCRA 901 (1989)
AGBANLOG VS. PEOPLE, 220 SCRA 530 (1993)
3. Cruel, degrading and inhuman punishments
Art. III, sec. 19(1)
Id., sec. 12(2)
PEOPLE vs. ECHEGARAY
267 SCRA 682 (1997)
Facts: Accused was convicted of incestuous rape and sentenced to
death under R.A. No. 7659 which reimposed the death penalty. He
now argues that the death penalty law is unconstitutional for having
been imposed in the absence of compelling reasons therefore and that
the death penalty for rape is a cruel, excessive and inhuman
punishment.
Ruling: The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes,
like murder, rape, kidnapping, which are, by their nature despicable,
either because life was callously taken or the victim is utterly
dehumanized. There are crimes, like bribery, destructive arson, drug
offenses involving government officials, in which the abdomination lies
in the significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the
scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context. There is no
need for Congress to state the compelling reason for each and every
heinous crime and statistical proof that such compelling reason actually
exists. The elements of heinousness and compulsion are inseparable
and are in fact interspersed with each other. The Court has no doubt
that insofar as heinousness is concerned Congress has correctly
identified the crimes warranting the death penalty.
The claim of accused that the death penalty for the crime of
rape is cruel and inhuman is based on a decision of the United States
Supreme Court. In turn, said Court made a finding that (1) the public
has manifested its rejection of the death penalty as a proper
punishment for the crime of rape by the willful omission by state
legislatures to include rape in their death penalty statutes, and (2)
while the crime involves a dastardly contemptuous violation of a
woman’s spiritual integrity and psychological balance, it does not
involve the taking of life. The first ground, however has no bearing on
Philippine experience and the context of our culture. As to the second,
we disagree with the notion that whether or not the crime warrants
the death penalty is the attendance of the circumstance of the death of
the victim because it goes back to the idea of retributive justice, of “an
eye for an eye.” The death penalty is imposed because the
perpetrators have committed unforgivable acts causing irreparable and
substantial injury to the victim and society so that they must be
permanently prevented form repetition of their acts.
PEOPLE VS. TONGKO 290 SCRA 595 (1998)
ECHEGARAY VS. SECRETARY 297 SCRA 754 (1998)
(paki double check ni na digest)
Facts: In 1997, Congress passed R.A. No. 8177, designating death by
lethal injection as the method of carrying out the death penalty.
Pursuant to the law, the Secretary of Justice promulgated the
implementing rules and directed the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections to prepare the Lethal Injection Manual. Echegaray, a death
convict, argues that death by the lethal injection is unconstitutional for
being a cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment.
Ruling: All punishments are cruel but of course the Constitution does
not mean that crime, for this reason, is to go unpunished. It implies
something inhuman and barbarous, something more that the mere
extinguishments of life. The cruelty against which the Constitution
protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of
punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method
employed to extinguish life humanely. Any infliction of pain in lethal
injection is merely incidental in carrying out the execution of the death
penalty. Courts in other countries have found that the few minutes of
pain does not rise to a level of constitutional violation. Likewise, what
is cruel and unusual must draw its meaning from the evolving standards
of decency, and the widespread of lethal injection indicates that it
comports with contemporary norms.
LIM vs. PEOPLE
390 SCRA 194 (2002)
Facts: The constitutionality of PD 818, a decree which amended Article
315 of the Revised Penal Code by increasing the penalties for estafa
committed by means of bouncing checks, is being challenged in this
petition for certiorari, for being violative of the due process clause, the
right to bail and the provision against cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment enshrined under the Constitution. Petitioner spouses
issued to private respondent two postdated checks. One check was
dishonored upon presentment for having been drawn against
insufficient funds. When petitioners reneged on their promise to cover
the amount, PR filed a complaint for estafa against them. The trial court
ruled against petitioner spouses.
Issue: WON PD 818 was enacted in contravention of Section 19 of
Article III of the Constitution
Ruling: A punishment authorized by statute is not cruel, degrading or
disproportionate to the nature of the offense unless it is flagrantly and
plainly oppressive and wholly disproportionate to the nature of the
offense as to shock the moral sense of the community. It takes more
than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion or severe for a
penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. Based on this principle,
the Court has consistently overruled contentions of the defense that
the penalty of fine or imprisonment authorized by the statute
involved is cruel and degrading. In one case, the SC ruled that
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is generally aimed at
the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in
respect of its duration or amount, and applies to punishments which
never existed in America or which public sentiment regards as cruel or
obsolete. This refers, for instance, to those inflicted at the whipping
post or in the pillory, to burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel,
disemboweling and the like. The fact that the penalty is severe
provides insufficient basis to declare a law unconstitutional and does
not, by that circumstance alone, make it cruel and inhuman.
In this case, the increase in the penalty, far from being cruel
and degrading, was motivated by a laudable purpose, namely, to
effectuate the repression of an evil that undermines the country’s
commercial and economic growth, and to serve as a necessary
precaution to deter people from issuing bouncing checks. The fact that
PD 818 did not increase the amounts corresponding to the new
penalties only proves that the amount is immaterial and
inconsequential. What the law sought to avert was the proliferation of
estafa cases committed by means of bouncing checks. Taking into
account the salutary purpose for which said law was decreed, we
3
conclude that PD 818 does not violate Section 19 of Article III of the
Constitution. Moreover, when a law is questioned before the Court, the
presumption is in favor of its constitutionality. To justify its nullification,
there must be a clear and unmistakable breach of the Constitution, not
a doubtful and argumentative one. T he burden of proving the invalidity
of a law rests on those who challenge it. In this case, petitioners failed
to present clear and convincing proof to defeat the presumption of
constitutionality of PD 818.
4. Indefinite Imprisonment
CASE - PEOPLE VS. DACUYCUY, 173 SCRA 90 (1989)
SEC. 20: No person shall be imprisoned for nonpayment of debt or
poll tax (cedula)
POLL TAX
Tax paid as a condition precedent for the exercise of suffrage.
According to Fr. Bernas, poll tax refers to residence certificate or cedula
and the tax paid is a precedent to the exercise of the right of suffrage.
NOTE: However, poll tax, as a condition precedent for the right to vote
might be contrary to the Constitutional prohibition on literacy,
property, or other substantive requirement as precedent to the right to
vote.
In non-payment of a debt, the debt assured in this section refers only
to CONTRACTUAL DEBT (that which arises from contracts).
Reason: this kind of contract is civil in nature.
DEFINITION OF DEBT UNDER SECTION 20:
1) Debt refers to a CONTRACTUAL obligation, whether express or
implied, resulting in any liability to pay money. Thus, all other types of
obligations are not within the scope of this prohibition.
2) Thus, if an accused fails to pay the fine imposed upon him, this
may result in his subsidiary imprisonment because his liability is ex
delicto and not ex contractu.
3) A FRAUDULENT debt may result in the imprisonment of the debtor
if:
A. The fraudulent debt constitutes a crime such as estafa
and
B. The accused has been duly convicted.
NON-PAYMENT OF POLL TAX
poll tax can be imposed but you cannot be imprisoned for not
 protection would be claimable. The first jeopardy has attached and he
paying it
 imposition of tax on right to vote --- BERNAS: you still cannot go to
jail for not paying it because its imposition is prohibited by the
Constitution
 no jurisprudence yet
NON-IMPRISONMENT FOR NON-PAYMENT OF DEBT
contractual debt only

 you cannot be imprisoned for non-payment of contractual debt
but you can be proceeded against for estafa
 LABOR CODE: minimum wage --- if you pay your employee the
amount less than that of the minimum wage, you cannot be imprisoned
for it.
C. The protection against double jeopardy
Art. III, sec. 21
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law
and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
There are two basic situations contemplated, the same act and the
same offense. The same act rule or the same offense rule are the two
situations contemplated under Section 21.
The same act, which is the 2nd sentence actually, when an act is
punished by a statute and an ordinance, the prosecution, conviction or
acquittal in one constitutes a bar to another prosecution. This is to
prevent from being harassed or punished twice for the same act.
It’s easy to understand, one act is punished by a national law or statute
and the other is by a local ordinance. So that if one is prosecuted,
convicted or acquitted in one, in either the law or the ordinance, then
that person may no longer be charged again for the same act in relation
to the other. This has been provided as the second situation
contemplated in the double jeopardy rule because the original context
of the double jeopardy protection only covers the same offense rule.
Under the same offense rule, if a person is charged before a statute in
an ordinance it could never fall under the same offense rule because
both laws are not enacted by the same legislative body. One is by a
local council and the other is by a statue and normally they do not have
the same elements or one is not necessarily included in the other or
vice versa and therefore there could be no protection from being
prosecuted twice for the same act. Now that has been added on again
as part of the double jeopardy protection.
Now with respect to the same offense rule, an act must be punished by
the same statute or of different statutes but are considered of the
same offense. Of the same statutes or of different statutes but they are
considered to be falling under the term same offense. The reason for
this is to prevent from being harassed or punished twice for the same
offense not for the same act. Now invariably you have come across a
lot of cases involving double jeopardy and the requisites of double
jeopardy would range from 3 to 5 to 6, depending on the decision of
the Supreme Court. But to put in simpler terms, the requisites of
double jeopardy are as simple as:
1. The first jeopardy must have attached; and
2. The accused is charged for the same offense.
Those are the simplest requisites of when the double jeopardy
is charged again for the same offense. But when should the first
jeopardy attach? This is when the decisions of the Supreme Court
would put on all those 5 or 6 conditions as depending on who wrote
the decision. So,
1. there must have to be a court of competent jurisdiction;
2. that there is a valid information sufficient in form
and substance;
3. that the accused must have been validly arraigned; –
meaning there is a valid entry of plea
4
4. that the case has been terminated, dismissed or the
accused have been convicted or acquitted; (and then they
put on the next)
5. that the accused is charged for the same offense
But if we try to look into when is it considered that the first jeopardy
have attached, it simply would require that there is a valid indictment
in a court with competent jurisdiction with the case has been dismissed
without the express consent of the accused or that the accused have
been convicted or acquitted. And then the second requisite would be
that the accused is charge for the same offense.
When we say that there is a court of competent jurisdiction, obviously
the simplest test there is on the penalty ranges. But because of the
Supreme Court circulars on other special courts, there are some cases
which would discuss that if this should have been tried in a special
court, even in the same RTC that court which is not designated as a
special court where that case or information should have been filed
would be considered that the court has no jurisdiction, so the first
jeopardy will never attach. So, again while ordinarily the penalty range
is determinative of whether the court has jurisdiction or not, there are
special instances by reason of Supreme Court circulars in relation to
existing laws that special courts re designated to handle special kinds of
cases.
When information is considered sufficient in form and substance? If
just like in your Criminal Procedure the information is sufficient to
convict the accused. Meaning there is at least a prima facie recitation
of facts in the information which is sufficient to afford a conviction. So
that if conversely the information is totally defective in form and
substance even if the accused pleads guilty thereto, the accused cannot
be convicted of any crime simply because the information charges no
offense.
Now, with respect to the case being dismissed without the expressed
consent of the accused, that would accept of two exceptions.
The first would be when the accused invokes his right to speedy trial.
Of course when the accused files a motion to dismiss invoking his right
to speedy trial that is with his consent. But nevertheless because we all
know that the court grants the dismissal because of the valid claim of
right to speedy trial, it is considered an adjudication on the merits, the
accused is considered acquitted and first jeopardy will attach.
The second situation is when the accused files a demurrer to evidence.
We all know that after the presentation of the prosecution’s evidence,
the accused may ask within five days therefrom motion for leave to
review to evidence and file thereafter within ten days from the grant
the demurrer to evidence, simply asking the court that based on the
prosecution’s evidence, the evidence cannot be sufficient to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. If the court grants it even if the
dismissal is sought by the accused, it is considered an adjudication on
the merits, the accused considered acquitted and therefore first
jeopardy will attach.
When the second offense is filed, when is it considered that it is filed
for the same offense?
One, it is literally for the same offense.
The second case is literally the same as that of the first. When the
second case is an attempt of the crime subject of the first case.
Third , when the second case is a frustration of the crime subject of the
first case.
Next, when the second offense is necessarily included in the crime
subject of the first offense. So necessarily included, meaning all of the
elements in the second case constitutes some of the elements of the
first case.
Good example would be second case is homicide, first case is murder.
And conversely if the second offense necessarily includes that of the
first case. Some of the elements in the second case constitute all of the
elements of the first case.
And under the Rules of Court , when there is a valid plea of guilty to a
lesser offense. Under the present rules now, the plea of guilt to a lesser
offense is subject to two conditions:
1. There must have to be the express consent of the private offended
party and of the prosecutor. That of the private offended party can be
dispensed with if that private offended party fails to appear during the
pre-trial but generally, his consent must have to be sought also when
there is a plea of guilt to a lesser offense.
2. The second requisite which is the more important requisite is that
the lesser offense must necessarily be connected or included in the
offense charged. Prior to this amendment in the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, you can plead guilty to any lower offense. There is no
requirement that the lower offense must be included in the original
offense as charged. So you were charged before with say rape, you can
plead guilty to the felony of trespass to dwelling or illegal whatever.
Now it must necessarily be included in the offense charged.
So if you are charged say of murder, can you plead guilty to a lesser
offense of physical injuries? So the question is is physical injuries
necessarily included in murder? Is it? Pitik nimo ang mata, naigo,
nilakay, naa may lansang, homicide. Okay, for so long as the lesser
offense is necessarily included in the original offense as charged then
you can.
Now the exceptions to the application of the claim of double jeopardy:
1. Supervening fact. In the supervening fact, it presupposes that the
graver offense was or has developed as a supervening fact after the
first jeopardy had attached. Now there are three cases here in your
outline: Melo vs. People, People vs. City Court and People vs. Yorac.
2. Second exception now has been provided for by the rules, the facts
constituting the graver offense became known or were discovered only
after the filing of the former information.
I think that they put it in a very simple term that there is a filing of a
former information. It should have been that after the first jeopardy
could have attached. Filing an information and there must have to be
arraignment at least of the accused. At the very least. Just the same
when it could not be a supervening fact, the fact constituting graver
offense was discovered or was made known to him only after the first
information.
3. When there is an invalid plea of guilt to a lesser offense.
1. Two situations contemplated
CASES - PEOPLE VS. RELOVA, 148 SCRA 292 (1987)
PEOPLE VS. CITY COURT, 154 SCRA 195 (1987)
5
2. Rules of Court Provisions People vs. Manolong for which reason we are constrained to apply the
Rule 117, sec. 7 general rule of double jeopardy.”

FIRST FIRST SECOND JEOPARDY MUST BE FOR THE

MELO VS. PEOPLE, 85 Phil. 776 (1950) JEOPARDY JEOPARDY SAME OFFENSE OR FOR THE SAME ACT
MUST MUST HAVE
In this case of Melo vs. People, it involved the supervening fact HAVE BEEN VALIDLY
doctrine. So for example the accused was charged with attempted ATTACHED TERMINATED
homicide, he immediately pleaded guilty but the victim was not yet PRIOR TO
discharged from the hospital, even if the accused has already THE
pleaded guilty and thereafter died of the same injuries he sustained SECOND
nd
which was then present when the accused was charged and was When first When first When 2nd When 2 jeopardy for
convicted of attempted homicide. Will the case for consummated jeopardy jeopardy jeopardy for the same act?
homicide now be allowable or would it be barred by reason of attached? terminated? the same
double jeopardy protection? The answer is it should be allowed offense?
because of the concept or the doctrine of supervening fact.
1. When 1. Whe 1. whe 1. First
there n accused n the two charge is for an act
The rule of identity does not apply when the second offense was not in
is a is offenses punished by a law
existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that
valid acquitted are and an ordinance,
in such case, there is no possibility for the accused, during the first
compl identical and the second
prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent.
aint or 2. Whe charge under either
Thus, where the accused was charged with physical injuries and after
inform n accused 2. whe is for the same act.
conviction, the injured person dies, the charged for homicide against
ation is n the
the same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy.
convicted second is
2. The an
compl 3. Whe attempt to
PEOPLE VS. CITY COURT, 121 SCRA 637 (1983)
aint or n the case commit
inform is the first
ation otherwise
PEOPLE VS. YORAC, 42 SCRA 230 (1971)
was dismissed 3. Whe
filed in without n the
Rodrigo Yorac was prosecuted for frustrated murder arising allegedly
a the second is
from having assaulted, attacked, and hit with a piece of wood the
compe express a
offended party, for which he had been previously tried and sentenced
tent consent of frustration
for slight physical injuries, his plea being one of guilt. The later
court the of the first
information for frustrated murder was based on a second medical
accused
certificate after the lapse of one week from the former previously given
3. the 4. whe
by the same physician who, apparently, was much more thorough the
accuse n the first
second time, to the effect that the victim did suffer a greater injury
d has necessaril
than was at first ascertained. The lower court, considering that there
been y includes
was no, supervening fact that would negate the defense of double
arraign the
jeopardy, sustained the motion to quash.
ed and second
has
Issue: Whether the defendant, who had already been convicted of
pleade 5. when the
slight physical injuries before the City Court of Bacolod for injuries
d first is
inflicted upon Lam Hock, and had served sentence therefore, may be
necessaril
prosecuted anew for frustrated murder for the same act committed
y included
against the same person.
in the
second
Held: If after the first prosecution “a new fact supervenes on which
defendant may be held liable, resulting in altering the character of the
crime and giving rise to a new and distinct offense, “the accused cannot
be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense.” Double jeopardy; elements. Double jeopardy attaches only:
(1) upon a valid indictment,
We attribute the new finding of fracture, which evidently lengthened (2) before a competent court,
the period of healing of the wound, to the very superficial and (3) after arraignment,
inconclusive examination made on December 10, 1956. Had an X-ray (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and
examination been taken at the time, the fracture would have certainly (5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was
been disclosed. The wound causing the delay in healing was already in dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
existence at the time of the first examination, but said delay was, accused.
caused by the very superficial examination then made. As we have
stated, we find therefore that no supervening fact had occurred which OTHER CASES :
justifies the application of the rule in the case of Melo vs. People and IVLER VS. MODESTO-SAN PEDRO 635 SCRA 191 (2010)
YSIDORO VS. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO 665 SCRA 89 (2012)
6
BAUTISTA VS. CUNETA-PANGILINAN 684 SCRA 521 (2012)
D. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
Art. III, sec. 15
Sec. 15: The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion when public
safety requires it.
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
 It is a prerogative writ of liberty employed to test the validity of a
person’s detention
 It is directed to the person detaining another, commanding him to
produce the body of the prisoner @ a designated time and place, w/
the day and cause of his caption and detention, to do, to submit to, and
receive whatever the court or judge awarding the writ shall consider in
his behalf
 The OBJECT of this writ is the liberty of those who may be in prison
w/o sufficient cause
 An order issued by a court directed to a person (illegally) detaining
another, commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner at a
designated time and place, and to explain the cause of his detention.
(Cross reference: Special Proceedings)
 The Habeas Corpus is not filed against a person. It is a special
proceeding and not a civil action. If it were civil, then there is the
plaintiff and defendant. Here, there is only the petitioner. You petition
the court to issue a writ directing someone to return the person
illegally detained.
 If a person is restrained of his liberty, he or someone acting on his
behalf may file a petition for habeas corpus to secure his release. This
action shall take precedence in the calendar of the court and must be
acted upon immediately.
 Mere delay in the resolution of the issue will by itself constitute an
invalid derogation of a person’s right to unlawful restraint.
Rule 102, Rules of Court: Sec. 1. To what habeas corpus extends. -
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas
corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.
 The following grounds are recognized by the SC for the
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus:
1. deprivation of any fundamental or constitutional right;
2. lack of jurisdiction of the court to impose the sentence;
3. imposition of excessive penalties;
Q: When is this remedy available?
A: The writ may be resorted to where a person’s liberty is subjected to
physical restraint.
Q: Is this right/remedy limited to cases of physical restrain?
A: NO. Even moral restraint is a ground for the issuance of this writ
[CUANCA vs. SALAZAR].
INSTANCES WHEN THE WRIT CAN BE AVAILED OF:
1. If a person has finished serving his sentence, his
incarceration has become unlawful. The authorities no longer have any
right to keep him in prison. If he is not released, then his relatives can
file for Habeas Corpus.
2. When patients are detained in hospitals for failure to pay
the bill. If the corpse is not released, will the writ apply? No, because
the Bill of Rights can only be availed of by living citizens of the
Philippines, or aliens.
3. Custody of Children
4. When a person is denied of one or more of his constitutional
rights.
5. When restraint is involuntary and unnecessary
6. When the deprivation of freedom which was originally valid
becomes arbitrary later on
7. When the court has no jurisdiction to impose the sentence
8. Imposition of excessive penalties
PURPOSE: Best remedy for personal freedom because by the Writ of
HC, the object is the speedy release by judicial decree of persons who
are illegally detained or deprived of their liberty. This is a weapon
against arbitrary use of State power.
THREE WAYS OF COMPLYING WITH THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS:
1. Produce the body;
2. If the person is sick and cannot be safely brought to court,
affidavit;
3. Proving, by means of affidavit, that the person detained has
waived his right to be present (the person who is being detained will
produce the affidavit)
Note: Non-production of the person detained is sufficient ground to
hold the offender in contempt of court. The offender must exert all
efforts to produce the body, mere writing of letters is not enough.
INSTANCES WHEN THE JUDGE WILL NOT ISSUE THE WRIT:
1. If the person is in the custody of an officer and under process
issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court
of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the
process, render the judgment, or make the order. Meaning legal
detention. No way will the court issue the writ;
2. When a person has been judicially charged with or convicted
or a crime in the Philippines. Again, legal detention. You cannot use the
writ if the offense is bailable and you cannot post bail. You cannot use
the writ to get out of jail;
3. If the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person
shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the
process, judgment or order;
4. A person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment;
5. In the case of Panillo vs. Salonga (June 24, 1994), if the issue
of detention raised in the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is
necessarily related with another pending case;
6. If the petitioner has the remedy of appeal;
7. When the writ is suspended and the person is being detained
for the crimes covered by the suspension.
Note: Even if the President suspends the privilege of the Writ, anybody
can still file a petition of Habeas Corpus. The judge can still issue the
Writ. But once the writ reaches the detaining officer and it is proven
that the detainee is covered by the suspension that is the time that the
writ shall not be effective. The detaining officer merely has to prove
that the person detained is covered.
Q: Can the judge inquire as to the reason of the detention of the
detainee?
A: No, because the detainee is already covered. And the judge can no
longer order the release of the detainee.
What happens? Is the writ really suspended? It is only the privilege of
the writ that is suspended. So, even if there is rebellion, invasion,
anybody can still petition for habeas corpus. And just because there is
7
rebellion, the judge cannot say " I will not issue a writ.". So if there is an  The SC has the power to revoke extension if it is without factual
application, and it is shown that there is illegal detention, the judge will basis.
issue the writ. Unless the decision is legal.

Now, when the judge issues the writ, what happens. It is addressed to CASES: HABEAS CORPUS
the person detaining another. As a detaining officer, you have to prove,
you have to show the judge that he (the person detained) is covered by 1. Functions of the writ
the suspension, and once he is covered by the detention, the judge VILLAVICENCIO VS. LUKBAN, 39 Phil. 778 (1919)
cannot do anything anymore. But he (the judge) has to issue the writ, Facts: Mayor Lukban of Manila herded 120 prostitutes into a beer and
even if the privilege is suspended. brought from Manila to Davao. The relatives of some went and filed a
petition for habeas corpus. Mayor’s defense was that habeas corpus
 Art. 7, Sec. 18: The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall was not the proper remedy because there was no restraint of liberty.
apply only to persons judicially charged with rebellion or offenses
inherent in, or directly connected with invasion. Ruling: The court held that any restraint which will preclude freedom of
action is sufficient reason to issue the writ. The forcible taking of the
LIMITATIONS ON THE POWER OF THE PRESIDENT TO SUSPEND THE women by the city officials who handed those to other parties and
WRIT: deposited them in a distant region deprived them of locomotion as
1. Suspension is limited to 60 days only; effectively as if they had been imprisoned. Without money or
2. Congress may extend the period, upon initiative of the belongings, they were prevented from exercising their right of going
President, if the invasion or rebellion still exists after the 60 day period, where they want. So restraint continues until they are brought back to
with the condition that public safety requires it. Manila, unless they do not want to return.
3. Congress by a majority vote can revoke the suspension, and NOTE: The petition for habeas corpus can be filed by anybody in behalf
this suspension cannot be set aside by the president. of the detainee.
4. Any citizen can file a petition in the SC challenging the
decision and the court can look into the legality of the decision. (The IN RE GONZALES 526 SCRA 483 (2007)
issue now becomes a political question, and the Court must promulgate VELUZ VS. VILLANUEVA 543 SCRA 63 (2008)
its decision within 30 days) FLETCHER VS. DIRECTOR OF BUREAU 593 SCRA 265 (2009)
5. If the person is detained, these authorities can only detain AMPATUAN VS. MACARAIG 622 SCRA 266 (2010)
him for 3 days. (if he is arrested without a warrant) He has to be
charged with an offense. 2. The writ of habeas corpus as a post conviction remedy
6. The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to CASES - LAMEN VS. DIRECTOR, 241 SCRA 573 (1995)
persons judicially charges with rebellion or offenses inherent in, or
directly connected with invasion. 3. Suspension of the privilege
Art. VIII, sec. 18
 A prisoner may avail of this remedy to secure his release if he was CASE - LANSANG VS. GARCIA, 42 SCRA 488 (1971)
convicted by a court w/o jurisdiction or his sentence had become
invalid [ALCANTARA vs. DIR. OF PRISONS 75 Phil. 749]. E. Affirmative rights
 The right is also available to a person sentenced to a longer
penalty than that subsequently meted out to another person convicted 1. Free access to the courts
of the same offense [GUMABON vs. DIR. OF PRISONS 37 SCRA 420]. Art. III, sec. 11
 Habeas Corpus may also be resorted to in case of a wrongful
denial of bail [ZAFRA vs. CITY WARDEN]. Section 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and
 HOWEVER where a decision is only tainted w/ errors of law, a adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason
petition for habeas corpus will not lie. If the error does not go to the of poverty.
jurisdiction of the court, the proper remedy would not be the
prerogative writ but an ordinary appeal [CELESTE vs. PEOPLE 31 SCRA
391].
 BUT if the error alleged denies the right to a speedy trial, the same PAUPER INDIGENT
is considered jurisdictional and so may be corrected on habeas corpus  need not be persons so  persons who have no
[CONDE vs. RIVERA 45 Phil. 650]. poor that they must be property or sources of income
 The writ itself is not suspended --- thus it may be issued --- but supported at public expense sufficient for their support aside
only the privilege --- meaning it cannot be given effect.  those protected include from their own labor though self-
NOTE: See also ARTICLE VII Sec. 18. lowly-paid employees, supporting when able to work and
 The SC has the power to annul the suspension of the privilege if domes-tic servants and in employment
the same is not based on the grounds enumerated in the constitution: laborers
1. invasion or rebellion
2. when the public safety so requires.
 While the President may suspend the privilege of the writ or
impose martial law for 60 days, Congress may, on his initiative, extend Case – MARTINEZ VS. PEOPLE 332 SCRA 694 (2000)
such measures with the concurrence of only a majority of its members
voting jointly --- same vote needed to revoke presidential acts. The 2. Protection and enforcement of constitutional rights
extension may be indefinite, depending on the discretion of the Art. III, sec. 12(4)
legislature; which may be dictated by the President. Art. VIII, sec. 5(5)
Art. XIII, sec. 18(3)

8

WRIT OF AMPARO
 It was promulgated on October 24, 2007 "in light of the prevalence
of extralegal killing and enforced disappearances." It was an exercise
for the Court's expanded power to promulgate rules to protect the
people's constitutional rights, which made its maiden appearance in
the 1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of the
martial law regime.
 The Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem
of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in
its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats
thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due
process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings."
CHARACTERISTICS OF ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES:
1. An arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a
government official or organized groups or private individuals acting
with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government;
2. The refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of
the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of
liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law.
 The1987 Constitution does not explicitly provide for the writ of
Amparo. But the second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution, the Grave Abuse Clause, provides for the judicial power
"to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government." The Clause accords a
similar general protection to human rights extended by the Amparo
contra leyes, Amparo casacion, and Amparo administrativo. Amparo
libertad is comparable to the remedy of habeas corpus found in several
provisions of the 1987 Constitution.
 Writ of Amparo offers a better remedy to extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances and threats thereof. The remedy provides
rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that
requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs
available to the petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt
requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages
requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility
requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive
proceedings.
 The writ of Amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in
addressing the problem of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of
impunity in the commission of these offenses; it is curative in that it
facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators as it will
inevitably yield leads to subsequent investigation and action. In the
long run, the goal of both the preventive and curative roles is to deter
the further commission of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances.
 It is similar to habeas corpus, only broader. This is practiced in
Mexico. And petition can be filed for deprivation of any constitutional
right.
WRIT OF AMPARO - AM No. 07-9-12-SC of September
25, 2007 as amended on October 16, 2007)
TAPUZ vs. DEL ROSARIO
554 SCRA 768
Facts: The private respondents spouses Sanson filed a complaint for
forcible entry and damages against the. The private respondents
alleged in their complaint that: (1) they are the registered owners the
disputed land; (2) they were the disputed land's prior possessors when
the petitioners - armed with bolos and carrying suspected firearms and
together with unidentified persons numbering 120 - entered the
disputed land by force and intimidation, without the private
respondents' permission and against the objections of the private
respondents' security men, and built thereon a nipa and bamboo
structure.
The petitioners denied the material allegations of the
complaint. They essentially claimed that: (1) they are the actual and
prior possessors of the disputed land; (2) on the contrary, the private
respondents are the intruders; and (3) the private respondents'
certificate of title to the disputed property is spurious. They asked for
the dismissal of the complaint and interposed a counterclaim for
damages.
Subsequently, private respondents filed a motion for
demolition. Meanwhile, the petitioners opposed the motion for
demolition. The respondent Judge nevertheless issued via a Special
Order a writ of demolition after the Sheriff's written notice to the
petitioners to voluntarily demolish their house/s to allow the private
respondents to effectively take actual possession of the land. When the
sheriif used the notice to vacate and for demolition, petitioners filed a
petition which contains and prays for three remedies, namely: a
petition for certiorari; the issuance of a writ of habeas data under the
Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data; and finally, the issuance of the writ of
amparo under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
The petitioners alleged in their motion that a petition for a
WRIT OF HABEAS DATA is prayed for so that the PNP may release the
report on the burning of the homes of the petitioners and the acts of
violence employed against them by the private respondents, furnishing
the Court and the petitioners with copy of the same; and that
petitioners apply for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA commanding the PNP to
produce the police report pertaining to the burning of the houses of
the petitioners in the land in dispute and likewise the investigation
report if an investigation was conducted by the PNP."
Issue: WON the issuance of the writ of habeas date is valid.
Ruling: The SC ruled that the petitions for certiorari and issuance of a
writ of habeas data fatally defective, both in substance and in form. The
petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo, on the other hand, is
fatally defective with respect to content and substance.
The petitioner’s allegations obviously lack what the Rule on
Writ of Habeas Data requires as a minimum, thus rendering the
petition fatally deficient. Specifically, there were no concrete
allegations of unjustified or unlawful violation of the right to privacy
related to the right to life, liberty or security. The petition likewise has
not alleged, much less demonstrated, any need for information under
the control of police authorities other than those it has already set
forth as integral annexes. The necessity or justification for the issuance
of the writ, based on the insufficiency of previous efforts made to
secure information, has not also been shown. In sum, the prayer for the
issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more than the "fishing
expedition" that the SC - in the course of drafting the Rule on habeas
data - had in mind in defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas data
is not. In these lights, the outright denial of the petition for the issuance
of the writ of habeas data is fully in order.
CANLAS vs. NAPICO HOMEOWNERS
554 SCRA 208
9
Facts: Petitioners are settlers in a certain parcel of land situated in
Pasig City. Their dwellings/houses have either been demolished as of
the time of filing of the petition, or is about to be demolished pursuant
to a court judgment. Hence, they filed a petition for writ of Amparo
before the SC alleging that they were deprived of their liberty, freedom
and/or rights to shelter enshrined and embodied in our Constitution, as
the result of these nefarious activities of both the Private and Public
Respondents.
Issue: WON the issuance of a writ of Amparo is proper.
Ruling: The Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides that, “The petition for
a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life,
liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof. The threatened demolition of a
dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the court, which in this case
was affirmed with finality by this Court is not included among the
enumeration of rights as stated in the above-mentioned provision for
which the remedy of a writ of amparo is made available. Their claim to
their dwelling, assuming they still have any despite the final and
executory judgment adverse to them, does not constitute right to life,
liberty and security. There is, therefore, no legal basis for the issuance
of the writ of amparo.
Under Section 6 of the same rules, the court shall issue the
writ upon the filing of the petition, only if on its face, the court ought to
issue said writ. Thus, under said provision,. “Upon the filing of the
petition, the court, justice or judge shall immediately order the
issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue. The clerk of court
shall issue the writ under the seal of the court; or in case of urgent
necessity, the justice or the judge may issue the writ under his or her
own hand, and may deputize any officer or person to serve it. The writ
shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition
which shall not be later than seven (7) days from the date of its
issuance. “
Considering that there is no legal basis for its issuance, as in
this case, the writ will not be issued and the petition will be dismissed
outright. This new remedy of writ of amparo is intended for the
protection of the highest possible rights of any person, which is his or
her right to life, liberty and security.
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE vs. MANALO
OCTOBER 7, 2008
Facts: The case at bar involves the rights to life, liberty and security in
the first petition for a writ of Amparo filed before the SC. This case was
originally a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) filed before the SC respondents (therein
petitioners) to stop herein petitioners (therein respondents) and/or
their officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty
and other basic rights. In SC’s resolution, it ordered (1) ordered the
Secretary of the Department of National Defense and the Chief of Staff
of the AFP, their agents, representatives, or persons acting in their
stead, including but not limited to the Citizens Armed Forces
Geographical Unit (CAFGU) to submit their Comment; and (2) enjoined
them from causing the arrest of therein petitioners, or otherwise
restricting, curtailing, abridging, or depriving them of their right to life,
liberty, and other basic rights as guaranteed under Article III, Section 1
of the 1987 Constitution.
While the Petition was pending, the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo took effect. Petitioners filed a Manifestation and Omnibus
Motion to Treat Existing Petition as Amparo Petition, to Admit
Supporting Affidavits, and to Grant Interim and Final Amparo Reliefs.
They prayed that: (1) the petition be considered a Petition for the Writ
of Amparo under Sec. 26 of the Amparo Rule; (2) the Court issue the
writ commanding therein respondents to make a verified return within
the period provided by law and containing the specific matter required
by law; (3) they be granted the interim reliefs allowed by the Amparo
Rule and all other reliefs prayed for in the petition but not covered by
the Amparo Rule; (4) the Court, after hearing, render judgment as
required in Sec. 18 of the Amparo Rule; and (5) all other just and
equitable reliefs. The Court resolved to treat the Petition as a petition
under the Amparo Rule and accordingly, the privilege of writ of Amparo
was granted.
Issue: WON respondents have a right to the privilege of the writ of
Amparo.
Ruling: The production order under the Amparo Rule should not be
confused with a search warrant for law enforcement under Article III,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. This Constitutional provision is a
protection of the people from the unreasonable intrusion of the
government, not a protection of the government from the demand of
the people such as respondents.
Instead, the Amparo production order may be likened to the
production of documents or things under Section 1, Rule 27 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure which provides in relevant part. Petitioners
assert that the disclosure of the present places of assignment of M/Sgt.
Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas, as well as the submission
of a list of medical personnel, is irrelevant, improper, immaterial, and
unnecessary in the resolution of the petition for a writ of Amparo. They
add that it will unnecessarily compromise and jeopardize the exercise
of official functions and duties of military officers and even unwittingly
and unnecessarily expose them to threat of personal injury or even
death.
On the contrary, the disclosure of the present places of
assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas,
whom respondents both directly implicated as perpetrators behind
their abduction and detention, is relevant in ensuring the safety of
respondents by avoiding their areas of territorial jurisdiction. Such
disclosure would also help ensure that these military officers can be
served with notices and court processes in relation to any investigation
and action for violation of the respondents' rights. The list of medical
personnel is also relevant in securing information to create the medical
history of respondents and make appropriate medical interventions,
when applicable and necessary.
In blatant violation of our hard-won guarantees to life, liberty
and security, these rights are snuffed out from victims of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances. The writ of Amparo is a tool that
gives voice to preys of silent guns and prisoners behind secret walls.
Hence, the petition was dismissed.
REYES VS. CA 606 SCRA 580 (2009)
SO VS. TACLA 633 SCRA 563 (2010)
MANILA ELECTRIC VS. LIM 632 SCRA 195 (2010)
Annotation: WRIT OF AMPARO 605 SCRA 642 (2009)
WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
 Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the
following material allegations of ultimate facts in a petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas data:
(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the
respondent;
10
 (b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and
how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved
party;
(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the
data or information;
(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the
government office, and the person in charge, in possession or in
control of the data or information, if known;
(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating,
rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or
information or files kept by the respondent.
In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining
the act complained of; and
(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable."

WRIT OF HABEAS DATA – AM No. 08-1-16-SC of

22 January 2008)

Cases – GAMBOA VS. CHAN 677 SCRA 385 (2012)

SAEZ VS. ARROYO 681 SCRA 678 (2012)

3. Compensation to, and rehabilitation of victims of tortures

Art. III, sec. 12(4)

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations
of this section as well as compensation to the rehabilitation of
victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.

11