REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

SANDIGANBAYAN
Quezon City
--------

First Division

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Criminal Case No. 26500

Plaintiff,

- versus -

Present:
FELINO U. BANGALAN,
Presiding Judge, Municipal LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
Trial Court, PJ, Chairman
Accused. PERALTA and
GESMUNDO, JJ.

Promulgated:
August 22, 2006

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DECISION

GESMUNDO, J.:

Judge Felino U. Bangalan is accused of the crime of Rendering

Unjust Interlocutory Order, defined and penalized under Article 206
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in an Information quoted as
follows:
“That on August 27, 1996, in the municipality of Aparri,
Province of Cagayan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, above-named accused, FELINO BANGALAN,
a public officer, being the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial
Court of Aparri, Cagayan, committing the offense in relation to his
office, and taking advantage of his official position, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously render an unjust
interlocutory order in Criminal case No. A-8016 declaring one
FLAVIANO CORTES guilty of direct contempt of court and
sentencing the latter to an imprisonment of One (1) day and a fine
of Ten Pesos (P10.00), an order which the Supreme Court found in
its Resolution dated January 19, 2000 to have been issued for
DECISION
Criminal Case No. 26500
People v. Bangalan
Page 2 of 19
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retaliation or vindication purposes and through gross inexcusable

ignorance , thereby causing undue injury to FLAVIANO CORTES.

CONTRARY TO LAW.”1

The generative facts of the case are as narrated by the

Supreme Court in Flaviano B. Cortes v. Judge Felino Banagalan:2

“Complainant is one of the accused in Criminal Case No.

8016 entitled “People vs. Merlyn Chua, et al.” for Adultery, which
was raffled to respondent Judge Felino Bangalan of the Municipal
Trial Court of Aparri-Calayan, Cagayan. Complainant moved for
the voluntary inhibition of respondent judge on the ground that
the latter could not be impartial over the criminal case since the
complainant had previously filed on August 9, 1996 a letter-
complaint addressed to Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L.
Suarez. It appears that the letter-complaint was filed with the
Judicial and Bar Council opposing the nomination of respondent
judge for RTC judge.

In the Order dated August 27, 1996, complainant was

declared guilty of direct contempt of court and sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of one (1) day and a fine of P 10.00. The respondent
judge opined that complainant, in filing the letter with the enclosed
administrative complaint, has filed a pleading containing
derogatory, offensive or malicious statements ‘equivalent to
misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or
judge as to interrupt the proceedings before the same within the
meaning of Rule 71.’ Respondent judge further stated that the
letter contained condemnable allegations which are ‘absolutely
false, baseless and licentious, as in fact based on rumors’.

Complainant filed a notice of appeal from the Order of

August 27, 1996 which was given due course by the respondent
judge, in his Order of September 9, 1996 but ordered complainant
to submit a record on appeal. For failure of complainant to submit
the record on appeal, respondent judge, in his Order of September
30, 1996, denied the notice of appeal and ordered that a warrant of
arrest be issued against complainant for the service of the
sentence for direct contempt. Complainant was arrested on
October 1, 1996 and stayed in jail for one (1) day and paid a fine of
ten (P 10.00) pesos.”3

1
Record, p. 1.
2
A.M. No. MTJ-97-1129, 19 January 2000, 322 SCRA 249.
3
A.M. No. MTJ-97-1129, 19 January 2000, 322 SCRA 249, 251(citations omitted).
DECISION
Criminal Case No. 26500
People v. Bangalan
Page 3 of 19
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The Supreme Court came into the picture by virtue of an

administrative complaint filed by complaining witness Flaviano B.
Cortes (Cortes) charging the accused with (1) oppressive conduct
and abuse of authority for holding him in direct contempt and (2)
gross ignorance of the law for requiring him to file a record of
appeal despite the fact that this was not required by the Rules of
Court.

In its Resolution4 dated 19 January 2000, the Supreme Court

adopted the findings of the Court Administrator adverse to the
accused but reduced the penalty to a fine equivalent to accused’s
one month salary with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

After receipt of the Supreme Court’s Resolution, Cortes filed

with the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint against the
accused for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment as defined
and penalized under Article 204 and for issuing an unjust
interlocutory order as defined and penalized under Article 206 of
the RPC. The Office of the Ombudsman, however, found the
contempt order of the accused to be merely interlocutory, falling
squarely under Article 206 of the RPC such that the instant
Information is only for violation of Article 206 of the RPC. 5

The accused was arraigned on 29 March 2001 and with the

assistance of his counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty.6

4
Exhibit “C-1” for the prosecution.
5
Record, pp. 9-10.
6
Id. at 35.
DECISION
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People v. Bangalan
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In the Pre-trial Order dated 26 June 2001, the Court declared

that both the prosecution and the accused admitted the
genuineness of the originals and the fidelity of the reproductions of
each others’ documentary exhibits. 7

After the presentation of its documentary evidence and

without presenting any testimonial evidence, the prosecution
submitted its written Formal Offer of Evidence on 27 July 2001 and
thereafter, rested its case.8 Since the accused, through his counsel,
manifested interposing that he had no objection to the admission of
the documentary exhibits offered by the Prosecution, 9 the Court
then resolved to admit its Exhibits “A”, “B”’ “B-1”, “C” and “C-1”. 10

Thereafter, the accused moved to dismiss the charge on

demurrer to evidence on the ground that the prosecution failed to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 11 This
was opposed by the prosecution on the ground that the evidence
presented by it was not merely substantial but constituted proof
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the offense. 12
In its Resolution dated 3 November 2004, the Court denied the
demurrer and ordered the accused to commence the presentation of
his evidence.13

The accused was the sole witness for the defense.

Accordingly, after the termination of his testimony, he was ordered
to submit his written formal offer of exhibits and the prosecution to
7
Record, pp. 57-59.
8
Id. at 62-63.
9
Id. at 75.
10
Id. at 133.
11
Id. at 136-143.
12
Id. at 149-151.
13
Id. at 152-155.
DECISION
Criminal Case No. 26500
People v. Bangalan
Page 5 of 19
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file its comment and opposition thereto and after which the parties
shall file their respective Memoranda. 14

The accused submitted his written Formal Offer of

Documentary Exhibits on 10 December 2004 15 with the prosecution
filing its comments and objections thereto on February 3, 2005. 16
On 7 February 2005, the Court resolved to admit all the documents
for the accused for the purposes for which they were offered. 17

After the lapse of the period given to the parties within which
to file their respective memoranda and without any memoranda
submitted by them, the case is now deemed submitted for decision.

The Information indicts the accused, Felino U. Bangalan, a

public officer, being the Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Circuit
Trial Court (MCTC) of Aparri, Cagayan, with an offense committed
in relation to his office when he allegedly rendered an unjust
interlocutory order in Criminal Case No. A-8016 for adultery when
he declared Cortes – the accused therein -- in direct contempt of
court to which the latter was sentenced to an imprisonment of one
day and a fine of Ten Pesos (P10.00).

For the crime of knowingly rendering an unjust interlocutory

order to exist, as defined and penalized under Article 206 of the
RPC, the following elements must concur:

14
Record, p. 159-A.
15
Id. at 160-161.
16
Id. at 170-173.
17
Id. at 171.
DECISION
Criminal Case No. 26500
People v. Bangalan
Page 6 of 19
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1) The offender is a judge;

2) He performs any of the following acts:
a) Knowingly rendering an unjust interlocutory order or
decree; or
b) Rendering a manifestly unjust interlocutory order
through inexcusable negligence or ignorance. 18

The first element is not in dispute. The second element,

however, has not been proven by the prosecution beyond
reasonable doubt. Necessarily, for failure to prove all the elements
of the crime beyond reasonable doubt, the accused must be
acquitted thereof.

It needs to be stressed at the outset that the law speaks of an

“interlocutory order” as opposed to a final decision or order which is
covered by other provisions of the RPC.19

The distinction between an interlocutory order and one that is

final is definite and settled.
“A court order is final if it puts an end to the particular
matter there resolved or settles definitely the subject therein
disposed of such that no further questions can come before the
court except with respect to its execution. Such an order may
refer to the entire controversy or to some defined and
separate branch thereof. On the other hand, an order is
interlocutory if its effects are merely provisional in character and
still leave substantial proceedings to be further conducted by the
issuing court in order to put the issue or controversy to rest.” 20

18
Layola vs. Judge Basilio Gabo, A. M. No. RTJ-00-1524. Jan. 26, 2000. 323
SCRA 348, 353.
19
See Articles 204 and 205 of the RPC.
20
Tamboan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138219, 17 September 2001, 365 SCRA
359, 369 (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied).
DECISION
Criminal Case No. 26500
People v. Bangalan
Page 7 of 19
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Thus, the fundamental test to determine whether the order for

direct contempt is final or interlocutory is: Does the order leave
something else to be done by the trial court on the case? If it does,
it is interlocutory, it not, it is final. 21

The contempt order subject matter of herein case is a final

order. In the 1933 case of Slade Perkins v. Director of Prisons,22 the
Supreme Court already had occasion to discuss that the
punishment for any contumacious act that is purportedly directed
against the authority and dignity of a court is deemed a judgment
in a criminal case and subject to review only in the manner
provided for review of judgments in criminal cases. A person guilty
of direct contempt can be punished summarily without need for
hearing.23 Once the Order of contempt is issued, there is nothing
left for the judge to do; hence, the person held in contempt of court
has no other remedy in law to stop the execution of the order but to
appeal therefrom (if issued before the 1997 amendment to the Rules
of Civil Procedure, as in this case) or to file a special civil action for
certiorari or prohibition (if filed under the amended rule 24) while
posting a bond for his provisional liberty. The rule prevailing at the
time material to this case reads:
21
Ibid. citing De Ocampo v. Republic, No. L-19533, 31 October 1963, 9 SCRA 440, 443.
22
G.R. No. 39676, 30 June 1933, 58 Phil. 271.
23
Dantes v. Judge Caguioa, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1919, 27 June 2005, 461 SCRA 236,
244; SECTION 1, Rule 71. Direct contempt punished summarily. – A person guilty of
misbehaving in the presence of or so near a court of judge as to obstruct or interrupt
the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court or judge,
offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness,
or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required so to do, may be
summarily adjudged in contempt by such court or judge and punished by fine not
exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it
be a superior court, or judge thereof, or by fine not exceeding ten pesos or
imprisonment not exceeding (1) days, or both, if it be an inferior court.
24
Sec. 2, Rule 71. Remedy therefrom.. -- The person adjudged in direct contempt
by any court may not appeal therefrom, but may avail himself of the remedies of
certiorari and prohibition. The execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending
resolution of such petition, provided such person files a bond fixed by the court which
rendered the judgment and conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment
should the petition be decided against him.
DECISION
Criminal Case No. 26500
People v. Bangalan
Page 8 of 19
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SEC. 2. Appeal. – The person adjudged in contempt by an

inferior court may appeal from the judgment to the Court of First
Instance of the province, and, as in ordinary criminal cases,
execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending the appeal
upon such person filing a bond conditioned that he will abide by
and perform the judgment should the appeal be decided against
him. Judgment of superior courts on direct contempt shall not be
appealable.

It is immaterial that the contempt order was issued during the

proceedings for adultery as the former did not form part of the
latter. The issue of whether or not Cortes was guilty of direct
contempt of court is completely alien to the issue in the main case
of whether or not the accused in the information for adultery are
guilty thereof. Thus, in Presidential Commission on Good
Government v. Sandiganbayan,25 now Chief Justice Panganiban, in
his concurring opinion, characterized a motion to disqualify counsel
as a final order as it refers to a “definite and separate branch” of the
main controversy as opposed to an issue which is “intimately
related to the very cause of action or merits of the case.” 26

In fact, the Supreme Court acknowledged in Cortes v. Judge

Bangalan that Cortes had filed an appeal of the subject order.
Accordingly, as the 27 August 1996 contempt citation is not an
interlocutory order but one that is final subject only to appeal to a
higher court, the accused cannot be adjudged guilty of rendering an
unjust interlocutory order under Article 206 of the RPC.

And, while there is proof that the subject order is actually a

final judgment, nonetheless, accused cannot be legally convicted of
25
G.R. Nos. 151809-12, 12 April 2005, 455 SCRA 526, 594-595.
26
Citing Republic v. Tacloban City Ice Plant, Inc., G.R. No. 106413, 5 July 1996,
258 SCRA 145.
DECISION
Criminal Case No. 26500
People v. Bangalan
Page 9 of 19
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rendering an unjust judgment under either Articles 204 or 205 of

the RPC. The said provisions provide:
Art. 204. Knowingly rendering unjust judgment. -- Any judge
who shall knowingly render an unjust judgment in any case
submitted to him for decision, shall be punished by prision mayor
and perpetual absolute disqualification.

Art. 205. Judgment rendered through negligence. – Any judge

who, by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance, shall
render a manifestly unjust judgment in any case submitted to him
for decision shall be punished by arresto mayor and temporary
special disqualification.

The distinguishing element of Article 206 is an interlocutory

order issued by an accused judge while both Articles 204 and 205
refer to a final judgment/order. In fact and in law, and as
previously discussed, an interlocutory order is completely distinct
from one that is final. Hence, an interlocutory order cannot be
included in nor does it include a final judgment or order.

Since the information charges accused of the issuance of an

unjust interlocutory order, to convict him for the issuance of an
unjust final order would be to violate his constitutional right to be
informed of the charges against him.27

Even if were to assume that the accused can be validly

convicted under Articles 204 or 205, still, the prosecution failed to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that he intentionally and willfully
rendered subject order knowing it to be unjust (or that he rendered
a manifestly unjust order through inexcusable negligence or
ignorance issued the contempt order in bad faith).

27
People v. Morico, G.R. No. 92660, 14 July 1995, 246 SCRA 214, 219.
DECISION
Criminal Case No. 26500
People v. Bangalan
Page 10 of 19
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As mentioned previously herein, the prosecution shied away

from any testimonial evidence and presented only documentary
evidence comprising the following:

EXHIBIT DESCRIPTION PURPOSE

“A” Order dated 27 August 1996 of the To prove that the
accused in his capacity as MCTC accused issued a
Judge citing complaining witness Contempt Order on
Cortez in direct contempt of court. January 19, 2000
against complaining
witness.
“B” Certificate of Discharge from jail To prove that
dated 2 October 1996 of complaining witness
complaining witness Cortez signed served the penalty
by jailer SJ02 Custodio S. Salvador, imposed by the
for reason of direct contempt. accused in his
Contempt Order (Exh.
“A”) to his damage and
prejudice.

“B-1” Official Receipt No. 6598577 dated 1 Same as “B”

October 1996 issued by MCTC-
Office of the Clerk of Court of
Appari, with complaining witness as
payor.

“C” Notice of Judgment of the Third To prove that the

Division of the Supreme Court dated Honorable Supreme
19 January 2000 in Flaviano Cortez Court found that
v. Judge Felino U. Bangalan”, A.M. accused was grossly
No. MTJ-97-1199 signed by Julieta negligent in his act of
Carreon. issuing the Contempt
Order (Exh. “A”)
without any concern or
conscious regard to
consequences in so far
as the complaining
witness was affected.

“C-1” Resolution of the Third Division of Same as “C”

the Supreme Court dated 19
January 2000 in Flaviano Cortez v.
Judge Felino U. Bangalan”, A.M. No.
MTJ-97-1199.
DECISION
Criminal Case No. 26500
People v. Bangalan
Page 11 of 19
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As gleaned from the purpose for which they were offered,

exhibits “A”, “B” and “B-1”, by themselves and on their face, do not
prove that the contempt order was unjust and that this was
rendered knowingly or in bad faith or through inexcusable
negligence or ignorance. Verily, “the power to punish for contempt
is inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of order
in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders
and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due
administration of justice.”28 This means that accused, as MTC
judge, had all the right and the power to cite a person in contempt
of court when the situation would so warrant it. Accused had all
the right and the power to summarily adjudge a person in direct
contempt of court for submitting a motion for inhibition containing
derogatory, offensive or malicious statements submitted to the
court in which the proceedings are pending. 29

The prosecution’s burden, therefore, is two-fold: not only

should it prove that the contempt order was unwarranted or unjust
but also that it was rendered with malice and in bad faith or
through inexcusable negligence or ignorance.

And this is where exhibits “C” and “C-1” come in. The
prosecution concentrated all its efforts on these two documents,
banking heavily on the Supreme Court resolution imposing upon
accused a fine equivalent to one month salary in an administrative
case filed by Cortes for oppressive conduct and abuse of authority

28
Slade Perkins v. Director of Prisons, supra note 22.
29
Wicker v. Arcangel, G.R. No. 112869, 29 June 1996; Ceniza v. Sebastian, No. L-
399914, 2 July 1984, 130 SCRA 295.
DECISION
Criminal Case No. 26500
People v. Bangalan
Page 12 of 19
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for the same act subject matter of herein criminal case and for
gross ignorance of the law for requiring Cortes to file a record on
appeal. It is the prosecution’s position that the Supreme Court
resolution constitutes the best proof of accused’s criminal liability
for knowingly rendering an unjust order.

By presenting only the Supreme Court resolution, together

with exhibits “A” to “B-1”, the prosecution seems to be working on
the mistaken notion that what constitutes as adequate proof in an
administrative case is likewise adequate proof in a criminal case.

Nothing can be farther from the truth. Elementary is the rule

that the quantum of proof required in administrative proceedings is
merely substantial evidence unlike in criminal cases which require
proof beyond reasonable doubt.30 As succinctly put by the
Supreme Court:
“Administrative proceedings are governed by the ‘substantial
evidence rule.’ A finding of guilt in an administrative case would
have to be sustained for as long as it is supported by substantial
evidence that the respondent has committed the acts stated in the
complaint or formal charge. As defined, substantial evidence is
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. This is different from the
quantum of proof required in criminal proceedings which
necessitates a finding of guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt.”31

Parenthetically, it should be stressed that the basis of

administrative liability differs from criminal liability. 32 The purpose
of administrative proceedings is mainly to protect the public service,
based on the time-honored principle that a public office is a public
30
Office of the Court Administrator v. Cañete, A.M. No. P-91-621, 10 November
2004, 441 SCRA 512, 520.
31
Velasquez, et al. v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 150732, 31 August 2004, 437 SCRA 357, 369.
32
Cf. Valencia, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 141336, 29 June 2004, 433
SCRA 88, 99.
DECISION
Criminal Case No. 26500
People v. Bangalan
Page 13 of 19
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trust while the purpose of the criminal prosecution is the

punishment of crime.33 Moreover, a judge cannot be subjected to
criminal liability for any error he commits provided he acts in good
faith.34 Good faith, therefore, is a defense in a criminal case for
rendering an unjust order or decision. 35

In order that the accused may be held criminally liable for

citing Cortes in contempt of court, therefore, it must be shown
beyond reasonable doubt that the order is unjust in the sense that
it is contrary to law or is not supported by the evidence, and the
same was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an
injustice.36

In this case, the prosecution has not gone beyond the findings
in the administrative case that accused’s order of contempt
“obviously smacks of retaliation.” The basis for such a finding was
the fact that Cortes attached to his motion for inhibition an
administrative complaint against the accused and that instead of
resolving the motion, accused cited Cortes in contempt of court. As
judges in general should use their contempt power sparingly, the
Supreme Court concluded that accused’s act of automatically citing
Cortes in contempt of court by virtue of the attached administrative
complaint was personally motivated. The Supreme Court held:
“Complainant charges respondent judge with gross
ignorance of the law, oppressive conduct and abuse of authority
when the latter held in contempt of court on account of the
33
Ibid.
34
Evangelista v. Baes, Adm. Case No. 741-CAR, 26 December 1974, 61 SCRA 476,
479.
35
See Maquiran v. Grugeda, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1888, 11 February 2005, 451 SCRA
15, 42 citing Basa Air Base Savings & Loans Association, Inc. v. Judge Pimentel, Adm.
Matter No. RTJ-01-1648, 22 August 2002, 387 SCRA 542, 547.
36
Cf. Sta. Maria v. Ubay, Adm. Matter No. 595-CFI, 11 December 1978, 87 SCRA
179, 188 citing In re: Climaco, Adm. Case No. 134-J, 21 January 1974, 55 SCRA 106,
119. See also Evangelista v. Baes, supra note 34.
DECISION
Criminal Case No. 26500
People v. Bangalan
Page 14 of 19
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statements he made in his letter-complaint which statements,

complainant insists, are absolutely privileged in nature.
Complainant further alleges that he filed a notice of appeal from
the order of contempt but respondent directed him to submit a
record on appeal despite the fact that the same is not required
under the rules.

In his Comment, respondent judge avers that the statements

contained in the letter-complaint were not absolutely privileged in
nature. He contends that whenever a pleading filed contains
derogatory, offensive or malicious statements, the same can be
likened to a misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a
court or judge as to interrupt the proceedings before it. He further
avers that the contempt order was necessitated under the
circumstances to protect and maintain the dignity and integrity of
the court against condemnable allegations which are absolutely
baseless as they were based on rumors. Respondent judge further
insists that a record on appeal is required to perfect an appeal
from a contempt order.

Complainant filed a Reply to Comment, alleging that the

letter-complaint filed against respondent judge before the Office of
the Court Administrator was not a pleading filed before the sala of
the respondent judge; that the supposed offensive language was
not directed to the court but to the Supreme Court before which
the complaint was lodged. Complainant contends that respondent
judge retaliated using the contempt powers of the court in an
abusive and oppressive manner. He further avers that respondent
judge is grossly ignorant of the elementary rule requiring a record
on appeal in multiple appeals.

Both parties manifested that they are willing to submit the

case on the basis of the pleadings on file.

The Court Administrator recommended that respondent

judge be fined in an amount equivalent to his two (2) months
salary with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts
in the future will be dealt with more severely.

We agree with the recommendation, but we believe that the

recommended penalty is too harsh and should be reduced.

While it is true that the complainant attached the

administrative letter-complaint in his letter for respondent judge to
inhibit in the criminal case, it was used merely to support his
contention in his motion for inhibition. A judge is bound never to
consider lightly a motion for his inhibition that questions or puts
to doubt, however insignificant, his supposed predilection to a case
pending before him. The alleged offensive and contemptuous
language contained in the letter-complaint was not directed to the
DECISION
Criminal Case No. 26500
People v. Bangalan
Page 15 of 19
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respondent court. As observed by the Court Administrator, ‘what

respondent should have done in this particular case is that he
should have given the Court (Supreme Court) the opportunity to
rule on the complaint and not simply acted precipitately in citing
complainant in contempt of court in a manner which obviously
smacks of retaliation rather than the upholding of a court's
honor.’

A judge may not hold a party in contempt of court for

expressing concern on his impartiality even if the judge may have
been insulted therein. While the power to punish in contempt is
inherent in all courts so as to preserve order in judicial
proceedings and to uphold the due administration of justice,
judges, however, should exercise their contempt powers judiciously
and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in view of
utilizing their contempt powers for correction and preservation not
for retaliation or vindication.

Anent the charge of gross ignorance of the law in requiring

complainant to submit a record on appeal, we find the respondent
judge's order to be not it accord with the established rule on the
matter. Section 39 of B.P. 129 is explicit in that no record on
appeal is required to take an appeal except in cases of multiple
appeals. In the case of Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs.
Court of Appeals, multiple appeals are allowed in “special
proceedings, in actions for recovery of property with accounting, in
the special civil action of eminent domain and foreclosure of
mortgage"; contempt proceedings is not one of those instances
where a record on appeal is required to perfect an appeal. Thus,
when the law is elementary, so elementary, not to know it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Felino Bangalan is hereby

ordered to pay a FINE equivalent to his one (1) month salary, with
a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the
future will be dealt with more severely by this Court.”37

Considering that the above-cited resolution was rendered

within the context of an administrative complaint, it is not proof of
criminal liability but is, at most, the jumping point for any criminal
indictment. And, while the Supreme Court had already adjudged
the contempt citation to be unwarranted or unjust, the prosecution
still has to prove that accused actually acted with malice and bad

37
Supra note 2 (underscoring and emphasis supplied; citations omitted).
DECISION
Criminal Case No. 26500
People v. Bangalan
Page 16 of 19
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faith in issuing the same. In Louis Vuitton S.A v. Judge Villanueva 38

an administrative case against Judge Villanueva for knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment, the Supreme Court held that even in
cases when the subject decision/resolution is patently unjust as to
be considered as a “res ipsa loquitur resolution,” the complainant
must still present proof of malice and bad faith, thus:
“’In these res ipsa loquitur resolutions, there was
on the face of the assailed decisions, an inexplicable
grave error bereft of any redeeming feature, a patent
railroading of a case to bring about an unjust decision,
or a manifestly deliberate intent to wreak (sic) an
injustice against a hapless party. The facts
themselves, previously proven or admitted, were of
such a character as to give rise to a strong inference
that evil intent was present. Such intent, in short, was
clearly deducible from what was already of record. The
res ipsa loquitur doctrine does not except or
dispense with the necessity of proving the facts on
which the inference of evil intent is based. It merely
expresses the clearly sound and reasonable conclusion
that when such facts are admitted or are already
shown by the record, and no credible explanation that
would negative the strong inference of evil intent is
forthcoming, no further hearing to establish them to
support a judgment as to the culpability of a
respondent is necessary.’

Thus, even granting that res ipsa loquitur is appreciable,

complainant still has to present proof of malice and bad faith.
Respondent judge, on the other hand, may raise good faith as
a defense. That good faith is a defense to the charge of knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment remains to be the law. He is also
given the chance to explain his acts and if such explanation is
credible, the court may absolve him of the charge.”

In herein case, the prosecution failed to submit any evidence

of malice and bad faith. It failed to show that the accused acted
with a deliberate intent to do an injustice. At the very least, the
prosecution could have presented Cortes himself in order to elevate

38
A.C. No. MTJ-92-643, 27 November 1992, 216 SCRA 121, 133 citing In Re:
Petition for Dismissal from Service and/or Disbarment of Judge Baltazar Dizon, Adm.
Case No. 3086, 173 SCRA 719, 725. See also Pilipinas Bank v. Tirona-Liwag, Adm.
Matter No. CA-90-11, 190 SCRA 834, 845.
DECISION
Criminal Case No. 26500
People v. Bangalan
Page 17 of 19
x------------------------------x

the administrative finding that accused’s act “obviously smacks of

retaliation” to an indubitable fact of malicious intent to get back at
Cortes.

Finally, we cannot help but observe that even the Supreme

Court in Cortes v. Judge Bangalan, supra looked benignly on
accused’s administrative infraction as it rejected the Office of the
Court Administrator’s (OCA) recommendation of a fine
corresponding to two months salary, imposing instead a fine
equivalent to one month salary. Note that the Supreme Court dealt
with both the order of contempt and the order requiring a record on
appeal, yet, it deemed the OCA recommendation as too harsh. The
instant criminal case, on the other hand, involves only the order of
contempt. Note as well that the penalty for a violation of Article 206
of the RPC is arresto mayor in its minimum and suspension (or
suspension only if the accused acted by reason of inexcusable
negligence or ignorance). The range of arresto mayor minimum is
imprisonment of one month and one day to one month and ten days
as minimum to one month and 21 days to two months as
maximum. Suspension, on the other hand, is for a period ranging
from six months and one day to six years.

If a fine of two months salary for both the orders of contempt

and requirement for record on appeal is too harsh, what more a
prison term and suspension from service for the order of contempt
only with exactly the same evidence adduced in both cases? Suffice
it to say that we cannot, so to speak, be more popish than the pope
in the instant case.
DECISION
Criminal Case No. 26500
People v. Bangalan
Page 18 of 19
x------------------------------x

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the

accused Felino U. Bangalan NOT GUILTY of violation of Article 206
of the Revised Penal Code for failure of the prosecution to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt and is hereby ACQUITTED. The
cash bond posted by him for his provisional liberty may now be
withdrawn by said accused upon presentation of the original receipt
evidencing payment thereof subject to the usual accounting and
auditing procedures. The hold departure order issued by this Court
dated 5 February 2001 is set aside and the Order issued by the
Bureau of Immigration dated 22 February 2001 including the name
of the accused in the Hold Departure List is ordered recalled and
cancelled.

SO ORDERED.

ALEXANDER G. GESMUNDO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

TERESITA J. LEONARDO- DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

DE CASTRO Associate Justice
Presiding Justice, Chairman
DECISION
Criminal Case No. 26500
People v. Bangalan
Page 19 of 19
x------------------------------x

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were

reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Chairman, First Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and

the Division Chairman’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Presiding Justice