Pale Cases 5

SECOND DIVISION
[ A.C. No. 4982, August 09, 2001 ]
KATRINA JOAQUIN CARINO, PETITIONER, VS. ATTY. ARTURO DE LOS REYES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines' (IBP) Resolution No. XIV-2000-460, dated July 29,
2000, dismissing the complaint for inexcusable negligence filed by Katrina Cariño against respondent Atty. Arturo de los
Reyes.
Complainant alleged that on March 3, 1998, she contracted the services of respondent, a former Quezon City prosecutor,
to file complaints for slander by deed, threats, and physical injuries against her relatives Faye Lorenz, Godofreditas
Lorenz, and Rosario Joaquin, who themselves subsequently filed charges against complainant and her father for
maltreatment, physical injuries, and threats with the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. As agreed, complainant paid
respondent the amount of P10,000.00 as acceptance fee. However, despite demands by complainant, respondent never
filed the complaint-affidavits with the prosecutor's office for preliminary investigation. On the other hand, with respect to
the complaints filed by the Lorenzes and Joaquin, Quezon City Assistant Prosecutor Francisco Soller recommended the
filing of informations for maltreatment, threats, and slight physical injuries against complainant and her father. The cases
were subsequently filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 41, Quezon City. Complainant alleged that
respondent failed to protect their interest, for which reason they were forced to hire the services of another counsel, Atty.
Ricardo J .M. Rivera, who promptly filed a motion for reinvestigation, which, however, was denied by the prosecutor's
office.[1]
Respondent denied that he had agreed to represent petitioner in filing criminal complaints against petitioner's
aforementioned relatives. He stated that his services were hired in connection with the filing of a case for partition of the
lot occupied by petitioner and her father, on one hand, and their relatives in question, on the other hand. It was alleged that
petitioner promised to furnish him the certification of the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa for the filing of the case in court as
well as the Transfer Certificate of Title of the lot to be partitioned but, as petitioner failed to do so, respondent withdrew
from the case and returned the acceptance fee of P10,000.00 paid by petitioner. Respondent added that he is a member of
the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP investigating complaints against member of the bar, and he is mindful of the
duties of members of the bar toward their clients.[2]
Petitioner admits the return of the P10,000.00 acceptance fee, but says that the money was paid only after repeated
demands made by her to respondent and after she had threatened to charge respondent with estafa.[3]
On June 14, 1999, the Court referred the case to the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation. In its resolution,
dated July 29, 2000, the IBP dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. Hence this petition under Rule 139-B,
§12(c).
We find the petition meritorious.
In dismissing petitioner's complaint, the IBP Investigating Commissioner[4] stated:
[C]omplainant's and respondent's version of the incident which gave rise to the present complaint are poles apart.
Consequently, the Commission had to weigh very well the evidence adduced by both parties. When juxtaposed against
each other, the Commission finds complainant's evidence inadequate to justify the imposition of disciplinary action
against the respondent. Certainly, if the intention of the respondent was to wreck havoc on the complainant, he would not
even have bothered to return the P10,000.00 acceptance fee, a fact which is not being disputed.
All persons are presumed innocent of the charge/s against [them] by reason of constitutional and statutory dicta. To
overcome this presumption, strong and convincing evidence must be adduced.
In the case at bar, this Commission finds complainant's evidence inadequate or insufficient to overcome said
presumption. Accordingly, there is no other option but to deny due course to complainant's complaint.[5]
The Court cannot subscribe to this finding.
In her complaint, petitioner narrated in detail the circumstances of her employment of respondent's legal services. She
alleged:
[I]n the morning of February 25, 1998, at around 9:00 o'clock, my father, Virgilio S. Joaquin, and I were the unfortunate
victims of physical assault, slander by deed and threats committed by our relatives, Rosario M. Joaquin, Faye Maybelle J.
Lorenz and Godofreditas Lorenz. Resultantly, we filed with the Barangay a complaint for said crimes against the
offenders, who, in turn, filed countercharges against us for maltreatment, physical injuries and threats. On March 3, 1998,
while conciliation hearings on the charges and countercharges were being undertaken by the Barangay, I and my father
hired the legal services of Atty. Arturo de los Reyes, a former Quezon City Prosecutor, who was referred to us by a family
friend and neighbor, Lily Jodloman. After briefing him of our legal problem, Atty. Reyes agreed to be our lawyer in the
cases for a fee of P10,000.00 plus P1,000.00 per court appearance. For the purpose of preparing our affidavit-complaint, I
furnished Atty. Reyes a xerox copy each of the medical certificate of my father; our joint-statement concerning the
incident, and a police blotter. Atty. Reyes assured us that our affidavit-complaint would be prepared by him at the soonest
possible time.
On March 17, 1998, at 12:00 noon, I paid Atty. Reyes [the] acceptance fee of P10,000.00.
[I]n the evening of April 6, 1998, I handed to Atty. Reyes the Certification to File Action issued by the Barangay
concerning our criminal complaint for slight physical injuries, slander by deed and threat against our aforementioned
tormentors. I informed Atty. De los Reyes that a Certificate to File Action on the countercharges [filed by] our tormentors
ha[d] likewise been issued by the Barangay. And [i]n the morning of April 10, 1998, Atty. Reyes informed me that he
had already gone over the Certification to File Action. He forewarned and assured me: "Pagnauna silang magfile, kayo ng
father mo ang maihahabla. Kayo ang makukulong. Pero huwag kang mag-alala itataya ko ang profesyon ko para sayo."
[I]n the morning of April 13, 1998, I telephoned Atty. Reyes and asked him if I and my father could already sign the
affidavit-complaint against our tormentors so that it could be filed with the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office, but he told
me that he has not yet prepared it. He assured me that he would work on it in the evening of said date. The following day
at around 9:00 a.m. I followed up the matter thru his beeper, Atty. Reyes did not respond. At 8:30 p.m. of that date, I
received a telephone call from Atty. Reyes. He told me that he had misplaced the Certification to File Action. Forthwith
my father rushed to Atty. Reyes' residence and gave him a copy thereof.
From April 15 to 19, 1998, I repeatedly followed up the preparation of our affidavit complaint thru beeper messages to
Atty. Reyes, but he had inexplicably failed to respond. Finally, [i]n the morning on April 20, 1998, Atty. Reyes called up
and informed me that he has not yet finished the affidavit-complaint, because his secretary did not report for work.
Extremely disappoint[ed] by the delay in the preparation of our affidavit-complaint and the filing thereof with the
Prosecutor's Office of Quezon City, I offered to do the typing for him, but Atty. Reyes said: "Huwag na, nakakahiya
naman sa iyo. Pag report ng secretary ko, ipapatype ko at tatawagan ko kayo ng father mo. Pasensiya ka na ha!"
On April 21, 1998, at 5:00 p.m., Atty. Reyes met me at the house of my friend, Lily Jodloman, whose house is only across
the street from ours. My friend Lily expressed grave concern about the unreasonable delay in the filing of our criminal
complaint, and this time, Atty. Reyes gave another reason. He claimed that he was tasked by the IBP to monitor the
coming national and local elections. He promised to finish our affidavit-complaint in the evening of that date and to
personally file it with the Office of the Prosecutor of Quezon City.
The following, (April 22, 1998), at 8:00 o'clock, I called up Atty. Reyes, but I was told by his wife that he had already
left. I requested for a return call, which request I repeated several times thru his beeper, but to no avail. Finally at 11:00
p.m., Atty. Reyes called up and said, "Masama ang nangyari." And I retorted, "Ano bang masama ang nangyari? Nagawa
na ho ba ninyo ang afftdavit namin?" He sounded evasive in his reply and merely said, "0 sige, Kit ha, magtawagan na
lang tayo bukas kasi kadarating ko lang galing sa election meeting. O bukas tatawagan kita ha." But he did not call me
the whole day of April 23, 1998. Neither did he call on April 24, 25, 26 and 27, 1998, despite repeated calls from me by
telephone and by beeper messages.
On April 28, 1998, at 10:30 p.m., Atty. Reyes at last called up. He said that his secretary did not report for work the
previous days and he could not give me a feedback. He further said: "Naku Kit, sigurado na bukas, sasamahan mo ako
bukas sa pagfile ha. Maghintay ka ng call ko sa hapon natin ipa-file." Because of this assurance by Atty. Reyes, I
cancelled all my appointments on April 29, 1998 and waited the whole day for his call, but he never did. In response to
my beeper message, he called up in the evening and explained that there was an emergency meeting called by LAKAS -
NUCD that kept him busy the whole day. He again promised to finish our affidavit-complaint and file it in few days.
On May 4, 1998, at around 9:30 a.m., I got the surprise of my life when I received a resolution from the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City, finding probable cause concerning the supposed countercharges against us that were filed in
the Barangay after we had filed ours, by our tormentors, Faye Maybelle J. Lorenz and Rosario M. Joaquin, for
maltreatment, physical injuries and threats. I then realized that the countercharges of our tormentors against us were filed
with the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office ahead of our complaint, which has yet to be filed with said office by our
lawyer[6]....
Respondent was unable to controvert the foregoing account. Instead, he claimed that he was hired by petitioner to file a
case for partition, but, because the latter failed to give him the documents to be used in filing of the case, he decided to
withdraw his representation.
The Court finds respondent's explanation flimsy. His services were hired by petitioner six days after the occurrence of the
incident giving rise to the filing of the charges and counter-charges for physical injuries, threats, and slander by deed filed
by the parties before the Lupong Tagapamayapa of their barangay. It is improbable, therefore, that petitioner at that time
would hire the services of respondent for a purpose other than in connection with petitioner's pressing legal
concern, i.e., the filing of the criminal complaints with the prosecutor's office. Moreover, the Court cannot believe that
petitioner merely made up a case of evasion of clear duty by respondent to hold the latter liable for professional
misconduct. On the other hand, respondent could have easily submitted the affidavits of his wife and/or that of Lily
Jodloman to controvert petitioner's claims had he had not taken his professional engagement seriously.
Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides -
A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.
What this Court said in Santiago v. Fojas[7] was totally lost on petitioner, to wit:
It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to become his
client. ...[However ,] once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence,
and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to
the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost
learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied.
...If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative
duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with
diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar,
and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.
Respondent's conduct in this case, exacerbated by his attempt to evade responsibility, falls short of what the law
requires. The fact that, as claimed by him, he is a member of the IBP commission investigating complaints against
members of the bar all the more should have impressed on him his duty of fidelity to his client's cause. That he returned
the money paid to him does not diminish his responsibility but only mitigates the penalty.
On the other hand, there is no merit in petitioner's claim that, as a result of respondent's failure to file the complaint for
threats, prescription set in. Pursuant to Art. 90, in relation to Art. 283 of the Revised Penal Code, the prescriptive period
for filing a complaint for threats is five years. In any event, the interests of petitioner and that of her father are not
altogether without legal protection as they can controvert the charges against them in the proceedings before the trial
court.
WHEREFORE, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines' Resolution No. XIV-2000-460, dated July 29, 2000, is SET
ASIDE and respondent Atty. Arturo de los Reyes is REPRIMANDED with warning to be henceforth more careful in the
performance of his duty to his clients.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

A.C. No. 6733 : October 10, 2012
HERMINIA P. VOLUNTAD-RAMIREZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. ROSARIO B. BAUTISTA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This administrative case arose from a complaint filed by Herminia P. Voluntad-Ramirez (complainant) against Atty.
Rosario B. Bautista (respondent) for violation of Canon 18, 1Ï‚rÎ½ll Rule 18.02,2Ï‚rÎ½ll and Rule 22.023Ï‚rÎ½ll of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, violation of the lawyer's oath, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the public.
The Facts
In her Affidavit-Complaint4Ï‚rÎ½ll dated 29 March 2005, complainant alleged that on 25 November 2002, she engaged the
legal services of respondent to file a complaint against complainants siblings for encroachment of her right of way. For his
legal services, respondent demanded P 15,000 as acceptance fee, plus P 1,000 per court appearance. Complainant then
paid respondent the P 15,000 acceptance fee. On 29 May 2003, or six months after she hired respondent, complainant
severed the legal services of respondent because respondent failed to file a complaint within a reasonable period of time as
requested by complainant. Complainant then retrieved from respondent the folder containing the documents and letters
pertaining to her case which complainant had entrusted to respondent. Complainant claimed that she was dissatisfied with
the way respondent handled her complaint considering that during the six months that elapsed, respondent only sent a
letter to the City Engineers Office in Navotas City concerning her complaint. On 8 March 2004, complainant sent a letter
to respondent, reiterating that she was terminating the services of respondent and that she was asking for the refund
of P 14,000 out of the P 15,000 acceptance fee. Complainant stated in her letter that due to respondents "failure to institute
the desired complaint on time" against complainants brothers and sisters, complainant was compelled to hire the services
of another counsel to file the complaint. Respondent failed to refund the P 14,000, prompting complainant to file on 10
May 2005 her complaint dated 29 March 2005 with the Office of the Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court. Complainant
charged respondent with violation of Canon 18, Rule 18.02, and Rule 22.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
violation of the lawyers oath, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the public.
In his defense, respondent alleges that complainant initially wanted him to file an injunction case against her siblings but
later changed her mind when she was apprised of the expenses involved. Respondent then advised complainant that since
her case involves family members, earnest efforts toward a compromise should be made in accordance with Article 222 of
the Civil Code5Ï‚rÎ½ll and that since the parties reside in the same barangay, the case must be referred to the barangay in
accordance with the Local Government Code. Respondent also suggested filing a criminal action instead of an injunction
case. The day after he was hired by complainant, respondent wrote a letter to the City Engineer of Navotas City pertaining
to complainants case. Respondent made several follow ups with the City Engineers Office and even filed a
case6Ï‚rÎ½ll against the City Engineer for nonfeasance under Republic Act No. 6713.7Ï‚rÎ½ll When complainant
voluntarily withdrew her case from respondent on 29 May 2003, complainant also retrieved the folder containing the
documents relevant to her case. It was only after almost ten months from severing respondents legal services that
complainant sent a letter dated 8 March 2004 demanding the refund of P 14,000 out of the P 15,000 acceptance fee.
Respondent explains that the acceptance fee is non-refundable because it covers the time and cost of research made
immediately before and after acceptance of the case. The acceptance fee also pays for the office supplies used for the case.
Nevertheless, respondent alleges that he did not ignore complainants request for a refund. Respondent claims that he sent
a letter dated 17 March 2004, which stated that although it is their law firms policy not to entertain requests for refund of
acceptance fee, they were willing to grant her a fifty percent (50%) discount and for complainant to contact them for her
refund.8Ï‚rÎ½ll In fact, respondent stated that he sent text messages to complainants lawyer, Atty. Bartolome, signifying
respondents willingness to refund the amount of P 9,000.9Ï‚rÎ½ll
In her Reply-Affidavit, complainant stated that even before she engaged respondents legal services, her case was already
referred to the barangay for conciliation proceedings. However, complainants siblings failed to appear which resulted in
the issuance on 1 July 2002 of a Certification to File Action by the Office of the Lupong Tagapamayapa, Office of the
Barangay Council, Barangay Daanghari, Navotas.10Ï‚rÎ½llRespondent countered in his Position Paper that complainant
did not inform him of the existence of the alleged Certification to File Action and that the said certification was not part of
the case folder which respondent turned over to complainant when his services was severed.
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation or
decision.
Report and Recommendation

of the Commission on Bar Discipline
The Investigating Commissioner found respondent "guilty of violation of the lawyers oath, Canon 18, Rule[s] 18.03 and
22.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, grave misconduct and thereby recommend that he be suspended for a
period of one (1) year with a stern warning that similar acts in the future will be severely dealt
with."11Ï‚rÎ½llRespondent was also ordered to refund to complainant the sum of P 14,000.
The Investigating Commissioner held that respondent has the moral duty to restitute P 14,000 out of the P 15,000
acceptance fee considering that, apart from sending a letter to the City Engineer of Navotas City, respondent did nothing
more to advance his clients cause during the six months that complainant engaged his legal services.
Decision of the Board of Governors of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines
On 31 May 2007, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVII-2007-230, adopting and approving the
Investigating Commissioners Report and Recommendation, with modification, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
and considering Respondents dishonesty, negligence in [his] mandated duty to file a case to protect [his] clients cause,
Atty. Rosario Bautista is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months, and Restitution of the amount
of P 14,000 to complainant is likewise ordered.12Ï‚rÎ½ll
In his Motion for Reconsideration, respondent alleged that even before complainant officially engaged his legal services
on 25 November 2002, complainant already consulted him for several days regarding her case for which no consultation
fee was charged. A day after receiving the P 15,000 acceptance fee, respondent sent a letter-complaint to the City
Engineer of Navotas City for a possible case of violation of the National Building Code. Respondent reiterated that
complainant failed to disclose to him that a Certification to File Action was already issued by the Office of the Lupong
Tagapamayapa.
In its 28 October 2011 Resolution No. XX-2011-143, the Board of Governors of the IBP partially granted respondents
Motion for Reconsideration:
RESOLVED to unanimously GRANT partially, the Respondents Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, Resolution No.
XVIII-2007-230 dated 31 May 2007 is hereby Amended, by lowering the recommended penalty of Suspension against
respondent Atty. Rosario Bautista from six (6) months to ADMONITION.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether respondent is guilty of negligence in handling the case of complainant.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court affirms the 28 October 2011 Resolution No. XX-2011-143 of the Board of Governors of the IBP, reducing the
recommended penalty from six months to admonition.
We agree with the finding of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent breached his duty to serve his client with
competence and diligence. Respondent is also guilty of violating Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which states that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable." However, we do not find respondent guilty of violating Rule 22.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility13Ï‚rÎ½ll since respondent immediately turned over to complainant the folder containing the documents and
letters pertaining to her case upon the severance of respondents legal services.
Once a lawyer receives the acceptance fee for his legal services, he is expected to serve his client with competence, and to
attend to his clients cause with diligence, care and devotion.14Ï‚rÎ½ll As held in Santiago v. Fojas:15Ï‚rÎ½ll
client. He has the right to decline employment, subject, however, to Canon 14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Once he agrees to take up the cause of [his] client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latters
cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of his client,
warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his clients rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the
end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of the law, legally applied. This simply means that
his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he
may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the
entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client bu also to the court, to the bar,
and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he
also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal
profession.16Ï‚rÎ½ll
In this case, respondent attributes his delay in filing the appropriate criminal case to the absence of conciliation
proceedings between complainant and her siblings before the barangay as required under Article 222 of the Civil Code
and the Local Government Code. However, this excuse is belied by the Certification to File Action by the Office of
the Lupong Tagapamayapa, Office of the Barangay Council, Barangay Daanghari, Navotas. The Certification to File
Action was issued on 1 July 2002, which was more than four months before complainant engaged respondents legal
services on 25 November 2002. Respondents allegation that complainant failed to inform him about the existence of the
Certification to File Action is hard to believe considering complainants determination to file the case against her siblings.
Clearly, respondent has been negligent in handling complainants case.
In Cari v. Atty. De Los Reyes,17Ï‚rÎ½ll the respondent lawyer who failed to file a complaint-affidavit before the
prosecutors office, restituted the P 10,000 acceptance fee paid to him. The respondent lawyer in Cari was reprimanded by
the Court with a warning that he should be more careful in the performance of his duty to his clients.
In this case, complainant is asking for the refund of P 14,000 out of the P 15,000 acceptance fee considering that, apart
from sending a letter to the City Engineer of Navotas City, respondent did nothing more to advance his clients cause
during the six months that complainant engaged his legal services. We agree with the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors that a refund is in order.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the 28 October 2011 Resolution No. XX-2011-143 of the Board of Governors of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, reducing the recommended penalty from six months to admonition. The Court finds
Atty. Rosario B. Bautista GUILTY of violating Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
he is ADMONISHED to exercise greater care and diligence in the performance of his duty to his clients. Atty. Bautista is
ordered to RESTITUTE to complainant P 14,000 out of the P 15,000 acceptance fee.Ï‚rÎ±lÎ±Ï‰lÎ¹brÎ±r
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10675, May 31, 2016
DATU ISMAEL MALANGAS, Complainant, v. ATTY. PAUL C. ZAIDE, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of me Philippines (IBP), complainant Datu Ismael
Malangas (complainant) instituted this verified complaint1 for disbarment against Atty. Paul C. Zaide (respondent lawyer),
Factual Antecedents
Complainant accused respondent lawyer of committing acts of dishonesty, breach of trust, and violation of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics2 in relation to the complaint for damages (Civil Case No. 6380 of the Regional Trial Court [RTC] of Lanao
del Norte at Iligan City) that he filed against Paul Alfeche (Alfeche) and the NEMA Electrical and Industrial Sales,
Inc/Melanio Siao (NEMA). Complainant averred mat on March 6, 2003, he figured in an accident while crossing Quezon
Avenue, Iligan City, when two vehicles hit and pinned him in between them, causing him to lose consciousness; that he
was then brought to a hospital where he was confined for four months; that he was later transferred to other hospitals
where he underwent different major operations for which he spent more than P1.5 million; and that despite the operations,
he remained crippled and bed ridden.
Because of these, he engaged respondent lawyer's professional services to prosecute his complaint for damages against
therein defendants Alfeche and NEMA; that he gave respondent lawyer P20,000.00 as acceptance fee and P50,000.00 as
filing fees; that respondent lawyer made him believe that the amount of P50,000.00 was needed as filing fees in order to
commence a P5 million-damage suit covering the accrued and anticipated damages caused by the accident; that
subsequently, respondent lawyer filed on his behalf a complaint for damages before the RTC of Iligan City, thereat
docketed as Civil Case No. 6380; that respondent lawyer then furnished him (complainant) with a copy of said Complaint
seeking to recover damages in the amount of P5 million; and that to assure him that the complaint had indeed been filed,
this complaint was stamped "received" by the RTC.
According to complainant, he later discovered, however, that his Complaint had been dismissed by the RTC because of
"failure to prosecute," for the reason that respondent lawyer did not attend two hearings in the case, and also because
respondent lawyer did not submit an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss filed therein by NEMA; that on account of this,
he asked respondent lawyer to file a Motion for Reconsideration, only to find out later that respondent lawyer not only did
not file a motion for reconsideration from the Order of dismissal issued by the RTC, but worse, respondent lawyer instead
filed a Withdrawal of Appearance as counsel effectiyely leaving him without counsel to prosecute his case; and that after
this, he sent a relative to the RTC, where he further discovered through this relative that the amount of damages sought in
the Complaint filed by respondent lawyer was only P250,000.00, and not P5 million, as stated in the copy of the
Complaint given to him by respondent lawyer.
Challenging complainant's allegations, respondent lawyer claimed that complainant was in fact a client of the Zaragoza-
Macabangkit Law Offices, a law firm that he joined way back in 2002, right after he passed the Bar Examinations; and
that as a junior associate in that law firm, he only received appearance fees in attending to complainant's civil case.
Respondent lawyer specifically denied that he received an acceptance fee of P20,000.00, and explained that complainant
was already an established client of the law office he was working for.
As regards the amount of damages, respondent lawyer claimed that in the Complaint he filed before the RTC, he was even
reluctant to ask for P250,000.00 in damages, as complainant's hospital bills did not reach this amount; but that he
nevertheless prayed for this amount because he was anticipating that complainant would incur additional expenses as a
result of the accident. According to respondent lawyer, the complaint which embodied a prayer for P5 million in damages
"was clearly maneuvered to create an impression that (he, respondent lawyer) defrauded the complainant."3
Lastly, respondent lawyer contended that although he deliberately skipped attending the hearings set by the RTC in said
Civil Case No. 6380, and that although he also intentionally filed no opposition to NEMA's Motion to Dismiss, these
matters were initially agreed upon between him and complainant after he (respondent lawyer) discovered that NEMA's car
did not in fact hit complainant, because NEMA's car was not illegally parked where it was at the time of the accident; that
although complainant was aware of these facts, complainant suddenly changed his mind, and insisted on continuing with
the case against NEMA, and pressing for the claim of P5 million in damages, because complainant believed that NEMA
had more leviable properties than the other defendant Alfeche. According to respondent lawyer, he also found out that
despite the fact that Alfeche had already settled with complainant, the latter still persisted in pursuing the civil case
against Alfeche;4 that at this point, he realized that complainant was acting under the compulsion of greed in pressing for
the continuation of the case against his adversaries; and that because of these reasons, he decided to withdraw from the
case as complainant's counsel.
Proceedings before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Following the investigation, Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline submitted his
Report and Recommendation5 dated January 29, 2013 finding respondent lawyer guilty of dishonesty and breach of trust,
for which he recommended a penalty of two years suspension against respondent lawyer. Commissioner Cachapero
found complainant's allegations more credible than respondent lawyer's explanations, thus -
Respondent further mentioned that he has been handling cases for or against Complainant since he embarked on law
practice and has never received acceptance fee from Complainant. He pictured himself as giving out pro bono services to
Complainant for two (2) years. However, he may have contradicted his declaration in this regard when in his Answer he
mentioned that he received P7,000.00 for docket fee and the rest was paid as advance fees for his services and the usual
visitation done by him at the hospital.6ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
As regards the true amount of damages sought in said Civil Case No. 6380, Commissioner Cachapero had this to say:
The undersigned deems the complainant's tale plausible enough. The aforesaid page containing a statement of claim
amounting to P5,000,000.00 shows impeccably feat it was typed simultaneously with the rest of the pages of the
complaint. There is no showing that it was merely inserted as a supplement or addition after taking out a genuine page of
the same. It is a constituent part of the complaint which could only have been printed and/or typed by the respondent or
his agent.
Respondent claimed that the insertion of the page (page 8) was 'maneuvered' by Complainant. If these were true, what
would have motivated Complainant to do such a 'switching' act? None. In fact, following his discovery of the same, he
conducted himself out like a man wronged. He wrote respondent twice in September 2004 (September 1 and 9, 2004) and
castigated respondent for his switching act. Surprisingly, respondent did not care to take the matter up with complainant
through letter or personal confrontation. To the undersigned, respondent's act of paying no heed to such claim from
Complainant reveals a subtle affirmation of his fault in this regard.7
Ultimately, Commissioner Cachapero found respondent lawyer negligent in the handling of complainant's case, citing the
RTC's Order of July 1, 2004, to wit-
In this regard the record will show that as early as May 18, 2004, plaintiff's counsel was furnished a copy of said motion,
but for reasons only known to him no comment or opposition was registered by plaintiff. In fact, if only to afford plaintiff
[a chance] to countervail movant's motion, last May 24, 2004, as prayed for, plaintiffs counsel was given ten (10) days to
file an Opposition, but sad to say, until now, notwithstanding the lapse of practically 37 days no opposition, neither a
comment was filed by plaintiff. With this development the Court will have to confine its scrutiny solely on the motion to
dismiss of movant.8
Action of the IBP Board of Governors

Via Resolution No. XX-2013-91,9 the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of
Commissioner Cachapero, viz.:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex 'A', and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules
and considering that Respondent committed Dishonesty, Breach of Trust and Negligence to Complainant, Arty. Paul C.
Zaide is hereby SUSPENDED from practice of law for two (2) years.
On January 11, 201410 respondent lawyer moved for reconsideration of the foregoing Resolution. But in its
Resolution11 of May 4, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors denied respondent lawyer's Motion for Reconsideration.
Our Ruling
After a careful review of the records, we find respondent lawyer guilty of professional misconduct and of violating
Canons 1,12 16,13 and 1814 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Not only do we find complainant's version
more credible but we also note the glaring inconsistencies in respondent lawyer's allegations.
Respondent lawyer claims that as a mere associate in the Zaragoza-Macabangkit Law offices, "he has NO participation
whatsoever regarding the fees the complainant is giving to the office."15 But, as pointed out by Commissioner Cachapero,
respondent lawyer himself admitted that he received "P7,000.00 for the docket fees and the rest [was paid] as advance fees
for his services and the usual visitation done [by] him at the hospital."16 Because of this admission, it can be concluded
that respondent lawyer received fees "for his services" from the complainant himself.
Further bolstering the fact that respondent lawyer did in fact receive fees for his professional services are complainant's
demand letters17 - one received on September 1, 2004 and another delivered by registered mail on September 9,2004 -
asking respondent lawyer to return the amount of P20,000.00 acceptance fee and to account for the docket fees paid to the
RTC of Iligan City. To these, respondent lawyer merely replied that he "was made to understand that the 'docket fee' in
Alfeche case is part of [respondent's] claims"18 without denying that he had received such amount. The complainant was
thus constrained to conduct his own investigation against his own lawyer, in the course of which he discovered that of the
F50,000.00 alleged filing fees that he gave respondent lawyer, only P2,623.60 was paid by respondent lawyer to the RTC.
As Commissioner Cachapero aptly stated in his Report and Recommendation,19 "[respondent's act of paying no heed to
such claim from [c]omplainant reveals a subtle affirmation" that he, indeed, received the acceptance fee.
Finally, respondent lawyer's former law partners belied his claim that he did not receive, as in fact it was the law firm
which received, the amounts paid by the complainant. In their Joint Affidavit,20 lawyers Leo M. Zaragoza and Alex E.
Macabangkit averred that "the payment made by complainant to Atty. Zaide belongs to him exclusively and we do not
interfere in the arrangement x x x and we do not [have] any share thereof."21
Respondent lawyer's refusal to account for the funds given to him, especially his refusal to return the amount paid in
excess of what was required as docket fees, clearly violated Rules 16,01 and 16.03 of the CPR, to wit:
Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However, he shall have
a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements,
giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions
he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
"The Code of Professional Responsibility demands the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with the
moneys entrusted to lawyers because of their fiduciary relationship."22 Any lawyer who does not live up to this duty must
be prepared to take the consequences of his waywardness.
As regards the alleged switching of page 8 of the complaint, respondent lawyer claimed that it was complainant who
switched the pages "to create an impression that respondent lawyer defrauded the complainant." 23 He asserted in his
Motion for Reconsideration that he came to learn of the P5 million claim only during the disbarment proceedings and that
he "thought it was a joke as respondent, lawyer was NOT able to attend the preliminary conference at the IBP Cagayan de
Oro City, where he could have seen the document."24 That respondent lawyer seems to find it hard to get together with
himself is shown by the fact that on the very same page of his Motion for Reconsideration, he himself admitted mat "when
respondent lawyer was told of the amount, he asked the clerk of the office to change it to a more reasonable and realistic
relief, which was eventually heeded, which respondent lawyer was NOT aware that herein complainant was able to get a
draft copy prepared by the office."25 To borrow Commissioner Cachapero's apt observation, this obvious contradiction
renders his defense doubtful, to say the least. Notably, respondent lawyer's former law partners also belied his claim that
Lorna B. Martinez, the person who supposedly typed the Complaint, was a personnel of their law firm. In their Joint
Affidavit, they contended that "Lorna B. Martinez was never our Office Staff. She never prepared any pleading in the
office for any of us including that of Atty. Zaide."26
Respondent lawyer's transgressions did not end there. By his deliberate failure to file a Comment on or Opposition to
NEMA's Motion to Dismiss in said Civil Case No. 6380, and by his failure to appear at the hearings in connection
therewith, respondent lawyer unduly delayed the case as the trial court, had to postpone the hearings thereon, and this, in
turn, naturally arrested the progress of the case insofar as NEMA was concerned. As previously mentioned, the RTC had
to put off for 37 days its ailing on NEMA's Motion to Dismiss because respondent lawyer moved for time to oppose the
same. Yet, despite the 10-day extension given to him, respondent lawyer still failed to appear at the hearings or file the
appropriate pleading. These failings are clearly offensive to Rules 18.0327 and 18.0428 of the CPR. If respondent lawyer's
claim that he and complainant had indeed agreed to drop the case against NEMA were true, then he as an officer of the
court should have saved the Court's precious time by at least promptly manifesting his lack of objection to NEMA's
Motion to Dismiss. This he did not do.
Given the gravity of the offenses imputed against him, and considering that this is his second administrative
case,29 respondent lawyer's defense that he was a young lawyer when he went astray, hardly merits sympathy from this
Court. Surely respondent lawyer could not have been unaware that when he took the solemn oath to become a member of
the bar, he did so not only to enjoy the rewards and privileges of an attorney and counsellor at law, but he also took upon
his shoulders the heavy burden of responsibility and duty that a full-fledged membership in the Philippine Bar necessarily
entailed. Respondent lawyer could not have been oblivious of the fact that the exercise of a right or privilege is always
encumbered with the burden of responsibility and duty.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, Atty. Paul C. Zaide is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years effective
immediately. Atty, Paul C. Zaide is also ORDERED to promptly return to complainant the sums given to him as
acceptance fee and docket fees in the amount of P70,000.00, from which should be deducted the amount of P2,623.60
paid as docketing fees.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrar
-------------------------------------------------------------------
FACTS
On March 6, 2003, complainant Malangas figured in a vehicular accident which made him crippled and bed ridden. To recover damages from the
said accident, complainant engaged the respondent lawyer's professional services. Malangas gave Atty. Zaide P20,000.00 as acceptance fee and
P50,000.00as filing fees; that subsequently, respondent lawyer filed on his behalf a complaint for damages before the RTC of Iligan City.
Complainant later discovered, that his Complaint had been dismissed by the RTC because of "failure to prosecute," for the reason that
respondent lawyer did not attend two hearings in the case. Worse, respondent lawyer filed a Withdrawal of Appearance as counsel
effectively leaving him without counsel to prosecute his case. Complainant accused respondent lawyer of committing acts of dishonesty, breach of
trust, and violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. Respondent lawyer challenged the allegations and specifically denied that he received an
acceptance fee of P20,000.00, and explained that complainant was already an established client of the law office he was working
for. The IBP Board of Governors approved the recommendation of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline to suspend Atty. Zaide from
practice of law for 2 years.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Zaide is guilty of committing Dishonesty, Breach of Trust and Negligence.
RULING:
The court finds respondent lawyer guilty of professional misconduct and of violating Canons1, 16, and 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR). Respondent lawyer's refusal to account for the funds given to him, especially his refusal to return the amount paid in excess
of what was required as docket fees, clearly violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of the CPR. The Code of Professional Responsibility demands the
utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with the moneys entrusted to lawyers because of their fiduciary relationship. Any
lawyer who does not live up to this duty must be prepared to take the consequences of his waywardness. Respondent
lawyer also violated Rules 18.03 and18.04 of the CPR for failing to appear at hearings and filing the appropriate pleadings causing the delay
of the case. The court approved the suspension of Atty. Zaide from practice of law for 2 years and ordered him to return the
acceptance fee and docket fees to the complainant
A.C. No. 5655 April 22, 2005
VALERIANA U. DALISAY, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. MELANIO MAURICIO, JR., Respondent.
The instant case stemmed from a verified letter-complaint dated February 21, 2002 filed with this Court by Valeriana U.
Dalisay against Atty. Melanio "Batas" Mauricio, Jr. for demanding and receiving exorbitant attorney’s fees but did not
take any action on her case.
In her complaint, Dalisay alleged that she was impressed by the pro-poor and pro-justice advocacy of respondent, a media
personality. So she engaged his services as her counsel in Civil Case No. 00-44, wherein she is the defendant, pending
before the Municipal Trial Court of Binangonan, Rizal. After consulting with respondent, she handed to him all the
pertinent documents. In turn, respondent demanded P25,000.00 as acceptance fee which she paid. Then respondent
asked her to pay P8,000.00 as filing fee. She paid the amount although she knew that Civil Case No. 00-44 was already
filed with the court.
After a month, complainant approached respondent to follow–up her case. Respondent demanded additional acceptance
fee, or a total of P90,000.00, with the explanation that he can give a discount should she pay in cash. Respondent also
asked her to pay him P3,000.00 as appearance fee.
Complainant raised an additional amount and paid respondent the total sum of P48,000.00. Adding to this
amount P8,000.00 filing fee, her total payment was P56,000.00.
Complainant further alleged that notwithstanding her payments, respondent never rendered any legal service for her in
Civil Case No. 00-044. As a result, she terminated their attorney-client relationship and demanded the return of her
money and documents. However, he refused to do so.
In his comment, respondent denied complainant’s charge. He claimed that Atty. Oliver Lozano referred her to him to
defend her in Civil Case No. 00-044. He explained to her that she is not covered by the free legal services being rendered
by his office. Thus, she would be treated as a regular client. Accordingly, his acceptance fee would be One Hundred
Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos. In addition, she would be charged for any pleading and paper filed with the court, plus
an appearance fee of P3,000.00.
A few days later, Atty. Lozano called respondent and asked him to reduce his acceptance fee. He then agreed and asked
only P25,000.00 for which complainant was very grateful.
Respondent denied demanding P8,000.00 as filing fee in Civil Case No. 00-044. He clarified that such fee was intended
for another case he would file for complainant, aside from Civil Case No. 00-044.
Respondent also alleged that he asked complainant to bring her son-in-law to his office for a conference and to submit to
him the necessary documents to enable him to prepare the filing of the complaints in order to protect her rights over the
subject property. But complainant did not heed his advice. Instead, she returned to his office and told him that she was
no longer interested in retaining his services. She then demanded a refund of the amounts she paid.
According to respondent, he rendered legal services to complainant by way of legal advice and opinions on all her
problems and those of her family. Consequently, he had every right to collect attorney’s fees from her. He prayed that
the instant complaint be dismissed.
On September 18, 2002, we resolved to refer this case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.
In her Report and Recommendation dated January 13, 2004, Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline made the following findings -
"It is evident that for the amount of P56,000.00 paid by the complainant as reflected in the duly signed official
receipts of respondent’s law office, no action had been taken nor any pleadings prepared by the respondent except
his alleged conferences and opinions rendered when complainant frequented his law office, as his legal services.
In view thereof, when complainant decided to withdrew respondent’s services as her counsel due to inaction; it is
quite fair and incumbent upon the respondent to return whatever amount the complainant had already paid in the
amount of P56,000.00 and the latter to compensate respondent for reasonable consultation fees due him which
was not included in their retained agreement."
and recommended as follows:

"Wherefore, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that the complaint against Atty. Melanio ‘Batas’
Mauricio, Jr., be dismissed and the respondent be required to refund the amount of Fifty Six Thousand Pesos
(P56,000.00) to the complainant within two (2) months from receipt hereof, with the advice to be more discreet
and cautious in dealing with clients relative to assessment and receipt of required fees in the future, specially
those assisted by him through referral and accommodation; otherwise severe penalty will be imposed.
Complainant is likewise ordered to pay respondent consultation fee equivalent to twenty percent (20%) of the
whole amount of P56,000.00.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED." 1
On February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2004-121 adopting and approving in
toto the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Navarro.
We cannot sustain the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that this case should be dismissed.
As found by IBP Investigating Commissioner Navarro, respondent agreed to handle Civil Case No. 00-044 on behalf of
complainant for an acceptance fee of P25,000.00 which she paid. Respondent then demanded additional acceptance fee
or a total of P48,000.00, instead of P25,000.00 initially agreed upon. In addition, respondent asked for P8,000.00 which
according to him was intended as filing fee for a new case he was supposed to file.
Hence, respondent received the total amount of P56,000.00 from complainant for his supposed legal services.
When respondent accepted P56,000.00 from complainant, it was understood that he agreed to take up the latter’s case and
that an attorney-client relationship between them was established. From then on, it was expected of him to serve
complainant with competence and attend to her case with fidelity, care and devotion.
However, there is nothing in the records to show that respondent entered his appearance as counsel of record for
complainant in Civil Case No. 00-044. He did not even follow-up the case which remained pending up to the time she
terminated his services.
As to the P8,000.00, allegedly as docket fees for other cases, paid to respondent by complainant, the Investigating
Commissioner found that "there was no evidence nor any pleadings submitted to show that respondent filed any case
considering that the filing fee had to be paid simultaneously with the filing of a case."
Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the body of rules governing the conduct of every member of
the Bar in this jurisdiction, provides:
"CANON 17 – A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE
MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE."
More specifically, Rule 18.03 states:
"A LAWYER SHALL NOT NEGLECT A LEGAL MATTER ENTRUSTED TO HIM, AND HIS
NEGLIGENCE IN CONNECTION THEREWITH SHALL RENDER HIM LIABLE."
Also, respondent’s Attorney’s Oath declares that respondent shall impose upon himself the sacred duty, among others,
that he will not delay any man for money or malice, and will conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to courts as well as to his clients.
A member of the legal profession owes his client entire devotion to his genuine interest and warm zeal in the maintenance
and defense of his rights.2 An attorney is expected to exert his
best efforts and ability to protect his client’s case, for his unwavering loyalty to his client likewise serves the ends of
justice. Indeed, the entrusted privilege of every lawyer to practice law carries with it his corresponding duties, not only to
his client, but also to the court, to the bar and to the public.
In Santos vs. Lazaro,3 we held that Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, above-quoted, is a basic
postulate in legal ethics. Verily, when a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in
protecting his rights. The failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention makes such lawyer unworthy of the
trust reposed in him by his client and makes him answerable not just to his client but also to the legal profession, the
courts and society.4
Respondent insists that he is entitled to attorney’s fees since he gave legal advice and opinions to complainant on her
problems and those of her family. Just like any other professional, a lawyer is entitled to collect fees for his
services. However, he should charge only a reasonable amount of fees. Canon 20 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility mandates that "A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees." There is, however, no
hard and fast rule which will serve as guide in determining what is or what is not a reasonable fee. That must be
determined from the facts of each case.5 The power to determine the reasonableness or the unconscionable character of a
lawyer’s fee is a matter falling within the regulatory prerogative of the Court.6
It is now clear to us that since respondent did not take any step to assist complainant in her case, charging P56,000.00 is
improper. While giving legal advice and opinion on complainant’s problems and those of her family constitutes legal
service, however, the attorney’s fee must be reasonable. Obviously, P56,000.00 is exorbitant.
We cannot understand why respondent initially demanded P8,000.00 as filing fee from complainant when he very well
knew that the docket fee for Civil Case No. 00-044 had been paid. If it was intended as a docket fee for another case,
why did he not file the corresponding complaint?
By his inaction in Civil Case No.00-044, respondent violated Canons 17, 18 and 18.03, earlier cited, as well as his Oath as
an attorney. Likewise, in collecting from complainant exorbitant consulting fee, respondent violated Canon 20 of the
same Code. For all these violations, respondent should be penalized.
The facts of Sencio vs. Calvadores,7 bear a striking similarity to the present case. Respondent lawyer Sencio did not
return the money to complainant despite demand following his failure to file the case. We found him guilty of
violation of the lawyer’s oath,
malpractice and gross misconduct and suspended him for six (6) months, and ordered to return to his client the amount
of P21,000.00 with interest at 12% per annum from the date of the promulgation of our Resolution until the return of the
amount.
In Garcia vs. Manuel,8 we suspended respondent lawyer from the practice of law for six (6) months and ordered him to
render an accounting of all monies he received from the complainant. We found him guilty of gross misconduct.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Melanio Mauricio, Jr. is hereby found GUILTY of malpractice and gross misconduct
for violating Canons 17, 18, Rule 18.03 and 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer’s Oath. He
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period for six (6) months effective from notice, and STERNLY
WARNED that any similar infraction in the future will be dealt with more severely. He is further ordered to RETURN,
within ten (10) days, also from notice, the sum of P56,000.00 to complainant Valeriana U. Dalisay and submit to this
Court proof of his compliance within three (3) days thereform.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Court Administrator for his distribution to all courts of the land , the IBP, the
Office of the Bar Confidant, and entered into respondent’s personal records as a member of the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.
------------------------------------------------------------
CANON 19
FACTS: Valeriana U. Dalisay engaged respondent’s services as counsel in Civil Case No. 00-044. Notwithstanding his receipt of
documents and attorneys fees, respondent never rendered legal services. As a result, she terminated the attorney-client relationship and
demanded the return of her money, but respondent refused. The Supreme Court in its Decision, found respondent guilty of malpractice
and gross misconduct and suspended him from the practice of law for a period of six months. Upon learning of the Court’s decision,
respondent verified the status of Civil Case No. 00-044. He learned of the trial court’s Decision holding that the tax declarations and
title submitted by complainant are not official records. Thereupon, respondent filed a Sworn Affidavit Complaint against complainant
alleging that complainant offered tampered evidence. The respondent then filed a motion for reconsideration for the Supreme Court
Decision and argued that complainant did not engage his services as counsel, and that complainant offered tampered evidence in Civil
Case No. 00-004, prompting him to file falsification cases against her.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the motion for reconsideration should be granted
HELD:
The respondent’s motion for reconsideration is denied. The Court explained that once a lawyer accepts money from a client, an
attorney-client relationship is established. Assuming that complainant indeed offered falsified documentary evidence, it will not be
sufficient to exonerate the respondent. Consistent with the mandate of Canon 19 that a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal and
only within the bounds of the law, Rule 19.02 of the same Canon specifically provides that a lawyer who has received information that
his clients has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall promptly call upon the client to
rectify the same, and failing which he shall terminate the relationship with such client in accordance with the Rules of Court. As a
lawyer, respondent is expected to know this Rule. Instead of inaction, he should have confronted complainant and asked her to rectify
her fraudulent representation. If complainant refuses, then he should terminate his relationship with her.
A.C. No. 11482
JOCELYN IGNACIO, Complainant

vs.
ATTY. DANIEL T. ALVIAR, Respondent
DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
This is an administrative case filed by complainant Jocelyn Ignacio against respondent Atty. Daniel T. Alviar for violation
of Canon 11 , Rule 1.012 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) for his alleged refusal to refund the amount of
acceptance fees; Canon 123, Rule 12.044 and Canon 185 Rule 18.036 for his alleged failure to appear in the criminal case
he is handling and to file any pleading therein.
The Facts
In March 2014, respondent was referred to complainant for purposes of handling the case of complainant's son who was
then apprehended and detained by the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) in Quezon City. Respondent agreed
to represent complainant's son for a stipulated acceptance fee of PhPl00,000. Respondent further represented that he
could refer the matter to the Commission on Human Rights to investigate the alleged illegal arrest made on complainant's
son.7
After the initial payments of PhP20,000 and PhP30,000 were given to respondent, the latter visited complainant's son at
the PDEA detention cell.8 There, respondent conferred with complainant's son for some 20 minutes. After which,
respondent left.9
Respondent, through his secretary, secured from the Office of the Pasay City Prosecutor plain copies of the case records.
Respondent also verified twice from the Hall of Justice if the case was already filed in court.10 It was at this time that
respondent asked, and was paid, the remaining balance of PhP50,000. Subsequently, respondent filed his notice of
appearance as counsel for complainant's son.11
Sometime in April 2014, complainant informed respondent that her son's arraignment was set on April 29, 2014.
Respondent, however, replied that he cannot attend said arraignment due to a previously scheduled hearing. He
committed to either find a way to attend the hearing or ask another lawyer-friend to attend it for him.
On April 26, 2014, complainant wrote a 1etter12 to respondent informing the latter that she had decided to seek the
intercession of another lawyer owing to the fact that respondent cannot attend her son's scheduled arraignment.
Complainant then requested that respondent retain a portion of the PhP 100,000 to fairly remunerate respondent for the
preparatory legal service he rendered. Respondent denies having received said letter. 13
On the date of the arraignment, neither respondent nor his promised alternate, appeared. When asked, respondent
replied that he forgot the date of arraignment.14
This incident prompted complainant to write another letter15 dated May 6, 2014 to respondent, requesting the latter to
formally withdraw as counsel and emphasized that respondent's withdrawal as counsel is necessary so that she and her
son can hire another lawyer to take his stead. In said letter, complainant also reiterated her request that a portion of the
PhPl00,000 be remitted to them after respondent deducts his professional fees commensurate to the preparatory legal
service he rendered.16
When respondent failed to take heed, complainant filed on June 16, 2014, the instant administrative complaint before the
Commission on Bar Discipline, Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
At the proceedings therein, respondent failed to attend the initial mandatory conferences and to file his responsive
pleading, citing as reason therefor the persistent threats to his life allegedly caused by a former client. 17 Upon finally
submitting his Answer18 , respondent denied having neglected his duties to complainant's son.
Report and Recommendation

of the Commission on Bar Discipline
On January 21, 2016, the Investigating Commissioner found respondent liable for negligence under Rule 18.03 of the
CPR and recommended a penalty of six months suspension from the practice of law. The Investigating Commissioner
observed that while respondent performed some tasks as lawyer for complainant's son, such do not command a fee of
PhPl00,000. It was also emphasized that respondent's failure to attend the arraignment shows the latter's failure to handle
the case with diligence.19
As such, the Investigating Commissioner disposed:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the undersigned recommends that respondent be meted out with the penalty
of suspension for six (6) months from the practice of law and ordered to restitute the amount of One Hundred Thousand
(Phpl00,000) Pesos to the complainant.
Respectfully Submitted.20
Resolution of the Board of Governors
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
On February 25, 2016, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XXII-2016-17821 lowering the recommended
penalty to reprimand with stem warning, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT with modification the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner reducing the penalty to
REPRJMAND WITH STERN WARNING.22
Pursuant to Rule 139-B, the records of the administrative case were transmitted by the IBP to the Court for final action.
Complainant further seeks a review23 of the Resolution No. XXII-2016-178 dated February 25, 2016.
The Issue
The threshold issue to be resolved is whether respondent is guilty of negligence in handling the case of complainant's
son.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court affirms the Resolution No. XXII-2016-178 dated February 25, 2016 of the IBP Board of Governors, reducing the
recommended penalty from six months to reprimand with stem warning. However, on the undisputed factual finding that
respondent only performed preparatory legal services for complainant's son, he is not entitled to the entire PhP 100,000
but only to fees determined on the basis of quantum meruit, Section 24, Rule 138, and Canon 20, Rule 20.01 of the CPR
and that the remainder should be restituted to complainant.
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the
client's cause.24 Canon 1825 of the CPR mandates that once a lawyer agrees to handle a case, it is the lawyer's duty to
serve the client with competence and diligence.
In Voluntad-Ramirez v. Atty. Bautista26 , the Court citing Santiago v. Fojas27 expounds:
client. He has the right to decline employment, subject, however, to Canon 14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Once he agrees to take up the cause of [his] client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the
latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of his
client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability
to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of the law, legally applied. This simply
means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the
land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is
because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the
court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest
of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to
the legal profession.28
We agree with the finding of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent failed to competently and diligently attend to
the legal matter entrusted to him. It is undisputed that respondent came to see complainant's son, his client, only once for
about 20 minutes and no more thereafter;29 it is likewise undisputed that respondent failed to attend the scheduled
arraignment despite the latter's commitment to either find a way to attend, or send a collaborating counsel to do so; 30 that
he forgot the date of arraignment is an equally dismal excuse.
Equally revealing of respondent's negligence was his nonchalant attitude towards complainant's request for a refund of a
portion of, not even the entire, PhPl00,000. In his Answer before the IBP, respondent simply denied having received any
of the letters sent by complainant.31 Respondent's claim that it was complainant who failed to talk to him and his
admission that he "forgot about complainant"32 reveal his rather casual and lackadaisical treatment of the complainant and
the legal matter entrusted to him.
If it were true that complainant already failed to communicate with him, the least respondent could have done was to
withdraw his appearance as counsel. But even this measure, it appears, respondent failed to perform. His failure to take
such action speaks of his negligence.
In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence is required to warrant disciplinary sanctions. Substantial evidence
is consistently defined as relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.33 While the Court finds respondent guilty of negligence, We cannot ascribe to him any unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct nor causing undue delay and impediment to the execution of a judgment or misusing court
processes. As such, and consistent with current jurisprudence, We find the penalty of reprimand with stem warning
commensurate to his offense.34
As regards the restitution of the acceptance fees, We find it necessary to first distinguish between an attorney's fee and
an acceptance fee as the former depends on the nature and extent of the legal services rendered, while the other does
not.
On one hand, attorney's fee is understood both in its ordinary and extraordinary concept. 35 In its ordinary concept,
attorney's fee refers to the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for legal services rendered. While, in its
extraordinary concept, attorney's fee is awarded by the court to the successful litigant to be paid by the losing party as
indemnity for damages.36 In the present case, the Investigating Commissioner referred to the attorney's fee in its ordinary
concept.
On the other hand, acceptance fee refers to the charge imposed by the lawyer for mere acceptance of the case. The
rationale for the fee is because once the lawyer agrees to represent a client, he is precluded from handling cases of the
opposing party based on the prohibition on conflict of interest. The opportunity cost of mere acceptance is thus
indemnified by the payment of acceptance fee. However, since acceptance fee compensates the lawyer only for lost
opportunity, the same is not measured by the nature and extent of the legal services rendered. 37
In this case, respondent referred to the PhPl00,000 as his acceptance fee while to the complainant, said amount answers
for the legal services which respondent was engaged to provide. Preceding from the fact that complainant agreed to
immediately pay, as she, in fact, immediately paid the sums of PhP20,000, PhP30,000 and PhP50,000, said amounts
undoubtedly pertain to respondent's acceptance fee which is customarily paid by the client upon the lawyer's acceptance
of the case.
Be that as it may, the Court had not shied from ordering a return of acceptance fees in cases wherein the lawyer had
been negligent in the handling of his client's case. Thus, in Carino v. Atty. De Los Reyes,38 the respondent lawyer who
failed to file a complaint-affidavit before the prosecutor's office, returned the PhPl 0,000 acceptance fee paid to him and
was admonished to be more careful in the performance of his duty to his clients. Likewise, in Voluntad-Ramirez v.
Baustista,39 the respondent lawyer was ordered to return the PhP14,000 acceptance fee because he did nothing to
advance his client's cause during the six-month period that he was engaged as counsel.
This being the case, the next query to be had is how much of the acceptance fee should respondent restitute.1âwphi1 In
this regard, the principle of quantum meruit (as much as he deserves) may serve as a basis for determining the
reasonable amount of attorney's fees. Quantum meruit is a device to prevent undue enrichment based on the equitable
postulate that it is unjust for a person to retain benefit without working for it.
Also, Section 24, Rule 138 should be observed in determining respondent's compensation, thus:
SEC. 24. Compensation of attorney's; agreement as to fees. An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his
client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the
controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by
the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such testimony and base
its conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid
therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.
The criteria found in the Code of Professional Responsibility are also to be considered in assessing the proper amount of
compensation that a lawyer should receive.40 Canon 20, Rule 20.01 provides:
CANON 20 A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND REASONABLE FEES.
Rule 20.01. A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his fees:
(a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;
(b) The novelty and difficulty of the question involved;
(c) The importance of the subject matter;
(d) The skill demanded;
(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case;
(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP Chapter to which he belongs;
(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the service;
(h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;
(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
(j) The professional standing of the lawyer.

Here, respondent only conferred once with the complainant's son for 20 minutes, filed his entry of appearance, obtained
copies of the case records and inquired twice as to the status of the case. For his efforts and for the particular
circumstances in this case, respondent should be allowed a reasonable compensation of PhP3,000. The remainder, or
PhP97,000 should be returned to the complainant.
WHEREFORE, We find Atty. Daniel T. Alviar LIABLE for violation of Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and he is hereby REPRIMANDED with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or similar
act would be dealt with more severely. Atty. Daniel T. Alviar is ordered to RESTITUTE to complainant the amount of
PhP97,000 out of the Phpl00,000 acceptance fee.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 124074. January 27, 1997]
RESEARCH and SERVICES REALTY, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MANUEL S.
FONACIER, JR., respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court questions the propriety of the
award for, and the reasonableness of the amount of, attorney's fees granted in favor of the private
respondent by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 64,[1] in Civil Case No. 612,[2] which
the Court of Appeals affirmed in its decision[3] of 31 March 1995 in CA-G.R. CV No. 44839.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
On 3 November 1969, the petitioner entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with Jose, Fidel, and
Antonia Carreon. Under the said agreement, the petitioner undertook to develop, subdivide, administer,
and promote the sale of the parcels of land owned by the Carreons. The proceeds of the sale of the lots
were to be paid to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) for the landowner's mortgage obligation, and the
net profits to be shared by the contracting parties on a 50-50 basis.
On 4 April 1983, the Carreons and a certain Patricio C. Sarile instituted before the RTC of Makati City
an action against the petitioner for rescission of the Joint Venture Agreement.They prayed therein that
pending the hearing of the case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the petitioner from
selling the lots subject of the agreement and that after hearing, the writ be made permanent; the
agreement be rescinded; and the petitioner be ordered to pay the PNB the stipulated 15% per annum of
the outstanding obligation and to pay the plaintiffs attorney's fees, exemplary damages, expenses of
litigation, and costs of suit. This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 612 at Branch 64 of the said court.
In its answer, which was prepared and signed by Atty. Apolonio G. Reyes, the petitioner sought the
denial of the writ of preliminary injunction, the dismissal of the complaint, and payment in its favor of
(a) P10 million by way of actual damages; (b) P5 million by way of return to the petitioner of the amount
advanced to the Carreons, payments to the PNB, and cost of the work on the subdivision; (c) P100,000.00
by way of exemplary damages; (d) any and all damages up to the amount of P4,638,420.00 which the
petitioner may suffer under the terms of its Performance Bond in favor of the National Housing Authority;
(e) P50,000.00 as attorney's fees; and (f) costs of suit.
On 9 April 1985, the petitioner engaged the services of private respondent Atty. Manuel S. Fonacier,
Jr., who then entered his appearance in Civil Case No. 612.
[4]
While the said case was pending, or on 24 July 1992, the petitioner, without the knowledge of the
private respondent, entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) [5] with another land developer,
Filstream International, Inc. (hereinafter Filstream). Under this MOA, the former assigned its rights and
obligations under the Joint Venture Agreement in favor of the latter for a consideration of P28 million,
payable within twenty-four months.
On 31 March 1993, the petitioner terminated the legal services of the private respondent. At the time
the petitioner had already received P7 million from Filstream.
Upon knowing the existence of the MOA, the private respondent filed in Civil Case No. 612 an Urgent
Motion to Direct Payment of Attorney's Fees and/or Register Attorney's Charging Lien praying, among
other things, that the petitioner be ordered to pay him the sum of P700,000.00 as his contingent fee in
the case.[6]
After hearing the motion, the trial court issued an order dated 11 October 1993 directing the
petitioner to pay the private respondent the sum of P600,000.00 as attorney's fees on the basis
of quantum meruit.
The trial court justified the award in this manner:
Insofar as material to the resolution of this Motion the records of this case show that movant Atty.
Fonacier became the counsel of defendant Research in May 1985 while this case has been in progress.
(Records, p.770). By this time also, the defendant Research has been enjoined by the Court from
executing Contracts To Sell involving Saranay Homes Subdivision . . . . (Order dated December 3, 1984,
Records pp. 625-626). However, the said counsel for defendant Research prepared for the latter various
pleadings and represented it in Court (See Records after May 1985). Until his services were terminated
the lawyer client relationship between Atty. Fonacier and Research was governed by a "contract"
embodied in a letter addressed to Atty. Fonacier on April 19, 1985 [sic], the pertinent portion of which is
reproduced below, as follows . . .
xxx
Soon after said letter, cases were referred to him including this case. In accordance with their agreement,
there were instances that Research gave Atty. Fonacier ten (10%) percent of the amount received as the
latter's attorney's fees pursuant to their agreement.
The instant case in which defendant is praying to be awarded attorney's fees, is an action for rescission of
the Joint Venture Agreement between plaintiffs, Patricio Sarile, et al., as owners of a parcel of land and
defendant Research & Service Realty, Inc., as developer of the land. At the time Atty. Fonacier entered his
appearance as counsel for defendant Research, the Court has issued a preliminary injunction against
Research. Thus all developmental and commercial activities of defendant had to stop. In this regard, Atty.
Fonacier did spade work towards persuading the plaintiffs to agree to the relaxation of the effects of the
injunction to pave the way to a negotiation with a third-party, the Filstream. Atty. Fonancier's efforts were
complemented by the efforts of his counterpart in the plaintiff's side. The third-party Filstream Inc.,
became the assignee of defendant Research. In this connection, a memorandum of agreement was
entered into between them. By the terms of agreement, defendant Research will be receiving from the
third party Filstream International, Inc. (Filstream) the following amount. . . .
xxx
The termination of the legal services of Atty. Fonacier was made definite on March 31, 1993 at which time
the Memorandum of Agreement which Research entered into with Filstream, Inc., has already been
effective. By this time also, defendant Research has already received the first two stipulated consideration
of the agreement in the total sum of Six Million (P6,000,000.00). The necessary and legal consequence of
said "Memorandum of Agreement" is the termination of the case insofar as plaintiff Patricio Sarile, et al.
and defendant Research is concerned. The conclusion of the Memorandum of Agreement insofar as the
cause of Research is concerned, is a legal victory for defendant Research. What could have been a loss in
investment has been turned to a legal victory. Atty. Fonancier's effort contributed to defendant's victory,
albeit outside the Court which would not have been possible without the legal maneuvering of a lawyer.
The dismissal of the case before this Court will come in a matter of time considering that plaintiffs, with
the assumption by the third party, Filstream Inc., of what were supposed to be the obligations to them of
defendant Research pursuant to their Joint Venture Agreement, is no longer interested in pursuing the
rescission.
It is a matter of record that Atty. Fonacier is the last of the three lawyers who handled this case. Moreover
it is Atty. Fonacier who contributed to the forging of the memorandum of agreement as testified to by
Atty. Rogel Atienza one of the two retained counsels of plaintiffs.
Considering the importance which is attached to this case, certainly it would not be fair for Atty. Fonacier
if his attorney's fees in this case would be equated only to the measly monthly allowance of (P800.00)
Pesos and office space and other office facilities provided by defendant Research. Ten (10%) per cent of
the amount which Research had received from Filstream at the time of the termination of a lawyer-client
relationship between Atty. Fonacier and Research or P600,000.00 will be a just and equitable
compensation for Atty. Fonancier's legal services, by way of quantum meruit (See Cabildo v. Provincial
Treasurer, Ilocos Norte, et al., 54 SCRA 26).[7]
In its Order[8] of 12 January 1994, the trial court denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration of
the above order.
The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its Appellant's Brief,[9] the petitioner alleged that
the private respondent was not entitled to attorney's fees under the retainer contract.Moreover, the
private respondent did not exert any effort to amicably settle the case, nor was he even present during
the negotiations for the settlement of the same. There was, therefore, no legal and factual justification for
the private respondent's "fantastic and unreasonable claim for attorney's fees of P600,000.00."
On the other hand, the private respondent asserted that he was assured by the petitioner that non-
collection cases were included in the contingent fee arrangement specified in the retainer contract wherein
there was to be contingent compensation for any award arising from any lawsuit handled by
him. According to him, Civil Case No. 612 was not the only "non-collection" case he handled for the
petitioner. There was a "right of way" dispute where the petitioner was awarded P50,000.00, and the
latter paid him P5,000.00, or 10% of the award as attorney's fees. He thus stressed that since under the
memorandum of agreement the petitioner was to receive P28 million, he should be entitled to 10%
thereof or P2.8 million as attorney's fees.
In its decision [10] of 31 March 1995, the Court of Appeals affirmed the challenged order of the trial
court. It ratiocinated as follows:
Movant-appellee, on the other hand, correctly argues that it was the clear intention of appellant and
counsel to compensate the latter for any legal services rendered by him to the former. Stated otherwise, it
was never the intention of the parties in the instant appeal that counsel's services shall be free or to be
rendered ex gratia.
xxx
It must in addition be underscored that the retainer contract of April 9, 1985 is the law that governs the
relationship between appellant and appellee. In fact, the following provisions squarely and categorically
supports the award of P600,000.00 to counsel, to wit:
Minimal allowance of P800 per month plus contingent fees and collection cases (case to case basis) aside
from the attorney's fee recovered from any law suit.
(Paragraph 3, Retainer Contract)
In an American jurisprudence on this point cited in local annotation on the Canon of Professional Ethics, it
was held that "if a lawyer renders valuable services to one who receives the benefits thereof, a promise to
pay a reasonable value is presumed, unless such services were intended to be gratuitous"
(Young vs. Buere, 78 Cal. Am. 127) In effect, to compensate a lawyer, we are faced with the pivotal
question: "was the legal services intended to be free or not?" If it is not free, then, appellant must simply
pay. The 10% contingent fee of the amount collected and/or to be collected in Civil Case No. 612 of the
lower court, is, to Our mind fair and reasonable. As ruled by the Supreme Court in the case of
Cosmopolitan Insurance Co. vs. Angel Reyes (G.R. L-20199, Nov. 23, 1965) 15% was even deemed
reasonable. [11]
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration [12] on the ground among other things, that the
decision is contrary to the evidence, as the trial court granted the claim for attorney's fees based
on quantum meruit, yet, the Court of Appeals granted the same on a contingent basis which it based on
an erroneous quotation and comprehension of the following provision of the retainer contract:
Minimal allowance of P800.00 per month plus contingent fees on collection cases (case to case basis)
aside from the attorney's fees recovered from any law suit. (underscoring ours) [13]
In its decision, the Court of Appeals substituted the word "on" after "contingent fees" with the word
"and." Under the aforequoted paragraph, the private respondent was entitled to attorney's fees on
contingent basis in collection cases only. In non collection cases, he was entitled only to the attorney's
fees that might be recovered in the lawsuit. [14] Since Civil Case No. 612 is not a collection case but an
action for rescission of a contract, then the aforequoted paragraph is not applicable as a basis for
awarding attorney's fees to the private respondent. [15]
Finding nothing new in the motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals denied it in the re-
solution [16] of 15 February 1996.
The petitioner then came to us via this petition for review wherein it contends that
I
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS HAD DECIDED THE CASE NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND THE
UNDISPUTED FACTS OF THE CASE.
II
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN AWARDING ON
CONTINGENT BASIS RESPONDENT-APPELLEE'S ATTORNEY'S FEES ON THE BASIS OF A MEMORANDUM OF
AGREEMENT IN WHICH HE HAD NO PARTICIPATION IN THE NEGOTIATION AND PREPARATION THEREOF.
III
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING EXCESSIVE AND
UNREASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEES.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT AND THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS HAVE NO JURISDICTION TO SATISFY
ATTORNEY'S CHARGING LIEN ON A SUM OF MONEY THAT THE COURT HAD NO AUTHORITY TO DISPOSE
OF AND OVER WHICH THE TRIAL COURT HAD MADE NO FINAL ADJUDICATION.
The petitioner's more important argument in support of the first error is the Court of Appeals'
misquotation of the provision in the retainer contract regarding attorney's fees on contingent basis, which
the petitioner had stressed in its motion for reconsideration. The petitioner maintains that under the
contract, attorney's fees on contingent basis could only be awarded in collection cases, and Civil Case No.
612 is not a collection case. Hence, the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the award on that basis, while
the trial court was correct in applying the principle of quantum meruit.
In its second assigned error, the petitioner asserts that the private respondent admitted in his Urgent
Motion to Direct Payment of Attorney's Fees and/or Register Attorney's Charging Lien that he had not
participated in the negotiations and preparation of the memorandum of agreement, thus:
Despite the dishonest concealment, by the light of Providence coupled with a streak of good luck, counsel
discovered in the first week of March 1993 that the parties had respectively entered into a meaningful
agreement with a third-party as early as July 27, 1992, which in the case of client, case in the form of a
"Memorandum of Agreement" (MOA) . . . . [17]
The third assigned error is but a logical consequence of the second, and the petitioner maintains that
since the private respondent "did not do anything spectacular or out of the ordinary" in Civil Case No. 612,
"except to ask for the suspension or postponement of the proceedings thereof from 1985 to 1993,"
the P600,000.00 attorney's fees, whether on contingent basis or quantum meruit, is excessive and
unreasonable.
In the fourth imputed error, the petitioner argues that the memorandum of agreement was never
submitted to the trial court, and the trial court never made any disposition or adjudication over the
proceeds of the said agreement. What would eventually happen then is the dismissal of Civil Case No.
612, as the trial court itself had intimated in its challenged order.Necessarily then, there would be no
money adjudication in favor of the petitioner as the defendant therein. Since such lien is collectible only
from an award of money that a court would adjudicate in a judgment rendered in favor of the attorney's
client pursuant to Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, it would follow that no attorney's charging
lien could be validly entered.
We uphold the petitioner, but not necessarily on the strength of it arguments.
The parties are in agreement that the lawyer-client relationship between the petitioner and the private
respondent, Atty. Manuel S. Fonacier, Jr., was governed by a retainer contract dated 9 April 1985. The
petitioner's undertakings thereunder are outlined as follows:
I. CORPORAT[ION]:
1. Corporation will provide the following:
a. Office space airconditioned

b. Furnishings, tables, executive chairs, visitor's chair & steel filing cabinet
c. Telephone facilities and partial secretarial services.
2. Legal service referrals by the corporation to its clients for additional income of the lawyer.
3. Minimal allowance of P800 per month plus contingent fees on contingent fees on collection
cases (case to case basis) aside from the attorney's fees recovered from any lawsuit.
4. That in case of legal problems to be attended to outside Metro Manila and Suburbs, the
corporation shall defray expenses for transportation, lodging and other legal expenses
incidental in the case. [18]
An analysis of the contract clearly shows that it was a general retainer, since its primary purpose was
to secure beforehand the services of the private respondent for any legal problem which might afterward
arise. [19] The fixed retaining fee was P800.00 a month. A retaining fee is a preliminary fee paid to ensure
and secure a lawyer's future services, to remunerate him for being deprived, by being retained by one
party, of the opportunity of rendering services to the other party and of receiving pay from him. In the
absence of an agreement to the contrary, the retaining fee is neither made nor received in consideration
of the services contemplated; it is apart from what the client has agreed to pay for the services which he
has retained him to perform. [20]
In the retainer contract in question, there was no intention to make the retaining fee as the attorney's
fees for the services contemplated. This is evident from the provision allowing additional attorney's fees
in collection cases consisting of (1) a "contingent fee" and (2) whatever the petitioner might recover as
attorney's fees in each case. The latter could only refer to the attorney's fees which the court might award
to the petitioner in appropriate cases.
While the contract did not mention non-collection cases, it is, nevertheless, clear therefrom that such
cases were not excluded from the retainership, as borne out by the provision requiring the private
respondent to "make appearances in Court for cases involving the corporation or any allied cases
pertaining to the latter." As to such cases, there was no specific stipulation of additional attorney's
fees. Nevertheless, nothing therein shows that the private respondent agreed to render professional
service in such cases gratuitously. The absence then of the stipulation of additional attorney's fees cannot
be construed as a bar to the collection of additional attorney's fees in non-collection cases.
Two basic principles come into play. The first is as stated earlier, viz., that the retaining fee is neither
made nor received in consideration of the services contemplated unless the contract itself so provides. The
second is that, unless expressly stipulated, rendition of professional services by a lawyer is for a fee or
compensation and is not gratuitous. This is implicit from the opening clause of Section 24, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court, which states that "[a]n attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no
more than a reasonable compensation for his services . . .," and by virtue of the innominate contract of
facio ut des (I do and you give), as enunciated by this Court in Corpus v. Court of Appeals, [21] thus:
Moreover, the payment of attorney's fees . . . may also be justified by virtue of the innominate contract
of facio ut des (I do and you give) which is based on the principle that "no one shall unjustly enrich
himself at the expense of another." Innominate contracts have been elevated to a codal provision in the
New Civil Code by providing under Article 1307 that such contracts shall be regulated by the stipulations
of the parties, by the general provisions or principles of obligations and contracts, by the rules governing
the most analogous nominate contracts, and by the customs of the people. The rationale of this article
was stated in the 1903 case of Perez vs. Pomar (2 Phil. 682).
In Perez v. Pomar, [22]

this Court stated:
[B]ut whether the plaintiff's services were solicited or whether they were offered to the defendant for his
assistance, inasmuch as these services were accepted and made use of by the latter, we must consider
that there was a tacit and mutual consent as to the rendition of the services. This gives rise to the
obligation upon the person benefited by the services to make compensation therefor, since the bilateral
obligation to render service as interpreter, on the one hand, and on the other to pay for the services
rendered, is thereby incurred. (Arts. 1088, 1089, and 1262 of the Civil Code).
Accordingly, as to non-collection cases where the petitioner was either a plaintiff or a defendant, the
private respondent could still collect attorney's fees, apart from his regular retaining fee, on the basis of
any-supplemental agreement or, in its absence, under the principle of quantum meruit. There was no such
supplemental agreement in this case.
We cannot sustain the private respondent's theory that he could collect attorney's fees on contingent
basis because in the other "non-collection" cases he handled for the petitioner' he was paid on contingent
basis at the rate of 10% of what was awarded to the petitioner. In the first place, Civil Case No. 612 is still
unresolved, and no judgment has yet been rendered in favor of the petitioner. The amount in the
memorandum of agreement could not be made the basis of a "contingent fee" in the said case for at least
three reasons. First, in his own Urgent Motion to Direct Payment of Attorney's Fees and/or Register
Attorney's Charging Lien, the private respondent based the contingent fee not only in Civil Case No. 612
but in a "multitude of peripheral cases," and the contingent fee would become due and collectible only if
and when the petitioner obtains a judgment in his favor in Civil Case No. 612. The second paragraph of
page 3 of the said motion reads as follows:
Hence, from May 1985 and continuously thru the years without interruption and surviving a series of no
less than five (5) changes of Presiding Judges, the undersigned counsel labored tirelessly in handling the
defense of client. In addition to the instant lawsuit, a multitude of peripheral cases, civil, criminal and
administrative, arising from the non-delivery of titles by client on fully paid lots in the subdivision project
were also filed as a consequence, not only against defendant but also against its President and Chief
Executive Officer (CEO). Needless to state, the undersigned was designated to handle majority of these
cases for both, where he appeared and conducted trial without any "appearance fees" for more than eight
(8) long years solely relying on the contingent fee in case of recovery in the instant main
case.[23] (underscoring supplied for emphasis)
Second, the amount of P28 million, which Filstream agreed to pay the petitioner, was not a judgment
or award in favor of the petitioner in Civil Case No. 612. It was the consideration of the assignment,
transfer, and conveyance to Filstream of all the petitioner's "rights, interest and participation embodied
and specified in the Joint Venture Agreement (Annex "A") and in all the eight hundred seventy-five (875)
parcels of land comprising the SARANAY HOMES subdivision. . . ." The plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 612 were
not parties to the memorandum of agreement, and there is no showing that they agreed to the
assignment of the petitioner's rights, interest, and participation in the Joint Venture Agreement. While
paragraph 10 of the memorandum of agreement provides that the petitioner
shall cause to sign a JOINT MOTION TO DISMISS, together with the CARREONS regarding Civil Case
No. 612 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati and to further DISMISS, the case filed against PNB
docketed as Civil Case No. 6918 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati . . . [and] shall obtain the
dismissal of all cases filed by lot buyers against it now pending with the HLURB
the fact remains that no such motion to dismiss has been filed yet in Civil Case No. 612, and there is no
assurance whatsoever that the plaintiffs therein will sign a joint motion to dismiss. Third, as correctly
posited by the petitioner, the private respondent had no participation in the negotiations leading to, and in
the preparation of, the memorandum of agreement.
Indisputably then, the private respondent's attorney's fee on "contingent basis" in Civil Case No. 612
is unwarranted. If at all, he could only be entitled to attorney's fees on quantum meruit basis as of the
expiration of his retainer contract on 31 March 1993.
Quantum meruit simply means "as much as he deserves." [24] In no case, however, must a lawyer be
allowed to recover more than what is reasonable pursuant to Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
which provides:
SEC. 24. Compensation of attorneys, agreement as to fees. An attorney shall be entitled to have and
recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the
importance of the subject-matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the
professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert
witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on its
own professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefor
unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.
This Court had earlier declared the following as circumstances to be considered in determining the
reasonableness of a claim for attorney's fees: (1) the amount and character of the service rendered; (2)
labor, time, and trouble involved; (3) the nature and importance of the litigation or business in which the
services were rendered; (4) the responsibility imposed; (5) the amount of money or the value of the
property affected by the controversy or involved in the employment; (6) the skill and experience called for
in the performance of the services; (7) the professional character and social standing of the attorney; (8)
the results secured; and (9) whether the fee is absolute or contingent, it being recognized that an
attorney may properly charge a much larger fee when it is contingent than when it is not. [25]
Rule 20.1, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enumerates the following factors which
should guide a lawyer in determining his fees:
(b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP Chapter to
which he belongs;
(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the
service;
It was incumbent upon the private respondent to prove the reasonable amount of attorney's fees,
taking into account the foregoing factors or circumstances. The records before us and the trial court's 11
October 1993 order do not confirm that the private respondent proved by either testimonial or
documentary evidence that the award of P600,000.00 was reasonable. The private respondent's testimony
thereon was crucial. Yet, it does not appear from the 11 October 1993 order that he took the witness
stand. From the Minutes of the trial court attached to the Rollo of CA-G.R. CV No. 44839, [26] it appears
that only Atty. Atienza and Mr. Suazo gave oral testimony on the motion.
It necessarily follows then that the 11 October 1993 order has insufficient factual basis, and the trial
court committed grave abuse of discretion in arbitrarily fixing the private respondent's attorney's fees
at P600,000.00. The affirmance of the said order by the Court of Appeals premised on the provision in the
retainer contract regarding contingent fee is thus fatally flawed.
The interest for both the petitioner and the private respondent demands that the trial court should
conduct further proceedings in Civil Case No. 612 relative to the private respondent's motion for the
payment of attorney's fees and, thereafter, fix it in light of Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court;
Rule 20.1, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and the jurisprudentially established
guiding principles in determining attorney's fees on quantum meruit basis.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged Decision of 31 March 1995 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 44839 and the Order of 11 October 1993 of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 64, in Civil Case No. 612 are hereby SET ASIDE. The trial court is further DIRECTED to set
for further hearing the private respondent's Urgent Motion to Direct Payment of Attorney's Fees and/or
Register Attorney's Charging Lien and thereafter to fix the private respondent's attorney's fees in Civil
Case No. 612 as of 31 March 1993 when his contract with the petitioner was effectively terminated, taking
into account Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; Rule 20.1, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and the jurisprudentially established guiding principles in determining attorney's fees
on quantum meruit basis.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Digest: Research and Services Realty, Inc v. CA G.R. No. 124074, January 27, 1997
Facts: The petitioner entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with the Carreons. The Carreons instituted
before the RTC an action against the petitioner rescission of the Joint Venture Agreement. They prayed for
among others, therein that the petitioner be ordered to pay the PNB the stipulated 15% per annum of the
outstanding obligation and to pay the plaintiffs attorney’s fees, exemplary damages, expenses of litigation,
and costs of suit. In its answer, which was prepared and signed by Atty. Apolonio G. Reyes, the petitioner
sought the denial of the writ of preliminary injunction, the dismissal of the complaint, and payment in its
favor of (a) P10 million by way of actual damages; (b) P5 million by way of return to the petitioner of the
amount advanced to the Carreons, payments to the PNB, and cost of the work on the subdivision; (c)
P100,000.00 by way of exemplary damages; (d) any and all damages up to the amount of P4,638,420.00
which the petitioner may suffer under the terms of its Performance Bond in favor of the National Housing
Authority; (e) P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and (f) costs of suit. On 9 April 1985, the petitioner engaged
the services of private respondent Atty. Manuel S. Fonacier, Jr.,4 who then entered his appearance in Civil
Case No. 612. While the said case was pending, or on 24 July 1992, the petitioner, without the knowledge
of the private respondent, entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with another land developer,
Filstream International, Inc. (hereinafter Filstream). Under this MOA, the former assigned its rights and
obligations under the Joint Venture Agreement in favor of the latter for a consideration of P28 million,
payable within twenty-four months. In 1993, the petitioner terminated the legal services of the private
respondent. At the time the petitioner had already received P7 million from Filstream. Upon knowing the
existence of the MOA, the private respondent filed in Civil Case No. 612 an Urgent Motion to Direct
Payment of Attorney’s Fees and/or Register Attorney’s Charging Lien praying, among other things, that
the petitioner be ordered to pay him the sum of P700,000.00 as his contingent fee in the case. After
hearing the motion, the trial court issued an order directing the petitioner to pay the private respondent
the sum of P600,000.00 as attorney’s fees on the basis of quantum meruit. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied by the RTC. The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which the Court
affirmed the challenged order of the trial court. Hence the petitioner then came to the SC to petition for
review.
Issue: Whether the Respondent Lawyer is entitled to an Attorney’s fee for a case of the Petitioner that
the former has no direct participation.
Held: No, the court cannot sustain the private respondent’s theory that he could collect attorney’s fees on
contingent basis because in the other “non-collection” cases he handled for the petitioner, he was paid on
contingent basis at the rate of 10% of what was awarded to the petitioner. In the first place, Civil Case
No. 612 is still unresolved, and no judgment has yet been rendered in favor of the petitioner. The amount
in the memorandum of agreement could not be made the basis of a “contingent fee” in the said case for at
least three reasons. First, in his own Urgent Motion to Direct Payment of Attorney’s Fees and/or Register
Attorney’s Charging Lien, the private respondent based the contingent fee not only in Civil Case No. 612
but in a “multitude of peripheral cases,” and the contingent fee would become due and collectible only if
and when the petitioner obtains a judgment in his favor in Civil Case No. 612. Second, the amount of P28
million, which Filstream agreed to pay the petitioner, was not a judgment or award in favor of the
petitioner in Civil Case No. 612. Indisputably then, the private respondent’s attorney’s fee on “contingent
basis” in Civil Case No. 612 is unwarranted. If at all, he could only be entitled to attorney’s fees on
quantum meruit basis as of the expiration of his retainer contract on 31 March 1993.
Quantum meruit simply means “as much as he deserves.” In no case, however, must a lawyer be allowed
to recover more than what is reasonable, pursuant to Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
This Court had earlier declared the following as circumstances to be considered in determining the
reasonableness of a claim for attorney’s fees: (1) the amount and character of the service rendered; (2)
labor, time, and trouble involved; (3) the nature and importance of the litigation or business in which the
services were rendered; (4) the responsibility imposed; (5) the amount of money or the value of the
property affected by the controversy or involved in the employment; (6) the skill and experience called for
in the performance of the services; (7) the professional character and social standing of the attorney; (8)
the results secured; and (9) whether the fee is absolute or contingent, it being recognized that an
attorney may properly charge a much larger fee when it is contingent than when it is not. Rule 20.1,
Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enumerates the factors which should guide a lawyer in
determining his fees.
G.R. No. 191247, July 10, 2013
FRANCISCO L. ROSARIO, JR., Petitioner, v. LELLANI DE GUZMAN, ARLEEN DE GUZMAN, PHILIP RYAN DE GUZMAN,
AND ROSELLA DE GUZMAN BAUTISTA, Respondents.
DECISION
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to set aside the November 23, 20091 and the
February 11, 20102 Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Manila (RTC), in Civil Case No. 89-50138, entitled "Loreta
A. Chong v. Sps. Pedro and Rosita de Guzman," denying the Motion to Determine Attorney's Fees filed by the petitioner.
The Facts
Sometime in August 1990, Spouses Pedro and Rosita de Guzman (Spouses de Guzman) engaged the legal services of Atty.
Francisco L. Rosario, Jr. (petitioner) as defense counsel in the complaint filed against them by one Loreta A. Chong (Chong)
for annulment of contract and recovery of possession with damages involving a parcel of land in Parañaque City, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 1292, with an area of 266 square meters, more or less. Petitioner’s legal services
commenced from the RTC and ended up in this Court.3 Spouses de Guzman, represented by petitioner, won their case at all
levels. While the case was pending before this Court, Spouses de Guzman died in a vehicular accident. Thereafter, they were
substituted by their children, namely: Rosella de Guzman-Bautista, Lellani de Guzman, Arleen de Guzman, and Philip Ryan
de Guzman (respondents).4
On September 8, 2009, petitioner filed the Motion to Determine Attorney’s Fees5 before the RTC. He alleged, among others,
that he had a verbal agreement with the deceased Spouses de Guzman that he would get 25% of the market value of the
subject land if the complaint filed against them by Chong would be dismissed. Despite the fact that he had successfully
represented them, respondents refused his written demand for payment of the contracted attorney’s fees. Petitioner insisted
that he was entitled to an amount equivalent to 25% percent of the value of the subject land on the basis of quantum
meruit.
On November 23, 2009, the RTC rendered the assailed order denying petitioner’s motion on the ground that it was filed out
of time. The RTC stated that the said motion was filed after the judgment rendered in the subject case, as affirmed by this
Court, had long become final and executory on October 31, 2007. The RTC wrote that considering that the motion was filed
too late, it had already lost jurisdiction over the case because a final decision could not be amended or corrected except for
clerical errors or mistakes. There would be a variance of the judgment rendered if his claim for attorney’s fees would still be
included.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the RTC for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.
The Issues
This petition is anchored on the following grounds: c ralavvo nline lawlib rary
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DENYING THE MOTION TO DETERMINE ATTORNEY’S FEES ON THE
GROUND THAT IT LOST JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE SINCE THE JUDGMENT IN THE CASE HAS BECOME FINAL AND
EXECUTORY; chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary
II
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT PETITIONER’S CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES WOULD RESULT IN
A VARIANCE OF THE JUDGMENT THAT HAS LONG BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY; chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE FINALITY OF THE DECISION DID NOT BAR PETITIONER FROM
FILING THE MOTION TO RECOVER HIS ATTORNEY’S FEES.6 nadcralavvonl inelawli bra ry
Petitioner claims that Spouses de Guzman engaged his legal services and orally agreed to pay him 25% of the market value
of the subject land. He argues that a motion to recover attorney’s fees can be filed and entertained by the court before and
after the judgment becomes final. Moreover, his oral contract with the deceased spouses can be considered a quasi-contract
upon which an action can be commenced within six (6) years, pursuant to Article 1145 of the Civil Code. Because his motion
was filed on September 8, 2009, he insists that it was not yet barred by prescription.7
For their part, respondents counter that the motion was belatedly filed and, as such, it could no longer be granted. In
addition, the RTC had already resolved the issue when it awarded the amount of ?10,000.00 as attorney’s fees. Respondents
further assert that the law, specifically Article 2208 of the Civil Code, allows the recovery of attorney’s fees under a written
agreement. The alleged understanding between their deceased parents and petitioner, however, was never put in writing.
They also aver that they did not have any knowledge or information about the existence of an oral contract, contrary to
petitioner’s claims. At any rate, the respondents believe that the amount of 25% of the market value of the lot is excessive
and unconscionable.8
The Court’s Ruling
Preliminarily, the Court notes that the petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
because of the denial of his motion to determine attorney’s fees by the RTC. Apparently, the petitioner pursued the wrong
remedy. Instead of a petition for review under Rule 45, he should have filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 because
this case involves an error of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.
Moreover, petitioner violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts which prohibits direct resort to this Court unless the
appropriate remedy cannot be obtained in the lower tribunals.9 In this case, petitioner should have first elevated the case to
the Court of Appeals (CA) which has concurrent jurisdiction, together with this Court, over special civil actions
for certiorari.10 Even so, this principle is not absolute and admits of certain exceptions, such as in this case, when it is
demanded by the broader interest of justice.11
Indeed, on several occasions, this Court has allowed a petition to prosper despite the utilization of an improper remedy with
the reasoning that the inflexibility or rigidity of the application of the rules of procedure must give way to serve the higher
ends of justice. The strict application of procedural technicalities should not hinder the speedy disposition of the case on the
merits.12 Thus, this Court deems it expedient to consider this petition as having been filed under Rule 65.
With respect to the merits of the case, the Court finds in favor of petitioner.
In order to resolve the issues in this case, it is necessary to discuss the two concepts of attorney’s fees – ordinary and
extraordinary. In its ordinary sense, it is the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for legal services
rendered. In its extraordinary concept, it is awarded by the court to the successful litigant to be paid by the losing party as
indemnity for damages.13 Although both concepts are similar in some respects, they differ from each other, as further
explained below: c ralavvonl inelawl ibra ry
The attorney’s fee which a court may, in proper cases, award to a winning litigant is, strictly speaking, an item of damages.
It differs from that which a client pays his counsel for the latter’s professional services. However, the two concepts have
many things in common that a treatment of the subject is necessary. The award that the court may grant to a
successful party by way of attorney’s fee is an indemnity for damagessustained by him in prosecuting or
defending, through counsel, his cause in court. It may be decreed in favor of the party, not his lawyer, in any of the
instances authorized by law. On the other hand, the attorney’s fee which a client pays his counsel refers to
the compensation for the latter’s services. The losing party against whom damages by way of attorney’s fees may be
assessed is not bound by, nor is his liability dependent upon, the fee arrangement of the prevailing party with his lawyer. The
amount stipulated in such fee arrangement may, however, be taken into account by the court in fixing the amount of counsel
fees as an element of damages.
The fee as an item of damages belongs to the party litigant and not to his lawyer. It forms part of his judgment
recoveries against the losing party. The client and his lawyer may, however, agree that whatever attorney’s fee as an
element of damages the court may award shall pertain to the lawyer as his compensation or as part thereof. In such a case,
the court upon proper motion may require the losing party to pay such fee directly to the lawyer of the prevailing party.
The two concepts of attorney’s fees are similar in other respects. They both require, as a prerequisite to their grant, the
intervention of or the rendition of professional services by a lawyer. As a client may not be held liable for counsel fees in
favor of his lawyer who never rendered services, so too may a party be not held liable for attorney’s fees as damages in
favor of the winning party who enforced his rights without the assistance of counsel. Moreover, both fees are subject to
judicial control and modification. And the rules governing the determination of their reasonable amount are applicable in one
as in the other.14 [Emphases and underscoring supplied]
In the case at bench, the attorney’s fees being claimed by the petitioner refers to the compensation for professional services
rendered, and not as indemnity for damages. He is demanding payment from respondents for having successfully handled
the civil case filed by Chong against Spouses de Guzman. The award of attorney’s fees by the RTC in the amount of
P10,000.00 in favor of Spouses de Guzman, which was subsequently affirmed by the CA and this Court, is of no moment.
The said award, made in its extraordinary concept as indemnity for damages, forms part of the judgment recoverable against
the losing party and is to be paid directly to Spouses de Guzman (substituted by respondents) and not to petitioner. Thus, to
grant petitioner’s motion to determine attorney’s fees would not result in a double award of attorney’s fees. And, contrary to
the RTC ruling, there would be no amendment of a final and executory decision or variance in judgment.
The Court now addresses two (2) important questions: (1) How can attorney’s fees for professional services be recovered?
(2) When can an action for attorney’s fees for professional services be filed? The case of Traders Royal Bank Employees
Union-Independent v. NLRC15 is instructive: c ralavvo nline lawlib rary
As an adjunctive episode of the action for the recovery of bonus differentials in NLRC-NCR Certified Case No. 0466, private
respondent’s present claim for attorney’s fees may be filed before the NLRC even though or, better stated, especially after its
earlier decision had been reviewed and partially affirmed. It is well settled that a claim for attorney’s fees may be
asserted either in the very action in which the services of a lawyer had been rendered or in a separate action.
With respect to the first situation, the remedy for recovering attorney’s fees as an incident of the main action may be availed
of only when something is due to the client. Attorney’s fees cannot be determined until after the main litigation has
been decided and the subject of the recovery is at the disposition of the court. The issue over attorney’s fees only
arises when something has been recovered from which the fee is to be paid.
While a claim for attorney’s fees may be filed before the judgment is rendered, the determination as to the
propriety of the fees or as to the amount thereof will have to be held in abeyance until the main case from which
the lawyer’s claim for attorney’s fees may arise has become final. Otherwise, the determination to be made by
the courts will be premature. Of course, a petition for attorney’s fees may be filed before the judgment in favor
of the client is satisfied or the proceeds thereof delivered to the client.
It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that a lawyer has two options as to when to file his claim for professional
fees. Hence, private respondent was well within his rights when he made his claim and waited for the finality of
the judgment for holiday pay differential, instead of filing it ahead of the award’s complete resolution. To
declare that a lawyer may file a claim for fees in the same action only before the judgment is reviewed by a
higher tribunal would deprive him of his aforestated options and render ineffective the foregoing
pronouncements of this Court. [Emphases and underscoring supplied]
In this case, petitioner opted to file his claim as an incident in the main action, which is permitted by the rules. As to the
timeliness of the filing, this Court holds that the questioned motion to determine attorney’s fees was seasonably filed.
The records show that the August 8, 1994 RTC decision became final and executory on October 31, 2007. There is no dispute
that petitioner filed his Motion to Determine Attorney’s Fees on September 8, 2009, which was only about one (1) year and
eleven (11) months from the finality of the RTC decision. Because petitioner claims to have had an oral contract of attorney’s
fees with the deceased spouses, Article 1145 of the Civil Code16 allows him a period of six (6) years within which to file an
action to recover professional fees for services rendered. Respondents never asserted or provided any evidence that Spouses
de Guzman refused petitioner’s legal representation. For this reason, petitioner’s cause of action began to run only from the
time the respondents refused to pay him his attorney’s fees, as similarly held in the case of Anido v. Negado:17
In the case at bar, private respondent’s allegation in the complaint that petitioners refused to sign the contract for legal
services in October 1978, and his filing of the complaint only on November 23, 1987 or more than nine years after his cause
of action arising from the breach of the oral contract between him and petitioners point to the conclusion that the six-year
prescriptive period within which to file an action based on such oral contract under Article 1145 of the Civil Code had already
lapsed.
As a lawyer, private respondent should have known that he only had six years from the time petitioners refused
to sign the contract for legal services and to acknowledge that they had engaged his services for the settlement
of their parents’ estate within which to file his complaint for collection of legal fees for the services which he
rendered in their favor. [Emphases supplied]
At this juncture, having established that petitioner is entitled to attorney’s fees and that he filed his claim well within the
prescribed period, the proper remedy is to remand the case to the RTC for the determination of the correct amount of
attorney’s fees. Such a procedural route, however, would only contribute to the delay of the final disposition of the
controversy as any ruling by the trial court on the matter would still be open for questioning before the CA and this Court. In
the interest of justice, this Court deems it prudent to suspend the rules and simply resolve the matter at this level. The Court
has previously exercised its discretion in the same way in National Power Corporation v. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay:18
In the event of a dispute as to the amount of fees between the attorney and his client, and the intervention of the courts is
sought, the determination requires that there be evidence to prove the amount of fees and the extent and value of the
services rendered, taking into account the facts determinative thereof. Ordinarily, therefore, the determination of the
attorney’s fees on quantum meruit is remanded to the lower court for the purpose. However, it will be just and equitable
to now assess and fix the attorney’s fees of both attorneys in order that the resolution of “a comparatively
simple controversy,” as Justice Regalado put it in Traders Royal Bank Employees Union-Independent v. NLRC,
would not be needlessly prolonged, by taking into due consideration the accepted guidelines and so much of the
pertinent data as are extant in the records.19 [Emphasis supplied]
With respect to petitioner’s entitlement to the claimed attorney’s fees, it is the Court’s considered view that he is deserving
of it and that the amount should be based on quantum meruit.
Quantum meruit – literally meaning as much as he deserves – is used as basis for determining an attorney’s professional
fees in the absence of an express agreement. The recovery of attorney’s fees on the basis of quantum meruit is a device that
prevents an unscrupulous client from running away with the fruits of the legal services of counsel without paying for it and
also avoids unjust enrichment on the part of the attorney himself. An attorney must show that he is entitled to reasonable
compensation for the effort in pursuing the client’s cause, taking into account certain factors in fixing the amount of legal
fees.20
Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility lists the guidelines for determining the proper amount of attorney fees,
to wit:
cral avvonli nelawlib ra ry
Rule 20.1 – A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his fees: cralavvo nline lawlib rary
a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required; c hanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra ry
b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; cha nrob lesvi rtua lawlibra ry
c) The importance of the subject matter; chan roble svirtualawl ibra ry
d) The skill demanded; c han roblesv irt ualawli bra ry
e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case; chan roble svirtualawl ibra ry
f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which he belongs; chan roble svirtu alawlibra ry
g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the service; cha nrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary
h) The contingency or certainty of compensation; chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry
i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
j) The professional standing of the lawyer.
Petitioner unquestionably rendered legal services for respondents’ deceased parents in the civil case for annulment of
contract and recovery of possession with damages. He successfully represented Spouses de Guzman from the trial court level
in 1990 up to this Court in 2007, for a lengthy period of 17 years. After their tragic death in 2003, petitioner filed a notice of
death and a motion for substitution of parties with entry of appearance and motion to resolve the case before this Court.21 As
a consequence of his efforts, the respondents were substituted in the place of their parents and were benefited by the
favorable outcome of the case.
As earlier mentioned, petitioner served as defense counsel for deceased Spouses de Guzman and respondents for almost
seventeen (17) years. The Court is certain that it was not an easy task for petitioner to defend his clients’ cause for such a
long period of time, considering the heavy and demanding legal workload of petitioner which included the research and
preparation of pleadings, the gathering of documentary proof, the court appearances, and the various legal work necessary
to the defense of Spouses de Guzman. It cannot be denied that petitioner devoted much time and energy in handling the
case for respondents. Given the considerable amount of time spent, the diligent effort exerted by petitioner, and the quality
of work shown by him in ensuring the successful defense of his clients, petitioner clearly deserves to be awarded reasonable
attorney’s fees for services rendered. Justice and equity dictate that petitioner be paid his professional fee based on quantum
meruit.
The fact that the practice of law is not a business and the attorney plays a vital role in the administration of justice
underscores the need to secure him his honorarium lawfully earned as a means to preserve the decorum and respectability of
the legal profession. A layer is as much entitled to judicial protection against injustice, imposition or fraud on the part of his
client as the client against abuse on the part of his counsel. The duty of the court is not alone to see that a lawyer acts in a
proper and lawful manner; it is also its duty to see that a lawyer is paid his just fees. With his capital consisting of his brains
and with his skill acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but in expenditure of time and energy, he is entitled to the
protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of his client to escape payment of his just compensation. It
would be ironic if after putting forth the best in him to secure justice for his client he himself would not get his due.22
The Court, however, is resistant in granting petitioner's prayer for an award of 25% attorney's fees based on the value of the
property subject of litigation because petitioner failed to clearly substantiate the details of his oral agreement with Spouses
de Guzman. A fair and reasonable amount of attorney's fees should be 15% of the market value of the property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court grants the Motion to Determine Attorney's Fees filed by
petitioner Atty. Francisco L. Rosario, Jr. Based on quantum meruit, the amount of attorney's fees is at the rate of 15% of the
market value of the parcel of land, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1292, at the time of payment.
SO ORDERED.
FACTS:
Sometime in August 1990, Spouses Pedro and Rosita de Guzman (Spouses de Guzman) engaged the legal services of
Atty. Francisco L. Rosario, Jr. (petitioner) as defense counsel in the complaint filed against them by one Loreta A. Chong
(Chong) for annulment of contract and recovery of possession with damages involving a parcel of land in Parañaque City.
Spouses de Guzman, represented by petitioner, won their case at all levels. While the case was pending before this Court,
Spouses de Guzman died in a vehicular accident. Thereafter, they were substituted by their children, namely:
Rosella de Guzman-Bautista, Lellani de Guzman, Arleen de Guzman, and Philip Ryan de Guzman (respondents).
On September 8, 2009, petitioner filed the Motion to Determine Attorney’s Fees before the RTC. He alleged, among
others, that he had a verbal agreement with the deceased Spouses de Guzman that he would get 25% of the market value
of the subject land if the complaint filed against them by Chong would be dismissed. Despite the fact that he had
successfully represented them, respondents refused his written demand for payment of the contracted attorney’s fees.
Petitioner insisted that he was entitled to an amount equivalent to 25% percent of the value of the subject land on the basis
of quantum meruit.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner is entitled to Attorney’s fees.
2. Whether the finality of the decision did not bar petitioner from filing the motion to
recover his attorney’s fees.
HELD:
In order to resolve the issues in this case, it is necessary to discuss the two concepts of attorney’s fees – ordinary and
extraordinary. In its ordinary sense, it is the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for legal
ervices rendered. In its extraordinary concept, it is awarded by the court to the successful litigant to be paid by the losing
party as indemnity for damages.
Although both concepts are similar in some respects, they differ fromeach other, as further explained below:
The attorney’s fee which a court may, in proper cases, award to a winning litigant is, strictly speaking, an item of
damages. It differs from that which a client pays his counsel for the latter’s professional services. However, the two
concepts have many things in common that a treatment of the subject is necessary. The award that the court may grant to a
successful party by way of attorney’s fee is an indemnity for damages sustained by him in prosecuting or defending,
through counsel, his cause in court. It may be decreed in favor of the party, not his lawyer, in any of the instances
authorized by law. On the other hand, the attorney’s fee which a client pays his counsel refers to the compensation for the
latter’s services. The losing party against whom damages by way of attorney’s fees may be assessed is not bound by, nor
is his liability dependent upon, the fee arrangement of the prevailing party with his lawyer. The amount stipulated in such
fee arrangement may, however, be taken into account by the court in fixing the amount of counsel fees as an element of
damages.
The two concepts of attorney’s fees are similar in other respects. They both require, as a prerequisite to their grant, the
intervention of or the rendition of professional services by a lawyer. As a client may not be held liable for counsel fees in
favor of his lawyer who never rendered services, so too may a party be not held liable for attorney’s fees as damages in
favor of the winning party who enforced his rights without the assistance of counsel. Moreover, both fees are subject to
judicial control and modification. And the rules governing the determination of their reasonable amount are applicable in
one as in the other.
EVANGELINA MASMUD (as substitute complainant for ALEXANDER J. MASMUD) vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION (First Division) and ATTY. ROLANDO B. GO, JR.,
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] dated October 31, 2007 and the
Resolution dated June 6, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 96279.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On July 9, 2003, Evangelina Masmuds (Evangelina) husband, the late Alexander J. Masmud (Alexander), filed a
complaint[3] against First Victory Shipping Services and Angelakos (Hellas) S.A. for non-payment of permanent disability
benefits, medical expenses, sickness allowance, moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees. Alexander engaged the
services of Atty. Rolando B. Go, Jr. (Atty. Go) as his counsel.
In consideration of Atty. Gos legal services, Alexander agreed to pay attorneys fees on a contingent basis, as follows:
twenty percent (20%) of total monetary claims as settled or paid and an additional ten percent (10%) in case of appeal. It
was likewise agreed that any award of attorneys fees shall pertain to respondents law firm as compensation.
On November 21, 2003, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a Decision granting the monetary claims of Alexander. The
dispositive portion of the decision, as quoted in the CA Decision, reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, judgment is rendered finding the [First Victory Shipping Services and Angelakos
(Hellas) S.A.] jointly and severally liable to pay [Alexanders] total permanent disability benefits in the amount of
US$60,000.00 and his sickness allowance of US$2,348.00, both in Philippine currency at the prevailing rate of exchange
at the time of payment; and to pay further the amount of P200,000.00 as moral damages, P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages and attorneys fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award.
[Alexanders] claim for payment of medical expenses is dismissed for lack of basis.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Alexanders employer filed an appeal before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). During the pendency of
the proceedings before the NLRC, Alexander died. After explaining the terms of the lawyers fees to Evangelina, Atty. Go
caused her substitution as complainant. On April 30, 2004, the NLRC rendered a Decision dismissing the appeal of
Alexanders employer. The employer subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration. The NLRC denied the same in an
Order dated October 26, 2004.
On appeal before the CA, the decision of the LA was affirmed with modification. The award of moral and exemplary
damages was deleted.[5] Alexanders employers filed a petition for certiorari[6] before this Court. On February 6, 2006, the
Court issued a Resolution dismissing the case for lack of merit.
Eventually, the decision of the NLRC became final and executory. Atty. Go moved for the execution of the NLRC
decision, which was later granted by the LA. The surety bond of the employer was garnished. Upon motion of Atty. Go,
the surety company delivered to the NLRC Cashier, through the NLRC Sheriff, the check amounting to P3,454,079.20.
Thereafter, Atty. Go moved for the release of the said amount to Evangelina.
On January 10, 2005, the LA directed the NLRC Cashier to release the amount of P3,454,079.20 to Evangelina. Out of the
said amount, Evangelina paid Atty. Go the sum of P680,000.00.
Dissatisfied, Atty. Go filed a motion to record and enforce the attorneys lien alleging that Evangelina reneged on their
contingent fee agreement. Evangelina paid only the amount of P680,000.00, equivalent to 20% of the award as attorneys
fees, thus, leaving a balance of 10%, plus the award pertaining to the counsel as attorneys fees.
In response to the motion filed by Atty. Go, Evangelina filed a comment with motion to release the amount deposited with
the NLRC Cashier. In her comment, Evangelina manifested that Atty. Gos claim for attorneys fees of 40% of the total
monetary award was null and void based on Article 111 of the Labor Code.
On February 14, 2005, the LA issued an Order[7] granting Atty. Gos motion, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, and further considering the substitute complainants initial payment of 20% to
movant-counsel of the monetary claims as paid, let the balance or unpaid twenty (20%) per cent of attorneys fees due
movant-counsel (or the amount of P839,587.39) be recorded as lien upon all the monies that may still be paid to substitute
complainant Evangelina Masmud.
Accordingly, the NLRC Cashier is directed to pay movant-counsel the amount of P677,589.96 which is
currently deposited therein to partially satisfy the lien.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Evangelina questioned the February 14, 2005 Order of the LA before the NLRC. On January 31, 2006, the NLRC issued a
Resolution[9] dismissing the appeal for lack of merit.
Evangelina then elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari.[10] On October 31, 2007, the CA rendered a
Decision[11] partially granting the petition. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Resolutions dated January 31, 2006 and July 18, 2006
are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the Attorneys fees of respondent Atty. Rolando B. Go, Jr. is
declared fully compensated by the amount of P1,347,950.11 that he has already received.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Evangelina filed a motion for reconsideration. However, on June 6, 2008, the CA issued a Resolution [13] denying
the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition.
Evangelina presented this issue, viz.:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW IN ITS DECISION
DATED 31 OCTOBER 2007 AND RESOLUTION DATED 6 JUNE 2008 INSOFAR AS IT UPHOLDS RESPONDENT
LAWYERS CLAIM OF FORTY PERCENT (40%) OF THE MONETARY AWARD IN A LABOR CASE AS
ATTORNEYS FEES.[14]
In effect, petitioner seeks affirmance of her conviction that the legal compensation of a lawyer in a labor proceeding
should be based on Article 111 of the Labor Code.
There are two concepts of attorney's fees. In the ordinary sense, attorney's fees represent the reasonable compensation paid
to a lawyer by his client for the legal services rendered to the latter. On the other hand, in its extraordinary concept,
attorney's fees may be awarded by the court as indemnity for damages to be paid by the losing party to the prevailing
party,[15] such that, in any of the cases provided by law where such award can be made, e.g., those authorized in Article
2208 of the Civil Code, the amount is payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless they have agreed that the award
shall pertain to the lawyer as additional compensation or as part thereof.[16]
Here, we apply the ordinary concept of attorneys fees, or the compensation that Atty. Go is entitled to receive for
representing Evangelina, in substitution of her husband, before the labor tribunals and before the court.
Evangelina maintains that Article 111 of the Labor Code is the law that should govern Atty. Gos compensation as her
counsel and assiduously opposes their agreed retainer contract.
Article 111 of the said Code provides:
ART. 111. Attorney's fees. (a) In cases of unlawful withholding of wages the culpable party may be assessed attorney's
fees equivalent to ten percent of the amount of the wages recovered.
Contrary to Evangelinas proposition, Article 111 of the Labor Code deals with the extraordinary concept of attorneys fees.
It regulates the amount recoverable as attorney's fees in the nature of damages sustained by and awarded to the prevailing
party. It may not be used as the standard in fixing the amount payable to the lawyer by his client for the legal services he
rendered.[17]
In this regard, Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court should be observed in determining Atty. Gos compensation.
The said Rule provides:
SEC. 24. Compensation of attorney's; agreement as to fees. An attorney shall be entitled to have and
recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the
importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the
professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert
witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on its
own professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefor
unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.[18]
The retainer contract between Atty. Go and Evangelina provides for a contingent fee. The contract shall control in the
determination of the amount to be paid, unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable. [19] Attorney's fees
are unconscionable if they affront one's sense of justice, decency or reasonableness. [20] The decree of unconscionability or
unreasonableness of a stipulated amount in a contingent fee contract will not preclude recovery. It merely justifies the
fixing by the court of a reasonable compensation for the lawyer's services.[21]
The criteria found in the Code of Professional Responsibility are also to be considered in assessing the proper amount of
compensation that a lawyer should receive. Canon 20, Rule 20.01 of the said Code provides:
(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP Chapter to which he
belongs;

Contingent fee contracts are subject to the supervision and close scrutiny of the court in order that clients
may be protected from unjust charges.[22] The amount of contingent fees agreed upon by the parties is
subject to the stipulation that counsel will be paid for his legal services only if the suit or litigation
prospers. A much higher compensation is allowed as contingent fees because of the risk that the lawyer
may get nothing if the suit fails.[23] The Court finds nothing illegal in the contingent fee contract between
Atty. Go and Evangelinas husband. The CA committed no error of law when it awarded the attorneys fees
of Atty. Go and allowed him to receive an equivalent of 39% of the monetary award.
The issue of the reasonableness of attorney's fees is a question of fact. Well-settled is the rule that conclusions and
findings of fact of the CA are entitled to great weight on appeal and will not be disturbed except for strong and cogent
reasons which are absent in the case at bench. The findings of the CA, which are supported by substantial evidence, are
almost beyond the power of review by the Supreme Court.[24]
Considering that Atty. Go successfully represented his client, it is only proper that he should receive adequate
compensation for his efforts. Even as we agree with the reduction of the award of attorney's fees by the CA, the fact that a
lawyer plays a vital role in the administration of justice emphasizes the need to secure to him his honorarium lawfully
earned as a means to preserve the decorum and respectability of the legal profession. A lawyer is as much entitled to
judicial protection against injustice or imposition of fraud on the part of his client as the client is against abuse on the part
of his counsel. The duty of the court is not alone to ensure that a lawyer acts in a proper and lawful manner, but also to see
that a lawyer is paid his just fees. With his capital consisting of his brains and with his skill acquired at tremendous cost
not only in money but in expenditure of time and energy, he is entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal against
any attempt on the part of his client to escape payment of his just compensation. It would be ironic if after putting forth
the best in him to secure justice for his client, he himself would not get his due.[25]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated October 31, 2007 and the Resolution dated June 6, 2008 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 96279 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Facts:
In 2003, Evangeline Masmud filed a complaint on behalf of her late husband Alexander against First Victory Shipping Services for non payment of
permanent disability benefits, medical expenses, sickness allowances, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees of his late husband
Alexander and then Alexander hire Atty. Go as his counsel. In consideration of Atty. Go’s legal services, Alexander agreed to pay attorneys fees on a
contingent basis, as follows: 20 % of total monetary claims as settled or paid and an additional 10 % in case of appeal. It was likewise agreed that any
ward of attorney’s fees shall pertain to respondent’s law firm as compensation.
The Labour Arbiter rendered a decision granting the monetary claims of Alexander. However Alexander’s employer filed an appeal with the NLRC.
During the pendency of the proceedings before the NLRC, Alexander died thereafter Atty. Go substitute Evangelina as complainant. The NLRC
denied the motion of the Alexander’s employer. On appeal before the CA, the decision of the Labour Arbiter was affirmed with modification.
Eventually, the decision of the NLRC became final and executor and Atty. Go moved for the execution of the NLRC decision, which was granted by
the Labour Arbiter. The surety bond of the employer was garnished and Atty. Go moved for the release of the said amount to Evangelina. The
Labour Arbiter directed the NLRC Cashier to release the amount of P 3, 454, 079. 20 to Evangelina and P 680,000.00 will go to Atty. Go.
Dissatisfied, Atty. Go filed a motion to record an enforce attorneys lien alleging that Evangelina reneged on their contigent fee agreement.
Evangelina paid only the amount of P680,000.00, equivalent to 20% of the award as attorneys fees, thus, leaving a balance of 10% pertaining to the
counsel as attorneys fees.
Evangelina manifested that Atty. Go’s claim for attorneys fees of 40% of the total monetary award was null and void based on Article 111 of the
Labour Code is the law that should govern Atty. Go’s compensation as her counsel.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Go’s compensation is under the concept of attorneys fees governed by Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court or under the
extraordinary concept governed by Article 111 of the Labour Code.
Ruling:
Atty. Go’s compensation should be governed by Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and not Article 111 of the Labour Code. The retainer
contract between Atty. Go and Evangelina provides for a contingent fee. The contract shall control in the determination of the amount to be paid,
unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable. Attorney's fees are unconscionable if they affront one's sense of justice, decency or
reasonableness. The decree of unconscionability or unreasonableness of a stipulated amount in a contingent fee contract will not preclude recovery. It
merely justifies the fixing by the court of a reasonable compensation for the lawyer's services.
The criteria found in the Code of Professional Responsibility are also to be considered in assessing the proper amount of compensation that a lawyer
should receive. Canon 20, Rule 20.01 of the said Code provides:
(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP Chapter to which he belongs;
Contingent fee contracts are subject to the supervision and close scrutiny of the court in order that clients may be protected from unjust charges. The
amount of contingent fees agreed upon by the parties is subject to the stipulation that counsel will be paid for his legal services only if the suit or
litigation prospers. A much higher compensation is allowed as contingent fees because of the risk that the lawyer may get nothing if the suit fails.
The Court finds nothing illegal in the contingent fee contract between Atty. Go and Evangelina’s husband. The CA committed no error of law when
it awarded the attorneys fees of Atty. Go and allowed him to receive an equivalent of 39% of the monetary award.
The issue of the reasonableness of attorney's fees is a question of fact. Well-settled is the rule that conclusions and findings of fact of the CA are
entitled to great weight on appeal and will not be disturbed except for strong and cogent reasons which are absent in the case at bench. The findings
of the CA, which are supported by substantial evidence, are almost beyond the power of review by the Supreme Court.
Considering that Atty. Go successfully represented his client, it is only proper that he should receive adequate compensation for his efforts. Even as
we agree with the reduction of the award of attorney's fees by the CA, the fact that a lawyer plays a vital role in the administration of justice
emphasizes the need to secure to him his honorarium lawfully earned as a means to preserve the decorum and respectability of the legal profession. A
lawyer is as much entitled to judicial protection against injustice or imposition of fraud on the part of his client as the client is against abuse on the
part of his counsel. The duty of the court is not alone to ensure that a lawyer acts in a proper and lawful manner, but also to see that a lawyer is paid
his just fees. With his capital consisting of his brains and with his skill acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but in expenditure of time and
energy, he is entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of his client to escape payment of his just compensation.
It would be ironic if after putting forth the best in him to secure justice for his client, he himself would not get his due.
[G.R. No. 120592. March 14, 1997]
TRADERS ROYAL BANK EMPLOYEES UNION-INDEPENDENT, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS COMMISSION and EMMANUEL NOEL A. CRUZ, respondents.
TRADERS ROYAL BANK EMPLOYEES UNION-INDEPENDENT, petitioner vs.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and EMMANUEL NOEL A. CRUZ,
respondents., G.R. No. 120592, Mar 14, 1997
FACTS:
Petitioner and private respondent Atty. Emmanuel Noel A. Cruz entered into a retainer agreement whereby the
former obligated itself to pay the latter a monthly retainer fee of P3,000.00 in consideration of the undertaking
to render the services enumerated in their contract.
During the existence of that agreement, petitioner union referred to private respondent the claims of its
members for holiday, mid-year and year-end bonuses against their employer, Traders Royal Bank (TRB). A
complaint was filed by petitioner. NLRC favored the employees, awarding them holiday pay differential, mid-
year bonus differential, and year-end bonus differential. TRB challenged the decision of the NLRC before the
SC. The SC deleted the award of mid-year and year-end bonus differentials while affirming the award of
holiday pay differential.
After private respondent received the decision of the SC he notified the petitioner union, the TRB and the
NLRC of his right to exercise and enforce his attorney’s lien over the award of holiday pay differential, he filed
a motion before LA for the determination of his attorney’s fees, praying that 10% of the total award for holiday
pay differential computed by TRB at P175,794.32, or the amount of P17,579.43, be declared as his attorney’s
fees, and that petitioner union be ordered to pay and remit said amount to him.
Petitioner opposed said motion. LA favored private respondent. Petitioner appealed to NLRC but NLRC
affirmed LA’s decision. Hence the petition at bar.
ISSUE:
Is the private respondent entitled to Atty.’s fees aside from his retainer fee?
RULING:
Yes. There are 2 commonly accepted concepts of attorney’s fees, the so-called ordinary and extraordinary. In
its ordinary concept, an attorney’s fee is the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal
services he has rendered to the latter. The basis of this compensation is the fact of his employment by and his
agreement with the client.
In its extraordinary concept, an attorney’s fee is an indemnity for damages ordered by the court to be paid by
the losing party in a litigation. The basis of this is any of the cases provided by law where such award can be
made, such as those authorized in Article 2208, Civil Code, and is payable not to the lawyer but to the client,
unless they have agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional compensation or as part thereof.
It is the first type of attorney’s fees which private respondent demanded before the labor arbiter. A claim for
attorney’s fees may be asserted either in the very action in which the services of a lawyer had been rendered or
in a separate action. While a claim for attorney’s fees may be filed before the judgment is rendered, the
determination as to the propriety of the fees or as to the amount thereof will have to be held in abeyance until
the main case from which the lawyer’s claim for attorney’s fees may arise has become final. Otherwise, the
determination to be made by the courts will be premature. Of course, a petition for attorney’s fees may be filed
before the judgment in favor of the client is satisfied or the proceeds thereof delivered to the client.
Private respondent was well within his rights when he made his claim and waited for the finality of the
judgment for holiday pay differential, instead of filing it ahead of the award’s complete resolution.
The P3,000.00 which petitioner pays monthly to private respondent does not cover the services the latter
actually rendered before the LA and the NLRC in behalf of the former. As stipulated in their retainer’s
agreement, the monthly fee is intended merely as a consideration for the law firm’s commitment to render the
services.
There are two kinds of retainer fees a client may pay his lawyer. These are a general retainer, or a retaining fee,
and a special retainer.
A general retainer, or retaining fee, is the fee paid to a lawyer to secure his future services as general counsel for
any ordinary legal problem that may arise in the routinary business of the client and referred to him for legal
action. The future services of the lawyer are secured and committed to the retaining client. For this, the client
pays the lawyer a fixed retainer fee. The fees are paid whether or not there are cases referred to the lawyer. The
reason for the remuneration is that the lawyer is deprived of the opportunity of rendering services for a fee to
the opposing party or other parties. In fine, it is a compensation for lost opportunities.
A special retainer is a fee for a specific case handled or special service rendered by the lawyer for a client. A
client may have several cases demanding special or individual attention. If for every case there is a separate and
independent contract for attorney’s fees, each fee is considered a special retainer.
The P3,000.00 monthly fee provided in the retainer agreement between the union and the law firm refers to a
general retainer, or a retaining fee, as said monthly fee covers only the law firm’s commitment to render the
legal services enumerated in said agreement.
Whether there is an agreement or not, the courts can fix a reasonable compensation which lawyers should
receive for their professional services. However, the value of private respondent’s legal services should not be
established on the basis of Article 111 of the Labor Code alone. Said article provides:
“(a) In cases of unlawful withholding of wages the culpable party may be assessed attorney’s fees equivalent to
ten percent of the amount of the wages recovered.”
The implementing provision 38 of the foregoing article further states:
“Sec. 11. Attorney’s fees. Attorney’s fees in any judicial or administrative proceedings for the recovery of
wages shall not exceed 10% of the amount awarded. The fees may be deducted from the total amount due the
winning party.”
The fees mentioned here are the extraordinary attorney’s fees recoverable as indemnity for damages sustained
by and payable to the prevailing part. The 10% attorney’s fees fixes only the limit on the amount of attorney’s
fees the victorious party may recover in any judicial or administrative proceedings and it does not revent the
NLRC from fixing an amount lower than 10% ceiling prescribed by the article when circumstances warrant it.
The measure of compensation for private respondent’s services as against his client should properly be
addressed by the rule of quantum meruit which means “as much as he deserves,” which is used in the absence
of a contract, but recoverable by him from his client. Where a lawyer is employed without a price for his
services being agreed upon, the courts shall fix the amount on quantum meruit basis.
But instead of adopting the above guidelines, the labor arbiter erroneously set the amount of attorney’s fees on
the basis of Article 111 of the Labor Code. He completely relied on the operation of Article 111 when he fixed
the amount of attorney’s fees.
Article 111 of the Labor Code may not be used as the lone standard in fixing the exact amount payable to the
lawyer by his client for the legal services he rendered. While it limits the maximum allowable amount of
attorney’s fees, it does not direct the instantaneous and automatic award of attorney’s fees in such maximum
limit. The criteria found in the Code of Professional Responsibility are to be considered, in assessing the proper
amount. These are: (a) the time spent and the extent of services rendered or required; (b) the novelty and
difficulty of the questions involved; (c) the importance of the subject matter; (d) the skill demanded; (e) the
probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case; (f) the customary charges
for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which the lawyer belongs; (g) the amount
involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the services; (h) the contingency or
certainty of compensation; (i) the character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and (j) the
professional standing of the lawyer.
WHEREFORE, the Resolution of respondent is MODIFIED, and petitioner is hereby ORDERED to pay the
amount of P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees to private respondent.

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SECOND DIVISION

[ A.C. No. 4982, August 09, 2001 ]

We find the petition meritorious.

In dismissing petitioner's complaint, the IBP Investigating Commissioner[4] stated:

The Court cannot subscribe to this finding.

Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides -

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

HERMINIA P. VOLUNTAD-RAMIREZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. ROSARIO B. BAUTISTA, Respondent.

Report and Recommendation

Decision of the Board of Governors of the

The Ruling of the Court

A.C. No. 10675, May 31, 2016

DATU ISMAEL MALANGAS, Complainant, v. ATTY. PAUL C. ZAIDE, Respondent.

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Proceedings before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

Action of the IBP Board of Governors

VALERIANA U. DALISAY, Complainant,

and recommended as follows:

More specifically, Rule 18.03 states:

JOCELYN IGNACIO, Complainant

Report and Recommendation

As such, the Investigating Commissioner disposed:

Resolution of the Board of Governors

of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

The Ruling of the Court

In Voluntad-Ramirez v. Atty. Bautista26 , the Court citing Santiago v. Fojas27 expounds:

CANON 20 A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND REASONABLE FEES.

(b) The novelty and difficulty of the question involved;

(c) The importance of the subject matter;

(d) The skill demanded;

(h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;

(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and

(j) The professional standing of the lawyer.

(Paragraph 3, Retainer Contract)

1. Corporation will provide the following:

a. Office space airconditioned

In Perez v. Pomar, [22]

The Court’s Ruling

c) The importance of the subject matter; chan roble svirtualawl ibra ry

d) The skill demanded; c han roblesv irt ualawli bra ry

h) The contingency or certainty of compensation; chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry

i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and

j) The professional standing of the lawyer.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Hence, the instant petition.

Evangelina presented this issue, viz.:

Article 111 of the said Code provides:

CANON 20 A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND REASONABLE FEES.

(b) The novelty and difficulty of the question involved;

(c) The importance of the subject matter;

(d) The skill demanded;

(h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;

(j) The professional standing of the lawyer.

CANON 20 A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND REASONABLE FEES.

(b) The novelty and difficulty of the question involved;

(c) The importance of the subject matter;

(d) The skill demanded;

(h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;

(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and

(j) The professional standing of the lawyer.

TRADERS ROYAL BANK EMPLOYEES UNION-INDEPENDENT, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR

TRADERS ROYAL BANK EMPLOYEES UNION-INDEPENDENT, petitioner vs.

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