Admin Law Case Digests |A.Y.
2017-2018|Jurado
Calilung v. Datumanong
G.R. No. 160869
Facts:
This is a petition for prohibition under
Rules 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Herein petitioner prayed for prohibition
for the implementation of R.A. 9225, said
implementation was tasked to herein
respondent being the secretary of Justice. R.A.
9225 as alleged by petitioner violates sec 4
Article IV of the 1987 Constitution which talks
about dual allegiance. (Secure copy of the law
and take note sec. 5 as it is relevant to election
of public officials)
Issue:
Whether or not R.A. 9225 is
unconstitutional?
Held:
The court answered on the negative
and looked at the legislative deliberation on the
said law to ascertain the intent of the law. It is
clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting
Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with the
provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63 which
takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-
born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens
of other countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225
does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born
Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does
not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to
the supreme authority of the Republic, the
person implicitly renounces his foreign
citizenship.
To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of
the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and
it is not a self-executing provision. The
legislature still has to enact the law on dual
allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No.
9225, the framers were not concerned with
dual citizenship per se, but with the status of
naturalized citizens who maintain their
allegiance to their countries of origin even after
their naturalization.
Domino v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 134015
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari with a
prayer for preliminary injunction on the
COMELEC Resolution declaring petitioner
disqualified as candidate for the lone legislative
district of the province of Sarangani.
Herein petitioner filed his certificate of
candidacy for the position of Representatives of
the lone legislative district of the Province of
Sarangani and alleged that he resided on the
said district for 1 year and 2 months. Private
respondents then contradicted petitioners claim
and averred that he was not a resident of said
area and was not a registered voter of the
province where he seeks election but such was
contradicted by herein petitioner stating that
there was a prior court ruling in the MTC
regarding the exclusion of voters on the said
area and that was an error in good faith, and
supported with a few more evidence such as
contract of lease and extrajudicial settlement of
estate with absolute deed of sale. After such
COMELEC promulgated a resolution favoring
the private respondents upon perusal of the
evidence presented it was found out that
petitioner, evidenced by his voter’s registration
and his address indicated as 24 bonifacio St.,
Ayala heights., Old Blara, Quezon city, thus,
prompted COMELEC to declare petitioner as
disqualified. Upon appeal electoral rival of
Domino, which was Lucille Chiongbian-Solon
intervened and asked the court to uphold the
disqualification and that she be declared as the
duly elected representative.
Issue:
1.) WoN the finding of the MTC regarding the
petitioners residency be final, conclusive and
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binding upon the whole world and the
COMELEC.
2.)Whether or not petitioner has satisfied the
one year residency requirement?
3.) WoN respondent COMELEC has jurisdiction
over the petition a quo for the disqualification
of the petitioner.
Held:
As to the first issue raised the finding of
the MTC on the inclusion and exclusion
proceeding is not conclusive upon the
COMELEC, it is the COMELEC under Sec. 78 Art.
IX of the Omnibus Election code if whether or
not the candidate has amply complied with the
requirements. The said proceedings is summary
in nature and aside from the matters regarding
right to vote any other thing is not conclusive
upon the COMELEC. Moreover, on the said
decision by the Trial court on the said exclusion
proceeding, the trial court exceeded it’s
jurisdiction when it proclaimed petitioner as
resident of Sarangani. It is beyond the
competence of the trial court to declare such,
its jurisdiction is only limited to petitioners right
to vote. The trial court has no power to order
the change or transfer of one place of residence
to another for it is the function of the Election
Regulation Board. The only effect of such
decision is the removal of the said party and
putting him in the inactive file. Furthermore res
judicata does not apply for this doesn’t comply
with the requisites such as, similarity in the
subject matter, identity of the parties and
identity of the cause of action.
On the Second issue, the term
“residence,” as used in the law prescribing the
qualifications for suffrage and for elective
office, means the same thing as “domicile,”
which imports not only an intention to reside in
a fixed place but also personal presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention. “Domicile” denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which, whenever
absent for business, pleasure, or some other
reasons, one intends to return.
Records show that petitioner’s domicile of
origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur and that
sometime in 1991; he acquired a
new domicile of choice in Quezon City, as
shown by his certificate of candidacy for the
position of representative of the Third District
of Quezon City in the May 1995 election.
Petitioner is now claiming that he had
effectively abandoned his residence in Quezon
City and has established a new domicile of
choice in the Province of Sarangani.
A person’s domicile, once established, is
considered to continue and will not be deemed
lost until a new one is established. To
successfully effect a change of domicile, one
must demonstrate an actual removal or an
actual change of domicile; bona fide intentions
of abandoning the former place of residence
and establishing a new one and definite acts
which correspond with the purpose.
The contract of lease of a house and lot entered
into sometime in January 1997 does not
adequately support a change of domicile.
The lease contract may be indicative of
Domino’s intention to reside in Sarangani, but it
does not engender the kind of permanency
required to prove abandonment of one’s
original domicile. The mere absence of
individual from his permanent residence, no
matter how long, without the intention to
abandon it does not result in loss or change
of domicile. Domino’s voters registration in
Quezon City is a strong indication that he has no
intention leaving such domicile.
Lastly on the issue of jurisdiction, the
higher court held that Under Sec 78, Art. XI of
the Omnibus Election Code the COMELEC has
jurisdiction to deny due course or to cancel
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certificate of candidacy. Such jurisdiction
continues even after the end of the election, if
for any reason no final judgment of
disqualification is rendered before the election,
and the candidate facing disqualification is
voted for and receives the highest number of
votes, and provided further that the winning
candidate has not been proclaimed or has taken
his oath of office. Considering that DOMINO has
not been proclaimed as Congressman-elect in
the Lone Congressional District of the Province
of Sarangani he cannot be deemed a member of
the House of Representative. Hence, it is the
COMELEC and not the Electoral Tribunal which
has jurisdiction over the issue of his ineligibility
as a candidate.
Bonus issue regarding the Intervenor
It is now a settled doctrine that the
candidate who receives the second highest
number of votes may not be proclaimed the
winner in case the first one is declared
disqualified. It would extremely be repugnant to
the basic concept of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who
has not acquired the majority or plurality of
votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as
the representative of a constituency, the
majority of which have positively declared that
they do not choose him. To assume that the
second placer would have received the other
votes would be to substitute our judgment for
the mind of the voters. Had the disqualified
candidate been excluded prior the election the
conditions might have differed. Thus, the only
effect is that the election fails and that the
election is a nullity.
Macalintal v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 157013
Facts:
This was a petition for certiorari and
prohibition filed by Atty. Romulo Macalintal a
member of the Philippine bar assailing the
constitutionality of certain provisions in R.A.
9189 (The oversees absentee voting act of
2003)
The petitioner argues in three main
points
1.) Sec.5 suffers from constitutional infirmity
because it violates Sec. 1 Art. 5 of the1987
constitution wherein it states that a voter is
required to be a resident of the Philippines for
at least 1 year and in the place where he wished
to vote for at least 6 months.
2.) The provisions of Sec. 18.5 of R.A. 9189
empowering COMELEC to proclaim winning
candidates for president and vice-president is
unconstitutional as it violates the provisions in
par.4 Sec.4 of Art.VII of the constitution which
vests Congress the sole duty to do such for said
elective positions.
3.) The creation of a Joint Congressional
Commission Oversight Committee with the
power to review, amend and approve the IRR
promulgated by the COMELEC interludes into
the independence of the COMELEC which is a
constitutional body.
The 1st point of argumentation was duly
countered by the Solicitor General except on
the last two points. Sol-Gen on the 1st point
argues that jurisprudence states that Filipino
who are immigrants or permanent residents
abroad may have in fact never abandoned their
Philippine domicile.
Thus, the court resolves these three
issues presented.
Issues:
1.) WoN certain provision of R.A. 9189
violates the constitutional provision stating the
voter’s residency requirement.
2.) WoN certain provisions of R.A. 9189
violates the constitutional provision regarding
the power of the Congress to canvass and
proclaim the winning Presidential and Vice-
Presidential candidate.
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3.) WoN several provisions R.A. 9189
violates the constitutional provision regarding
the independence of the COMELEC it being a
constitutional body.
Held:
The petition is partially granted, the
court then ratiocinated that:
1.) It must be noted that in in a plethora of
cases it has been stated that “residence is used
to indicate a place of abode, whether
permanent or temporary; domicile denotes a
fixed permanent residence to which, when
absent, one has the intention of returning.”
Now on the first issue, this court looks
into the deliberation of the framers of the
constitution wherein it found out that, the
reason the framers put in absentee voting in the
constitution as a mandate to the legislature is
that there could be inconsistency on the
residence rule if it is just a question of
legislation by congress. So by allowing it and
saying that this is possible then the legislation
can take care of the rest.
Such absentee voting even includes
those who are temporarily residing in abroad on
the date of election.
Clearly therefrom, the intent of the
Constitutional Commission is to entrust to
Congress the responsibility of devising a system
of absentee voting. The qualifications of voters
as stated in Section 1 shall remain except for
the residency requirement. This is in fact the
reason why the Constitutional Commission
opted for the term qualified Filipinos abroad
with respect to the system of absentee
voting that Congress should draw up.
The strategic location of Section 2
indicates that the Constitutional Commission
provided for an exception to the actual
residency requirement of Section 1 with respect
to qualified Filipinos abroad.
With regards to Sec. 5(d) of R.A. 9189 it
specifically disqualifies an immigrant or
permanent resident who is recognized as such
in the host country because immigration or
permanent residence in another country implies
renunciation of ones residence in his country of
origin. However, same section allows
immigrant and permanent resident abroad to
register as voter as long as he/she executes an
affidavit to show that he/she has not
abandoned his domicile in pursuance of the
constitutional intent expressed in Sec. 1 and 2
of Art. V.
The affidavit required in Sec. 5 does not
only serve as a proof of the intent to fo back but
an explicit expression that he had not in fact
abandoned his domicile of origin. The affidavit
is required of immigrants and permanent
residents abroad because by their states in their
host countries, they are presumed to have
relinquished their intent to return to this
country thus, without the affidavit, the
presumption of abandonment of Philippine
Domicile shall remain. It must be emphasized
that Section 5(d) does not only require an
affidavit or a promise to resume actual
physical permanent residence in the Philippines
not later than three years from approval of
his/her registration, the Filipinos abroad must
also declare that they have not applied for
citizenship in another country. Thus, they must
return to the Philippines; otherwise, their
failure to return shall be cause for the removal
of their names from the National Registry of
Absentee Voters and his/her permanent
disqualification to vote in absentia. Thus, the
court finds no reason to declare this provision
as unconstitutional.
2.) On the second issue at hand the court ruled
that in view of the existing constitutional
provision, Congress could not have allowed
the COMELEC to usurp a power that
constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly stated
by petitioner, to encroach on the power of
Congress to canvass the votes for president
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and vice-president and the power to proclaim
the winners for the said positions. This
provision is then struck down as it has been
declared unconstitutional.
3.) On the third issue which was agreed by all
the parties to be unconstitutional was declared
to be such. Stating that By vesting itself with
the powers to approve, review, amend, and
revise the IRR for The Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003, Congress went beyond the
scope of its constitutional authority. Congress
trampled upon the constitutional mandate of
independence of the COMELEC. Furthermore, it
is not correct to hold that because of its
recognized extensive legislative power to enact
election laws, Congress may intrude into the
independence of the COMELEC by exercising
supervisory powers over its rule-making
authority.
Montejo vs Comelec
G.R. No. 118702
Facts:
Petitioner Montejo represents the first
District of Leyte, he seeks to annul sec 1 of
Resolution 2736 of COMELEC redistricting
certain municipalities, on the ground of
violation of the principle of equality of
representation.
In 1992, the Local Government Code took
effect, and sub province Biliran became a
regular province pursuant to sec 462 of the
code. (sub-provinces were converted to regular
provinces upon approval by a majority of votes
in a plebiscite conducted by COMNELEC). As a
consequence, the Third district was reduced to
5 municipalities.
To remedy the inequality of distribution of
inhabitants, voters and municipalities,
COMELEC held consultation meetings with the
representatives of the province as well as
interested parties, thereby promulgating
resolution 2736 which transferred Capoocan of
the second district and Palompon of the Fourth
district to the third district.
As a result, petitioner Montejo filed a motion
for reconsideration due to the inequitable
distribution of voters between the 1st district
(178,688 registered voters) and 2nd district
(156,462 voters). He proposed that the
municipality of Tolosa with 7,700 voters be
transferred from 1st district to 2nd.
Respondent Commission denied the motion
ruling that (1) its adjustment of municipalites
involved the least disruption of the territorial
composition of each district, and (2) said
adjustment complied with the constitutional
requirement that each legislative district shall
comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact and adjacent territory.
So petitioner brought the case to the Supreme
Court alleging that Sec 1 of Res 2736 violates
the principle of equality of representation
ordained in the Constitution. COMELEC on the
other hand, commented that it acted within the
parameters of the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether COMELEC had the power to transfer
municipalities from one district to another.
Ruling:
Sec 1 of Res 2736 which transferred
municipalities is void.
Under Sec 2(c) Article IX of the Constitution,
COMELEC had basic powers as enforcer and
administrator of our election laws, but
COMELEC relied on the Ordinance (entitled
"Apportioning the Seats of the House of
Representatives of the Congress of the
Philippines to the Different Legislative Districts
in Provinces and Cities and the Metropolitan
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Manila Area") appended to the 1987
Constitution as the source of its power of
redistricting. (which is regarded as part of the
power to make laws). Sec 2 of the Ordinance
gave The COMELEC the power to make MINOR
adjustments of the reapportionment made. Sec
3 also gave COMELEC the power to
correspondingly adjust the number of members
apportioned to the province out of which such
new province was created or where the city,
whose population has so increased. but such
adjustment shall not be made within one
hundred and twenty days before the election.
Now it should be noted that the Constitutional
Commission had to resolve issues before the
first congressional elections under 1987
Constitution, one of which was "how the
apportionment should be made. It was decided
that reapportionment power as to the 1st
election belong to the Constitutional
Commission, and not to the COMELEC.
The meaning of the phrase minor adjustments
in the Ordinance was clarified the there should
be no change in the allocations per district, this
adjustments may happen when the Commission
has forgotten a municipality which is still in the
territory of one assigned district or an error in
the correct name of a particular municipality,
then COMELEC may adjust a certain district.
Sec 3 also did not give COMELEC the power to
transfer municipalities, it only gave COMELEC
the power to adjust the number of members
apportioned to the province out of which such
new province was created.
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it
promulgated sec 1 of RES 2736 which
transferred a municipality.
Lastly, sec 5(4) Article 6 of the Constitution
gives Congress the power to reapportion.
"within 3 years following the return of every
census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based
on he standards provided in this section.
Sema vs COMELEC
G.R. No.
Facts:
Cotabato City was treated as part of the
legislative district of the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan pursuant to COMELEC's resolution
7902.
An ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution apportioned 2 legislative districts
of Maguindanao, the first consists of Cotabato
City and 8 municipalities. While Maguindanao
forms part of ARMM, Cotabato is not, having
voted against its inclusion in a plebiscite.
ARMM through its power to create provinces
under Sec 19, Art 6 of RA 9054, then created
the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composing
eight municipalities which was in the first
district of Maguindanao pursuant to MMA Act
201 (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy 201).
COMELEC then issued Resolution 07-0407 to
clarify the status of Cotabato as part of Shariff
Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of
Maguindanao pending the enactment of the
appropriate law by Congress.
In preparation of the May 2007 elections,
COMELEC promulgated Resolution 7845 stating
that Maguindanao's first legislative district is
composed only of Cotabato because of MMA
Act 201.
Subsequently, COMELEC issued another
Resolution 7902, amending 07-040 by renaming
legislative district as "Shariff Kabunsuan
Province with Cotabato City". This was
questioned by petitioner alleging that COMELEC
acted in excess of its jurisdiction because it is
the Congress who has the power to create or
reapportion legislative districts.
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On the other hand, case with GR no. 177597
which was consolidated in this case had the
issue on whether or not ARMM Regional
Assembly having the power to create provinces
which was delegated is constitutional and
whether the province created under RA 9054 is
entitled to one representative without need of
national law.
Main issues:
(1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA
9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays, is constitutional;
and
(2) if in the affirmative, whether a
province created by the ARMM Regional
Assembly under MMA Act 201 pursuant to
Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to
one representative in the House
Representatives without need of a national law
creating a legislative district for such province.
(3) whether COMELEC Resolution No.
7902 is valid for maintaining the status quo in
the first legislative district of Maguindanao (as
Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City
[formerly First District of Maguindanao with
Cotabato City]), despite the creation of the
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan out of such
district (excluding Cotabato City).
Ruling:
ARMM Regional Assembly does not
have the power to create provinces and cities
(Sec 19 Art 6 RA 9054 is unconstitutional, MMA
Act 201 creating the Province of Shariff
Kabuynsuan is void, Comelec Resolution 7902 is
valid.
There is no express prohibition or grant of
authority in the Constitution for Congress to
delegate to regional or local legislative bodies
the power to create local government units, but
in its plenary legislative powers, Congress can
delegate to local legislative bodies the power to
create local government units (subject to
serctain standards and no conflict against the
constitution). However, under the Local
Government Code, only an "Act of Congress"
can create provinces, cities or municipalities.
Congress delegated to ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays using its plenary
legislative powers. While there is no provision in
the Constitution that conflicts with the
delegation to regional legislative bodies of the
power to create municipalities and barangays (
provided sec 10 Art X of the Constitution is
followed). But the creation of provinces and
cities is another matter, Sec 5(3) of Art 6 of the
Constitution states that Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand, or each province, shall have at least
of one representative" in the House of
Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution
provides, "Any province that may hereafter be
created, or any city whose population may
hereafter increase to more than two hundred
fifty thousand shall be entitled in the
immediately following election to at least one
Member. This means that a province cannot be
created without a legislative district because it
will violate Sec 6 of the Constitution as well as
Sec 3 of the Ordinance appending the
Constitution.
For Congress to delegate validly the power to
create a province or city, it must also delegate
the power to create a legislative district which
under the Constitution, is only vested in
Congress. Sec 5(4) Art 6 of the Constitution.
In Montejo v. COMELEC,29 we held that the
"power of redistricting x x x is traditionally
regarded as part of the power (of Congress) to
make laws," and thus is vested exclusively in
Congress. The logic behind this is that Congress
is a national legislature, any increase of the
allowable membership through the creation of
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legislative districts must be embodied in a Regional Assembly and creating the Province of
national law, it would be anomalous for Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.
regional or local legislative bodies to create or Resolution No. 7902 Complies with the
reapportion legislative districts sfor a national Constitution
legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative Consequently, we hold that COMELEC
body, created by a superior legislative body, Resolution No. 7902, preserving the geographic
cabnnot change the membership of the and legislative district of the First District of
superior legislative body. Maguindanao with Cotabato City, is valid as it
Sec 20 Art 10 of the Constitution limits the merely complies with Section 5 of Article VI and
coverage of the Regional Assembly's legislative Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as
powers as it mentioned "National Elections as well as Section 1 of the Ordinance appended to
an exception wherein The Regional Assembly the Constitution.
may exercise legislative power. -- creating a WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI
legislative district creates a representative who of Republic Act No. 9054 UNCONSTITUTIONAL
is elected in national elections. SEc 20 of Art 10 insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly of
of the Constitution expressly limits the coverage the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
of the Regional Assembly's legislative power the power to create provinces and cities. Thus,
within its territorial jurisdiction. we declare VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy
In summary, we rule that Section 19, Article VI Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff
of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the ARMM Kabunsuan. Consequently, we rule that
Regional Assembly the power to create COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is VALID.
provinces and cities, is void for being contrary
to Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of
Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 3
of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
Only Congress can create provinces and cities
because the creation of provinces and cities
necessarily includes the creation of legislative
districts, a power only Congress can exercise
under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution
and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly
cannot create a province without a legislative
district because the Constitution mandates that
every province shall have a legislative district.
Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly
cannot enact a law creating a national office like
the office of a district representative of
Congress because the legislative powers of the
ARMM Regional Assembly operate only within
its territorial jurisdiction as provided in Section
20, Article X of the Constitution. Thus, we rule
that MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM