Ocampo v.

Abando
Topic: Rule 110; Amendment or Substitution
Doctrine: if during trial, petitioners are able to show that the alleged murders were indeed
committed in furtherance of rebellion, Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides the
remedy.
Facts:
The letters narrated that on 26 August 2006, elements of the 43rd Infantry Brigade of the
Philippine Army discovered a mass grave site of the CPP/NPA/NDFP at Sitio Sapang Daco,
Barangay Kaulisihan, Inopacan, Leyte. Recovered from the grave site were 67 severely
deteriorated skeletal remains believed to be victims of Operation VD.
The 12 complaint-affidavits were from relatives of the alleged victims of Operation VD. All of them
swore that their relatives had been abducted or last seen with members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP
and were never seen again. They also expressed belief that their relatives’ remains were among
those discovered at the mass grave site.
On the basis of the 12 letters and their attachments, Prosecutor Vivero issued a subpoena
requiring, among others, petitioners to submit their counter-affidavits and those of their witnesses.
Petitioner Ocampo argued that a case for rebellion against him and 44 others (including
petitioners Echanis and Baylosis and Ladlad) docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-944 was then
pending before the RTC Makati, Branch 150 (RTC Makati). Putting forward the political offense
doctrine, petitioner Ocampo argues that common crimes, such as murder in this case, are already
absorbed by the crime of rebellion when committed as a necessary means, in connection with
and in furtherance of rebellion.
Issue: Whether the murder charges against him are already included in the rebellion charge
against him in the RTC.
Held:
Yes.
Under the political offense doctrine, “common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political
offense, are divested of their character as “common” offenses and assume the political
complexion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be
punished separately from the principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the
imposition of a graver penalty.
Any ordinary act assumes a different nature by being absorbed in the crime of rebellion. Thus,
when a killing is committed in furtherance of rebellion, the killing is not homicide or murder. Rather,
the killing assumes the political complexion of rebellion as its mere ingredient and must be
prosecuted and punished as rebellion alone.
However, this is not to say that public prosecutors are obliged to consistently charge respondents
with simple rebellion instead of common crimes. No one disputes the well-entrenched principle in
criminal procedure that the institution of criminal charges, including whom and what to charge, is
addressed to the sound discretion of the public prosecutor. But when the political offense doctrine
is asserted as a defense in the trial court, it becomes crucial for the court to determine whether
the act of killing was done in furtherance of a political end, and for the political motive of the act
to be conclusively demonstrate.
Petitioners aver that the records show that the alleged murders were committed in furtherance of
the CPP/NPA/NDFP rebellion, and that the political motivation behind the alleged murders can
be clearlyseen from the charge against the alleged top leaders of the CPP/NPA/NDFP as co-
conspirators.
We had already ruled that the burden of demonstrating political motivation must be discharged
by the defense, since motive is a state of mind which only the accused knows.
The proof showing political motivation is adduced during trial where the accused is assured an
opportunity to present evidence supporting his defense.
As held in the case of Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga Del Norte v. CA, if during
trial, petitioners are able to show that the alleged murders were indeed committed in furtherance
of rebellion, Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides the remedy, to wit: “If it appears
at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the
court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the
proper offense in accordance with Section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be placed
in double jeopardy.
Thus, if it is shown that the proper charge against petitioners should have been simple rebellion,
the trial court shall dismiss the murder charges upon the filing of the Information for simple
rebellion, as long as petitioners would not be placed in double jeopardy.
Based on the law, double jeopardy only applies when: (1) a first jeopardy attached; (2) it has been
validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first.
A first jeopardy attaches only after the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case has
been dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent, by a competent court in a
valid indictment for which the accused has entered a valid plea during arraignment.
To recall, on 12 May 2006, an Information for the crime of rebellion, as defined and penalized
under Article 134 in relation to Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 06-944 was filed before the RTC Makati against petitioners and several others.
However, petitioners were never arraigned in Criminal Case No. 06 -944. Even before the
indictment for rebellion was filed before the RTC Makati, petitioners Ocampo, Echanis and Ladlad
had already filed a petition before this Court to seek the nullification of the Orders of the DOJ
denying their motion for the inhibition of the members of the prosecution panel due to lack of
impartiality and independence.
When the indictment was filed, petitioners Ocampo, Echanis and Ladlad filed supplemental
petitions to enjoin the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 06-944.131 We eventually ordered the
dismissal of the rebellion case. It is clear then that a first jeopardy never had a chance to attach.
WHEREFORE, the instant consolidated petitions are DISMISSED. The RTC of Manila, Branch
32, is hereby ORDERED to proceed with dispatch with the hearing of Criminal Case No. 08-
262163.
Branza v. Sandiganbayan
Topic: Rule 117; Double Jeopardy
Doctrine: For double jeopardy to exist, the elements of one offense should ideally encompass or
include those of the other. What the rule on double jeopardy prohibit refers to identity of elements
in the two offenses.
Facts:
The Philippines was assigned the hosting rights for the 12th Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) Leaders Summit scheduled in December 2006.
One of the ASEAN Summit-related projects to be undertaken was the installation of street lighting
systems along the perimeters of the Cebu International Convention Center in Mandaue City and
the ceremonial routes of the Summit to upgrade the appearance of the convention areas and to
improve night-time visibility for security purposes. Four (4) out of eleven (11) street lighting
projects were awarded to FABMIK Construction and Equipment Supply Company, Inc. (FABMIK).
After the summit, a letter-complaint was filed before the Public Assistance and Corruption
Prevention Office (PACPO), Ombudsman.Visayas, alleging that the ASEAN Summit street
lighting projects were overpriced. Braza being the president of FABMIK, was impleaded as one
of the respondents.
On March 23, 2007, the fact-finding body issued its Evaluation Repor recommending the filing of
charges for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practice Act, against the DPWH officials and employees in Region VII and the
cities of Mandaue and Lapu-lapu, and private contractors FABMIK and GAMPIK Construction and
Development, Inc.
This report was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas (OMB-Visayas) for the conduct
of a preliminary investigation and was docketed therein as OMB-V-C-07-124-C, entitled PACPO-
OMB-Visayas v. Lala, et al.
After the preliminary investigation, the OMB Visayas issued its Resolution, dated January 24,
2008, finding probable cause to indict the concerned respondents for violation of Section 3(g) of
R.A. No. 3019.
Subsequently, the OMB-Visayas filed several informations before the Sandiganbayan for violation
of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. 3019 against the officials of DPWH Region VII, the officials of the cities of
Mandaue and Lapu-lapu and private contractors, FABMIK President Braza and GAMPIK Board
Chairman Gerardo S. Surla.
On June 6, 2008, Braza was arraigned as a precondition to his authorization to travel abroad. He
entered a plea of “not guilty.”
On November 13, 2008, Braza filed a manifestation9 to make of record that he was maintaining
his previous plea of “not guilty” without any condition.
During the proceedings held on November 3, 2008, the Sandiganbayan reconsidered its August
14, 2008 resolution and directed a reinvestigation of the case.
According to the anti-graft court, the allegations to the effect that no independent canvass was
conducted and that the charge of overpricing was based on falsified documents were serious
reasons enough to merit a reinvestigation of the case.
Braza filed his Manifestation , dated February 2, 2009, informing the Sandiganbayan of his
intention to abandon his previous motion for reinvestigation. He opined that the prosecution would
merely use the reinvestigation proceedings as a means to engage in a second unbridled fishing
expedition to cure the lack of probable cause.
On March 23, 2009, Braza filed a motion in support of the abandonment of reinvestigation with a
plea to vacate Information, insisting that the further reinvestigation of the case would only afford
the prosecution a second round of preliminary investigation which would be vexatious, oppressive
warranting its dismissal with prejudice.
After concluding its reinvestigation of the case, the OMB-Visayas issued its Resolution, dated
May 4, 2009, (Supplemental Resolution) which upheld the finding of probable cause but modified
the charge from violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 301914 to violation of Sec. 3(e) of the same law.
Accordingly, the prosecution filed its Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended Information16
on May 8, 2009.
Braza averred that he could not be arraigned under the second information without violating the
constitutional proscription against double jeopardy.
The Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed resolution admitting the Amended Information, dated
May 4, 2009, (second Information) and denying Braza’s plea for dismissal of the criminal case.
The Sandiganbayan ruled that Braza would not be placed in double jeopardy should he be
arraigned anew under the second information because his previous arraignment was conditional.
It continued that even if he was regularly arraigned, double jeopardy would still not set in because
the second information charged an offense different from, and which did not include or was
necessarily included in, the original offense charged.
Braza posits that double jeopardy has already set in on the basis of his “not guilty” plea in the first
Information and, thus, he can no longer be prosecuted under the second Information. He claims
that his arraignment was unconditional because the conditions in the plea were ineffective for not
being unmistakable and categorical. He theorizes that the waiver of his constitutional guarantee
against double jeoardy was not absolute as the same was qualified by the phrase “as a result of
the pending incidents.” He argues that even granting that his arraignment was indeed conditional,
the same had become simple and regular when he validated and confirmed his plea of “not guilty”
by means of a written manifestation which removed any further condition attached to his previous
plea.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) retorts that the withdrawal of the first information and
the subsequent filing of the second information did not place Braza in double jeopardy or violate
his right to speedy disposition of the case. The OSP reasons that Braza waived his right to invoke
double jeopardy when he agreed to be conditionally arraigned. It further argues that even granting
that the arraignment was unconditional, still double jeopardy would not lie because the charge of
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 in the second information is a different offense with different
elements from that of the charge of violation of Sec. 3(g) in the first Information.
Issue: whether or not there is double jeopardy.
Held:
No.
While it is true that the practice of the Sandiganbayan of conducting “provisional” or “conditional”
arraignment of the accused is not specifically sanctioned by the Revised Internal Rules of the
Procedure of the Sandiganbayan or by the regular Rules of Procedure, this Court had tangentially
recognized such practice in People v. Espinosa provided that the alleged conditions attached to
the arraignment should be “unmistakable, express, informed and enlightened.
A careful perusal of the record in the case at bench would reveal that the arraignment of Braza
under the first information was conditional in nature as it was a mere accommodation in his favor
to enable him to travel abroad without the Sandiganbayan losing its ability to conduct trial in
absentia in case he would abscond.
The Sandiganbayan’s June 6, 2008 Order clearly and unequivocally states that the conditions for
Braza’s arraignment as well as his travel abroad, that is, that if the Information would be amended,
he shall waive his constitutional right to be protected against double jeopardy and shall allow
himself to be arraigned on the amended information without losing his right to question the same.
It appeared that these conditions were duly explained to Braza and his lawyer by the anti-graft
court. He was afforded time to confer and consult his lawyer. Thereafter, he voluntarily submitted
himself to such conditional arraignment and entered a plea of “not guilty” to the offense of violation
of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019.
Verily, the relinquishment of his right to invoke double jeopardy had been convincingly laid out.
Such waiver was clear, categorical and intelligent.
Having given his conformity and accepted the conditional arraignment and its legal
consequences, Braza is now estopped from assailing its conditional nature just to conveniently
avoid being arraigned and prosecuted of the new charge under the second information.
Assuming, in gratia argumenti, that there was a valid and unconditional plea, Braza cannot
plausibly rely on the principle of double jeopardy to avoid arraignment under the second
information because the offense charged therein is different and not included in the offense
charged under the first information.
The right against double jeopardy is enshrined in Section 21 of Article III of the Constitution. This
constitutionally mandated right is procedurally buttressed by Section 17 of Rule 11728 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. To substantiate a claim for double jeop ardy, the accused
has the burden of demonstrating the following requisites: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached
prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second
jeopardy must be for the same offense as in the first.
As to the first requisite, the first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a
competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the
accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent. The test for the third element is whether one offense is identical with the
other or is an attempt to commit it or a frustration thereof; or whether the second offense includes
or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information.
Braza, however, contends that double jeopardy would still attach even if the first information
charged an offense different from that charged in the second information since both charges arose
from the same transaction or set of facts.
Braza claims that an accused should be shielded against being prosecuted for several offenses
made out from a single act. It appears that Braza has obviously lost sight, if he is not altogether
aware, of the ruling in Suero v. People where it was held that the same criminal act may give rise
to two or more separate and distinct offenses; and that no double jeopardy attaches as long as
there is variance between the elements of the two offenses charged. The doctrine of double
jeopardy is a revered constitutional safeguard against exposing the accused from the risk of being
prosecuted twice for the same offense, and not a different one.
There is simply no double jeopardy when the subsequent information charges another and
different offense, although arising from the same act or set of acts. Prosecution for the same act
is not prohibited. What is forbidden is the prosecution for the same offense.
In the case at bench, there is no dispute that the two charges stemmed from the same transaction.
A comparison of the elements of violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 and those of violation of
Sec. 3(e) of the same law, however, will disclose that there is neither identity nor exclusive
inclusion between the two offenses.
Although violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 and violation of Sec. 3(e) of the same law share
a common element, the accused being a public officer, the latter is not inclusive of the former.
For double jeopardy to exist, the elements of one offense should ideally encompass or include
those of the other. What the rule on double jeopardy prohibits refers to identity of elements in the
two offenses.
In this case, there’s no double Jeopardy.