IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P.

LIM;
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL P. LIM;
G.R. Nos. 168992-93, May 21, 2009

FACTS:

Petitioner Monina Lim was married Primo Lim (Lim). They were childless. Minor children,
whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban).
Being so eager to have a child of their own, petitioner and Lim registered the children to make
it appear that they were the children’s parents. The children were named Michelle P. Lim
(Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael).

The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They sent the children
to exclusive schools. They used the surname Lim in all their school records and documents.
Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998, Lim died. On 27 December 2000, petitioner married
Angel Olario (Olario), an American citizen.

Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under
Republic Act No. 8552 (RA 8552) to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child. Thus,
in 2002, petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael, at the time
of the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while
Michael was 18 years and seven months old.

In 2004, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the petitions. The trial court ruled that
since petitioner had remarried, petitioner should have filed the petition jointly with her new
husband. The trial court ruled that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory
citing Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family Code. Petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration and was subsequently denied by the Trial Court ruling that
Petitioner did not fall under any of the exceptions under RA 8552 It also ruled that consent of
the husband was untenable, because, there are additional requirements, such as residency
and certification of his qualifications, which the husband must comply.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.

HELD:

No.

The Supreme Court held that: It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were
filed, petitioner had already remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without being joined
by her husband Olario. It had no other recourse but to affirm the trial court’s decision denying
the petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit under Section 7, Article III of RA
8552:

Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:

(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or

(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided,
however, That the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or
 (iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.

In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate
son/daughter of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.
(Emphasis supplied)

The use of the word shall in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the
husband and the wife is mandatory. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a
legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures
harmony between the spouses.

The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the
petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed
only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in
denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.

Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First,
the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband Olario.
Second, the children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and
Olario are not legally separated from each other.
LAHOM vs. SIBULO
G.R. No. 143989, July 14, 2003

FACTS:

Spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Mrs. Isabelita Lahom realized that their marriage felt
incomplete without any children. The realization could have likely prodded the spouses to take
into their care Isabelita's nephew Jose Melvin Sibulo and to bring him up as their own. At the
tender age of two, Jose Melvin enjoyed the warmth, love and support of the couple who treated
the child like their own. Indeed, for years, spouses Dr. and Mrs. Lahom fancied on legally
adopting Jose Melvin. Finally, in 1971, the couple decided to file a petition for adoption.

In 1972, an order granting the petition was issued that made all the more intense than before
the feeling of affection of the spouses for Melvin. In keeping with the court order, the Civil
Registrar of Naga City changed the name "Jose Melvin Sibulo" to "Jose Melvin Lahom."

A sad turn of events came many years later. Eventually, in December of 1999, Mrs. Lahom
commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
of Naga City.

Prior to the institution of the case, specifically on 22 March 1998, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8552,
also known as the Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect. The new statute deleted from the
law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption. Section 19 of Article VI of R.A. No.
8552 which reads:

"SEC. 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. — Upon petition of the adoptee, with
the assistance of the Department if a minor or if over eighteen (18) years of age but is
incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the adoption may be rescinded on any of the
following grounds committed by the adopter(s): (a) repeated physical and verbal
maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having undergone counseling; (b) attempt on
the life of the adoptee; (c) sexual assault or violence; or (d) abandonment and failure
to comply with parental obligations.

Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition, contending principally (a) that the trial
court had no jurisdiction over the case and (b) that the petitioner had no cause of action in
view of the aforequoted provisions of R.A. No. 8552. Petitioner asseverated, by way of
opposition, that the proscription in R.A. No. 8552 should not retroactively apply, i.e., to cases
where the ground for rescission of the adoption vested under the regime of then Article 348 of
the Civil Code and Article 192 of the Family Code. In an order, dated 28 April 2000, the Trial
Court dismissed the petition, stating:

"Admittedly, Section 19, Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 deleted the right of an adopter to
rescind an adoption earlier granted under the Family Code. Conformably, on the face
of the petition, indeed there is lack of cause of action.

ISSUE:

1. May the subject adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972, still be revoked or rescinded by
an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552?

2. In the affirmative, has the adopter's action prescribed?

HELD:

No.

The Supreme Court held that the controversy should be resolved in the light of the law
governing at the time the petition was filed.

It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed an action to
revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law, had already abrogated
and repealed the right of an adopter under the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a
decree of adoption. Consistently with its earlier pronouncements, the Court should now hold
that the action for rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by petitioner after
R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer could be pursued.

Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside the adoption is
subject to the five-year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter
would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise
of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a
vested right entitled to protection. It must also be acknowledged that a person has no vested
right in statutory privileges. While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a "right,"
the privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely
created by statute. It is a privilege that is governed by the state's determination on what it may
deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the child. Matters relating to adoption, including
the withdrawal of the right of an adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to regulation
by the State. Concomitantly, a right of action given by statute may be taken away at anytime
before it has been exercised.

While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a consequential right to
rescind the adoption decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to be
undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura
lex sed lex would be the hackneyed truism that those caught in the law have to live with. It is
still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption,
can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an
undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny
to an adopted child his legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely exclude him from
having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.
DE LA CRUZ vs. DE LA CRUZ
G.R. No. L-19391, September 29, 1964

FACTS:

In 1954, the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, in a special proceeding, the minor Manuel J.
Aquino was declared the legally adopted child of the spouses Cecilio de la Cruz and Eustaquia
Devis de la Cruz.

Seven years later the adopting parents filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan a
petition to have the decree of adoption revoked on the ground that the adopted minor had
definitely repudiated the adoption by open display of defiance, animosity, revulsion and
disobedience to petitioners and had for more than three years abandoned petitioners' home
by living with his natural mother, Felicidad Dasalla, in Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur.

A special appearance was entered by counsel for the minor with a motion to dismiss the
petition on the grounds that (1) the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject-matter thereof;
(2) the Court had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of the adopted minor; (3) venue
was improperly laid; and (4) the petition did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action.

The motion to dismiss was granted, the trial court stating that since the "Initial proceedings
were totally had in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur," the "expediente in said Case No.
1041 is still, presumably, open for the herein petitioners to come in and ask for the revocation
of the decree of adoption." The Court added by implication, that it had no power to interfere
with the judgment of another court of coordinate jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not venue of the petition was properly laid.

Whether or not a Petition for Revocation of Adoption is a continuation of the proceeding for
Petition for Adoption.

HELD:

The provisions of the Civil Code on revocation of adoption do not specify the court where the
proceedings should be filed. The Rules of Court designate the venue of proceeding for
adoption, which is the place where the petitioner resides (Section 1, Rule 99), but is silent with
respect to the venue of proceeding for rescission and revocation of adoption (Rule 100).

t is clear that the two proceedings are separate and distinct from each other. In the first what
is determined is the propriety of establishing the relationship of parent and child between two
persons not so related by nature. For that purpose, the court inquires into the qualifications
and disqualifications of the adopter; the personal circumstances of the person to be adopted;
the probable value and character of his estate; the other proceeding either the adopting parent
or the adopted seeks to severe the relationship previously established, and the inquiry refers
to the truth of the grounds upon which the revocation is sought.

Once the proper court has granted a petition for adoption and the decree has become final
the proceeding is terminated and closed. A subsequent petition for revocation of the adoption
is neither a continuation of nor an incident in the proceeding for adoption. It is an entirely
new one, dependent on facts which have happened since the decree of adoption. The
venue of this new case, applying Rule 99 in a suppletory character, is also the place of the
residence of the petitioner. In the present instance petitioners reside in Pangasinan, having
moved there from their former residence in Ilocos Sur.
 COMPARATIVE CHART: HABEAS CORPUS, WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS
DATA
Writ of Habeas Corpus
Involves the right to liberty of and
rightful custody by the aggrieved
party
There is an actual violation of
aggrieved party’s right.
Respondent: may or may not be
an officer.
Who may file the petition:
Filed by the party for whose
relief it is intended or by some
person on his behalf.
Filed before:
1. RTC or any judge thereof,
enforceable within its territorial
jurisdiction;
2. CA or any member thereof in
instances authorized by law; and
3. SC or any member thereof.
Contents of the signed verified
petitions:
1. The fact that the person in
whose behalf the petition is filed
is imprisoned or restrained of his
liberty;
2.The detaining officer or private
individual, if unknown or
uncertain, such officer or person
Writ of Amparo
Involves the right to life, liberty and
security of the aggrieved party and
covers extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances
There is an actual or threatened
violation of aggrieved party’s right.
Respondent is a public official or
employee or a private individual or
entity.
Who may file the petition:
Filed by the aggrieved party or by
any qualified person or entity in the
following order:
a) any member of the immediate
family of the aggrieved party, i.e.
spouse, children and parents;
b) any ascendant, descendant or
collateral relative of the aggrieved
party within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity;
c) any concerned citizen,
organization, association or
institution (right to file is
successive).
The filing of the aggrieved party
himself suspends the right to file
petition by other persons.
Upon filing of the petition by an
authorized person suspends the
right to file by others down the
order.
Filed before:
1. RTC of the place where the threat
act or omission was committed or
any of its elements occurred;
2. Sandiganbayan or any
justice thereof;
3. CA or any justice thereof; and
4. SC or any justice thereof.
Contents of the signed and
verified petition:
1. Petitioner’s circumstances.
2. Respondent’s circumstances
3. The right violated or threatened to
be violated details of the violation or
threat.
4. Investigations conducted
Writ of Habeas Data
Involves the right to privacy in life,
liberty or security of the aggrieved
party and covers extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances
There is an actual or threatened
violation of aggrieved party’s right.
Respondent is a public official or
employee or a private individual or
entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person,
family name and correspondence
of the aggrieved party.
Who may file the petition:
Filed by the aggrieved party; but
in cases of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances, may be
filed by:
a) any member of the immediate
family of the aggrieved party, i.e.
spouse, children and parents;
b) any ascendant, descendant or
collateral relative of the aggrieved
party within the fourth civil degree
of consanguinity or affinity.
Filed before:
1. RTC where the petitioner or
respondent resides, or that
which has jurisdiction over the
place where the data or
information is gathered collected
or stored, at the option of petitioner
2. SC, CA or Sandiganbayan
when the action concerns public
data files or government offices.
Contents of the signed and
verified petition:
1. Petitioner’s circumstances.
2. Respondent’s circumstances.
3. Location of the file or database
and the person or entity having
custody, possession or control.
may be described by an assumed
appellation;
3.The place where the person
deprived of his liberty is
imprisoned or detained; and
4.A copy of the commitment or
cause of detention of such
person, if it can be procured
without impairing the efficiency of
the remedy, or the fact that the
imprisonment or detention is
without any legal authority.
If granted by SC or CA or any
member of such courts, it is
enforceable anywhere in the
Philippines; if granted by the RTC
or a judge thereof, it is
enforceable only within his
judicial district.
If granted by the SC or CA or any
member of such courts, it may be
made returnable before the court
or any member thereof or before
an RTC or any judge thereof.
If granted by the RTC or a judge
thereof, it is returnable before
himself.
5. Actions and recourses taken by
the petitioner in ascertaining the
whereabouts of the aggrieved party.
6. Relief prayed for which may
include a general prayer for other
just and equitable reliefs.
The writ shall be enforceable
anywhere in the Philippines
regardless of who issued the same.
If issued by the RTC or any judge
thereof, it is returnable before such
court or judge.
If issued by the Sandiganbayan or
the CA or any of their justices, it may
be returnable before such court or
any justice thereof, or to any RTC of
the place where the threat, act or
omission was committed or any of its
elements occurred.
If issued by the SC or any of its
justices, it may be returnable before
such Court or any justice thereof, or
the Sandiganbayan or CA or any of
their justices, or to any RTC of the
place where the threat, act or
omission was committed or any of its
elements occurred.
The writ shall be immediately issued
upon filing of a valid petition
substantial in form and content.
The clerk of court shall issue the writ
under the seal of the court. Except in
emergency cases which may be
issued by the judge or justice.
The writ shall set the date and time
for summary hearing within 7 days
from the issuance of the writ.
4. Actions and recourses taken by
the petitioner to secure the data or
information.
5. Update, rectification,
suppression or destruction of the
file or database or the enjoinment
of the threat.
6. General prayer to other just and
equitable reliefs.
The writ shall be enforceable
anywhere in the Philippines
regardless of who issued the
same.
If issued by the RTC or any judge
thereof, it shall be returnable
before
such court or judge.
If issued by the CA or the
Sandiganbayan or any of its
justices, it may be returnable
before
such court or any justice thereof,
or to any RTC of the place where
the
petitioner or respondent resides or
that which has jurisdiction over the
place where the data or
information is gathered, collected
or stored.
If issued by the SC or any of its
justices, it may be returnable
before
such Court or any justice thereof,
or before the CA or the
Sandiganbayan or any of its
justices, or to any RTC of the place
where the petitioner or respondent
resides or that which has
jurisdiction over the place where
the
data or information is gathered,
collected or stored.
The writ shall be immediately
issued upon filing of a valid petition
substantial in form and content.
The clerk of court shall issue the
writ under the seal of the court;
shall be served by the clerk within
3 days from issuance. In case of

Date and time of hearing is
specified in the writ.
Served to the person to whom it
is
directed; and if not found or has
not the prisoner in his custody, to
the other person having or
exercising such custody.
If the person to whom the writ is
directed neglects or refuses to
obey or make return of the same,
or makes a false return thereof, or
who, upon demand made by or
on behalf of the prisoner, refuses
to deliver to the person
demanding, within 6 hours after
the demand therefore, a true
copy of the warrant or order of
commitment, he shall forfeit to the
party aggrieved the sum of Php
1,000 and may be punished for
contempt.
The person who makes the return
is the officer by whom the
prisoner is imprisoned or the
person in whose custody the
prisoner is found.
Contents of the Return:
1. Whether or not he has custody
over the aggrieved party;
2. The authority and the true and
whole cause of detention;
3. if the party detained cannot be
produced, he must state the
sickness or infirmity;
4. if he has transferred the
custody, he shall state whom the
person was transferred, time,
cause and authority of such
transfer.
Petitioner is exempted from
payment
of docket and other lawful fees.
Summary hearing shall be
conducted not later than 7 days from
the date of the issuance of the writ.
Served upon the respondent
personally, but if it cannot be served
personally, the rules on substituted
service shall apply.
A copy is served on the respondent
and the sheriff retains a copy on
which to make a return of service.
If the respondent refuses to make a
return or makes a false return, he
may be punished with imprisonment
or fine for committing contempt
without prejudice to other
disciplinary actions.
The person who files the return is the
respondent. The return must be filed
within 5 days from the service of the
writ.
Contents of the Return:
1. Lawful defenses available to
the respondent.
2. The actions and steps taken by
the petitioner in determining the
whereabouts of the aggrieved
party and the identity of the
violator.
3. All information relevant to the
case.
4. Actions taken by the public
official:
a. In verifying the identity of
the aggrieved party.
b. Recovery and preservation
of the evidence for the
prosecution.
emergency, the writ maybe issued
by a justice or judge.
The writ shall set the date and time
for summary hearing within 10
days from issuance.
Only an indigent petitioner is not
required to pay docket and other
lawful fees.
Summary hearing shall be
conducted not later than 10 work
days from the date of the issuance
of the writ.
Served upon the respondent
personally, but if it cannot be
served
personally, the rules on
substituted
service shall apply.
A copy is served on the
respondent
and the sheriff retains a copy on
which to make a return of service.
If the respondent makes a false
return or refuses to make a return,
he may be punished with
imprisonment or fine for
committing contempt without
prejudice to other disciplinary
actions.
The person who files the return is
the respondent. The return must
be filed within 5 days from the
service of the writ.
Contents of the Return:
1. Lawful defenses available.
2. If the respondent has
possession or control of the data
or information:
a. He must disclose the data or
information, its nature, and the
purpose of his collection.
b. The actions and steps taken in
order to secure the confidentiality
of
the data or information.
c. The accuracy of the data or
information in his possession or
control.
3. All relevant allegations.

Sec. 12
1. Unless for good cause shown,
the hearing is adjourned, in which
event the court shall make an
order for the safe keeping of the
person imprisoned or restrained
as the nature of the case
requires;
2. The court or judge must be
satisfied that the person’s illness
is so grave that he cannot be
produced without any danger.
Period of appeal is within 48
hours from notice of the judgment
or final order appealed from. The
appeal shall be filed to the
Supreme Court under Rule 45.
Quantum of proof is clear and
convincing evidence.
c. Determine the
circumstances surrounding
the death of
disappearance.
d. Identify and apprehend the
persons involved.
e. Bring the suspected
offender to the court.
A general denial of the allegations
inthe petition shall not be allowed.
Effects of failure to file a return:
If the respondent fails to file a return,
the court, justice or judge shall
proceed to hear the petition ex parte.
There are prohibited pleadings and
motions.
Sec. 14. The court, justice or judge
may grant interim reliefs, to wit:
temporary protection order,
inspection order, production order
and witness protection order.
There is no presumption that official
duty has been regularly performed.
Judgment shall be rendered
within10 days from the time the
petition is submitted for decision.
The writ and reliefs prayed for must
be granted if the allegations are
proven by substantial evidence.
Otherwise, it must be denied.
Period of appeal shall be 5 working
days from the date of notice of the
adverse judgment. Filed with SC
thru
RULE 45. Given the same priority as
that of Habeas Corpus.
May be consolidated with a criminal
action filed subsequent to the
petition.
Quantum of proof is substantial
evidence.
A general denial of the allegations
in the petition shall not be allowed.
Effects of failure to file a return:
The Court, justice or judge shall
proceed to hear the petition ex
parte, granting the petitioner such
relief as the petition may warrant
unless the court in its discretion
requires petitioner to submit
evidence.
There are prohibited pleadings
and motions.
NOT applicable.
Judgment shall be rendered within
10 days from the time the petition
is
submitted for decision.
The writ and reliefs prayed for
must be granted if the allegations
are proven by substantial
evidence. Otherwise, it must be
denied.
Judgment shall be enforced
within 5
working days.
Period of appeal shall be 5
working
days from the date of notice of the
judgment or final order. Filed with
SC thru RULE 45. Given the same
priority as that of Habeas Corpus.
May be consolidated with a
criminal action filed subsequent to
the petition.
If the petition cannot proceed for a
valid cause, it shall not be dismissed
by the court, but it must be archived.

After 2 years from notice of the

archiving of the petition, it shall be
dismissed with prejudice upon
failure to prosecute.
Substantive rights cannot be Substantive rights cannot be
increased, diminished or modified. increased, diminished or modified.
The Rules of Court applies The Rules of Court applies
suppletorily. suppletorily.