Psychological Inquiry Copyright

C 2007 by
2007, Vol. 18, No. 1, 1–22 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

TARGET ARTICLE

Some Costs of American Corporate Capitalism:

A Psychological Exploration of Value and Goal Conflicts
Tim Kasser and Steve Cohn
Knox College, Galesburg, Illinois
Allen D. Kanner
Wright Institute, Berkeley, California
Richard M. Ryan
University of Rochester, Rochester, New York

Psychology rarely examines the effects of economic systems on people’s lives. In

this target article, we set out to explore some of the costs of American corporate
capitalism and its focus on self-interest, competition, hierarchical wage labor, and
strong desires for financial profit and economic growth. Specifically, we apply recent
cross-cultural research on goal and value systems (Schwartz, 1996; Grouzet et al.
2006), as well as a variety of other types of evidence, to demonstrate how the aims
and practices that typify American corporate capitalism often conflict with pursuits
such as caring about the broader world, having close relationships with others,
and, for many people, feeling worthy and free. We hope that by bringing to light
the value and goal conflicts inherent in this economic system, psychologists might
begin to systematically investigate this pervasive yet paradoxically ignored feature
of contemporary culture.

Human societies require systems for organizing the
production, the distribution, and the consumption of
the material bases of life. Throughout human history
(and pre-history), a variety of different economic sys-
tems have been developed for this purpose, and each
has had its own particular set of rules, institutions,
and ideologies to support its functioning. For example,
in the earliest known human economic organizations,
small bands of tightly-knit kin groups typically hunted
animals, gathered local vegetation, and lived a semi-
nomadic lifestyle characterized by few personal pos-
sessions, an egalitarian social organization, and gift-
giving and bartering as the primary modes of economic
exchange (Martin and Shirk, 2007). Thousands of years
later under feudalism, a few lords typically controlled
most of the means of production, consumed a dispro-
portionate amount of what was produced by others, and
rarely participated directly in the production of those
goods, leaving such work mainly to serfs tied to the
land (Dillard, 1967). As we enter the 21st century, the
economic system known as capitalism has clearly be-
come the dominant means of organizing economic life
around the globe. Western European, American, and
Australian nations adopted this system centuries ago,
many “developing” nations have recently re-oriented
their social economic systems towards capitalism, and
the People’s Republic of China and the former USSR
have shifted away from central planning economies
towards market capitalism.
Capitalism appears to have many strong points. No
previous economic system has produced as much eco-
nomic output or spurred as rapid a pace of technologi-
cal advancement. The latter has provided many people
with valuable goods and services, such as new means
of communicating and traveling as well as important
medical treatments. Capitalistic economies also seem
to free some people from the bondage of certain types
of drudgery and labor, as well as to provide many
options for individuals to purchase the products and
services that they desire. Many supporters of capital-
ism point to these and other observations in support
of their conclusion that capitalism is the only possible
way of successfully organizing economic life in the
contemporary world; this belief has come to be known
as TINA, which stands for “There Is No Alternative”
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TINA).
 KASSER, COHN, KANNER, RYAN

Table 1. Articles in Peer-reviewed Journals Found in PsycInfo Search (1887–May 6, 2006) by Using Search Term “capitalis*”

Journal Number References

American Psychologist 2 Albee (1977); Bramel and Friend (1981)

Child Development
Developmental Psychology
Journal of Abnormal Psychology
Journal of Abnormal & Social Psychology
Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology
Journal of Consumer Psychology
Journal of Cross-cultural Psychology
Journal of Economic Psychology
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
Psychological Bulletin
Psychological Inquiry
Psychological Review
0 —
0 —
0 —
3 Vetter (1947)
1 Hurvitz (1973)
0 —
1 Forgas and O’Driscoll (1984)
2 Garai (1987); Leiser and Zaltsman (1990)
2 Kasser and Ryan (1993); Sampson (1978)
2 Malka and Chatman (2003); McFarland, Ageyev, and Djintcharadze (1996)
1 Riegel (1972)
0 —
0 —

Note: Articles mentioned in this table are identified with a ∗ in the reference section.

Given the clear and ever-increasing influence of the
capitalistic form of economic organization, and the
strong claims sometimes made about its strengths, one
might expect that the discipline of psychology would
have developed a substantial literature that investigates
the psychology of the capitalistic economic system and
the psychological and social consequences of living
under it. However, a PsychInfo search using the term
“capitalis*” (to capture “capitalistic” and “capitalism”)
yielded only 816 articles in peer-reviewed journals
published between 1887 and May 6, 2006. Because
some of these articles were from sociological, anthro-
pological, and communications journals indexed by
PsychInfo, this rather small number of articles might
actually overestimate the extent of the psychological
literature on capitalism. To examine this possibility,
we narrowed our search to some of the most pres-
tigious peer-reviewed journals that cover topics that
might lead psychologists to mention “capitalism” or
“capitalistic” in abstracts. As can be seen in Table 1,
many of these journals have apparently never had an
article whose abstract referred to the world’s dominant
economic system, and, at most, a few journals have
published only one or two such articles.1
The current target article sets out to address the
lack of psychological work on capitalism by attempt-
ing to understand how its aims and goals affect in-
stitutions that organize social life and mold people’s
beliefs. As such, we see ourselves as following in the
tradition of psychologists who have examined other
broad, distal socio-cultural features such as religions,
individualism and collectivism, racism, and sexism. As
1 It is possible that the psychological impacts of economic phe-
nomena were discussed without referring to “capitalism.” Scholars
in some fields use words such as “industrial society” and “market
society” when referring to capitalism that may have been missed in
our search. We also note that we did not include book reviews or
comments on other articles in our search results.
these and other literatures attest, broad socio-cultural
practices and ideologies often have an enormous influ-
ence on people’s self-concepts, motivation, behavior,
and interpersonal relationships. We have every reason
to expect that capitalism would be even more perti-
nent, as it is the very nature of economic systems
to motivate behavior, define the role of participants,
and determine rules for many human interactions and
exchanges.
Indeed, capitalism shares features with all broad
socio-cultural organizations that shape people’s psy-
chological lives. Consider, for example, religion as a
socio-cultural organization. Any religion, in order to
maintain itself and survive in the long term, must cre-
ate a set of institutions that increase the likelihood
that individuals will believe in the particular ideolo-
gies supportive of that religion; both, in turn, increase
the likelihood that people will engage in the behaviors
that maintain the religion. For example, Christianity is
characterized by a particular ideology or set of beliefs
(i.e., monotheism, the divinity of Christ, the possibility
of reaching heaven, etc.) that is supported and empha-
sized by a group of institutions (e.g., churches, reli-
gious publishing houses, and religious organizations).
Both these institutions and ideologies encourage peo-
ple to engage in a set of behaviors (e.g., praying, tithing,
going to church, following the Ten Commandments)
that are consistent with and support Christianity. That
is, both the institutions and the ideologies are necessary
for the religion to maintain itself, for if large numbers
of former Christians stopped participating in the insti-
tutions (e.g., went to the mall rather than church) and
believing in the ideologies (e.g., believed in pagan-
ism rather than monotheism), the religion would die
out. Similar dynamics could be identified for political
systems, such as democracy, in which particular ide-
ologies (e.g., equal representation, human rights) and
institutions (e.g., constitutions, voting laws) support
the system.

2
 COSTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE CAPITALISM
In the same way, for a capitalistic economic system
to be successful, it must be supported by a particular
set of institutions (e.g., legal systems protecting pri-
vate property and limiting corporate liability, organi-
zational support from Chambers of Commerce to the
World Trade Organization, etc.,) and ideologies (e.g.,
the treatment of natural resources as private property;
the primacy of self-interest; beliefs in the benefits of
competition and the necessity of economic growth). By
doing so, the culture encourages individuals to pursue
the types of behaviors (e.g., working for a wage, invest-
ing in the stock market, consuming in large amounts)
that ensure the smooth and long-term functioning of
capitalism.
Just as there are many forms of Christianity (e.g.,
Protestant, Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, etc.,), each of
which has their own particular institutions and ideolo-
gies that vary around a few basic themes, there are also
different forms of capitalism, such as Nordic, Asian,
and third-world capitalism. In this target article, we
have chosen to focus on one particular form of capital-
ism, namely American corporate capitalism, or what
we will call ACC. There are three reasons we have
chosen to explore some of the dynamics that occur
under ACC in particular, rather than capitalism in gen-
eral. First, as it is the system under which we per-
sonally live, it is the one that we are most familiar
with and that affects us the most. Second, it seems to
us that ACC is the form of capitalism that currently
has the largest worldwide influence. Third, the process
of economic globalization which so characterizes the
contemporary world (Friedman, 1999) promotes ACC
more than other forms of capitalism, thereby making
it the type of capitalism most likely to influence peo-
ple in the future. Thus, unless otherwise indicated, all
of the observations we make only concern American
corporate capitalism at the turn of the millennium.
Overview of the Current Article
We will first provide a brief description of ACC so
that readers may understand its primary features. Then,
building on empirical work concerning the organiza-
tion of values and goals (Schwartz, 1992; Kasser and
Ryan, 1996; Grouzet et al., 2005), we will present a
framework for understanding how the institutions and
ideologies of ACC come to emphasize one set of aims
and to de-emphasize another set. Specifically, we will
show that ACC fosters and encourages a set of val-
ues based in self-interest, a strong desire for financial
success, high levels of consumption, and interpersonal
styles based on competition. The consequence of such
an emphasis is that ACC also tends to oppose, under-
mine, de-emphasize, and “crowd out” goals and values
for caring about the broader world, cultivating close in-
terpersonal relationships, and, especially among poorer
individuals, feeling worthy and free; notably, such aims
are typically associated with psychological well-being,
optimal performance, social cohesion, and ecological
sustainability (Deci and Ryan, 2000; Ryan and Deci,
2000; Kasser, 2002), and thus their conflict with the
aims of ACC might be of interest to many psycholo-
gists. We will then review theoretical, empirical, his-
torical, cultural, and anecdotal evidence to provide fur-
ther support for our observation that the institutions
and ideology of ACC often work against the aims of
helpfulness, intimacy, and personal freedom.
Before we begin this endeavor in earnest, we ask
our readers to keep three issues in mind.
First, our discussion is limited in many ways. For
example, the page limits on this article do not allow
for full exposition of our ideas in terms of both depth
and breadth. Also, the fact that psychology has not in-
cluded capitalism as a key construct in its “nomological
network,” (as suggested by Table 1) renders it rather
difficult to find research on these issues, especially the
quantitative type of research compelling to most psy-
chologists. Further, our focus on the goals and values
of capitalism is only one possible approach, as there
are no doubt other methods and perspectives that can
be applied. We therefore acknowledge that more depth
of argument, more empirical evidence, and a greater
diversity of approaches are needed to understand more
fully the psychological costs (and potential benefits)
of capitalism. Thus, we view what follows not as a lit-
erature review or as anywhere near a final statement,
but instead as a broad set of ideas that we hope might
spur future research, policy positions, and other pro-
fessional activities that concern the consequences of
living under ACC.
Second, some of the psychological dynamics and
costs that we will identify as occurring in ACC may
also occur under other economic systems. As Galbraith
(1981, p. 352) opined, “Under capitalism, man exploits
man. And under communism, it is just the reverse.”
Some of the issues we highlight may not be unique to
ACC; indeed, we suggest that future research and theo-
rizing ought to address the comparative psychological
costs of different economic systems. Yet, even if some
of the dynamics we identify with ACC are found in
other economic systems, these dynamics are still in-
fluencing the lives of the people who live under ACC,
and therefore they are worthy of investigation in their
own right.
Finally, we acknowledge that psychologists are of-
ten reluctant to explore emotionally and politically
charged topics such as the effects of living under par-
ticular economic systems (Kasser and Kanner, 2004).
This reluctance may be due to a fear among psychol-
ogists that they would be considered politically in-
correct, unaware of cultural relativism, or even un-
scientific were they to explore such matters. Indeed,
when we proposed the present target article, one of
3
 KASSER, COHN, KANNER, RYAN
Psychological Inquiry’s editors cautioned us to write
extra carefully so that readers did not “discount the
ideas as left wing propaganda.” We hope that our col-
leagues will not treat the mere fact that we are explicitly
examining some costs of ACC as evidence of political
bias; to do so would render the economic system a sa-
cred cow excused from the intellectual and empirical
scrutiny that science encourages, and requires, for any
topic of investigation.
What is American Corporate Capitalism?
It would of course require a book to provide any-
thing like a full answer to this question. Our definition
is thus brief and does not reflect all of the complexities
and qualifiers a full exposition would necessitate. We
shall attempt to present an objective set of definitions,
recognizing that other writers might characterize ACC
differently or highlight other features of the system.
Characteristics of ACC
Unlike some economic systems in which land, tech-
nology (e.g., plows, factories), and other aspects of
the means of production are shared by the community,
ACC involves the private ownership of property by par-
ticular individuals (or, as we shall see below, by large
corporations owned by shareholders). This is the very
nature of “capital,” i.e., individuals invest some of their
own resources to purchase land or technology and then
use that property as a means of producing some good
or service that they (i.e., the capitalists) hope will cre-
ate a profit. Capital is also used to hire laborers, as the
individual who owns the means of production typically
needs workers to produce the goods (e.g., wheat, wid-
gets) or the services (e.g., computer tech help, travel
planning) that will eventually be sold to consumers; in
return for their time and skills, the capitalist pays the
laborers a wage. The product or service is then put up
for sale in the marketplace, where consumers use their
own income (derived mostly from wages) as a means
of purchasing the products or services that they need
and desire.
The fundamental assumption of ACC is that the
system works best when capitalists, laborers, and con-
sumers are each able to pursue their own self-interest
to the maximum extent possible. The grandfather of
capitalistic thought, economist Adam Smith, put this
especially well, writing:
“It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the
brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but
from their regard to their own interest. We address
ourselves, not to their humanity, but to their self-love,
and never talk to them of our own necessities, but of
their advantages” (Smith 1776/1976, p. 26–27).
4
That is, owners of the means of production are not
expected to create products and hire laborers for the
social good, but rather as a means of creating profit
and accumulating further capital for their own self-
interest. This leads to a system in which the capitalist
strives to keep the costs of production down in order to
maximize profit, even if it results in low wages for the
laborers.
But laborers, too, act in their own self-interest, sell-
ing their time, energy, and skills not for the social
good but instead for the highest possible wage. Fi-
nally, consumers also enter the marketplace and use
the income they have acquired in order to purchase the
goods and services that they desire, i.e., that serve their
self-interest. Of course, consumers’ self-interest is best
served if they can buy products or services for the low-
est possible price and thus expend as little income as
possible, even if this lowers profits for capitalists and
wages for laborers.
According to Adam Smith (1776/1976), the result of
this generalized pursuit of self-interests is a bending of
private interests (as if guided by “an invisible hand”)
to serve the welfare of society. And what guides the
hand? Competition among and between the three main
players in the marketplace: the capitalist, who hopes
to maximize profit by keeping costs (including wages)
low and prices high; the laborer, who hopes to have high
wages; and the consumer, who hopes that the costs of
products and services will be low. Further, when capi-
talists compete with each other, producers who provide
excellent goods and services at relatively low prices
will assumedly attract more customers, and therefore
generate more profit, than producers who make poor
goods and services and/or charge relatively high prices.
Similarly, laborers who provide more valued skills for
lower pay will be more likely to obtain wages than will
laborers whose skills are common, poorly developed,
and/or who demand higher pay. Capitalists are also in
competition with each other for labor, and thus there
is some pressure on them to pay relatively high wages
and offer good jobs in order to obtain workers. Finally,
consumers compete with each other, as at an auction
where individuals bid against each other for a product
or service offered; if many people want a particular
product or service, and the supply is limited, the price
goes up.
To summarize briefly, the basic premise of ACC is
that members of society will be provided with the op-
portunity to get what they want (i.e., a profit, a wage,
and/or a product) through competing with each other
and pursuing their self-interests. Moreover, such com-
petition is assumed to lead to the highest quality goods
and services at the lowest price to the consumer, thus
benefiting society as a whole.
Because the per unit cost of goods often falls as
the scale of production rises, businesses under this
economic system must often reinvest past profits in
 COSTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE CAPITALISM
expanded production facilities or larger workforces if
they hope “to remain competitive” with other firms.
Such expansion frequently requires more capital than
individual entrepreneurs can mobilize on their own.
As such, competition has encouraged the emergence
of the corporation. The corporate form of enterprise
allows firms to sell partial ownership of themselves
(i.e., stock shares) in order to raise capital. This pool-
ing of capital then allows corporations to grow in size,
and also results in a shift of the firms’ oversight from
individual entrepreneurs to boards of directors who
represent the stockholders.
One of the key features of corporations under ACC
is that they provide “limited liability” to shareholders
for the corporation’s actions, thus making investments
safer for and more attractive to potential shareholders
because they cannot be sued for the corporation’s activ-
ities. Other legal decisions have also lead corporations
under ACC to evolve in ways that increase their power
to make a profit. For example, in the US, corporations
are considered to be “legal persons,” and thus have the
same protections guaranteed to “natural persons” under
the Bill of Rights (e.g., freedom of speech), despite the
many differences between the two (including potential
immortality; Bakan, 2004; Hartmann, 2002; Korten,
1995). Further, although early US corporate law re-
quired corporations to consider the “public good” in
their actions, these laws were overturned in the later
19th and early 20th centuries (Kelly 2001). Now, for-
profit corporations have a single mandate: to act in the
interest of share-holders by increasing profit.
Such laws, combined with other governmental poli-
cies and the logic of competition, have concentrated
enormous wealth, and thus power, in the hands of large
corporations. As just one example, consider the fact
that in 2000, 52 of the 100 largest economies in the
world were corporations (Mander, Barker, and Korten,
2001). That is, the economic activity of 52 corporate
entities exceeded that of the majority of nations in the
world. From the perspective of ACC, this is a sign of
great success, for it shows the power of corporations
to make profit.
Another feature of ACC is what Galbraith (1993,
pg. 143) referred to as “bureaucratic symbiosis”: the
development of large governmental bureaucracies that
are designed (somewhat paradoxically) both to regu-
late corporate activity and to facilitate corporate efforts
to make a profit (Hartmann, 2002; Bakan, 2004; Chua,
2004; Wood, 2005). National projects involving collab-
orations between the Department of Energy and large
energy companies exemplify how large public organi-
zations and for-profit companies often work together.
At the global level, trans-national bureaucracies such
as the World Trade Organization have been developed
to oversee and regulate trade (particularly the types
of trade involving large, multinational corporations)
and to facilitate international economic integration
(Friedman, 1999; Stiglitz, 2002).
One of the most important actions of such govern-
mental or pan-governmental organizations under ACC
is to create policies that encourage economic growth.
Like a bicycle, ACC is most stable while in motion
(Friedman, 1999). In fact, economic growth appears
necessary in ACC to maintain what we now consider
to be normal, daily life. There are at least three reasons
for this. First, growth provides the incentive for invest-
ment spending on the part of businesses that seems
necessary to avoid unemployment, and thus to provide
laborers with the income that they can use to purchase
the goods and services provided in the marketplace
by corporations and other entrepreneurs. Second, eco-
nomic growth tends to defuse social tensions caused by
the high level of economic inequality typical of ACC
(see below); that is, growth provides those in lower
socio-economic strata a “bigger piece of pie” via the
creation of a larger pie, rather than via the redistribu-
tion of shares of the existing pie. Finally, economic
growth provides the basis for nation-state power (i.e.,
the bureaucracies described above), because the poten-
tial surplus that is derived from economic growth can
be taxed and then controlled for governmental purposes
(Wood, 2005).
These pressures for economic growth are reflected
in two final features of ACC that we would like to
highlight: the march of globalization and the expansion
of advertising (Cavanagh and Mander, 2004; Kanner,
2005). The desire for new markets, cheap resources,
and cost advantages in production has encouraged
many corporations to promote global economic inte-
gration. In the last couple of decades, for example,
treaties such as the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment and organizations such as the World Trade Orga-
nization have been created to facilitate market expan-
sion in ways that increase the likelihood that corpora-
tions can pursue their desire for profit. These treaties
and organizations ensure that nations do not have bar-
riers to free trade, i.e., laws or policies that interfere
with imports or investments from foreign corporations
hoping to make a profit (Friedman, 1999; Stiglitz,
2002).
Advertising has become another increasingly im-
portant tool that producers use to inform consumers
about goods and services available in the marketplace,
and to stimulate consumers’ desire to purchase those
goods and services. Advertisements have become in-
creasingly omnipresent in modern society, and even
form the basis for much social interaction. Consider,
for example, that: a) about the same sum is typically
spent on advertising in the US as on higher education
(Goodwin, Ackerman, and Kiron, 1997) and b) the av-
erage American is exposed to about 3,600 commercial
impressions daily (Jhally, 1997).
5
 KASSER, COHN, KANNER, RYAN
The Values and Goals
of American Corporate Capitalism
What we hope comes into relief from our brief
description is that ACC carries with it certain prac-
tices and beliefs that foster the pursuit of self-interest,
competition, economic growth, and high levels of con-
sumption. As such, ACC is more than just money and
goods—it is a system of beliefs, social relationships,
and institutions that encourage, regulate, and direct hu-
man motivations and values (just as religion, political
systems, and other features of societies do). As we
have mentioned, for ACC to take hold successfully in
a culture, it must engage people in competitive institu-
tions, entice them with an ever-new panoply of desir-
able goods, and expose them to practices and ideologies
that lead them to internalize2 values for self-interest,
competition, and economic advancement. When peo-
ple adopt these attitudes and values, ACC becomes
further anchored within the culture, and increasingly
determines the beliefs and concerns people embrace,
reject, or ignore, and the institutions that they will sup-
port or oppose. In short, like any social system, ACC
fosters ideological values and institutional practices
that further fuel its goals and suppresses other values
and practices at odds with its aims.
Several lines of evidence show that when people are
exposed to the socializing institutions of ACC’s ideol-
ogy, they do indeed take on or internalize its beliefs and
values. For example, ingestion of contemporary media,
with its many messages glorifying consumption and
wealth, is associated with greater concern for financial
success and a stronger consumer orientation (Rahtz
Sirgy and Meadow, 1988, 1989; Kasser and Ryan,
2001; Schor, 2004). When parents (i.e., the previous
generation living under ACC) hold strong financial
success values, their children do as well (Kasser, Ryan,
Zax, and Sameroff, 1995). Subtle exposure to business-
related objects (e.g., briefcases and board room tables)
also increases competitive cognitions and behaviors
(Kay, Wheeler, Bargh, and Ross, 2004). Further, those
who enter disciplines tightly intertwined with the in-
stitutions and ideology of ACC (such as business, eco-
nomics, and the law), become increasingly focused
on self-interested, financial success values and beliefs,
and become less concerned with cooperation and help-
ing others (Frank, Gilovich, and Regan, 2000; Sheldon
and Krieger, 2004; Vansteenkiste, Duriez, Simons, and
2 In the current target article, we use the term “internalization”
to refer to the process of taking in and eventually regulating be-
liefs and/or behaviors that were originally outside of the person.
Sometimes people integrate beliefs and behaviors with the self and
feel autonomous, whereas other times they internalize in a less self-
determined and more controlled fashion (see Deci and Ryan 2000).
As we shall demonstrate later in the article, internalization of capi-
talistic ideology and behavior frequently is of this latter, less optimal
type.
6
Soenens, in press). Yet such values and beliefs are also
notable in the general population: Approximately 70%
of contemporary US late adolescents believe that finan-
cial success is a “very important” or “essential” aim in
life (Myers, 2000) and a similar percentage believe that
Americans are basically self-interested and care little
about those in need (Wuthnow, 1995).
Proponents of ACC might view these outcomes as
evidence that many Americans have come to adopt
the beliefs that will permit them to follow their true
nature (which proponents typically assume to be self-
interested and competitive) and to become optimally
happy (which is assumed to occur by acquiring material
wealth). We note, however, at least two sets of problems
with such a position.
The first problem is that ACC’s assumptions that
people are primarily self-interested and competitive,
and that the acquisition of material goods promotes
happiness, are at best debatable and at worst incorrect.
As we will see later in our review, many psycholog-
ical theories propose that a focus on self-interest and
competition reflects immature psychological develop-
ment and/or psychopathology; these perspectives in-
stead recognize that humans have co-operative, altru-
istic motives as well.3 Other research questions the
validity of ACC’s assumptions about the relations of
material acquisitions and financial success to happi-
ness. For example, substantial research on psycholog-
ical well-being demonstrates that, past the point of
meeting basic needs for food, shelter, etc., wealth does
little to increase happiness (see Diener and Seligman,
2004 for a recent review). Further, when the types of
materialistic aims encouraged by ACC, namely goals
such as wealth, fame or image, are relatively important
to people, lower well-being is reported (see Kasser
2002, for a review).
The second problem, and the one on which we will
focus in the current article, is that substantial evidence
suggests that when the values and goals necessary
for the smooth functioning of ACC become increas-
ingly central to individuals and to institutions, the re-
sult is a corresponding conflict with three other aims:
concern for the broader community and the world;
close, intimate relationships; and feeling worthy and
autonomous. Later in the paper we will discuss a va-
riety of theories and types of evidence supportive of
this observation. As initial support, we ask our readers
to consider the models of values and goals presented
in Figures 1 and 2. Each of these models is based
on substantial cross-cultural empirical work examining
how the aims that people hold as important in life are
3 Even economist Adam Smith (1776/1976), on whose work
much of ACC’s claims about self-interest rest, did not himself see
self-interest as the sole motive that could support capitalism—he ar-
gued that “empathy” and “generosity” were other important motives
necessary to balance greed and create a balanced, healthy society.
 COSTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE CAPITALISM
Figure 1. Circumplex model of values, Schwartz (1992). Note: This figure was published in Experimental Social Psychology (Vol. 25, pp. 1–65),
Copyright Academic Press, 1992, and is reprinted with permission.
organized psychologically (S. Schwartz, 1992, 1996;
Grouzet et al., 2005). In both models, human values
and goals have been shown to be well-represented by
a “circumplex” in which aims that are consistent with
each other are adjacent in the circle, whereas aims in
conflict are on opposite ends of the circle.
It is not difficult to identify the aims described in
either model that most centrally characterize the as-
sumptions, values, and goals of ACC. For example, S.
Schwartz (1992, 1996; Fig. 1) has found the emergence
across diverse countries of two “self-enhancing” val-
ues that conceptually overlap with the primary aims
of ACC. The first set of values, which he identi-
fies as “Power,” involves “dominance over people
and resources”; specific values included in this do-
main include “social power” and “wealth.” The second
set, termed “Achievement,” involves a focus on per-
sonal success demonstrated through socially-accepted
means. Both Power and Achievement values echo the
self-interested, competitive, financially-acquisitive be-
haviors and desires characteristic of ACC’s central
tenets. Further evidence that power and achievement
values reflect the dominant concerns of ACC comes
from multi-dimensional scaling analyses showing that
Richins and Dawson’s (1992) widely-used measure of
materialism lands quite close to power and achieve-
ment values in Schwartz’s circumplex (Burroughs and
Rindfleisch, 2002).
Capitalism’s aims are also identifiable in Fig. 2
(Grouzet et al., 2005) as the extrinsic aspirations stud-
ied by Kasser and Ryan (1993, 1996, 2001). Extrinsic
goals are those focused on external rewards and other
people’s praise, and include strivings for financial suc-
cess, as well as for image and status. In a study of over
1800 individuals from 15 nations, Grouzet et al. (2005)
found that these aims consistently emerged as basic as-
pirations across cultures, and fall closely together in the
circumplex model.
As noted, a circumplex model assumes that a fo-
cus on one set of values and goals is associated with
caring less about and feeling conflict concerning the
values and goals on the opposite side of the circum-
plex. What values and goals are in opposition to those
central in ACC? Schwartz’s model in Fig. 1 shows that
7
 KASSER, COHN, KANNER, RYAN
Figure 2. Circumplex model of aspirations, Grouzet et al., (2005).
universalism, benevolence, and self-direction oppose
ACC’s aims of power and achievement; Burroughs and
Rindfleisch’s (2002) results echo this for materialism.
That is, the evidence shows that increasing concern for
wealth, power, and personal achievement corresponds
with less concern for “Understanding, appreciation,
tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people
and for nature,” “Preservation and enhancement of the
welfare of people with whom one is in frequent con-
tact,” and “Independent thought and action choosing,
creating, exploring.” Remarkably similar conclusions
are reached when we examine the circumplex model of
goals developed by Grouzet et al. (2005) and presented
in Fig. 2. Here we see that financial success goals op-
pose those for community feeling, affiliation, and self-
acceptance. That is, concern for wealth and possessions
conflicts with working “to improve the world through
activism or generativity,” having “satisfying relation-
ships with family and friends,” and feeling “competent
and autonomous.” Table 2 provides more detail about
the specific values and goals from each of these circum-
plex models that are in opposition to the aims typically
associated with ACC.
This empirical research, conducted with different
methodologies, from different theoretical perspectives,
and with thousands of individuals from dozens of na-
tions around the world, leads to a provocative conclu-
sion: The values and goals most closely expressive of
ACC’s ideology and institutions are also those that op-
8
pose and potentially undermine people’s concern for:
a) promoting the welfare of others in the broader com-
munity; b) developing a sense of connection and close-
ness to other humans; and c) choosing paths in life that
help them to feel worthy and autonomous.4
Some Psychological Costs of ACC
In this section, we organize our discussion of some
of the costs of ACC around the circumplex models
presented in Figures 1 and 2 and the information pro-
vided in Table 2. Specifically, we will now explore
in greater detail how the common and valued human
propensities for community, affiliation, benevolence,
self-worth, and even autonomy can be undermined
when people and institutions take on the self-interested,
competitive, materialistic values and goals that are re-
quired for the smooth functioning of ACC. Within each
section we will discuss extant psychological theories
and empirical research, as well as some of the historical
4 It is worth noting that these empirically-based findings conflict
with some of the standard assumptions of mainstream (neoclassical)
economic theory, which pictures capitalist economies as well-oiled
machines that can be put to any use. From a neoclassical perspective,
participants in a capitalist economy could just as easily live a life of
voluntary simplicity and use the productivity of capitalism to protect
the environment as to live a life of conspicuous consumption and
burden the environment. We hold that this picture is not consistent
with the available data.
 COSTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE CAPITALISM
Table 2. Values (from S. Schwartz, 1992) and Aspirations (from Grouzet et al., 2005) Opposing the Aims of American
Corporate Capitalism
Domain Definition
Values
Universalism Understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and
protection for the welfare of all people and for
nature
Benevolence Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of
people with whom one is in frequent contact.
Self-direction Independent thought and action choosing, creating,
exploring
Aspirations
Community feeling To improve the world through activism or
generativity
Affiliation To have satisfying relationships with family and
friends
Self-acceptance To feel competent and autonomous
practices of ACC that reveal how the system frequently
opposes and undermines these aims.
ACC and Universalism/Community Feeling
As shown in Figures 1 and 2 and in Table 2, the
values of competitive achievement and power and the
goal of financial success encouraged by ACC oppose
universalism values for “Understanding, appreciation,
tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people
and for nature,” (S. Schwartz, 1992, 1996) and commu-
nity feeling aspirations to “improve the world through
activism or generativity,” (Grouzet et al., 2005). S.
Schwartz (1992, p. 15) described the conflict between
these sets of aims well when he wrote “acceptance of
others as equals and concern for their welfare inter-
feres with the pursuit of one’s own relative success and
dominance over others.”
Many thinkers in the social sciences have com-
mented on this tension between the self-interested val-
ues of ACC and the aim of being a good community,
national, and global citizen. For example, the political
scientist Inglehart (1977) has noted how materialistic
values oppose broader “post-materialistic” cares for
the broader world. In sociology, Putnam (2000) sug-
gested that involvement in community activities has
dropped as the individualistic consumer mentality has
spread in the United States. Political economist Hirsch
(1976) described how ACC erodes the “social capital”
(i.e., social connections and solidarity) on which the
system depends for efficient market exchanges. Others
have discussed how market society has lead the role of
Items
Broadminded; Wisdom; Social justice; Equality; A world at
peace; A world of beauty; Unity with nature; Protecting
the environment
Helpful; Honest; Forgiving; Loyal; Responsible; True
friendship; Mature love
Creativity; Freedom; Independent; Curious; Choosing own
goals; Self-respect
I will assist people who need it, asking nothing in return;
The things I do will make other people’s lives better; I
will help the world become a better place.
People will show affection to me, and I will to them; I will
feel that there are people who really love me; Someone in
my life will accept me as I am, no matter what; I will
express my love for special people; I will have a
committed, intimate relationship.
I will choose what I do, instead of being pushed along by
life; I will feel free; I will deal effectively with problems
in my life; I will feel good about my abilities; I will be
efficient; I will overcome the challenges that life presents
me; I will have insight into why I do the things I do.
“citizen” to be usurped by that of “consumer” (Landau,
2004), leading to less participation in the democratic
and social institutions that help bind communities to-
gether.
Many well-known psychological theories would
seemingly agree that the individualistic and con-
sumeristic desires often encouraged by ACC and by
economic globalization oppose those for generosity
and for caring about one’s community and the world at
large. Indeed, some would view these different types of
desires as indicative of different levels of maturity (see
Nikelly, 2000). For example, psychodynamically in-
spired psychologists typically hold that healthy devel-
opment involves movement from a strong concern for
one’s own self-interest towards social interest (Adler,
1956) or generativity and care for the world (Erikson,
1959/1980); see also McAdams, de St. Aubin, and
Logan (1993) and Loevinger (1976). Cognitive theo-
ries of moral development, whether for men (Kohlberg,
1969) or women (Gilligan, 1982), also argue (and em-
pirically demonstrate) that lower stages are typified
by self-interested motivations whereas higher stages
involve a concern for other people’s feelings and the
welfare of society as a whole. Maslow’s (1954) hu-
manistic theory similarly suggests that people move
from self-interested, deficiency needs to higher-level
self-actualization needs that incorporate issues like
helping the world and seeking knowledge and beauty
(i.e., universalism values). Clinically, some forms of
psychopathology (American Psychiatric Association,
2000) and family dysfunction (Minuchin, 1974) are
understood as occurring because individuals focus on
9
 KASSER, COHN, KANNER, RYAN
their own self-interest and lack concern and empa-
thy for others (see also Ryan, Deci, Grolnick, and La
Guardia, 2006). Thus, each of these theories suggests
that healthy functioning and higher development in-
volve a move away from the self-interested, competi-
tive values, and goals encouraged by ACC and towards
the community feeling goals and universalism values
that more deeply connect individuals with the broader
world.
Both historical occurrences over the last 50 years
(i.e., the time during which ACC has become increas-
ingly dominant in the world) and empirical evidence
from the psychological literature also support the idea
that the aims of ACC conflict with many of the com-
munity oriented values and goals presented in Table
2. Perhaps the most noteworthy set of facts supporting
this claim is the increasing financial inequality within
corporations, within the United States, and across the
world that reflects the triumph of self-interested profit
over concern for equality in the community. Within
corporations, for example, the income of chief execu-
tive officers (CEOs) increased from about 26 times that
of average hourly workers in 1965 to 185 times in 2003
(Mishel, Bernstein, and Allegretto, 2005). Within the
United States, the level of income and wealth inequality
declined from the late 1920s until the early 1970s, but
since then, inequality has increased dramatically (Har-
rison and Bluestone, 1988, p. 7; Wolff, 1996, p. 28). For
example, in the period of US economic expansion be-
tween 1980 and 2000, 97% of the increased wealth was
garnered by those in the top 20% of incomes, leading
America today to become the most unequal society in
the industrialized West in terms of wealth distribution
(Hertz, 2001). Data concerning financial inequalities
within the world are rather complicated, but many in-
dicators suggest that the gap between the very rich and
the very poor has widened in recent years. For exam-
ple, the per capita income of the 20 richest countries
leaped from 18 times the level of the 20 poorest coun-
tries in 1960 to 37 times their level in 1995 (World
Watch Institute, 2003). Pollin (2003, p. 137) also cites
a May 2000 International Monetary Fund report which
concluded, “the relative gap between the richest and
poorest countries has continued to widen” and himself
concludes that “when one separates out the Chinese
experience, it becomes unambiguous that inequality
has been growing over the neoliberal era” (p. 134), i.e.,
the time of expanding economic globalization. Stiglitz
(2002), a Nobel prize winning economist and former
chief economist at the World Bank, also has discussed
the redistribution of wealth upwards under globaliza-
tion, noting that the net effect of globalization “all too
often has been to benefit the few at the expense of the
many, the well-off at the expense of the poor” (p. 20)
and concluding that “for millions of people, globaliza-
tion has not worked. Many have actually been made
worse off, as they have seen their jobs destroyed and
10
their lives become more insecure. They have felt in-
creasingly powerless against forces beyond their con-
trol. They have seen their democracies undermined,
their cultures eroded” (p. 248).
Although ACC clearly is successful in generating
great wealth, the evidence described above shows that
the system does not ensure an equitable distribution
of this wealth. Frank and Cook (1995) suggest, in
fact, that the “winner-take all” mentality engendered
by capitalism ensures that, in the minds of those who
have internalized the ideology of the system and who
are best positioned by institutions to garner profits, this
inequitable distribution is quite fair, for it follows the
rules which proclaim that self-interest and competition
are of primary importance.5
A number of studies in the psychological literature
would appear to buttress the conclusion that those who
most embrace the materialistic ethos of ACC are less
likely to act in ways reflective of universalism and com-
munity feeling values and goals. For example, studies
show that materialistic values are associated with lower
generosity (Kasser, 2005), as well as fewer proso-
cial (Sheldon and Kasser, 1995; McHoskey, 1999) and
more anti-social activities such as cheating and petty
theft (Kasser and Ryan, 1993; Cohen and Cohen, 1996;
McHoskey, 1999). The importance placed on goals for
financial success is also associated with greater dis-
agreeableness (Roberts and Robins, 2000), lower em-
pathy (Sheldon and Kasser, 1995), more Machiavellian
tendencies (McHoskey, 1999), and more racial prej-
udice (Duriez, Vansteenkiste, Soenens, and DeWitte,
2005). Social dilemma research also shows that those
who have taken on the values of ACC treat others in
more competitive and less cooperative ways (Sheldon
and McGregor, 2000; Sheldon, Sheldon, and Osbald-
iston, 2000) and share less (Kasser, 2005).
In addition to undermining the care with which peo-
ple treat other humans in the broader world, ACC’s
values and goals also affect how people treat the en-
vironment and other species. Although rising world
populations clearly play a role in ecological degrada-
tion, the effect of ACC’s enormous need for the natural
resources required to feed production and consump-
tion cannot be ignored. For example, many habitats for
animal and plant species have been lost or drastically
diminished due to economic expansion and activity;
several ecological economists claim that the annual
extinction rate has reached at least 5,000 species per
year, a rate about 10,000 times the pre-human species
extinction rate (Costanza, Cumberland, Daly, Good-
land, and Norgaard, 1997). And the increasing green-
house gas emissions from automobiles, factories, and
other economic activities encouraged by ACC have led
5 Fair or not, it is clear that wealth inequality is problematic in
many regards, including both mental and physical health (Albee
1986; Wilkinson 1996).
 COSTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE CAPITALISM
many scientists to believe that significant disturbances
to global weather will occur in the coming decades that
could further disrupt the lives of many species, includ-
ing our own (Athanasiou, 1996). Although some na-
tions have agreed to lower their emission levels to help
reduce this danger, the government of the United States
has, as of this writing refused to participate in the pri-
mary international treaty constraining such emissions,
claiming it would hurt the economy too much (Moseley
and Bendavid, 2001). The US government’s decision
brings into stark relief how the imperative for economic
growth under ACC can conflict with concerns for the
broader world of other species and future generations.
The psychological literature provides parallel ev-
idence that persons who embrace ACC’s values are
less concerned with the Earth’s ecological health. Peo-
ple espousing more materialistic concerns express less
love of the natural world (Saunders and Munro, 1999)
and engage in fewer behaviors that benefit the en-
vironment (Richins and Dawson, 1992; Brown and
Kasser, 2005; Kasser, 2005). Further, materialistic peo-
ple report more greed and use more resources in social
dilemma games, such as the well-known “tragedy of
the commons” problem (Kasser and Sheldon, 2000;
Sheldon and McGregor, 2000). These results make it
unsurprising that persons who have internalized the
values of ACC cause more harm to the Earth: Brown
and Kasser (2005) demonstrated that adults’ endorse-
ment of materialistic, extrinsic values was positively
associated with their ecological footprints (Dholakia
and Wackernagel, 1999), a measure of how many acres
of arable land are required to meet one’s use of trans-
portation, food, and shelter. In sum, these observations
suggest that the values encouraged by ACC are asso-
ciated with taking more resources for one’s self, and
leaving less for other people, other species, and future
generations.
ACC and Benevolence/Affiliation
The values and aims associated with ACC not only
oppose individuals’ connections with the larger world,
but also many of the values and aspirations that support
healthy intimate relationships. As seen in Figures 1 and
2 and in Table 2, the values of ACC oppose being “help-
ful,” “honest,” “forgiving,” and “loyal,” as well as car-
ing about close, committed, mutually-supportive rela-
tionships. Such results should be of particular concern
to psychologists, who almost universally recognize that
good relationships are a key feature of psychologi-
cal health (e.g., Maslow, 1954; Bowlby, 1969/1982;
Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983; Epstein, 1990;
Baumeister and Leary, 1995; Ryan and Deci, 2000).
Problems with both the quantity and quality of close
relationships can happen under ACC. Regarding quan-
tity, the increasing work hours of the last few decades in
the US (Hochschild, 1997; Schor, 2003; Mishel et al.,
2005) have had the effect of leaving less time avail-
able for the cultivation of relationships. Although part
of increasing work hours may be due to citizens’ de-
sire to work more, Hochschild’s (1997) study of one
major US corporation showed that many of its institu-
tional time policies made it quite difficult for workers
to meet their basic family responsibilities; mandatory
overtime in some work positions leads to similar prob-
lems (Golden, 2003). Long work hours in the pursuit
of wealth and economic growth also leave little energy
at the end of the day for interactions with spouses and
children, not to mention friends. Lane (2000) has even
suggested that, as Americans have pursued the aims
of materialism and wealth, they have at the same time
experienced “a kind of famine of warm interpersonal
relations, of easy-to-reach neighbors, of encircling, in-
clusive memberships, and of solid family life” (p. 9).
The quality as well as the quantity of interper-
sonal relationships suffers under ACC’s values. As B.
Schwartz (1994) suggested, the focus on competition,
self-interest, and consumption typified by ACC leads
people to form “exchange relationships” in which other
people are considered for “what they can do for me.”
Similarly, Kasser (2002) suggested that the focus on
things and objects in ACC leads to increased “objecti-
fication” in relationships. That is, rather than pursuing
“I-Thou” relationships (Buber, 1958) in which others
are treated as subjective, experiencing beings with their
own concerns and perspectives, ACC conduces to “I-it”
relationships in which other people are often consid-
ered in terms of how they can be used for one’s own
purposes.
Both empirical and cultural evidence support the
idea that the values of ACC may create poorer inter-
personal relationships. For example, Kasser and Ryan
(2001) reported that individuals more focused on ex-
trinsic goals for financial success, image, and popu-
larity reported shorter, more conflictual relationships
with their friends and lovers. Similarly, Solberg, Di-
ener, and Robinson (2004; Study 12) had three friends
and/or family members complete a survey about the
quality of their relationship with each study participant;
these significant others reported lower quality relation-
ships with participants who scored high in materialism.
As described above, other research shows that peo-
ple oriented towards materialistic values are less em-
pathic (Sheldon and Kasser, 1995), more Machiavel-
lian (McHoskey, 1999), and less cooperative (Sheldon
et al., 2000), all of which conduce towards objectifica-
tion and interfere with quality interpersonal relation-
ships.
Corporations also sometimes use the fact that people
desire interpersonal relationships as a form of manip-
ulation to increase profits. For example, because many
people “tune out” or defend against incoming commer-
cial messages when they know they are being adver-
tised to, “stealth marketing” has been developed as a
11
 KASSER, COHN, KANNER, RYAN
means of using interpersonal relationships to promote
products. Early forms of this sort of marketing involved
hiring paid actors to pretend that they were regular
people, approach individuals in public places, and then
make positive statements about products such as cam-
eras or liquor (Walker, 2004). More recently, in the
recognition that friends have more persuasive power
than do strangers, companies have recruited individ-
uals to bring certain foods to parties and to promote
particular products to their friends, without, of course,
mentioning that they are doing so. Such practices even
occur at children’s sleepover parties via the company
“Girls Intelligence Agency”, which recruits girls to be-
come official “agents” who host parties at which prod-
ucts provided by the company are introduced to the
guests (Schor, 2004). The “agent” then reports back to
the company about how the guests liked the products,
and this information is used for marketing purposes.
Hostesses are told that they have “gotta be sneaky” in
order to obtain the best information. Although to our
knowledge psychologists have not studied this type
of profit-oriented objectification in relationships, we
would expect that, over the long-term, such practices
would undermine trust, empathy, and intimacy.
In addition to manipulating casual relationships and
friendships, the bond between parents and their chil-
dren has been increasingly under attack from corpora-
tions in their pursuit of profit. For example, in 1998 two
marketing consulting firms conducted a study on nag-
ging; their goal, as evidenced in the title of their report
(“The fine art of whining: Why nagging is a kid’s best
friend”) was to understand the most effective forms of
nagging so as to facilitate this practice among children
and increase profits (Linn, 2004). Some commercials
“teach” children to whine and nag as a means of mod-
eling a behavior that marketers hope will eventually
lead the “gatekeeper” (i.e., the parent) to relent to the
child’s consumption desires. Another practice of mar-
keters is to present commercials and shows in which
“smart” children overcome the controlling effects of
dumb, ineffectual, and/or mean adults who block
the children’s way to the product they desire (Linn,
2004).
Such marketing activities can be understood as ac-
tive attempts by corporations (supported by the institu-
tions which are supposed to regulate them) to increase
family conflict in order to enhance their own material
gain. Given what we know about modeling, it would
not be surprising to find that such practices undermine
the quality of parent-child relationships. Indeed, Schor
(2004) provided evidence that it does: Path analyses
showed that as television and media use increased,
children’s levels of consumer involvement increased,
which in turn predicted more conflict and fewer con-
nections with parents.
Despite such evidence, advertisers and corporations
doggedly defend their “right” to manipulate children
12
and their parents for the sake of profit, (Linn, 2004;
Schor, 2004; Kanner and Gomes, 1995; Kanner, 2005;
Kunkel, Wilcox, Cantor, Palmer, Linne, and Dowrick,
2005). This, of course, is a natural consequence of the
values of ACC. That is, ACC’s ideology and institu-
tions lead many decision makers in corporations and
advertising firms to raise their desire for potential prof-
its over potential concerns for the harm such practices
may have on interpersonal relationships.
ACC and Self-direction/Self-acceptance
Of the three types of psychological costs of ACC
on which we are focusing, this last form is, on the sur-
face, probably the most surprising to and perhaps the
most controversial for many readers. Although ACC’s
ideology rarely makes claims that it encourages car-
ing about other people or the broader world, it is of-
ten asserted that ACC is the best economic system
for enhancing self-related feelings and a sense of per-
sonal freedom. Yet some evidence suggests that feel-
ings of self-esteem and freedom are nonetheless often
undermined by the aspects of ACC. Because our un-
derstanding of these issues rests on somewhat different
dynamics, we treat them separately in the sections that
follow.
Self-esteem. As we have described above, the suc-
cess of ACC requires those living under it to “buy into”
its ideology. Thus, ACC needs individuals to believe
that their relative worth is reflected in their accumula-
tion of wealth and capacity to consume, as such beliefs
increase the likelihood that people will work hard to
earn money which they will then spend on goods and
services that in turn create a profit for corporations, a
tax base for governments, and wages for citizens. This
equation of self-worth with financial success occurs at
many levels in ACC. For the individual person, self-
worth may be judged by the size of a person’s bank
account and stock portfolio, and the number and qual-
ity of his/her possessions. For a corporation, value is
judged by quarterly earnings reports and the price of its
stock. For a nation, prestige, strength, and progress are
often judged by indicators such as growth in GNP per
capita. Thus, in terms of the circumplex models pre-
sented in Figures 1 and 2, a principle means by which
worth or esteem is demonstrated under ACC is through
financial success.
One institution that frequently reinforces this
element of ACC’s ideology is the media, which, under
ACC, is almost exclusively owned by for-profit cor-
porations. Media companies encourage the belief that
“wealth = success” through frequent presentations of
millionaire business, sports, and entertainment figures
as the models of those who have “made it” and are
worthy of imitation. Moreover, citizens are frequently
exposed to advertising messages that share the same
fundamental cognitive script: “You lack the product
 COSTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE CAPITALISM
being advertised. The cool, happy, good-looking,
successful, sexy person in our ad does have the
product. If you want to be like this person too, you
should buy this product.”
As these examples hopefully make clear, self-
esteem, and sense of self-worth under ACC involve
two mechanisms familiar to social and personality
psychologists: discrepancy creation and upward social
comparison. That is, ACC promotes particular states
(wealth) or individuals (the wealthy) as worthy ide-
als to which people living under the system should
compare themselves. As we know from the literature
on discrepancies and social comparison, comparisons
between one’s present situation and an unmet goal or
someone of higher status have the dual effects of lead-
ing individuals to: a) feel unhappy and less worthy;
and b) become increasingly motivated to engage in
activities that help them reduce these unpleasant feel-
ings (Carver and Scheier, 1981; Higgins, 1987; Suls
and Wills, 1991). This second outcome means that cit-
izens will be more likely to engage in activities such
as working long hours, going shopping, investing their
money in the stock market, etc., in order to help them
to reach these “ideals.” As such, they participate more
in the ideologies and institutions of ACC, and thus help
maintain the system.
A psychologically costly element of this dynamic,
however, is that these comparison processes rely on
creating feelings of insecurity and unhappiness in indi-
viduals by increasing their awareness of discrepancies
between their present state and the ideals defined by
ACC (Richins, 1995). Research shows that exposure to
such idealized messages about financial success in ad-
vertisements can in fact negatively influence people’s
self-evaluations (Gulas and McKeage, 2000). Indeed,
many marketers knowingly exploit such discrepancies,
as seen in the following quote from the former presi-
dent of a marketing firm:
“Advertising at its best is making people feel that with-
out their product, you’re a loser. . . Kids are very sen-
sitive to that. If you tell them to buy something, they
are resistant. But if you tell them that they’ll be a dork
if they don’t, you’ve got their attention. You open up
emotional vulnerabilities, and it’s very easy to do with
kids because they’re the most emotionally vulnerable”
(Harris, 1989, pg. 1).
Another problem regarding self-worth under ACC
is that citizens who internalize its ideologies often find
themselves running on an unsatisfying treadmill. There
are a few reasons for this dynamic. First, as economists
and others have pointed out (van Praag, 1993), happi-
ness with regards to financial status depends largely on
one’s relative standing to others. That is, satisfaction
depends not so much on how much money one actually
has, but on how much money one has in comparison to
other people. Thus, if a person successfully increases
her salary, but everyone else in her comparison group
does as well, she is unlikely to feel happier or more es-
teemed. Indeed, the research bears this out fairly well
with regard to both individual and national improve-
ments in wealth (e.g., Stutzer, 2004). A second reason
why the social comparisons encouraged within ACC
can be unending is that the specific means of attaining
the “ideals” proposed are continually in flux, as new
products enter the marketplace and are advertised as
desirable. Such flux is necessary for ACC’s continual
expansion and economic growth, but it also means that
when individuals successfully reduce the gap between
their current state and an ideal via the purchase of a
product, marketers are quick to present a new prod-
uct that is purported to be even more desirable (i.e.,
this year’s car model, new updated software for one’s
computer, etc.).
A third reason why we consider this system of com-
parisons to exact heavy costs is that success at the ideal
is reserved for relatively few people under AAC. That
is, because of the vertical, hierarchical nature of ACC
and the “winner take all” mentality it fosters (Frank
and Cook, 1995), only a small percentage of people
can be successful by its standards. Consider, for exam-
ple, the findings by Nickerson, Schwarz, Diener, and
Kahneman (2003) that the negative effects of materi-
alism on life satisfaction are notable until an income
of about $290,000 per year, at which point the cor-
relation between materialism and satisfaction became
essentially null. Because so few Americans have an in-
come of $290,000 per year, these findings suggest that
the vast majority of Americans who internalize the
values of ACC are likely to feel unsatisfied. Notably,
this percentage is probably even higher for the world
population, given that the United States is among the
wealthiest nations in the world.
As we have been describing, ACC’s smooth
functioning requires individuals to believe that they
are more worthy to the extent that they receive high
salaries, have high status jobs, and consume particular
products and services. In addition to the issues re-
garding social comparison and discrepancy reviewed
above, such an analysis also suggests that ACC’s
ideology encourages a particular form of self-esteem
that researchers have called “fragile” or “contingent”
(Deci and Ryan, 1995; Crocker, 2002; Kernis, 2003).
That is, even highly competent individuals who report
high self-esteem sometimes have a fragile, unstable
sense of self-worth that is highly dependent upon
external praise and circumstances. We suspect that
ACC benefits from creating the circumstances that
lead individuals to hinge their sense of self-worth on
the opinions of others. This is because individuals
who internalize the ideology of ACC are likely to
have frequent ups and downs in their self-assessments
(Kernis, 2003), and may sometimes attempt to distract
13
 KASSER, COHN, KANNER, RYAN
themselves or compensate for negative feelings by
pursuing culturally sanctioned means of attaining
success such as workaholism and retail therapy.
Although we are unaware of research that has di-
rectly examined these theoretical ties between contin-
gent, unstable self-esteem and the values of ACC, some
research is suggestive of the connection. For example,
Kasser and Ryan (1993, 1996, 2001) have described the
desire for financial success as an “extrinsic” aspiration,
given that it is focused on rewards and others’ opinions
and empirically linked with both lower self-esteem and
with narcissism. Further, cross-cultural research (see
Fig. 2) has demonstrated that financial success values
cluster with “popularity” and “image” aspirations that
also reflect strong concern with others’ opinions. Much
further research remains to be done regarding how the
ideology of ACC may be associated with contingent
self-esteem.
Autonomy. As with feelings of worth or esteem,
some may be surprised by the idea that ACC can limit
autonomy, as ACC’s ideology and institutions typically
highlight that the “free” market is not only compatible
with, but actually necessary for, humans to live in free-
dom (Locke, 1990; Wright, 2005). Nonetheless, as we
see in Figures 1 and 2 and in Table 2, cross-cultural
research shows that the values of ACC oppose those
for self-direction and self-acceptance. Specifically, in
S. Schwartz’s (1992, 1996) model, power and achieve-
ment values tend to oppose aims such as “freedom”
and “choosing own goals.” Similarly, Grouzet et al.
(2005) similarly found oppositions between financial
success aspirations on the one hand and “feeling free”
and “choosing what I do” on the other.
As we have shown for other values and aspira-
tions, this conflict between the values necessary for
the smooth functioning of ACC and the desire for free-
dom manifests itself in a variety of ways. That is, the
idea that the demands of ACC can often conflict with
people’s autonomy and freedom is supported both by
a growing psychological literature and through exam-
ination of a variety of practices increasingly common
in capitalistic economic organizations. Below, we fo-
cus on four different examples of how ACC sometimes
conflicts with freedom; our reviews are unfortunately
brief, but hopefully will provide readers with a sense
of the issues involved.
Controlled, non-autonomous regulation of ACC’s
ideology. As we have noted, a particular set of beliefs
characterizes ACC’s worldview, and the economic sys-
tem requires individuals to take on these beliefs so that
they will participate optimally in the system. Empir-
ical research on three central components of ACC’s
ideology suggests, however, that these beliefs are typ-
ically regulated for controlled reasons rather than for
autonomous reasons that are better internalized. That
is, people seemingly have a difficult time freely endors-
ing some of the key beliefs of capitalistic ideology, and
14
instead typically report feeling pressured and coerced
around such beliefs. To support this claim, we apply a
long tradition of research from Self-determination the-
ory (Ryan, 1995; Ryan and Deci, 2000) that has demon-
strated that individuals sometimes regulate their behav-
ior for autonomous reasons (such as interest or personal
value) and sometimes for controlled, non-autonomous
reasons, (such as guilt, anxiety, or external coercion
and the promise of rewards). As demonstrated by a
variety of studies (see Ryan and Deci, 2000, for a re-
view), people who have more autonomous reasons for
their behavior report greater well-being and better per-
formance than those with a more controlled regulatory
style. As we shall see momentarily, the core beliefs
of ACC tend not to be well-internalized, but instead
regulated for non-autonomous reasons.
The value of materialistic pursuits is the first belief
necessary to ACC that we will discuss. Research shows
that extrinsic, materialistic goals are typically pur-
sued for more controlled and less autonomous reasons
(Sheldon and Kasser, 1995, 1998, 2001; Carver and
Baird, 1998; Sheldon, Ryan, Deci, and Kasser, 2004).
Srivastava, Locke, and Bortol (2001) reported simi-
lar results with business students and entrepreneurs,
finding that materialistic aims were positively associ-
ated with motivations to overcome self-doubt and look
good in social comparisons, which self-determination
theory would classify as introjected regulation, a form
of controlled motivations (Ryan, 1995).
A second important belief characteristic of ACC
concerns the benefits of competition, or what Triandis
(1995) would categorize as “vertical individualistic”
beliefs. As we have noted, the idea that individuals
should compete against each other in the pursuit of
their own self-interest is central to ACC. Recent re-
search shows, however, that such beliefs are relatively
poorly internalized. In a study of US, South Korean,
Russian, and Turkish individuals, Chirkov, Ryan, Kim,
and Kaplan (2003) found that subjects were especially
likely to report more controlled and less autonomous
reasons for believing it is important to strive “to work
in situations involving competition with others,” for
wanting to express the idea that “competition is the
law of nature” and for believing that “without compe-
tition, it is impossible to have a good society.” Such
results suggest that the type of competition that char-
acterizes ACC is not easily integrated into humans’
psyches, but is associated with feelings of control and
pressure rather than volition and freedom.
A third belief that is often poorly internalized con-
cerns what Miller (1999) has labeled “the norm of
self-interest.” As described above, a fundamental tenet
of ACC is that it is normal and good to act in one’s
own self-interest with little to no concern for other
parties. Miller and his colleagues have shown, how-
ever, that this norm of self-interest often leads indi-
viduals to feel a sense of pressure and to conform in
 COSTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE CAPITALISM
situations in which they may otherwise want to act in a
non-self-interested manner. This pressure typically is
a worry about being censured or thought “strange” by
others for acting in an altruistic manner; such motiva-
tions would be considered controlled, non-autonomous
forms of regulation by self-determination theory.
In sum, this evidence shows that three of the beliefs
central to ACC (i.e., materialism, competition, and self-
interest) are unlikely to be experienced by most indi-
viduals as freely chosen. Instead, such beliefs tend to be
associated with feelings of pressure and coercion. What
this suggests, then, is that the ideology of ACC may
be at odds with one of the deepest psychological needs
of people, as they find it difficult to fully and wholly
endorse the system’s key goals, beliefs, and norms.
Work life under ACC. As we have noted above,
wage labor is a fundamental characteristic of ACC. In-
dividuals enter the “labor market” and sell their time,
energy, and skills to those with capital who are willing
to pay a wage. The capitalist under this system reaps
the benefits of the laborers’ energy and skills (in terms
of profits) but also takes significant risks by spending
some capital that may not yield a return on its invest-
ment. This particular form of work, especially as it has
evolved in recent decades, is characterized by a num-
ber of features that undermine the optimal experience
of autonomy by workers. We will focus here on three
of these features.
First, people under ACC are more or less free to
pursue any type of work, but people often do not
feel free while at work. For instance, a recent study
(Bernstein, Ryan, and Brown, 2005) examined North
American workers and the “weekend effect,” in which
significantly higher well-being is experienced on non-
work days. Their results suggested that the significantly
lower well-being experienced on non-work days is to
a large extent a function of the lack of autonomy expe-
rienced by workers when they are working. Put differ-
ently, for many American workers, daily job life does
not feel like freedom. Such data converge with anecdo-
tal accounts from Terkel (1974) and Ehrenreich (2001)
attesting to the alienation and sense of being controlled
many people, and especially wage laborers, feel in the
modern workplace.
Although the American workplace is characterized
by a number of diverse and sometimes competing
management styles, many workers, especially those in
lower income jobs, are still subjected to various forms
of Taylorism (Taylor, 1914). Talyorism describes an
approach to labor in which the manager plans not only
what workers must accomplish, but also exactly how
they will do it, leaving little sense of choice or initiative
to the worker. The fundamental assumption of Tay-
lorism is that experts (e.g., bosses and consultants) can
maximize efficiency (and therefore output and eventual
profit) when laborers follow set, proscribed patterns de-
veloped by the employers. Although factory line work
is the prototypical way in which Taylorism has been
applied to labor, the same principles can also apply in
other settings, such as telemarketers’ scripts for mak-
ing phone calls, or the protocols that many law firms
increasingly make their lawyers, paralegals, and secre-
taries follow. In essence, Taylorism takes formerly in-
tegrated activities and divides them into smaller chunks
of behavior relevant to certain skills; these separable
skills are then divided up among specialized individual
human workers who become another programmable
part of the machinery of production.
This Taylorite management style so common in
America can have important costs to workers’ feelings
of autonomy (Deci et al., 1989). For example, Deci,
Ryan, Gagné, Leone, Usunov, and Kornazheva (2001)
found that the job engagement, satisfaction, and well-
being of both US workers in a capitalist company and
Bulgarian workers in a collectivist, state-run company
was predicted by support for autonomy and feelings of
competence in the workplace. Interestingly, however,
whereas the Bulgarian workers suffered particularly
from a lack of a sense of competence (i.e., few goals,
an absence of acknowledgement or rewards for accom-
plishment), American workers felt less autonomy (i.e.,
they reported having little say in the workplace or input
to supervisors).
This everyday demand for workers to “do what they
are told” is often deeply internalized (Kohn, 1977).
That is, because most individuals in the lower socio-
economic strata work at jobs that require following the
rules of authorities, Kohn, Slomczynski, and Schoen-
bach (1986) suggest that they value conformity more
than self-direction, and pass on such values to their
children. Indeed, recent research supports this conclu-
sion (Kasser, Koestner, and Lekes, 2002), suggesting
that lower status workers under ACC are not only often
forced into conformity by their employers, but pass on
such pressures for conformity to their children.
A second set of problems with work life under ACC
is that rewards are almost exclusively administered via
extrinsic, monetary means. A recent meta-analysis of
128 studies shows that extrinsic rewards typically un-
dermine intrinsic motivation (e.g., feelings of fun, in-
terest, and enjoyment) and increase feelings of control
and pressure (Deci, Koestner, and Ryan, 1999). Fur-
ther, extrinsic rewards can also undermine creativity
(Hennesey and Amabile, 1988), which, as shown in Ta-
ble 2, is another of the values opposing the types of con-
cerns typically emphasized by ACC. Because work-
places under ACC are dominated by such extrinsic re-
wards, they may thus negatively influence individuals’
intrinsic job satisfactions. Indeed, Malka, and Chatman
(2003) reported that individuals who are more oriented
towards the intrinsic satisfactions of work (e.g., fun,
enjoyment, interest, and creativity) find that their life
satisfaction decreases when they receive high monetary
rewards.
15
 KASSER, COHN, KANNER, RYAN
Because motivational structures under ACC are so
often focused on issues of monetary compensation,
other types of rewards and satisfactions that are impor-
tant to quality of work life are often less available to
workers. For example, not only do many workers have
little say in the way they construct their day to day
work tasks, but they very rarely have representation
on the corporate boards whose decisions affect their
work lives (Kelly, 2001). Unlike most of the (antici-
pated) readers of this article, who have the privileged
position of working in academia, laborers in many set-
tings under ACC have little to no say about when they
take breaks, when they come to work (or take a day
off), whether their work causes physical or environ-
mental damage, and whether their jobs may be lost
to laborers in another location who are willing to sell
their time and skills for less money. Indeed, employers
can monitor their employees’ work e-mail or subject
them to unwarranted searches and seizures at work,
losses of the right to privacy and autonomy that are pro-
tected outside, but not inside, the American workplace
(Kaufman, 2003).
A third problematic aspect of work life under ACC
concerns the time that individuals spend at work. As
Schor (2003) and others have demonstrated, after sig-
nificant declines in work hours through the 1800s and
the first half of the 1900s, annual work hours have
risen in the US from 1,716 in 1967 to 1,878 in 2000;
this equates to four extra 40 hour weeks per year, and is
substantially more than most European nations (where,
for example, the Norwegians worked 1,376 hours on
average in 2000). There are a variety of explanations
for this change. Some of these concern the internal-
ization of the capitalistic beliefs equating success with
wealth and possessions; those who have taken on such
beliefs are likely to want to work more hours as a
way to prove their success. Other reasons reflect insti-
tutional pressures. For example, as corporations have
laid-off workers and replaced them with temporary or
part-time labor (often as a strategy for cutting costs for
health insurance or benefits), many laborers must cob-
ble together more than one job to support themselves.
Further, although many other nations have rules lim-
iting mandatory overtime, in the United States “it is
entirely legal for an employer to require an employee
to work beyond his or her scheduled shift time with no
advance notice, and to take disciplinary action against
a worker who refuses” (Golden, 2003, p. 29). Another
explanation for the increase in work hours is that la-
borers in the United States have no mandatory mini-
mum vacation, whereas most Europeans have at least
a couple of weeks, if not more, by law (e.g., Swedes
have a minimum of 25 days vacation [Hayden, 2003]).
Those who are not willing to increase their work hours
forego vacations, or work mandatory overtime know
that they are likely to be considered less than adequate
by their employers. Even among more affluent white-
16
collar employees, who presumably are given greater
flexibility in how they do their work, it is not clear how
much “time freedom” they actually experience. Many
employees do not seem to feel free to take time off
for personal matters, and indeed, many feel pressured
to work more than they would like or to “touch base”
with the office on days they are scheduled to be off
(Robinson, 2003).
This harried, achievement-oriented lifestyle is re-
flected by Americans’ growing lack of time for family
meals, increasing use of fast food and services, increas-
ing obesity from lack of activity, and direct experience
of time stress (de Graaf, 2003; Whybrow, 2005). It is
thus an irony that as Americans have embraced ACC,
they have experienced less “time affluence” even as
material affluence has risen. The loss of discretion
with regards to time is perhaps one of the greatest
threats to human freedom, but unfortunately is rarely
recognized as a form of bondage because it seems that
people “choose” to keep their ever more demanding
jobs.
Globalization and democracy. Some contemporary
cultural observers have also noted that the institutions
and treaties that are most responsible for the systemic
spread of ACC around the globe (i.e., globalization)
can work against democracy and the ability of many
countries to freely determine their own laws and eco-
nomic structure(s). Decisions by World Trade Organi-
zation panels on whether national laws are “barriers
to trade” have forced countries, through the threat of
economic sanctions, to overturn laws passed by demo-
cratically elected legislatures (Danaher and Burbach,
2000; Rademacher, 2000). These WTO panels, whose
members are appointed rather than elected, meet in se-
cret and hand down final decisions that have no appeal
process (Beck and Danaher, 2000; Stiglitz, 2002).
Other examples of how current practices facilitating
globalization work against national autonomy concern
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World
Bank, which provide loans to developing countries. Of-
tentimes, the structure of these loans is contingent on
the recipient nations redesigning their economic sys-
tems so as to fit into the global economy, i.e., ACC
(Cavanagh, Welch, and Retallack, 2001; Mander et al.,
2001). For example, some past loan requirements have
forced nations to weaken or eliminate environmental
laws, reduce spending on public services, lower wages,
and remove tariffs in order to become more “efficient”
and more open to doing business with international
corporations (Bello, 1995; Heredia and Purcell, 1995).
Further, international trade agreements have expanded
international corporations’ investment rights and pro-
tections by weakening the rights of member nations
to regulate their own industries, once again compro-
mising national sovereignty (Barlow, 2001; Economic
Policy Institute, 2001; Public Citizens Global Trade
Watch and Friends of the Earth, 2001).
 COSTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE CAPITALISM
These examples illustrate how democratic govern-
ing institutions (i.e., the political system that is de-
signed to maximize freedom and autonomy) can be un-
dermined by the demands of economic globalization,
corporations’ desires for profit, and ACC’s mandate of
continual economic growth (Nader and Wallach, 1996;
McChesney, 1997; Danaher and Burbach, 2000;
Cavanagh and Mander, 2004; Chua, 2004). They in-
dicate that ACC and democracy are at times funda-
mentally at odds with each other. Moreover, when
such conflicts occur, trans-national organizations and
treaties increase the likelihood that the goals of ACC
will take precedence over those of democracy.
More micro-options but fewer macro-options. A
quick walk through the aisles of any grocery store,
a flip of the thumb on the TV remote, or a word typed
into an Internet search engine make it clear that, at least
in terms of consumer goods, individuals living under
ACC have an enormous amount of choice and options.
Where else can one find dozens of types of toothpaste
with such a bewildering variety of cleansers, flavors,
and colors? The large array of options provided to con-
sumers is, from the viewpoint of ACC, an important
outcome, as it provides them the opportunity to pursue
their own self-interest (e.g., mint gel with tartar con-
trol vs. strawberry paste with whitener) and signals a
healthy competition among producers.
However, as B. Schwartz (2004) and others (Iyengar
and Lepper, 2000) have recently shown, the enormous
array of options provided by the free market can fre-
quently lead individuals to feel overwhelmed and un-
able to choose. This common problem of unending
options is compounded by the fact that ACC encour-
ages individuals to engage in a “maximizing” style
of decision making, wherein people fret over whether
they have made the best choice (Schwartz, 2004). Such
a decision style has several unfortunate consequences
for people, including lower life satisfaction and happi-
ness, as well as more regret and depression (Schwartz,
Ward, Monterosso, Lyubomirsky, White, and Lehman,
2002).
Although we agree with this critique, we hold that
the options provided by ACC are actually an enormous
array of relatively superficial micro-options that mask
a substantial diminution of macro-options. This im-
portant point was brought home to the first author of
this paper when, while on a trip, he had to purchase
underwear for his 4 year old son. The stores sold many
varieties of children’s underwear, but all of them had
some marketing tie-in to a cartoon character (e.g., Find-
ing Nemo, Sponge-Bob Square pants, Blue’s Clues).
Thus, there were many micro-options (i.e., many kinds
of underwear), but the macro-option of buying plain
underwear was unavailable.
At least two features of ACC work against the exis-
tence of meaningful macro-options. First, governmen-
tal policies under ACC typically support privatization,
which allows corporations to make more profits. The
result is that publicly run services that might provide
a qualitatively different type of “product” or service
become less available. For example, while consumers
can choose between thousands of options and colors
on cars (i.e., trivial micro-options), many Americans
do not have the opportunity to use a good public trans-
portation system (i.e., meaningful macro-option; see
Maniates, 2002 or Sanne, 2002). Similarly, as govern-
ments spend less money to fund public television or
support schools and other community services, corpo-
rate “sponsors” increasingly step in, “donating” funds
in return for the opportunity to advertise their products
(see www.commercialalert.org for a host of examples
of this practice). As such, people have many opportuni-
ties to see many different kinds of advertisements (i.e.,
trivial micro-options) but fewer possibilities of avoid-
ing advertisements (i.e., meaningful macro-option).
The second feature of ACC that creates fewer
macro-options concerns the fact that larger corpora-
tions are, on average, more likely to succeed (i.e., turn
a profit) than smaller corporations. As a result, a rel-
atively small number of corporations eventually often
come to control the vast majority of the products of-
fered, and thus consumers have limited macro-options.
Consider, for example, that over 80% of all the me-
dia options in the US are owned by five companies
(McChesney, 1997), that 60% of farm sales in the US
come from 3% of the farms (Lappe and Lappe, 2002),
and that although there were 70% fewer hog and dairy
farms in the US in 1992 than in 1969, production re-
mained the same (Manno, 2002). The power that accu-
mulates behind so much capital makes it easier for big
corporations to squeeze out smaller competitors who
might provide true macro-options.
Indeed, the spread of corporate products and ser-
vices internationally, with the concomitant spread of
corporate micro-options across the planet, is leading
to what some analysts have termed a worldwide cor-
porate “monoculture” (Cavanagh and Mander, 2004)
in which corporate products and services crowd out
other competition. As a result, the same restaurants,
shops, movies, cars, and the like are to be found in
most locales; as such, local businesses, and thus local
cultures, are overwhelmed. The long history of corpo-
rate tactics to eliminate competition, from Standard Oil
up through Microsoft, is testament to how the concen-
tration of money and power in fewer hands leads to a
process of homogenization in which cultural diversity,
and thus meaningful macro-options, is replaced with
the narrow range of micro-options offered by corpora-
tions (Kanner, 2005).
Before closing this section, it is important to men-
tion again one last, more conceptual, but nonethe-
less extremely important, example of how macro-
options are limited under capitalism. We referred to
this idea at the outset of the paper: TINA, or “There Is
17
 KASSER, COHN, KANNER, RYAN
No Alternative” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TINA).
What is there no alternative to? Capitalism. Claims that
“things must be the way they are” and that “there are
no better options than the present system” not only be-
speak the pervasiveness of the system, but can also have
the effects of leading people (including economists and
psychologists) not to ask probing questions about the
system and not to seek out alternative lifestyles that are
less competitive and consumeristic.
Conclusion
The two major goals of this article have been to
make the case that ACC is a complex social system
worthy of study by psychologists and to suggest that,
although the system has successfully generated great
wealth and perhaps alleviated certain problems con-
fronting humanity, there are also some costs it incurs.
We showed that one useful way of understanding some
of the costs of ACC is to examine the values and
goals that help to maintain its institutions and ide-
ologies. By using cross-cultural research on how val-
ues and goals are organized, we identified the aims
most consistent with ACC (i.e., self-interest, finan-
cial success, and competition) and then reviewed a
variety of literatures demonstrating how these aims
conflict with and undermine pursuits long thought by
psychologists to be essential to individual and collec-
tive well-being. These include helping the world be a
better place, having committed, intimate relationships,
and feeling worthy and autonomous. Further, we noted
that ACC is built upon questionable assumptions about
self-interest, competition, and the relationship between
wealth and happiness.
There is no doubt that American corporate capital-
ism is spreading through the world at a stunning pace,
and is infiltrating more and more aspects of people’s
lives. Although we recognize that there may be bene-
fits to this economic system, we have highlighted here
some of ACC’s costs, as it is the nature of this (and
perhaps any) system that the costs are often left unar-
ticulated. We hope that our colleagues will take up the
challenge of exploring the host of theoretically inter-
esting and vitally important questions about the costs
(and potential benefits) of living under this economic
system, that they will begin to explore the dynamics
of other forms of capitalism and of other economic
systems, and that they will apply other perspectives to
understanding economic systems than the models of
goals and values that we used in this target article. In-
sofar as psychology begins to bring a sophisticated set
of approaches to understanding ACC and other eco-
nomic systems, an exciting and worthwhile opportu-
nity presents itself: Psychology could apply its unique
perspectives and knowledge toward developing a more
equitable, compassionate, enlivening, and ecologically
sustainable economic system.
18
Acknowledgements
The following people read and made helpful com-
ments on earlier drafts of this manuscript: David
Duemler, Mary Gomes, Virginia Kasser, Malte Klar,
and Sharon Shavitt. We particularly thank the editors
of Psychological Inquiry for their steadfast support of
this article and their encouragement.
Note
Address correspondence to Tim Kasser, Box K-
83, 2 East South Street, Knox College, Galesburg, IL
61401. E-mail: tkasser@knox.edu
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