Reference: Pavón-Cuéllar, D. (2017). Latin-American Marxist Critiques of Psychology. In G.

Sullivan, J. Cresswell, B. Ellis, M. Morgan and E. Schraube (Eds), Resistance and Renewal
in Theoretical Psychology (pp. 106–115). Concord, CA: Captus University Publications.

Chapter 12
Latin-American Marxist Critiques of Psychology

David Pavón-Cuéllar
Universidad Michoacana de San Nicolás de Hidalgo

SUMMARY
This paper examines some of the most important critical Marxist approaches to psychology developed
in Latin-America during the 20th century, focusing on theoretical works by Alberto Merani (Venezuela),
José Bleger (Argentina), José Revueltas (Mexico), Néstor Braunstein (Argentina-Mexico), Oswaldo
Yamamoto (Brazil) and Carlos Pérez Soto (Chile). It is shown how these authors actualized and
expanded the critical ideas we find in Marx and Marxist theoreticians. The issue of Latin-American
specificity is raised, as well as the close connections between Marxism and psychoanalysis in this part
of the world.

INTRODUCTION
In Latin America, as in other settings, we can distinguish two kinds of theoretical
approaches to psychology: psychological constructs, and critiques of psychology. The
two approaches may intersect at times. When they do, they open up a space for critical
psychology.

Psychological Critical Critiques of

constructs psychology psychology

Both the critiques of psychology and psychological theories may be Marxist, and
Marxism can also be found in critical psychology, of course. Accordingly, we can
differentiate three Marxist fields related to the psychological sphere, all three well-known
Latin-American Marxist Critiques of Psychology 107

in the European context: Marxist psychology, represented by such outstanding

psychologists as Lev Vygotsky and Henri Wallon; the Marxist critical psychology found
in works by Ian Parker and Klaus Holzkamp; and the Marxist critique of psychology, the
oldest and perhaps least-known field, exemplified by Georges Politzer, Didier Deleule
and countless classic Marxist authors, including Trotsky (1925/2004), who denounced
psychology as a “servant of capitalism” (p. 129), and Gramsci (1932/1986), who
described psychological ideas as “fig leaves” used to cover up politics (p. 78).

Critical
psychology Critique of
Psychology psychology

Marxist
critical
psychology
Marxist Marxist
psychology critique of
psychology

Marxism

The boundaries between the fields and locations of these authors are not always clear.
Politzer not only criticizes psychology, but also proposes a concrete Marxist psychology,
while Vygotsky develops his own psychological theory on the basis of a critical
examination of the psychology of his time. However, one element will always
predominate over the others and justify distinguishing these three Marxist fields related
to psychology.
The three fields have been explored in Latin America for almost a century. Well-
known Latin-American Marxist psychologists include pioneers like Anibal Ponce and
Jorge Thenon in Argentina, Jorge Molina in Mexico, Marta Shuare and Silvia Lane in
Brazil, and Fernando González-Rey in Cuba. It would have been interesting to expound
on Latin-American Marxist psychology, but time is too short, and I must focus on the two
critical Marxist psychological intersections that are relevant to me here: Marxist critical
psychologies elaborated by José Bleger in Argentina, Alberto Merani in Venezuela, and
Oswaldo Yamamoto in Brazil, and Marxist critiques of psychology offered by Jose
Revueltas in Mexico, Néstor Braunstein in Argentina and Mexico, and Carlos Pérez Soto
in Chile.
108 Pavón-Cuéllar

It should be noted that these authors have not been selected as the most prominent or
influential. I have chosen them because they constitute a sort of representative sample,
come from different countries and periods, belong to opposed traditions, are
complementary to each other, show a high level of theoretical reflection, and offer acute
and original ideas that I consider especially important for current critical approaches to
psychology. I discuss some of these ideas in the following paragraphs, beginning with the
non-psychological Marxist critiques of psychology.

MARXIST CRITIQUES OF PSYCHOLOGY

Leading Latin-American Marxist thinkers were already discussing psychology or
clarifying psychological concepts in the 1920s and 30s. The Peruvian José Carlos
Mariátegui (1930/1974) defended Marxism against the attacks of the revisionists Henri de
Man (1926/1974) and Max Eastman (1927), who used psychology and psychoanalysis to
rectify supposed errors and omissions in Marx and his followers. Ten years later, in
Mexico, Vicente Lombardo Toledano criticized what he considered the unscientific,
literary and idealistic nature of Antonio Caso’s ideas on psychology (Caso & Lombardo
Toledano, 1935/1963; Krauze, 1990). Both Mariátegui and Lombardo Toledano wielded
materialistic arguments against psychologization, spiritualization and idealization. Both
were not only interested in psychology, but were important socialists and union leaders
who played decisive roles in creating the largest trade unions in their respective countries.
Mariátegui also founded the Peruvian Socialist Party, the future Communist Party, while
Lombardo Toledano founded the People’s Party, the future People’s Socialist Party of
Mexico.
One of the most prominent Mexican Marxist critics of Lombardo Toledano was José
Revueltas, a writer, radical communist and tireless activist who was jailed three times and
whose works range from Marxism-Leninism to Trotskyism and Spartacism. His most
important contribution to psychology was the book Dialectics of Consciousness
(Revueltas, 1976/1982). But here I wish to refer to his Marxist critical approach to
the “psychology of the Mexican” (1950/2006), which was influential from the 1930s
to 60s, as a part of a nationalist—and sometimes also Latin-Americanist—populist
revolutionary project (e.g. Ramos, 1934/1993).
We know that national psychologies had been questioned previously by Marxist
thinkers like Labriola (1896/1971) and Bukharin (1921/1974), who rejected the notion of
a national soul and stressed the historical and economic determination of the psyche.
Revueltas takes up and clarifies these arguments, but also completes them with a global
questioning of the psychological field. According to Revueltas (1950/2006), psychology
forgets what really matters—i.e., the real life and its “material conditions”—to focus on
cementing and essentializing epiphenomena, deceptive appearances, “dependent data”,
that which is the least important and “most ephemeral”, but also what is most favoured
by “careless scholars” (p. 220). Psychological explanations are thus nothing more than
empty words, unscientific gossip, and “cheap literature” (p. 219).
The Marxist critique of the literary and unscientific character of psychology was
already incorporated into Lombardo Toledano’s thought, but, unlike Revueltas in 1950,
in 1935 Lombardo Toledano believed in a psychological discipline that had ‘ceased to be
part of literature to become an experimental science’ and even an “exact science such as
Latin-American Marxist Critiques of Psychology 109

biology” (Caso & Lombardo Toledano, 1935/1963, pp. 94, 107). He thus seemed to
accept the possibility of a scientific Marxist psychology, while Revueltas simply confined
psychology to literature.
Twenty years after Revueltas, another Mexican Marxist thinker, Jorge Carrión, used
Louis Althusser to deepen the critique of the psychology of the Mexican. Unlike
Revueltas, Carrión (1970) no longer insists on the literary-fictitious character of this
psychology, but, rather, on its ideological nature as an expression of ideas and ideals that
were economically determined and imposed in Mexican society by Western capitalism in
its colonial and imperialist forms. There would thus be a truth of the psychology of the
Mexican: real historical powers lie behind its psychological-ideological conceptions of
the national soul. Certainly, in spite of its historical-economical truth, this kind of
psychology is pure “ideological stuff”, but Carrión still believes in the possibility of a
“materialist social psychology” that would consider precisely how the psyche is
constituted by ideology and determined by history and economy (pp. 110-111). This
option seemed to vanish around the same time in the work of another Althusserian Marxist
in Mexico, the Argentinian Néstor Braunstein, a physician and psychoanalyst who
reduces “all academic psychology”, and not only the psychology of the Mexican, to an
unscientific “psychological ideology”, which, since it occurs “in the field of ideological
practice”, can be studied by a science like psychoanalysis, but “lacks a scientific nature”
in itself (Braunstein Pasternac, Benedito & Saal, 1974/2006, pp. 45-49). Psychology can
only be scientific by turning into psychoanalysis, i.e., by becoming other than itself, as
psychoanalysis is here the opposite of psychology.
Interestingly, the difference between the Marxist Althusserians Carrión and
Braunstein reproduces that between Lombardo Toledano and Revueltas. For Carrión and
Lombardo Toledano, a social-materialist or empirical-experimental scientific Marxist
psychology may exist, but there can be no other acceptable psychology, either speculative
or national-political, for this is pure literature or ideology. In contrast, for Braunstein and
Revueltas, psychology as a whole is not science, but pure literature or ideology. The
questionings by Revueltas and Braunstein are more severe and global, and come from
beyond the sphere of psychology, which they condemn in its entirety.
All psychological specialisations, both professional and academic, are thoroughly
reviewed and questioned as ideologies in the book Psicología: ideología y ciencia
[Psychology: Ideology and Science], by Braunstein and his co-authors Pasternac,
Benedito and Saal, first published in Mexico in 1974 (Braunstein et al., 1974/2006). After
23 editions and tens of thousands of copies sold, this work has been, without a doubt, the
best-selling and most influential critique of psychology in Latin America. It presents an
Althusserian Marxist approach that explicitly uses psychoanalysis and begins to move
towards Jacques Lacan. This Lacanian orientation, forerunner of the current use of Freud
and Lacan by European critical psychologists (Parker, 2003, 2004; Owens, 2009), is
found as well in another Latin-American Marxist-Althusserian critic of psychology, the
Argentinian Carlos Sastre, whose book La psicología, red ideológica [Psychology, an
Ideological Network], published in 1974, also had some influence in Latin America
(Sastre, 1974).
In both Sastre and Braunstein, the psychoanalytic inspiration for the critique of
psychology seems to be rooted in the cultural and historical specificity of Argentina in
the 1950s, 60s and 70s, a context in which psychoanalysis and Marxism were firm allies
in the critique of ideology, society, institutions, capitalist economy, right-wing forces and
110 Pavón-Cuéllar

finally the dictatorship. It is very significant that in the 1970s, just before the military
coup of 1976, the Argentinian Anti-Communist Alliance (AAA) pursued both
psychoanalysts and Marxists, and associated their positions to the point of identifying
them and considering them a common enemy to be vanquished. This situation had been
seen earlier in Nazi Germany, as noted by the famous Austrian-Argentinian Freudo-
Marxist Marie Langer (1981), who knew first-hand European fascisms and then Latin-
American dictatorships, having been exiled to Mexico at the same time as Braunstein and
many other South-American Marxists, some of them critics of psychology inspired by
psychoanalysis, like Guinsberg (1977) and Follari (1979).
Psychoanalysts have not been the only Latin-American Marxist critics of psychology,
of course, but were the most prominent ones in the 1960s and 70s. Before them, as we
saw above, came the militants and communist leaders, Mariátegui, Lombardo Toledano
and Revueltas. And then, from the 1980s to the present, came the time of the academics,
including the Chilean Carlos Pérez Soto.
Pérez Soto has been a professor of subjects as varied as political philosophy,
epistemology and anti-psychiatry. He has proposed and defended a Hegelian Marxism,
and shown great interest in the ideas of Marcuse and the Frankfurt School. His critique of
psychology, especially in the book Sobre la condición social de la psicología [On the
Social Condition of Psychology] (Pérez Soto, 1998/2009), has become very influential
among undergraduate students and is at the origin of the youth movement of
contrapsicólogos [counter-psychologists], which is, in turn, closely linked to recent
student protests in Chile. Pérez Soto himself has been actively associated with these and
other mobilizations though he is not a full-time activist, as was the case of the early Latin-
American Marxist critics of psychology, Revueltas, Lombardo Toledano and Mariátegui.
Unlike his predecessors, Perez Soto (1998/2009) no longer has recourse to old
questionings of the ideological, literary or unscientific aspects of psychology. Rather, he
conceives the psychological discipline in historical perspective, not only as a theoretical
ideology, but as an individualistic practice that reacts against the crisis of modern
individual subjectivity, and is coloured, in this sense, by an “aftertaste and nostalgia for
the past” (p. 151). Psychology is then intrinsically outdated, reactionary and conservative.
It is a form of regression to something that does not exist anymore. But it is also a form
of alienating adaptation to what currently exists: “alienation” complemented with a
flexible “standardization” and the legitimation of the “places of normality” (pp. 151-154).
Pérez Soto (1998/2009) is not a psychologist, but he does not reject psychology
outright, for he can still glimpse the possibility of a critical psychology aimed at
“producing a collective subjectivity, binding solidarity”, opposed to the dominant
psychological individualism (pp. 161-162). As we shall see below, this idea of another
psychology, a Marxist psychology with a critical orientation, has a long history in Latin
America.

MARXIST CRITICAL PSYCHOLOGY

We might consider that the first Marxist critical psychologists in Latin-America were
those thinkers, like Mariátegui in the 20s and Lombardo Toledano in the 30s, who
criticized psychology but did not reject it as a whole. Though familiar with certain
psychological ideas, Mariátegui and Lombardo Toledano were not psychologists, and
Latin-American Marxist Critiques of Psychology 111

their critical psychological projects were insufficiently elaborated, justified or

systematised. I believe that the first well-developed Latin-American Marxist critical
psychology is found in the thirties in the work of the psychologist Aníbal Ponce (1938),
another Argentinian exiled in Mexico, who became famous for his book Educación y
lucha de clases [Education and Class Struggle], in which he explained successive
educational models in terms of the economic and political organization of society in each
period (Ponce, 1938). In other works, Ponce (1937, 1938/1992) stressed the social and
historical determinations of the psyche, and condemned psychological universalisations
that do not consider the conditions of life of different people, and, specifically, their class
origin and position in history. This was the case of psychoanalysis, which was found
guilty of a kind of asocial, ahistorical universalism. Ponce was also thinking of this when
he denounced—in his own words—“Freud’s obsession with finding sexuality
everywhere” (Ponce, 1938/1992, p. 205).
Psychoanalysis would be criticized again in the 50s, almost twenty years after Ponce,
by another Argentinian Marxist psychologist, José Bleger (1958/1988). Unlike Ponce,
Bleger was trained as a psychoanalyst and so was very familiar with Freud’s work, though
this did not prevent him, inspired by the French Marxist Georges Politzer (1928/2003),
from criticizing psychoanalytic theory for its abstraction, spiritualism, idealism,
mechanistic reasoning, and energetic and biological assumptions, problems not exclusive
to psychoanalysis, but ones shared with other psychological perspectives. Bleger
(1958/1988) conceived psychology in general as a “pseudoscience” consisting of a
“transposition of concrete reality into religious, metaphysical or mythological
abstractions, which eventually take on a pseudoscientific form” (p. 80). To be scientific,
psychology should avoid abstract generalizations, and should focus on particular concrete
real events in the life of each individual. As in Politzer, novels and other literary works
are thus, paradoxically, the closest to psychological science. So, contrary to Revueltas
and Lombardo Toledano, Bleger does not presuppose a contradiction between scientific
and literary psychology.
Bleger (1958/1988) criticized Freudian metapsychology for reproducing, instead of
resolving, the problems of psychology. But he also thought, like Politzer, that
psychoanalysis held the promise of a concrete Marxist psychology that would be truly
critical, dialectical and materialistic, and would recognize the dramatic aspect of human
existence without dissolving it into dynamic abstractions.
We may say that Bleger subordinated his critical work to the Marxist project of a
concrete psychology inspired by Politzer. Similarly, but in Venezuela in the 1960s and
70s, the Argentinian Marxist psychologist Alberto Merani (1968) subordinated his critical
work to a Marxist project of dialectical psychology inspired by yet another French
psychologist, Henry Wallon. Wallonian dialectical psychology would transcend the
oppositions between subject and object, matter and consciousness, and quantity and
quality, thus overcoming the debates between objectivism and subjectivism, or
materialism and idealism, in which Lombardo Toledano and other early Marxist critics
of psychology were still trapped.
Both Merani and Bleger offer positive and constructive theoretical programs, not just
negative or critically deconstructive works. They agree in their critique of psychoanalysis,
in their conception of contemporary psychology as a sort of mythology, and in their
guiding idea that psychology should leave behind general abstract myths and concentrate
on actual concrete experience in specific contexts. However, in contrast to Bleger, Merani
112 Pavón-Cuéllar

strays farther from psychoanalysis and gets closer to psychology, preferring to focus on
the social-historical particularity of human beings rather than the singular, unique life of
each subject. He is more familiar with Soviet psychology, adopts a historical-cultural
perspective, and is interested in the ideological foundations of the various psychological
theories. Merani also offers an elaborate and detailed criticism of the epistemological
orientations of psychology, such as empiricism, positivism, irrationalism and
substantialism, all in a monumental work composed of more than 30 books.
In 1987, three years after Merani’s death, when his work still dominated Marxist
critical psychology in Latin-American countries, a small book entitled A crise e as
alternativas da psicologia [The Crisis of Psychology and Alternatives to It] was published
in Brazil. Its author, the young Marxist psychologist Oswaldo Yamamoto (1987), leaned
primarily on Lukács interpretation of Marx, criticizing psychology as a by-product of the
capitalist division of labour and the resulting fragmentation of knowledge that loses sight
of concrete material totality. This view was consistent with the Lukácsian conception of
Marxism as a science of totality, as opposed to bourgeois psychology and other human
sciences that still clung to fragments abstracted from total, material reality.
Instead of a reconstruction of psychology as in Bleger and Merani, Yamamoto (1987)
prefers to posit a simple “dismissal of psychology” (p. 76). The psychological field is thus
rejected from within. The interesting thing about this approach is precisely that it departs
from psychology to finally abandon psychology. It is the opposite of what we found in
Carlos Pérez Soto, who set out from a critique of psychology, but ended up proposing a
critical psychology.
Instead of going from negation to affirmation, Yamamoto proceeds from affirmation
to negation, from construction to deconstruction, from critical psychology to the critique
of psychology outside the psychological domain. He is a kind of consistent Marxist
psychologist who discards psychology once he realizes that it is irreconcilable with
Marxism. This irreconcilability, according to him, was based on the incompatibility
between the Marxist dialectical-materialist study of the concrete totality and the specific
idealist-psychological analysis of the psyche abstracted from the totality. It was
irreconcilability between materialism and idealism, dialectics and analysis, concretion
and abstraction, and holism and specialization.
The discordancy between Marxism and psychology had been glimpsed previously by
two other Marxists, the physician and psychoanalyst Néstor Braunstein, and the
communist activist and writer José Revueltas. But, unlike Yamamoto, Braunstein and
Revueltas were not psychologists. Yamamoto is a psychologist whose Marxism places
him against psychology. This is why his approach seems to me so important.
After earning his degree in psychology, Yamamoto studied a Master’s and Doctorate
in Education, and has taught in the psychology department of a Brazilian university for
the last thirty years. Unfortunately his academic career and subsequent reflections do not
seem to correspond to the dismissal of psychology posited in his 1987 book.

CONCLUSION
We have seen that psychology was rejected by Revueltas for its purely literary content,
by Braunstein for its ideological aspect, and by Yamamoto for its fragmentary, abstract
and partial character. In all three cases, psychology deserves to be rejected because it fails
Latin-American Marxist Critiques of Psychology 113

to constitute a science in the Marxist sense: a materialist science that opposes and
elucidates ideology, and does not abstract its object from the economic-social-historical
concrete totality. In Revueltas’ classic perspective, the scientific method precludes
studying the psyche in isolation from its historical, economic and social infrastructure.
Braunstein’s science would rather explain ideologies that can only be described by
psychology. As for Yamamoto’s epistemological theory, it postulated that science
requires considering the total reality instead of abstracting the psyche from this totality
and ignoring everything else, as psychology does.
Upon becoming familiar with Yamamoto’s, Braunstein’s and Revueltas’ convincing
reasons for rejecting psychology, it may be difficult to understand how other Marxists of
critical spirit decided to remain in the psychological field and proposed alternative
psychologies, such as Bleger’s concrete psychology, Merani’s dialectical psychology, or
Pérez Soto’s critical social psychology. I believe that the determining factor which
impeded those authors from rejecting psychology is to be found in their theoretical and
intellectual affiliations. Pérez Soto relied on Hegelianism in order to accept the existence
of something as essentially idealistic as psychology. Bleger and Merani set out from the
psychological proposals of two French Marxists, Politzer and Wallon, who never
contemplated a wholesale rejection of psychology. It is not the same to start out, as Bleger
and Merani did, from an already-constituted Marxist psychology, as to begin, like
Yamamoto, with psychology and Marxism as separate terms.
Yamamoto uses Lukács’ ideas to address the problem of the relationship between
Marxism and psychology, though this had already been resolved by Bleger and Merani’s
adoption of the perspectives of Wallon and Politzer, the two French Marxist psychologists
who gave Merani and Bleger the solution. Yamamoto, in contrast, had to seek the solution
himself, finding it with the help of Lukács. We must understand that Lukács was not a
psychologist and did not prescribe clearly or explicitly what the correct scientific attitude
towards Marxist psychology should be. Though inspired in Lukács, this attitude is
Yamamoto’s own. His theoretical method is analogous to that of Pérez Soto, who figured
out the solution by himself, but with the support of Hegel and his other philosophical
references.
Yamamoto and Pérez Soto reach opposite conclusions; the former ends by rejecting
psychology, the latter recommending its reformulation. But both have the merit of
opening their own paths. And this holds true for Braunstein and Revueltas as well.
Obviously, they used, respectively, Althusser and Marx, Lenin, Trotsky and Luxemburg,
but only as theoretical resources that allowed them to present original critiques of
psychology.
No Latin-American Marxist psychologists can afford to ignore the immense
theoretical legacy of Marx, Marxism and Marxist psychology, though they may consider
it in different ways. They can use it, make it their own and develop it in unprecedented
directions, or add something new to it, as most of the authors mentioned herein have done.
But Latin-American Marxist psychologists may also proceed like Bleger and Merani, by
simply taking something—a theory, a concept or a theoretical choice—from another
author and applying it to Latin-America. I do not mean to imply that Merani and Bleger
lacked original ideas. Nor do I pretend to suggest that they had an attitude of colonial
subordination to their French masters. No way. On the one hand, anyone who faithfully
follows a theory may do so out of firm conviction, not docile submission. On the other,
in the specific case of Bleger and Merani, their theories do indeed contain highly original
114 Pavón-Cuéllar

ideas. My view is only that they took the same decision as their masters did, namely, not
to reject psychology, but to promote concrete, dialectical perspectives inside the
psychological field. Yet we must not neglect the fact that Bleger and Merani have decided
to import these decisions into the Latin American context.
It is interesting to note that there is an alluring coincidence between, on the one hand,
the critical Marxist theories we have reviewed, including those of Wallon-Merani and
Politzer-Bleger, and, on the other, the conceptions of the psyche often found in
Amerindian cultures that are constituent parts of the current Latin-American mestizo
world (Pavón-Cuéllar, 2013). The characteristic features of their conceptions, such as the
inseparable union of subject and world, or the irreducibly practical and collective
character of the soul, are also key elements of the psychological ideas of Marxism,
whether manifested in the consideration of the socioeconomic-historical world by
Revueltas and Braunstein, in the monistic dialectics of Wallon and Merani, in the
existential drama of Politzer and Bleger, in the totality of Yamamoto and Lukács, or in
the authentically social psychology of Pérez Soto. In all these cases, Marxism contradicts
the dominant individualistic psychology for it agrees with most indigenous Latin-
American communitarian psychologies.
Some of the psychological orientations of Amerindian cultures seem to be as
essentially communist, anti-individualistic and anti-capitalist as Marxism is, or should be.
This was glimpsed by Marx and Engels themselves in the 1880s, when they turned their
attention to Henry Morgan (1877), prehistory, pre-capitalist societies and the
Amerindians, and revalorized so-called primitive communism (Marx, 1882/1988; Engels,
1884/2011). Different forms of Amerindian resistance to new Western colonialism
preserve communist orientations that produce all kinds of psychological manifestations.
This might give a deeper meaning to Latin-American Marxist approaches to psychology,
and could promote their reconciliation with influential postcolonial psychological
perspectives. In reality, the postcolonial turn was prefigured by some of the Marxist
thinkers I have mentioned, especially those who lived in countries with a dense colonial
past, such as the Peruvian Mariátegui, and the Mexicans Revueltas and Carrión. One
simply cannot be a Marxist in Mexico or Peru without being concerned with colonialism
and a colonial heritage that includes capitalism. The psychological effects of capitalism
are also consequences of colonialism.

REFERENCES
Bleger, J. (1988). Psicoanálisis y dialéctica materialista: estudios sobre la estructura del psicoanálisis.
Buenos Aires: Paidós. (Original work published 1958)
Braunstein, N. A.; Pasternac, M.; Benedito, G., & Saal, F. (2006). Psicología: ideología y ciencia.
México: Siglo XXI. (Original work published 1974)
Bukharin, N. (1974). Teoría del materialismo histórico. Ensayo popular de sociología marxista. Madrid:
Siglo XXI. (Original work published 1921)
Carrión, J. (1970). Mito y magia del mexicano y un ensayo de autocrítica. México: Nuestro Tiempo.
Caso, A., & Lombardo Toledano, V. (1963). Idealismo vs. materialismo dialéctico. Caso-Lombardo.
México: Universidad Obrera de México. (Original work published 1935)
De Man, H. (1974). Au-delà du marxisme. París: Seuil. (Original work published 1926)
Eastman, M. (1927). Marx and Lenin: The science of revolution. Nueva York: Boni.
Engels, F. (2011). El origen de la familia, de la propiedad privada y del Estado. México: Colofón.
(Original work published 1884)
Follari, R. (1979). Política y ciencia en psicología. Dialéctica, 6, 145-161.
Gramsci, A. (1986). Cuadernos de la cárcel. Tomo 3. México: Era. (Original work published 1932)
Latin-American Marxist Critiques of Psychology 115

Guinsberg, E. (1977). Apuntes sobre el psicoanálisis para la construcción de una psicología científica.
Dialéctica, 2, 65-97.
Krauze, R. (1990). La filosofía de Antonio Caso. México: UNAM.
Labriola, A. (1971). Del materialismo histórico. México: Grijalbo. (Original work published 1896)
Langer, M. (1981). Memoria, historia y diálogo psicoanalítico. México: Folios.
Mariátegui, J. C. (1974). Defensa del marxismo: polémica revolucionaria. Obras Completas de José
Carlos Mariátegui V. Lima: Amauta. (Original work published 1930)
Marx, K. (1988). Los apuntes etnológicos de Karl Marx. Madrid: Siglo XXI. (Original work published
1882)
Merani, A. (1968). La dialéctica en psicología. México: Grijalbo.
Morgan, L. H. (1877). Ancient society; or, researches in the lines of human progress from savagery,
through barbarism to civilization. New York: Holt.
Owens, C. (2009). Editor’s Introduction: Lacan for Critics! Annual Review of Critical Psychology, 7, 1-
4. Retrieved fromhttp://www.discourseunit.com/arcp/7.htm
Parker, I. (2003). Jacques Lacan, barred psychologist. Theory & Psychology, 13(1), 95-115.
Parker, I. (2004). Psychoanalysis and critical psychology. In D. Hook (Ed), Critical psychology (pp. 138-
161). Cape Town: UCT Press.
Pavón-Cuéllar, D. (2013). La psicología mesoamericana: ideas psicológicas, psicopatológicas y
psicoterapéuticas en las culturas maya, purépecha y azteca. Memorandum, 25, 93-111.
Pérez Soto, C. P. (2009). Sobre la condición social de la psicología. Santiago: Lom. (Original work
published 1998)
Politzer, G. (2003). Critique des fondements de la psychologie. Paris: PUF. (Original work published
1928)
Ponce, A. (1992). Conferencias inéditas en el Colegio de San Nicolás. In Aníbal Ponce, maestro
nicolaita (pp. 53-86). Morelia: Universidad Michoacana de San Nicolás de Hidalgo. (Original work
published 1937)
Ponce, A. (1938). Educación y lucha de clases. México: América.
Ponce, A. (1992). Diario íntimo de una adolescente. In Aníbal Ponce, maestro nicolaita (pp. 121-218).
Morelia: Universidad Michoacana de San Nicolás de Hidalgo. (Original work published 1938)
Ramos, S. (1993). El perfil del hombre y la cultura en México. México: Espasa-Calpe. (Original work
published 1934)
Revueltas, J. (1982). Dialéctica dela conciencia. Obras completas 20. México: Era. (Original work
published 1976)
Revueltas, J. (2006). Posibilidades y limitaciones del mexicano. In Roger Bartra (Ed.), Anatomía del
mexicano (pp. 215-234). México: Random House Mondadori. (Original work published 1950)
Sastre, C. L. (1974). La psicología, red ideológica. Buenos Aires: Tiempo Contemporáneo.
Trotsky, L. (2004). El materialismo dialéctico y la ciencia. In Escritos filosóficos (pp. 127-146). Buenos
Aires: CEIP León Trotsky. (Original work published 1925)
Yamamoto, O. H. (1987). A crise e as alternativas da psicologia. São Paulo: Edicon.