IN RE: EDILLON (AC 1928 12/19/1980)

FACTS: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing

Attorney in the Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the
Court the removal of the name of the respondent from
its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues
assailing the provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions of par.
2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization
of IBP, payment of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the
same.

Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of

his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled as a pre-
condition to maintain his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a
member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a
consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to
which he is admitted personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the
rights to liberty and properly guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence,
the respondent concludes the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the
IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay
his membership fee to the IBP.

HELD: The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must
be a member of as distinguished from bar associations in
which membership is merely optional and voluntary. All lawyers are subject
to comply with the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar including
payment a reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements. The Rules of
Court only compels him to pay his annual dues and it is not in violation of
his constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration does not compel the
lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not the meeting of
his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election as he
chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of
annual dues. The Supreme Court in order to further the State’s legitimate
interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require
thet the cost of the regulatory program – the lawyers.

Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State.

The right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a
matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And if the power to impose the fee
as a regulatory measure is recognize then a penalty designed to enforce its
payment is not void as unreasonable as arbitrary. Furthermore, the Court
has jurisdiction over matters of admission, suspension, disbarment, and
reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation as part of its inherent judicial
functions and responsibilities thus the court may compel all members of the
Integrated Bar to pay their annual dues.

A.C. No. 10912

PAULINA T. YU, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. BERLIN R. DELA CRUZ, Respondent.

DECISION

PERCURIAM:

Subject of this disposition is the September 28, 2014 Resolution1 of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) which adopted and approved the findings and the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner for the disbarment of Atty. Berlin Dela
Cruz (respondent lawyer).

It appears from the records that respondent lawyer agreed to represent Paulina T.
Yu (complainant) in several cases after having received various amounts as acceptance fees, to wit:

Case Title Acceptance Fees

People v. Tortona for attempted homicide
(Case No. 06-359) filed with the P20,000.00
Metropolitan Trial Court, Bacoor, Cavite
Paulina T. Yu v. Pablo and Radel
Gamboa for qualified theft/ estafa (LS. No.
P8,000.00
XV-07-INV-116-05339) filed with the City
Prosecutor of Manila
Paulino T. Yu v. Roberto Tuazon et
al. (Civil Case No. LP-00-0087) filed
P15,000.00
before the Regional Trial Court of Las
Piñas2

On November 29, 2011, while the lawyer-client relationship was subsisting, respondent lawyer
borrowed pieces of jewelry from complainant and pledged the same with the Citystate Savings Bank,
Inc. for the amount of P29,945.50, as shown in the Promissory Note with Deed of
Pledge.3 Respondent lawyer appropriated the proceeds of the pledge to his personal use. In order to
facilitate the redemption of the said jewelry, respondent lawyer issued to complainant, Citystate
Savings Bank Check No. 0088551, dated August 31, 2011, in the amount of P34,500.00. Upon
presentment, however, complainant was shocked to learn that the check was dishonored for the
reason, "Account Closed. "4 Complainant immediately notified respondent lawyer of the dishonor of
the check.
In a letter,5 dated March 23, 2012, complainant demanded for the refund of the acceptance fees
received by respondent lawyer prior to the "abandonment" of the cases and the payment of the value
of the jewelry, but to no avail.

In another letter,6 dated April 18, 2012, this time represented by another lawyer, Atty. Francisco C.
Miralles, complainant yet again demanded the redemption of the check in cash within five days from
notice; the refund of the paid acceptance fees, in exchange for which no service was rendered; the
payment of the value of the pledged jewelry in the amount of P100,000.00 in order to avoid the
interests due and the possible foreclosure of the pledge; and moral damages of P300,000.00.

For his failure to heed the repeated demands, a criminal case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 was filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor, Las Piñas City, against him.7

On June 7, 2012, a verified complaint was filed with the IBP-Commission

on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD),8 where complainant prayed for the disbarment of respondent lawyer on
account of grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming of a lawyer and commission of acts in violation of
the lawyer's oath. The IBP-CBD required respondent lawyer to submit his answer to the
complaint.9 Despite having been duly served with a copy of the complaint and the order to file his
answer, as shown in a certification10 issued by the Post Master of the Las Piñas Central Post Office,
respondent still failed to file an answer.

Respondent lawyer was likewise notified of the scheduled mandatory conference/hearing on

November 23, 2012, but only the complainant and her counsel appeared on the said day. The IBP-
1âwphi1

CBD then ordered the resetting of the mandatory conference for the last time to January 11, 2013
and the personal service of the notice thereof to respondent lawyer's given
address.11 Notwithstanding the receipt of the notice by respondent lawyer's mother,12 he still failed to
appear during the conference, prompting complainant to move for the termination of the conference
and the submission of the case for report and recommendation.

On June 7, 2013, the Investigating Commissioner recommended the disbarment of respondent

lawyer from the practice of law.13 Based on the evidence on record, respondent lawyer was found to
have violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which proscribed the
borrowing of money from a client, unless the latter's interests were fully protected by the nature of
the case or by independent advice. Worse, respondent lawyer had clearly issued a worthless check
in violation of law which was against Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the CPR stating that, "[a] lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct."

On September 28, 2014, the IBP-BOG affirmed the said recommendation in Resolution No. XXI-
2014-698.14

Neither a motion for reconsideration before the BOG nor a petition for review before this Court was
filed. Nonetheless, the IBP elevated to this Court the entire records of the case for appropriate action
with the IBP Resolution being merely recommendatory and, therefore, would not attain finality,
pursuant to par. (b), Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.15

The Court acknowledges the fact that respondent lawyer failed to refute the accusations against him
despite the numerous opportunities afforded to him to explain his side. All means were exhausted to
give respondent lawyer a chance to oppose the charges against him but to no avail and for reasons
only for known to him. Whether respondent lawyer had personally read the orders by the IBP-CBD
or his mother failed to forward the same for his personal consideration may only be an object of
surmise in which the Court cannot indulge. "Disbarment of lawyers is a proceeding that aims to
purge the law profession of unworthy members of the bar. It is intended to preserve the nobility and
honor of the legal profession."16 Surely, respondent lawyer's failure or refusal to participate in the
IBP-CBD proceedings does not hinder the Court from determining the full extent of his liability and
imposing an appropriate sanction, if any.

After a judicious review of the records, the Court finds no reason to deviate from the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner with respect to respondent lawyer's violation of Canons
1,17 16,18 17,19 and Rules 1.01,20 16.04,21 of the CPR.

In the case at bench, the complaint stemmed from the use by respondent lawyer of his client's
property. He had, indeed, come into possession of valuable pieces of jewelry which he presented as
security in a contract of pledge. Complainant voluntarily and willingly delivered her jewelry worth
Pl35,000.00 to respondent lawyer who meant to borrow it and pawn it thereafter. This act alone
shows respondent lawyer's blatant disregard of Rule 16.04. Complainant's acquiescence to the
"pawning" of her jewelry becomes immaterial considering that the CPR is clear in that lawyers are
proscribed from borrowing money or property from clients, unless the latter's interests are fully
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Here, respondent lawyer's act of
borrowing does not constitute an exception. Respondent lawyer used his client's jewelry in order to
obtain, and then appropriate for himself, the proceeds from the pledge. In so doing, he had abused
the trust and confidence reposed upon him by his client. That he might have intended to
subsequently pay his client the value of the jewelry is inconsequential. What deserves detestation
was the very act of his exercising influence and persuasion over his client in order to gain undue
benefits from the latter's property. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship
between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with trust and confidence. And as true as any natural
tendency goes, this "trust and confidence" is prone to abuse.22 The rule against borrowing of money
by a lawyer from his client is intended to prevent the lawyer from taking advantage of his influence
over his client.23 The rule presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer's ability to use all
the legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation.24 Suffice it to say, the borrowing of money or
property from a client outside the limits laid down in the CPR is an unethical act that warrants
sanction.

Due to complainant's respect for respondent lawyer, she trusted his representation that the subject
jewelry would be redeemed upon maturity. She accepted respondent lawyer's check, which was
eventually dishonored upon presentment. Despite notice of the dishonor, respondent lawyer did not
take steps to remedy the situation and, on the whole, reneged on his obligation, constraining
complainant to avail of legal remedies against him.

Given the circumstances, the Court does not harbor any doubt in favor of respondent lawyer.
Obviously, his unfulfilled promise to facilitate the redemption of the jewelry and his act of issuing a
worthless check constitute grave violations of the CPR and the lawyer's oath. These shortcomings
on his part have seriously breached the highly fiduciary relationship between lawyers and clients.
Specifically, his act of issuing worthless checks patently violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the CPR
which requires that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
This indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him, shows such lack of
personal honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence, and
constitutes a ground for disciplinary action,25 and thus seriously and irreparably tarnishes the image
of the profession.26 Such conduct, while already off-putting when attributed to an ordinary person, is
much more abhorrent when exhibited by a member of the Bar.27 In this case, respondent lawyer
turned his back from the promise that he once made upon admission to the Bar. As "vanguards of
the law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their
dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond
reproach."28
As to the penalty commensurate to respondent lawyer's actions, the Court takes heed of the
guidepost provided by jurisprudence, viz.: "Disbarment should not be decreed where any
punishment less severe, such as reprimand, suspension, or fine, would accomplish the end desired.
This is as it should be considering the consequence of disbarment on the economic life and honor of
the erring person."29 Hence, caution is called for amidst the Court's plenary power to discipline erring
lawyers. In line with prevailing jurisprudence,30 the Court finds it proper to impose the penalty of
three-year suspension against respondent lawyer, with a stem warning that a repetition of any of the
infractions attributed to him in this case, or any similar act, shall merit a heavier penalty.

Anent the monetary demands made by complainant, the Court reiterates the rule that in disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed
to continue as a member of the Bar.31 Thus, the Court is not concerned with the erring lawyer's civil
liability for money received from his client in a transaction separate, distinct, and not intrinsically
linked to his professional engagement. Accordingly, it cannot order respondent lawyer to make the
payment for the subject jewelry he pawned, the value of which is yet to be determined in the
appropriate proceeding.

As to the return of acceptance fees, a clarification is in order. The Investigating Commissioner erred
in referring to them as "attorney's fees"-

As to the charge that respondent abandoned the cases he accepted after payment of attorney's
fees, this commission is not fully satisfied that the complainant was able to prove it with substantial
or clear evidence. It was not fully explained in the complaint how or in what manner were the cases
"abandoned" by the respondent; and what prejudice was caused to the complainant. This
Commission noted that not a single document or order coming from the court of prosecutor's office
was appended to the Complaint-Affidavit that would at least apprise this body of what the
respondent actually did with the cases he represented.32

There is a distinction between attorney's fee and acceptance fee. It is well-settled that attorney's fee
is understood both in its ordinary and extraordinary concept.33 In its ordinary sense, attorney's fee
refers to the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for legal services rendered.
Meanwhile, in its extraordinary concept, attorney's fee is awarded by the court to the successful
litigant to be paid by the losing party as indemnity for damages.34 On the other hand, acceptance fee
refers to the charge imposed by the lawyer for merely accepting the case. This is because once the
lawyer agrees to represent a client, he is precluded from handling cases of the opposing party based
on the prohibition on conflict of interest. Thus, this incurs an opportunity cost by merely accepting the
case of the client which is therefore indemnified by the payment of acceptance fee. Since the
acceptance fee only seeks to compensate the lawyer for the lost opportunity, it is not measured by
the nature and extent of the legal services rendered.35

In the case at bench, the amounts of P20,000.00, P18,000.00, and P15,000.00, respectively, were in
the nature of acceptance fees for cases in which respondent lawyer agreed to represent
complainant. Despite this oversight of the Investigating Commissioner, the Court affirms the finding
that aside from her bare allegations, complainant failed to present any evidence showing that
respondent lawyer committed abandonment or neglect of duty in handling of cases. Hence, the
Court sees no legal basis for the return of the subject acceptance fees.

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Berlin R. Dela Cruz GUILTY of violating Canons 1, 16, 17,
and Rules 1.01 and 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court
hereby SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for THREE YEARS with a STERN WARNING that
a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Bar Confidant to be entered in the personal record of the
respondent as a member of the Philippine Bar; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to
all its chapters; and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts throughout the
country.

SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 5299. August 19, 2003]

ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and

Chief, Public Information Office, complainant, vs. ATTY.
RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, respondent.

[G.R. No. 157053. August 19, 2003]

ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, petitioner, vs. IBP COMMISSION ON

BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in his
capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public
Information Office, respondents.

RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that

appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of the newspaper, Philippine Daily
Inquirer, which reads: ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-
4333/521-2667. [1]

Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information

Office of the Supreme Court, called up the published telephone number and
pretended to be an interested party.She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed
that her husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in handling annulment
cases and can guarantee a court decree within four to six months, provided
the case will not involve separation of property or custody of children. Mrs.
Simbillo also said that her husband charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of which
is payable at the time of filing of the case and the other half after a decision
thereon has been rendered.
 Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public
Information Office revealed that similar advertisements were published in the
August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue
of The Philippine Star. [2]

On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as

Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of the Public Information Office, filed
an administrative complaint against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper
advertising and solicitation of his legal services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and
Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27
of the Rules of Court. [3]

In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued
that advertising and solicitation per se are not prohibited acts; that the time
has come to change our views about the prohibition on advertising and
solicitation; that the interest of the public is not served by the absolute
prohibition on lawyer advertising; that the Court can lift the ban on lawyer
advertising; and that the rationale behind the decades-old prohibition should
be abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he be exonerated from all the charges
against him and that the Court promulgate a ruling that advertisement of legal
services offered by a lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy and public
order as long as it is dignified. [4]

The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation. On June 29, 2002, the IBP
[5]

Commission on Bar Discipline passed Resolution No. XV-2002-306, finding [6]

respondent guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court,
and suspended him from the practice of law for one (1) year with the warning
that a repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more severely. The IBP
Resolution was noted by this Court on November 11, 2002. [7]

In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for

Reconsideration, which was denied by the IBP in Resolution No. XV-2002-
[8]

606 dated October 19, 2002 [9]

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No.
157053 entitled, Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court Administrator and
Chief, Public Information Office, Respondents. This petition was consolidated
with A.C. No. 5299 per the Courts Resolution dated March 4, 2003.
In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to
manifest whether or not they were willing to submit the case for resolution on
the basis of the pleadings. Complainant filed his Manifestation on April 25,
[10]

2003, stating that he is not submitting any additional pleading or evidence and
is submitting the case for its early resolution on the basis of pleadings and
records thereof. Respondent, on the other hand, filed a Supplemental
[11]

Memorandum on June 20, 2003.

We agree with the IBPs Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:

Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to
solicit legal business.

Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim
regarding his qualifications or legal services.

Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds

therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct
in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney
for a party without authority to do so.

It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a

business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the
[12]

primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making

venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The [13]

gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration. The duty to [14]

public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary

consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or
what they owe to themselves. The following elements distinguish the legal
[15]

profession from a business:

1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in

which one may attain the highest eminence without making much
money;

2. A relation as an officer of the court to the administration of justice

involving thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability;
 3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;

4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and

unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and
encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.
[16]

There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained

of. He himself admits that he caused the publication of the
advertisements. While he professes repentance and begs for the Courts
indulgence, his contrition rings hollow considering the fact that he advertised
his legal services again after he pleaded for compassion and after claiming
that he had no intention to violate the rules. Eight months after filing his
answer, he again advertised his legal services in the August 14, 2001 issue of
the Buy & Sell Free Ads Newspaper. Ten months later, he caused the same
[17]

advertisement to be published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy &

Sell. Such acts of respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous affront on
[18]

the Courts authority.

What adds to the gravity of respondents acts is that in advertising himself
as a self-styled Annulment of Marriage Specialist, he wittingly or unwittingly
erodes and undermines not only the stability but also the sanctity of an
institution still considered sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of
permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in assuring prospective clients that an
annulment may be obtained in four to six months from the time of the filing of
the case, he in fact encourages people, who might have otherwise been
[19]

disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to
do so.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether
proscribed. However, for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with
the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in a modest and decorous
manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar. Thus, the use of
[20]

simple signs stating the name or names of the lawyers, the office and
residence address and fields of practice, as well as advertisement in legal
periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible. Even the use of
calling cards is now acceptable. Publication in reputable law lists, in a
[21]

manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of

brief biographical and informative data is likewise allowable. As explicitly
stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.: [22]

Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyers
name and the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers,
cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to
the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational
distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal
teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees
thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in
other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their
written consent, the names of clients regularly represented.

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it
cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or
periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a
lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a
daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit
his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management, or contents of which
are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower dignity
or standing of the profession.

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may
contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected
with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication
of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the
partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the
profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone
directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. (emphasis and italics
supplied)

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T.

SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of
Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR
effective upon receipt of this Resolution. He is likewise STERNLY WARNED
that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more
severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for
their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
LINSANGAN vs. TOLENTINO
Facts:
A complaint for disbarment was filed by Pedro Linsangan against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino
for solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional services. Complaint alleged that
respondent, withthe help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients to transfer legal
representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance and expeditious collection on
their claims. To induce them to hire hisservices, he persistently called them and sent them text
messages. To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit of
James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client
relations with complainant and utilize respondent’s services instead, in exchange for aloan of
P50, 000.00. Complainant also attached “respondent’s” calling card. Respondent, in his
defense,denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation of the said calling
card.
Issue:
Whether or not Tolentino’s actions warrant disbarment.
Held:
Y e s . R u l e 2 . 0 3 o f t h e C P R p r o v i d e s t h a t a l a w ye r s h a l l n o t d o o r p e r m i t t o
b e d o n e a n y a c t designed primarily to solicit legal business. Hence, lawyers are prohibited
from soliciting cases for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers. Such actuation constitute
smalpractice, a ground for disbarment. Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of
the CPR which provides that lawyer, shall not for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any
suit or proceedingor delay any man’s cause. This rule proscribes “ambulance chasing” (the
solicitation of almost any kindof legal business by an attorney, personally or through an
agent in order to gain employment) as ameasure to protect the community from barratry
and champerty. In the case at bar, complainant presentedsubstantial evidence (consisting of the
sworn statements of the very same persons coaxed by Labiano andreferred to respondent’s
office) to prove that respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as
profitedfrom referrals’ suits. Through Labiano’s actions, respondent’s
law practice was benefited. Haplessseamen were enticed to transfer representation on the
strength of Labiano’s word that respondent
could produce a more favorable result. Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited empl
oymentviolating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules
of C o u r t . A n y a c t o f s o l i c i t a t i o n s c o n s t i t u t e s m a l p r a c t i c e w h i c h c a l l s f o r t
h e e x e r c i s e o f t h e C o u r t ’ s disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statues
warrants serious sanctions for initiating contactwith a prospective client for the purpose of
obtaining employment. Thus in this jurisdiction, the Courtadheres to the rule to protect
the public from the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyersand to uphold the
nobility of the legal profession.C a n o n 2 : A l a w ye r s h a l l m a k e h i s
l e g a l s e r v i c e s a v a i l a b l e i n a n e f f i c i e n t a n d c o n v e n i e n t m a n n e r compatible
with the independence, integrity and effectiveness of the profession. Rule 2.03: A
lawyer shallnot do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.
CANON 1by Rei-Anne Santos
RE: FINANCIAL AUDIT OF ATTY. RAQUEL G. KHO
(A.M. No. P-06-2177, June 26, 2006)
FACTS:Atty. Kho is a former clerk of court of the RTC in Eastern Samar. He was found guilty
of gross misconduct for his failure to make a timely remittance of judiciary funds in his
custody.She was fined P10k. Since his malfeasance prima facie contravened Canon 1, Rule 1.01
of theCode of Professional Responsibility (A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful conduct), the
SCordered ordered him to show cause why he should not be disciplined as a lawyer and as
anofficer of the court. Atty. Kho explained that his failure to make a timely remittance of the
cashdeposited with him was inexcusable; he maintained his contention that he kept the money in
the
court’s safety vault and never once used it for his own benefit.
ISSUE:Whether Atty. Kho is guilty of violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01.HELD:YES. Even though he
was in good faith, his action was a breach of his oath to obey thelaws as well as the legal orders
of the duly constituted authorities and of his duties under Canon1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Canon 1 provides that a lawyer shalluphold the constitution, obey
the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legalprocesses while Rule 1.01 states
that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoralor deceitful conduct. As servants
of the law and officers of the court, lawyers are required to beat the forefront of observing and
maintaining the rule of law. They are expected to makethemselves exemplars worthy of
emulation. The least a lawyer can do in compliance with Canon1 is to refrain from engaging in
unlawful conduct. By definition, any act or omission contrary tolaw is unlawful. The presence of
evil intent on the part of the lawyer is not essential in order tobring his act or omission within the
terms of Rule 1.01 which specifically prohibits lawyers from
engaging in unlawful conduct. Atty. Kho’s conduct was not only far from exemplary, it was
unlawful as well. For this, he must be called to account. Atty. Kho is ordered to pay FINE.

A.M. No. RTJ-93-1033 October 10, 1995

MARIBETH CORDOVA and CHRISTOPHER CORDOVA, complainants,

vs.
HON. EMMA C. LABAYEN, Presiding Judge, Branch 54, RTC, 6th Judicial Region, Bacolod
City; HON. BETHEL KATALBAS-MOSCARDON, former Presiding Judge of Branch 54, RTC,
6th Judicial Region, Bacolod City; GIA L. ARINDAY, Branch Clerk of Court, and MARIO P.
LAMERA, Court Sheriff, Branch 54, RTC, Bacolod City; ARMANDO N. ESO, Court Sheriff, and
EDGAR DEPAMAYLO, Subpoena Server, Branch 50, RTC, Bacolod City, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

For consideration by the Court is the matter of the order we issued on November 23, 1994,1 requiring
Atty. Salvador T. Sabio, counsel for herein complainants, to show cause and explain why he should
not be administratively dealt with for violation of Canon I, Rules 1.02 and 1.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Acting on the Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator and the Compliance2 filed by
Atty. Sabio, the Court issued a Resolution on May 30, 1995,3 further referring the matter to the Bar
Confidant for evaluation, report and recommendation. On July 7, 1995, the latter submitted a Report
and Recommendation4 finding Atty. Sabio guilty of violating Rules 1.02 and 1.03 of Canon I, which
the Court hereby approves with modifications.

The present incident is an offshoot of an administrative complaint5 filed by complainants Maribeth

and Christopher Cordova, through their aforesaid counsel, Atty. Sabio, against herein respondents
for disbarment, dismissal from office and disqualification to hold public office with forfeiture of
employment benefits for their involvement in Civil Case No. 7092 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
54, Bacolod City. The administrative complaint, however, was dismissed by this Court on the basis
of a Memorandum Report6 dated October 17, 1994 submitted by Deputy Court Administrator
Bernardo P. Abesamis, who likewise recommended that Atty. Sabio be required to explain why he
should not be administratively dealt with for violation of Canon I, Rules 1.02 and 1103 on the ground
that:

Their charge that Atty. Salvador T. Sabio "clearly instigated" the filing of this
complaint is also not totally baseless.

In her comment, Judge Moscardon stated that ". . . the original counsel on record
unquestionably accepted the Decision of the appellate RTC court (sic). On the other
hand, the petitioners now, as well as their present counsel who are not fully
conversant (with) the circumstances surrounding the matter, now attempt to mislead
the High Court . . . ." Also worth mentioning were the allegations that (1) the
respondent sheriffs were criminally charged for robbery, grave threats and malicious
mischief; (2) that the plaintiffs re-occupied the premises after being ejected
therefrom; (3) Atty. Sabio had been charged for crimes involving dishonesty.

The foregoing points to the possible violations of the Code of Professional Ethics,
particularly Canon I, Rule 1.02 (A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law . . .) and Rule 1.03 (A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or
interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man's cause).

The main bulk of Atty. Sabio's contentions were premised on the issue of whether the writs of
execution were issued and implemented by herein respondents in gross violation of Sections 8 and
10, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, with manifest partiality and breach of judicial trust, and with grave
abuse of discretion in excess of jurisdiction. In his Compliance, Atty. Sabio asserts that the writ of
execution was issued pending appeal despite the filing of a supersedeas bond and the payment of
advance rentals. A review of the complaint, comment and answer filed in this case will readily show
that the writs in question were issued strictly in accordance with Sections 8 and 10, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court which provide:

Sec. 8. Immediate Execution of judgment. How to stay same. — If judgment is

rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately, unless an appeal
has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient bond,
approved by the municipal or city court and executed to the plaintiff to enter the
action in the Court of First Instance and to pay the rents, damages, and costs
accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the
pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due
from time to time under the contract, if any, as found by the judgment of the
municipal or city court to exist. In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the
court the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the
 preceding month or period at the rate determined by the judgment, on or before the
tenth day of each succeeding month or period. The supersedeas bond shall be
transmitted by the municipal or city court, with the other papers, to the clerk of the
Court of First Instance to which the action is appealed.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 10. Stay of execution on appeal to Court of Appeals or Supreme Court. —

Where defendant appeals from a judgment of the Court of First Instance, execution
of said judgment, with respect to the restoration of possession, shall not be stayed
unless the appellant deposits the same amounts and within the periods referred to in
Section 8 of this rule to be disposed of in the same manner as therein provided.

The records of this administrative matter show that in an action for ejectment filed against the
predecessor in interest of herein complainants,7 judgment was rendered on April 14, 1992 by the
Municipal Trial Court, Branch 6, Bacolod City, in Civil Case No. 18761, ordering defendants to
vacate the premises and to pay plaintiffs therein the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees plus
P1,200.00 appearance fee, P18,000.00 for rentals from May, 1991 to April, 1992, and costs of suit.
On August 20, 1992, the Regional Trial Court affirmed said judgment after finding that there was no
cogent reason to reverse the lower court's decision.

A Motion for Writ of Execution Pending Appeal was filed by plaintiffs on September 4, 1995, to which
an Opposition and Motion for Reconsideration was filed by defendants on September 10, 1992. The
Regional Trial Court granted the motion on September 28, 1992 and the writ of execution was
issued on September 30, 1992. However, in the afternoon of September 29, 1992, plaintiffs filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the order of September 28, 1992 granting the motion for execution, on
the ground that they could not file the supersedeas bond because the court allegedly failed to
apprise them of the amount thereof and, at the same time, attaching to said motion a bond in the
amount of P18,000.00. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Regional Trial Court on
October 1, 1992, as a consequence of which the writ of execution previously issued was
implemented on October 8, 1992 and plaintiffs were ordered restored to the possession of the
subject premises.

Therein defendant Luz Cordova went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari with
injunction but was rebuffed therein. In a decision promulgated on March 31, 1993 in CA-G.R. SP No.
29102, said appellate court affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court. As a result, the
lower court granted on April 21, 1993 the Motion for Alias Writ of Execution filed by plaintiffs and
ordered the release of the amounts of P12,000.00 and P18,000.00 deposited by therein defendants.
An alias writ of execution was subsequently issued on April 26, 1993.

The administrative complaint now filed before us by herein complainants, as heirs and successors in
interest of the late Luz Cordova, revolves around the validity of the writ of execution issued by Judge
Moscardon and the alias writ of execution issued by Judge Labayen.

1. The writ of execution issued on September 30, 1992 by Judge Moscardon is being controverted
on the ground that a supersedeas bond had been validly filed in this case and periodic rentals had
been paid, hence said supposed compliance with the Rules of Court should have legally stayed
execution pending appeal.

Sections 8 and 10 of Rule 70 clearly provide that to stay the immediate execution of judgment in
ejectment proceedings, it is necessary that the defendant-appellant must (a) perfect his appeal, (b)
file a supersedeas bond, and (c) periodically deposit the rentals falling due during the pendency of
the appeal.

The purpose of the supersedeas bond is to answer for the rents, damages and costs accruing down
to the judgment of the inferior court appealed from, the amount of which is to be determined from the
judgment of said court. The postulation of complainants and their counsel that the execution sought
was effectively stayed by the filing of a supersedeas bond was sufficiently refuted and justifiably
rejected when we consider the circumstances then obtaining.

First. The amount of the supersedeas bond to be posted is easily discernible from the dispositive
portion of the judgment of the municipal trial court. Hence, it was erroneous, if not altogether a
deliberate falsity, for Atty. Sabio to claim that they could not file a supersedeas bond because that
court failed to determine the same.

Second. The bond should have been filed forthwith after the municipal trial court had rendered
judgment against complainants, which judgment was immediately executory, without prejudice to the
right of appeal. As the records readily reveal, the purported bond was belatedly filed on September
29, 1992, more than five months later, and only after the aforementioned Regional Trial Court had
already issued an order granting the motion for execution pending appeal. We cannot, therefore,
elude the impression thus created that the filing thereof came only as a dilatory afterthought on the
part of defendants and their counsel. In a vain attempt to remedy the situation, Atty. Sabio filed a
motion for reconsideration of the order granting execution, but the same necessarily had to fail for
being frivolous.

Third. It will be observed that no supersedeas bond was filed after the rendition of the decision either
in the court of origin or in the appellate court. The requirement for the filing of a supersedeas bond is
mandatory.8 Defendants in the ejectment case appealed to the latter court without filing a
supersedeas bond. Such failure is a ground for outright execution of the judgment of the municipal
trial court, the duty of the appellate court to order the execution of the appealed decision being
thereby ministerial and imperative.9

Fourth. The Court of Appeals stated that the amount of P18,000.00 deposited by defendants therein
represented rental payments for the period from May, 1991 to April, 1992, and that a writ of
execution had by then already been issued by the Regional Trial Court. Evidently, therefore, the
amount thus deposited could not qualify as or subserve the purpose of a supersedeas bond. Thus:

Finally, anent the prayer for injunction, petitioner contends that she had deposited
with the public respondent court the amount of P18,000.00 representing the money
judgment, to stay execution pending appeal. The court noted that the said amount
represented the rental payments only for the months from May 1991 to April 1992. It
is for this reason that this Court, in its Resolution dated October 9, 1992 (p.
60, Rollo), ordered petitioner to present proof of subsequent payments made
pursuant to Sections 8 and 10 of Rule 70. It appears, however, that a Writ of
Execution was already issued and even implemented (par. 5. Urgent Motion for
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order, pp. 98-99, Rollo; Delivery of Possession,
p. 118, Rollo) that a preliminary injunction is thereby rendered nugatory. . . .10

While it is true, therefore, that defendants deposited an amount which approximates the monetary
judgment for unpaid rentals, since the same was filed late, it could not qualify as a supersedeas
bond. What is considered material for purposes of staying execution pending appeal under Rule 70
is not only the fact of payment but, more importantly, the timeliness of the filing of the supersedeas
bond. Hence, the amount of P18,000.00 was correctly applied as mere rental payments from May,
1991 to April, 1992. On this ground alone, Judge Moscardon was perfectly justified in issuing the writ
of execution and respondent sheriffs in implementing the same. Of these legal considerations, Atty.
Sabio could not have been unaware.

The records, furthermore, do not sustain Atty. Sabio's representations with respect to the application
of the P12,000.00 which complainants supposedly deposited with the court a quo. Atty. Sabio insists
that said amount was intended to answer for monthly rentals falling due after the rendition of the
decision of the Municipal Trial Court. This, however, runs contrary to the facts obtaining in this case.
The decisions of the Municipal Trial Court and the Court of Appeals are silent on this point except for
a statement found in the higher court's decision that "this Court, in its Resolution dated October 9,
1992, ordered petitioner to present proof of subsequent payments made." Also, in the order of Judge
Moscardon dated October 1, 1992, she stated that "the record does not show that the defendants
had likewise paid the periodical rentals." Also, in the complaint filed in this administrative matter, it is
alleged that the defendant consigned the rentals from May, 1991 until April, 1992 in the amount of
P12,000.00.

In view of these conflicting statements of complainants, plus the fact that there is not enough
evidence on hand, we are prevented from making a specific determination thereon. Nevertheless,
whether or not periodic rental payments were made during the pendency of the appeal no longer
carries any weight in view of our earlier finding that execution could not be legally stayed by reason
of the admittedly belated filing of the purported supersedeas bond.

Complainants further contend that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to issue the writ of
execution allegedly because it should have forwarded the records of the case to the court of origin
for proper implementation. The argument is specious. The Municipal Trial Court may issue execution
immediately after judgment if no action was taken therefrom by defendants. But, after the perfection
of the appeal, it is obvious that the jurisdiction over the controversy had passed to the Regional Trial
Court, hence the properly filed in and granted by the latter court.11

2. Anent the issue on the legality of the alias writ of execution issued by Judge Labayen, Atty. Sabio
avers that the same is void for the reason that he was not furnished a copy of the order, dated April
21, 1993, which granted the motion for alias writ of execution. He further insists that the same was
issued despite the fact that the decision of the Court of Appeals had not yet become final and
executory since it was still pending review before the Supreme Court.

Under Section 10 of Rule 70, an appeal to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court shall likewise
not be stayed unless the appellants deposit the amount of rent due from time to time. In the case at
bar, no proof has been presented to show that the monthly rentals which fell due after the rendition
of the trial court's decision had been duly paid. Assuming arguendo, as claimed by Atty. Sabio, that
the P12,000.00 deposited with the Regional Trial Court should answer for said rentals, the same
was not sufficient to cover rentals due during the entire pendency of the case before the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court. At most, such amount could apply only to rental payments from
May, 1992 to December, 1992. Of these facts, again, Atty. Sabio could not have been completely
oblivious.

The Court of Appeals rendered its decision on March 31, 1993 and there is absolutely nothing in the
records to show that herein complainants made further payments aside from the P12,000.00 and
P18,000.00 deposited with the Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court, respectively. In
addition, Atty. Sabio does not refute, and in fact it is admitted in paragraph 6 of the complaint filed in
this administrative matter, that complainants reentered and remained in possession of the premises,
and it appears that they continued to do so despite the prior implementation of the original writ of
execution. Verily, this time for failure of complainants to make periodic deposits during the pendency
of the appeal and their continued occupancy of the premises, the issuance of the alias writ of
execution was a ministerial and mandatory duty of respondent judges.

Atty. Sabio likewise claims that execution could not issue because he was not served a copy of the
order dated April 21, 199312 which granted the motion for alias writ of execution. He rationalizes that:

. . . The fact is that, a copy of the Order dated April 21, 1993 was not furnished the
defendant's counsel.

Truth to tell, this is exactly the ground why undersigned counsel filed his Urgent
Motion to Lift Alias Writ of Execution, . . . .

It is therefore clear that the Alias Writ of Execution dated April 26, 1993 issued by the
defendant Clerk of Court, Gia L. Aranday, was improperly issued, considering that
the Order of the court granting the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution dated
April 21, 1993 was
not furnished the undersigned counsel, and, it is only through the resourcefulness of
the undersigned of following-up this case that he came to know of the said Order
dated April 21, 1993.

Undersigned counsel found himself in an embarrassing situation, when he was

confronted by his clients that the Alias Writ of Execution dated April 26, 1993 was
issued without his knowledge of the prior Court Order dated April 21, 1993.

It is in this respect, that undersigned honestly believed that he has a well grounded
complaint against respondents Clerk of Court and process server for their negligent
act. (Emphasis in the original text.)13

That bad faith attended the filing of this administrative charge was unwittingly disclosed by the
aforequoted allegations of Atty. Sabio in his compliance. No ratiocination was proffered by him nor
did he invoke any authority of law or jurisprudence, since decidedly there is none, to support his
theory that execution should not issue where the adverse party is not served a copy of the order
even where the grant thereof had become a matter of right. The inescapable conclusion, therefore,
is that the filing of the present complaint was, at the very least, ill-conceived and malicious, and was
resorted to as a last-ditch effort and a face-saving recourse of counsel.

It is worth noting that the administrative complaint was filed against herein respondents only after the
Court of Appeals had rendered a decision in favor of plaintiffs. This in itself is already a clear
indication that the acts of respondents are valid and legal. Yet, Atty. Sabio persisted in instituting
these baseless charges against respondents to their proven prejudice.14 As correctly observed by the
Bar Confidant, under the given circumstances, it is apparent that complainants decided to institute
the present case only on the advice and/or upon the urging of Atty. Sabio. It also bears stressing that
respondent Judge Labayen even waited for the Court of Appeals' decision before acting on the
motion for an alias writ of execution of plaintiffs, if only to obviate any imputation of bias or partiality.

We are fully convinced that, despite the misleading assertions of Atty. Sabio, the issuance of the writ
of execution was done in the valid and judicious exercise of the functions and duties of respondent
judges. We have carefully examined and analyzed the procedure adopted by respondents in the
issuance and enforcement of the questioned writs. It would be the height of injustice were we to
impose any sanction on them for complying faithfully with the procedural mandate of the rules
governing the matter.
The Court would like to call attention again to the reprehensible propensity of disgruntled litigants,
most especially their counsel, of filing totally baseless and unfounded charges against judges and
court personnel in a vain attempt to escape the dire consequences of their own negligence or in an
effort to transgress the lawful orders of the court. Judges and court personnel should be protected
from unjust accusations of dissatisfied litigants, abetted by counsel who seek thereby to camouflage
their shortcomings. Besides, it goes without saying that mere suspicion that a judge is partial to one
of the parties to the case is not enough. There should be evidence to prove the charge,15which is
obviously absent in the case at bar.

As an officer of the court, a lawyer has the sworn duty to assist in, not to impede or pervert, the
administration of justice. The present administrative charge seeks to cast doubt on the integrity of
respondent judges, the judicial personnel and the court which they represent, in flagrant abdication
of the bounden responsibility of a lawyer to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of
justice. Atty. Sabio thus deserves to be punished for instigating the filing of an administrative
complaint by his clients, in the guise of upholding their rights but actually to frustrate the enforcement
of lawful court orders and consequently obstruct the desirable norms and course of justice.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Salvador T. Sabio is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of SIX (6) MONTHS, effective upon his receipt of a copy of this decision. He is warned that a more
severe sanction shall be imposed should he commit another administrative offense. Let copies
hereof be attached to his record and served on the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and on all courts of the land.

SO ORDERED.