TORTS &DAMAGES 1

L-24803 May 26, 1977

Laws Applicable: ART. 2177,Article 397,article 1093,Article 2180 of the Civil Code
Lessons Applicable: Quasi-delict (Tort and Damages)

FACTS:

Reginald Hill, a minor, married but living with his father, Atty. Marvin Hill with whom he was living and getting subsistence
killed Agapito Elcano

CFI Civil Case: dismissed on the ground that he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of
intent to kill, coupled with mistake

Spouses Elcano appealed

ISSUES:

W/N the civil action should be barred by the acquittal of criminal action - NO
W/N the Civil Code can be applied to Atty. Marvin Hill even though Reginald is already married –YES

HELD: order appealed from is reversed

1. NO.

separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with
regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which,
after such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime.

If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, accordingly
to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and
application in actual life

to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case,
preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. . Otherwise. there would be many instances of
unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified remedium."

ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.

in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law

It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict,
hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.

2. YES

While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article
397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399,
emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary
concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as
though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or
mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian."

Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom one is responsible

the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not give
answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their minor
married child without their consent

Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son

G.R. No. 108164 February 23, 1995

Far East Bank and Trust Company, petitioner
vs Court of Appeals, Luisa Luna and Clarita Luna, respondents
Ponente: Vitug

Facts:
TORTS &DAMAGES 2

Luis Luna applied for a far east card issued by far east bank at its Pasig branch. Upon his request, the bank also issued a
supplemental card to private respondent Clarita Luna. Then Clarita lost her credit card and submitted an affidavit of loss. Later
on October 6, 1988 in a restaurant, Luis' credit card was not honored.

Luis thru a counsel then demanded from far east to pay damages for the humiliation he felt. The vice-president of the bank
expressed bank's apologies to Luis.

Still evidently feeling aggrieved, private respondents, on 05 December 1988, filed a complaint for damages with the Regional
Trial Court ("RTC") of Pasig against FEBTC.
On 30 March 1990, the RTC of Pasig, given the foregoing factual settings, rendered a decision ordering FEBTC to pay private
respondents (a) P300,000.00 moral damages; (b) P50,000.00 exemplary damages; and (c) P20,000.00 attorney's fees.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court, FEBTC has come to this Court with this petition for
review.

There is merit in this appeal.

In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted in bad faith or with malice
in the breach of the contract. The Civil Code provides:
Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the
circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted
fraudulently or in bad faith.

Bad faith, in this context, includes gross, but not simple, negligence. Exceptionally, in a contract of carriage, moral damages are
also allowed in case of death of a passenger attributable to the fault (which is presumed) of the common carrier.

Held:
The Court has not in the process overlooked another rule that a quasi-delict can be the cause for breaching a contract that
might thereby permit the application of applicable principles on tort 9 even where there is a pre-existing contract between the
plaintiff and the defendant. This doctrine, unfortunately, cannot improve private respondents' case for it can aptly govern only
where the act or omission complained of would constitute an actionable tort independently of the contract. The test (whether
a quasi-delict can be deemed to underlie the breach of a contract) can be stated thusly: Where, without a pre-existing contract
between two parties, an act or omission can nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by itself, the fact that the parties are
contractually bound is no bar to the application of quasi-delict provisions to the case. Here, private respondents' damage claim
is predicated solely on their contractual relationship; without such agreement, the act or omission complained of cannot by
itself be held to stand as a separate cause of action or as an independent actionable tort.

PHIL HAWK CORP V. VIVIAN TAN LEE

GR 166869 FEBRUARY 16, 2010

FACTS:
On March 15, 2005, respondent Vivian Tan Lee filed a case for Damages based on QD
arising from vehicular accident between a motorcycle and bus of Phil Hawk. The accident
resulted in the death of respondent’s husband, Silvino Tan, and caused respondent physical
injuries. Before the answer, respondent filed an amended complaint, adding additional damages
and reliefs.

The trial court held petitioner bus company liable for failing to exercise the diligence of a
good father of the family in the selection and supervision of Avila, having failed to sufficiently
inculcate in him discipline and correct behavior on the road.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court with modification
in the award of damages.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not negligence may be attributed to petitioner’s driver, and whether negligence
on his part was the proximate cause of the accident, resulting in the death of Silvino Tan and
causing physical injuries to respondent;
(2) Whether or not petitioner is liable to respondent for damages; and
(3) Whether or not the damages awarded by respondent Court of Appeals are proper.

HELD:

In this case, the bus driver, who was driving on the right side of the road, already saw the
motorcycle on the left side of the road before the collision. However, he did not take the
necessary precaution to slow down, but drove on and bumped the motorcycle, and also the
passenger jeep parked on the left side of the road, showing that the bus was negligent in veering
to the left lane, causing it to hit the motorcycle and the passenger jeep.

Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly

arises a presumption that the employer failed to exercise the due diligence of a good father of the
TORTS &DAMAGES 3

family in the selection or supervision of its employees. To avoid liability for a quasi-delict
committed by his employee, an employer must overcome the presumption by presenting convincing proof that he
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee.

McKee v. Intermediate Appellate Court

FACTS:

It was the 8th of January in 1977, at around 9:00 or 10:00 in the morning, somewhere between Angeles City and San Fernando,
Pampanga. Jose Koh was driving his daughter, Araceli Koh McKee, and her minor children, Christopher, George, and Kim, as
well as Kim’s babysitter, Loida Bondoc, from San Fernando, Pampanga in the direction of Angeles City (northward) in a Ford
Escort. Meanwhile, a cargo truck owned by Jaime Tayag and Rosalinda Manalo, driven by Ruben Galang, was headed in the
opposite direction, from Angeles City to San Fernando (southward), going to Manila.

The cargo truck was considerable in size as it was carrying 200 hundred cavans of rice, which weighed 10 metric tons. As the
Escort approached one Pulong-Pulo Bridge from the southern portion, 2 boys suddenly ran from the right side of the road into
the Escort’s lane. As the boys were going back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all the way or turn back, Jose blew his
horn. He was then forced to swerve left and into the lane Galang was driving in. Jose switched his headlights on, applied his
brakes, and attempted to return to his lane. However, he failed to get back into the right lane, and collided with the cargo truck.
The collision occurred on the bridge.

The collision resulted in the deaths of the driver, Jose, the one-year-old, Kim, and her babysitter, Loida, on whose lap she was
sitting. Loida was seated in the passenger seat. Araceli, Christopher, and George, who were sitting in the back of the Escort,
received physical injuries from the collision. An information was filed against Ruben Galang, charging him for reckless
imprudence resulting in multiple homicide, physical injuries, and damage to property. He was found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the charges in the information. The conviction was affirmed by the CA and achieved finality after the denial by the CA
of his MR and the denial by the SC of his Petition for Review.

Two civil cases were filed. The first one, by the wife and children of Jose Koh, and the second one by Araceli and her husband
for the death of Kim and injuries to Araceli and her other children. The respondents were impleaded against as the employers
of Ruben Galang – Galang was not included. The cases here are based on quasi-delict. These cases were eventually
consolidated. The trial court dismissed the civil cases and awarded the respondents damages and attorney’s fees.

On appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court, the dismissal was reversed. This was based on its finding that it was Galang’s
inattentiveness or reckless imprudence that caused the accident. However, upon filing by the respondents of an MR, the IAC set
aside its original decision and upheld that of the trial court because the fact that Koh’s car invaded the lane of the truck and the
collision occurred while still in Galang’s lane gave rise to the presumption that Koh was negligent. ISSUE: Was the IAC correct
in reversing their original decision?

HELD:

NO.

The petition has merit. Procedural (not important): Given the circumstances, the cases (civil and criminal) should have been
consolidated to prevent separate appreciation of the evidence. To be fair, the petitioners did move to adopt the testimonies of
the witnesses in the criminal case but the motion was denied. The non-consolidation resulted in two conflicting decisions.

In any case, the guilty verdict of Galang was deemed by the Court as irrelevant to the case at bar. On the basis of this presumed
negligence, the appellate court immediately concluded that it was Jose Koh’s negligence that was the immediate and proximate
cause of the collision. This is an unwarranted deduction as the evidence for the petitioners convincingly shows that the car
swerved into the truck’s lane because as it approached the southern end of the bridge, two boys darted across the road from
the right sidewalk into the lane of the car.

Araceli’s testimony was pretty much what was stated in the facts plus the fact that when Jose swerved to the left, the truck was
immediately noticed. This is why he switched his headlights on – to warn the truck’s driver to slow down and let the Escort
return to its lane. When asked as to how she could tell that the truck did not slow down, Araceli said that the truck just kept on
coming, indicating that it didn’t reduce its speed. She posited that if it did, there wouldn’t have been a collision. Her testimony
remained intact, even upon cross-examination – that Jose’s entry into Galang’s lane was necessary to avoid what was, in his
mind at the time, a greater peril – death or injury to the two idiots.

This is hardly negligent behavior. Her testimony was corroborated by one Eugenio Tanhueco1 , who was an impartial
eyewitness. He said that the truck, moving at 50 to 60kph, only stopped upon collision. Also, when the police investigated the
scene of the collision, they found skidmarks under the truck instead of behind it. This indicated that Galang only applied the
brakes moments before the collision.

While Galang claimed that he had stopped when the Escort was within 10 meters of the truck but this only served to
substantiate Tanhueco’s statement that he stopped only upon collision, considering the speed at which he was going2 . 1 The
court said he could not be an “accommodation witness” (WUT) because he was the first to arrive at the scene and, in fact,
brought one of the injured passengers to the hospital, as opposed to a witness presented by the respondents (Roman Dayrit –
who allegedly lived across the street – but it happened on a bridge tho…. :/) who didn’t even help and said he wanted to call the
police but his phone hadn’t a dial tone.
TORTS &DAMAGES 4

NOTE: None of the respondents’ witness testimonies were given credence simply because one was the passenger of Galang
(who the court expects would naturally take the side of the person she is associated with) and the other one was an
accommodation witness 2 He said he was going only “30” (unclear whether he meant miles or kilometers per hour) as opposed
to the 50-60kph – speed limit was 30kph On the basis of the definition3 and the test4 of negligence, no negligence can be
imputed to Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid running over the two boys by swerving
the car away from where they were even if this would mean entering the opposite lane. Avoiding such immediate peril would
be the natural course to take particularly where the vehicle in the opposite lane would be several meters away and could very
well slow down, move to the side of the road and give way to the oncoming car.

THE EMERGENCY RULE: “one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider
the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is
brought about by his own negligence.” Jose Koh adopted the best means possible in the given situation. This means he cannot
be considered negligent.

ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT JOSE WAS NEGLIGENT, THE COLLISION STILL WOULD NOT BE IMPUTED TO HIM BECAUSE:

1. Proximate Cause: that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.

• Galang’s negligent act of not slowing down or stopping and allowing the Escort to return to the right lane was the
sufficient intervening cause and the actual cause of the tragedy (failure to take the necessary measures and the degree of
care necessary to avoid the collision) o “The entry of the car into the lane of the truck would not have resulted in the
collision had the latter heeded the emergency signals given by the former to slow down and give the car an opportunity to
go back into its proper lane.

Instead of slowing down and swerving to the far right of the road, which was the proper precautionary measure under the
given circumstances, the truck driver continued at full speed towards the car. The truck driver’s negligence becomes more
apparent in view of the fact that the road is 7.50 meters wide while the car measures 1.598 meters and the truck, 2.286
meters, in width. This would mean that both car and truck could pass side by side with a clearance of 3.661 meters to
spare. Furthermore, the bridge has a level sidewalk, which could have partially accommodated the truck. Any reasonable
man finding himself in the given situation would have tried to avoid the car instead of meeting it head-on.” o Negligence of
Galang apparent in the records: “He himself said that his truck was running at 30 miles (48 kilometers) per hour along the
bridge while the maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge52 is only 30 kilometers per hour.

Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was
violating any traffic regulation.” 2. Last Clear Chance Doctrine: A doctrine in the law of torts which states that the
contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the defendant might,
by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured party. In
such cases, the person who had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap is considered in law solely responsible for the
consequences thereof. A person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the
negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely responsible for
the consequences of the accident. The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or
antecedent negligence but the defendant, who had the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so, is
made liable for all the consequences of the accident notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff.

• Basically, the last clear chance was with Galang, as can be gleaned from the evidence presented Therefore, respondents
are found, under Article 2180, directly and primarily responsible for the acts of their employee. Their negligence flows
from the negligence of their employee. Such presumption is juris tantum (rebuttable) and not juris et de jure (conclusive).
They did not present evidence that showed that the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision
of their employee5 , Galang.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the respondent Court of 3 April 1984 is SET
ASIDE while its Decision of 29 November 1983 in C.A.-G.R. CV Nos. 69040-41 is REINSTATED. 3 Layugan v. IAC: The
omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct
of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something

Taylor v. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co.

Facts:

Plaintiff David Taylor was 15 years old at the time he received the injuries that gave rise to this complaint. On September 30,
1905, plaintiff and Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age, went to the power plant owned by the defendant to visit one
Murphy, an employee. Not being able to find Murphy on inquiry, the boys for curiosity wandered around the premises and
reached the place where the company dumped in the cinders and ashes from its furnaces. There they found some 20-30
fulminating caps scattered on the ground. The caps are intended for explosion of dynamites, and have in themselves explosive
power. The boys picked up the caps and carried them home. Along the way they met Jessie Adrian, a 9-year old girl. The 3 went
to Manuel’s house and performed a little experiment. They opened the caps and found yellowish substance. They lighted a
match and applied it on the contents. The girl became frightened and ran away. The substance exploded, causing a slight cut on
Jessie’s neck, burns on Manuel, and loss of David’s eyesight. Plaintiff sued the company for damages.

Issue:

Whether the company could be faulted for the allowing the children to be exposed to the harmful substances
TORTS &DAMAGES 5

Held:

Fulminating caps or detonators for the discharge by electricity of blasting charges by dynamite are not articles in common use
by the average citizen, and under all the circumstances, and in the absence of all evidence to the contrary, we think that the
discovery of twenty or thirty of these caps at the place where they were found by the plaintiff on defendant's premises fairly
justifies the inference that the defendant company was either the owner of the caps in question or had the caps under its
possession and control. We think also that the evidence tends to disclose that these caps or detonators were willfully and
knowingly thrown by the company or its employees at the spot where they were found, with the expectation that they would
be buried out of the sight by the ashes which it was engaged in dumping in that neighborhood, they being old and perhaps
defective; and, however this may be, we are satisfied that the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding that the company or
some of its employees either willfully or through an oversight left them exposed at a point on its premises which the general
public, including children at play, where not prohibited from visiting, and over which the company knew or ought to have
known that young boys were likely to roam about in pastime or in play.

It is clear that the accident could not have happened and not the fulminating caps been left exposed at the point where they
were found, or if their owner had exercised due care in keeping them in an appropriate place; but it is equally clear that
plaintiff would not have been injured had he not, for his own pleasure and convenience, entered upon the defendant's
premises, and strolled around thereon without the express permission of the defendant, and had he not picked up and carried
away the property of the defendant which he found on its premises, and had he not thereafter deliberately cut open one of the
caps and applied a match to its contents.

Children are actuated by similar childish instincts and impulses. Drawn by curiosity and impelled by the restless spirit of
youth, boys here as well as there will usually be found whenever the public is permitted to congregate. The movement of
machinery, and indeed anything which arouses the attention of the young and inquiring mind, will draw them to the
neighborhood as inevitably as does the magnet draw the iron which comes within the range of its magnetic influence. The
owners of premises, therefore, whereon things attractive to children are exposed, or upon which the public are expressly or
impliedly permitted to enter or upon which the owner knows or ought to know children are likely to roam about for pastime
and in play, "must calculate upon this, and take precautions accordingly." In such cases the owner of the premises can not be
heard to say that because the child has entered upon his premises without his express permission he is a trespasser to whom
the owner owes no duty or obligation whatever. The owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to prevent the child from
entering his premises at a place where he knows or ought to know that children are accustomed to roam about of to which
their childish instincts and impulses are likely to attract them is at least equivalent to an implied license to enter, and where the
child does enter under such conditions the owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to guard the child against injury
from unknown or unseen dangers, placed upon such premises by the owner, is clearly a breach of duty, responsible, if the child
is actually injured, without other fault on its part than that it had entered on the premises of a stranger without his express
invitation or permission. To hold otherwise would be expose all the children in the community to unknown perils and
unnecessary danger at the whim of the owners or occupants of land upon which they might naturally and reasonably be
expected to enter.

But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's property without defendant's express invitation or
permission would not have relieved defendant from responsibility for injuries incurred there by plaintiff, without other fault
on his part, if such injury were attributable to the negligence of the defendant, we are of opinion that under all the
circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate
cause of the injury received by the plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly speaking, "attributable to the negligence of the
defendant," and, on the other hand, we are satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting match
to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the
defendant, therefore is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred.

As was said in case of Railroad Co. vs. Stout, "While it is the general rule in regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover
damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of another he must himself have been free from fault, such is not
the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. The care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity
only, and this is to be determined in each case by the circumstances of the case." In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the
accident was a well-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age. The
evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that, despite his denials on the witness stand, he well knew the explosive
character of the cap with which he was amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an
explosion admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts to
explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought about by the application of a match to the
contents of the caps, show clearly that he knew what he was about.

We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and understanding to be sensible of the danger to which he
exposed himself when he put the match to the contents of the cap; that he was sui juris in the sense that his age and his
experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which would
have avoided the injury which resulted from his own deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him must be held to have
been the direct and immediate result of his own willful and reckless act, so that while it may be true that these injuries would
not have been incurred but for the negligence act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless
plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury.