DE LIMA V.
GATDULA the parties to file their respective memoranda within five (5) working
Facts:
on 27 February 2012, respondent Magtanggol B. Gatdula filed a
Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in the Regional Trial
Court of Manila.
The Amparo was directed against petitioners Justice Secretary Leila
M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director
Reynaldo O. Esmeralda of the National Bureau of Investigation (DE
LIMA, ET AL. for brevity). Gatdula wanted De Lima, et al. "to cease
and desist... from framing up Petitioner [Gatdula] for the fake
ambush incident by filing bogus charges of Frustrated Murder against
Petitioner [Gatdula] in relation to the alleged ambush incident."
Instead of deciding on whether to issue a Writ of Amparo, the judge
issued summons and ordered De Lima, et al. to file an Answer.
.He also set the case for hearing on 1 March 2012. The hearing was
held allegedly for determining whether a temporary... protection
order may be issued.
ued. During that hearing, counsel for De Lima, et al. manifested that
a Return, not an Answer, is appropriate for Amparo cases.
Judge Pampilo insisted that "[s] ince no writ has been issued, return
is not the required pleading but answer".
The judge noted that the Rules of Court apply suppletorily in
Amparo... cases.
He opined that the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure applied and
thus required an Answer.
Judge Pampilo proceeded to conduct a hearing on the main case on
7 March 2012.[10] Even without a Return nor an Answer, he ordered
days after that hearing. Since the period to file an
Answer had not yet lapsed by then, the judge also decided that the
memorandum of De Lima, et al. would be filed in lieu of their
Answer.[11]
On 20 March 2012, the RTC rendered a "Decision" granting the
issuance of the Writ of Amparo. The RTC also granted the interim
reliefs prayed for, namely: temporary protection, production and
inspection orders. The production and inspection orders were in
relation... to the evidence and reports involving an on-going
investigation of the attempted assassination of Deputy Director
Esmeralda. It is not clear from the records how these pieces of
evidence may be related to the alleged threat to the life, liberty or
security of the respondent
Gatdula.
the RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration dated 23 March 2012
filed by De Lima, et al.
Petitioners Sec. De Lima, et al. thus came to this Court assailing the
RTC "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 through a Petition for Review
on Certiorari
SEC. 19. Appeal. Any party may appeal from the final judgment or
order to the Supreme Court under Rule 45. The appeal may raise
questions of fact or law or both. x x x (Emphasis supplied).
Issues: The "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 assailed by the
petitioners could not be the judgment or final order that is
appealable under Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
Held: The privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be distinguished
from the actual order called the Writ of Amparo. The privilege
includes availment of the entire procedure outlined in A.M. No. 07-
9-12-SC, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. After... examining the
petition and its attached affidavits, the Return and the evidence
presented in the summary hearing, the judgment should detail the
required acts from the respondents that will mitigate, if not totally
eradicate, the violation of or the threat to the petitioner's... life,
liberty or security.
A judgment which simply grants "the privilege of the writ" cannot be
executed. It is tantamount to a failure of the judge to intervene and
grant judicial succor to the petitioner. Petitions filed to avail of the
privilege of the Writ of Amparo arise out of very real and... concrete
circumstances. Judicial responses cannot be as tragically symbolic or
ritualistic as "granting the privilege of the Writ of Amparo."
RODRIGUEZ V. GMA
FACTS: Noriel Rodriguez (petitioner) is a member of Alyansa Dagiti
Mannalon Iti Cagayan, a peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang
Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP).
Under the Oplan Bantay Laya, the military tagged KMP members as
an enemy of the state, making its members an easy target of extra-
judicial killings and enforced disappearances.
On September 6, 2009, Rodriguez just alighted from a tricycle driven
by Hermie Antonio Carlos in Brgy. Tapel, Cagayan, when 4 men
forcibly took him and forced him to get inside a car where more men
in civilian clothing were waiting (1 was holding a .45 caliber pistol).
The men started punching Rodriguez inside the car, and forced him
to confess that he is a member of the New People’s Army (NPA).
Rodriguez remained silent until they reached a military camp
belonging to the 17th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army.
Rodriguez was then subjected to beatings and torture by members of
the Philippine Army. Members of the army wanted him to admit that
he is an NPA member and then pinpoint other NPA members and
camp locations. Since Rodriguez cannot answer, he is repeatedly
beaten and tortured. Rodriguez was also coerced to sign several
documents to declare that he is a surenderree.
On September 17, 2009, Rodriguez’s mother and brother came to
see him (accompanied by members of the CHR – Pasicolan, Cruz and
Callagan). They insisted to take Rodriguez home with them to Manila.
Rodriguez arrived in Manila on September 18. Callagan and 2 military
members went inside their house and took pictures for around 30
minutes despite Rodriguez’s effort to stop them.
On November 3, Rodriguez and his girlfriend notices that several
suspicious-looking men are following them on the streets, jeepney
and MRT.
On December 7, Rodriguez filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo
and Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection
Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents and
Personal Properties dated 2 December 2009.
The petition was filed against former President Arroyo, Gen. Ibrado,
PDG. Versoza, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Major General (Maj. Gen.) Nestor Z.
Ochoa, P/CSupt. Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Col. De Vera, 1st Lt.
Matutina, Calog, George Palacpac, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan.
Respondents contend that Rodriguez is a double agent, and had been
working as their informant/infiltrator in the fight against NPA rebels.
Then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, through the solicitor-
general, insisted on her immunity from suits (by virtue of her position
as president).
Supreme Court granted the writs after finding that the petition
sufficiently alleged the abduction and torture of Rodriguez by
members of the Philippine Army. SC directed the Court of Appeals to
hear the petition.
CA ruled in favor of Rodriguez and found Ibrado, Versoza, Bangit,
Ochoa, Tolentino, Santos, De Vera and Matutina liable for his
abduction and torture. As to Calog and Palacpac, the case was
dismissed for lack of merit. On President Arroyo, the case was
dismissed on account of her immunity from suits.
Issue: WON the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in
writs of amparo and habeas data cases.
Held: Yes. The doctrine of command responsibility may be used to
determine whether respondents are accountable for and have the
duty to address the abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable the
courts to devise remedial measures to protect his rights.
Proceedings under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo do not determine
criminal, civil or administrative liability, but this should not abate the
applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility.
“In the context of amparo proceedings, responsibility may refer to
the participation of the respondents, by action or omission, in
enforced disappearance. Accountability, on the other hand, may
attach to respondents who are imputed with knowledge relating to
the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure;
or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of
extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced
disappearance.”
“Despite maintaining former President Arroyo in the list of
respondents in G.R. No. 191805, and allowing the application of the
command responsibility doctrine to amparo and habeas data
proceedings, Rodriguez failed to prove through substantial evidence
that former President Arroyo was responsible or accountable for the
violation of his rights to life, liberty and property. He likewise failed
to prove through substantial evidence the accountability or
responsibility of respondents Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Cruz, Pasicolan and
Callagan.”
BALAO V. GMA
FACTS: The siblings of James Balao, and Longid (petitioners), filed
with the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet a Petition for the Issuance of a
Writ of Amparo in favor of James Balao who was abducted by
unidentified armed men earlier. Named respondents in the petition
were then President GMA, Exec Sec Eduardo Ermita, Defense Sec
Gilberto Teodoro, Jr., ILG Secretary Ronaldo Puno, National Security
Adviser (NSA) Norberto Gonzales, AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Alexander .
Yano, PNP Police Director General Jesus Verzosa, among others.
James M. Balao is a Psychology and Economics graduate of the UP-
Baguio. In 1984, he was among those who founded the Cordillera
Peoples Alliance (CPA), a coalition of NGOs working for the cause of
indigenous peoples in the Cordillera Region.
According to witnesses’ testimony, James was abducted by
unidentified men, saying they were policemen and were arresting
him for a drugs case and then made to ride a white van.
petitioners prayed for the issuance of a writ of amparo and likewise
prayed for (1) an inspection order for the inspection of at least 11
military and police facilities which have been previously reported as
detention centers for activists abducted by military and police
operatives; (2) a production order for all documents that contain
evidence relevant to the petition, particularly the Order of Battle List
and any record or dossier respondents have on James; and (3) a
witness protection order.
the RTC issued the assailed judgment, disposing as follows:
ISSUE a Writ of Amparo Ordering the respondents to (a) disclose
where James is detained or confined, (b) to release James considering
his unlawful detention since his abduction and (c) to cease and desist
from further inflicting harm upon his person; and
DENY the issuance of INSPECTION ORDER, PRODUCTION ORDER and
WITNESS PROTECTION ORDER for failure of herein Petitioners to
comply with the stringent provisions on the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo and substantiate the same
ISSUE: WON the totality of evidence satisfies the degree of proof
required by the Amparo Rule to establish an enforced disappearance.
HELD: NO; The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated on
October 24, 2007 amidst rising incidence of “extralegal killings” and
“enforced disappearances.” It was formulated in the exercise of this
Court’s expanded rule-making power for the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights enshrined in the 1987
Constitution, albeit limited to these two situations. “Extralegal
killings” refer to killings committed without due process of law, i.e.,
without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand,
“enforced disappearances” are attended by the following
characteristics: an arrest, detention, or abduction of a person by a
government official or organized groups or private individuals acting
with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the
refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person
concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty
which places such person outside the protection of law.
LEE VS ILAGAN
FACTS: Neri, a police officer, filed a petition or the issuance of Writ
of Habeas Data against Joy, her former common-law partner.
According to him, sometime in July, he visited Joy’s condominium and
rested or a while. When he arrived at his office, he noticed his digital
camera missing. On August 23, 2011, Joy confronted him about a
purported sex video she discovered from the digital camera showing
him and another woman. He denied the video and demanded the
return of the camera, but she refused. 'hey had an altercation where
Neri allegedly slammed Joy’s head against a wall and then walked
away. because of this, Joy filed several cases against him, including a
case for violation
of republic Act 9262 and administrative cases before the Napolcom.
utilizing the said video. the use of the same violated his right to life,
liberty, security and privacy and that of the other woman, thus he
had no choice but to file the petition for issuance of the writ of
habeas data
private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or
storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home,
and correspondence o the aggrieved party. thus, in order to support
a petition for the issuance of such writ, Section 4 of the Habeas Data
rule essentially requires that the petition sufficiently alleges, among
others, the manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and
how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved
party.
In other words, the petition must adequately show that there exists
a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand and the right
to life liberty or security on the other.
In this case, the court found that Iligan was not able to sufficiently
allege that his right to privacy in life, liberty and security was or would
be violated through the supposed reproduction and threatened
dissemination of the sex video.

Issue: whether or not habeas data is a proper remedy

Held: The rule on the Writ of Habeas Data was conceived as a

response given the lack of effective and available remedies, to
address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced
disappearances. It was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing
the right to privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy
of individuals, which is defined as the right to control the collection,
maintenance, use, and dissemination of data about oneself.

As defned in section 1 of the Habeas Data rule, the writ of habeas

data now stands as ;a remedy available to any person whose right to
privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or o a
SALNONGA V. PANO
Facts: The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to
life and liberty guaranteed by the due process clause, alleging that no
prima facie case has been established to warrant the filing of an
information for subversion against him. Petitioner asks the Court to
prohibit and prevent the respondents from using the iron arm of the
law to harass, oppress, and persecute him, a member of the
democratic opposition in the Philippines.
The case roots backs to the rash of bombings which occurred in the
Metro Manila area in the months of August, September and October
of 1980. Victor Burns Lovely, Jr, one of the victims of the bombing,
implicated petitioner Salonga as one of those responsible.
On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent the
petitioner a “Notice of Preliminary Investigation” in People v.
Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al. (which included petitioner as a co-accused),
stating that “the preliminary investigation of the above-entitled case
has been set at 2:30 o’clock p.m. on December 12, 1980” and that
petitioner was given ten (10) days from receipt of the charge sheet
and the supporting evidence within which to file his counter-
evidence. The petitioner states that up to the time martial law was
lifted on January 17, 1981, and despite assurance to the contrary, he
has not received any copies of the charges against him nor any copies
of the so-called supporting evidence.
The counsel for Salonga was furnished a copy of an amended
complaint signed by Gen. Prospero Olivas, dated 12 March 1981,
charging Salonga, along with 39 other accused with the violation of
RA 1700, as amended by PD 885, BP 31 and PD 1736. On 15 October
1981, the counsel for Salonga filed a motion to dismiss the charges
against Salonga for failure of the prosecution to establish a prima
facie case against him. On 2 December 1981, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano
(Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII,
Quezon City) denied the motion. On 4 January 1982, he (Pano) issued
a resolution ordering the filing of an information for violation of the
Revised Anti-Subversion Act, as amended, against 40 people,
including Salonga. The resolutions of the said judge dated 2
December 1981 and 4 January 1982 are the subject of the present
petition for certiorari. It is the contention of Salonga that no prima
facie case has been established by the prosecution to justify the filing
of an information against him. He states that to sanction his further
prosecution despite the lack of evidence against him would be to
admit that no rule of law exists in the Philippines today.
Issue: whether or not sc can decide writ habeas corpus in this case
Held: Yes. Despite the SC’s dismissal of the petition due to the case’s
moot and academic nature, it has on several occasions rendered
elaborate decisions in similar cases where mootness was clearly
apparent. The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and
controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It
has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent
of protection given by constitutional guarantees.
In dela Camara vs Enage (41 SCRA 1), the court ruled that: “The fact
that the case is moot and academic should not preclude this Tribunal
from setting forth in language clear and unmistakable, the obligation
of fidelity on the part of lower court judges to the unequivocal
command of the Constitution that excessive bail shall not be
required.”
In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the Cultural
Center of the Philippines could validly be created through an
executive order was mooted by Presidential Decree No. 15, the
Center’s new charter pursuant to the President’s legislative powers
under martial law. Nevertheless, the Court discussed the
constitutional mandate on the preservation and development of
Filipino culture for national Identity. (Article XV, Section 9, Paragraph
2 of the Constitution).
In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183), the
fact that the petition was moot and academic did not prevent this
Court in the exercise of its symbolic function from promulgating one
of the most voluminous decisions ever printed in the Reports.
MARTELINO vs. ALEJANDRO
FACTS:
Major Eduardo Martelino is charged with the violation of the 94th
and 97th Articles of War, as a result of the alleged shooting on March
18, 1968 of some Muslim recruits then undergoing commando
training on the island of Corregidor. On August 12, 1969 Martelino
sought the disqualification of the President of the general court-
martial, following the latter's admission that he read newspaper
stories of the Corregidor incident. Martelino contended that the case
had received such an amount of publicity in the press and other news
media and in fact was being exploited for political purposes in
connection with the presidential election on November 11, 1969 as
to imperil his right to a fair trial. After deliberating, the military court
denied the challenge. Respondents assert that despite the publicity
which the case had received, no proof has been presented showing
that the court-martial's president's fairness and impartiality have
been impaired. On the contrary, they claim, the petitioner's own
counsel expressed confidence in the "integrity, experience and
background" of the members of the court.
ISSUE: Whether the publicity given to the case against the petitioners
was such as to prejudice their right to a fair trial?
HELD: NO, the spate of publicity in this case did not focus on the guilt
of the petitioners but rather on the responsibility of the Government
for what was claimed to be a "massacre" of Muslim trainees. If there
was a "trial by newspaper" at all, it was not of the petitioners but of
the Government. Absent here is a showing of failure of the court-
martial to protect the accused from massive publicity encouraged by
those connected with the conduct of the trial either by a failure to
control the release of information or to remove the trial to another
venue or to postpone it until the deluge of prejudicial publicity shall
have subsided. Indeed, we cannot say that the trial of the petitioners
was being held under circumstances which did not permit the
observance of those imperative decencies of procedure which have
come to be identified with due process. Granting the existence of
"massive" and "prejudicial" publicity, since the petitioners here do
not contend that the respondents have been unduly influenced but
simply that they might be by the "barrage" of publicity, we think that
the suspension of the court-martial proceedings has accomplished
the purpose sought by the petitioners' challenge for cause, by
postponing the trial of the petitioner until calmer times have
returned. The atmosphere has since been cleared and the publicity
surrounding the Corregidor incident has so far abated that we believe
the trial may now be resumed in tranquility.
PEOPLE V. AYSON
FACTS:
Felipe Ramos, a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines (PAL),
was charged with estafa for irregularities in the sale of plane tickets.
Respondent judge admitted all evidentiary and testamentary
evidence offered against Ramos except for the latter’s handwritten
note expressing his willingness to settle the irregularities alleged
against him as well as his statement during an administrative
investigation where he admitted to the offense.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not respondent judge is correct in not admitting the note
and statement in evidence.
RULING:
NO. Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under custodial interrogation
prior to and during the administrative inquiry into the discovered
irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a hand.
The constitutional rights of a person under custodial interrogation
under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did not therefore
come into play. He had voluntarily answered questions posed to him
on the first day of the administrative investigation and agreed that
the proceedings should be recorded. The note that he sent to his
superiors offering to compromise his liability in the alleged
irregularities, was a free and even spontaneous act on his part.
Petition is GRANTED. Respondent judge ordered to ADMIT IN
EVIDENCE the note and statement.
GAMBOA V. CRUZ
FACTS: Petitioner herein was arrested and was brought to the police
station because of vagrancy. The next day, the petitioner and with
other 5 detainees were ask to line up. The complainant, meanwhile,
during the line up pointed to the petitioner herein as a suspect of
robbery. After that, he was asked to sit in front of the complainant
while the latter is being investigated. An information of robbery has
been filed against the herein petitioner.
During the arraignment, the prosecution offered and presented its
evidence. While on the other hand, the petitioner, with the
assistance of his counsel, instead preparing for his evidence, file a
Motion to Acquit or Demurrer of evidence. The petitioner filed this
motion on the ground that the conduct of the line up, without notice,
and in the absence of his counsel violated his constitutional right to
counsel and to due process.
wart of custodial inquest, hence the petitioner was not entitled to
right to counsel.
Under the 1973 and 1987 Constitution, the right to counsel attaches
at the start of the investigation against the respondent, and even
before the adversary judicial proceedings against the accused begins.
While the court finds no real need to afford a suspect the services of
counsel during a police line up, the moment there is a move to elicit
admissions or confessions, even a plain information which may
appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he
should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the
right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of
the counsel.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s right to counsel and to due

process was violated during the line up.

HELD: No. The Rights to counsel and to due process is protected by

the constitution whether it be 1973 or 1987.

The right to counsel attaches upon the start of the investigation, or

when the investigating officers tries to elicit or ask information from
the accuse,even though the questions appeases to be innocent. At
this point of stage, the assistance of the counsel is needed in order to
avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions
or confessions from the lips fo the person undergoing interrogation,
for the commission of an offense.

When the petitioner was asked to line up with other detainees, he

was not asked any question nor to answer. The police line up is not
NARCISO VS. CRUZ
Facts: After a preliminary investigation, Narciso Cruz was charged
with the crime of parricidefor allegedly killing his wife. He was
thereby detained. He then filed a motion for reinvestigationand to lift
warrant of arrest.Also, Cruz filed an ex-parte motion for bail. The
prosecutor made no objection. Themotion was granted on the same
day, allowing the accused to post bail at P150,000.Flor Cruz, sister of
the deceased wife, filed a Motion to lift order allowing accused to
postbail.
Issue: Is the grant of bail valid?
Ruling: No. Cruz was charged with parricide which is punishable by
reclusion perpetua. When the penalty prescribed by law is reclusion
perpetua, a hearing must be conducted by the trial judge before the
bail can be granted. Without such hearing, the order granting bail is
void for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. In the
case, there was no basis for the granting of the bail. No hearing was
conducted on the application for bail – summary or otherwise. The
CA even found that only 10 minutes had elapsed between the filing
of the Motion and the granting of bail. Such lapse of time could not
be deemed sufficient for the trial court to receive and evaluate any
evidence. Even if the prosecutor did not object to the motion, the
judge still had no basis to grant the bail. The judge had no reason to
presume that that prosecutor knew what he was doing. It is the
judge’s duty first to determine if evidence of guilt is strong before bail
is granted.
GOV’T OF HK V. OLALIA
FACTS:
Respondent Muñoz was charged of 3 counts of offences of “accepting
an advantage as agent”, and 7 counts of conspiracy to defraud,
punishable by the common law of Hongkong. The Hongkong
Depoartment of Justice requested DOJ for the provisional arrest of
respondent Muñoz; the DOJ forward the request to the NBI then to
RTC. On the same day, NBI agents arrested him.
Respondent filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction
and writ of habeas corpus questioning the validity of the order of
arrest. The CA declared the arrest void. Hence this petition by the
Hongkong Department of Justice thru DOJ.
DOJ filed a petition for certiorari in this Court and sustained the
validity of the arrest.
Hongkong Administrative Region then filed in the RTC petition for
extradition and arrest of respondent. Meanwhile, respondent filed a
petition for bail, which was opposed by the petitioner, initially the
RTC denied the petition holding that there is no Philippine Law
granting bail in extradition cases and that private responded is a
“flight risk”.
Motion for reconsideration was filed by the respondent, which was
granted. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not right to bail can be avail in extradition cases.
HELD:
In Purganan case, the right to bail was not included in the extradition
cases, since it is available only in criminal proceedings.
However the Supreme Court, recognised the following trends in
International Law.
1. The growing importance of the individual person in publican
international law who, in the 20th century attained global
recognition.
2. The higher value now being given in human rights in international
sphere
3. The corresponding duty of countries to observe these human
rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations
4. The of duty of this court to balance the rights of the individual
under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition
on the other.
The modern trend in the public international law is the primacy
placed on the sanctity of human rights.
Enshrined the Constitution “The state values the dignity of every
human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.” The
Philippines therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and
promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process,
ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the
proceeding before the a court, to enable it to decide without delay
on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified.
ENRILE V. SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:
Year 2014, Sen. Enrile was charged with plunder before the
Sandiganbayan for their alleged involvement in the diversion and
misuse of appropriation under the PDAF. When his warrant was
issued, Sen. Enrile voluntarily surrendered to the CIDG and was later
confined and detained at the PNP General Hospital, he then filed a
motion to fix bail where he argued that:
He should be allowed to post bail as a matter of right;
Although charged with plunder his penalty would only be reclusion
temporal considering that there are two mitigating circumstances,
his voluntary surrender and that he is already at the age of 90;
That he is not a flight risk and his medical condition must be seriously
considered.
The Sandiganbayan however, denied his motion on the grounds that:
 He is charged with a capital offense;
 That it is premature for the Court to fix the amount of his bail
because the prosecution have not yet presented its
evidences.
Sen. Enrile then filed a certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for denying his
motion to fix bail?
Ruling:

Yes, the Supreme Court held that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily

ignored the objective of bail and unwarrantedly disregarded Sen.
Enrile’s fragile health and advanced age. Bail is a matter right and is
safeguarded by the constitution, its purpose is to ensure the personal
appearance of the accused during trial or whenever the court
requires and at the same time recognizing the guarantee of due
process which is the presumption of his innocence until proven guilty.
The Supreme Court further explained that Bail for the provisional
liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged should be
allowed independently of the merits charged, provided his continued
incarceration is injurious to his health and endanger his life. Hence,
the Sandiganbayan failed to observe that if Sen. Enrile be granted the
right to bail it will enable him to have his medical condition be
properly addressed and attended, which will then enable him to
attend trial therefore achieving the true purpose of bail.