BROTHERHOOD” LABOR UNITY MOVEMENT vs HON.

ZAMORA (1991)

FACTS:

 Petitioners-members of “Brotherhood Labor Unit Movement of the Philippines” (BLUM),

worked as “cargadores” or “pahinante” since 1961 at the SMC Plant. Sometime in
January 1969, the petitioner workers – numbering 140 organized themselves and
engaged in union activities.

 Believing that they are entitled to overtime and holiday pay, the petitioners aired their
gripes and grievances but it was not heeded by the respondents. One of the union
member was dismissed from work. Hence, the petitioners filed a complaint of unfair
labor practice against respondent SMC on the ground of illegal dismissal.

 On the other hand, SMC argued that the complainant are not or have never been their
employees but they are the employees of the Guaranteed Labor Contractor, an
independent labor contracting firm

 Labor Arbiter Nestor Lim rendered a decision in favor of the complainants which was
affirmed by the NLRC

 On appeal, the Secretary set aside the NLRC ruling stressing the absence of an
employer-employee relationship

Issue: Whether an employer-employee relationship exists between petitioners and respondent

San Miguel Corporation

HELD: YES

In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the elements that are

generally considered are the following: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b)
the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the employer's power to control the
employee with respect to the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished. It is
the called "control test" that is the most important element

In the CAB, petitioners worked continuously and exclusively for an average of 7 years for the
company. Considering the length of time that the petitioners have worked, there is justification to
conclude that they were engaged to perform activities necessary or desirable in the usual
business of trade of the respondent. Hence, petitioners are considered “regular employees.”

Page 1 of 29
Even assuming that there is a contract of employment executed between SMC and the said
labor contractor, the court ruled that Guaranteed and Reliable Labor contractors have neither
substantial capital nor investment to qualify as an independent contractor under the law. The
premises, tools and equipments used by the petitioners in their jobs are all supplied by the
respondent SMC. It is only the manpower or labor force which the alleged contractors supply,
suggesting the existence of a "labor only" contracting scheme prohibited by law

It is important to emphasize that that in a truly independent contractor-contractee relationship,

the fees are paid directly to the manpower agency in lump sum without indicating or implying
that the basis of such lump sum is the salary per worker multiplied by the number of workers
assigned to the company.

In the CAB, the alleged independent contractors were paid a lump sum representing only the
salaries the workers were entitled to, arrived at by adding the salaries of each worker which
depend on the volume of work they had accomplished individually. Therefore, there is no
independent contractor-contractee relationship.

WHEREFORE, PETITION IS GRANTED.

Page 2 of 29
 Tabas, et., al, vs. California Manufacturing Company Inc., et., al.
G.R. No. L-80680 January 26, 1989

SECOND DIVISION, SARMIENTO, J.:

Facts:

On July 21, 23, and 28, 1986, the petitioners petitioned the NLRC for reinstatement and
payment of various benefits, including minimum wage, overtime pay, holiday pay, thirteen-
month pay, and emergency cost of living allowance pay, against the respondent.

On October 7, 1986, after the cases had been consolidated, the respondent filed a motion to
dismiss as well as a position paper denying the existence of an employer-employee relation
between the petitioners and the respondents and, consequently, any liability for payment of
money claims.

It appears that the petitioners were, prior to their stint with respondents, employees of Livi,
which subsequently assigned them to work as "promotional merchandisers" 3 for the former firm
pursuant to a manpower supply agreement. The petitioners were made to sign employment
contracts with durations of six months, upon the expiration of which they signed new
agreements with the same period, and so on. The petitioners now allege that they had become
regular California employees and demand, as a consequence whereof, similar benefits. They
likewise claim that pending further proceedings below, they were notified by California that they
would not be rehired. As a result, they filed an amended complaint charging California with
illegal dismissal.

California admits having refused to accept the petitioners back to work but deny liability therefor
for the reason that it is not, to begin with, the petitioners' employer and that the "retrenchment"
had been forced by business losses as well as expiration of contracts. 9

Issue:

Whether there exist an employer-employee relation between the petitioners and the
respondents based on the manpower supply contract agreement between repondent California
and Livi.

Held:

The existence of an employer-employees relation is a question of law and being such, it cannot
be made the subject of agreement. Hence, the fact that the manpower supply agreement
between Livi and California had specifically designated the former as the petitioners' employer
and had absolved the latter from any liability as an employer, will not erase either party's
obligations as an employer, if an employer-employee relation otherwise exists between the
workers and either firm. At any rate, since the agreement was between Livi and California, they
alone are bound by it, and the petitioners cannot be made to suffer from its adverse
consequences.

This Court has consistently ruled that the determination of whether or not there is an employer-
employee relation depends upon four standards:

Page 3 of 29
(1) the manner of selection and engagement of the putative employee;
(2) the mode of payment of wages;
(3) the presence or absence of a power of dismissal; and
(4) the presence or absence of a power to control the putative employee's conduct. 14
Of the four, the right-of-control test has been held to be the decisive factor. 15

The Court need not therefore consider whether it is Livi or California which exercises control
over the petitioner vis-a-vis the four barometers referred to earlier, since by fiction of law, either
or both shoulder responsibility.

The records show that the petitioners bad been given an initial six-month contract, renewed for
another six months. Accordingly, under Article 281 of the Code, they had become regular
employees-of-California-and had acquired a secure tenure. Hence, they cannot be separated
without due process of law.

Decision:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Judgment is hereby RENDERED: (1): SETTING

ASIDE the decision, dated March 20, 1987, and the resolution, dated August 19, 1987; (2)
ORDERING the respondent, the California Manufacturing Company, to REINSTATE the
petitioners with full status and rights of regular employees; and (3) ORDERING the respondent,
the California Manufacturing Company, and the respondents, Livi Manpower Service, Inc.
and/or Lily-Victoria Azarcon, to PAY, jointly and severally, unto the petitioners: (a) backwages
and differential pays effective as and from the time they had acquired a regular status under the
second paragraph, of Section 281, of the Labor Code, but not to exceed three (3) years, and (b)
all such other and further benefits as may be provided by existing collective bargaining
agreement(s) or other relations, or by law, beginning such time; and (4) ORDERING the private
respondents to PAY unto the petitioners attorney's fees equivalent to ten (10%) percent of all
money claims hereby awarded, in addition to those money claims. The private respondents are
likewise ORDERED to PAY the costs of this suit.

Page 4 of 29
G.R. No. 111501, March 5, 1996

Phil. Fuji Xerox Corp., Jennifer Bernardo and Atty. Victorino Luis, petitioners

vs NLRC

Ponente: Mendoza

Facts:

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the decision of NLRC finding Fuji guilty of illegally
dismissing privated respondent Pedro Gerado and ordering him reinstated. NLRC reversed the
decision of Labor Arbiter finding Gerado to be an employee of another firm (Skillpower).

May 1977, Fuji entered into an agreement under Skillpower to operate copier machines of Fuji
in its sales offices where Gerado was assigned as key operator.

February 1983, Gerado went on leave and his place was taken by a substitute. He returned
March and discovered that there was a apoilage of over 600 copies. He tried to talk to the
service techinician of Fuji to stop the meter of the machine but was refused. Fuji then knew
about the incident and reported to Skillpower. Skillpower wrote a letter to Gerado asking for
explaination and suspended him from work. Gerado then filed for illegal dismissal.

Labor Arbiter found that Gerado applied for work to Skillpower and was made to sign a contract.
Although he receives his salaries from Fuji, Skillpower exercises control and supervision over
his wrk. Labor arbiter then held the decision that Gerado was an employee of Skillpower.

NLRC found Gerado to be an employee of Fuji and was illegally dismissed. NLRC found that
Skillpower acted on behalf of Fuji in supervising his work, and that FUji paid his salaries and
Skillpower was just a paymaster-agent.

Here, Fuji petitions that Skillpower is an independent contractor and Gerado is its employee: (1)
Gerado was recruited by Skillpower, (2) work done by Gerado was not necessary to the conduct
of business of Fuji, (3) Gerado's salaries and benefits were paid directly by Skillpower, (4)
Gerado worked under the control of Skillpower and (5) Skillpower is a highly-capitalized
business venture.

Issue: (1) Whether Gerado is an employee of Fuji or of Skillpower.

Page 5 of 29
Ruling: Contentions are without merit. Gerado is en employee of Fuji.

(1) Gerado was recruited by Skillpower to be assigned at Fuji. With a contract between Gerado
and Fuji as basis.

(2) The job of Gerado may not generate income directly to Fuji but it is necessary in their
products and promotion of the company's public image.

(3) The letters of the legal and industrial relations officer of Fuji and the union president played
the dismissal of the employee, the order of dismissal was issued as a mere obedience to the
decision of petitioner.

(4) The service being rendered by privated respondent was not a specific or special skill that
Skillpower was in the business of providing. Skillpower is classified under Article 106 of the
Labor Code; where there is "labor only" where the person supplying workers to an employer
does not have suubstantial capital or investment in the forms of tools, equipment, etc. and
workers recruited and placed are performing activities directly related to the principal employer.
Skillpower merely supplied workers to Fuji.

(5) There is an agreement between Fuji and Skillpower that Skillpower has no control over the
workers they supplied with Fuji.

Page 6 of 29
Manila Golf & Country Club, Inc., vs IAC and Fermin Llamar (1994) G.R. 64948

Facts:

Respondents were caddies and employees of Manila Golf & Country Club who originally filed a
petition with the Social Security Commission (SSC) for coverage and availment of benefits
under the Social Security Act. They alleged that although the petitioners were employees of the
Manila Golf and Country Club, a domestic corporation, the latter had not registered them as
such with the SSS.

In the case before the SSC, the respondent Club alleged that the petitioners, caddies by
occupation, were allowed into the Club premises to render services as such to the individual
members and guests playing the Club's golf course and who themselves paid for such services;
that as such caddies, the petitioners were not subject to the direction and control of the Club as
regards the manner in which they performed their work; and hence, they were not the Club's
employees.

Issue: WON there exist an employer-employee relationship between the cadies and the Golf
Club?

Held: No existence of employer-employee relationship.

In the very nature of things, caddies must submit to some supervision of their conduct while
enjoying the privilege of pursuing their occupation within the premises and grounds of whatever
club they do their work in. For all that is made to appear, they work for the club to which they
attach themselves on sufferance but, on the other hand, also without having to observe any
working hours, free to leave anytime they please, to stay away for as long they like. It is not
pretended that if found remiss in the observance of said rules, any discipline may be meted
them beyond barring them from the premises which, it may be supposed, the Club may do in
any case even absent any breach of the rules, and without violating any right to work on their
part. All these considerations clash frontally with the concept of employment.

The IAC would point to the fact that the Club suggests the rate of fees payable by the players to
the caddies as still another indication of the latter's status as employees. It seems to the Court,
however, that the intendment of such fact is to the contrary, showing that the Club has not the
measure of control over the incidents of the caddies' work and compensation that an employer
would possess. Court agree that the group rotation system so-called, is less a measure of
employer control than an assurance that the work is fairly distributed, a caddy who is absent
when his turn number is called simply losing his turn to serve and being assigned instead the
last number for the day.

Moreover, as pointed out by petitioner which was never refuted that: has no means of
compelling the presence of a caddy. A caddy is not required to exercise his occupation in the
premises of petitioner. He may work with any other golf club or he may seek employment a
caddy or otherwise with any entity or individual without restriction by petitioner.

Page 7 of 29
G.R. No. L-41182-3 April 16, 1988

DR. CARLOS L. SEVILLA and LINA O. SEVILLA, petitioners-appellants,

vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS, TOURIST WORLD SERVICE, INC., ELISEO S.CANILAO, and
SEGUNDINA NOGUERA, respondents-appellees.

On the strength of a contract (Exhibit A for the appellant Exhibit 2 for the appellees) entered into
on Oct. 19, 1960 by and between Mrs. Segundina Noguera, party of the first part; the Tourist
World Service, Inc., represented by Mr. Eliseo Canilao as party of the second part, and
hereinafter referred to as appellants, the Tourist World Service, Inc. leased the premises
belonging to the party of the first part at Mabini St., Manila for the former-s use as a branch
office. In the said contract the party of the third part held herself solidarily liable with the party of
the part for the prompt payment of the monthly rental agreed on. When the branch office was
opened, the same was run by the herein appellant Una 0. Sevilla payable to Tourist World
Service Inc. by any airline for any fare brought in on the efforts of Mrs. Lina Sevilla, 4% was to
go to Lina Sevilla and 3% was to be withheld by the Tourist World Service, Inc.

On or about November 24, 1961 (Exhibit 16) the Tourist World Service, Inc. appears to have
been informed that Lina Sevilla was connected with a rival firm, the Philippine Travel Bureau,
and, since the branch office was anyhow losing, the Tourist World Service considered closing
down its office. This was firmed up by two resolutions of the board of directors of Tourist World
Service, Inc. dated Dec. 2, 1961 (Exhibits 12 and 13), the first abolishing the office of the
manager and vice-president of the Tourist World Service, Inc., Ermita Branch, and the
second,authorizing the corporate secretary to receive the properties of the Tourist World
Service then located at the said branch office. It further appears that on Jan. 3, 1962, the
contract with the appellees for the use of the Branch Office premises was terminated and while
the effectivity thereof was Jan. 31, 1962, the appellees no longer used it. As a matter of fact
appellants used it since Nov. 1961. Because of this, and to comply with the mandate of the
Tourist World Service, the corporate secretary Gabino Canilao went over to the branch office,
and, finding the premises locked, and, being unable to contact Lina Sevilla, he padlocked the
premises on June 4, 1962 to protect the interests of the Tourist World Service. When neither the
appellant Lina Sevilla nor any of her employees could enter the locked premises, a complaint
wall filed by the herein appellants against the appellees with a prayer for the issuance of
mandatory preliminary injunction. Both appellees answered with counterclaims. For apparent
lack of interest of the parties therein, the trial court ordered the dismissal of the case without
prejudice. Trial court ruled in favor of the respondent, hence this petition.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS AN EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP EXIST.

No, there was no employer-employee relationship. The records will show that the petitioner,
Lina Sevilla, was not subject to control by the private respondent Tourist World Service, Inc.,
either as to the result of the enterprise or as to the means used in connection therewith. In the

Page 8 of 29
first place, under the contract of lease covering the Tourist Worlds Ermita office, she had bound
herself in solidum as and for rental payments, an arrangement that would be like claims of a
master-servant relationship. True the respondent Court would later minimize her participation in
the lease as one of mere guaranty, that does not make her an employee of Tourist World, since
in any case, a true employee cannot be made to part with his own money in pursuance of his
employer's business, or otherwise, assume any liability thereof. In that event, the parties must
be bound by some other relation, but certainly not employment.

Page 9 of 29
Encyclopaedia Britannica (Phil) Inc., vs NLRC (1996) G.R. 87098

Facts:

Private respondent Benjamin Limjoco was a Sales Division Manager of petitioner Encyclopaedia Britannica
and was in charge of selling petitioner’s products through some sales representatives. As compensation,
private respondent received commissions from the products sold by his agents. He was also allowed to use
petitioner’s name, goodwill and logo. It was, however, agreed upon that office expenses would be deducted
from private respondent’s commissions. Petitioner would also be informed about appointments,
promotions, and transfers of employees in private respondent’s district.

On June 1974, Limjoco resigned from office to pursue his private business. He then filed a complaint against
petitioner Encyclopaedia Britannica with DOLE, claiming for non-payment of separation pay and other
benefits, and also illegal deduction from his sales commissions.

Petitioner alleged that Limjoco was not its employee but an independent dealer authorized to promote and
sell its products and in return, received commissions there from. Limjoco did not have any salary and his
income from the company was dependent on the volume of sales accomplished. He also had his own
separate office, financed the business expenses, and maintained his own workforce. The salaries of his
secretary, utility man, and sales representatives were chargeable to his commissions. Thus, petitioner argued
that it had no control and supervision over the complainant as to the manner and means he conducted his
business operations, moreover, the latter did not even report to the office of the petitioner and did not
observe fixed office hours

Issue: WON there exist an employer-employee relationship and necessarily entitles Limjoco of his claims?

Held: Private respondent was merely an agent or an independent dealer of the petitioner.

In ascertaining whether the relationship is that of employer-employee or one of independent contractor,

each case must be determined by its own facts and all features of the relationship are to be considered.

Respondent was free to conduct his work and he was free to engage in other means of livelihood. At the
time he was connected with the petitioner company, private respondent was also a director and later the
president of the Farmers’ Rural Bank. Had he been an employee of the company, he could not be employed
elsewhere and he would be required to devote full time for petitioner. If private respondent was indeed an
employee, it was rather unusual for him to wait for more than a year from his separation from work before
he decided to file his claims. As he pointed out in his resignation letter, Limjoco was aware of “conflict with
other interests which xxx have increasingly required my personal attention”. At the very least, it would
indicate that petitioner has no effective control over the personal activities of Limjoco, who as admitted by
the latter had other “conflict of interest” requiring his personal attention.

As pointed out “the element of control is absent; where a person who works for another does so more or less
at his own pleasure and is not subject to definite hours or conditions of work, and in turn is compensated
according to the result of his efforts and not the amount thereof.”

Page 10 of 29
Insular Life vs NLRC (March 12, 1998)

FACTS:

Petitioner entered into an agency contract with respondent delos Reyes authorizing the
latter to solicit for life insurance and he would be paid compensation in the form of commissions.
It contained the stipulation that no ER-EE relationship shall be create. However, delos Reyes
was prohibited by petitioner from working for any other life insurance company and violation of
this company was a ground of termination.

Petitioner and private respondent entered into another contract where the latter was
appointed as Acting Unit Manager under its office. One of the duties of delos Reyes is to
supervise and coordinate the underwriters. It was similarly provided in the management contract
that the relation of the acting unit manager and/or the agents of his unit to the company shall be
that of independent contractor.

Private respondent worked concurrently as agent and Acting Unit Manager until he was
notified by petitioner that his services were terminated. So, he filed a complaint on the ground of
illegal dismissal and for not paying him salaries and separation pay.

ISSUE: W/N ER-EE relationship exists between Insular Life and delos Reyes

HELD: Yes.

Both petitioner and respondent NLRC treated the agency contract and the management
contract entered into between petitioner and de los Reyes as contracts of agency. There exist
major distinctions between the two arrangements. While the first has the earmarks of an agency
contract, the second is far removed from the concepts of agency in that provided therein are
conditionality that indicates an employer-employee relationship.

Private respondent was appointed as Acting Unit Manager only upon recommendation of
the District Manager. This indicates that private respondent was hired by petitioner because of
the favorable endorsement of its duly authorized officer. Then, the very designation of the
appointment of private respondent as “acting” unit manager obviously implies a temporary
employment status which may be made permanent only upon compliance with company
standards.

On the matter of payment of wages, petitioner points out that respondent was
compensated strictly on commission basis, the amount of which was totally dependent on his

Page 11 of 29
total output. But, the manager’s contract, speaks differently. Under the contract, de los Reyes
must meet with the manpower and production requirements as Acting Unit Manager.

As to the matter involving the power of dismissal and control by the employer,
respondent’s duty to collect the company’s premiums using company receipts is further
evidence of petitioner’s control over respondent.

Thus, exclusivity of service, control of assignments and removal of agents under private
respondent;s unit, collection of premiums, furnishing of company yfacilities and materials as well
as capital described are but hallmarks of the management system in which herein private
respondent worked. Private respondent de los Reyes was an employee of herein petitioner.

Wherefore, petition of Insular Life is denied.

Page 12 of 29
Francisco vs NLRC (2006) 500 SCRA 690

Facts:

Petitoner was hired by Kasei Corporation during the incorporation stage. She was designated
as accountant and corporate secretary and was assigned to handle all the accounting needs of
the company. She was also designated as Liason Officer to the City of Manila to secure permits
for the operation of the company.

In 1996, Petitioner was designated as Acting Manager. She was assigned to handle recruitment
of all employees and perform management administration functions. In 2001, she was replaced
by Liza Fuentes as Manager. Kasei Corporation reduced her salary to P2,500 per month which
was until September. She asked for her salary but was informed that she was no longer
connected to the company. She did not anymore report to work since she was not paid for her
salary. She filed an action for constructive dismissal with the Labor Arbiter.

The Labor Arbiter found that the petitioner was illegally dismissed. NLRC affirmed the decision
while CA reversed it.

Issue: WON there was an employer-employee relationship.

Held: Petitioner is an employee of Kasei Corporation.

The court held that in this jurisdiction, there has been no uniform test to determine the existence
of an employer-employee relation. Generally, courts have relied on the so-called right of control
test where the person for whom the services are performed reserves a right to control not only
the end to be achieved but also the means to be used in reaching such end. In addition to the
standard of right-of-control, the existing economic conditions prevailing between the parties, like
the inclusion of the employee in the payrolls, can help in determining the existence of an
employer-employee relationship.

The better approach would therefore be to adopt a two-tiered test involving: (1) the putative
employer’s power to control the employee with respect to the means and methods by which the
work is to be accomplished; and (2) the underlying economic realities of the activity or
relationship.

In Sevilla v. Court of Appeals, the court observed the need to consider the existing economic
conditions prevailing between the parties, in addition to the standard of right-of-control like the
inclusion of the employee in the payrolls, to give a clearer picture in determining the existence of
an employer-employee relationship based on an analysis of the totality of economic
circumstances of the worker.

Thus, the determination of the relationship between employer and employee depends upon the
circumstances of the whole economic activity, such as: (1) the extent to which the services

Page 13 of 29
performed are an integral part of the employer’s business; (2) the extent of the worker’s
investment in equipment and facilities; (3) the nature and degree of control exercised by the
employer; (4) the worker’s opportunity for profit and loss; (5) the amount of initiative, skill,
judgment or foresight required for the success of the claimed independent enterprise; (6) the
permanency and duration of the relationship between the worker and the employer; and (7) the
degree of dependency of the worker upon the employer for his continued employment in that
line of business. The proper standard of economic dependence is whether the worker is
dependent on the alleged employer for his continued employment in that line of business.

By applying the control test, there is no doubt that petitioner is an employee of Kasei
Corporation because she was under the direct control and supervision of Seiji Kamura, the
corporation’s Technical Consultant. It is therefore apparent that petitioner is economically
dependent on respondent corporation for her continued employment in the latter’s line of
business.

There can be no other conclusion that petitioner is an employee of respondent Kasei

Corporation. She was selected and engaged by the company for compensation, and is
economically dependent upon respondent for her continued employment in that line of business.
Her main job function involved accounting and tax services rendered to Respondent
Corporation on a regular basis over an indefinite period of engagement. Respondent
Corporation hired and engaged petitioner for compensation, with the power to dismiss her for
cause. More importantly, Respondent Corporation had the power to control petitioner with the
means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished.

Page 14 of 29
 Efren P. Paguio v. NLRC, Metromedia Times Corporation, Robina Y. Gokongwei, Liberto
Gomez, Jr., Yolanda E. Aragon, Frederick D. Go, and Alda Iglesia

May 9, 2003 G.R. No. 147816

Vitug, J.:

Facts:

On 22 June, 1992, respondent Metro Media Times Corporation entered into an

agreement with petitioner, Efren P. Paguio, appointing the latter to be an account executive of
the firm. The petitioner was to solicit advertisements for the “Manila Times”, a newspaper
published by the respondent company.

On 15 August, 1992, barely two months after the renewal of his contract, petitioner
received a notice of termination from the respondent firm. There was no given definite cause for
the petitioner’s termination. Aggrieved, Paguio filed a case before the labor arbiter, asking that
his dismissal be declared unlawful and prayed that respondent company officials be held
accountable for acts of unfair labor practices, P500,000.0 moral damages, and for P20,000.0
exemplary damages.

The Labor arbiter found for petitioner and declared his dismissal illegal. The arbiter
ordered respondent company and its officers to reinstate Paguio to his former position and to
pay him his commissions and other remunerations. He likewise adjudged that the general
manager of the respondent corporation be held liable to Paguio for moral damages in the
amount of P20,000.0.

On appeal, NLRC reversed the ruling of the labor arbiter and declared the contractual
relationship between the parties as a fixed-term employment.

Petitioner Paguio appealed the ruling of the NLRC before the Court of Appeals.

Issues:

Whether or not there is an employer-employee relationship, petitioner’s contract with

private respondent company is for a fixed period and whether or not petitioner’s dismissal is
legal.

Held:

As defined in Article 280 of the Labor Code, a regular employee is one who is engaged
to perform activities which are necessary and desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer as against those which are undertaken for a specific project or are seasonal. Even in
these latter cases, where such person has rendered at least one year of service, regardless of
the nature of the activity performed or of whether it is continuous or intermittent, the employment

Page 15 of 29
is considered regular as long as the activity exists, it not being indispensable that he be first
issued a regular appointment or be formally declared as such before acquiring a regular status.

The law in defining their contractual relationship, does not necessarily or exclusively
upon the terms of their written or oral contract, but also on the basis of the nature of the work
petitioner has been called upon to perform.

A lawful dismissal must meet both substantive and procedural requirements; in fine, the
dismissal must be for a just or authorized cause and must comply with the rudimentary due
process of notice and hearing. It is not shown that respondent company has fully bothered itself
with either of these requirements in terminating the services of petitioner. The notice of
termination recites no valid or just cause for the dismissal of petitioner nor does it appear that
he has been given an opportunity to be heard in his defense.

Page 16 of 29
 GREAT PACIFIC LIFE ASSURANCE v. JUDICO

G.R. No. 73887 December 21, 1989

Ponente: PARAS. J

FACTS:

Honorato Judico filed a complaint against Grepalife insurance for award of money claims
consisting of separation pay, unpaid salary and 13th month pay.

Judico entered into an agreement of agency with Grepalife to become a debit agent attached to
the Industrial Life Agency in Cebu City. He had definite work assignments including but not
limited to collection of premiums from policy holders and selling insurance to prospective clients.
He received a definite minimum amount per week as his wage known as “Sales Reserve”
wherein the failure to maintain the same would bring him back to the beginner’s employment
with fixed weekly wage of P200 for 13 weeks regardless of production. He was assigned a
definite a definite place in the office to work on when he is not in the field; and in addition to his
canvassing work he was burdened with the job collection. In both cases he was required to
make a regular report to the company regarding their duties. He was then promoted to Zone
Supervisor with additional allowance. On June 28, 1982 he was dismissed by way of
Termination of his agency contract.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is an employer-employee relationship between insurance agents

and their principal?

HELD:

Yes, there is an employer-employee relationship between Grepalife and Judico because

the element of control by Grepalife over Judico is Present.

The facts shows that Judico was controlled by Grepalife insurance company not only as to the
kind of work; that amount of results, the kind of performance but also the power of dismissal.
Judico by nature and his position and work has been a regular employee and therefore entitled
to the protection of the law and not to be terminated without valid and justifiable cause.

Page 17 of 29
 Villamaria vs. CA and Bustamante

G.R. No. 165881, April 19, 2006

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Facts:

Petitioner Villamaria and respondent Bustamante executed a contract entitled

“Kasunduan ng Bilihan ng Sasakyan sa Pamamagitan ng Boundary-Hulog”

Under the “Kasunduan”, respondent was required to remit P550 daily to petitioner, with
the amount representing the “boundary” and the partial payment for the purchase of the jeepney.
Any excess would be kept by the driver as his daily wage. Under the “Kasunduan”, the petitioner
retained ownership with the material possession vested in the driver. Also in the “Kasunduan” if
the driver failed to remit P550 for a week, the agreement would be of no force and effect with
the driver to return the jeepney to the owner. If still allowed to drive, owner and driver would
revert to a daily P550 Boundary only.

Sometime in 1999, petitioner issued a “Paalala” to all their drivers reminding them about
the “Kasunduan”

July 24, 2000, respondent Bustamante was barred by petitioner to drive the vehicle that
was already taken back.

Respondent filed an illegal dismissal complaint. Villamaria countered that there was no
dismissal because the “Kasunduan” transformed the employer – employee relationship to that of
a buyer – seller.

The Labor Arbiter decided in favor of petitioner with the reason that the “Kasunduan”
was in effect between the parties and with the “Paalala” it was shown that respondent had
violated the terms of the contract and is not entitled to damages.

Respondent appealed to NLRC which then was then dismissed not because of the
arbiter’s decision but because of jurisdictional issues pertaining to the “Kasunduan” which gives
way to the juridical relationship as vendor – vendee meaning that the Labor Arbiter had no
jurisdiction over the case. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration was also denied.

Issue:

Whether or not the employer – employee relationship exists even with the “Kasunduan”?

Ruling:

The juridical relationship of employer – employee was not negated by the “Kasunduan”,
considering that the petitioner retained control of respondent’s conduct as driver of the vehicle.

Page 18 of 29
 Sy et. Al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 142293 February 27, 2003

SECOND DIVISION, QUISUMBING, J.:

Facts:

Sometime in 1958, private respondent Jaime Sahot5 started working as a truck helper for
petitioners’ family-owned trucking business. In 1965, he became a truck driver of the same
family business. Throughout all for 36 years, private respondent continuously served the
trucking business of petitioners. However, starting in April 1994, Sahot had been incurring
absences as he was suffering from various ailments which greatly affected the performance of
his task as a driver. He inquired about his medical and retirement benefits with the Social
Security System (SSS) on April 25, 1994, but discovered that his premium payments had not
been remitted by his employer. And due to his absences, he was dismissed from work.

On September 13, 1994, Sahot filed with the NLRC NCR Arbitration Branch, a complaint for
illegal dismissal praying for the recovery of separation pay and attorneys fees against herein
petitioners.

For their part, petitioners admitted they had a trucking business in the 1950s but denied
employing helpers and drivers. They contend that private respondent was not illegally dismissed
as a driver because he was in fact petitioner’s industrial partner. They add that it was not until
the year 1994, when SBT Trucking Corporation was established, and only then did respondent
Sahot become an employee of the company, with a monthly salary that reached P4,160.00 at
the time of his separation.

Issue: Whether an employer-employee relationship existed between petitioners and private

respondent Sahot.

Held:

We agree with complainant that there was error committed by the Labor Arbiter when he
concluded that complainant was an industrial partner prior to 1994. A computation of the age of
complainant shows that he was only twenty-three (23) years when he started working with
respondent as truck helper. How can we entertain in our mind that a twenty-three (23) year old
man, working as a truck helper, be considered an industrial partner. Hence we rule that
complainant was only an employee, not a partner of respondents from the time complainant
started working for respondent.17

The elements to determine the existence of an employment relationship are: (a) the selection
and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d)
the employer’s power to control the employee’s conduct. The most important element is the

Page 19 of 29
employer’s control of the employee’s conduct, not only as to the result of the work to be done,
but also as to the means and methods to accomplish it.19

As found by the appellate court, petitioners owned and operated a trucking business since the
1950s and by their own allegations, they determined private respondent’s wages and rest
day.20 Records of the case show that private respondent actually engaged in work as an
employee. During the entire course of his employment he did not have the freedom to determine
where he would go, what he would do, and how he would do it. He merely followed instructions
of petitioners and was content to do so, as long as he was paid his wages. Indeed, said the CA,
private respondent had worked as a truck helper and driver of petitioners not for his own
pleasure but under the latter’s control.

Time and again this Court has said that "if doubt exists between the evidence presented by the
employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter."25 Here,
we entertain no doubt. Private respondent since the beginning was an employee of, not an
industrial partner in, the trucking business.

Decision:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated February
29, 2000 is AFFIRMED. Petitioners must pay private respondent Jaime Sahot his separation
pay for 36 years of service at the rate of one-half monthly pay for every year of service,
amounting to P74,880.00, with interest of six per centum (6%) per annum from finality of this
decision until fully paid.

Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

Austria-Martinez, J., no part.

Page 20 of 29
MAKATI HABERDASHERY, INC., JORGE LEDESMA and CECILIO G. INOCENCIO,
petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, CEFERINA J. DIOSANA (Labor Arbiter,
Department of Labor and Employment, National Capital Region), SANDIGAN NG
MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO (SANDIGAN)-TUCP and its members, JACINTO GARCIANO,
ALFREDO C. BASCO, VICTORIO Y. LAURETO, ESTER NARVAEZ, EUGENIO L. ROBLES,
BELEN N. VISTA, ALEJANDRO A. ESTRABO, VEVENCIO TIRO, CASIMIRO ZAPATA,
GLORIA ESTRABO, LEONORA MENDOZA, MACARIA G. DIMPAS, MERILYN A. VIRAY,
LILY OPINA, JANET SANGDANG, JOSEFINA ALCOCEBA and MARIA ANGELES,
respondents.

Individual complainants, private respondents herein, have been working for petitioner Makati
Haberdashery, Inc. as tailors, seamstress, sewers, basters (manlililip) and "plantsadoras". They
are paid on a piece-rate basis except Maria Angeles and Leonila Serafina who are paid on a
monthly basis. In addition to their piece-rate, they are given a daily allowance of three (P 3.00)
pesos provided they report for work before 9:30 a.m. everyday.

Private respondents are required to work from or before 9:30 a.m. up to 6:00 or 7:00 p.m. from
Monday to Saturday and during peak periods even on Sundays and holidays.

On July 20, 1984, the Sandigan ng Manggagawang Pilipino, a labor organization of the
respondent workers, filed a complaint docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 7-2603-84 for (a)
underpayment of the basic wage; (b) underpayment of living allowance; (c) non-payment of
overtime work; (d) non-payment of holiday pay; (e) non-payment of service incentive pay; (f)
13th month pay; and (g) benefits provided for under Wage Orders Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. 1

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT EMPLOYER EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP EXIST.

Yes there was employer-employee relationship that existed. The first issue which is the pivotal
issue in this case is resolved in favor of private respondents. The test of employer-employee
relationship is four-fold: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of
wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the employee's conduct. It is the
so called "control test" that is the most important element. This simply means the determination
of whether the employer controls or has reserved the right to control the employee not only as to
the result of the work but also as to the means and method by which the same is to be
accomplished.

The facts at bar indubitably reveal that the most important requisite of control is present. As
gleaned from the operations of petitioner, when a customer enters into a contract with the
haberdashery or its proprietor, the latter directs an employee who may be a tailor, pattern maker,
sewer or "plantsadora" to take the customer's measurements, and to sew the pants, coat or shirt
as specified by the customer. Supervision is actively manifested in all these aspects — the
manner and quality of cutting, sewing and ironing.

Page 21 of 29
ALEJANDRO MARAGUINOT, JR. and PAULINO ENERO, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (SECOND DIVISION) composed of
Presiding Commissioner RAUL T. AQUINO, Commissioner ROGELIO I. RAYALA and
Commissioner VICTORIANO R. CALAYCAY (Ponente), VIC DEL ROSARIO and VIVA FIMS,
respondents.

FACTS:

The parties present conflicting sets of facts.

Petitioner Alejandro Maraguinot, Jr. maintains that he was employed by private respondents on
18 July 1989 as part of the filming crew with a salary of P375.00 per week. About four months
later, he was designated Assistant Electrician with a weekly salary of P400.00, which was
increased to P450.00 in May 1990. In June 1991, he was promoted to the rank of Electrician
with a weekly salary of P475.00, which was increased to P539.00 in September 1991.

Petitioner Paulino Enero, on his part, claims that private respondents employed him in June
1990 as a member of the shooting crew with a weekly salary of P375.00, which was increased
to P425.00 in May 1991, then to P475.00 on 21 December 1991.

Petitioners' tasks consisted of loading, unloading and arranging movie equipment in the
shooting area as instructed by the cameraman, returning the equipment to Viva Films'
warehouse, assisting in the "fixing" of the lighting system, and performing other tasks that the
cameraman and/or director may assign.

Sometime in May 1992, petitioners sought the assistance of their supervisors, Mrs. Alejandria
Cesario, to facilitate their request that private respondents adjust their salary in accordance with
the minimum wage law. In June 1992, Mrs. Cesario informed petitioners that Mr. Vic del Rosario
would agree to increase their salary only if they signed a blank employment contract. As
petitioners refused to sign, private respondents forced Enero to go on leave in June 1992, then
refused to take him back when he reported for work on 20 July 1992. Meanwhile, Maraguinot
was dropped from the company payroll from 8 to 21 June 1992, but was returned on 22 June
1992. He was again asked to sign a blank employment contract, and when he still refused,
private respondents terminated his services on 20 July 1992. Petitioners thus sued for illegal
dismissal before the Labor Arbiter.

Hence, the Labor Arbiter, in his decision of 20 December 1993, decreed as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that complainants were illegally

dismissed.

Respondents are hereby ordered to reinstate complainant to their former positions without loss
[of] seniority rights and pay their backwages starting July 21, 1992 to December 31, 1993

Page 22 of 29
temporarily computed in the amount of P38,000.00 for complainant Paulino Enero and
P46,000.00 for complainant Alejandro Maraguinot, Jr. and thereafter until actually reinstated.

Respondents are ordered to pay also attorney's fees equivalent to ten (10%) and/or P8,400.00
on top of the award.

Private respondents appealed to the NLRC (docketed as NLRC NCR-CA No. 006195-94). In its
decision of 10 February 1995, the NLRC found the following circumstances of petitioners' work
"clearly established:"

1. Complainants [petitioners herein] were hired for specific movie projects

and their employment was co-terminus with each movie project the
completion/termination of which are pre-determined, such fact being
made known to complainants at the time of their engagement.

xxx xxx xxx

2 Each shooting unit works on one movie project at a time. And the work
of the shooting units, which work independently from each other, are not
continuous in nature but depends on the availability of movie projects.

3. As a consequence of the non-continuous work of the shooting units,

the total working hours logged by complainants in a month show extreme
variations. . . For instance, complainant Maraguinot worked for only 1.45
hours in June 1991 but logged a total of 183.25 hours in January 1992.
Complainant Enero logged a total of only 31.57 hours in September 1991
but worked for 183.35 hours the next month, October 1991.

4. Further shown by respondents is the irregular work schedule of

complainants on a daily basis. Complainant Maraguinot was supposed to
report on 05 August 1991 but reported only on 30 August 1991, or a gap
of 25 days. Complainant Enero worked on 10 September 1991 and his
next scheduled working day was 28 September 1991, a gap of 18 days.

5. The extremely irregular working days and hours of complainants' work

explain the lump sum payment for complainants' services for each movie
project. Hence, complainants were paid a standard weekly salary
regardless of the number of working days and hours they logged in.
Otherwise, if the principle of "no work no pay" was strictly applied,
complainants' earnings for certain weeks would be very negligible.

6. Respondents also alleged that complainants were not prohibited from

working with such movie companies like Regal, Seiko and FPJ
Productions whenever they are not working for the independent movie

Page 23 of 29
 producers engaged by respondents . . . This allegation was never
rebutted by complainants and should be deemed admitted.

The NLRC, in reversing the Labor Arbiter, then concluded that these circumstances, taken
together, indicated that complainants (herein petitioners) were "project employees."

After their motion for reconsideration was denied by the NLRC in its Resolution of 6 April 1995,
petitioners filed the instant petition, claiming that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in: (1) finding that petitioners were project employees;
(2) ruling that petitioners were not illegally dismissed; and (3) reversing the decision of the Labor
Arbiter.

To support their claim that they were regular (and not project) employees of private respondents,
petitioners cited their performance of activities that were necessary or desirable in the usual
trade or business of private respondents and added that their work was continuous, i.e., after
one project was completed they were assigned to another project. Petitioners thus considered
themselves part of a work pool from which private respondents drew workers for assignment to
different projects. Petitioners lamented that there was no basis for the NLRC's conclusion that
they were project employees, while the associate producers were independent contractors; and
thus reasoned that as regular employees, their dismissal was illegal since the same was
premised on a "false cause," namely, the completion of a project, which was not among the
causes for dismissal allowed by the Labor Code.

Private respondents reiterate their version of the facts and stress that their evidence supports
the view that petitioners are project employees; point to petitioners' irregular work load and work
schedule; emphasize the NLRC's finding that petitioners never controverted the allegation that
they were not prohibited from working with other movie companies; and ask that the facts be
viewed in the context of the peculiar characteristics of the movie industry.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) is convinced that this petition is improper since
petitioners raise questions of fact, particularly, the NLRC's finding that petitioners were project
employees, a finding supported by substantial evidence; and submits that petitioners' reliance
on Article 280 of the Labor Code to support their contention that they should be deemed regular
employees is misplaced, as said section "merely distinguishes between two types of employees,
i.e., regular employees and casual employees, for purposes of determining the right of an
employee to certain benefits."

The OSG likewise rejects petitioners' contention that since they were hired not for one project,
but for a series of projects, they should be deemed regular employees. Citing Mamansag v.
NLRC, the OSG asserts that what matters is that there was a time-frame for each movie project
made known to petitioners at the time of their hiring. In closing, the OSG disagrees with
petitioners' claim that the NLRC's classification of the movie producers as independent
contractors had no basis in fact and in law, since, on the contrary, the NLRC "took pains in
explaining its basis" for its decision.

Page 24 of 29
As regards the propriety of this action, which the Office of the Solicitor General takes issue with,
we rule that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the proper
remedy for one who complains that the NLRC acted in total disregard of evidence material to or
decisive of the controversy. 15 In the instant case, petitioners allege that the NLRC's conclusions
have no basis in fact and in law, hence the petition may not be dismissed on procedural or
jurisdictional grounds.

ISSUE:

1. Whether an employer-employee relationship existed between petitioners and private

respondents or any one of private respondents.
2. Whether petitioners were illegally dismissed.

RULING:

The Court's ruling here is meant precisely to give life to the constitutional policy of strengthening
the labor sector, but, we stress, not at the expense of management. Lest it be misunderstood,
this ruling does not mean that simply because an employee is a project or work pool employee
even outside the construction industry, he is deemed, ipso jure, a regular employee. All that we
hold today is that once a project or work pool employee has been:

(1) continuously, as opposed to intermittently, re-hired by the same employer for the same
tasks or nature of tasks; and

(2) these tasks are vital, necessary and indispensable to the usual business or trade of the
employer, then the employee must be deemed a regular employee,pursuant to Article 280 of the
Labor Code and jurisprudence.

To rule otherwise would allow circumvention of labor laws in industries not falling within the
ambit of Policy Instruction No. 20/Department Order No. 19, hence allowing the prevention of
acquisition of tenurial security by project or work pool employees who have already gained the
status of regular employees by the employer's conduct.

In closing then, as petitioners had already gained the status of regular employees, their
dismissal was unwarranted, for the cause invoked by private respondents for petitioners'
dismissal, viz.: completion of project, was not, as to them, a valid cause for dismissal under
Article 282 of the Labor Code. As such, petitioners are now entitled to back wages and
reinstatement, without loss of seniority rights and other benefits that may have accrued.
Nevertheless, following the principles of "suspension of work" and "no pay" between the end of
one project and the start of a new one, in computing petitioners' back wages, the amounts
corresponding to what could have been earned during the periods from the date petitioners
were dismissed until their reinstatement when petitioners' respective Shooting Units were not
undertaking any movie projects, should be deducted.

Page 25 of 29
Petitioners were dismissed on 20 July 1992, at a time when Republic Act No. 6715 was already
in effect. Pursuant to Section 34 thereof which amended Section 279 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines and Bustamante v. NLRC, petitioners are entitled to receive full back wages from the
date of their dismissal up to the time of their reinstatement, without deducting whatever earnings
derived elsewhere during the period of illegal dismissal, subject however, to the above
observations.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission in NLRC NCR CA No. 006195-94 dated 01 February 1995, as well as its
Resolution dated 6 April 1995, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE for having been
rendered with grave abuse of discretion, and the decision of the Labor Arbiter in NLRC NCR
Case No. 00-07-03994-92 is REINSTATED, subject, however, to the modification above
mentioned in the computation of back wages.No pronouncement as to costs.

Page 26 of 29
 Orlando Farm Groves Association vs NLRC
299 SCRA 364

GR No 129076 November 25, 1998

Parties:

ORLANDO FARMS GROWERS ASSOCIATION/GLICERIO AÑOVER, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FIFTH DIVISION),
ANTONIO PAQUIT, ESTHER BONGGOT, FRANCISCO BAUG, LEOCADIO ORDONO,
REBECCA MOREN, MARCELINA HONTIVEROS, MARTIN ORDONO, TITO ORDONO, FE
ORDONO, ERNIE COLON, EUSTIQUIO GELDO, DANNY SAM, JOEL PIAMONTE,
FEDERICO PASTOLERO, VIRGINIA BUSANO, EDILMIRO ALDION, EUGENIO BETICAN, JR.
and BERNARDO OPERIO, respondents.

Romero, J.

Facts:

Petitioner Orlando Farms Growers Association, with co-petitioner Glicerio Añover as its
President, is an association of landowners engaged in the production of export quality bananas
located in Kinamayan, Sto. Tomas, Davao del Norte, established for the sole purpose of dealing
collectively with Stanfilco on matters concerning technical services, canal maintenance,
irrigation and pest control, among others. Respondents, on the other hand, were hired as farm
workers by several member-landowners but; nonetheless, were made to perform functions as
packers and harvesters in the plantation of petitioner association.

After respondents were dismissed on various dates from January 8, 1993 to July 30,
1994, several complaints were filed against petitioner for illegal dismissal and monetary benefits.

Issues:

Petitioner alleged that the NLRC erred in finding that respondents were its employees
and not of the individual landowners which fact can easily be deduced from the payments made
by the latter of respondent's Social Security System (SSS) contributions. Moreover, it could
have never exercised the power of control over them with regard to the manner and method by

Page 27 of 29
which the work was to be accomplished, which authority remain vested with the landowners
despite becoming members thereof.

Held:

Held in the case of Filipinas Broadcasting Network, Inc. v. NLRC, 3 the following are generally
considered in the determination of the existence of an employer-employee relationship;

(1) the manner of selection and engagement;

(2) the payment of wages;

(3) the presence or absence of the power of dismissal;

(4) the presence or absence of the power of control;

During the subsistence of the association, several circulars and memoranda were issued
concerning, among other things, absences without formal request, loitering in the work area and
disciplinary measures with which every worker is enjoined to comply. Furthermore, the
employees were issued identification cards which the Court, in the case of Domasig v.
NLRC, construed, not only as a security measure but mainly to identify the holder as a bonafide
employee of the firm. However, what makes the relationship explicit is the power of the
petitioner to enter into compromise agreements involving money claims filed by three of its
employees, namely: Lorna Paquit, Lovella Dorlones and Jasmine Espanola

In spite of the overwhelming evidence sufficient to justify a conclusion that respondents

were indeed employees of petitioner, the latter, nevertheless, maintain the preposterous claim
that the ID card, circulars and memoranda were issued merely to facilitate the efficient use of
common resources, as well as to promote uniform rules in the work establishment.

The observations made by the NLRC when it ruled that, while the original purpose of the
formation of the association was merely to provide the landowners a unified voice in dealing
with Stanfilco, petitioner however exceeded its avowed intentions when its subsequent actions
reenforced only too clearly its admitted role of employer.

Page 28 of 29
 Factual findings of the NLRC, particularly when they coincide with those of the Labor
Arbiter, are accorded respect, even finality, and will not be disturbed for as long as such findings
are supported by substantial evidence.

It is settled that in termination disputes, the employer bears the burden of proving that
the dismissal is for just cause, failing which it would mean that the dismissal is not justified and
the employer is entitled to reinstatement. The dismissal of employees must be made within the
parameters of the law and pursuant to the basic tenets of equity, justice and fair play. In Brahm
Industries, Inc. v. NLRC, the Court explained that there are two (2) facets of valid termination of
employment;

(a) the legality of the act of dismissal, i.e., the dismissal must be under any of the just
causes provided under Art. 282 of the Labor Code; and

(b) the legality of the manner of dismissal, which means that there must be observance
of the requirements of due process, otherwise known as the two-notice rule.

Thus, "the employer is required to furnish the employee with a written notice containing a
statement of the cause for termination and to afford said employee ample opportunity to be
heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires. The
employer is also required to notify the worker in writing of the decision to dismiss him, stating
clearly the reasons therefore."

Decision:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of
the National Labor Relations Commission dated September 6, 1995 is AFFIRMED subject to
the deletion of the award of moral damages and attorney's fees. The Court, however, is
remanding this case to Labor Arbiter Newton R. Sancho to specify in the dispositive portion of
his decision the names of the respondents and the amount that each is entitled to.

Page 29 of 29