Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
In Schelling’s “On the Relation between the Real and the Ideal in
dzȋͣͪͨ͢Ȍǡ
e-
ǡ it Ǥ
ǯ
ǡr-
mer as an instance of the nature from which iǡa-
ǯ
ǯr-
ǫǡǡ
ǫ
ǡ
ǡ
Ǥ
͟Ǥ
Why did Schelling not write a book of logic? In fact, he did, athough
there are no logics in Schelling that are not environed by “intercon-
nected resistants” (zusammenhängende Gegenstände), as the Frei-
heitsschrift states 1, no systems not embedded in others, according to
the Stuttgart Seminars 2 and the lecture “On the Nature of Philosophy
A version of this paper was delivered at the second annual conference of the
ǣ
, in London, Ontario, in
͟͠͞͡Ǥ and Ben Woodard for
organizing that excellent event, and, for the introduction to the present essay, to
Ǥ
1 Ǥ Ǥ
Ǥ
ǡ
ò
i-
man decided to create a system, there already existed one, that of the cosmos
[ ȐǤdz ǡ ͢͟͠ǡ (Ǥ) Ǥ
s Primal Germ or Nothing Is ͥ͟͞
they are therefore something partial or subordinateǤdz ǡ ͧ͠͞ǡ Ǥ
Ǥ Dz
ǡdz Ǥ Dž ǡ ȋǤȌ
ͣͪͤͥȀͥͥǡȋǤȌǤ ȋǣǯǡͧͥ͟͠Ȍǡ͟͢–ͣ͟Ǥ
7 Andere Deduktion paraphrased above is a concise source for Schelling’s
Ǥ
ͦ͟͞ , ǤͣͫǤͣȋȀͤͣͧ͢Ȍ
8 ǡͣͧ͡–ͥͦǡǤǤ
On the World SoulǤ
9 Schelling, Groundingǡͤͣ͡Ǥ
10 SW ǡ͡͡͠Ǥ
11 Dz
ȏWissenschaft] lies in the cognition [é]
ϐ
ǡǡͤ͟͞Ǥ
s Primal Germ or Nothing Is ͧ͟͞
ǡ
Ǥ ϐ
logic contests is that it can be withdrawn from its environment, its
ǡ
Ǥ ǡ
the entailment of the transcendental that whatever is must meet it on
ǡ
Ǥ
een bought by, amongst other methods, the
ǣ ϐǡ
non-constitutedness the recipient of whatever it is that is said to
be given 13, violating what I shall call the Kantian axiom that “he who
wouϐ
dz 14 in the interests of
Dz dz
ǡ
Ǥ
ǡ
result of that procedure would be that the known is not, while only
what is not known is, or that “what is” is entirely knowing-dependent
Ǥ
Second, the short-circuiting of nature that is the presupposition of
givenness demonstrates a physiocidal tendency as evident in con-
tempo
ǯǤ 15 ǡDzdz
ȋDzdzǡȌǤ
ǡ
ǡ
certain readings, eliminates any ontology for which being is insepa-
Ǥ
ǡ
to contest the connectedness of thought and being, but their insepa-
ǡ
ǡ
ǡo-
Ǥ ǡ n revisiting the problem of the conceptual
constructedness of what is, rather than worrying about egress from
the transcendental to some non-conceptual reality, I have in my
Ǥ
13 Dz Ǯǯǣ
ǡ
ǡ
universals, proposiǡ
ǡϐ
ǡǤdz
Wilfrid Sellars,
Ǥ
Robert Brandom ȋǣǡͧͧͥ͟Ȍǡ͟͢Ǥ
14 Immanuel Kant, ǡ ȋǤ ǤȌ Ǥ Dž ȋǣ m-
ǡͧͧ͟͡Ȍǡ͢͠͞Ǥ
15 ǡǡ
ǯǤǡȋǤȌ
ȋǣǡ͠͞͞͠Ȍǡͥͥ͠ǣDz
reminder of second nature has done its work, nature can drop out of my picture
Ǥdz
ϐ
ǯǡ Transcendental Ontolo-
Ǥ
ȋǣ ǡ ͟͟͠͞Ȍǡ
“hardly ever mentions the world in his book Ǥdz ȋi) See also
ǯ
ǯ
ȋm-
ǣ ǡ ͧͧ͟͢Ȍǡ Dz dz
ȏǣȀȀǤǤȀ
ȀȀȀǤȐ
ͥ
͟͢͠͞Ǥ
͟͟͞ , ǤͣͫǤͣȋȀͤͣͧ͢Ȍ
16 Ǥ Dz
Higher Physics,” in
Ǥ
ϐ On the World Soul ͥͧͦ͟ǡ
ǡ
which On the Relation ǡͦͤ͟͞ǡͦͧ͟͞Ǥ
s Primal Germ or Nothing Is ͟͟͟
matters, since thought is, like its resistants, the universe in the uni-
Ǥ
Dz
dz
ǡǤ
͠Ǥǥǣ
ǥǤ dialectical which reasons from
Ǥdz ǡ
ǡ ȋǤȌ Ǥ ǡ Posterior
ǡ
ȋǣǡͧͤ͟͞Ȍǡ͟͞͞Ǥ
s Primal Germ or Nothing Is ͟͟͡
21 Dz ǡ ǡ a-
Ǣ
Ǥ
ǡ
Ǥt
is that is being (and this in the end is alone what it is concerned with), one must,
ǡ
ǡ
ǤTentan-
Ǥdzȋǡ͡͡͞Ȍ
22 Dz
s, the irreducible [nie aufge-
24
ǯ ǡ ͢͟͡Ȁǡ ͟͡ ǡ ͟͠͡–
͟͢ȀǡͦǤ
25 “Absolute identity has surely never ceased being identity, and everything that
ȏαȐǤϐǡǮαǯǡ
ǡǮαǯǡǡϐǡ
third, ‘A and B are ǯǡǡǮǤǯdzȋǡ͟͢͠ȀǡͦȌ
ͤ͟͟ , ǤͣͫǤͣȋȀͤͣͧ͢Ȍ
28ǡͣ͟͠ȀDzǡdzͣ͟͠Ǥ
29Dzǣ
ǯ
,” Schelling StudienǡǤ͟ȋ͟͢͠͞Ȍǡ͡–͢͠Ǥ
s Primal Germ or Nothing Is ͥ͟͟
ǡ
ǡ
Ǥ omena of nature result
from the ǡ or raising [] of this un-
known rootǤ ǡ
i-
ϐ
ǡ
Ǥȋǡͣͧ͡Ȍ
ǡǣ
Dzdz
ǡǡǡǤ
ǡ ǡ
ϐi-
ciently local as to be susceptible of isolation, matter would be singu-
lar and isolated from the universe that it could no longer, in conse-
ǡǤ
ǡ
t-
Ǥ ϐ
ǡ
ǡ Ǥ ǡ ϐ
ǡ
before it is said to be darkness itself, raising the distinction between
exemplar and archetype, on the one hand, and between particular
ǡ Ǥ ϐǣ
ϐ ǡ
ǫ
ǡ
ǡ
ǡ
is, relatively dark but not darkneǫϐes,
but is not ǡ
Ǥ
If, taking the second distinction, matter is particular, whatever
ǡǤ
universal, however, in what respect is it differentiable, even on the
scale of light and dark? In what respect, that is, would it be darkness
Ǥ
ǡ ϐ
Dz
cognitive faculties are our representations connected together? Is it the under-
ǡ
ǫdzϐc-
tion achieves the proper environing of representations and the correct distribu-
Ǥ
ϐ
ǡ
ǯ
ǡ ǡ
ǡ
ǡǤ
ͦ͟͟ , ǤͣͫǤͣȋȀͤͣͧ͢Ȍ
itself, or darkness, since its universality would entail that it also
Ǥ
hown that, for Schelling, the
universe is the only measure of a universal, although in such a claim,
Ǥ
ϐ ϐǡ
instance of the fǡ
Ǥ
Yet the passage does not only particularize matter as a logical
Ǥ Dz
forms,” that is, that it is a morphogenetic universal or “the universe,
ϐ Ǥdz ȋ ǡ ͤ͡͠Ȍ 31 Schelling’s particularization of
matter as a root, precisely in the sense that it can be potentiated or
raised, of a mathematically comprehensible morphogenesis 32, is
ϐDzǤdzǡ
ǡ
ǡ
then the link between matter and morphogenesis is lacking, leaving
the latter incomprehensible if the root remains unǤ
It is important to note, however, that Schelling’s claim is not that
this root is a “thing,” sensibly or physically located amongst other
things and merely therefore in Ǥ ǡ
function, it obtains only when the functioǤ
ǡϐ
ǡ
ȋ͟Ȍ it can have none in itself, as we have seen, and
ȋ͠Ȍ
Ǥ
ǡ
es obtain, then as root of “all the
forms and living phenomena of nature,” it must be s
ǡ
were, a higher-order exhibition than merely the existing or
31 ǡ Forms of Becomingǡ ȋǤȌ Ǥ
(Princǣ
ǡ ͧ͠͞͞Ȍǣ “the universe of possible forms
ǡ ϐǡ Ǥ
ϐ
included or excluded from ϐǫdzȋͤ͢Ȍ
32
ǡ
33ǡ Forms of Becomingǡ ͦͧ–ͧ͞ǡ
Dzϐ ϐǡdz
ǣ ȋ͟Ȍ
“mature” or “adult” form, since as chrysalis forming animals demonstrate, an
Ǣ ȋ͠) also dropping the geneticist
assumption of the terminus of process in individuation, since not all processes
Ǥ
tter served by a focus on Ǥ(IbidǤǡ
ͧ͟͠–ͧ͡Ȍ
͟͠͞ , ǤͣͫǤͣȋȀͤͣͧ͢Ȍ
ȋǣǡͧͦͦ͟Ȍǡͦͦ͟Ǥ
36 IbidǤ
s Primal Germ or Nothing Is ͟͟͠
͢Ǥ
ǡ
the arche kineseos
ǡ Dz dz y-
37 IbidǤǡ͠͠͡Ȁͥͧ͟Ǥ
͟͠͠ , ǤͣͫǤͣȋȀͤͣͧ͢Ȍ
39
ǡ ȋǣǡ
͠͞͞͞Ȍǡ͢͠Ǥ
͟͢͠ , ǤͣͫǤͣȋȀͤͣͧ͢Ȍ
obtaining, and both sever nature into a before and an after, both of
ǡ
ǡǤ
ǡǡ
ϐ
ǫ ǡ
we have hinted at the topological complexity of Schelling’s thought of
the copula, to the fuller exhibition of which this essay is preparato-
Ǥ 40 ϐ
ǣϐǡ
with Schelling, that the copula in matter is not another, but only a
“stricter” one than in reaǤȋǡͤ͡͞Ȍǡn-
ic problem of the ϐ
the extent that the division between nature and logic must always be
the effect of the understanding in nature, the “division of forces,” as
the Freiheitschrift
Dzϐ
Ǥdzȋǡǣͤ͟͡Ȁǡͤ͡Ȍ
Second, in the essay we have been considering, as in the First Out-
line, the World Soul, the
, and the , but
also in the dimensional diagrams that pepper niversal Deduction,
the magnetic lines that gradually transform into the
41 of
propositions within propositions, and then into the Weltformel 42, or
the fascination with Aristotle’s ethological modelling of behaviour in
the Darstellung des rein-ra 43ǡ
ǯ
is the morphology or topology of the sheerly but not merely ideal
insofar as this consists in the self-augmentation of the real, rather
than as a supersession, suspension, replacement, or merely epistem-
ic eliminatǡDzdzǡǤ
ǡǡ
ϐa-
tive realism on ǡϐ
Ǥ ǡ ϐinally, adds to the
catalogue of real forms, this is because nature is generalizably tran-
Ǥ
-
ϐ
ǡ
darkness itself, according tǤ
Ǥ
̻Ǥ
Ǥ
ǡ ȋǤȌ Ǥ ardt (Stuttgart- ǣ m-
mann-ǡ ͧͦͧ͟Ȍǡ ͣͣ–ͣͤǤ ǡ ͟͞͡ǡ Ǥ Ǥ
ȋǣǡͧͧ͟͢Ȍǡͥ͟͟Ǥ
42 ǡ͟͡͠Ȁǡͦ͢Ǥ
43
ͧ͟ǡǡ͢͡͡–ͣͤǤ