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Ullrich Langer "Aristotle commentary and ethical behaviour: Bernardo Segni on friendship between unequals (Ethica d’Aristotile tradotta in lingua fiorentina et comentata, 1550)" in Philosophy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries: Conversations with Aristotle. Constance Blackwell & Sachiko Kusukawa (eds.) Ashgate (1999) [Routledge, 2016]
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Aristotle commentary and ethical behaviour: Bernardo Segni on friendship between unequals
Ullrich Langer "Aristotle commentary and ethical behaviour: Bernardo Segni on friendship between unequals (Ethica d’Aristotile tradotta in lingua fiorentina et comentata, 1550)" in Philosophy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries: Conversations with Aristotle. Constance Blackwell & Sachiko Kusukawa (eds.) Ashgate (1999) [Routledge, 2016]
Ullrich Langer "Aristotle commentary and ethical behaviour: Bernardo Segni on friendship between unequals (Ethica d’Aristotile tradotta in lingua fiorentina et comentata, 1550)" in Philosophy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries: Conversations with Aristotle. Constance Blackwell & Sachiko Kusukawa (eds.) Ashgate (1999) [Routledge, 2016]
Chapter 6
Aristotle commentary and ethical
behaviour: Bernardo Segni on friendship
between unequals
(Ethica d’Aristotile tradotta in lingua fwrentina et
comentata, 1550)
Ullrich Langer
It is a commonplace to assert that in order to be virtuous, it is hardly
sufficient to know what virtue is, and to discuss ethical behaviour: one
must also behave ethically, Otherwise, Aristotle says, one is like the sick
person who listens to the physician’s advice but fails to carry out his
prescriptions (Nicomachean Ethics, 2.4, 1105M5-~17). The passage from
ethical theorizing to ethical practice is one of the main concerns of
certain Renaissance writers; moreover the general insistence in the early
modern period on the cultivation of judgement and above all prudence is
a sign of both the delicate nature of this passage and of its urgency.’
One area in which ethical theory opens to practice, or at least invites
reflection on its application, would seem to be the commentary.
Renaissance commentators on Aristotle or Cicero, when not attending
simply to the verba, to the text itself, surely adduce contemporary
examples, showing that what they are commenting on is indeed worth
commenting on. This is what one would expect, especially from the
various humanist commentators on the Nicomachean Ethics.” However,
expectations for such relevant commentary are usually disappointed:’ the
relative sparseness of commentary on sections of the text concerning the
application of theory is disconcerting, as if the commentators were not
aware of the irony implicit in theorizing about the insufficiency of
theorizing. For example, Aristotle addresses the question of ethical
behaviour (as opposed to discussion of ethics) relatively early in the
second book, leading to the simile of the sick listening to advice but not
following prescriptions:
It is correct therefore to say that a man becomes just by doing just actions
and temperate by doing temperate actions; and no one can have the remotestchance of becoming good without doing them. But the mass of mankind,
instead of doing virtuous acts, have recourse to discussing virtue, and fancy
that they are pursuing philosophy and that this will make them good men.
(Nicomachean Ethics 2.4, 1105b9-15).
Pier Vettori’s commentary on the second part of the passage is
representative of the sober and apparently unselfconscious humanist
glosses:
They, then, doing none of the things from which these moral virtues are
disposed, having set aside actions, giving themselves entirely over to
conversations, and disputations about these objects of study, believe
themselves, Aristotle says, to be philosophers, and believe that in this way
they will become temperate, and possess great virtues.*
It is true, of course, that the commentators do not think of their work as a
sermo or a disputatio concerning ethical issues; especially the latter term
may be associated with scholastic commentary and its systematic
rehearsal of opinions pro and contra given positions.’ The very sobriety
of some humanist commentary is, pemeps. a way of avoiding
unnecessary philosophizing and a way of enabling a direct apprehension
of the text and the moral message present in the elucidated text.
However, if the commentary is not really a conversation about theory,
then presumably the dialogue would be such a conversation. For
example, Felice Figliueci’s De la filosofia morale libri died (1551) is a
dialogue in Italian paraphrasing the Nicomachean Ethics, set up
explicitly as a conversation punctuated by observations about the setting,
the time of day, etc. The relevant passage in Aristotle is paraphrased in
the following way:
Ma sono bene assai, che non cercono di operare virtuosamente, e nandimeno:
credono, essere huomini da bene, percioche attendono ad udire parole essai,
& 4 discorrere, disputare, & ad apprendere li precetti di filosofia, & in
questo modo credono poter esser detti filosofi, e cosi pensano doventare per
questa via huomini da bene, attendendo solo 4 le parole, & 4 li precetti
(72-3)°
There is no suggestion that the participants in the dialogue are in danger
of doing precisely what Aristotle deems insufficient, and there seems to
be no attempt to distinguish clearly between Figliucci’s own dialogue
and the sorts of discussion referred to in Aristotle. In other words, at a
moment in the text of the Nicomachean Ethics, when the intersection of
theory and practice is highlighted, the commentary itself does not seem
to consider the intersection problematic, and does not see itself as
enabling the application of Aristotle’s precetti. Usually commentaries or
quaestiones on the Nicomachean Ethics, whether they are composed byscholastics (such as Thomas Aquinas and Johannes Versor, to a lesser
extent John Buridan and John Major) or by humanists (such as Donato
Acciaiuoli, Jacques Lefevre d’Etaples and Josse Clichtove, and Pier
Vettori), do not appear to intend the act of commenting to stand for or
imply an ethical act. There are suggestions in the commentaries that this
or that is particularly well said by Aristotle, certain elements of the
argument are objects of greater rhetorical emphasis than others, and the
lexicon employed in paraphrasing the argument acquires vividness and
variety in certain sixteenth-century commentators. By and large,
however, the commentator can be assured of a neutral space in the drama
of ethical practice.
It is against this background that [ wish to look at a surprising and
highly unusual instance of a commentator’s ‘involvement’ in the ethical
argument being elucidated. This involvement is part of the commentary,
and assumes a political situation, the prince’s court, which somewhat
unexpectedly encourages the connection between theoretical reflection
and practice, a connection which arises through the contingent and
temporal process of exposition itself, rather than through a set of
examples adduced to enable imitation.
In the case I will be examining, the commentary at a crucial point
becomes a narrative of a personal experience of the humanist
commentator Bernardo Segni. The exposition of a particular difficulty in
the text of Aristotle is not simply an elucidation of the logical steps
constituting the argument or an elucidation of philological features of the
Greek text, but instead a narrative of the way in which the exposition
itself evolved. This narrative depends on the contingencies of the
personal situation of the commentator, whose commentary changes over
time, under the political pressures of his circle of powerful friends.
Bernardo Segni’s Ethica d’Aristotile tradotta in lingua fiorentina et
comentata was first published in Florence in 1550. It constitutes the first
complete translation into [talian of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics; the
1550s also saw other such ‘vulgarizations’ of Aristotle, for example the
paraphrase in Italian by Felice Figliucci, and a partial translation into
French by Philippe LePlessis (Paris: Vascosan, 1553), improving on
Nicole Oresme’s fourteenth-century translation. Segni (1504—58)
translated other works of Aristotle (the Rhetoric, Poetics, Politics, De
anima) and Sophocles’s Oedipus Rex. He is best known for his
chronicles of Florence (Storie fiorentine, 1527-55, published in 1723).
He was born to a family of merchants, studied letters and law, wied
business without success, and entered the service of the Medici family.
His translation work was completed during his activity at the court of the
Medici.
Indeed the translation of the Nicomachean Ethics is dedicated to
Cosimo | (d. 1574), and the dedicatory letter makes clear immediately
that Segni is acutely aware of the paradoxes of his situation. If Aristotle’s