People vs Judge Edmar Castillo

GR No. 204419
November 7, 2016
(MTC)

Facts:

1.) On January 13, 2012, Judge Marcelo C. Cabalbag of the MTC of Gattaran, Cagayan issued Search Warrant No. 45.
2.) Thereafter, to effect the above Search and Seizure Order, a search was conducted by elements of the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) and officers of the Philippine National Police (PNP) yielding one (1) sachet containing residue
of suspected methamphetamine hydrochloride inside the house of private respondent Rabino located in Aparri, Cagayan.
When the confiscated item was submitted to the Regional Crime Laboratory Office No. 2 of the PNP in Tuguegarao City for
qualitative examination, the test gave positive result for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug.
3.) Thus, an Information 4 dated January 15, 2012 was filed against private respondent Rabino for violation of Section 11 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.
4.) The case was raffled to the RTC, Branch 6, Aparri, Cagayan, presided by respondent Judge Castillo. Before the case was set
for arraignment, or on March 13, 2012, private respondent Rabino Fled a Motion to Quash Search Warrant and for
Suppression of Illegally Acquired Evidence with the following grounds: Search Warrant; Issuing Court must have territorial
jurisdiction over the place to be searched; No compelling reason for MTC Gattaran to issue warrant
5.) The RTC, through respondent Judge Castillo, granted the above motion in its Joint Resolution
6.) Petitioner Fled a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the same court in its Joint Order

Issue:
Whether a municipal trial court has the authority to issue a search warrant involving an offense in which it has no
jurisdiction
Ruling:
This Court answers in the affirmative. Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides: SEC. 2. The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such probable cause must be
determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the
witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the
warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
Necessarily, a motion to quash a search warrant may be based on grounds extrinsic of the search warrant, such as (1) the
place searched or the property seized are not those specified or described in the search warrant; and (2) there is no probable cause
for the issuance of the search warrant. The respondent RTC judge, in this case, quashed the search warrant and eventually dismissed
the case based merely on the fact that the search warrant was issued by the MTC of Gattaran, Cagayan proceeding from a suspected
violation of R.A. 9165 or The Dangerous Drugs Act, an offense which is beyond the jurisdiction of the latter court. It is therefore safe
to presume that the other grounds raised by the private respondent in his motion to quash are devoid of any merit. By that alone,
the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in quashing the search warrant on a basis other than the accepted grounds. It
must be remembered that a search warrant is valid for as long as it has all the requisites set forth by the Constitution and must only
be quashed when any of its elements are found to be wanting.
This Court has provided rules to be followed in the application for a search warrant. Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides: Sec. 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be fled. — An application for search warrant shall be
filed with the following: (a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed. (b) For compelling reasons stated
in the application, any court within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is
known, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced. However, if the criminal action has already been
filed, the application shall only be made in the court where the criminal action is pending. Apparently, in this case, the application
for a search warrant was Filed within the same judicial region where the crime was allegedly committed. For compelling reasons, the
Municipal Trial Court of Gattaran, Cagayan has the authority to issue a search warrant to search and seize the dangerous drugs
stated in the application thereof in Aparri, Cagayan, a place that is within the same judicial region. The fact that the search warrant
was issued means that the MTC judge found probable cause to grant the said application after the latter was found by the same
judge to have been Fled for compelling reasons. Therefore, Sec. 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court was duly complied with.
 It must be noted that nothing in the above-quoted rule does it say that the court issuing a search warrant must also have
jurisdiction over the offense. A search warrant may be issued by any court pursuant to Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and
the resultant case may be Filed in another court that has jurisdiction over the offense committed. What controls here is that a
search warrant is merely a process, generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to
be entertained by a court pursuant to its original jurisdiction. 24 Thus, in certain cases when no criminal action has yet been filed,
any court may issue a search warrant even though it has no jurisdiction over the offense allegedly committed, provided that all the
requirements for the issuance of such warrant are present.

PEOPLE VS. AMADOR PASTRANA, ET. AL.

G.R. No. 196045
February 21, 2018
(Sec. 4 – requisites)

FACTS:

1.) On 26 March 2001, the National Bureau of Investigation Special Investigator Albert Froilan Gaerlan filed a Sworn Application for a
Search Warrant before the RTC, Makati City, Branch 63, for the purpose of conducting a search of the office premises of respondents
Amador Pastrana and Rufina Abad at Room 1908, 88 Corporate Center, Valero Street, Makati City. SI Gaerlan alleged that he
received confidential information that respondents were engaged in a scheme to defraud foreign investors. Some of their
employees would call prospective clients abroad whom they would convince to invest in a foreign-based company by purchasing
shares of stocks. Those who agreed to buy stocks were instructed to make a transfer for the payment thereof. No shares of stock,
however, were actually purchased. Instead, the money collected was allocated to different transactions. Special Investigator Gaerlan
averred that the scheme not only constituted estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), but also a violation of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8799 or the Securities Regulation Code (SRC).

2.) On 26 March 2001, Judge Tranquil Salvador, Jr. (Judge Salvador, Jr.) of the RTC, Branch 63, Makati City, issued Search Warrant.

3.) Thus, on 27 March 2001, NBI agents and representatives from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proceeded to
respondents' office to search the same. The search was witnessed by Isagani Paulino and Gerardo Derma, Chief Security Officer and
Building Administrator, respectively of 88 Corporate Center. Pursuant to the Return, dated 2 April 2001, and the Inventory
Sheet13 attached thereto, the NBI and the SEC were able to seize the following:

1. Eighty-nine (89) boxes containing the following documents: Telephone bills of the company calls to clients; List of brokers and 201
files; Sales agreements; Official receipts; Credit advise; Fax messages; Clients message slips; Company brochures; Letterheads; and
Envelopes.
2. Forty (40) magazine stands of brokers' records;
3. Offshore incorporation papers;
4. Lease contracts; and
5. Vouchers/ledgers.

4.) On 11 June 2001, respondent Abad moved to quash Search Warrant No. 01-118 because it was issued in connection with two (2)
offenses, one for violation of the SRC and the other for estafa under the RPC, which circumstance contravened the basic tenet of the
rules of criminal procedure that search warrants are to be issued only upon a finding of probable cause in connection with one
specific offense. Further, Search Warrant No. 01-118 failed to describe with specificity the objects to be seized.

5.) On 19 September 2001, pending the resolution of the motion to quash the search warrant, respondent Abad moved for the
inhibition of Judge Salvador, Jr. She contended that the lapse of three (3) months without action on the motion to quash clearly
showed Judge Salvador, Jr.'s aversion to passing judgment on his own search warrant.

6.) In an Order, dated 15 November 2001, Judge Salvador, Jr. voluntarily inhibited himself from the case. Hence, the case was re-
raffled to the RTC, Makati City, Branch 58.

7.) In an Omnibus Order, dated 10 May 2002, the RTC ruled that the search warrant was null and void because it violated the
requirement that a search warrant must be issued in connection with one specific offense only. Aggrieved, petitioner, through the
Office of the Solicitor General elevated an appeal before the CA.

8.) In its decision, dated 22 September 2010, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. It declared that Search Warrant No. 01-118
clearly violated Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which prohibits the issuance of a search warrant for more than one specific
offense, because the application failed to specify what provision of the SRC was violated or even what type of estafa was committed
by respondents.

9.) Hence, petition to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave error in sustaining the trial court’s order which quashed the search warrant.

Ruling:

The purpose of Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution against unlawful searches and seizures is to prevent violations of private
security in person and property, and unlawful invasion of the sanctity of the home, by officers of the law acting under legislative or
judicial sanction, and to give remedy against such usurpations when attempted.

Additionally, Rule 126, Sections 4 and 5 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure provide for the requisites for the issuance of a
search warrant, to wit:

SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witness he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in
the Philippines.

SEC. 5. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of
searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally
known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted.

Hence, in the landmark case of Stonehill v. Diokno (Stonehill), the Court stressed two points which must be considered in the
issuance of a search warrant, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined personally by the
judge; and (2) that the warrant shall particularlydescribe the things to be seized. Moreover, in Stonehill, on account of the
seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the search warrants involved in that case, the Court deemed it fit to
amend the former Rules of Court by providing that "a search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with
one specific offense."

In this case, Search Warrant No. 01-118 was issued for "violation of R.A. No. 8799 (The Securities Regulation Code) and
for estafa (Art. 315, RPC)."

First, violation of the SRC is not an offense in itself for there are several punishable acts under the said law such as manipulation of
security prices, insider trading, acting as dealer or broker without being registered with the SEC, use of unregistered exchange, use
of unregistered clearing agency, and violation of the restrictions on borrowings by members, brokers, and dealers among others.
Even the charge of "estafa under Article 315 of the RPC" is vague for there are three ways of committing the said crime: ( 1) with
unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence; (2) by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts; or (3) through fraudulent means. The three
ways of committing estafa may be reduced to two, i.e., (1) by means of abuse of confidence; or (2) by means of deceit. For these
reasons alone, it can be easily discerned that Search Warrant No. 01-118 suffers a fatal defect.

Second, to somehow remedy the defect in Search Warrant No. 01-118, petitioner insists that the warrant was issued for violation of
Section 28.1 of the SRC, which reads, "No person shall engage in the business of buying or selling securities in the Philippines as a
broker or dealer, or act as a salesman, or an associated person of any broker or dealer unless registered as such with the
Commission." However, despite this belated attempt to pinpoint a provision of the SRC which respondents allegedly violated, Search
Warrant No. 01-118 still remains null and void. The allegations in the application for search warrant do not indicate that respondents
acted as brokers or dealers without prior registration from the SEC which is an essential element to be held liable for violation of
Section 28.1 of the SRC. It is even worthy to note that Section 28.1 was specified only in the SEC's Comment on the Motion to
Quash,47dated 5 April 2002.

Third, contrary to petitioner's claim that violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC and estafa are so intertwined with each other that the
issuance of a single search warrant does not violate the one-specific-offense rule, the two offenses are entirely different from each
other and neither one necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the other. An offense may be said to necessarily include
another when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former constitute the latter. And vice versa, an offense may be
said to be necessarily included in another when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting
the latter.

It is elemental that in order to be valid, a search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be
seized. The constitutional requirement of reasonable particularity of description of the things to be seized is primarily meant to
enable the law enforcers serving the warrant to: (1) readily identify the properties to be seized and thus prevent them from seizing
the wrong items; and (2) leave said peace officers with no discretion regarding the articles to be seized and thus prevent
unreasonable searches and seizures. It is not, however, required that the things to be seized must be described in precise and
minute detail as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities

Here, as previously discussed, Search Warrant No. 01-118 failed to state the specific offense alleged committed by respondents.
Consequently, it could not have been possible for the issuing judge as well as the applicant for the search warrant to determine that
the items sought to be seized are connected to any crime. Moreover, even if Search Warrant No. 01-118 was issued for violation of
Section 28.1 of the SRC as petitioner insists, the documents, articles and items enumerated in the search warrant failed the test of
particularity. The terms used in this warrant were too all-embracing, thus, subjecting all documents pertaining to the transactions of
respondents, whether legal or illegal, to search and seizure. Even the phrase "and other showing that these companies acted in
violation of their actual registration with the SEC" does not support petitioner's contention that Search Warrant No. 01-118 was
indeed issued for violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC; the same could well-nigh pertain to the corporations' certificate of registration
with the SEC and not just to respondents' lack of registration to act as brokers or dealers.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Abraham Miclat vs People

GR No. 176077
August 31, 2011
(Allowable scope of search incidental to lawful arrest)

Facts:

1.) At about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of November 8, 2002, P/Insp. Jose Valencia of the Caloocan City Police Station-SDEU
called upon his subordinates after the (sic) receiving an INFOREP Memo from Camp Crame relative to the illicit and down-
right drug-trading activities being undertaken along Palmera Spring II, Bagumbong, Caloocan City involving Abe Miclat, Wily
alias "Bokbok" and one Mic or Jojo. Immediately, P/Insp. Valencia formed a surveillance team headed by SPO4 Ernesto
Palting and is composed of Fve (5) more operatives from the Drug Enforcement Unit, namely: PO3 Pagsolingan, PO2
Modina, PO2 De Ocampo, and herein witness PO3 Antonio. After a short brieFng at their station, the team boarded a
rented passenger jeepney and proceeded to the target area to verify the said informant and/or memorandum.
2.) When the group of SPO4 Palting arrived at Palmera Spring II, Caloocan City at around 3:50 o'clock that same afternoon,
they were [at] once led by their informant to the house of one Alias "Abe." PO3 Antonio then positioned himself at the
perimeter of the house, while the rest of the members of the group deployed themselves nearby. Thru a small opening in
the curtain-covered window, PO3 Antonio peeped inside and there at a distance of 1 1/2 meters, he saw "Abe" arranging
several pieces of small plastic sachets which he believed to be containing shabu. Slowly, said operative inched his way in by
gently pushing the door as well as the plywood covering the same. Upon gaining entrance, PO3 Antonio forthwith
introduced himself as a police officer while "Abe," on the other hand, after being informed of such authority, voluntarily
handed over to the former the four (4) pieces of small plastic sachets the latter was earlier sorting out. PO3 Antonio
immediately placed the suspect under arrest and brought him and the four (4) pieces of plastic sachets containing white
crystalline substance to their headquarters and turned them over to PO3 Fernando Moran for proper disposition. The
suspect was identified as Abraham Miclat y Cerbo a.k.a "ABE," 19 years old, single, jobless and a resident of Maginhawa
Village, Palmera Spring II, Bagumbong, Caloocan City.
3.) On July 28, 2004, the RTC, after Fnding that the prosecution has established all the elements of the offense charged,
rendered a Decision 6 convicting petitioner of Violation of Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165
4.) In affirming the RTC, the CA ratiocinated that contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the evidence presented by the
prosecution were all admissible against him. Moreover, it was established that he was informed of his constitutional rights
at the time of his arrest. Hence, the CA opined that the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt all of the
elements necessary for the conviction of the petitioner for the offense of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT PEEPING THROUGH A CURTAIN-COVERED WINDOW IS WITHIN THE MEANING OF "PLAIN VIEW
DOCTRINE" FOR A WARRANTLESS SEIZURE TO BE LAWFUL.

Ruling:

The petition is bereft of merit.

In the instant case, contrary to petitioner's contention, he was caught in flagrante delicto and the police authorities
effectively made a valid warrantless arrest. The established facts reveal that on the date of the arrest, agents of the Station Drug
Enforcement Unit (SDEU) of the Caloocan City Police Station were conducting a surveillance operation in the area of Palmera Spring
II to verify the reported drugrelated activities of several individuals, which included the petitioner. During the operation, PO3
Antonio, through petitioner's window, saw petitioner arranging several plastic sachets containing what appears to be shabu in the
living room of their home. The plastic sachets and its suspicious contents were plainly exposed to the view of PO3 Antonio, who was
only about one and one-half meters from where petitioner was seated. PO3 Antonio then inched his way in the house by gently
pushing the door. Upon gaining entrance, the operative introduced himself as a police officer. After which, petitioner voluntarily
handed over to PO3 Antonio the small plastic sachets. PO3 Antonio then placed petitioner under arrest and, contrary to petitioner's
contention, PO3 Antonio informed him of his constitutional rights. 16 PO3 Antonio then took the petitioner and the four (4) pieces
of plastic sachets to their headquarters and turned them over to PO3 Moran. Thereafter, the evidence were marked "AMC 1-4," the
initials of the name of the petitioner. The heat-sealed transparent sachets containing white crystalline substance were submitted to
the PNP Crime Laboratory for drug examination, which later yielded positive results for the presence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug under RA No. 9165.

Considering the circumstances immediately prior to and surrounding the arrest of the petitioner, petitioner was clearly
arrested in flagrante delicto as he was then committing a crime, violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, within the view of the
arresting officer. As to the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it too falls within the established exceptions. Verily, no less
than the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and consequent seizure must be carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it
becomes unreasonable, and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 17 The right
against warrantless searches and seizure, however, is subject to legal and judicial exceptions, namely: 1. Warrantless search
incidental to a lawful arrest; 2. Search of evidence in "plain view"; 3. Search of a moving vehicle; 4. Consented warrantless search; 5.
Customs search; 6. Stop and Frisk; and 7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.

What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable
from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of
probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles
procured. It is to be noted that petitioner was caught in the act of arranging the heat-sealed plastic sachets in plain sight of PO3
Antonio and he voluntarily surrendered them to him upon learning that he is a police officer. The seizure made by PO3 Antonio of
the four plastic sachets from the petitioner was not only incidental to a lawful arrest, but it also falls within the purview of the "plain
view" doctrine.

It is clear, therefore, that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. Since petitioner's arrest is
among the exceptions to the rule requiring a warrant before effecting an arrest and the evidence seized from the petitioner was the
result of a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest, which incidentally was in plain view of the arresting officer, the results of
the ensuing search and seizure were admissible in evidence to prove petitioner's guilt of the offense charged.

DANILO VILLANUEVA vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 199042
November 17, 2014
(Search when arrest waived)

Facts:

1.) Petitioner Danilo Villanueva was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or The
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. On 15 July 2004, the accused, duly assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to
the offense charged.
2.) Four witnesses testified for the prosecution: (1) Police Senior Inspector (PSI) Albert Arturo, (2) Police Officer (PO) 3 Jonathan
Coralde, (3) PO2 Reynante Mananghaya, and (4) Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Antonio Asiones. 6 Their testimonies reveal that a
Complaint was filed by Brian Resco against Danilo Villanueva for allegedly shooting the former along C-3 Road, Navotas City. After
recording the incident in the police blotter, PO3 Jonathan Coralde, SPO3 Enrique de Jesus, SPO2 Henry Martin and SPO1 Anthony
Asiones, together with Resco, proceeded to the house of Villanueva. They informed Villanueva about the Complaint lodged against
him. They invited him to the police station. There, he was subjected to a body search and, in the process, a plastic sachet of shabu
was recovered from the left pocket of his pants. PO3 Coralde marked the sachet with the initial "DAV 06-15-04", and PO2 Reynante
Mananghaya brought it to the National Police District Scene of the Crime Operatives (NPD-SOCO) for examination.

3.) The Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 127 of Caloocan City, in its Decision 9 dated 6 April 2009, convicted petitioner of the offense
charged.

4.) CA affirmed the Decision of the lower court. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied.

5.) Hence, the instant petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the petitioner’s conviction for violation of Section 11 of RA 9165 despite the illegality of the
arrest and the lapses on the part of the police officers in the handling of the confiscated drug.

Ruling:

We find the instant appeal meritorious.

Accused-appellant is estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest.

Accused-appellant was arrested without a warrant. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, lays down the
basic rules on lawful warrantless arrests either by a peace officer or a private person, as follows:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts
or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.

The circumstances that transpired between accused-appellant and the arresting officer show none of the above that would make
the warrantless arrest lawful. Nevertheless, records reveal that accused-appellant never objected to the irregularity of his arrest
before his arraignment. He pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. He actively participated in the trial of the case. Thus, he is
considered as one who had properly and voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court and waived his right to
question the validity of his arrest.17

The warrantless search conducted is not among those allowed by law.

A waiver of an illegal arrest, however, is not a waiver of an illegal search.18 Records have established that both the arrest and the
search were made without a warrant. While the accused has already waived his right to contest the legality of his arrest, he is not
deemed to have equally waived his right to contest the legality of the search.

Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements on when a warrantless search can be conducted.1âwphi1 These searches include: (1)
search of a moving vehicle; (2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs search; (4) waiver or consented search; (5) stop-and-frisk situation;
(6) search incidental to a lawful arrest and (7) exigent and emergency circumstance. 19
The search made was not among the enumerated instances. Certainly, it was not of a moving vehicle, a customs search, or a search
incidental to a lawful arrest. There could not have been a seizure in plain view as the seized item was allegedly found inside the left
pocket of accused-appellant’s pants. Neither was it a stop-and-frisk situation. While this type may seemingly fall under the
consented search exception, we reiterate that "[c]onsent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing
evidence."

Having been obtained through an unlawful search, the seized item is thus inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellant.
Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree." Hence, the confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence
consonant with Article III, Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution: "Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."23 Without the seized item, therefore, the conviction of accused appellant
cannot be sustained. This being the case, we see no more reason to discuss the alleged lapses of the officers in the handling of the
confiscated drug.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated 4 May 2011 and Resolution dated 18 October 2011 issued by the
Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 32582 are SET ASIDE. Petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED.

MARIO VERIDIANO vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 200370
June 7, 2017
(warrantless searches, requisites)

Facts:

1.) At about 7:20am of 15 January 2008, a concerned citizen called a certain PO3 Esteves, police radio operator of the Nagcarlan
Police Station, informing him that a certain alias “Baho” who was later identified as Veridiano, was on the way to San Pablo City to
obtain illegal drugs.

PO3 Esteves immediately relayed the information to PO1 Cabello and PO3 Alvin Vergara who were both on duty. Chief of Police June
Urquia instructed PO1 Cabello and PO2 Vergara to set up a checkpoint at Barangay Taytay, Nagcarlan, Laguna.

The police officers at the checkpoint personally knew Veridiano. They chanced upon Veridiano at around 10PM inside a passenger
jeepney coming from San Pablo, Laguna. They flagged down the jeepney and asked the passengers to disembark. The police officers
instructed the passengers to raise their t-shirts to check for possible concealed weapons and to remove the contents of their
pockets.

The police officers recovered from Veridiano “a tea bag containing what appeared to be marijuana.” PO1 Cabello confiscated the tea
bag and marked it with his initials. Veridiano was arrested and apprised of his constitutional rights. He was then brought to the
police station.

At the police station, PO1 Cabello turned over the seized tea bag to PO1 Solano, who also placed his initials. PO1 Solano then made a
laboratory examination request, which he personally brought with the seized tea bag to the Philippine National Police crime
laboratory. The contents of the tea bag tested positive for marijuana.

2.) RTC found Veridiano guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of illegal possession of marijuana.

3.) Veridiano appealed the decision of the trial court asserting that "he was illegally arrested." The CA rendered a Decision affirming
the guilt of Veridiano.

4.) The Court of Appeals found that "Veridiano was caught in flagrante delicto" of having marijuana in his possession.

5.) Veridiano moved for reconsideration which was denied.

6.) Veridiano filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari. Petition was granted.

Issue:

Whether there was a valid warrantless search against petitioner

Ruling:
Petitioner's warrantless arrest was unlawful.

A search incidental to a lawful arrest requires that there must first be a lawful arrest before a search is made. Otherwise stated, a
lawful arrest must precede the search; "the process cannot be reversed." 78For there to be a lawful arrest, law enforcers must be
armed with a valid warrant. Nevertheless, an arrest may also be effected without a warrant.

There are three (3) grounds that will justify a warrantless arrest. Rule 113, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 5. Arrest Without Warrant; When Lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.

The first kind of warrantless arrest is known as an in flagrante delicto arrest. The validity of this warrantless arrest requires
compliance with the overt act test79 as explained in Cogaed:

[F]or a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delicto to be affected, "two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he [or she] has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
(2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.”

Failure to comply with the overt act test renders an in flagrante delicto arrest constitutionally infirm. In Cogaed, the warrantless
arrest was invalidated as an in flagrante delicto arrest because the accused did not exhibit an overt act within the view of the police
officers suggesting that he was in possession of illegal drugs at the time he was apprehended.

Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court pertains to a hot pursuit arrest. 92 The rule requires that an offense has just been
committed. It connotes "immediacy in point of time."93 That a crime was in fact committed does not automatically bring the case
under this rule.94 An arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court entails a time element from the moment the crime is
committed up to the point of arrest.

In this case, petitioner's arrest could not be justified as an in flagrante delicto arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of
Court. He was not committing a crime at the checkpoint. Petitioner was merely a passenger who did not exhibit any unusual conduct
in the presence of the law enforcers that would incite suspicion. In effecting the warrantless arrest, the police officers relied solely
on the tip they received. Reliable information alone is insufficient to support a warrantless arrest absent any overt act from the
person to be arrested indicating that a crime has just been committed, was being committed, or is about to be committed.

The warrantless arrest cannot likewise be justified under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The law
enforcers had no personal knowledge of any fact or circumstance indicating that petitioner had just committed an offense.

A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have personal knowledge of facts, based on their
observation, that the person sought to be arrested has just committed a crime. This is what gives rise to probable cause that would
justify a warrantless search under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Moreover, petitioner's silence or lack of resistance can hardly be considered as consent to the warrantless search. Although the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures may be surrendered through a valid waiver, the prosecution must prove that the waiver
was executed with clear and convincing evidence. 134 Consent to a warrantless search and seizure must be "unequivocal, specific,
intelligently given . . . [and unattended] by duress or coercion."

In the present case, the extensive search conducted by the police officers exceeded the allowable limits of warrantless searches.
They had no probable cause to believe that the accused violated any law except for the tip they received. They did not observe any
peculiar activity from the accused that may either arouse their suspicion or verify the tip. Moreover, the search was flawed at its
inception. The checkpoint was set up to target the arrest of the accused.

The warrantless search conducted by the police officers is invalid. Consequently, the tea bag containing marijuana seized from
petitioner is rendered inadmissible under the exclusionary principle in Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution. There being no
evidence to support his conviction, petitioner must be acquitted.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 16, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court in Criminal Case No. 16976-SP and the Decision dated
November 18, 2011 and Resolution dated January 25, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. CR. No. 33588 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Petitioner Mario Veridiano y Sapi is hereby ACQUITTED and is ordered immediately RELEASED from confinement unless he is
being held for some other lawful cause.

CRIMPRO RULE 126

Title GR No. 204589
Sanchez v. People Date: November 19 , 2014
Ponente: Mendoza, J.
Rizaldy Sanchez, petitioner People of the Philippines , respondent
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to reverse and set aside the July 25, 2012 Decision and the November 20,
2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR No. 31742 filed by petitioner Rizaldy Sanchez y Cajili (Sanchez),
affirming the April 21, 2005 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20 (RTC), which convicted him for
Violation of Section 11, Article l l of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.
FACTS
1. Sanchez was charged for violation of Sec. 11 of Article II of RA 9165 for the possession of shabu. He pleaded not guilty
to the offense charged.
Prosecution’s Version of Facts
 SPO1 Elmer Amposta together with other CSUs Hernandez, Tagle, and Monzon, acted on the information that
Jacinta Marciano was selling drugs to tricycle drivers. They were dispatched to Brgy. Alapan 1-B, Imus, Cavite, to
conduct an operation.
 While at the place, they waited for a tricycle going to, and coming from the house of Jacinta. After a few minutes,
they spotted a tricycle carrying Rizaldy Sanchez coming out of the house. The group chased the tricycle. After
catching up with it, they requested Sanchez to alight. It was then they noticed Rizaldy holding a match box.
 SPO1 Amposta asked Sanchez if he could see the contents of the match box which the latter agreed to. While
examining it, SPO1 Amposta found a small transparent plastic sachet which contained a white crystalline
substance. Suspecting that it was a regulated drug, the group accosted Sanchez and the tricycle driver. They were
brought to the police station.
 The forensic chemist from NBI found that the said susbtance was shabu.

Defense’s Version of Facts

 Sanchez denied all the allegations of the prosecution. He said that he and Darwin Reyes were on their way hope
where they transported a passenger, when their way was blocked by four armed men riding an owner-type
jeepney. Without a word, the four men frisked him and Darwin. He protested and asked what offense did they
commit. The officers told him that they had just bought drugs from Alapan. He reasoned out that he merely
transported a passenger there but the policemen still accosted him and he was brought to Imus Police Station.
 On cross-examination, the accused admitted tht it was the first time that he saw the police officers at the time he
was arrested.

2. The RTC ruled that Sanchez was caught in flagrante delicto, in actual possession of shabu. It stated that the police
operatives had reasonable ground to believe that Sanchez was in possession of the said dangerous drug and suspicion
was confirmed when the match box Sanchez was carrying was found to contain shabu.
3. The CA found no cogent reason to reverse or modify the findings of facts and conclusions reached by the RTC and
upheld the conviction of Sanchez. According to the CA, there was probable cause for the police officers that he was
seen leaving the residence of a notorious drug dealer, where, according to a tip they received, illegal drug activities
were being perpetrated. It also conccluded that the confiscation by the police operative of the subject narcotics from
Sanchez was pursuant to a valid search.
ISSUE/S
I. Whether or not the Sanchez was caught in flagrante delicto hence a search warrant was no longer necessary –NO
RATIO
It is observed that the Court of Appeals confused the search incidental to a lawful arrest with stop-and-frisk principle.

A stop-and-frisk search is entirely different from and should not be confused with the search incidental to a lawful arrest
envisioned in Sec. 13 Rule 126.

In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, arrest determines the validity of the incidental search. The law requires that there first
be a lawful arrest before a search can be made, the process cannot be reveresed. The arresting officer may search the person of
the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or
property found which was used in the commission of the crime.

As held in Terry v. Ohio, the Terry stop-and-frisk serach is a limited protective searcch of outer clothing for weapons. Where a
police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him to reasonably conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity
may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of
investigating this behavior he identifies himself as apoliceman and makes reasonable inquiries, he is entitled for the protection
of himself.

The two-fold interest of stop-and-frisk are:

1. The general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer
may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating
possible criminal behavior even without probable cause
2. The more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police office to take steps to assure
himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be
used against the police officer.

IN THE CASE AT BENCH, neither the in flagrante delict arrest nor the stop-and-frisk principle was applicable to justify the
warrantless search and seizure made by the police operatives. The search preceded the arrest of Sanchez . There was no arrest
prior to the conduct of the search. Under Sec. 1 of Rule 113, arrest is the taking of a person into custody that he may be bound
to answer for the commission of an offense. Sec. 2 of the same rules provides that an arrest is effected by an actual restraint of
the person to be arrested or by his voluntary submission to the custody of the person making the arrest.

It appears that SPO1 Amposta after they caught up with the tricycle just noticed Sanchez holding a match box and requested if
he could see the contents. The arrest was made only after the discovery by SPO1 Amposta of the shabu inside the boxx. What
happened in this case was a search first before arrest was effected. This does not qualifiy under a valid warrantless arrest under
Sec. 5 Rule 113*.

The evidence on record reveals that no physical act could be properly attributed to Sanchez as to rouse suspicion in the minds
of the police operatives that he had just committeed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime. He was merely seen by
the police operatives leaving the residence of a known drug peddler. IT has not been established either that the rigorous
conditions set in par. B of Sec 5 of Rule 113 have been complied with. The police officers had no personal knowledge to believe
that Sanchez bought shabu from the notorious drug dealer and actually possessed the illegal drug when he boarded the tricycle.
The police officers had no inkling whatsoever as to what Sanchez did inside the house of the known drug dealer. Nowhere in the
prosecution evidence does it show that the drug dealer was conducting her nefarious drug activities insidde the house. There
was no over manifestation on the part of Sanchez that he had just engaged in, was actually engaging in, or was attemptin to
engage in the criminal activity of ilegally possessiong shabu.

There is no valid stop-and-frisk. This is an act of apolice officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him and pat him for
weapon/s or contraband. The police officer should properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach and restrain a
person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check the latter’s outer clothing for possible concealed
weapons. The apprehending officer must have a genuine reason, in accordance with the police officer’s experience and the
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held has weapons or contraband concealed.

The Court does not find the totality of the circumstance sufficient to incite a reasonable suspicion that would justify a stop-and-
frisk search on Sanchez. Coming out from the house of a drug pusher and boarding a tricylce without more, were innocuous
movements, and by themselves alone could not give rise in the mind of an experienced and prudent police officer of any belief
that he had shabu in his possession.

Lastly, the OSG characterizes the seuzure of the subject shabu from Sanchez as seizure of evidence in plain view. The SC
disagrees.
 Under the plaint view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that
view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.
The following are the requisites:
1. the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from
which he can view a particular area
2. the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent
3. it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or
otherwise subject to seizure.

It is readily apaprent that the seizure of the subject shabu does not fall within the plain view exception. There was no valid
intrusion. Sanchez was illegally arrested. The subject shabu was not inadvertently discovered and it was not plainly exposed to
sight. Here, the subject shabu was alledly inside amatch box being then held by Sanchez and was not readily apparent or
transparent to the police officers.

RULING
Given the procedural lapses pointed out above, a serious uncertainty hangs over the identity of the seized shabu that the
prosecution introduced in evidence. The prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody, resulting in rendering the
seizure and confiscation of the shabu open to doubt and suspicion. Hence, the incriminatory evidence cannot pass judicial
scrutiny. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed July 25, 2012 Decision and the November 20, 2012 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31742 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Rizaldy Sanchez y Cajili is ACQUITTED on
reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the Court orders the immediate release of the petitioner, unless the latter is being lawfully held
for another cause; and to inform the Court of the date of his release, or reason for his continued confinement, within ten (10)
days from receipt of notice.

Notes
* Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actuallly committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.

2-S 2016-17 (SALVACION)

Feliciano Galvante vs. Casimiro

G.R. No. 16808
April 22, 2008
(without warrant)

Facts:

1.) Respondents pointed their firearms to petitioner; went near the owner type jeep owned by petitioner and conducted a search.
Respondents saw a .38 pistol under the floormat of the jeep and asked petitioner of the MR of the firearm. Due to fear
that respondents' long arms were still pointed to them, petitioner searched his wallet and gave the asked document. Immediately,
the policemen (respondents) left them without saying anything bringing with them the firearm.

2.) The RTC found that "the action of the policemen who conducted the warrantless search in spite of the absence of any
circumstances justifying the same intruded into the privacy of the accused and the security of his property.

3.) Unaware of the RTC decision, Ombudsman dismissed the criminal complaint for illegal search. It found that the allegations of the
complainant failed to establish the factual basis of the complaint, it appearing that the incident stemmed from a valid warrantless
arrest.

Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and/ or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the complaint of the petitioner.

Ruling:

No. There is no grave abuse of discretion. The complaint for warrantless search charges no criminal offense. The conduct of a
warrantless search is not a criminal act for it is not penalized under the Revised Penal Code (RPC) or any other special law. What the
RPC punishes are only two forms of searches: Art. 129. Search warrants maliciously obtained and abuse in the service of those legally
obtained, and Art. 130. Searching domicile without witnesses.

Petitioner did not allege any of the elements of the foregoing felonies; rather, he accused private respondents of conducting
a search on his vehicle without being armed with a valid warrant. This situation, while lamentable, is not covered by Articles 129 and
130 of the RPC.

The remedy of petitioner against the warrantless search conducted on his vehicle is civil, under Article 32, in relation to Article
2219 (6) and (10) of the Civil Code.

Ombudsman properly dismissed the complaint for illegal search, although the reason for dismissing (valid warrantless arrest) the
same is rather off the mark. The same should have been dismissed by the reason that it is not cognizable by the Ombudsman
as illegal search is not a criminal offense.