view of an earlier disbarment case brought against him

EN BANC (Lucman v. Atty. Delos Santos, CBD Case No. 09-253).

[ A.C. No. 10179 (Formerly CBD 11-2985),

Resolution No. XX-2013-253
March 04, 2014 ]
On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued
BENJAMIN Q. ONG, COMPLAINANT, VS. Resolution No. XX-2013-253 adopting and approving
ATTY. WILLIAM F. DELOS SANTOS, the findings of IBP Commissioner Dela Rama, Jr.,[9] to
RESPONDENT. wit:

DECISION RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby

unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report
BERSAMIN, J.: and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
A lawyer's issuance of a worthless check renders him in
Resolution as Annex "A," and finding the
breach of his oath to obey the laws. To accord with the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
canon of professional responsibility that requires him to
record and the applicable laws and rules and considering
uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and
that Respondent violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon
promote respect for the law and legal processes, he
7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
thereby becomes administratively liable for gross
Atty. William F. Delos Santos is hereby SUSPENDED
misconduct.
from the practice of law for three (3) years and
ORDERED to RETURN the amount of One Hundred
Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos to complainant with legal
Antecedents
interest within thirty days from receipt of notice.
Issue
In January 2008, complainant Benjamin Ong was
introduced to respondent Atty. William F. Delos Santos
By issuing the worthless check, did Atty. Delos Santos
by Sheriff Fernando Mercado of the Metropolitan Trial
violate Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of
Court of Manila. After several calls and personal
the Code of Professional Responsibility?
interactions between them, Ong and Atty. Delos Santos
became friends.[1] In time, according to Ong, Atty. Delos
Santos asked him to encash his postdated check
Ruling
inasmuch as he was in dire need of cash. To reassure
Ong that the check would be funded upon maturity, Atty.
We agree with the findings of the IBP but modify the
Delos Santos bragged about his lucrative practice and his
recommended penalty.
good paying clients. Convinced of Atty. Delos Santos'
financial stability, Ong handed to Atty. Delos Santos on
Every lawyer is an officer of the Court. He has the duty
January 29, 2008 the amount of P100,000.00 in
and responsibility to maintain his good moral character.
exchange for the latter's Metrobank Check No. 0110268
In this regard, good moral character is not only a
postdated February 29, 2008.[2] However, the check was
condition precedent relating to his admission into the
dishonored upon presentment for the reason that the
practice of law, but is a continuing imposition in order
account was closed.[3] Ong relayed the matter of the
for him to maintain his membership in the Philippine
dishonor to Atty. Delos Santos, and demanded
Bar.[10] The Court unwaveringly demands of him to
immediate payment, but the latter just ignored
remain a competent, honorable, and reliable individual in
him.[4] When efforts to collect remained futile, Ong
whom the public may repose confidence.[11] Any gross
brought a criminal complaint for estafa and for violation
misconduct that puts his moral character in serious doubt
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against Atty. Delos
renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law.[12]
Santos.[5] Ong also brought this disbarment complaint
against Atty. Delos Santos in the Integrated Bar of the
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 has been enacted in order to
Philippines (IBP), which docketed the complaint as CBD
safeguard the interest of the banking system and the
Case No. 11-2985.
legitimate public checking account users. [13] The
gravamen of the offense defined and punished by Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22, according to Lozano v.
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP Bar
Martinez,[14] is the act of making and issuing a worthless
Commissioner
check, or any check that is dishonored upon its
presentment for payment and putting it in circulation; the
In his Commissioner's Report,[6] IBP Bar Commissioner
law is designed to prohibit and altogether eliminate the
Jose I. Dela Rama, Jr. stated that Ong had sufficiently
deleterious and pernicious practice of issuing checks
established the existence of the dishonored check; and
with insufficient funds, or with no credit, because the
that Atty. Delos Santos did not file his answer despite
practice is deemed a public nuisance, a crime against
notice, and did not also present contrary evidence. [7]He
public order to be abated. The Court has observed
recommended that Atty. Delos Santos be held liable for
in Lozano v. Martinez:
violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility; and that the
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two
transcends the private interests of the parties directly
years, plus the return of the amount of P100,000.00 to
involved in the transaction and touches the interests of
the complainant,[8] be meted on Atty. Delos Santos in
the community at large. The mischief it creates is not
only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to
the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless
commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a
thousandfold, can very well pollute the channels of trade
and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually
hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.[15] xxx
Being a lawyer, Atty. Delos Santos was well aware of
the objectives and coverage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
If he did not, he was nonetheless presumed to know
them, for the law was penal in character and application.
His issuance of the unfunded check involved herein
knowingly violated Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and
exhibited his indifference towards the pernicious effect
of his illegal act to public interest and public
order.[16] He thereby swept aside his Lawyer's Oath that
enjoined him to support the Constitution and obey the
laws. He also took for granted the express commands of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03, viz:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND
LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A Lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES
UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
These canons, the Court has said in Agno v.
Cagatan,[17] required of him as a lawyer an enduring
high sense of responsibility and good fidelity in all his
dealings, thus:
The afore-cited canons emphasize the high standard of
honesty and fairness expected of a lawyer not only in the
practice of the legal profession but in his personal
dealings as well. A lawyer must conduct himself with
great propriety, and his behavior should be beyond
reproach anywhere and at all times. For, as officers of
the courts and keepers of the public's faith, they are
burdened with the highest degree of social responsibility
and are thus mandated to behave at all times in a manner
consistent with truth and honor. Likewise, the oath that
lawyers swear to impresses upon them the duty of
exhibiting the highest degree of good faith, fairness and
candor in their relationships with others. Thus, lawyers
may be disciplined for any conduct, whether in their
professional or in their private capacity, if such conduct
renders them unfit to continue to be officers of the
court.[18]
That his act involved a private dealing with Ong did not
matter. His being a lawyer invested him whether he was
acting as such or in a non-professional capacity with the
obligation to exhibit good faith, fairness and candor in
his relationship with others. There is no question that a
lawyer could be disciplined not only for a malpractice in
his profession, but also for any misconduct committed
outside of his professional capacity.[19] His being a
lawyer demanded that he conduct himself as a person of
the highest moral and professional integrity and probity
in his dealings with others.[20]
Moreover, in issuing the dishonored check, Atty. Delos
Santos put into serious question not only his personal
integrity but also the integrity of the entire Integrated
Bar. It cannot be denied that Ong acceded to Atty. Delos
Santos' request for encashment of the check because of
his complete reliance on the nobility of the Legal
Profession. The following excerpts from Ong's
testimony bear this out, to wit:
COMM. DELA RAMA: What did you feel when you
were issued a bounced check by the respondent?
MR. ONG: Actually, the reason I even loaned him
money because actually he was not even my friend. He
was just referred to me. The reason why I felt at ease to
loan him money was because the sheriff told me that
abogado eto. It is his license that would be at stake
that's why I lent him the money.[21]
x x x x
COMM. DELA RAMA: In other words, what you are
saying is that you felt betrayed when the lawyer issued a
bounced check in your favor.
MR. ONG : Yes, Commissioner.
COMM. DELA RAMA: Why, what is your expectation
of a lawyer?
MR. ONG : They uphold the law, they know the law.
He should not have issued the check if you know it
cannot be funded because actually I have many lawyer
friend[s] and I have always high regard for lawyers. [22]
Atty. Delos Santos should always be mindful of his duty
to uphold the law and to be circumspect in all his
dealings with the public. Any transgression of this duty
on his part would not only diminish his reputation as a
lawyer but would also erode the public's faith in the
Legal Profession as a whole. His assuring Ong that he
was in good financial standing because of his lucrative
law practice when the contrary was true manifested his
intent to mislead the latter into giving a substantial
amount in exchange for his worthless post-dated check.
Such actuation did not speak well of him as a member of
the Bar.
Accordingly, Atty. Delos Santos was guilty of serious
misconduct, warranting appropriate administrative
sanction. Noting that the criminal complaint charging
him with the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was
already dismissed, and that he already repaid to Ong the
full amount of P100,000.00,[23] both of which are treated
as mitigating circumstances in his favor, we find the
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to
suspend him from the practice of law for a period of
three years harsh. Thus, we reduce the penalty to
suspension from the practice of law to six months in
order to accord with the ruling in Philippine Amusement
and Gaming Corporation v. Carandang.[24]
ACCORDINGLY, the
Court PRONOUNCES respondent ATTY. WILLIAM
F. DELOS SANTOS GUILTY of violating the
Lawyer's Oath, and Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7,
Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
and, accordingly, SUSPENDS HIM FROM THE
PRACTICE OF LAW FOR A PERIOD OF SIX
MONTHS EFFECTIVE FROM NOTICE, with a
stern warning that any similar infraction in the future
will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of

the Bar Confidant to be appended to Atty. Delos Santos'
personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines; and to all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

[ AC. No. 7388, Oct 19, 2016 ]
ATTY. RUTILLO B. PASOK v. ATTY. FELIPE G.
ZAPATOS +
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This administrative case concerns the respondent, a
retired judge who took on the case that he had intervened
in during his incumbency on the Bench. The
complainant was the counsel of record of the plaintiff in
the case. The charge specified that the respondent was
guilty of "representing adverse interest, illegal practice
of law, conduct and (sic) becoming as a former member
of the bench and conduct unbecoming in violation of the
canons of legal ethics with prayer for disbarment"[1]
Antecedent
The antecedents summarized in the Report and
Recommendation submitted by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-
CBD)[2] are as follows:
Complainant alleged that respondent was the former
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Branch
35, Ozamis City and retired as such. But before his
appointment as RTC Judge, he was the Presiding Judge
of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities 10 thJudicial
Division, Tangub City where he presided [over] a
Forcible Entry case docketed as Civil Case No. 330
entitled "Ronald Rupinta vs. Sps. Pacifico Conol and
Malinda Conol." Complainant was the counsel of
Rupinta and the decision was rendered against him by
respondent.
Sometime on 24 November 1994 and while respondent
was still the Presiding Judge of MTCC, Tangub City,
another civil complaint was filed by Ronald Rupinta
with his mother, Anastacia Rupinta, as co-plaintiff,
against Carmen Alfire and Pacifico Conol, docketed as
Civil Case No. 357, for Declaration of Nullity of Deed
of Absolute Sale, Reconveyance of Ownership,
Accounting of Rents and Fruits and Attorney's Fees and
Damages with Petition tor the Appointment of a
Receiver. Complainant represented the plaintiffs and the
complaint was heard by respondent as Presiding Judge
of MTCC, 10th Judicial Region, Tangub City. When the
case was already scheduled for trial on the merits,
respondent suspended the scheduled hearing "motu
proprio" for reason that there was still affirmative
defenses raised by the defendants, like the issue of lack
of jurisdiction which prompted the plaintiff to file a
Manifestation and Memorandum which made respondent
to (sic) inhibit himself from trying the case.
Since 17 January 1996, the aforesaid case hibernated and
respondent was appointed Presiding Judge of RTC
Branch 35, Ozamis City. Sometime on 23 March 2006,
the newly appointed Presiding Judge of MTCC
10th Judicial Region, Tangub City, Judge Rodolfo L.
Vapor, issued an Order informing the parties on the
aforesaid case whether they were amenable for him to
render judgment on the case of which complainant's
client agreed and filed their Memorandum. However,
complainant was surprised when he received a
Manifestation from the defendants that they are now
represented by respondent, the former judge who once
presided over the aforesaid case.
Plaintiffs, through complainant, filed their Memorandum
within 30 days. However, Judge Vapor, instead of
rendering judgment based on the merits and evidences
(sic) already presented, issued an Order dated 26 May
2006, dismissing the complaint on the ground that the
complaint being denominated as an annulment of a Deed
of Sale, is by nature a claim beyond pecuniary
estimation, hence the court has no jurisdiction. xxx
The Decision dismissing the complaint was appealed to
the RTC, Branch 16, Tangub City presided by Judge
Sylvia Singidas-Machacon who directed the appellant to
submit their Memorandum. Despite the warning of the
complainant that the appearance of respondent is highly
illegal, immoral, unethical and adverse to the interest of
the public, respondent, being the previous presiding
judge, continued on with his appearance for the
appellees by filing a Motion for Extension of Time to
Submit Memorandum. On appeal, Judge Machacon,
reversed the Decision of Judge Vapor sustaining the
stand of the client of respondent that the original
jurisdiction of the case is vested with the MTCC,
Tangub City.
While the aforesaid appealed case was pending before
Judge Machacon, complainant filed a Motion to
Expunge from the Court Records the Memorandum filed
by the Defendants-Appellees through their counsel Ex-
MTC and RTC Judge Felipe G. Zapatos, on the ground
that as the former presiding judge of the MTCC, Tangub
City, he is, disqualified to appear as counsel for the
defendants. For allegedly failing to attend the hearing of
the above-mentioned Motion, the same was denied by
Judge Machacon despite the fact that respondent
admitted in his Comment to the said Motion the
allegations of complainant. Respondent raised as his
defense that he cannot be charged nor penalized of any
violation as the counsel of the defendants because when
he rendered the first judgment in the Forcible Entry case,
he believes he was completely in absolute neutrality.
Respondent, likewise, justified his appearance as counsel
for the defendants on the ground that he is encountering
extreme poverty due to the absence of adequate income
and as a source of livelihood he was constrained to
handle the aforesaid case.
Respondent admits that complainant filed Civil Case No.
330 entitled "Rupinta vs. Conol" before the MTCC,
Tangub City where respondent was the presiding judge.
As a result of that case, respondent rendered a decision
dismissing the same on 23 September 1993. After the
aforesaid case was dismissed, complainant, as counsel of
Anastacia Rupinta Largo and Ronald Rupinta, filed Civil
Case No. 357 for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of
Absolute Sale, Reconveyance of Ownership, Accounting
of Rents and Fruits and Attorney's Fees and Damages
with [Petition for the] Appointment of a Receiver and
Civil Case No. 356 entitled "In the Matter of the
Intestate Estate of the Deceased Perfecto Rupinta,
Petition for Letters of Administration, Mrs. Anastacia
Rupinta Largo, Petitioner". Respondent as Presiding
Judge inhibited himself from conducting the trial of the
two (2) cases as provided for in his Order dated 17
January 1996 on the ground that complainant as counsel
for the plaintiffs and petitioner in the aforesaid cases
have doubted the absolute neutrality or impartiality of
respondent.
After inhibiting himself from these cases, respondent
was promoted as Regional Trial Court Judge of Branch
35, Ozamis City on 28 October 1997 until he retired
from the Judiciary on 14 November 200 I. Thereafter, on
account of the fact that respondent needs income in order
to survive or he would die of starvation, he engaged in
the private practice of law. Four (4) years after he retired
from the judiciary and more than ten (1 0) years after he
inhibited himself from conducting trial on Civil Case
No. 357, respondent filed a Manifestation for the
defendants in Civil Case 357.[3]
Ignoring the warnings of the complainant, the
respondent persisted in his representation of the
defendants in Civil Case No. 357. Hence, the
complainant commenced this administrative case.
After being required by the Court, the respondent
submitted his comment, to which the complainant filed a
rejoinder. Thereafter, the Court referred the case to the
IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.
Report and Recommendation
of the IBP-CB
After the parties submitted their position papers, the
IBP-CBD issued its Rep01i and Recommendation dated
July 9, 2008,[4] whereby it found and held the respondent
guilty of violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and recommended that he be suspended
from the practice of law and as a member of the Bar for
one (1) month. It observed that under Rule 6.03, "a
lawyer shall not, after leaving the government service,
accept engagement or employment in connection with
any matter in which he had intervened while in said
service;" and that the words or phrases any matter and he
had intervened qualifying the prohibition were very
broad terms, and included any conceivable subject in
which the respondent acted on in his official capacity.[5]
In Resolution No. XVIII-2008-403 adopted on August
14, 2008,[6] the IBP Board of Governors approved the
Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
On June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors passed
Resolution No. XIX-2011-434[7] denying the
respondent's motion for reconsideration, and affirming
Resolution No. XVIII-2008-403.
The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the records to
the Court in accordance with Section 12(b), Rule 139-B
of the Rules of Court, to wit:
If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total
membership, determines that the respondent should be
suspended from the practice or law or disbarred, it shall
issue a resolution setting forth its findings and
recommendations which, together with the whole record
of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme
Court for final action.
Ruling of the Court
We adopt and affirm the findings and recommendation
of the IBP Board of Governors.
Rule 6.03 of the Code ofProfessional
Responsibility provides:
Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving
government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which
he had intervened while in said service.
This rule, according to Presidential Commission on
Good Government v. Sandiganbayan,[8] traces its lineage
to Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, viz.:
36. Retirement from judicial position or public
employment
A lawyer should not accept employment as an
advocate in any matter upon the merits of which he
has previously acted in a judicial capacity.
A lawyer, having once held public office or having
been in the public employ should not, after his
retirement, accept employment in connection with
any matter he has investigated or passed upon while
in such office or employ.
To come within the ambit of Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the respondent must be
shown to have accepted the engagement or employment
in relation to a matter that, by virtue of his judicial
office, he had previously exercised power to influence
the outcome of the proceedings.[9] That showing was
sufficiently made herein. The respondent, in his capacity
as the judge of the MTCC of Tangub City, presided over
the case before eventually inhibiting himself from
further proceedings. His act of presiding constituted
intervention within the meaning of the rule whose text
does not mention the degree or length of the intervention
in the particular case or matter. It is also plain and
unquestionable that Canon 36, supra, from which the
canon was derived, prohibited him as a former member
of the Bench from handling any case upon which he had
previously acted in a judicial capacity. In this context, he
not only exercised the power to influence the outcome of
the proceedings but also had a direct hand in bringing
about the result of the case by virtue of his having the
power to rule on it.
The restriction extended to engagement or employment.
The respondent could not accept work or employment
from anyone that would involve or relate to any matter
in which he had intervened as a judge except on behalf
of the body or authority that he served during his public
employment.[10] The restriction as applied to him lasted
beyond his tenure in relation to the matters in which he
had intervened as judge.[11] Accordingly, the fact that he
was already retired from the Bench, or that he was
already in the private practice of law when he was
engaged for the case was inconsequential.

Although the respondent removed himself from the cases

once his neutrality and impartiality were challenged, he
ultimately did not stay away from the cases following his
retirement from the Bench, and acted thereon as a lawyer
for and in behalf of the defendants.

The respondent has pleaded for the sympathy of the

Court towards his plight of "poverty." Although we can
understand his current situation and symphatize with
him, his actuations cannot be overlooked because they
contravened the express letter and spirit of Rule 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. In any case, his
representing the defendants in the civil cases was not the
only way by which he could improve his dire financial
situation. It would not be difficult for him, being a
lawyer and a former member of the Bench, to accept
clients whom he could ethically represent in a
professional capacity. If the alternatives open to him
were not adequate to his liking, he had other recourses,
like serving as a notary public under a valid commission.
His taking on of the defendants' civil cases despite his
previous direct intervention thereon while still a member
of the Bench was impermissible. He should have
maintained his ethical integrity by avoiding the
engagement by the defendants.

WHEREFORE, the
Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES ATTY. FELIPE G.
ZAPATOS guilty of violating Rule 6.03 of Canon 6 of
theCode of Professional Responsibility,
and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for a
period of ONE (1) MONTH effective immediately upon
receipt of this decision, with warning that a similar
offense by him will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this decision be included in the personal

record of the respondent and be entered in his file in the
Office of the Bar Confidant; and be furnished to the
Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to
all lower courts in the country, as well as to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its information and
guidance.

SO ORDERED.
 A.M. No. RTJ-10-2217, APRIL 8 2013 "just passed the bar", defend the respondent, and was
likewise helping the latter defend herself. Pertinent
SONIA DECENA & REY DECENA v. JUDGE portion of the records of the proceedings are as follows:
NILO MALANYAON
xxxx
Atty.
BERSAMIN, J.: Nieves
A judge may not involve himself in any activity that is
an aspect of the private practice of law. His acceptance
of an appointment to the Bench inhibits him from
engaging in the private practice of law, regardless of the Atty.
beneficiary of the activity being a member of his
Zamora
immediate family. He is guilty of conduct unbecoming
of a judge otherwise.
Antecedents
Judge
The complainants have lodged an administrative
Malanyaon Malanyaon. I am assisting her. And so
complaint for conduct unbecoming a judge against Hon.
Nilo A. Malanyaon, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Atty.
Trial Court, Branch 32, in Pili, Camarines Sur. [1] Zamora
Atty.
In their joint complaint-affidavit dated April 10,
Nieves
2007,[2] the complainants averred that complainant Rey
C. Decena had brought an administrative case in
Regional Office No. V of the Civil Service Commission
in Legaspi City, Albay against Judge Malanyaon's wife, Atty.
Dr. Amelita C. Malanyaon (Dr. Amelita), then the
Zamora
Assistant Provincial Health Officer of the Province of
Camarines Sur; that during the hearing of the
administrative case on May 4, 2006, Judge Malanyaon
sat beside his daughter, Atty. Ma. Kristina C. Judge
Malanyaon, the counsel of Dr. Amelita in the case; and
Malanyaon of turn, out of turn.
that the events that then transpired were as recounted in
the joint complaint-affidavit, to wit:
Atty.
3. During the early stage of the hearing when the hearing
Nieves
officer, Atty. Dennis Masinas Nieves, brought up the
matter regarding Dr. Malanyaon's manifestation or
motion (to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction),
Judge Malanyaon coached her daughter in making
manifestations/motions before the hearing officer, by Atty.
scribbling on some piece of paper and giving the same to
Zamora
the former, thus prompting her daughter to rise from her
seat and/or ask permission from the officer to speak, and Atty.
then make some manifestations while reading or
Nieves
glancing on the paper given by Judge Malanyaon. At one
point, Judge Malanyaon even prompted her daughter to Atty.
demand that Atty. Eduardo Loria, the collaborating Zamora
counsel of our principal counsel, Atty. Mary Ailyne Atty.
Zamora, be required to produce his PTR number.
Nieves
Atty.
4. When our principal counsel, Atty. Zamora, arrived
Zamora
and took over from Atty. Loria, she inquired regarding Atty.
the personality of Judge Malanyaon, being seated at the
Malanyaon respondent.
lawyer's bench beside Atty. Malanyaon, Judge Atty.
Malanyaon then proudly introduced himself and
Nieves
manifested that he was the "counsel of the respondent's
counsel". Atty. Zamora proceeded to raise the propriety
of Judge Malanyaon's sitting with and assisting his Atty.
daughter in that hearing, being a member of the
Zamora
judiciary, to which Judge Malanyaon loudly retorted that
he be shown any particular rule that prohibits him from
sitting with his daughter at the lawyers' bench. He Atty.
insisted that he was merely "assisting" her daughter, who
Nieves
:First, she has to enter her appearance. Okay?
Anyway, … I don't think, I do not memorize
my PTR number, I don't remember my PTR
number, but aside from that Your Honor, I
think this Honorable Hearing Officer could
take judicial notice that Atty. Ed Loria is
:
indeed a lawyer in good standing in IBP.
And moreover, Your Honor, I would like to
inquire as to the personality of the gentleman
next to the lawyer of the defendant or
respondent, Your Honor?
I am the counsel of the complainant, ah, of
the respondent's counsel, I am Judge
:
what?!!
Ah, you are the counsel of the
:
…(interrupted)
There's no need to be belligerent… let's calm
:
down…
Your Honor, Your Honor, we all do not
know each other, and with due respect to the
judge, there is also a hearing officer here
Your Honor, and I think Your Honor the
:
Hearing Officer here deserves due respect. I
mean, the word "So what?!", I don't think
that would be proper Your Honor in this
Court.
I am sorry your Honor, because the … is out
:
This is not necessary, actually, this is not
necessary. So we might as well proceed with
our hearing today. I've already made a ruling
regarding the, the query regarding PTR.
:
Okay, at this stage it is not proper
considering that Atty. Loria only entered his
appearance during the start of the hearing.
Okay. So, we have to proceed now.
I am accepting Your Honor the delegation
again of Atty. Loria. I am entering my
:
appearance as the lead counsel for this case,
Your Honor, as counsel for the complainant.
:Okay.
And may I be clear that the judge will be the
:collaborating counsel for the respondent or
the counsel of record of the respondent?
:… of the judge is … I'm sorry?
He manifested Your Honor that he is the
:
counsel of the respondent.
No, the counsel of the counsel of the
:
He has not, he has not entered his
:
appearance in this case.
Would that be proper for him Your Honor,
considering that he is a judge Your Honor?
Would that, ah, there will be undue
:
influence, or whatever, Your Honor? We are
just trying to avoid any bias or undue
influence in this court, Your Honor.
Okay, it will not, considering the fact that he
:
has not entered his appearance for the
 respondent.
If Your Honor, please, the respondent is my
wife. Counsel for the respondent is my
daughter. She just passed the bar! I'm
Judge
:assisting her. Is it not my right, my duty to
Malanyaon
assist my daughter? And to assist my wife
defend herself? I am only sitting with my
daughter! I'm not acting for the respondent!
I don't think Your Honor under the rule, the
Atty. counsel needs a counsel. Only the one
:
Zamora charged or the one being charged needs a
counsel.
Okay, let's settle this now. Judge Malanyaon
Atty.
:has not entered his appearance. It will not in
Nieves
any way …
xxxx
The complainants averred that the actuations of Judge
Malanyaon during the hearing of his wife's
administrative case in the Civil Service Commission
constituted violations of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippines Judiciary.
On June 21, 2007, then Court Administrator Christopher
O. Lock required Judge Malanyaon to comment on the
complaint.[3]
On July 15, 2007, Judge Malanyaon filed his comment,
refuting the allegations of the complaint thusly:
1. Complainants are the sister and nephew of my
wife, Amelita C. Malanyaon, there is bad blood
between them arising from divergent political
loyalties and family differences;
2. There is no reason for complainants to take
offense at my sitting beside my daughter Ma.
Kristina, when she appeared for my wife in the
first hearing of the administrative case Rey C.
Decena filed against my wife; the hearing officer
himself could cite no rule disallowing me from
sitting beside my daughter, in the counsel's
table, and he did not ask me to vacate where I
sat beside my daughter; the transcript does not
support complainants' claim;
3. It is true I snapped at Atty. Zamora, when she
asked about my personality but she was
speaking out of turn as all I was doing was
sitting beside my daughter when she came as the
transcript will show, I apologized to the hearing
officer, who graciously let the matter pass;
4. My daughter is a new practitioner; her law
partner and lead counsel could not make it on
time, and as her consultant, I did not speak, nor
enter my appearance for my wife to lend a
helping hand to a neophyte lawyer, defending
her mother in an administrative case, is not
unethical, nor does it constitute the proscribed
practice of law;
5. It is petty for my sister-in-law and for my
nephew to complain of my presence during the
hearing; it is my filial duty to lend my wife and
daughter, moral and legal support in their time
of need; indeed, it is strange for complainants to
take offense at my presence and accuse me of
practicing law during my stint as a judge when
before the bad blood between my wife and her
sibling and nephew erupted, I helped them out
with their legal problems gratis et amore and
they did not complain of my practicing law on
their behalf, indeed, one of the crosses a judge
must carry is the cross of base ingratitude.[4]
On March 27, 2008, then Court Administrator Zenaida
N. Elepaño recommended to the Court that: (a) the
complaint be re-docketed as a regular administrative
matter; (b) Judge Malanyaon be found guilty of gross
misconduct; and (c) Judge Malanyaon be fined
P50,000.00.[5]
On September 16, 2009, the Court required the parties to
manifest within 10 days from notice if they were willing
to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the
records or pleadings filed.[6]
The complainants complied on November 13, 2009,
stating their willingness to submit the case for resolution
after a formal investigation or hearing was conducted,
and after they were given time to file their respective
position papers or memoranda.[7]
On January 11, 2010, the Court resolved: (a) to re-docket
the administrative case as a regular administrative
matter; (b) to await Judge Malanyaon's compliance with
the September 16, 2009 resolution; and (c) to refer the
administrative matter to the OCA for evaluation, report
and recommendation.[8]
After Judge Malanyaon did not submit any compliance
with the September 16, 2009 resolution, the Court
ordered him on February 10, 2010 to show cause why he
should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in
contempt for such failure, and further directed him to
still comply with the resolution.[9]
On February 15, 2010, Judge Malanyaon's counsel
informed the Court that Judge Malanyaon had
meanwhile suffered a massive stroke on September 2,
2009 that had affected his mental faculties and made him
unfit to defend himself here; and prayed for the
suspension of the proceedings until Judge Malanyaon
would have been found competent to comprehend and
stand the rigors of the investigation.[10]
On April 12, 2010, the Court deferred action on the case,
and required Judge Malanyaon to submit a medical
certificate.[11]
Judge Malanyaon submitted a medical certificate dated
May 27, 2010, issued by the Philippine General
Hospital, certifying that he had been confined thereaft
from September 2, 2009 to October 19, 2009 for the
following reason, to wit:
Cerebro Vascular disease, Hypertension Intra Cerebral
Hematoma
Left Thalamus with obstructive Hydrocephalus; DM
type II, Chronic
Obstructive Pulmonary disease; Pneumonia; lleus
(resolved); Neurogenic bladder, Benign Prostatic
Hypertrophy; Grave's disease;
Arthritis.
OPERATION PERFORMED:
Bilateral tube ventriculostomy[12]
Judge Malanyaon submitted two more medical
certificates, the first dated October 5, 2010, [13] certifying
that, among others, he was undergoing regular check-up,
and the other, dated January 24, 2011,[14] certifying that
his functional and mental status had been assessed as
follows:
The severity and location of the hemorrage in the brain
resulted in residual epoliptogenic focus (Post-gliotic
seizures) and significant impairment of cognition,
memory judgment behavior (Vascular Dementia). He
has problems with memory recall, analysis of
information, events and situations which may make
defending himself difficult, if necessary. Although he is
independent on ambulation, he requires assistance even
in basic activities of daily living.[15]
The Court required the complainants to comment on
Judge Malanyaon's medical certification dated October
5, 2010.
On July 18, 2011, however, Dr. Amelita submitted a
manifestation and urgent motion to dismiss, seeking the
dismissal of the administrative case against Judge
Malanyaon upon the following grounds, to wit:
x x x x
2. Unfortunately, in a "Medical Certification" dated June
15, 2011 the original of which is attached hereto as
Annex "1", the attending neurologist of my husband has
pronounced him permanently mentally impaired. x x x.
x x x x
3. As a consequence, my husband has permanently lost
the capacity to understand the nature and object of the
administrative proceedings against him. He cannot
intelligently appoint his counsel or communicate
coherently with him. He cannot testify in his own behalf,
and confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses.
Indeed, he cannot properly avail himself of his rights in
an adversarial administrative investigation;
4. Given the progressive mental impairment afflicting
my husband, he has permanently lost the capacity to
defend himself. Thus, to continue the administrative
investigation against my husband who is no longer in
any position to defend himself would constitute a denial
of his right to be heard (Baikong Akang Camsa vs. Judge
Aurelio Rendon, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1395 dated 19
February 2002).[16]
Even so, on September 26, 2011, we required the
complainants to comment on the manifestation and
motion of Dr. Amelita.[17]
Subsequently, Dr. Amelita submitted another motion
dated January 23, 2012,[18] praying for the dismissal of
the case against Judge Malanyaon.
On February 6, 2012, Court Administrator Jose Midas P.
Marquez reiterated the recommendation made on March
27, 2008 by then Court Administrator Elepaño by
recommending that: (a) the administrative case be re-
docketed as a regular administrative matter; and (b)
Judge Malanyaon be found guilty of gross misconduct
and fined P50,000.00.[19]
On May 3, 2012, the Court received the complainants'
compliance dated February 1, 2012, [20] as their response
to the show cause order issued in relation to their failure
to submit the comment the Court had required on
September 26, 2011.[21]
On September 4, 2012, the Court received from Dr.
Amelita an urgent ex parte motion for immediate
resolution, praying that the motion to dismiss dated July
18, 2011 be already resolved.[22]
Issues
For consideration and resolution are the following
issues, namely: (a) whether or not Judge Malanyaon
would be denied due process if the administrative case
was not dismissed; (b) whether the actuations of Judge
Malanyaon complained of constituted conduct
unbecoming of a judge; and (c) if Judge Malanyaon was
guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge, what should be
the correct sanction.
Ruling
We now discuss and resolve the issues accordingly.
1.
Respondent's right to due process
is not violated by resolution of the case
In her manifestation with urgent motion to
dismiss,[23] Dr. Amelita stressed that proceeding against
Judge Malanyaon despite his present medical state
would violate his right to due process. She stated:
3. As a consequence, my husband has permanently lost
the capacity to understand the nature and object of the
administrative proceedings against him. He cannot
intelligently appoint his counsel or communicate
coherently with him. He cannot testify in his own behalf,
and confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses.
Indeed, he cannot properly avail himself of his rights in
an adversarial administrative investigation.[24]
Opposing, the complainants argued that Dr. Amelita's
concern was unfounded considering that Judge
Malanyaon had not only been given the opportunity to
be heard, but had been actually heard on their complaint.
The complainants' argument is well taken.
On August 3, 2007, or prior to his suffering the massive
stroke that impaired his mental faculty, Judge
Malanyaon already submitted his comment containing
his explanations and refutations of the charge against
him. His comment asserted that during the hearing of the
administrative case of his wife in the Regional Office of
the Civil Service Commission, the hearing officer did
not even cite any rule that prohibited him from sitting
beside his daughter who was then acting as the counsel
of Dr. Amelita therein, or that inhibited him from
assisting his daughter in the defense of his wife. He
pointed out that although he had then lost his temper
after the opposing counsel had inquired about his
personality in that hearing, he had ultimately apologized
to the hearing officer, who had in turn graciously let the
matter pass.
Under the circumstances, Judge Malanyaon was
accorded due process. In administrative cases, the
requirement of due process is satisfied whenever the
parties are afforded the fair and reasonable opportunity
to explain their side of the controversy, [25] either through
oral arguments or through pleadings.[26] That is what
happened herein. Accordingly, Dr. Amelita's motion was
bereft of basis, and should be denied.
2.
Actuations of Judge Malanyaon
rendered him guilty of
conduct unbecoming of a judge
The following actuations of Judge Malanyaon
constituted conduct unbecoming of a judge upon the
reasons set forth below.
First was Judge Malanyaon's occupying a seat beside his
daughter that was reserved for the lawyers during the
hearing. Such act displayed his presumptuousness, and
probably even his clear intention to thereby exert his
influence as a judge of the Regional Trial Court on the
hearing officer in order for the latter to favor his wife's
cause. That impression was definitely adverse against
the Judiciary, whose every judicial officer was presumed
to be a subject of strict scrutiny by the public. Being an
incumbent RTC Judge, he always represented the
Judiciary, and should have acted with greater
circumspection and self-restraint, simply because the
administrative hearing was unavoidably one in which he
could not but be partisan. Simple prudence should have
counselled him to avoid any form of suspicion of his
motives, or to suppress any impression of impropriety on
his part as an RTC judge by not going to the hearing
himself.
Second was Judge Malanyaon's admission that his
presence in that hearing was to advise his daughter on
what to do and say during the hearing, to the point of
coaching his daughter. In the process, he unabashedly
introduced himself as the "counsel of the respondent's
counsel" upon his presence being challenged by the
adverse counsel, stating that his daughter was still
inexperienced for having just passed her Bar
Examinations. Such excuse, seemingly grounded on a
"filial" duty towards his wife and his daughter, did not
furnish enough reason for him to forsake the ethical
conduct expected of him as a sitting judge. He ought to
have restrained himself from sitting at that hearing,
being all too aware that his sitting would have him cross
the line beyond which was the private practice of law.
Section 35[27] of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court expressly prohibits sitting judges like Judge
Malanyaon from engaging in the private practice of law
or giving professional advice to clients. Section
11,[28] Canon 4 (Propriety),[29] of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct and Rule 5.07[30] of the Code of
Judicial Conduct reiterate the prohibition from engaging
in the private practice of law or giving professional
advice to clients. The prohibition is based on sound
reasons of public policy, considering that the rights,
duties, privileges and functions of the office of an
attorney are inherently incompatible with the high
official functions, duties, powers, discretion and
privileges of a sitting judge. It also aims to ensure that
judges give their full time and attention to their judicial
duties, prevent them from extending favors to their own
private interests, and assure the public of their
impartiality in the performance of their functions. These
objectives are dictated by a sense of moral decency and
desire to promote the public interest.[31]
Thus, an attorney who accepts an appointment to the
Bench must accept that his right to practice law as a
member of the Philippine Bar is thereby suspended, and
it shall continue to be so suspended for the entire period
of his incumbency as a judge. The term practice of
law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court or to
participation in court proceedings, but extends to the
preparation of pleadings or papers in anticipation of a
litigation, the giving of legal advice to clients or persons
needing the same, the preparation of legal instruments
and contracts by which legal rights are secured, and the
preparation of papers incident to actions and special
proceedings.[32] To the Court, then, Judge Malanyaon
engaged in the private practice of law by assisting his
daughter at his wife's administrative case, coaching his
daughter in making manifestations or posing motions to
the hearing officer, and preparing the questions that he
prompted to his daughter in order to demand that Atty.
Eduardo Loria, collaborating counsel of the
complainants' principal counsel, should produce his
privilege tax receipt. Judge Malanyaon did so voluntarily
and knowingly, in light of his unhesitating
announcement during the hearing that he was the
counsel for Atty. Katrina Malanyaon, the counsel of the
respondent, as his response to the query by the opposing
counsel why he was seated next to Atty. Malanyaon
thereat.
Third was Judge Malanyaon's admission that he had
already engaged in the private practice of law even
before the incident now the subject of this case by his
statement in his comment that "it is strange for
complainants to take offense at my presence and accuse
me of practicing law during my stint as a judge when
before the bad blood between my wife and her sibling
and nephew erupted, I helped them out with their legal
problems gratis et amoreand they did not complain of
my practicing law on their behalf."[33] He thereby
manifested his tendencies to disregard the prohibition
against the private practice of law during his
incumbency on the Bench.
Any propensity on the part of a magistrate to ignore the
ethical injunction to conduct himself in a manner that
would give no ground for reproach is always worthy of
condemnation.[34] We should abhor any impropriety on
the part of judges, whether committed in or out of their
courthouses, for they are not judges only occasionally.
The Court has fittingly emphasized in Castillo v.
Calanog, Jr.: [35]
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of
a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only
with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but
also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private
individual. There is no dichotomy of morality; a public
official is also judged by his private morals. The Code
dictates that a judge, in order to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. As we
have very recently explained, a judge's official life
cannot simply be detached or separated from his
personal existence. Thus:
Being a subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge
should freely and willingly accept restrictions on
conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the
ordinary citizen.
A judge should personify judicial integrity and
exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior
of a judge, both in the performance of official duties and
in private life should be above suspicion.
Fourth was Judge Malanyaon's display of arrogance
during the hearing, as reflected by his reaction to the
opposing counsel's query on his personality to sit at the
counsel table at the hearing, to wit:
I am the counsel of the complainant, ah, of the
respondent's counsel, I am Judge Malanyaon. I am
assisting her. And so what?!!
Judge Malanyaon's uttering "And so what?" towards the
opposing counsel evinced his instant resentment towards
the adverse parties' counsel for rightly challenging his
right to be sitting on a place reserved for counsel of the
parties. The utterance, for being made in an arrogant
tone just after he had introduced himself as a judge, was
unbecoming of the judge that he was, and tainted the
good image of the Judiciary that he should uphold at all
times.[36] It is true that the challenge of the opposing
counsel might have slighted him, but that was not
enough to cause him to forget that he was still a judge
expected to act with utmost sobriety and to speak with
self-restraint. He thereby ignored the presence of the
hearing officer, appearing to project that he could
forsake the decorum that the time and the occasion
rightly called for from him and the others just because he
was a judge and the other side was not. He should not
forget that a judge like himself should be the last person
to be perceived by others as a petty and sharp-tongued
tyrant.
Judge Malanyaon has insisted that his actuations were
excused by his filial obligation to assist his daughter,
then only a neophyte in the Legal Profession. We would
easily understand his insistence in the light of our culture
to be always solicitous of the wellbeing of our family
members and other close kin, even risking our own
safety and lives in their defense. But the situation of
Judge Malanyaon was different, for he was a judicial
officer who came under the stricture that uniformly
applied to all judges of all levels of the judicial
hierarchy, forbidding him from engaging in the private
practice of law during his incumbency, regardless of
whether the beneficiary was his wife or daughter or other
members of his own family.
3.
What is the proper penalty?
Judge Malanyaon had been previously sanctioned by the
Court on the following three occasions, namely: (a)
A.M. No. RTJ-93-1090, with admonition for gross
ignorance of the law and unreasonable delay in resolving
motions;[37] (b) A.M. No. RTJ-99-1444, with reprimand
for failure to resolve motions;[38] and (c) A.M. No. RTJ-
02-1669, with a fine of P20,000.00 (coupled with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act
would be dealt with more severely) for conduct
unbecoming of a judge.[39] He had other administrative
cases that were dismissed.[40] Of the three administrative
cases that merited sanctions, however, only the third
should be considered as aggravating herein because it
involved the similar offense of conduct unbecoming of a
judge for which he had been given the stern warning of a
more severe penalty upon a repetition.
However, our uniform treatment of administrative
sanctions as having the nature of liabilities akin to those
in criminal cases now brings us to offset such
aggravating circumstance with the apparent fact that the
actuations of Judge Malanyaon complained of had not
been motivated by bad faith, or by any malice towards
another. Indeed, he did not intend to thereby cause any
prejudice to another, having so acted from a sincere,
albeit misplaced, desire to go to the help of his wife and
daughter.
Accordingly, the Court deems it condign and proper to
mitigate the fine of P50,000.00 recommended by the
Court Administrator by imposing on Judge Malanyaon a
fine of P40,000.00. With his disability retirement from
the Judiciary having been earlier granted by the Court,
the fine shall be deducted from his remaining retirement
benefits.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds and
pronounces JUDGE NILO A. MALANYAON,
Presiding Judge of Branch 32 of the Regional Trial
Court in Pili, Camarines Sur, administratively liable for
conduct unbecoming of a Judge, and penalizes him with
a fine of P40,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
 JESSIE R. DE LEON v. ATTY. EDUARDO G.
CASTELO xxx in causing it (to) appear that
persons (spouses Lim Hio and Dolores
AC No. 8620. JAN 12, 2011 Chu) have participated in an act or
proceeding (the making and filing of the
BERSAMIN, J.: Answers) when they did not in fact so
participate; in fact, they could not have
so participated because they were
This administrative case, which Jessie R. already dead as of that time, which is
De Leon initiated on April 29, 2010,concerns respondent punishable under Article 172, in relation
to Article 171, paragraph 2, of the
attorneys alleged dishonesty and falsification committed Revised Penal Code.
in the pleadings he filed in behalf of the defendants in
Respondent also committed the
the civil action in which De Leon intervened. crime of Use of Falsified Documents, by
submitting the said falsified Answers in
Antecedents the judicial proceedings, Civil Case No.
4674MN;

On January 2, 2006, the Government brought Respondent also made a mockery

of the aforesaid judicial proceedings by
suit for the purpose of correcting the transfer certificates representing dead persons therein who,
of title (TCTs) covering two parcels of land located in he falsely made to appear, as contesting
the complaints, counter-suing and cross-
Malabon City then registered in the names of defendants
suing the adverse parties.
Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu due to their
encroaching on a public callejon and on a portion of the 12. That, as a consequence of the
above criminal acts, complainant
Malabon-Navotas River shoreline to the extent, respectfully submits that respondent
respectively, of an area of 45 square meters and of about likewise violated:
600 square meters. The suit, entitled Republic of
the Philippines, represented by the Regional Executive (a) His Lawyers Oath:
xxx
Director, Department of Environment and Natural
(b) The Code of Professional
Resources v. Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu, Responsibility:[3]
Gorgonia Flores, and the Registrar of Deeds xxx

of Malabon City, was docketed as Civil Case No.

4674MN of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 74, On June 23, 2010, the Court directed the

in Malabon City.[1] respondent to comment on De Leons administrative

complaint.[4]

De Leon, having joined Civil Case No.

4674MN as a voluntary intervenor two years later (April In due course, or on August 2, 2010,[5] the

21, 2008), now accuses the respondent, the counsel of respondent rendered the following explanations in

record of the defendants in Civil Case No. 4674MN, his comment, to wit:

with the serious administrative offenses of dishonesty

1. The persons who had engaged him as
and falsification warranting his disbarment or suspension attorney to represent the Lim family
as an attorney. The respondents sin was allegedly in Civil Case No. 4674MN were
William and Leonardo Lim, the
committed by his filing for defendants Spouses Lim Hio children of Spouses Lim Hio and
and Dolores Chu of various pleadings (that is, answer Dolores Chu;
with counterclaim and cross-claim in relation to the
2. Upon his (Atty. Castelo) initial
main complaint; and answer to the complaint in queries relevant to the material
intervention with counterclaim and cross-claim) despite allegations of the
Governments complaint in Civil
said spouses being already deceased at the time of Case No. 4674MN, William Lim,
filing.[2] the representative of the Lim
Family, informed him:

De Leon avers that the respondent committed a. That the Lim family had
dishonesty and falsification as follows: acquired the properties from
Georgina Flores;

b. That William and
Leonardo Lim were already
actively managing the
family business, and now
co-owned the properties by
virtue of the deed of
absolute sale their parents,
Spouses Lim Hio and
Dolores Chu, had executed
in their favor; and
c. That because of the execution
of the deed of absolute sale,
William and Leonardo Lim
had since honestly assumed
that their parents had
already caused the transfer
of the TCTs to their names.
3. Considering that William and
Leonardo Lim themselves were the
ones who had engaged his services,
he (Atty. Castelo) consequently
truthfully stated in the motion
seeking an extension to file
responsive pleading dated February
3, 2006 the fact that it was the
family of the defendants that had
engaged him, and that he had then
advised the children of the
defendants to seek the assistance as
well of a licensed geodetic surveyor
and engineer;
4. He (Atty. Castelo) prepared the
initial pleadings based on his honest
belief that Spouses Lim Hio and
Dolores Chu were then still
living.Had he known that they were
already deceased, he would have
most welcomed the information and
would have moved to substitute
Leonardo and William Lim as
defendants for that reason;
5. He (Atty. Castelo) had no intention
to commit either a falsehood or a
falsification, for he in fact submitted
the death certificates of Spouses
Lim Hio and Dolores Chu in order
to apprise the trial court of that fact;
and
6. The Office of the Prosecutor
for Malabon City even dismissed
the criminal complaint for
falsification brought against him
(Atty. Castelo) through the
resolution dated February 11, 2010.
The same office denied the
complainants motion for
reconsideration on May 17, 2010.
On September 3, 2010, the complainant
[6]
submitted a reply, whereby he asserted that the
respondents claim in his comment that he had
represented the Lim family was a deception, because the
subject of the complaint against the respondent was his
filing of the answers in behalf of Spouses Lim Hio and
Dolores Chu despite their being already deceased at the
time of the filing. The complainant regarded as baseless
the justifications of the Office of the City Prosecutor
for Malabon City in dismissing the criminal complaint
against the respondent and in denying his motion for
reconsideration.
The Court usually first refers administrative
complaints against members of the Philippine Bar to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation
and appropriate recommendations. For the present case,
however, we forego the prior referral of the complaint to
the IBP, in view of the facts being uncomplicated and
based on the pleadings in Civil Case No. 4674MN. Thus,
we decide the complaint on its merits.
Ruling
We find that the respondent, as attorney, did not
commit any falsehood or falsification in his pleadings in
Civil Case No. 4674MN. Accordingly, we dismiss the
patently frivolous complaint.
I
Attorneys Obligation to tell the truth
All attorneys in the Philippines, including the
respondent, have sworn to the vows embodied in
following Lawyers Oath,[7] viz:
I, ___________________, do
solemnly swear that I will maintain
allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines; I will support its
Constitution and obey the laws as well
as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do
no falsehood, nor consent to the doing
of any in court; I will not wittingly or
willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor
give aid nor consent to the same. I will
delay no man for money or malice, and
will conduct myself as a lawyer
according to the best of my knowledge
and discretion with all good fidelity as
well to the courts as to my clients; and I
impose upon myself this voluntary
obligation without any mental
reservation or purpose of evasion. So
help me God.

The Code of Professional Responsibility echoes
the Lawyers Oath, providing:[8]
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL
UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION,
OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR
LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct.
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES
CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD
FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do
any falsehood, nor consent to the doing
of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or
allow the Court to be misled by any
artifice.
The foregoing ordain ethical norms that bind all
attorneys, as officers of the Court, to act with the highest
standards of honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness. All
attorneys are thereby enjoined to obey the laws of the
land, to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of
court or from consenting to the doing of any in court,
and to conduct themselves according to the best of their
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well
to the courts as to their clients. Being also servants of the
Law, attorneys are expected to observe and maintain the
rule of law and to make themselves exemplars worthy of
emulation by others.[9] The least they can do in that
regard is to refrain from engaging in any form or manner
of unlawful conduct (which broadly includes any act or
omission contrary to law, but does not necessarily imply
the element of criminality even if it is broad enough to
include such element).[10]
To all attorneys, truthfulness and honesty have
the highest value, for, as the Court has said in Young v.
Batuegas:[11]
A lawyer must be a disciple of
truth. He swore upon his admission to
the Bar that he will do no falsehood nor
consent to the doing of any in court and
he shall conduct himself as a lawyer
according to the best of his knowledge
and discretion with all good fidelity as
well to the courts as to his clients. He
should bear in mind that as an officer of
the court his high vocation is to
correctly inform the court upon the law
and the facts of the case and to aid it in
doing justice and arriving at correct
conclusion. The courts, on the other
hand, are entitled to expect only
complete honesty from lawyers
appearing and pleading before them.
While a lawyer has the solemn duty to
defend his clients rights and is expected
to display the utmost zeal in defense of
his clients cause, his conduct must never
be at the expense of truth.
Their being officers of the Court extends to
attorneys not only the presumption of regularity in the
discharge of their duties, but also the immunity from
liability to others for as long as the performance of their
obligations to their clients does not depart from their
character as servants of the Law and as officers of the
Court. In particular, the statements they make in behalf
of their clients that are relevant, pertinent, or material to
the subject of inquiry are absolutely privileged
regardless of their defamatory tenor. Such cloak of
privilege is necessary and essential in ensuring the
unhindered service to their clients causes and in
protecting the clients confidences. With the cloak of
privilege, they can freely and courageously speak for
their clients, verbally or in writing, in the course of
judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings, without running
the risk of incurring criminal prosecution or actions for
damages.[12]
Nonetheless, even if they enjoy a number of
privileges by reason of their office and in recognition of
the vital role they play in the administration of justice,
attorneys hold the privilege and right to practice law
before judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative tribunals
or offices only during good behavior.[13]
II
Respondent did not violate the Lawyers Oath
and the Code of Professional Responsibility
On April 17, 2006, the respondent filed
an answer with counterclaim and cross-claim in behalf
of Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu, the persons whom
the Government as plaintiff named as defendants in Civil
Case No. 4674MN.[14] He alleged therein that:
2. The allegations in paragraph 2 of the
complaint are ADMITTED. Moreover,
it is hereby made known that
 defendants spouses Lim Hio and
Dolores Chu had already sold the two
(2) parcels of land, together with the
building and improvements thereon,
covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. (148805) 139876 issued by
the Register of Deeds of Rizal, to
Leonardo C. Lim and William C.
Lim, of Rms. 501 502 Dolores Bldg.,
Plaza del Conde, Binondo, Manila.
Hence, Leonardo Lim and William
Lim are their successors-in-interest
and are the present lawful owners
thereof.
In order to properly and fully protect
their rights, ownership and interests,
Leonardo C. Lim and William C. Lim
shall hereby represent the defendants-
spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu as
substitute/representative parties in
this action. In this manner, a complete
and expeditious resolution of the
issues raised in this case can be
reached without undue delay. A photo
copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale over
the subject property, executed by herein
defendants-spouses Lim Hio and
Dolores Chu in favor of said Leonardo
C. Lim and William C. Lim, is hereto
attached as Annex 1 hereof.
xxx
21. There is improper joinder of parties
in the complaint. Consequently,
answering defendants are thus unduly
compelled to litigate in a suit regarding
matters and facts as to which they have
no knowledge of nor any involvement or
participation in.
22. Plaintiff is barred by the principle of
estoppel in bringing this suit, as it was
the one who, by its governmental
authority, issued the titles to the subject
property.
This action is barred by the
principles of prescription and laches for
plaintiffs unreasonable delay in brining
this suit, particularly against defendant
Flores, from whom herein answering
defendants acquired the subject property
in good faith and for value. If truly
plaintiff has a clear and valid cause of
action on the subject property, it should
not have waited thirty (30) years to
bring suit.
Two years later, or on April 21, 2008,
De Leon filed his complaint in intervention in Civil Case
No. 4674MN.[15] He expressly named therein as
defendants vis--vis his intervention not only the Spouses
Lim Hio and Dolores Chu, the original defendants, but
also their sons Leonardo Lim, married to Sally Khoo,
and William Lim, married to Sally Lee, the same persons
whom the respondent had already alleged in the answer,
supra, to be the transferees and current owners of the
parcels of land.[16]
The following portions of De Leons complaint
in intervention in Civil Case No. 4674MN are
relevant, viz:
2. Defendant spouses Lim Hio and
Dolores Chu, are Filipino citizens
with addresses at 504 Plaza del
Conde, Manila and at 46 C. Arellano
St., San Agustin, Malabon City, where
they may be served with summons
and other court processes;
3. Defendant spouses Leonardo Lim
and Sally Khoo and defendant
spouses William Lim and Sally Lee
are all of legal age and with postal
address at Rms. 501-502 Dolores
Bldg., Plaza del Conde, Binondo,
Manila, alleged purchasers of the
property in question from
defendant spouses Lim Hio and
Dolores Chu;
4. Defendants Registrar of Deeds of
Malabon City holds office
in Malabon City, where he may be
served with summons and other court
processes. He is charged with the duty,
among others, of registering decrees of
Land Registration in Malabon Cityunder
the Land Registration Act;
xxx
7. That intervenor Jessie de Leon, is the
owner of a parcel of land located
in MalabonCity described in TCT no.
M-15183 of the Register of Deeds of
Malabon City, photocopy of which is
attached to this Complaint as Annex G,
and copy of the location plan of the
aforementioned property is attached to
this complaint as Annex H and is made
an integral part hereof;
8. That there are now more or less at
least 40 squatters on intervenors
property, most of them employees of
defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores
Chu and defendant spouses Leonardo
Lim and Sally Khoo and defendant
spouses William Lim and Sally Lee who
had gained access to intervenors
property and built their houses without
benefit of any building permits from the
government who had made their access
to intervenors property thru a two panel
metal gate more or less 10 meters wide
and with an armed guard by the gate and
with permission from defendant spouses
Lim Hio and Dolores Chu and/or and
defendant spouses Leonardo Lim and
Sally Khoo and defendant spouses
William Lim and Sally Lee illegally
entered intervenors property thru a
wooden ladder to go over a 12 foot wall
now separating intervenors property
from the former esquinita which is now
part of defendant spouses Lim Hio and
Dolores Chus and defendant spouses
Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoos and
defendant spouses William Lim and
Sally Lees property and this illegally
allowed his employees as well as their
relatives and friends thereof to illegally
enter intervenors property through the
ladders defendant spouses Lim Hio and
Dolores Chu installed in their wall and
also allowed said employees and
relatives as well as friends to build
houses and shacks without the benefit of
any building permit as well as permit to
occupy said illegal buildings;
9. That the enlargement of the properties
of spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu
had resulted in the closure of street lot
no. 3 as described in TCT no. 143828,
spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu
having titled the street lot no. 3 and
placed a wall at its opening on C.
Arellano street, thus closing any exit or
egress or entrance to intervenors
property as could be seen from Annex H
hereof and thus preventing intervenor
from entering into his property resulted
in preventing intervenor from fully
enjoying all the beneficial benefits from
his property;
10. That defendant spouses Lim Hio
and Dolores Chu and later on
defendant spouses Leonardo Lim and
Sally Khoo and defendant spouses
William Lim and Sally Lee are the
only people who could give permission
to allow third parties to enter
intervenors property and their
control over intervenors property is
enforced through his armed guard
thus exercising illegal beneficial rights
over intervenors property at
intervenors loss and expense, thus
depriving intervenor of legitimate
income from rents as well as
legitimate access to intervenors
property and the worst is preventing
the Filipino people from enjoying the
Malabon Navotas River and enjoying
the right of access to the natural fruits
and products of the Malabon Navotas
River and instead it is defendant
spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu
and defendant spouses Leonardo Lim
and Sally Khoo and defendant
spouses William Lim and Sally Lee
using the public property exclusively
to enrich their pockets;
xxx
13. That defendant spouses Lim Hio
and Dolores Chu and defendant
spouses Leonardo Lim and Sally
Khoo and defendant spouses William
Lim and Sally Lee were
confederating, working and helping
one another in their actions to inhibit
intervenor Jessie de Leon to gain
access and beneficial benefit from his
property;
On July 10, 2008, the respondent,
representing all the defendants named in De
Leons complaint in intervention, responded in an answer
to the complaint in intervention with counterclaim and
cross-claim,[17] stating that spouses Lim Hio and Dolores
Chu xxx are now both deceased, to wit:
xxx
2. The allegations in paragraphs 2
and 3 of the Complaint are
ADMITTED, with the qualification
that defendants-spouses Leonardo
Lim and Sally Khoo Lim, William
Lim and Sally Lee Lim are the
registered and lawful owners of the
subject property covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. M-35929,
issued by the Register of Deeds for
Malabon City, having long ago
acquired the same from the
defendants-spouses Lim Hio and
Dolores Chu, who are now both
deceased. Copy of the TCT No. M-
35929 is attached hereto as Annexes 1
and 1-A. The same title has already been
previously submitted to this Honorable
Court on December 13, 2006.
xxx
The respondent subsequently submitted to the
RTC a so-called clarification and submission,[18] in
which he again adverted to the deaths of Spouses Lim
Hio and Dolores Chu, as follows:
1. On March 19, 2009, herein
movants-defendants Lim filed before
this Honorable Court a Motion for
Substitution of Defendants in the
Principal Complaint of
the plaintiff Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the DENR;
2. The Motion for Substitution
is grounded on the fact that the two
(2) parcels of land, with the
improvements thereon, which are the
subject matter of the instant case, had
long been sold and transferred by the
principal defendants-spouses Lim Hio
and Dolores Chu to herein complaint-
in-intervention defendants Leonardo
C. Lim and William C. Lim, by way
of a Deed of Absolute Sale, a copy of
which is attached to said Motion as
Annex 1 thereof.
3. Quite plainly, the original
principal defendants Lim Hio and
Dolores Chu, having sold and
conveyed the subject property, have
totally lost any title, claim or legal
interest on the property. It is on this
factual ground that this Motion for
Substitution is based and certainly not
on the wrong position of Intervenor
de Leon that the same is based on the
death of defendants Lim Hio and
Dolores Chu.
4. Under the foregoing
circumstances and facts, the demise of
defendants Lim Hio and Dolores Chu
no longer has any significant
relevance to the instant Motion. To,
however, show the fact of their death,
photo copy of their respective death
certificates are attached hereto as
Annexes 1 and 2 hereof.
5. The Motion for substitution of
Defendants in the Principal Complaint
dated March 18, 2009 shows in detail
why there is the clear, legal and
imperative need to now substitute herein
movants-defendants Lim for defendants
Lim Hio and Dolores Chu in the said
principal complaint.
6. Simply put, movants-
defendants Lim have become the
indispensable defendants in the principal
complaint of plaintiff DENR, being now
the registered and lawful owners of the
subject property and the real parties-in-
interest in this case.Without them, no
final determination can be had in the
Principal complaint.
7. Significantly, the property of
intervenor Jessie de Leon, which is the
subject of his complaint-in-intervention,
is identically, if not similarly, situated as
that of herein movants-defendants Lim,
and likewise, may as well be a proper
subject of the Principal Complaint of
plaintiff DENR.
8. Even the plaintiff DENR, itself,
concedes the fact that herein movants-
defendants Lim should be substituted as
defendants in the principal complaint as
contained in their Manifestation
dated June 3, 2009, which has been filed
in this case.
WHEREFORE, herein movants-
defendants Lim most respectfully
submit their Motion for substitution of
Defendants in the Principal Complaint
and pray that the same be granted.
xxx
Did the respondent violate the letter and spirit of
the Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility in making the averments in the
aforequoted pleadings of the defendants?
A plain reading indicates that the respondent did
not misrepresent that Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu
were still living. On the contrary, the respondent directly
stated in the answer to the complaint in intervention with
counterclaim and cross-claim, supra, and in
the clarification and submission, supra, that the Spouses
Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were already deceased.
Even granting, for the sake of argument, that any
of the respondents pleadings might have created any
impression that the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu
were still living, we still cannot hold the respondent
guilty of any dishonesty or falsification. For one, the
respondent was acting in the interest of the actual owners
of the properties when he filed the answer with
counterclaim and cross-claim on April 17, 2006. As
such, his pleadings were privileged and would not
occasion any action against him as an attorney.
Secondly, having made clear at the start that the Spouses
Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were no longer the actual
owners of the affected properties due to the transfer of
ownership even prior to the institution of the action, and
that the actual owners (i.e., Leonardo and William Lim)
needed to be substituted in lieu of said spouses, whether
the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were still living
or already deceased as of the filing of the pleadings
became immaterial. And, lastly, De Leoncould not
disclaim knowledge that the Spouses Lim Hio and
Dolores Chu were no longer living. His joining in the
action as a voluntary intervenor charged him with notice
of all the other persons interested in the litigation. He
also had an actual awareness of such other persons, as
his own complaint in intervention, supra, bear out in its
specific allegations against Leonardo Lim and William
Lim, and their respective spouses. Thus, he could not
validly insist that the respondent committed any
dishonesty or falsification in relation to him or to any
other party.
III
Good faith must always motivate any complaint
against a Member of the Bar

According to Justice Cardozo,[19] xxx the fair

fame of a lawyer, however innocent of wrong, is at the
mercy of the tongue of ignorance or malice. Reputation
in such a calling is a plant of tender growth, and its
bloom, once lost, is not easily restored.

A lawyers reputation is, indeed, a very fragile

object. The Court, whose officer every lawyer is, must
shield such fragility from mindless assault by the
unscrupulous and the malicious. It can do so, firstly, by
quickly cutting down any patently frivolous complaint
against a lawyer; and, secondly, by demanding good
faith from whoever brings any accusation of unethical
conduct. A Bar that is insulated from intimidation and
harassment is encouraged to be courageous and fearless,
which can then best contribute to the efficient delivery
and proper administration of justice.

The complainant initiated his complaint possibly

for the sake of harassing the respondent, either to vex
him for taking the cudgels for his clients in connection
with Civil Case No. 4674MN, or to get even for an
imagined wrong in relation to the subject matter of the
pending action, or to accomplish some other dark
purpose. The worthlessness of the accusation apparent
from the beginning has impelled us into resolving the
complaint sooner than later.

WHEREFORE, we dismiss the complaint for

disbarment or suspension filed against Atty. Eduardo G.
Castelo for utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
 MAGAWAY v. AVECILLA
AC NO 7072, JULY 27 2016
BERSAMIN, J.:
The complainants hereby seek the disbarment of the
respondent for his violation of the Lawyer's Oath, the
duties of attorneys under Section 20, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, the rules on notarial practice, and
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
They aver in their affidavit-complaint dated January
2006 the following:[1]
That the OCT P-2419 with a total land area of 10.5
hectares has been mortgaged (Sale with the right to
repurchase) by the late Gavino Magaoay to the late
Elena Gongon in the amount of Three Thousand Nine
hundred (P3,900.00) pesos on July 10, 1959 and the late
Gavino Magaoay was not able to redeemed (sic) the land
because he died on December 3, 1963 prior to the date of
redemption;
That we have the right of ownership by virtue of right of
her[e]ditary succession from the original patent holder,
[the] late Gavino Magaway who is the registered owner
of OCT P[-]2419 which was fraudulently reconstituted
and fraudulently sold by virtue of the falsified deed of
sale fictitiously executed by [the] late Elena Gongon,
falsified request for issuance of separate titles fictitiously
executed by the late Gavino Magaoay and falsified
affidavit of non-tenancy fictitiously executed by the late
Elena Gongon;
That OCT P-2419 whom Gavino Magaoay is the
registered owner and the mortgagor was never
consolidated in the name of Elena Gongon, the
mortgagee;
That it was Attorney Mariano A. Avecilla who duly
prepared, notarized and manipulated the Falsified Deed
of Sale executed by Elena Gongon dated December 7,
1993 with her fictitious Residence Certificate Nr.927294
which was issued on February 7, 1995 at Roxas, Isabela
and Affidavit of non-tenancy which was fictitiously
executed by the late Elena Gongon in favor of Angelito
Ramiscal Sr et al where Transfer Certificate Titles: T-
238312, T-238313, T-238314 and T-238315 were
derived therein and all tainted with irregularities;
That in consideration of the amount of Thirty Thousand
(Php.30,000.00) pesos whom Attorney Mariano A.
Avecilla and his wife Loreta had accepted from Angelito
Ramiscal Sr. as a package deal in the preparation of the
Falsified Deed of Sale dated December 7, 1993 and
other above mentioned documents that are instrumental
in the anomalous transfer of land Title in favor of the
Ramiscals' (transcript of stenographic notes, RTC
Branch 23, Roxas, Isabela dated June 11, 2003).
That Elena Gongon could not have thumb marked the
Deed of Sale and affidavit of non-tenancy dated
December 7, 1993 which was notarized by Atty.
Mariano A. Avecilla because Elena Gongon had already
died on May 11, 1966 and already dead for twenty seven
(27) years at the date of the instruments;
That Gavino Magaoay could not have signed the request
for issuance of separate titles dated April 3, 1995 and
Public Land Survey Plan PSD 02-053024 dated March
1, 1995 in favor of the Ramiscals because he was
unschooled and he died on December 3, 1963 so that he
was already dead for thirty (30) years at the date of the
instruments which was also used in the falsification and
unlawful transfer of the aforementioned Transfer
Certificate Titles which was manipulated by Attorney
Avecilla and his wife Loreta in favor of the Ramiscals;
That Attorney Mariano A. Avecilla of Roxas, Isabela has
committed serious damages to us, because we are
deprived of our rights for hereditary succession over the
property in question due his unprofessional, illegal,
anomalous conduct and incompetence in the practice of
law particularly by circum[v]enting the laws in dealing
with registered land through the preparation, notarization
and signing deed of sale where the parties were already
dead for long time ago (sic);
That due to the unlawful manipulations of Attorney
Mariano A. Avecilla, land titles tainted with
irregularities were issued in favor of Angelito Ramiscal
Sr et al thus he should be prohibited to practice Law
because he is incompetent and a liability in the justice
system of the Republic of the Philippines that are
contributory to the loosing (sic) trust and confidence by
the people among some (sic) undesirable lawyers and in
the administration of Justice in this country;[2]
It appears that the notarization of the documents
(specifically, the deed of sale by attorney-in-fact by
Eleanor Gongon Flores represented by her attorney-in-
fact Efren Vera Cruz, Sr. on August 5, 1992 in favor of
Angelito Ramiscal, Sr.; the deed of sale executed by
Elena Gongon on December 7, 1993 in favor of Angelito
Ramiscal, Sr.; and the affidavit of non-tenancy executed
by Elena Gongon on December 7, 1993) had led to the
filing of two criminal cases and a civil action. The first
criminal case, for estafa through falsification of a public
document, was filed by the complainants against
Angelito Ramiscal, Sr. and the respondent in the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor of Isabela, but the case was
ultimately dismissed on July 15, 1998. The second
criminal case, also for falsification of a public document,
was initiated by Eleanor Gongon Flores against the
Ramiscals, the respondent, and the latter's wife, Loreta
Avecilla. The case was also dismissed on October 5,
2000. The civil action seeking the declaration of nullity
of fraudulently reconstituted original certificate of title
and all the transfer certificates of title derived therefrom,
and declaration of nullity of instruments registered
affecting them was brought on July 28, 1997 by the
complainants as the heirs of the late Gavino Magaoay
against the Ramiscals (namely, Angelito, Sr. and his
children Arlene, Ervin and Angelito, Jr.) and the
respondent in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Roxas,
Isabela (Civil Case No. 23-551-97), which ultimately
dismissed the complaint through a decision rendered on
June 14, 2004.[3] On appeal, however, the Court of
Appeals, through its decision promulgated on August 29,
2008,[4] reversed the dismissal of the case by the RTC.
After the Court referred this administrative complaint to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation and recommendation, the IBP Board of
Governors called the parties for mandatory conferences
on July 30, 2007 and September 10, 2007.
In due time, IBP Investigating Commissioner Manuel M.
Maramba rendered his report and recommendation dated
October 24, 2008,[5] whereby he found in favor of the
complainants after giving more weight and credence to
their assertions than to the denial and explanation of the
respondent; and he recommended the respondent's
suspension from the practice of law for one year, and the
indefinite revocation of the respondent's notarial
commission.
In its Resolution No. XVIII-2009-21 dated February 19
2009,[6] the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the report and recommendation with
modification of the recommended penalty to suspension
from the practice of law for one year and disqualification
from being commissioned as notary public for two years.
The respondent sought reconsideration of the
resolution,[7] but the IBP Board of Governors rejected his
motion.[8]
In the comment he submitted to the Court, [9] the
respondent contended that his notarization of the three
documents had not prejudiced anyone considering that
the late Gavino Magaway, the predecessor in interest of
the complainants, did not repurchase the property by
April 30, 1960, as stipulated between the late Gavino
Magaway, as vendor a retro, and Eleanor Gongon Flores,
as the vendee a retro; that the complainants, assuming
them to be the true legal heirs of the late Gavino
Magaway, who had died without issue, had nothing
more to inherit; that the sale of the property had been
first made on August 5, 1992 by Efren Vera Cruz, Sr. as
the attorney-in-fact of Eleanor Gongon Flores; that on
the same date, Vera Cruz, Sr. had sold the portion of the
property with an area of 8.479 hectares to Angelito
Ramiscal, Sr. and his family for P400,000.00; that on
December 7, 1993, a woman in her mid-30's, claiming
herself to be an employee of the Office of the Registry of
Deeds of Isabela, had accompanied an elderly woman to
the respondent's law office to request him to notarize the
ready-made deed of sale the elderly woman had brought
with her; that he had notarized the document out of pity
and kindness for the elderly woman, who had affixed her
thumbprint on the document; and that the elderly woman
turned out to be an impostor.
Ruling of the Court
The findings and recommendations of the IBP Board of
Governors, being supported by the records, are adopted.
The function of a notary public is, among others, to
guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements in the
execution of public documents.[10] In this case, the
respondent's affixing of his notarial seal on the
documents and his signature on the notarial
acknowledgments transformed the deeds of sale from
private into public documents,[11] and rendered them
admissible in court without further proof of their
authenticity because the certificate of acknowledgment
constituted them the prima facie evidence of their
execution.[12] In doing so, he proclaimed to the world
that all the parties executing the same had personally
appeared before him; that they were all personally
known to him; that they were the same persons who had
executed the instruments; that he had inquired into the
voluntariness of execution of the instrument; and that
they had acknowledged personally before him that they
had voluntarily and freely executed the same. [13]
As a lawyer commissioned to be a notary public, the
respondent was mandated to discharge his sacred duties
with faithful observance and utmost respect for the legal
solemnity of an oath in an acknowledgment
or jurat.[14]Indeed, such responsibility was incumbent
upon him by virtue of his solemn Lawyer's Oath to do no
falsehood or consent to the doing of any, and by virtue
of his undertaking, pursuant to the Code of Professional
Responsibility, not to engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct and to uphold at all times
the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. [15] His
failure to ascertain the identity of the person executing
the same constituted gross negligence in the performance
of his duties as a notary public.[16] As such, it is now
unavoidable for him to accept the commensurate
consequences of his indiscretion.[17]
The respondent's rather convenient assertion that an
impostor had appeared before him and affixed her
thumbprint on the ready-made deed of sale and affidavit
of non-tenancy does not sway the Court. He should have
demanded that such person first prove her identity before
acting on the documents she had brought for his
notarization. The objective of the requirement, which
was to enable him as the notary public to verify the
genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party
and to ascertain that the deed of sale and affidavit of
non-tenancy were the party's free act and deed, [18] was
not to be served as casually as he did. By not ensuring
that the person then appearing before him as the executor
of the documents was really Elena Gongon, not the
impostor, he clearly did not exercise the precautions and
observe the protocols that would have easily insulated
the performance of his notarial duties from forgery and
falsification.
By his neglect, the respondent undermined the
confidence of the public on the worth of notarized
documents. He thus breached Canon I of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, by which he as an attorney
commissioned to serve as a notary public was required to
uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and
promote respect for the law and legal processes. [19]
The respondent's argument that no person had been
prejudiced by the execution of the documents was
undeserving of consideration. There was no denying that
the notarization of the deed of sale and affidavit of non-
tenancy adversely affected the rights of the complainants
and Eleanor Gongon Flores on their existing interest in
the property involved in such instruments.
Time and again, the Court has reminded notaries public
of the importance attached to the act of notarization. We
must stress yet again that notarization is not an empty, or
perfunctory, or meaningless act, for it is invested with
substantial public interest. Courts and other public
offices, and the public at large could rely upon the
recitals of the acknowledgment executed by the notary
public.[20] For this reason, notaries public must observe
with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of
the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance
would be undermined.[21]
In Lanuzo v. Bongon[22] and Linco v. Lacebal,[23] we have
ruled that the notarial commission of a notary public
who fails to faithfully discharge his duties as such should
be revoked, and he should be further disqualified from
being commissioned as such for a period of two years.
The notary public in such situation may further be
suspended from the practice of law for one year. In this
case, the same penalties should be imposed on the
respondent. Indeed, his acts manifested breach of the
vow he took under his Lawyer's Oath to do no falsehood,
and to delay no man for money or with malice.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVOKES the notarial
commission of respondent ATTY. MARIANO A.
AVECILLA effective
immediately; DISQUALIFIES him from reappointment
as Notary Public for a period of two years effective
immediately; SUSPENDS him from the practice of law
for a period of one year effective immediately with
the WARNING that the repetition of the same or similar
acts shall be dealt with more severely;
and DIRECTS him to report the date of receipt of this
decision in order to determine when his suspension shall
take effect.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of
the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
and all courts throughout the country. Let a copy of this
decision be attached to the personal records of ATTY.
MARIANO A. AVECILLA.
SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 7927, October 19, 2016
SANDY V. DOMINGO, Complainant, v. ATTY.
PALMARIN E. RUBIO AND ATTY. NICASIO T.
RUBIO, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Administrative charges against members of the Bar must
not rest on frivolous matters. Otherwise, they shall be
outrightly dismissed because their aim is only to harass
the respondents.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Case
Under consideration is the complaint for disbarment
brought on April 11, 2008 against respondent Atty.
Palmarin E. Rubio, in his capacity as the City Prosecutor
of Legazpi City, for allegedly refusing to act on the order
of the Secretary of Justice and for allegedly fraudulently
and deceitfully withholding the prepared motion for
reconsideration from being filed in the Department of
Justice (DOJ), thereby causing damage and prejudice to
the complainant - an accused in parricide - thereby
violating the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The complainant later on charged respondent Atty.
Nicasio T. Rubio in his capacity as Assistant City
Prosecutor for his direct participation in the alleged
irregularities imputed to his co-respondent.
For convenience, respondents Atty. Palmarin E. Rubio
and Atty. Nicasio T, Rubio are hereafter be referred to,
respectively, as CP Rubio and ACP
Rubio.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Antecedents
The Philippine National Police (PNP) of Legazpi City
filed a case for murder in the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Legazpi City arising from the killing of
one Juan Edgardo Yap Bongalon on August 22, 2005.
After due proceedings, the Office of the City Prosecutor
filed an infonnation in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Legazpi City charging Ariel Dayap and four other
persons who were then not identified with particularity
as having acted in conspiracy with Dayap to commit the
murder.
Subsequently, Dayap executed an extrajudicial
confession to the effect that he had conspired with four
other persons, namely: the complainant, Mike Arena,
Noli Marquez and Lorna Bongalon (the widow of the
victim), with the last as the mastermind.
Thus, the Office of the City Prosecutor sought leave of
comi to conduct a preliminary investigation preparatory
to amending the information to include the other four in
the charge. However, the assigned investigating
prosecutor requested her inhibition from conducting
further preliminary investigation because Lorna
Bongalon had branded her as biased.
The request for inhibition was granted, and the case was
re-assigned to ACP Rubio, who ultimately rendered a
resolution recommending the dismissal of the charge as
to the four alleged co-conspirators upon finding that the
extrajudicial confession of Dayap had been
uncounselled.
Approving the resolution, CP Rubio moved for the
withdrawal of the information, but the RTC denied the
motion to withdraw because the confession of Dayap
already established probable cause. The respondents
moved to reconsider the denial, but the RTC persisted on
its resolution.
On February 6, 2006, the Legazpi PNP presented
additional evidence. Thus, a new complaint was filed
and was assigned for preliminary investigation to ACP
Rubio, who, after conducting the preliminary
investigation, issued his resolution on February 27, 2006
finding probable cause for parricide against the
complainant, Arena, Marquez and Lorna Bongalon,
acting in conspiracy with Dayap, and for robbery only
against Dayap, Arena and Marquez.
The amended information for parricide was allowed by
the RTC on March 6, 2006, and the RTC issued the
warrants for the arrest of the newly-charged accused.
Lorna Bongalon sought a reinvestigation, but the RTC
did not give due course to her motion. Accordingly, she
moved for the deferment of her arraignment to enable
her to appeal to the DOJ by petition for review.
In the meantime, the complainant was arrested. On
March 16, 2006, he executed an extrajudicial confession
with the assistance of counsel.
Acting favorably on Lorna Bongalon's petition for
review, the Secretary of Justice directed CP Rubio on
August 11, 2006 to cause with leave of court the
withdrawal of the information for parricide against her,
the complainant and their three co-accused, and to file in
lieu thereof another information for murder only against
Dayap.
On August 24, 2006, the respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration vis-a-vis the resolution of the Secretary
of Justice arguing that the extrajudicial confession
executed by the complainant had not been made part of
the petition for review filed by Lorna Bongalon's
counsel.
It appears that the respondents failed to actually send a
copy of their motion for reconsideration to the Secretary
of Justice despite furnishing all the parties copies of the
motion; and that the motion for reconsideration was
received by the DOJ only on April 12, 2007.1
According to the complainant, CP Rubio and ACP
Rubio, by intentionally not sending to him a copy of
their motion for reconsideration to the DOJ despite
furnishing their motion for reconsideration to the other
parties, and by belatedly submitting their motion for
reconsideration to the DOJ, which eventually got a copy
of it, acted fraudulently.
CP Rubio and ACP Rubio countered that their failure to
send a copy to the complainant and to the DOJ was due
to sheer oversight, explaining that the releasing clerk of
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Legazpi City had not
sent the motion for reconsideration despite furnishing
copies thereof to all the other parties.
Based on the foregoing, the complainant initiated the
complaint for disbarment against CP Rubio and ACP
Rubio directly in this Court,2 stating that the refusal of
the respondents to comply with the order of the
Secretary of Justice had caused him to remain behind
bars for a crime that he had already been exonerated of,
thereby causing him and his family tremendous
sufferings; that the respondents had also withheld the
filing at the DOJ of their already-prepared motion for
reconsideration, and caused the filing of the motion only
many months later; that upon resuming its proceedings
in the criminal case involving the complainant in early
2007, the RTC, unaware of the appeal by petition for
review of Lorna Bongalon in the DOJ, proceeded with
the case and issued on March 1, 2007 the order for the
arrest against all the accused, including him, but it could
have suspended such proceedings to give way to the
exercise of review by the Secretary of Justice; that the
actuations of the respondents were unjust and absolutely
prejudicial to him because he was thereby forced to
languish in jail; and that the respondents deserved to be
disbarred or otherwise sanctioned for their ignorance of
the law and misconduct.
After the parties submitted their respective position
papers, the Investigating Commissioner of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline
(IBP-CBD) deemed the case submitted for resolution
upon the sole issue of whether or not the act of the
respondents in respect of the filing of the motion for
reconsideration constituted a ground for
disbarment.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The IBP- CBD's Report and Recommendation
In its Report and Recommendation dated January 31,
2011,3 the IBP-CBD recommended that the complaint
for disbarment be dismissed for lack of merit.
The Investigating Commissioner noted that although the
complainant relied on Section 27,4 of Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court, the complaint for disbarment was
nonetheless frivolous because the rule - which referred
to the "wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court" as a ground for suspension or disbarment
- had no application because the Secretary of Justice was
not a superior court; that the filing of the motion for
reconsideration was done in good faith inasmuch as the
respondents believed that the motion was the best course
of action to take in light of the new evidence in the form
of the complainant's own extrajudicial confession; and
that the respondents no longer needed to comply with the
directive of the Secretary of Justice to cause the
withdrawal of the information considering that the RTC
had meanwhile issued its order directing the pre-trial to
proceed and the trial to be held continuously thereafter
until the case was terminated.5
In Resolution No. XX-2012-202 passed on June 13,
2012,6 the IBP Board of Governors unanimously
adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner, and upheld the
dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit.
On April 15, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors passed
Resolution No. XX-2013-4187 unanimously denying the
complainant's motion for reconsideration and affirming
Resolution No. XX-2012-202.
The IBP Board of Governors then forwarded the case to
the Court as required by Section 12(b), Rule 139-B8 of
the Rules of Court.
Ruling of the Court
We affirm the findings of the IBP Board of Governors.
The complainant argues that the resolution issued by the
Secretary of Justice directing the withdrawal of the
information against him exonerated him from all
charges, thereby warranting his immediate release from
detention, was a proper basis for bringing the complaint
for disbarment against the respondents upon learning
that they had filed the motion for reconsideration. In
support of his complaint, he cites Section 27, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court, which
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before admission
to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (As amended
by Resolution of the Supreme Court, Feb. 13, 1992).
chanrobleslaw
The complainant's reliance on Section 27 was obviously
misplaced. The observation of the Investigating
Commissioner that the Secretary of Justice was not the
same as the superior court referred to by the rule was
correct. As such, the filing by the respondents of the
motion for reconsideration was not a defiance or wilful
disobedience to the lawful order of the superior court.
A further consideration in favor of the respondents is
that they were expected as public prosecutors whose
sworn duty was to prosecute crimes to the best of their
abilities in order to protect the interest of the people to
do everything within the bounds of the law to discharge
such duty. Their filing of the motion for reconsideration
was a valid recourse for them to prevent the withdrawal
of the information against the complainant considering
that the new evidence consisting of the complainant's
own extrajudicial confession had not been brought to the
attention of the Secretary of Justice. It is worthy of
mention in this connection that the respondents even
enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the performance
of their official duties as far as the filing of the motion
for reconsideration was concerned. Accordingly, there
was no justification on the complainant's part to impute
to them any fraudulent intent.
At any rate, it was not the Secretary of Justice who
would ultimately determine whether the information
against the complainant, among others, would be
withdrawn or not. This was because the RTC as the trial
court already acquired jurisdiction over the criminal
case. As such, the decision whether or not to allow the
withdrawal of the information upon motion of the public
prosecutor in compliance with the directive of the
Secretary of Justice then pe1iained to the RTC. Such
jurisdiction of the RTC was exclusive,. for, as held in
Crespo v. Mogul:9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a
complaint or information is filed in Court any
disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction
or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion
of the Court. Although the [public prosecutor] retains the
direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases
even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose
his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and
sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The
determination of the case is within its exclusive
jurisdiction and competence.
chanrobleslaw
Verily, the RTC could grant or deny the motion to unfounded and vexatious charges of misconduct and
withdraw the information not out of subservience to the misbehavior is to do a disservice to the ideals of justice,
Secretary of Justice but in faithful exercise of its judicial and to disregard the Constitution and the laws to which
prerogative.10 In that regard, we note that the RTC all lawyers vow their enduring fealty.
ultimately denied the motion to withdraw the
information and directed the pre-trial to proceed.
WHEREFORE, the Court ABSOLVES respondents
Atty. Pal marin Rubio and Atty. Nicasio T. Rubio of the
This proceeding for disbarment cannot be the occasion charges of gross misconduct; and DISMISSES the
to impeach the respondents' filing of the motion for complaint for disbarment for utter lack of merit and
reconsideration. The issues that the complainant raised substance.
against such filing and any other matters incidental to
such filing should have been raised only in the trial
court, or in the proper office. We cannot allow the SO ORDERED.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
trivialization of the sanction of disbarment by the
complainant. He should be reminded that disbarment is
the most severe form of disciplinary sanction against a
misbehaving member of the Integrated Bar; as such, the
power to disbar is always exercised with great caution
only for the most imperative reasons and in cases of
clear misconduct affecting the standing and moral
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and
member of the bar.11

Based on all the established attendant circumstances, the

complainant had no legal or factual basis for his
disbarment complaint against the respondents. The case
involved their official acts as public prosecutors,
focusing on how they had proceeded in a pending matter
that was entirely within their official competence and
responsibility. How they could be held answerable or
accountable as lawyers for their official acts escapes
us,,but at least the Court now gives them some
consolation by dismissing the disbarment proceedings as
unworthy and devoid of substance.

We deem it timely and appropriate to remind that

administrative proceedings brought against lawyers,
including those in the public service, to make them be
accountable for their acts or omissions in the exercise of
their profession are not alternatives to reliefs that may be
sought and obtained from the proper offices or agencies.
The Court will exercise its disciplinary power only by
observing due process and if the lawyer's administrative
guilt is proved by clear, convincing, and satisfactory
evidence. This norm is aimed at preserving the integrity
and reputation of the Law Profession, and at shielding
lawyers, in general, due to their being officers
themselves of the Court. Any complaint for disbarment
or other disciplinary sanction brought against lawyers
that is based on frivolous matters or proof, like this case,
should be immediately dismissed because its plain
objective is to harass or get even with the respondent.
The public must be reminded that lawyers are
professionals bound to observe and follow the strictest
ethical canons, and to subject them to frivolous,
 EN BANC
[ A.C. No. 7474, September 09, 2014 ]
PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE L. MADRID,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 51,
SORSOGON CITY, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY.
JUAN S. DEALCA, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Complainant Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
has had enough of the respondent, a law practitioner,
who had engaged in the unethical practice of filing
frivolous administrative cases against judges and
personnel of the courts because the latter filed a motion
to inhibit the complainant from hearing a pending case.
Hence, the complainant has initiated this complaint for
the disbarment of respondent on the ground of gross
misconduct and gross violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Antecedents
On February 7, 2007, Atty. Juan S. Dealca entered his
appearance in Criminal Case No. 2006-6795, entitled
"People of the Philippines v. Philip William Arsenault"
then pending in Branch 51 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Sorsogon City, presided by complainant Judge
Jose L. Madrid. [1]Atty. Dealca sought to replace Atty.
Vicente Judar who had filed a motion to withdraw as
counsel for the accused. But aside from entering his
appearance as counsel for the accused, Atty. Dealca also
moved that Criminal Case No. 2006-6795 be re-raffled
to another Branch of the RTC "[c]onsidering the adverse
incidents between the incumbent Presiding Judge and
the undersigned," where "he does not appear before the
incumbent Presiding Judge, and the latter does not also
hear cases handled by the undersigned."[2]
Judge Madrid denied Atty. Dealca's motion to re-raffle
through an order issued on February 14, 2007,[3] viz:
x x x x
This Court will not allow that a case be removed from it
just because of the personal sentiments of counsel who
was not even the original counsel of the litigant.
Moreover, the motion of Atty. Dealca is an affront to the
integrity of this Court and the other Courts in this
province as he would like it to appear that jurisdiction
over a Family Court case is based on his whimsical
dictates.
This was so because Atty. Dealca had filed
Administrative as well as criminal cases against this
Presiding Judge which were all dismissed by the Hon.
Supreme Court for utter lack of merit. This is why he
should not have accepted this particular case so as not to
derail the smooth proceedings in this Court with his
baseless motions for inhibition. It is the lawyer's duty to
appear on behalf of a client in a case but not to appear
for a client to remove a case from the Court. This is
unethical practice in the first order.
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the Motion of
Atty. Juan S. Dealca is hereby DENIED.
Relative to the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for the
Accused filed by Atty. Vicente C. Judar dated January
29, 2007, the same is hereby DENIED for being
violative of the provisions of Section 26 of Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court.
So also, the Appearance of Atty. Juan S. Dealca as new
counsel for accused Philip William Arsenault is likewise
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Consequently, Judge Madrid filed a letter complaint[4] in
the Office of the Bar Confidant citing Atty. Dealca's
unethical practice of entering his appearance and then
moving for the inhibition of the presiding judge on the
pretext of previous adverse incidents between them.
On April 10, 2007, we treated the complaint as a regular
administrative complaint, and required Atty. Dealca to
submit his comment.[5]
In his comment-complaint,[6] Atty. Dealca asserted that
Judge Madrid's issuance of the February 14, 2007 order
unconstitutionally and unlawfully deprived the accused
of the right to counsel, to due process, and to a fair and
impartial trial; that Judge Madrid exhibited bias in
failing to act on the motion to lift and set aside the
warrant of arrest issued against the accused; and that it
should be Judge Madrid himself who should be
disbarred and accordingly dismissed from the Judiciary
for gross ignorance of the law.
On July 17, 2007, the Court referred the matter to the
IBP for appropriate investigation, report and
recommendation.[7] Several months thereafter, the Court
also indorsed pertinent documents in connection with
A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ, entitled "Joseph Yap
III v. Judge Jose L. Madrid and Court Stenographer
Merlyn D. Dominguez, both of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) Branch 51, Sorsogon City" (Yap v. Judge
Madrid). [8]
On June 6, 2007, the Court in Yap v. Judge
Madrid dismissed for its lack of merit the administrative
complaint against Judge Madrid for allegedly falsifying
the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing on
March 4, 2005 in Civil Case No. 2001-6842 entitled
Joseph D. Yap V, et al. v. Joseph H. Yap III, but referred
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation the propensity
of Atty. Dealca to file administrative or criminal
complaints against judges and court personnel whenever
decisions, orders or processes were issued adversely to
him and his clients.[9]
In compliance with the referral, the IBP-Sorsogon
Chapter submitted its report with the following findings
and recommendation:[10]
x x x x
The documentary evidence offered by complainants
show that respondent Atty. Juan S. Dealca filed by
himself (1) Bar Matter No. 1197 and acting as counsel
for the complainants (2) Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 04-
2113-RTJ; (3) OMB-L-C-05-0478-E; (4) Adm. Matter
OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ and (5) Adm. Matter OCA
IPI No. 05-2191-RTJ. These five (5) cases are factual
evidence of the cases that respondent had filed by
himself and as counsel for the complainants against
court officers, judges and personnel as a consequence of
the IBP Election and incidents in cases that respondent
had handled as counsel for the parties in the said cases.
It will be noted that in Bar Matter No. 1197, the
respondents were judges (Judge Jose L. Madrid & Judge
Honesto A. Villamor) and lawyers in IBP Sorsogon
Chapters, who are no doubt officers of the court, and the
case aroused (sic) out of the unfavorable consensus of
the IBP chapter members that was adverse to the
position of the respondent. The other four (4) cases
aroused [sic] out of the cases handled by respondent for
the complainants who failed to secure a favorable action
from the court.
Specifically, Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 04-2113-RTJ
was a result of the case before the sala of Judge Jose L.
Madrid (RTC 51) entitled "Alita P. Gomez vs. Rodrigo
Jarabo, et al.," for: Accion Publiciana and Damages, that
was handled by respondent for the complainant Alita
Gomez.
OMB-L-C-0478-E was an offshoot of Civil Case No.
2001-6842 entitled "Marilyn D. Yap, Joseph D. Yap V,
et al., vs. Joseph H. Yap III" for: Support pending before
the sala of complainant Judge Jose L. Madrid (RTC 51).
Respondent, after an unfavorable decision against
defendant Joseph H. Yap III, entered his appearance and
pleaded for the latter. As a result of an adverse order,
this ombudsman case arose.
Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2191-RTJ was
also a result of the Civil Case No. 5403 entitled "Salve
Dealca Latosa vs. Atty. Henry Amado Roxas, with Our
Lady's Village Foundation and Most Reverend Arnulfo
Arcilla, DD as third party defendant that was heard,
tried, decided and pending execution before the sala of
Judge Honesto A. Villamor (RTC 52).
Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ was
also a consequence of Civil Case No. 2001-6842 entitled
"Marilyn D. Yap, Joseph D. Yap V, et al., vs. Joseph H.
Yap III" for Support pending before the sala of
complainant Judge Jose L. Madrid (RTC 51).
All these four (4) cases are precipitated by the adverse
ruling rendered by the court against the clients of the
respondent that instead of resorting to the remedies
available under the Rules of Procedure, respondent
assisted his clients in filing administrative and criminal
case against the judges and personnel of the court.
The other documentary evidence of the complainants
such as the (a) VERIFIED COMPLAINT dated March 7,
2003 in Civil Service Case entitled "EDNA GOROSPE-
DEALCA vs. JULIANA ENCINAS-CARINO, et al.; (b)
NOTICE OF RESOLUTION on October 22, 2005 in
Adm. Case No. 6334 entitled "SOFIA JAO vs. ATTY.
EPIFANIA RUBY VELACRUZ-OIDA" passed by the
Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines which Resolution No. XVII-2005-92
provides: "RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner dismissing the case for lacks (sic) merit;
(c) RESOLUTION of the Third Division of the Supreme
Court dated February 1, 2006 in Administrative Case
No. 6334 (Sofia Jao vs. Epifania Ruby Velacruz-Oida)
The notice of resolution dated October 22, 2005 of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dismissing the
case for lack of merit; (d) VERIFIED COMPLAINT in
Adm. Case No. 6334 dated February 17, 2004 entitled
"Sofia Jao vs. Atty. Epifania Ruby Velacruz-Oida" for:
Malpractice (Forum Shopping), and (e) ORDER dated
January 18, 2007 by Acting Presiding Judge RAUL E.
DE LEON in Criminal Cases Nos. 2451 to 2454 entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Cynthia Marcial, et al.
For: Falsification of Medical Records" which provides
for the dismissal of the cases against all the accused, do
not show participation on the part of the respondent that
he signed the pleadings, although the verified complaint
is one executed by the wife of the
respondent. Moreover, these cases are pertaining to
persons other than judges and personnel of the court that
are not squarely covered by the present investigation
against respondent, although, it is an undeniable fact that
respondent had appeared for and in behalf of his wife,
the rest of the complainants in the Civil Service Case
and Sofia Jao against Land Bank of the Philippines, the
latter case resulted in the administrative case of Atty.
Epifania Ruby Velacruz-Oida, respondent's sister
member of the Bar. All these documentary evidence
from (a) to (e) are helpful in determining the
"PROPENSITY" of the respondent as a member of the
bar in resorting to harassment cases instead of going
through the procedures provided for by the Rules of
Court in the event of adverse ruling, order or decision of
the court.
x x x x
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended
that in view of the above-foregoings [sic], a penalty of
SUSPENSION in the practice of law for a period of six
(6) months from finality of the decision be ordered
against respondent Atty. Juan S. Dealca.
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP
IBP Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag ultimately
submitted his Report and Recommendation[11] finding
Atty. Dealca guilty of violating the Lawyer's Oath and
the Code of Professional Responsibility by filing
frivolous administrative and criminal complaints; and
recommending that Atty. Dealca be suspended from the
practice of law for one year because his motion to inhibit
Judge Madrid was devoid of factual or legal basis, and
was grounded on purely personal whims.
In Resolution No. XVIII-2008-41,[12] the IBP Board of
Governors modified the recommendation and dismissed
the administrative complaint for its lack of merit, thus:
RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED,
the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner,
and APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled
case for lack of merit.
Judge Madrid filed a petition,[13] which the IBP Board of
Governors treated as a motion for reconsideration, and
soon denied through its Resolution No. XX-2012-545.[14]
Issues
(1) Did Atty. Dealca file frivolous administrative and
criminal complaints against judges and court personnel
in violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility?
(2) Was Atty. Dealca guilty of unethical practice in
seeking the inhibition of Judge Madrid in Criminal Case
No. 2006-6795?
Ruling of the Court
We REVERSE Resolution No. XX-2012-545.
I
Atty. Dealca must guard against
his own impulse of initiating unfounded suits
Atty. Dealca insists on the propriety of the
administrative and criminal cases he filed against judges
and court personnel, including Judge Madrid. He argues
that as a vigilant lawyer, he was duty bound to bring and
prosecute cases against unscrupulous and corrupt judges
and court personnel.[15]
We see no merit in Atty. Dealca's arguments.
Although the Court always admires members of the Bar
who are imbued with a high sense of vigilance to weed
out from the Judiciary the undesirable judges and
inefficient or undeserving court personnel, any acts
taken in that direction should be unsullied by any taint of
insincerity or self-interest. The noble cause of cleansing
the ranks of the Judiciary is not advanced otherwise. It is
for that reason that Atty. Dealca's complaint against
Judge Madrid has failed our judicious scrutiny, for the
Court cannot find any trace of idealism or altruism in the
motivations for initiating it. Instead, Atty. Dealca
exhibited his proclivity for vindictiveness and penchant
for harassment, considering that, as IBP Commissioner
Hababag pointed out,[16] his bringing of charges against
judges, court personnel and even his colleagues in the
Law Profession had all stemmed from decisions or
rulings being adverse to his clients or his side. He well
knew, therefore, that he was thereby crossing the line of
propriety, because neither vindictiveness nor harassment
could be a substitute for resorting to the appropriate legal
remedies. He should now be reminded that the aim of
every lawsuit should be to render justice to the parties
according to law, not to harass them. [17]
The Lawyer's Oath is a source of obligations and duties
for every lawyer, and any violation thereof by an
attorney constitutes a ground for disbarment, suspension,
or other disciplinary action.[18] The oath exhorts upon the
members of the Bar not to "wittingly or willingly
promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit."
These are not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a
sacred trust that must be upheld and keep inviolable. [19]
As a lawyer, therefore, Atty. Dealca was aware of his
duty under his Lawyer's Oath not to initiate groundless,
false or unlawful suits. The duty has also been expressly
embodied in Rule 1.03, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility thuswise:
Rule 1.03 A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or
interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any
man's cause.
His being an officer of the court should have impelled
him to see to it that the orderly administration of justice
must not be unduly impeded. Indeed, as he must resist
the whims and caprices of his clients and temper his
clients' propensities to litigate,[20] so must he equally
guard himself against his own impulses of initiating
unfounded suits. While it is the Court's duty to
investigate and uncover the truth behind charges against
judges and lawyers, it is equally its duty to shield them
from unfounded suits that are intended to vex and harass
them, among other things.[21]
Moreover, Atty. Dealca must be mindful of his mission
to assist the courts in the proper administration of
justice. He disregarded his mission because his filing of
the unfounded complaints, including this one against
Judge Madrid, increased the workload of the Judiciary.
Although no person should be penalized for the exercise
of the right to litigate, the right must nonetheless be
exercised in good faith.[22] Atty. Dealca's bringing of
the numerous administrative and criminal complaints
against judges, court personnel and his fellow lawyers
did not evince any good faith on his part, considering
that he made allegations against them therein that he
could not substantially prove, and are rightfully deemed
frivolous and unworthy of the Court's precious time and
serious consideration.
Repeatedly denying any wrongdoing in filing the various
complaints, Atty. Dealca had the temerity to confront
even the Court with the following arrogant tirade, to wit:
With due respect, what could be WRONG was the
summary dismissal of cases filed against erring judges
and court personnel 'for lack of merit', i.e. without even
discussing the facts and the law of the case. [23]
Atty. Dealca was apparently referring to the minute
resolutions the Court could have promulgated in
frequently dismissing his unmeritorious petitions. His
arrogant posturing would not advance his cause now. He
thereby demonstrated his plain ignorance of the rules of
procedure applicable to the Court. The minute
resolutions have been issued for the prompt dispatch of
the actions by the Court.[24] Whenever the Court then
dismisses a petition for review for its lack of merit
through a minute resolution, it is understood that the
challenged decision or order, together with all its
findings of fact and law, is deemed sustained or
upheld,[25] and the minute resolution then constitutes the
actual adjudication on the merits of the case. The
dismissal of the petition, or its denial of due course
indicates the Court's agreement with and its adoption of
the findings and conclusions of the court a quo.[26]
The requirement for stating the facts and the law does
not apply to the minute resolutions that the Court issues
in disposing of a case. The Court explained why
in Borromeo v. Court of Appeals: [27]
The [Supreme] Court x x x disposes of the bulk of its
cases by minute resolutions and decrees them as final
and executory, as where a case is patently without merit,
where the issues raised are factual in nature, where the
decision appealed from is supported by substantial
evidence and is in accord with the facts of the case and
the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records
that the petition is filed merely to forestall the early
execution of judgment and for non-compliance with the
rules. The resolution denying due course or dismissing
the petition always gives the legal basis.
x x x x
The Court is not 'duty bound' to render signed Decisions
all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate
Decisions and/or Minute Resolutions, provided a legal
basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case.
The constitutionality of the minute resolutions was the
issue raised in Komatsu Industries (Phils.), Inc. v. Court
of Appeals.[28] The petitioner contended that the minute
resolutions violated Section 14,[29] Article VIII of the
Constitution. The Court, through Justice Regalado,
declared that resolutions were not decisions within the
constitutional contemplation, for the former "merely
hold that the petition for review should not be
entertained and even ordinary lawyers have all this time
so understood it; and the petition to review the decision
of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right but of
sound judicial discretion, hence there is no need to fully
explain the Court's denial since, for one thing, the facts
and the law are already mentioned in the Court of
Appeal's decision." It pointed out that the constitutional
mandate was applicable only in cases submitted for
decision, i.e., given due course to and after the filing of
briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not
where the petition was being refused due course, with
the resolutions for that purpose stating the legal basis of
the refusal. Thus, when the Court, after deliberating on
the petition and the subsequent pleadings, decided to
deny due course to the petition and stated that the
questions raised were factual, or there was no reversible
error in the lower court's decision, there was a sufficient
compliance with the constitutional requirement. [30]

II
Atty. Dealca violated Canon 11 and Rule 11.04
of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Atty. Dealca maintains that Judge Madrid should have
"in good grace inhibited himself" upon his motion to
inhibit in order to preserve "confidence in the
impartiality of the judiciary."[31] However, IBP
Commissioner Hababag has recommended that Atty.
Dealca be sanctioned for filing the motion to inhibit
considering that the motion, being purely based on his
personal whims, was bereft of factual and legal bases. [32]
The recommendation of IBP Commissioner Hababag is
warranted.
Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts empowered
to appear, prosecute and defend the legal causes for their
clients. As a consequence, peculiar duties,
responsibilities and liabilities are devolved upon them by
law. Verily, their membership in the Bar imposes certain
obligations upon them.[33]
In this regard, Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility pertinently state:
Canon 11 A lawyer shall observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and to the judicial officers and
should insist on similar conduct by others.
x x x x
Rule 11.04 A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge
motives not supported by the record or have no
materiality to the case.
In light of the foregoing canons, all lawyers are bound to
uphold the dignity and authority of the courts, and to
promote confidence in the fair administration of justice.
It is the respect for the courts that guarantees the stability
of the judicial institution; elsewise, the institution would
be resting on a very shaky foundation.[34]
The motion to inhibit filed by Atty. Dealca contained the
following averment, to wit:
Considering the adverse incidents between the
incumbent Presiding Judge and the undersigned, he
does not appear before the incumbent Presiding Judge,
and the latter does not also hear cases handled by the
undersigned x x x.[35] (Bold emphasis supplied)
Atty. Dealca's averment that Judge Madrid did not hear
cases being handled by him directly insinuated that
judges could choose the cases they heard, and could
refuse to hear the cases in which hostility existed
between the judges and the litigants or their counsel.
Such averment, if true at all, should have been
assiduously substantiated by him because it put in bad
light not only Judge Madrid but all judges in general.
Yet, he did not even include any particulars that could
have validated the averment. Nor did he attach any
document to support it.
Worth stressing, too, is that the right of a party to seek
the inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does not
appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and
independent in handling the case must be balanced with
the latter's sacred duty to decide cases without fear of
repression. Thus, it was incumbent upon Atty. Dealca to
establish by clear and convincing evidence the ground of
bias and prejudice in order to disqualify Judge Madrid
from participating in a particular trial in which Atty.
Dealca was participating as a counsel.[36] The latter's
bare allegations of Judge Madrid's partiality or hostility
did not suffice,[37] because the presumption that Judge
Madrid would undertake his noble role to dispense
justice according to law and the evidence and without
fear or favor should only be overcome by clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary.[38] As such, Atty.
Dealca clearly contravened his duties as a lawyer as
expressly stated in Canon 11 and Rule 11.04, supra.
On a final note, it cannot escape our attention that this is
not the first administrative complaint to be ever brought
against Atty. Dealca. In Montano v. Integrated Bar of
the Philippines,[39] we reprimanded him for violating
Canon 22 and Rule 20.4, Canon 20 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and warned him that a
repetition of the same offense would be dealt with more
severely. Accordingly, based on the penalties the Court
imposed on erring lawyers found violating Canon 1,
Rule 1.03,[40] and Canon 11, Rule 11.04[41] of the Code,
we deem appropriate to suspend Atty. Dealca from the
practice of law for a period one year.
ACCORDINGLY, the
Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY.
JUAN S. DEALCA GUILTY of violating Canon 1,
Rule 1.03 and Canon 11, Rule 11.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him from
the practice of law for one year effective from notice of
this decision, with a STERN WARNING that any
similar infraction in the future will be dealt with more
severely.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of
the Bar Confidant to be appended to Atty. Dealca's
personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines; and to all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
 [ A.C. No. 10757, December 05, 2016 ]
LOUISITO N. CHUA, COMPLAINANT, V. ATTY.
OSCAR A. PASCUA, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The administrative complaint herein was brought by Dr.
Louisito N. Chua (Dr. Chua) before the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP)[1] accusing respondent Atty. Oscar
A. Pascua of violating several provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.[2]
Atty. Pascua was the co-plaintiff in the ejectment suit
filed against the complainant and his mother in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC). [3] After the
MeTC dismissed the ejectment suit, Atty. Pascua and his
co-plaintiff appealed. Although the RTC initially
dismissed the appeal,[4]it reversed itself and rendered
judgment in favor of Atty. Pascua and his co plaintiff
upon their motion for reconsideration. [5] According to
Dr. Chua, Atty. Pascua, in filing the motion for
reconsideration, did not furnish a copy of the motion to
Dr. Chua and his mother, thereby employing a
fraudulent scheme designed to prevent him and his
mother from having their day in court. Dr. Chua further
stated that only Atty. Pascua appeared at the hearing of
the motion for reconsideration at which he made his oral
arguments. Thereby, Atty. Pascua allegedly "obtained a
favorable decision without [their] knowledge."[6]
Following the rendition of the adverse judgment, Dr.
Chua and his mother moved for reconsideration. In
respect to their motion for reconsideration, Atty. Pascua
submitted a comment/opposition in which he used foul
language and insulting words.[7]
Alleging that Atty. Pascua had used foul language and
insulting words in his other written submissions to the
RTC, Dr. Chua declared in his complaint against Atty.
Pascua that:
xxxx
We filed our Motion for Reconsideration for having
been deprived of our day in Court. However, in his
Comment/Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration
and Omnibus Motion for the Correction of the Order
12.dated July 16, 2010 and to make Entry of Judgment
filed on September 17, 2010 he stated the following
scurrilous words and sentences to damage of (sic) my
name and reputation as a professional doctor and a
respectable councilor, and I quote:
Par. 9 - Appellee Chua using undue influence and
taking advantage of his being looked upon as a
councilor duped Ms. Yolanda Salindognd (sic) cause
her t[o] make statement dated August 17, 2010
marked as Annex "A" of their motion for
reconsideration.
Par. 9.1 The act of Appellant Chua to take advantage
of the innocence of Ms. Salindog as well as the trust
and confidence given to him as a Councilor. Chua
was able to cajole Ms. Salindog to state that she was
the one who received the Order dated July 20, 2009
and was to show the copy to Chua only in February
2010:
11. However, his ignorance and abusive
manner led him to say: ―Panalo kami sa kaso, paano
ako tatlunin (sic) ni Pascua eh isa lang fiscal at ako
konsehal na nagbibigay ng allowance sa knila (sic)
pati mga judges". (He put put those words into my
mouth to make me appear as arrogant and bad to my
constituents who elected me for three consecutive
terms as councilor when he in fact lost his
candidacy).
13.1 Yet, the foolishness of the statement of the
Honorable Councilor of the 4th District of
Manila is that it is very clear in the 2 nd page of the
Order that copies were sent only to counsels;
Atty. Pascua even accused the Judge of Branch 36
of bungling with (sic) the case and used foul
language in the Court taking advantage of his
13.experience as a veteran lawyer since 1971. In fact, the
Honorable Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 36, Emma
S. Young voluntarily inhibited from hearing the case
and in her order she stated the following, to wit:
"It caught the ire of counsel for plaintiff-appellee,
hence, the foul language in its pleading that the
undersigned bungled with (sic)the case".
x x x x[8]
Dr. Chua further declared that Atty. Pascua had abused
court procedures to his advantage, to wit:
16. Respondent Atty. Pascua also played (sic) a
mockery of the Court to our prejudice when he
alleged that he sent a demand letter to vacate
dated April 5, 2006 which was allegedly mailed
to me on April 20, 2006 when in truth and in
fact it is not April 5, 2006 but April 5, 2005
because it was just superimposed to make it
appear as April 5, 2006 and he intentionally did
not send said demand letter to me as in fact, he
cant (sic) show proof of receipt and/or
certification from the post office that he indeed
mailed said letter.
17. Similar to this mockery of Atty. Pascua was his
act of attaching a different Registry Receipt to
his Motion for Reconsideration filed on July 31,
2008. The proof of mailing which the registry
receipt attached to the motion filed in Court and
the Affidavit of Service attesting to said mailing
pertains to two different registry receipts. x x x;
18. Noticeably, the Registry Receipt with Number
139883 pertaining to the mail sent to counsel for
the plaintiff, Atty. Edgardo Abad and the
Registry Receipt Number 922640 for MTC
Branch 3, although both were mailed at the same
time (July 31, 2008) and place (Central Post
Office) bore different Registry Numbers.
Normally, Registry Receipts for mails (sic)
mailed at the same time or simultaneously with
each other at the same post office would bear a
successive number which is more or less
consecutive in character. Respondent is
obviously using fraudulent scheme of the
prevailing parties which prevented the plaintiff
from having his day in court.
19. During the hearing on September 26, 2008,
respondent took advantage of the non-
appearance of our counsel and despite the
objection of the Honorable Judge insisted in
having an ex parte presentation of his exhibits
which were all photocopies. x x x[9]
Dr. Chua pointed to the different dates appearing in Atty.
Pascua's pleadings indicating the supposed date of
issuance of his MCLE certificate.[10] Dr. Chua mentioned
that there were instances when Atty. Pascua did not
indicate his MCLE compliance certificate number, or
when Atty. Pascua used another lawyer's MCLE
compliance certificate number.[11] Finally, Dr. Chua
charged Atty. Pascua with fomenting suits that "would
require his clients to execute Deed of Sale of Rights as
his payment for Attorney's fees and would make himself
as co-plaintiff."[12]
In his answer to Dr. Chua's complaint, Atty. Pascua
focused on the untruthful statements Dr. Chua had
supposedly made regarding the ownership of the
property subject of the litigation between them.[13] Anent
the issue of his acquiring rights over the property from
the client, he asserted that such was a personal matter
between him and his client.[14] He denied using foul
language, insisting that "these are part of the pleadings
filed by complainant without malice but in good faith
taking into consideration the facts under the
circumstances."[15] He claimed that the errors made in
indicating the date of issuance of his MCLE compliance
certificate number were merely typographical, not
intentional.[16]
After investigation, the Investigating Commissioner of
the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (CBD-IBP) rendered a report with the
following recommendation, to wit:
WHEREFORE, it is recommended that for encouraging
suit, using intemperate, offensive and foul language in
his pleadings, for misusing the legal processes to the
ends of justice, for using another lawyers['] MCLE in his
pleading and for attributing to a judge motive not
supported by the records, RESPONDENT be suspended
from the practice of law of six (6) months effective from
notice.[17]
On June 21, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued a
resolution adopting and approving the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of
the CBD-IBP, viz.:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
resolution as Annex "A", and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules and for
encouraging suit, using intemperate, offensive and foul
language in his pleading, for misusing the legal
processes to defeat the ends of justice, for using another
lawyers['] MCLE number in his pleading and for
attributing to a Judge a motive not supported by the
records, Atty. Oscar Pascua is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for six (6) months.[18]
In a subsequent resolution, the IBP Board of Governors
denied Atty. Pascua's motion for reconsideration. [19]
Ruling of the Court
The Court reverses the IBP Board of Governors'
resolutions adopting and upholding the findings and
recommendation and imposing the penalty of suspension
from the practice of law for six months.
Every lawyer is required to act with courtesy at all times,
even towards the adverse parties. This duty is clearly
imposed by the Rules of Court which mandates lawyers
to "abstain from all offensive personality and to advance
no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or
witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with
which he is charged."[20] Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility reiterates this
duty by commanding that "[a] lawyer shall not, in his
professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper."
The adversarial nature of our legal system does not
sanction an attorney's use of foul or intemperate
language, whether spoken or in pleadings. In Sanchez v.
Aguilos,[21] we pointedly observed:
The Court recognizes the adversarial nature of our legal
system which has necessitated lawyers to use strong
language in the advancement of the interest of their
clients. However, as members of a noble profession,
lawyers are always impressed with the duty to
represent their clients' cause, or, as in this case, to
represent a personal matter in court, with courage
and zeal but that should not be used as license for the
use of offensive and abusive language. In maintaining
the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, a
lawyer's language — spoken or in his pleadings —
must be dignified. (Emphasis supplied)
At issue is whether or not Atty. Pascua's use of words
and phrases like duped, to take advantage of the
innocence of, his ignorance and abusive manner,
foolishness in reference to Dr. Chua as one of the
adverse parties, and bungling in reference to the trial
judge, was offensive and abusive as to violate the
aforecited command to every lawyer not to use abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper language in his
professional dealings.
It is notable that the Investigating Commissioner, in his
report and recommendation, concluded that Atty. Pascua
had "on several instances filed pleadings with the Court,
using offensive and intemperate language against the
parties as well as the court, even if the same is not
material to the case.‖[22] However, the Investigating
Commissioner did not explain or justify his conclusion
against Atty. Pascua, particularly to disclose why he
considered the words and phrases of Atty. Pascua
adverted to as offensive and intemperate.
We declare that the report and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner were bereft of factual basis.
Words and phrases like duped, to take advantage of the
innocence of, his ignorance and abusive manner,
foolishness, and bungling (even if the latter referred to
the act of the trial judge) are of common usage in our
daily life. They should be understood by what they
ordinarily convey. Admittedly, they can at times be
considered as off-color or even as abrasive, but their
being so considered depends on the specific context or
situation in which they are used or uttered. That they
have synonyms or alternatives that
are more orless expressive does not warrant
characterizing them as excessive, intemperate or
offensive. To depreciatingly generalize about them, as
the Investigating Commissioner obviously did, is to
unwarrantedly relegate them to a negative light. Doing
so herein would be uncalled for because the
Investigating Commissioner did not render any
justification for his negative conclusion about them. His
omission has effectively deprived the Court of the
factual basis for reviewing and affirming his conclusion.
Atty. Pascua's alleged usage of a wrong MCLE
compliance certificate number, or of that pertaining to
another lawyer, if established, could really constitute a
violation of Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which directs that "[a]
lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the
Court to be misled by any artifice." But for the Court to
find against him in this respect will be unwarranted
considering the absence from the Investigating
Commissioner's report and recommendation of any
factual finding thereon. Neither did his report and
recommendation advert to any evidence sufficiently
showing Atty. Pascua to have abused legal processes and
procedure.
We presume that the silence of the report and
recommendation on the foregoing matters was by virtue
of the absence of a clear showing by the complainant of
the factual circumstances supporting the charges against
Atty. Pascual. Otherwise, the Investigating
Commissioner would have easily stated his factual
findings thereon because it was his duty to do so under
Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, which
expressly provides:
Section 12. Review and decision by the Board of
Governors. - (a) Every case heard by an investigator
shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon
the record and evidence transmitted to it by the
Investigator with his report. The decision of the Board
upon such review shall be in writing and shall clearly
and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on
which it is based. It shall be promulgated within a
period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next
meeting of the Board following the submittal of the
Investigator's Report.
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total
membership, determines that the respondent should be
suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall
issue a resolution setting forth its findings and
recommendations which, together with the whole
record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the
Supreme Court for final action.
x x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

In view of the foregoing, the Court is given no

alternative but to dismiss the charges against Atty.
Pascua.
WHEREFORE, the
Court ABSOLVES respondent ATTY. OSCAR A.
PASCUA of the administrative complaint against him;
and DECLARESthis administrative
case CLOSED and TERMINATED.
SO ORDERED.
Re: ANONYMOUS LETTERCOMPLAINT ON THE
ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT AND FOR ENGAGING
IN THE BUSINESS OF LENDING MONEY AT
USURIOUS RATES OF INTEREST OF MS.
DOLORES T. LOPEZ, SC CHIEF JUDICIAL STAFF
OFFICER, AND MR. FERNANDO M. MONTALVO,
SC SUPERVISING JUDICIAL STAFF OFFICER,
CHECKS DISBURSEMENT DIVISION, FISCAL
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET OFFICE. (to be
printed from actual file; retrievable at
http://nlpdl.nlp.gov.ph:81/SC01/2014sep/2010-21-
SC.pdf)
 [ A.C. No. 6664, July 16, 2013 ]
FERDINAND A. SAMSON, COMPLAINANT, VS.
ATTY. EDGARDO O. ERA, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
An attorney who wittingly represents and serves
conflicting interests may be suspended from the practice
of law, or even disbarred when circumstances so
warrant.
Antecedents
Ferdinand A. Samson has brought this complaint for
disbarment charging respondent Atty. Edgardo O. Era
with violation of his trust and confidence of a client by
representing the interest of Emilia C. Sison, his present
client, in a manner that blatantly conflicted with his
interest.
Samson and his relatives were among the investors who
fell prey to the pyramiding scam perpetrated by ICS
Exports, Inc. Exporter, Importer, and Multi-Level
Marketing Business (ICS Corporation), a corporation
whose corporate officers were led by Sison. The other
officers were Ireneo C. Sison, William C. Sison, Mimosa
H. Zamudio, Mirasol H. Aguilar and Jhun Sison.
Samson engaged Atty. Era to represent and assist him
and his relatives in the criminal prosecution of Sison and
her group. Pursuant to the engagement, Atty. Era
prepared the demand letter dated July 19, 2002
demanding the return or refund of the money subject of
their complaints. He also prepared the complaint-
affidavit that Samson signed and swore to on July 26,
2002. Subsequently, the complaint-affidavit charging
Sison and the other corporate officials of ICS
Corporation with several counts of estafa[1] was
presented to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City (OCPQC). After the preliminary investigation, the
OCPQC formally charged Sison and the others with
several counts of estafa in the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 96 (RTC), in Quezon City. [2]
In April 2003, Atty. Era called a meeting with Samson
and his relatives to discuss the possibility of an amicable
settlement with Sison and her cohorts. He told Samson
and the others that undergoing a trial of the cases would
just be a waste of time, money and effort for them, and
that they could settle the cases with Sison and her group,
with him guaranteeing the turnover to them of a certain
property located in Antipolo City belonging to ICS
Corporation in exchange for their desistance. They
acceded and executed the affidavit of desistance he
prepared, and in turn they received a deed of assignment
covering land registered under Transfer Certificate of
Title No. R-4475 executed by Sison in behalf of ICS
Corporation.[3]
Samson and his relatives later demanded from Atty. Era
that they be given instead a deed of absolute sale to
enable them to liquidate the property among themselves.
It took some period of negotiations between them and
Atty. Era before the latter delivered to them on
November 27, 2003 five copies of a deed of absolute
sale involving the property. However, Atty. Era told
them that whether or not the title of the property had
been encumbered or free from lien or defect would no
longer be his responsibility. He further told them that as
far as he was concerned he had already accomplished his
professional responsibility towards them upon the
amicable settlement of the cases between them and ICS
Corporation.[4]
When Samson and his co-complainants verified the title
of the property at the Registry of Deeds and the
Assessor's Office of Antipolo City, they were dismayed
to learn that they could not liquidate the property
because it was no longer registered under the name of
ICS Corporation but was already under the name of
Bank Wise Inc.[5] Upon their urging, Atty. Era
negotiated as their counsel with ICS Corporation.
Due to the silence of Atty. Era for sometime thereafter,
Samson and his group wrote to him on September 8,
2004 to remind him about his guarantee and the promise
to settle the issues with Sison and her cohorts. But they
did not hear from Atty. Era at all.[6]
During the hearings in the RTC, Atty. Era did not
anymore appear for Samson and his group. This forced
them to engage another lawyer. They were shocked to
find out later on, however, that Atty. Era had already
been entering his appearance as the counsel for Sison in
her other criminal cases in the other branches of the RTC
in Quezon City involving the same pyramiding scam that
she and her ICS Corporation had perpetrated. [7] In this
regard, they established Atty. Era's legal representation
of Sison by submitting several certified copies of the
minutes of the proceedings in the criminal cases
involving Sison and her group issued by Branch 102 and
Branch 220 of the RTC in Quezon City showing that
Atty. Era had appeared as the counsel of Sison in the
cases for estafa pending and being tried in said
courts.[8] They also submitted a certification issued on
November 3, 2004 indicating that Atty. Era had visited
Sison, an inmate in the Female Dormitory in Camp
Karingal, Sikatuna Village, Quezon City as borne out by
the blotter logbook of that unit.[9]
On January 20, 2005, Samson executed an affidavit
alleging the foregoing antecedents, and praying for Atty.
Era's disbarment on the ground of his violation of the
trust, confidence and respect reposed in him as their
counsel.[10]
Upon being required by the Court to comment on the
complaint against him within 10 days from notice, Atty.
Era several times sought the extension of his period to
file the comment to supposedly enable him to collate
documents relevant to his comment.[11] The Court
granted his request and allowed him an extension
totalling 40 days. But despite the lapse of the extended
period, he did not file his comment.
On September 27, 2005, Samson reiterated his complaint
for disbarment against Atty. Era.[12]
By its resolution dated March 1, 2006,[13] the Court
required Atty. Era to show cause why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such
failure to submit his comment.
In the comment that he subsequently filed on April 11,
2006 in the Office of the Bar Confidant, [14] Atty. Era
alleged that the conclusion on April 23, 2002 of the
compromise settlement between Samson and his group,
on one hand, and Sison and her ICS Corporation, on the
other, had terminated the lawyer-client relationship
between him and Samson and his group; and that on
September 1, 2003, he had been appointed as counsel de
officio for Sison by Branch 102 of the RTC in Quezon
City only for purposes of her arraignment.
On July 17, 2006, the Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.[15]
In his report and recommendation dated October 1,
2007,[16] the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found Atty.
Era guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting
interests, for failing to serve his clients with competence
and diligence, and for failing to champion his clients'
cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion.
The Investigating Commissioner observed that the
evidence did not sustain Atty. Era's claim that his legal
services as counsel for Samson and his group had
terminated on April 23, 2003 upon the execution of the
compromise settlement of the criminal cases; that he
even admitted during the mandatory conference that
there was no formal termination of his legal
services;[17] that his professional obligation towards
Samson and his group as his clients did not end upon
execution of the settlement agreement, because he
remained duty-bound to see to it that the settlement was
duly implemented; that he also had the obligation to
appear in the criminal cases until their termination; and
that his acceptance of the engagement to appear in behalf
of Sison invited suspicion of his double-dealing and
unfaithfulness.
The Investigating Commissioner recommended that
Atty. Era be suspended from the practice of law for six
months, viz:
From the foregoing, it is clear that respondent is guilty of
misconduct for representing conflicting interests, failing
to serve his client, complainant herein, with competence
and diligence and champion the latter's cause with
wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion. It is
respectfully recommended that respondent be
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
six (6) months and WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar act would merit a more severe
penalty.[18]
In Resolution No. XVIII-2007-195 passed on October
19, 2007,[19] the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the report and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD, with the
modification that Atty. Era be suspended from the
practice of law for two years.
On June 9, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors passed
Resolution No. XX-2012-180,[20] denying Atty. Era's
motion for reconsideration and affirming Resolution No.
XVIII-2007-195.
The IBP Board of Governors then forwarded the case to
the Court pursuant to Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of
the Rules of Court.[21]
On October 17, 2012, Atty. Era filed a Manifestation and
Motion (With Leave of Court).[22] However, on
November 26, 2012, the Court merely noted the
manifestation, and denied the motion for its lack of
merit.[23]
Ruling
We affirm the findings of the IBP.
In his petition for disbarment, Samson charged Atty. Era
with violating Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for representing conflicting interests by
accepting the responsibility of representing Sison in the
cases similar to those in which he had undertaken to
represent Samson and his group, notwithstanding that
Sison was the very same person whom Samson and his
group had accused with Atty. Era's legal assistance. He
had drafted the demand letters and the complaint-
affidavit that became the bases for the filing of
the estafa charges against Sison and the others in the
RTC in Quezon City.
Atty. Era's contention that the lawyer-client relationship
ended when Samson and his group entered into the
compromise settlement with Sison on April 23, 2002
was unwarranted. The lawyer-client relationship did not
terminate as of then, for the fact remained that he still
needed to oversee the implementation of the settlement
as well as to proceed with the criminal cases until they
were dismissed or otherwise concluded by the trial court.
It is also relevant to indicate that the execution of a
compromise settlement in the criminal cases did not ipso
facto cause the termination of the cases not only because
the approval of the compromise by the trial court was
still required, but also because the compromise would
have applied only to the civil aspect, and excluded the
criminal aspect pursuant to Article 2034 of the Civil
Code.[24]
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that: "A lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent
of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts." Atty. Era thus owed to Samson and his group
entire devotion to their genuine interest, and warm zeal
in the maintenance and defense of their rights. [25] He was
expected to exert his best efforts and ability to preserve
the clients' cause, for the unwavering loyalty displayed
to his clients likewise served the ends of justice.[26]
In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat,[27] the Court discussed the
concept of conflict of interest in this wise:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents
inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties.
The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is
the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is
his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he
argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by
him when he argues for the other client." This rule
covers not only cases in which confidential
communications have been confided, but also those in
which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used.
Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the
new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act
which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter
in which he represents him and also whether he will be
called upon in his new relation to use against his first
client any knowledge acquired through their connection.
Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether
the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney
from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity
and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance
thereof.[28]
The prohibition against conflict of interest rests on five
rationales, rendered as follows:
x x x. First, the law seeks to assure clients that their
lawyers will represent them with undivided loyalty. A
client is entitled to be represented by a lawyer whom the
client can trust. Instilling such confidence is an objective
important in itself. x x x.
Second, the prohibition against conflicts of interest seeks
to enhance the effectiveness of legal representation. To
the extent that a conflict of interest undermines the
independence of the lawyer's professional judgment or
inhibits a lawyer from working with appropriate vigor in
the client's behalf, the client's expectation of effective
representation x x x could be compromised.
Third, a client has a legal right to have the lawyer
safeguard the client's confidential information xxx.
Preventing use of confidential client information against
the interests of the client, either to benefit the lawyer's
personal interest, in aid of some other client, or to foster
an assumed public purpose is facilitated through
conflicts rules that reduce the opportunity for such
abuse.
Fourth, conflicts rules help ensure that lawyers will not
exploit clients, such as by inducing a client to make a
gift to the lawyer xxx.
Finally, some conflict-of-interest rules protect interests
of the legal system in obtaining adequate presentations
to tribunals. In the absence of such rules, for example, a
lawyer might appear on both sides of the litigation,
complicating the process of taking proof and
compromise adversary argumentation x x x. [29]
The rule prohibiting conflict of interest was fashioned to
prevent situations wherein a lawyer would be
representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to
any of his present or former clients. In the same way, a
lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client
involving the same or a substantially related matter that
is materially adverse to the former client only if the
former client consents to it after consultation.[30] The rule
is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of
loyalty.[31] Throughout the course of a lawyer-client
relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected
with the client's case, including the weak and strong
points of the case. Knowledge and information gathered
in the course of the relationship must be treated as sacred
and guarded with care. It behooves lawyers not only to
keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid
the appearance of treachery and double-dealing, for only
then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets
to their lawyers, which is paramount in the
administration of justice.[32] The nature of that
relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of
the highest degree.[33]
Contrary to Atty. Era's ill-conceived attempt to explain
his disloyalty to Samson and his group, the termination
of the attorney-client relationship does not justify a
lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict
with that of the former client. The spirit behind this rule
is that the client's confidence once given should not be
stripped by the mere expiration of the professional
employment. Even after the severance of the relation, a
lawyer should not do anything that will injuriously affect
his former client in any matter in which the lawyer
previously represented the client. Nor should the lawyer
disclose or use any of the client's confidences acquired
in the previous relation.[34] In this regard, Canon 17 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility expressly
declares that: "A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his
client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him."

The lawyer's highest and most unquestioned duty is to

protect the client at all hazards and costs even to
himself.[35] The protection given to the client is perpetual
and does not cease with the termination of the litigation,
nor is it affected by the client's ceasing to employ the
attorney and retaining another, or by any other change of
relation between them. It even survives the death of the
client.[36]

In the absence of the express consent from Samson and

his group after full disclosure to them of the conflict of
interest, therefore, the most ethical thing for Atty. Era to
have done was either to outrightly decline representing
and entering his appearance as counsel for Sison, or to
advice Sison to engage another lawyer for herself.
Unfortunately, he did neither, and should now suffer the
proper sanction.

WHEREFORE, the
Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES Atty. EDGARDO
O. ERA guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of Canon 15, and
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;
and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for two
years effective upon his receipt of this decision, with a
warning that his commission of a similar offense will be
dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this decision be included in the personal

record of Atty. EDGARDO O. ERA and entered in his
file in the Office of the Bar Confidant.

Let copies of this decision be disseminated to all lower

courts by the Office of the Court Administrator, as well
as to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its
guidance.

SO ORDERED.
 NILO DIONGZON v. ATTY WILLIAM MIRANO extension of the time for him to file his comment.

AC NO 2404, AUG 17 2016 In the meantime, Atty. Flora, in an attempt to explain

why the respondent had appeared as counsel for the
Gonzaleses, filed a manifestation claiming that the
Gonzaleses had been his own personal clients, and that
he had only requested the respondent's appearance
BERSAMIN, J.: because he had been indisposed at the time.[8]
A lawyer who agrees to represent a client's interests in
The complainant belied the explanation of Atty. Flora,
the latter's business dealings is duty-bound to keep the
however, and pointed out that Atty. Flora was actually a
confidence of such client, even after their lawyer-client
new lawyer then working in the law office of the
relationship had ended. If he represents any other party
respondent.[9] As proof, the complainant submitted the
in a case against his former client over a business deal he
stationery showing the letterhead of the law office of the
oversaw during the time of their professional
respondent that included Atty. Flora's name as an
relationship, he is guilty of representing conflicting
associate.[10]
interests, and should be properly sanctioned for ethical
misconduct.
In his answer dated September 9, 1982,[11] the
respondent stated that the complainant had been his
client in a different civil case; that the complainant had
The Case
never consulted him upon any other legal matter; that the
complainant had only presented the deeds of sale
Before the Court is the petition for review of the
prepared by another lawyer because he had not been
Resolution No. 2013-160 adopted by the Board of
contented with the terms thereof: that he had not been
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
the complainant's retained counsel because the retainer
on the complaint for disbarment filed by the complainant
agreement did not take effect; that he had returned the
against respondent Atty. William Mirano,[1] whereby the
amount paid to him by the complainant; that he had
IBP Board of Governors found the respondent guilty of
appeared for the Gonzaleses only after their evidence
representing conflicting interest, and recommended the
against the complainant had been presented; that the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one
complainant had approached him when he needed a
year. The respondent assails the recommendation of the
lawyer to defend him from an estafa charge: and that the
IBP Board of Governors.
complainant had even wanted him to falsify documents
in relation to that estafa case, but because he had refused
his bidding, the complainant had then filed this
Antecedents
administrative case against him.[12]
On the dates material to this case, the complainant was a
businessman engaged in the fishing industry in Bacolod
Proceedings before the IBP
City, Negros Occidental. In 1979, he retained the
respondent as his legal counsel to represent him as the
The complaint was referred to the IBP for investigation.
plaintiff in Civil Case No. 10679 then pending in the
The case was heard over a long period of time spanning
City Court of Bacolod City (Branch 1). In November
1985 to 2003,[13] and the IBP Board of Governors finally
1981, the complainant again retained the respondent as
recommended on February 13, 2013 that the respondent
his lawyer in relation to the execution of two deeds of
be held guilty of conflict of interest for appearing as the
sale covering the boats the former was selling to Spouses
counsel for the opponents of the complainant with whom
Almanzur and Milagros Gonzales (Gonzaleses).[2] In
he had an existing lawyer-client relationship, a gross
January 1982, the parties herein signed a retainer
violation of his ethical duties as an attorney; and that he
contract for legal services that covered legal
should be punished with suspension from the practice of
representation in cases and transactions involving, the
law for one year.
fishing business of the complainant.[3]
The Court noted the resolution of the IBP Board of
In February 1982, the Gonzaleses sued the complainant
Governors on April 1, 2014.
for replevin and damages, and sought the annulment of
the aforementioned deeds of sale. [4]They were
The respondent filed in this Court a Manifestation with
represented by Atty. Romeo Flora, the associate of the
Motion and a Supplement to Manifestation with Motion,
respondent in his law office. It appears that the bond
wherein he proceeded to argue against the findings
they filed to justify the manual delivery of the boats
although he initially claimed not to have been furnished
subject of the suit had been notarially acknowledged
with the IBP Board of Governors' recommendation. He
before the respondent without the knowledge and prior
posited that he still had a pending Motion for
consent of the complainant;[5] and that the respondent
Reconsideration in the IBP, and requested that this case
eventually entered his appearance as the counsel for the
be remanded to the IBP for disposition.
Gonzaleses against the respondent.[6]

On May 24, 1982, therefore, the complainant initiated

Ruling of the Court
this administrative complaint for disbarment against the
respondent by verified letter-complaint.[7]
We uphold the findings and recommendations of the IBP
Board of Governors because they were substantiated by
The respondent thereafter sought several times the
the records.

On the preliminary matter of procedure being raised by
the respondent, it is unnecessary to remand this case to
the IBP for further investigation and disposition by the
IBP. Remanding the case to the IBP would be
superfluous and unnecessary. The complaint was filed in
1982, and since then the case underwent three decades of
hearings before different investigating commissioners of
the IBP. The matters subject of the complaint were
extensively covered and sifted. In our view, the records
are already adequate for resolution of the charge against
the respondent, which, after all, is something that only
the Court can ultimately do.
Was the respondent guilty of representing conflict of
interest?
The lawyer-client relationship begins from the moment a
client seeks the lawyer's advice upon a legal concern.
The seeking may be for consultation on transactions or
other legal concerns, or for representation of the client in
an actual case in the courts or other fora. From that
moment on, the lawyer is bound to respect the
relationship and to maintain the trust and confidence of
his client. No written agreement is necessary to generate
a lawyer-client relationship, but in formalizing it, the
lawyer may present a retainer agreement to be
considered and agreed to by the client. As with all
contracts, the agreement must contain all the terms and
conditions agreed upon by the parties.
In this case, the respondent presented such a retainer
contract to the complainant, the terms of which are
stated below:
The CLIENT retains and employs the ATTORNEY to
take charge of the legal matters of the former in
connection with his fishing business, and the attorney
accepts such retainer and employment subject to the
following terms and conditions, to wit:
1. That the term of this contract shall be for two
"2" years beginning February, 1982 but is
deemed automatically renewed for the same
period if not terminated by both parties by virtue
of an agreement to that effect and signed by
them;
2. That the compensation to be paid by the client
for the services of the attorney, .shall be three
hundred pesos (P300.00) a month;
3. That the attorney may be consulted at all times
by CLIENT on all business requiring his
professional advice and opinion and when the
ATTORNEY gives a written opinion, a copy
shall be sent to the CLIENT;
4. That the duties of the attorney in this retainer
contract shall include
consultations, opinions, legal advices,
preparations and drafting of contracts and other
legal papers, and other legal works, in
connection with the business of the CLIENT,
except those cases involving
trials in court, which if they are entrusted
to the ATTORNEY, shall be subject to a new
agreement;[14]
Both parties signed their retainer contract on January 20,
IS82. Contrary to the assertion of the respondent, the
retainer agreement did not contain a suspensive
condition that affected its effectivity as of the date of its
execution. It simply stipulated that the respondent would
represent the interests of the complainant in all matters
pertaining to his fishing business, thereby formalizing
their lawyer-client relationship. The respondent's
insistence that the complainant should return all the
checks to the Gonzaleses relative to the sale of the
fishing boats was clearly not part of the contract.
The lawyer-client relationship between the parties was
duly established beginning in 1979 and lasted until 1982.
The respondent's claim that he returned the retainer fee
did not alter the juridical existence of their lawyer-client
relationship. When the complainant consulted him on the
sale of the boats to the Gonzaleses, the respondent
reviewed the contracts of sale in the capacity of the
complainant's lawyer, and even notarized the same. He
became aware of the details of the sale by virtue of the
confidentiality generated by his lawyer-client
relationship with the complainant.
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility enjoins lawyers to observe candor,
fairness and loyalty in all their dealings and transactions
with their clients. Specifically, Canon 15.03 demands
that: "A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests
except by written consent of all concerned given after a
full disclosure of the facts." A conflict of interest exists
where a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two
opposing parties, like when the lawyer performs an act
that will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in
which he represented him, or when the lawyer uses any
knowledge he previously acquired from his first client
against the latter.[15] The prohibition against conflict of
interest is founded on principles of public policy and
good taste, inasmuch as the lawyer-client relationship is
based on trust and confidence.[16] A lawyer has a duty to
preserve his client's confidence in him, even if their
relationship ends. The purpose is to assure freedom of
communication between the lawyer and the client in
order to enable the former to properly represent and
serve the latter's interests. To use against the latter any
information the former gains during the relationship is
deplorable and unethical.
When he appeared in court for the benefit of the
Gonzaleses to try the case against the complainant, the
respondent unquestionably incurred a conflict of interest.
Having become privy to the terms of the sale subject of
the civil case, the conflict of interest became unmitigated
because the complainant had not expressly consented in
writing to his appearing in behalf of the Gonzaleses. It
would have been more prudent for him to have excused
himself from representing either party in the civil case.
In cavalier fashion, the respondent has cited his
accomplishments as a member and officer of the IBP in
his region to buttress his claim of being more credible
than the complainant, supposedly a convicted felon. But
such a defense is unworthy of consideration in this
instance because the praiseworthiness of one's
accomplishments and professional reputation never
furnishes the license for any ethical lawyer to flagrantly
and knowingly violate the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

On the penalty, we note that suspension from the

practice of law for one year was imposed on the lawyer
who had appeared as defense counsel for the accused in
an estafa case despite having written and sent the
demand letter for the complainant in the same case. [17] In
another case, the same penalty was imposed on the
lawyer who had initially drafted a deed of sale for the
client, and who eventually filed a case against said client
to annul the same contract.[18] Such penalty is
appropriate and commensurate for this case.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS the Resolution

adopted on February 13, 2013 by the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; FINDS and DECLARES Atty. William N.
Mirano guilty of ethical misconduct due to conflict of
interest, and, ACCORDINGLY, SUSPENDS him from
the practice of law for ONE YEAR, effective
immediately upon receipt of this decision.

Let copies of this decision be entered in the personal

records of Atty. Mirano in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and
a copy of this decision be furnished to the Office of the
Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts in the
country.

SO ORDERED.
 TERESITA T. BAYONLA v. ATTY. PURITA deliver the balance of P52,000.00 despite repeated
REYES
demands; that on June 5, 1995, Atty. Reyes had
AC No. 4808, NOV 22, 2011 collected the amount of P121,119.11 from the ATO; that

BERSAMIN, J.: Bayonlas share, after deducting Atty. Reyes attorneys

fees, would be P109,007.20, but Atty. Reyes had handed
Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall her only P56,500.00, and had failed to deliver the
deliver the funds and property of his
balance of P52,507.20; and that Atty. Reyes should be
client when due or upon demand.
However, he shall have a lien over disbarred for depriving her of her just share. [4]
the funds and may apply so much
thereof as may be necessary to
satisfy his lawful fees and In her comment dated February 10, 1998,[5] Atty.
disbursements, giving notice Reyes admitted that Bayonla and Alfredo had engaged
promptly thereafter to his client. He
shall also have a lien to the same her legal services for the purpose of collecting their
extent on all judgments and share in the expropriation compensation; that as
executions he has secured for his
consideration for her services, Bayonla and Alfredo had
client as provided for in the Rules of
Court. agreed upon a 40% contingent fee for her; that she had
- Code of Professional given to Bayonla more than what had been due to her;
Responsibility.
that Alfredo had received from the ATO the check for
the second release corresponding to the share of both
This canon of professional responsibility is at
Bayonla and Alfredo; that Alfredo had gotten more than
the center of this administrative complaint for
Bayonla out of the second release; that on June 5, 1995
disbarment for gross dishonesty, deceit, conversion, and
she had received out of the second release by the ATO
breach of trust filed against Atty. Purita A. Reyes by
only her 40% contingent fee; that Bayonla and Alfredo
Teresita T. Bayonla, her client.[1]
had agreed to bear the expenses for the collection of
their share; that she had incurred travel and other
Antecedents
expenses in collecting such share; and that she should be
absolved from liability arising from the complaint.
Petra Durban and Paz Durban were sisters who
had jointly owned a parcel of land situated in Butuan
On June 29, 1998, the Court referred the
City in their lifetimes. They died without leaving a will.
complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Their land was thereafter expropriated in connection
for investigation, report, and recommendation.[6]
with the construction of the Bancasi Airport. An
expropriation compensation amounting to P2,453,429.00
On April 20, 1999, IBP Commissioner Lydia A.
was to be paid to their heirs. Bayonla and her uncle,
Navarro (Commissioner Navarro) rendered a
Alfredo Tabada (Alfredo), were the compulsory heirs of
report,[7] whereby she found and recommended against
Paz, being, respectively, Pazs granddaughter and son. [2]
Atty. Reyes as follows:

On June 22, 1997, Bayonla charged Atty. Reyes In so far as this case of disbarment
with gross dishonesty, deceit, conversion, and breach of is concerned, the issue hinges only on
the complainants position; one of the
trust. Bayonla alleged that on October 21, 1993, she and
heirs of Paz Durban whose legal
Alfredo had engaged the legal services of Atty. Reyes to services of the respondent was not
collect their share in the expropriation compensation revoked.

from the Air Transportation Office (ATO), Cagayan De The parties were required to
Oro City, [3]
agreeing to her attorneys fees of 10% of submit documents relative to their
respective defenses (sic) specially the
whatever amount would be collected; that in November actual amounts released by ATO, actual
1993, Atty. Reyes had collected P1 million from the amount due to the complainant as her
share, the remittances made by the
ATO; that Bayonlas share, after deducting Atty. Reyes
respondent to the complainant of her
attorneys fees, would be P75,000.00, but Atty. Reyes share and receipts to prove the same.
had delivered to her only P23,000.00, and had failed to
 Unfortunately, only the
respondent filed an answer without the
necessary documents required of them
and attached only a xerox copy of the
computation made by Atty. Ismael Laya
for the heir of Pedro Durban which had
already been previously attached to the
records of this case.
In the said computation it appears
that for the release on February 17,
1993, the heirs of Durban
received P84,852.00 and for the second
release each of them as well as the
complainant was entitled P121,119.11.
It could be inferred from here that
complainant was supposed to received
(sic) P205,971.11 as her share.
Inasmuch as the attorneys fees of
40% was (sic) supported by evidence
instead of (sic) complainants allegation
of ten [10%] percent; then respondent
was entitled to P82,388.45 as attorneys
fees; leaving a balance of P123,582.66
due to the complainant.
Respondents allegation that she
gave more than what was alleged by the
complainant is untenable for she did not
submit evidence to prove the same,
therefore, as it is complainants
allegation that she received
only P79,000.00 for her share as a whole
shall be considered for the moment until
such time that proofs to the contrary
shall have been submitted.
Considering that complainant was
supposed to receive the amount due her
which was P123,582.66 and actually
received only P79,000.00; then
respondent still has to remit to
complainant the amount of P44,582.66.
From the records of this case
respondent alleged that she only
collected the 40% attorneys fees for the
second release whereby Alfredo Tabada
the other heir of Paz Durban received
the check from ATO and got a large part
of the same. Respondent did not
mention how much she got as attorneys
fees against complainants share but on
the whole amounting to P496,895.00
which is unfair to the complainant.
As counsel for the heirs of Paz
Durban, complainant herein should have
been advised by the respondent and
given a breakdown of whatever amount
was received or came to her knowledge
as complainants counsel. Short of the
foregoing, respondent violated Rule
16.01 Canon 16 Chapter III of the Code
of Professional Responsibility; to wit:
Rule 16.01 A
lawyer shall account for
all money or property
collected or received for
or from the client.
Respondent was given a chance to
rectify whatever errors or misgivings
(sic) she had done for her client but she
unfortunately failed to do so and did not
comply with the Order dated October
29, 1998.
Wherefore, in view of the
foregoing, the Undersigned respectfully
recommends that the respondent be
required to render an accounting or
inventory duly confirmed by the
complainant of all the collected shares
due the complainant and remit to the
latter the said amount of P44.582.66;
Until such time that respondent
had complied with the aforementioned,
she is suspended from the practice of her
legal profession.
Respectfully submitted.
On June 19, 1999, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the report of Commissioner
Navarro through Resolution No. XIII-99-165.[8]
Atty. Reyes moved for reconsideration, but on
September 27, 1999 the IBP Board of Governors denied
her motion for reconsideration through Resolution No.
XIV-99-117.[9]
Atty. Reyes then filed a motion for
reinvestigation. However, through its Resolution No.
XV-2001-111 adopted on July 28, 2001, the IBP Board
of Governors denied the motion for reinvestigation for
lack of jurisdiction, stating that the matter had already
been endorsed to the Court.[10]
On July 30, 2002, the Court directed the IBP
Board of Governors to report on whether Atty. Reyes
had already accounted for and remitted the amount
of P44,582.66 to Bayonla.[11]
On August 22, 2002, the IBP Board of
Governors informed the Court that per the manifestation
of Bayonlas counsel Atty. Reyes had not yet rendered an
accounting and had not yet remitted the amount
of P44,582.66 to Bayonla.[12]

Through her manifestation dated September 4,
[13]
2002 to the Court, Atty. Reyes posed some queries, as
follows: (a) whether she could be compelled to pay the
amount of P44,582.66 to Bayonla even if the latters
claims had been based on perjured statements; (b)
whether the payment of the amount would operate to
dismiss the estafacase previously filed by Bayonla
against her for allegedly failing to deliver the balance of
Bayonlas share; and (c) whether she could deposit the
amount of P44,582.66 with either the IBP Board of
Governors or the Court.
Atty. Reyes also stated in the manifestation that
the IBP Board of Governors did not accord to her the
right to confront Bayonla during the investigation
conducted by the IBP Board of Governors; that Bayonlas
counsel had induced Bayonla to file the estafa charge
against her; and that this had prompted her to initiate a
disbarment complaint against Bayonlas counsel.[14]
On May 24, 2010, the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) recommended the final resolution of
this case.[15] The recommendation was noted by the
[16]
Court on June 29, 2010.
Issue
Whether or not the findings and
recommendations of the IBP Board of Governors were
proper.
Ruling
We affirm the findings of the IBP Board of
Governors, which were supported by the records, but we
modify the sanctions to be imposed on Atty. Reyes.
I immediately turned over to the client.[21]The unjustified
Respondent was guilty of violating the canons
of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility requires that a lawyer shall hold in trust
all moneys and properties of her client that may come
into her possession. Rule 16.01 of Canon 16 imposes on
the lawyer the duty to account for all money or property
collected or received for or from the client. Rule 16.03
of Canon 16 demands that the lawyer shall deliver the
funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand, subject to the lawyers lien over the funds, or the
lawyers option to apply so much of the funds as may be
necessary to satisfy the lawful fees and disbursements,
giving notice promptly thereafter to the client.
The canons are appropriate considering that the
relationship between a lawyer and her client is highly
fiduciary, and prescribes on a lawyer a great degree of
fidelity and good faith. There is no question that the
money or property received by a lawyer for her client
properly belongs to the latter.[17] Conformably with these
canons of professional responsibility, we have held that a
lawyer is obliged to render an accounting of all the
property and money she has collected for her client. This
obligation includes the prompt reporting and accounting
of the money collected by the lawyer by reason of a
favorable judgment to his client.[18]
Based on the records, Bayonla and her uncle
would each receive the amount of P84,852.00 out of the
first release, and the amount of P121,119.11 out of the
second release. Her total share from the two releases
was P205,971.11. With Atty. Reyes being entitled
to P82,388.44 as attorneys fees, the equivalent of 40% of
Bayonlas share, the net share of Bayonla
was P123,582.67. Yet, Atty. Reyes actually delivered to
her only P79,000.00,[19] which was short
by P44,582.67. Despite demands by Bayonla and despite
the orders from the IBP Board of Governors for her to
remit the shortage,[20] Atty. Reyes refused to do so.
By not delivering Bayonlas share despite her
demand, Atty. Reyes violated the aforestated canons.
The money collected by Atty. Reyes as the lawyer of
Bayonla was unquestionably money held in trust to be
withholding of money belonging to the client warrants
the imposition of disciplinary sanctions on the
lawyer.[22] Without doubt, Atty. Reyes failure to
immediately account for and to deliver the money upon
demand was deceit, for it signified that she had
converted the money to her own use, in violation of the
trust Bayonla had reposed in her. It constituted gross
misconduct for which the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law became justified pursuant to Section 27, administrative matters, such that the
disposition in the first two will not
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to wit: inevitably govern the third and vice
versa. In this light, we refer to this
Section 27. Disbarment or Courts ruling in Berbano vs. Barcelona,
suspension of attorneys by Supreme citing In re Almacen, where it was held:
Court, grounds therefor. A member of Disciplinary proceedings
the bar may be disbarred against lawyers are sui
or suspended from his office as attorney generis. Neither purely civil
by the Supreme Court for any deceit, nor purely criminal, they do
malpractice, or other gross misconduct not involve a trial of an action
in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or a suit, but rather
or by reason of his conviction of a crime investigations by the Court
involving moral turpitude, or for any into the conduct of one of its
violation of the oath which he is officers. Not being intended
required to take before admission to to inflict punishment, [they
practice, or for a wilful disobedience are] in no sense a criminal
appearing as an attorney for a party to a prosecution. Accordingly,
case without authority so to do. The there is neither a plaintiff nor
practice of soliciting cases at law for the a prosecutor therein. [They]
purpose of gain, either personally or may be initiated by the
through paid agents or brokers, Court motu proprio. Public
constitutes malpractice. interest is [their] primary
objective, and the real
The disbarment or suspension of a question for determination is
member of the Philippine Bar by a whether or not the attorney is
competent court or other disciplinary still a fit person to be allowed
agency in a foreign jurisdiction where the privileges as
he has also been admitted as an attorney such. Hence, in the exercise
is a ground for his disbarment or of its disciplinary powers,
suspension if the basis of such action the Court merely calls upon
includes any of the acts hereinabove a member of the Bar to
enumerated. account for his actuations as
an officer of the Court with
The judgment, resolution or order the end in view of
of the foreign court or disciplinary preserving the purity of the
agency shall be prima facie evidence of legal profession and the
the ground for disbarment or proper and honest
suspension. (As amended by SC administration of justice by
Resolution dated February 13, 1992.) purging the profession of
members who by their
misconduct have prove[n]
themselves no longer worthy
II to be entrusted with the
Pendency of other cases not an obstacle duties and responsibilities
to administrative proceeding against respondent pertaining to the office of an
attorney.

Hence, our only concern in the

The filing of the perjury charge by Atty. Reyes instant case is the determination of
respondents administrative liability
against Bayonla and of the estafa charge by Bayonla and our findings herein should not in
against Atty. Reyes could not halt or excuse the duty of any way be treated as having any
material bearing on any other judicial
Atty. Reyes to render an accounting and to remit the action which the parties may choose
amount due to Bayonla. Nor did the pendency of such to file against each other. [emphasis
supplied]
cases inhibit this administrative matter from proceeding
on its due course. It is indisputable that the pendency of
Relevantly, we have also emphasized
any criminal charges between the lawyer and her client
in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v.
does not negate the administrative proceedings against
[24]
Naldoza that
the lawyer. We explained why in Suzuki v.
Tiamson,[23] to wit:
xxx a finding of guilt in the
criminal case will not necessarily result
The settled rule is that criminal in a finding of liability in the
and civil cases are different from administrative case. Conversely,
 respondents acquittal does not
necessarily exculpate him
administratively. In the same vein, the
trial courts finding of civil liability
against the respondent will not
inexorably lead to a similar finding in
the administrative action before this
Court. Neither will a favorable
disposition in the civil action absolve
the administrative liability of the lawyer.
It serves well to mention, lastly, that the
simultaneous pendency of an administrative case and a
judicial proceeding related to the cause of the
administrative case, even if the charges and the evidence
to be adduced in such cases are similar, does not result
into or occasion any unfairness, or prejudice, or
deprivation of due process to the parties in either of the
cases.[25]
III
No denial of due process to respondent
Atty. Reyes contends that she was denied her
right to due process because the IBP Board of Governors
did not permit her to personally confront the
complainant.
We do not consider Atty. Reyess contention
valid. She was accorded full due process, for she in fact
participated in all stages of the proceedings.
It is true that a lawyer shall not be disbarred or
suspended from the practice of law until she has had full
opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the
charges against her, to produce witnesses in her behalf,
and to be heard by herself or counsel. [26] Contrary to
Atty. Reyes insistence, however, the IBP Board of
Governors was under no legal obligation to conduct a
trial-type proceeding at which she could have personally
confronted Bayonla. In other words, the lack of such
proceeding neither diminished her right to due process
nor deprived her of the right. A formal investigation
entailing notice and hearing is required in administrative
proceedings for disbarment, but the imperative need of
notice and hearing does not always mean the holding of
an adversarial trial-type proceeding. Due process is still
satisfied when the parties are afforded the reasonable
opportunity to be heard and to submit evidence in
support of their respective sides.[27] As the Court said
[28]
in Samalio v. Court of Appeals:
Due process in an
administrative context does not
require trial-type proceedings similar
to those in courts of justice. Where
opportunity to be heard either
through oral arguments or through
pleadings is accorded, there is no
denial of procedural due process. A
formal or trial-type hearing is not at
all times and in all instances essential.
The requirements are satisfied where
the parties are afforded fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain
their side of the controversy at hand.
The standard of due process that
must be met in administrative
tribunals allows a certain degree of
latitude as long as fairness is not
ignored. In other words, it is not
legally objectionable for being
violative of due process for an
administrative agency to resolve a
case based solely on position papers,
affidavits or documentary evidence
submitted by the parties as affidavits
of witnesses may take the place of
their direct testimony.
In this case, petitioner was heard
through the various pleadings which he
filed with the Board of Discipline of the
BID when he filed his answer and two
motions to dismiss, as well as other
motions and papers. He was also able to
participate in all stages of the
administrative proceeding. He was able
to elevate his case to the Secretary of
Justice and, subsequently, to the CSC by
way of appeal.
We have consistently held that
the essence of due process is simply
the opportunity to be heard or, as
applied to administrative proceedings,
the opportunity to explain ones side
or the opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. And any seeming
defect in its observance is cured by
the filing of a motion for
reconsideration. Denial of due process
cannot be successfully invoked by a
party who has had the opportunity to
be heard on his motion for
reconsideration. [bold emphasis
supplied]
Nevertheless, the IBP Board of Governors
actually conducted a formal investigation of the
complaint against Atty. Reyes upon the directive of the
Court. In her formal investigation of the complaint,
Commissioner Navarro allowed both parties to submit
their respective proofs on the actual amounts released by
the ATO, the amounts due to Bayonla as her share, Atty.
Reyes corresponding contingent fees, the remittances by Considering that the sin of Atty. Reyes had
Atty. Reyes to Bayonla, and the receipts showing such striking resemblance with the sins thus sanctioned in the
[29]
remittances. In due course, Atty. Reyes submitted her aforementioned precedents, the proper penalty for her is
written answer, attaching to the answer the documents suspension from the practice of law for two years, with
[30]
supporting her defenses. Commissioner Navarro took warning that a similar offense by her will be dealt with
all of Atty. Reyes submissions into good and proper more severely.
[31]
account, as borne out by her report. And even after the
IBP Board of Governors had adopted Commissioner Atty. Reyes is further obliged to pay to Bayonla
Navarros report (and its recommendation), Atty. Reyes the amount of P44,582.67, which the IBP Board of
was still afforded the fair opportunity to challenge the Governors found to be still unpaid, by way of restitution.
adverse findings by filing her motion for Although the Court renders this decision in an
reconsideration, although such motion was ultimately administrative proceeding primarily to exact the ethical
[32]
resolved against her. responsibility on a member of the Philippine Bar, the
Courts silence about the respondent lawyers legal
IV obligation to restitute the complainant will be both unfair
Sanction
and inequitable. No victim of gross ethical misconduct
concerning the clients funds or property should be
The penalty for gross misconduct consisting in
required to still litigate in another proceeding what the
the failure or refusal despite demand of a lawyer to
administrative proceeding has already established as the
account for and to return money or property belonging to
respondents liability. That has been the reason why the
a client has been suspension from the practice of law for
Court has required restitution of the amount involved as
two years. In Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit,[33] the lawyer
a concomitant relief in the cited cases of Mortera v.
who withdrew the rentals pertaining to his client
Pagatpatan, supra, Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit, supra,
totaling P255,000.00 without the knowledge of the client
and Small v. Banares, supra.
and who ignored the demand of the client to account for
and to return the amount was suspended from the
In addition, Atty. Reyes is liable for interest of
practice of law for two years. In Mortera v.
12% per annum reckoned from June 22, 1997, the date
Pagatpatan,[34] the lawyer received P155,000.00 from
when she was formally charged with disbarment. This
the adversary of his clients as partial payment of a final
rate of interest was prescribed by the Court
and executory decision in favor of the clients pursuant to
in Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit and Small v. Banares.
a secret arrangement between the lawyer and the
adversary, and deposited the amount to the lawyers
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS AND
personal bank account without the knowledge of the
PRONOUNCES ATTY. PURITA A. REYES guilty of
clients; the lawyer thereafter refused to surrender the
violating Rule 16.01 and Rule 16.03 of Canon 16 of
money to his clients. The suspension of the lawyer for
the Code of Professional Responsibility,
two years from the practice of law was ordered by the
and SUSPENDS her from the practice of law for a
Court. In Small v. Banares,[35] a similar penalty of
period of two years effective upon receipt of this
suspension for a period of two years from the practice of
Decision, with warning that a similar offense by her will
law was imposed on a lawyer who had failed to file a
be dealt with more severely.
case for the purpose of which he had received an amount
of P80,000.00, and to return the amount upon
[36] The Court ORDERS Atty. Reyes to pay to
demand. In Barcenas v. Alvero, the Court suspended
complainant Teresita T. Bayonla within 30 days from
for a period of two years from the practice of law a
receipt of this Decision the amount of P44,582.67, with
lawyer who had failed to immediately account for and to
interest of 12% per annum from June 22, 1997, and to
return P300,000.00 received from a client for the
render unto the complainant a complete written
purpose of depositing it in court, after the lawyer had
accounting and inventory of: - (a) the amounts she had
been found not to have deposited the money in court.
collected from the Air Transportation Office
as expropriation compensation; (b) the total amount due
to the complainant; (c) the total amount she had actually
remitted to the complainant; and (d) the amount she had
deducted as her contingent fee vis--vis the complainant.

Within the same period of compliance, Atty.

Reyes shall submit to the Court, through the Office of
the Bar Confidant, authentic written proof that her
accounting, inventory, and payment were furnished to
and received by the complainant in due course.

This Decision is without prejudice to any

pending or contemplated proceedings against Atty.
Reyes.

Let this Decision be disseminated to all lower

courts and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, with a
copy of it to be included in Atty. Reyes file in the Office
of the Bar Confidant.

SO ORDERED.
 [ A.C. No. 10483, March 18, 2016 ]
THE CHRISTIAN SPIRITISTS IN THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., PICO LOCAL CENTER,
REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-
FACT, EDWIN A. PANTE, COMPLAINANT, VS.
ATTY. DANIEL D. MANGALLAY, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This administrative case against the respondent attorney
did not arise from any attorney-client relationship gone
wrong between the parties but from the ejectment action
in which the respondent attorney, as the plaintiff,
successfully defeated the local congregation of the
Christian Spiritists in the Philippines, Inc., Pico Local
Center (CSP-PLC), whose church building and other
structures were the objects of the action. After the
defendants filed their notice of appeal, the parties agreed
to settle among themselves, with the defendants
withdrawing the notice of appeal and agreeing to
voluntarily vacate and remove their structures by August
31, 2013 in consideration of the respondent's financial
assistance of P300,000.00. But, despite receiving the
respondent's financial assistance, the defendants reneged
on their end of the agreement; hence, at the respondent's
instance, the trial court issued the writ of execution and
the writ of demolition, by virtue of which the structures
of the defendants were ultimately demolished.
The demolition impelled the CSP-PLC, represented by
its local Minister, Edwin A. Pante (Pante), to bring the
disbarment complaint against the respondent based on
his allegedly gross misconduct and deceit in causing the
demolition of the structures without the demolition order
from the court, violation of the Lawyer's Oath, and
disobedience to a lawful order of the court, positing that
he thereby abused his legal knowledge.
Antecedents
Pante avers that the CSP-PLC constructed its church
building on the land located in JE 176 Pico, La Trinidad,
Benguet, which was owned by Maria Omiles who had
bought it from Larry Ogas;[1] that on June 11, 2012,
Omiles and Pastor Elvis Maliked received the summons
issued by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of La
Trinidad, Benguet requiring them to answer the
complaint for unlawful detainer filed against them by the
respondent; that based on the allegations of the
complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. R-1256
entitled Daniel Dazon Mangallay v. Maria Tomino
Omiles and all persons staying with and/or acting on her
behalf, including all Officers and/or patrons of the
Church of the Christian Spiritists in the Philippines,
represented by Pastor Elvis S. Maliked), the respondent
claimed ownership of the land where the church of the
CSP-PLC had been erected, attaching the copy of
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 45241 issued by
the Register of Deeds of Benguet, and the deed of
absolute sale executed between him and one Pedro
Loy;[2] that the MTC later on decided the case by
declaring the respondent to have the better right of
possession; and that the MTC further declared that the
CSP-PLC was a builder in good faith, without prejudice
to the respondent exercising his option to appropriate the
building in accordance with Article 448 of the Civil
Code.[3]
As earlier mentioned, the respondent sought and
obtained the writ of execution from the MTC after the
defendants, including the complainant, reneged on the
promise to voluntarily vacate and surrender the premises
by August 31, 2013 in consideration of the respondent's
financial assistance of P300,000.00. The writ of
execution was issued on December 13, 2013 and the writ
of demolition on December 19, 2013. Sheriffs Joselito S.
Tumbaga and John Marie O. Ocasla, accompanied by
the respondent and elements of the Philippine National
Police, implemented the writ of execution and writ of
demolition on January 22 and January 23, 2014 by
demolishing the church building and the pastoral house
of the CSP-PLC.[4]
Pante now insists that the demolition was done without a
demolition order from the MTC; that the dismantled
materials worth P462,236.00 were forcibly taken away
by the respondent, who had taken advantage of his legal
knowledge to cause the premature demolition of the
structures sans the demolition order; that such taking
away of the dismantled materials constituted robbery and
malicious mischief; and that his act warranted his
disbarment.
In response, the respondent denies any wrong doing. He
counters that the demolition was backed up by a court
order;[5] that after receiving the decision of the MTC, the
parties entered into a compromise agreement by virtue of
which the CSP-PLC withdrew its appeal and promised to
voluntarily vacate and surrender the disputed premises in
consideration of P300,000.00 to be paid by him;[6] that
despite his having paid the same, the CSP-PLC did not
vacate the premises even within the grace period given
to them;[7] that he then moved for the execution of the
judgment, and his motion was granted by the
MTC;[8] that the sheriffs report dated November 21,
2013[9] stated that after the CSP-PLC did not comply
with the writ of execution to remove or demolish its
structures on the premises; that he consequently sought
from the MTC the writ of demolition; and that the MTC
issued the writ of demolition.[10]
The respondent avers that it was not he but the sheriffs
who implemented the writ of demolition; that the
sheriffs report dated January 30, 2014 stated that the
conduct of the implementation was peaceful, and that
Pante and the other members of the church personally
observed the conduct of the demolition; and that the
sheriffs report further stated that Pante showed no
defiance of the lawful order of the court.[11]
The respondent submits that there was nothing wrong in
his appropriating the dismantled materials to ensure
compensation for the expenses incurred in the
demolition; and that the complaint for his disbarment
should be dismissed.
Ruling of the Court
The complaint for disbarment is absolutely devoid of
merit and substance.
Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, provides as
follows:
Section 1. How Instituted. — Proceedings for the
disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may
be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified
complaint of any person. The complaint shall state
clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall
be supported by affidavits of persons having personal
knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such
documents as may substantiate said facts.
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon
referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter Board of
Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and
prosecute proper charges against erring attorneys
including those in the government service. Provided,
however, That all charges against Justices of the Court of
Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, and Judges of the Court
of Tax Appeals and lower courts, even if lawyers are
jointly charged with them, shall be filed with the
Supreme Court; Provided, further, That charges filed
against Justices and Judges before the IBP, including
those filed prior to their appointment in the Judiciary,
shall immediately be forwarded to the Supreme Court
for disposition and adjudication
Six (6) copies of the verified complaint shall be filed
with the Secretary of the IBP or the Secretary of any of
its chapter who shall forthwith transmit the same to the
IBP Board of Governors for assignment to an
investigator. (As amended, Bar Matter No. 1960, May 1,
2000.)
Under the foregoing rule, the proceedings for the
disbarment, suspension or discipline of an attorney may
be taken by the Court, motu proprio, or by the IBP itself
upon the verified complaint of any person.
Should the disciplinary complaint against the attorney be
filed directly with the Court, the complaint is referred to
the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.
The reference to the IBP is resorted to whenever the
factual basis for the charge may be contested or
disputed, or may require the reception of the evidence of
the complainant and the respondent attorney. After the
referral and hearings, the IBP renders its findings and
recommendations on the complaint, subject to the review
by the Court.[12]Yet, the Court may dispense with the
referral to the IBP and resolve the charge without delay.
This happens particularly when the charge is patently
frivolous, or insincere, or unwarranted, or intended only
to harass and spite the respondent attorney.
The Court has not enunciated any rule that prohibits the
direct filing with it of administrative complaints against
attorneys in order to emphasize its role as the guardian
of the legal profession with the ultimate disciplinary
power over attorneys. The disciplinary power of the
Court is both a right and a duty.[13] Quite recently,
however, the Court has revised Rule 139-B[14] to
eliminate any ambiguity about the authority of the Court
to directly receive administrative complaints against
attorneys, thus:
Section 1. How Instituted. - Proceedings for the
disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may
be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or upon
the filing of a verified complaint of any person before
the Supreme Court or the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP). The complaint shall state clearly and
concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported
by affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of
the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as
may substantiate said facts.
The IBP shall forward to the Supreme Court for
appropriate disposition all complaints for disbarment,
suspension and discipline filed against incumbent
Justices of the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court
of Tax Appeals and judges of lower courts, or against
lawyers in the government service, whether or not they
are charged singly or jointly with other respondents, and
whether or not such complaint deals with acts unrelated
to the discharge of their official functions. If the
complaint is filed before the IBP. six (6) copies of the
verified complaint shall be filed with the Secretary of the
IBP or the Secretary of any of its chapter who shall
forthwith transmit the same to the IBP Board of
Governors for assignment to an investigator.
x x x x
B. PROCEEDINGS IN THE SUPREME COURT
Section 13. Investigation of complaints. - In proceedings
initiated by the Supreme Court, or in other proceedings
when the interest of justice so requires, the Supreme
Court may refer the case for investigation to the
Office of the Bar Confidant, or to any officer of the
Supreme Court or judge of a lower court, in which
case the investigation shall proceed in the same manner
provided in sections 6 to 11 hereof, save that the review
of the report of investigation shall be conducted directly
by the Supreme Court.
The complaint may also be referred to the IBP for
investigation, report, and recommendation, [bold
emphasis supplied to indicate the revisions]
Under the foregoing revisions of Rule 139-B, the
administrative complaints against attorneys are generally
not dismissed outright but are instead referred for
investigation, report and recommendation either to the
IBP, or the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC), or any
office of the Court or even a judge of a lower court. Such
referral ensures that the parties' right to due process is
respected as to matters that require further inquiry and
which cannot be resolved by the mere evaluation of the
documents attached to the pleadings.[15] Consequently,
whenever the referral is made by the Court, the IBP, the
OBC or other authorized office or individual must
conduct the formal investigation of the administrative
complaint, and this investigation is a mandatory
requirement that cannot be dispensed with except for
valid and compelling reasons because it serves the
purpose of threshing out all the factual issues that no
cursory evaluation of the pleadings can determine. [16]
However, the referral to the IBP is not compulsory when
the administrative case can be decided on the basis of the
pleadings filed with the Court, or when the referral to the
IBP for the conduct of formal investigation would be
redundant or unnecessary, such as when the protraction
of the investigation equates to undue delay. Dismissal of
the case may even be directed at the outset should the
Court find the complaint to be clearly wanting in
merit.[17]Indeed, the Rules of Court should not be read as
preventing the giving of speedy relief whenever such
speedy relief is warranted.
It is upon this that we dispense with the need to refer the
complaint against the respondent to the IBP for the
conduct of the formal investigation. The documents he
submitted to substantiate his denial of professional
wrongdoing are part of the records of the trial court, and,
as such, are sufficient to establish the unworthiness of
the complaint as well as his lawful entitlement to the
demolition of the structures of the defendants in Civil
Case No. R-1256.
Specifically, the demolition was authorized by the order
issued by the MTC on December 19, 2013. [18] In the
execution of the final and executory decision in Civil
Case No. R-1256, the sheriffs dutifully discharged their
functions. The presence of the respondent during the
execution proceedings was by no means irregular or
improper, for he was the plaintiff in Civil Case No. R-
1256. The complainant was then represented by Pante
and some other members of the congregation, who did
not manifest any resistance' or objection to any
irregularity in the conduct of the execution. After all,
elements of the Philippine National Police were also
present to ensure the peaceful implementation of the writ
of execution.
Neither do we find anything wrong, least of all criminal,
in the act of the respondent of taking away the materials
of the demolished structures. The parties put an end to
their dispute by the defendants, including the
complainant and Pante, opting to withdraw their notice
of appeal and undertaking to voluntarily vacate and to
peacefully turn over the premises to the respondent by
August 31, 2013 in exchange for the latter's financial
assistance of the P300,000.00. The respondent paid the
amount in the MTC on March 20, 2013, and the amount
was later on received by Maria Omiles, Feliciano
Omiles, Jr., and Noralyn T. Abad as the representatives
of the CSP-PLC on the same day.[19] But the latter
reneged on their part of the agreement without returning
the P300,000.00 to the respondent, who was left to
exhaust his legal remedies to enforce the judgment
against them. It is notable that the judgment expressly
directed him "to exercise his option pursuant to the
provisions of Article 448 of the New Civil Code of the
Philippines within thirty (30) days from the finality of
this judgment insofar as the improvements introduced by
the defendants on the subject property."[20] Article 448 of
the Civil Code granted to him as the owner of the
premises, among others, "the right to appropriate as his
own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the
indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548." His act
of taking the materials of the demolished structures was
undoubtedly the exercise of the right of appropriating
them in light of the fact that the P300,000.00 earlier
delivered as financial assistance was most likely meant
to indemnify the supposed builders in good faith.
The respondent has called attention to the letter of the
Christian Spiritists in the Philippines, Inc.,[21] the mother
organization to which the CSP-PLC belonged, to the
effect that it was disavowing knowledge of or
participation in the disbarment complaint, and that it was
categorically declaring that the complaint had been filed
by Pante only for his personal interest at the expense of
the congregation. The sentiments expressed in the letter
manifested the inanity of the complaint, and the ill
motives behind Pante's filing of the complaint against
the respondent. The proper outcome for such a complaint
is its immediate dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the complaint
for disbarment against Atty. Daniel Dazon Mangallay
for its utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED
ATTY. ARTURO MATURAN v. JUDGE LIZABETH
GUTIERREZ-TORRES

AM OCA IPI No. 04-1606-MTJ

(to be printed separately; pdf file retrievable at

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/september2
012/04-1606-MTJ.pdf)
 Adm. Case No. 9058 : November 14, 2012
ROBERT VICTOR G. SEARES,
JR., Complainant, v. ATTY. SANIATA LIWLIWA V.
GONZALES-ALZATE, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Atty. Saniata Liwliwa V. Gonzales-Alzate is charged
with incompetence and professional negligence, and a
violation of the prohibition against representing
conflicting interests. Complainant Robert Victor G.
Seares, Jr. is her former client.
Seares, Jr. alleges that Atty. Gonzales-Alzate was his
legal counsel when he ran for the position of Municipal
Mayor of Dolores, Abra in the May 2007 elections; that
after he lost by a 50-vote margin to Albert Z. Guzman,
she filed in his behalf a "Petition Of Protest Ad
Cautelam"1ςrνll in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Bangued, Abra; that the petition was dismissed for being
"fatally defective;"2ςrνll that several months later, she
insisted on filing a "Petition of Protest" in the RTC, but
the petition was also dismissed on the ground that it was
already time-barred, and on the further ground of forum
shopping because the certification against forum
shopping was false; that the RTC declared her as
"professionally negligent;"3ςrνllthat he again ran for
Municipal Mayor of Dolores, Abra in the May 2010
elections, and won; that he later learned that his political
opponents retained her as their counsel;4ςrνll that with
him barely two months in office, one Carlito Turqueza
charged him with abuse of authority, oppression and
grave misconduct in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Abra;5ςrνll that she represented Turqueza as
counsel;6ςrνll and that she intentionally made false and
hurtful statements in the memorandum she prepared in
that administrative case in order to attack him.7ςrνll
Seares, Jr. asserts that Atty. Gonzales-Alzate thereby
violated Canon 15, Canon 17 and Canon 18 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility for negligently handling
his election protest, for prosecuting him, her former
client, and for uttering false and hurtful allegations
against him. Hence, he prays that she should be
disbarred.
In her comment,8ςrνll Atty. Gonzales-Alzate denies
the charges of professional negligence and
incompetence, and of representing conflicting interests.
She states that Seares, Jr. solicited her legal services in
the last week of May 2007 because his counsel, Atty.
Yasser Lumbos, informed him that he could not go to
Abra to handle his ad cautelam petition;9ςrνll that
Seares, Jr. and his parents were themselves the ones who
decided not anymore to appeal the dismissal of the ad
cautelam petition despite her advice that an appeal
would likely succeed;10ςrνll that she did not convince
Seares, Jr. to file the second petition because he and his
parents were the ones who insisted on filing the appeal
in disregard of the possibly adverse consequences of
doing so;11ςrνll and that the imputation of negligence
against her based on the trial judges declaration that she
submitted a false certification against forum shopping
was unwarranted, because all that she did was to make
superimpositions in the certification against forum
shopping in order to write the correct dates as well as the
notarial document number and notarial docket page
number for the certification against forum shopping.
Atty. Gonzales-Alzate refutes the charge that she
represented conflicting interests by explaining that: (a)
she was engaged as an attorney in the May 2010
elections only by Dominic Valera (a candidate for
Municipal Mayor of Bangued, Abra) and by President
Aquino, neither of whom was Seares, Jr.s political
opponent;12ςrνll (b) Carlito Turqueza used to be a
political ally of Seares, Jr.;13ςrνll (c) she disclosed to
Turqueza her having once acted as a counsel of Seares,
Jr.;14ςrνll (d) Seares, Jr. did not object to her legal
representation of Turqueza;15ςrνll and (e) the 2007
election protest that she handled for Seares, Jr. was
unrelated to the administrative complaint that Turqueza
brought against Seares, Jr. in 2010.16ςrνll
Issues
To be determined are the following issues, namely:
(a) Was Atty. Gonzales-Alzate guilty of professional
negligence and incompetence in her handling of Seares,
Jr.s electoral protest in the RTC?
(b) Did Atty. Gonzales-Alzate violate the prohibition
against representing conflicting interests when she
assisted Turqueza in his administrative case against
Seares, Jr., her former client?
Ruling
The severity of disbarment or suspension proceedings as
the penalty for an attorneys misconduct has always
moved the Court to treat the complaint with utmost
caution and deliberate circumspection. We have done so
because we must wield the power to disbar or suspend
on the preservative rather than on the vindictive
principle,17ςrνll conformably with our thinking that
disbarment or suspension will be condign and
appropriate only when there is a clear, convincing, and
satisfactory proof of misconduct seriously affecting the
professional standing and ethics of respondent attorney
as an officer of the Court and as a member of the
Bar.18ςrνll
Guided by the foregoing tenets, we dismiss the
disbarment complaint against Atty. Gonzales-Alzate.
I.
Charge of professional negligence and incompetence
is unfounded and devoid of substance
Seares, Jr. insists that Atty. Gonzales-Alzates submission
of a "fatally defective" petition in his election protest
violated Canon 1719ςrνll and Canon 1820ςrνll of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, claiming that her
attaching a "cut-and-paste" certificate of non-forum
shopping to his election protest, which the trial courts
decision described as "professional negligence,"
reflected her lack of diligence and competence as an
attorney because it was fatal to his protest.
The complaint against Atty. Gonzales-Alzate is
unfounded and devoid of substance.
For administrative liability under Canon 18 to attach, the
negligent act of the attorney should be gross21ςrνlland
inexcusable22ςrνll as to lead to a result that was highly
prejudicial to the clients interest.23ςrνll Accordingly,
the Court has imposed administrative sanctions on a
grossly negligent attorney for unreasonable failure to file
a required pleading,24ςrνll or for unreasonable failure
to file an appeal,25ςrνll especially when the failure
occurred after the attorney moved for several extensions
to file the pleading26ςrνll and offered several excuses
for his nonfeasance.27ςrνll The Court has found the
attendance of inexcusable negligence when an attorney
resorts to a wrong remedy,28ςrνll or belatedly files an
appeal,29ςrνll or inordinately delays the filing of a
complaint,30ςrνll or fails to attend scheduled court
hearings.31ςrνll Gross misconduct on the part of an
attorney is determined from the circumstances of the
case, the nature of the act done and the motive that
induced the attorney to commit the act.32ςrνll
Yet, a reading of the June 8, 2007 order of the RTC
(Branch I) in Bangued, Abra shows that the true cause of
the dismissal of Seares, Jr.s "Petition For Protest Ad
Cautelam" was its prematurity in light of the pendency
in the Commission on Elections of his "Petition to
Suspend Canvass and Proclamation."33ςrνll The RTC
cogently held that "(t)he primary objective of this
petition is to pray for the issuance of a Preliminary
Precaution Order xxx (but) a prayer for the issuance of
the protection of ballot boxes, Books and Lists of Voters
and other election paraphernalia in the recently
concluded elections is well within the power of the
Commission on Elections."34ςrνll We see no trace of
professional negligence or incompetence on the part of
Atty. Gonzales-Alzate in her handling of Seares, Jr.s
protest, especially because she even filed in his behalf a
"Motion for Reconsideration,"35ςrνll a "Comment on
the Courts Dismissal of the Protest Ad
Cautelam"36ςrνll and a "Motion to Withdraw Cash
Deposit."37ςrνll Besides, her explanation that it was
Seares, Jr. himself who decided not to pursue the appeal
and who instead requested her to move for the
withdrawal of his cash deposit was very plausible.
Also, we cannot find Atty. Gonzales-Alzate
professionally negligent in respect of the filing and
eventual dismissal of the subsequent "Petition for
Protest." The verification and certification against forum
shopping attached to the petition contained handwritten
superimpositions by Atty. Gonzales-Alzate, but such
superimpositions were apparently made only to reflect
the corrections of the dates of subscription and the
notarial document number and docket number for the
verification and certification. If that was all there was to
the superimpositions, then there was nothing to support
the trial judges observation that the "cut and paste"
method in preparing the verification and certification for
non-forum shopping constituted "professional
negligence" that proved fatal to her clients
protest.38ςrνll As a matter of policy, a court-bound
document or paper prepared in a slipshod manner affects
only the form but not the substance of the submission.
Such slipshod preparation, even assuming it to be true,
would not deserve administrative censure. Not letting
form prevail over substance still remains to be the
judicial ideal.
The foregoing notwithstanding, we doubt the sincerity of
the charge of professional negligence and incompetence.
Had Seares, Jr. been prejudiced by Atty. Gonzales-
Alzates negligent and incompetent handling of his
election protest, we wonder why he would denounce her
only after nearly five years have passed. The motivation
for the charge becomes suspect, and the charge is
thereby weakened all the more.
II.
Charge of representing
conflicting interests is bereft of merit
Seares, Jr. next charges Gonzales-Alzate with violating
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for
supposedly representing conflicting interests when she
took on the administrative complaint that Turqueza
brought against Seares, Jr.
The charge of Seares, Jr. is bereft of merit.
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
prohibits an attorney from representing a party in a
controversy that is either directly or indirectly related to
the subject matter of a previous litigation involving
another client. Relevantly, Rule 15.01, Rule15.02 and
Rule15.03 provide:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Rule 15.01A lawyer, in conferring with a prospective
client, shall ascertain as soon as practicable whether the
matter would involve a conflict with another client or his
own interest, and if so, shall forthwith inform the
prospective client.
Rule 15.02A lawyer shall be bound by the rule on
privilege communication in respect of matters disclosed
to him by a prospective client.
Rule 15.03A lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts.
Atty. Gonzales-Alzates legal representation of Turqueza
neither resulted in her betrayal of the fidelity and loyalty
she owed to Seares, Jr. as his former attorney, nor
invited the suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing
while she was performing her duties as an
attorney.39ςrνll Representing conflicting interests
would occur only where the attorneys new engagement
would require her to use against a former client any
confidential information gained from the previous
professional relation.40ςrνll The prohibition did not
cover a situation where the subject matter of the present
engagement was totally unrelated to the previous
engagement of the attorney.41ςrνll To constitute the
violation, the attorney should be shown to intentionally
use against the former client the confidential information
acquired by her during the previous
employment.42ςrνll But a mere allegation of
professional misconduct would not suffice to establish
the charge, because accusation was not synonymous
with guilt.43ςrνll
As it turned out, the charge of representing conflicting
interests leveled against Atty. Gonzales-Alzate was
imaginary. The charge was immediately unworthy of
serious consideration because it was clear from the start
that Atty. Gonzales-Alzate did not take advantage of her
previous engagement by Seares, Jr. in her legal
representation of Turqueza in the latters administrative
charge against Seares, Jr. There was no indication
whatsoever of her having gained any confidential
information during her previous engagement by Seares,
Jr. that could be used against Seares, Jr. Her engagement
by Seares, Jr. related only to the election protest in 2007,
but Turquezas complaint involved Seares, Jr.s
supposedly unlawful interference in ousting Turqueza as
the president of the Liga ng mga Barangay of Dolores,
Abra in 2010. There is no question that both charges
were entirely foreign to one another.
Moreover, the prohibition against representing
conflicting interests further necessitated identity of the
parties or interests involved in the previous and present
engagements. But such identity was not true here. The
adverse party in Seares, Jr.s election protest in 2007 was
Albert Z. Guzman, the newly-elected Municipal Mayor
of Dolores, Abra, who was not involved in Turquezas
administrative complaint against Seares, Jr. In fact,
Turqueza was not even a mayoral candidate in Dolores,
Abra in the elections held in 2007 and in 2010. The
allegation by Seares, Jr. that Atty. Gonzales-Alzate
represented his political opponent was not even true
because Turqueza was Seares, Jr.s political ally, as Atty.
Gonzales-Alzate stated.
It is notable, too, that Seares, Jr. expressly agreed to
Atty. Gonzales-Alzates legal representation of Turqueza
in the latters administrative case against Seares, Jr. This
is borne out by the affidavit of Turqueza that Atty.
Gonzales-Alzate submitted,44ςrνll the relevant portion
of which follows:
xxx
6. When Mayor Robert Victor Seares arrived, he was
with a black shirt and jeans and the Vice Governor
started the conference asking us if there is a possibility
of amicable settlement. Atty. Ma. Saniata Liwliwa
Gonzales-Alzate first talked and she raised the fact that
in 2007 Mayor Robert Victor Seares was her client in an
election protest and she even said how she represented
him, and Mayor Seares said "wen Attorney (yes
Attorney) and the Atty. Gonzales-Alzate said to all of us
in the said room that she was before the lawyer of Jr.
Seares (Mayor Robert Victor Seares) and now if Jr. will
not oppose it, she will be representing me in the said
administrative case and this time, she will now be a
lawyer against Jr. Seares. The said lawyer was even
smiling when she said that and Jr. Seares (Mayor Robert
Victor Seares) was normally giggling and smiling and
said "wen attorney, awan ti kuak dita, iyabogaduam latta
a, isuna lang a ni kapitan no nya paylang ti kayatna,
nayted la ngarud sueldo nan" (Yes, attorney, I have no
concern with that, you lawyer for him if that is so, I dont
know what the (barangay) captain would still want, his
salary was already released to him.) xxx.
xxx
The Court emphasizes that an attorney enjoys the
presumption of innocence, and whoever initiates
administrative proceedings against the attorney bears the
burden of proof to establish the allegation of
professional misconduct.45ςrνll When the complainant
fails to discharge the burden of proof, the Court has no
alternative but to dismiss the charge and absolve the
attorney.
We find that the administrative complaint against Atty.
Gonzales-Alzate was nothing but an attempt to vex,
harass and humiliate her as well as to get even with her
for representing Turqueza against Seares, Jr. Such an ill-
motivated bid to disbar Atty. Gonzales-Alzate trifles
with the Courts esteem for the members of the Bar who
form one of the solid pillars of Justice in our land. We
cannot tolerate it because attorneys are officers of the
Court who are placed under our supervision and control
due to the law imposing upon them peculiar duties,
responsibilities and liabilities.46ςrνll We exist in a
symbiotic environment with them where their duty to
defend the courts is reciprocated by our shielding them
from vindictive individuals who are deterred by nothing
just to strip them of their privilege to practice law.
In De Leon v. Castelo,47ςrνll we underscored the need
to shield attorneys as officers of the Court from the
mindless assaults intended to vex or harass them in their
performance of duty, stating:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
According to Justice Cardozo, "xxx the fair fame of a
lawyer, however innocent of wrong, is at the mercy of
the tongue of ignorance or malice. Reputation in such a
calling is a plant of tender growth, and its bloom, once
lost, is not easily restored."
A lawyers reputation is, indeed, a very fragile object.
The Court, whose officer every lawyer is, must shield
such fragility from mindless assault by the unscrupulous
and the malicious. It can do so, firstly, by quickly cutting
down any patently frivolous complaint against a lawyer;
and, secondly, by demanding good faith from whoever
brings any accusation of unethical conduct. A Bar that is
insulated from intimidation and harassment is
encouraged to be courageous and fearless, which can
then best contribute to the efficient delivery and proper
administration of justice.48ςrνll
In Lim v. Antonio,49ςrνll we censured the complainant
because revenge and bad faith had motivated him into
filing a baseless complaint against an attorney,
stressing:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The dignity and honor of the profession require that acts
unworthy of membership in the bar should be visited
with the appropriate penalty. The charge against
respondent is of a serious character. If in fact there was
such a violation of the law as charged, he should be duly
penalized. It is quite clear, however, that the complaint is
unfounded. It was the product of ill-will, the desire of
complainant to avenge himself. It certainly was not made
in good faith. If it were so, its dismissal would have
sufficed. To repeat, such is not the case. As the Report
made clear, the complaint arose from a feeling of
resentment, even of hate. To allow complainant to trifle
with the Court, to make use of the judicial process as an
instrument of retaliation, would be a reflection on the
rule of law. He should be held to strict accountability,
considering that this is his second attempt. Such
stubbornness, compounds the gravity of his offense. He
appears to be incorrigible. At the very least, therefore, he
should be censured.50ςrνll

We have often demonstrated our genuine concern for the

members of the Bar, especially those who stand before
our courts as ethical advocates of their clients causes.
We definitely do not tolerate unwarranted and malicious
assaults against their honor and reputation. The Court
issued a stern warning to the complainant attorney in
Dela Victoria v. Orig-Maloloy-on51ςrνll for filing an
unfounded complaint against a clerk of court, and found
the complainant attorney in contempt of court and
deserving of a P2,000.00 fine. But a stiffer penalty of
P5,000.00 was imposed on the complainant attorneys in
Prieto v. Corpuz52ςrνlland Arnado v.
Suarin ςrνll because their complaints against a judge
53

and a court sheriff, respectively, were found to be

baseless.

Considering the circumstances attendant here, the Court

deems it sufficient for now to merely admonish Seares,
Jr., but sternly warns him that he shall be dealt with
more severely should he commit a similar act against a
member of the Bar.ςηαοblενιrυαllαωlιbrαr

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the

administrative complaint against Atty. Saniata Liwliwa
V. Gonzales-Alzate for utter lack of merit; and
ADMONISHES Robert Victor G. Seares, Jr. for filing
the malicious complaint, WITH STERN WARNING
that a repetition shall be dealt with more severely as
indirect contempt of the Court.ςrαlαωlιbrαr

SO ORDERED.
 MAYOR BALINDONG v. CA
GR No. 177600,
LIMBONA v. HON. JUDGE BALUT OF RTC
BRANCH 76, GR No. 178684, OCT 19 2015
BERSAMIN, J.:
The issuance by the trial court of the warrant of arrest
upon filing of the information and supporting papers
implies the determination of probable cause for the
offense charged. It is then superfluous for the accused to
seek the judicial determination of probable cause on the
pretext that the trial court should still act and proceed
independently of the executive determination of
probable cause to charge the proper offense.
The Case
Before us are the consolidated cases of G.R. No. 177600
and G.R. No. 178684. G.R. No. 177600 involves the
appeal by petition for review on certiorari of Mayor
Anwar Berua Balindong, Lt. Col. Jalandoni Cota, Mayor
Amer Oden Balindong, and Ali Balindong
(Balindong, et al.) to assail the Decision promulgated on
April 24, 2007 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 97121.[1] G.R. No. 178684 relates to
the Petition (To Show Cause Why Respondent Should
Not Be Held in Contempt of Court)[2]brought by Zenaida
M. Limbona (Limbona), the private complainant in the
criminal cases instituted against Balindong, et al.,
charging Presiding Judge Alexander S. Balut of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 76, in Quezon City
with contempt of court for issuing the order dated July
16, 2007 suspending the proceedings in the criminal
cases involving Balindong, et al. out of judicial
courtesy.[3]
Antecedents
The CA's decision being assailed in CA-G.R. SP No.
97121 rendered the following factual antecedents, to wit:
The long-drawn controversy now raised in the instant
petition was instigated by a shooting incident that took
place in Poblacion, Malabang, Lanao del Sur on May 11,
1998 that resulted in the death of Dante Limbona and
Ante Maguindanao, and the serious wounding of Azis
Panda and Kiri Hadji Salik. In the course of the
preliminary investigation the investigating prosecutor
found probable cause to charge private respondents Lt.
Col. Jalandoni D. Cota, Anwar Berua Balindong,
PO1 Kennedy Balindong, Amer Oden
Balindong and Ali Sarip Balindong with Double
Murder with Multiple Frustrated Murder.
The Information was thereupon filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, Branch 12.
However, after reinvestigation ordered by the trial court,
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor downgraded the
charges against private respondents Lt. Col. Jalandoni
D. Cota, Anwar Berua Balindong and Kennedy
Balindong and dropped the charges against Amer Oden
Balindong and Ali Balindong. Private complainant
Zenaida Limbona, the widow of the victim Dante
Limbona, filed a petition for review questioning the
Provincial Prosecutor's 28 August 1998
Resolution before the Department of Justice (DOJ). In a
4 August 1999 Resolution, then Secretary Serafin
Cuevas modified the assailed resolution and directed the
Provincial Prosecutor to file instead "two (2)
informations for frustrated murder with attempted
murder, two (2) informations for frustrated murder and
an information for attempted murder" against private
respondents. Subsequently, in a 1 December 1999
Resolution, Secretary Cuevas denied private
respondents' Motion for Reconsideration in this wise:
"The matters raised in the instant motion for
reconsideration have been taken into consideration in
arriving at our resolution, hence, we find no cogent
reason to reconsider the same.
In view, however, of the Supplemental Manifestation
filed by Prosecutor Ringcar B. Pinote on October 19,
1999, the dispositive portion of our resolution dated
August 4, 1999 is hereby modified to read as follows:
xxx WHEREFORE, your resolution is hereby modified.
You are directed to file two (2) informations for murder
with attempted murder, two (2) informations for
frustrated murder and an information for attempted
murder against respondents Datu Anwar Berua
Balindong, Lt. Col. Jalandoni Cota, PO1 Kennedy
Macaborod Balindong, Datu Amer-Oden Sarip
Balindong and Datu Ali Sarip Balindong. Report your
compliance within ten (10) days from receipt hereof x x
x"
The corresponding Amended Informations were
accordingly filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Maguindanao, Cotabato City and docketed as Criminal
Case Nos. 2503, 2573, 2574, 2575 and 2576. Private
respondents, in the meantime, filed a second Motion for
Reconsideration, which the succeeding DOJ Secretary
Artemio G. Tuquero in a 16 March 2000
Resolution denied "with finality and with warning that
no further pleadings will be entertained". Undeterred by
the tenor of the denial of their second motion for
reconsideration, they filed a Third Motion for
Reconsideration that was eventually granted by the new
DOJ Secretary Hernando B. Perez in a 12 March 2001
Resolution. Private complainants sought reconsideration
thereof but the same was subsequently denied in a 24
July 2001 Resolution, prompting them to bring the
matter before the Court of Appeals in a petition for
certiorari docketed as C.A. G.R. SP No. 66858. In a 22
May 2003 Decision, the Court of Appeals set aside the
assailed issuances of DOJ Secretary Perez and reinstated
the 4 August 1999, 1 December 1999 and 16 March
2000 DOJ Resolutions, in due time denying private
respondents' Motion for Reconsideration in a 23
September 2003 Resolution.
Later, Criminal Case Nos. 2503 and 2573 were re-raffled
to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
Branch 219 and re-docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-
01-998992-93 [sic], Q-01-100542-43 and Q-01-100594.
Then, pursuant to the 22 May 2003 Decision of the Court
of Appeals, the RTC-Branch 219 issued a resolution
finding probable cause to charge private respondents
for Murder with Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No.
Q-01-998992-93 [sic], Frustrated Murder in Criminal
Case No. Q-01-100542-43, and Attempted Murderin
Criminal Case No. Q-01-100594. The warrants of arrest
were accordingly issued against private respondents,
who, undaunted, went up to the Supreme Court to
question the Decision of the Court of Appeals by way of
a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No.
159962. Soon after, the Supreme Court promulgated
therein its 16 December 2004 Decision, the dispositive
portion of which states:
"WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 22 May 2003
which annulled the DOJ Resolution dated March 12,
2001 and reinstated its Resolutions issued on 04 August
1999, 01 December 1999 and 16 March 2000 is
AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued
on 18 February 2004 by this Court is hereby LIFTED,
and the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
219, is ORDERED to implement its Resolution dated 03
December 2003 relative to the issuance of warrants of
arrest against all the accused. The said court is directed
to submit a report thereon within ten (10) days from
receipt hereof."
Private respondents filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but the same was denied with finality as
the Supreme Court declared in its 6 June 2005
Resolution that "there is no longer any obstacle to the
implementation of the existing warrants of arrest".
Despite the categorical pronouncement, however, private
respondents adamantly filed another motion purportedly
for clarification of the 16 December 2004 Decision but
which was in fact an attempt to have the High Court
order a re-determination by the trial court of the
appropriate crime with which to charge private
respondents. In the 14 August 2005 Resolution, the
Supreme Court ruled thus:
"The Court Resolves to (a) EXPUNGE from the records
of this case petitioners' urgent motion for clarification
dated June 25, 2005, xxx; and
(b) ADMONISH petitioners and their counsel to pay
heed to the directives of this Court and against
misrepresenting the import of its rulings and to desist
from any further unauthorized pleadings UNDER PAIN
OF CONTEMPT."
The 16 December 2006 Decision of the Supreme Court
became final and executory on July 5, 2005.
Subsequently, due to the inhibition of the presiding
judge of the RTC-Branch 219 the criminal cases were
raffled to RTC-Branch 100, whose presiding judge was
expressly ordered by the Supreme Court to enforce the
warrants of arrest against private respondents with
utmost dispatch in a 12 December 2005 Resolution.
After issuing the Order relative to the enforcement of the
warrants of arrest against private respondents, however,
the presiding judge of the RTC-Branch 100 inhibited
herself as well from hearing the criminal cases and the
same were re-raffled anew to the RTC-Branch 83,
presided by respondent Judge Ralph S. Lee.
Private respondents then filed before RTC-Branch 83
a Motion to Re-Determine the Existence or Non-
Existence of Probable Cause Which May Even Warrant
Dismissal - Even of the Appropriate Charges of
Homicide, Frustrated and Attempted Homicides. Private
complainants, on the other hand, moved for respondent
Judge Lee's inhibition when the latter failed to act upon a
motion for the issuance of Alias Warrants of Arrest.
However, prior to voluntarily inhibiting himself from the
subject criminal cases, respondent Judge Lee issued the
assailed 12 May 2006 Order granting private
respondents' motion for redetermination of probable
cause and consequently ordering the downgrading of the
crimes charged. The cases were then re-raffled to RTC-
Branch 77, presided by respondent Judge Vivencio S.
Baclig, who then issued the second assailed 18 October
2006 Order denying a Motion for Reconsideration of
the 12 May 2006 Order issued by respondent Judge Lee
and setting the arraignment on November 3, 2006.
Private complainants filed a motion for the voluntary
inhibition of respondent Judge Baclig, who later denied
said motion and re-set the arraignment on December 11,
2006 in the 22 November 2006 Order.[4]
Aggrieved by the orders issued on May 12, 2006 and
October 18, 2006, respectively, by Judge Ralph S. Lee
and Judge Vivencio S. Baclig, the State, through the
Office of Solicitor General, commenced a special civil
action for certiorari in the CA (CA-G.R. SP No. 97121),
alleging that:
RESPONDENT JUDGES COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE
ASSAILED MAY 12, 2006 AND OCTOBER 18, 2006
ORDERS.[5]
On November 20, 2006, the Court promulgated its
Decision in G.R. No. 173290 adjudging Judge Lee and
Balindong, et al. guilty of indirect contempt,[6] viz.:
In the present case, private respondents are guilty of
indirect contempt for filing the following:
Urgent Motion for Clarification of the dispositive
(1)portion of the December 16, 2004 Decision in G.R.
No. 159962;
Motion for Determination of Probable Cause and/or
Motion to Dismiss the Case and to Quash Warrant of
Arrest (with prayer for suspension of the enforcement
(2)
of warrant of arrest pending hearing) filed on
September 1, 2005 before Branch 100 of the RTC of
Quezon City presided by Judge Christine Jacob;
Motion for Reconsideration of Judge Jacob's January
(3)4, 2006 Order denying their motion dated September
1, 2005 filed on January 24, 2006;
Motion to Re-Determine the Existence or Non-
Existence of Probable Cause Which May Even
(4)Warrant Dismissal - Even of the Appropriate Charges
of Homicide, Frustrated and Attempted Homicide
filed before Branch 83 on February 21, 2006.
The December 16, 2004 Decision of the Court in G.R.
No. 159962 clearly sustained the filing of two
Informations for Murder with Attempted Murder, two
Informations for Frustrated Murder and an Information
for Attempted Murder against private respondents. The
Court even directed the implementation of the arrest
warrants against them. This, notwithstanding, private
respondents filed a motion for determination of probable
cause and/or dismissal of the case against them. Worse,
this was done after being admonished by the Court to
pay heed to its directives under pain of contempt.
With the finality of this Court's Decision, all issues
relative to the determination of the proper offenses with
which to charge private respondents had been laid to
rest. In continuing to file pleadings and motions
purportedly seeking for the clarification of the proper
charges against them, respondents merely rehashed their
tired arguments and unavailing assertions. They did not
only succeed in delaying the conduct of the trial of the
aforesaid cases but also willfully and deliberately flouted
this Court's directives with their stubborn refusal to
abide by our pronouncement and their incessant nit-
picking of issues already resolved with finality.
In granting respondents' motions for reconsideration and
re-determination of probable cause, and consequently
down-grading the charges against respondents in his
Order dated May 12, 2006, Judge Lee contravened this
Court's directive in G.R. No. 159962 and in the subject
Resolutions. He impudently substituted his own
judgment for that of this Court. Had he thoroughly
reviewed the records of the case, it would have been
impossible for him to misread the import of said
Decisions and Resolutions.[7]
Thereafter, Judge Lee inhibited from the criminal cases,
which were re-assigned to Branch 91 the RTC, presided
by Judge Lita Tolentino-Genilo, who, on May 24, 2007,
issued an order: (a) reinstating the charges against
Balindong, et al. for two counts of murder with
attempted murder, two counts of frustrated murder, and
one count of attempted murder to conform with the
decision promulgated in G.R. No. 159962; (b)
issuing alias warrants of arrest against them; and (c)
inhibiting herself from further hearing the
cases.[8] Subsequently, the criminal cases were re-raffled
to Branch 76, whose Presiding Judge was respondent
Judge Alexander S. Balut.
Aggrieved by the dispositions of Judge Tolentino-
Genilo, Balindong, et al. filed their Motion for
Reconsideration and/or Recall Suspend Order of
Arrest.[9] As the new trial judge, however, Judge Balut
opted to defer action to await the Court's ruling in G.R.
No. 177600.[10] He further suspended the enforcement of
the alias warrants issued for the arrest of Balindong, et
al.[11] Hence, Limbona commenced G.R. No. 178684.
On April 24, 2007, the CA promulgated its ruling in CA-
G.R. SP No. 97121,[12] disposing:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
hereby GRANTED. The 12 May 2006 Order of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 83, as well
as, the 18 October 2006 Order of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 77
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.[13]
The CA declared the assailed orders of Judge Lee and
Judge Baclig to be in clear defiance of the Court's
decision in G.R. No. 159962.[14] It pronounced that
Judge Lee erred in opining that the Court had only
sustained in G.R. No. 159962 the executive
determination of probable cause by the DOJ, and had not
touched on what appropriate crimes should have been
charged against Balindong, et al.;[15] and that Judge
Baclig similarly erred in holding that the Court "did not
prohibit the trial judge from determining the appropriate
crime to be filed against the accused [once] the cases
were brought to his sala."[16] It pointed out that:
There are no two ways to construe the 16 December
2004 Decision of the Supreme Court relative the
appropriate charges to be filed against private
respondents. In upholding the Court of Appeals' ruling
that the DOJ should not have entertained a third motion
for reconsideration, the Supreme Court did not merely
touch upon a procedural infirmity but ruled further on
private respondents' material objections to the propriety
of the murder charge against them. x x x
x x x x
To reiterate the rule, determination of qualifying
circumstances is a matter of evidence. Thus, as pointed
out by petitioner, by arbitrarily downgrading the original
charge from murder, frustrated murder and attempted
murder to homicide, frustrated homicide and attempted
homicide, respondent Judge Lee effectively denied the
prosecution the opportunity to prove the attendance of
qualifying circumstances in a fullblown trial.[17]
The CA took note of the ruling of the Court in G.R. No.
173290, which said in part:
Finally, whatever other grounds for opposition raised by
private respondents in their Comment to the
Petition and Rejoinder to Petitioner's Reply, the
resolution of this case has been simplified by the
promulgation of the Supreme Court 20 November 2006
Decision in the petition for indirect contempt filed
against private respondents. In granting private
respondents' motion for reconsideration and re-
detcrmination of probable cause, and consequently
downgrading the charges, the Supreme Court found
respondent Judge Lee guilty of indirect contempt for
having clearly contravened the Court's directive in G.R.
No. 159962 and impudently substituting his own
judgment for that of the Court. It further found private
respondents' persistent attempts to raise issues long
settled by a final and executory judgment a
contumacious defiance of the Court's authority. x x x
x x x x
Accordingly, private respondents have been penalized
for their contumacious acts and the issue concerning the
proper crimes with which they should be charged has
been laid to rest.[18]
Balindong, et al. have appealed the CA's decision in CA-
G.R. SP No. 97121 (G.R. No. 177600).
Issues
In G.R. No. 177600, Balindong, et al. submit the
following issue:
WHETHER OR NOT AFTER THE EXHAUSTION OF
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION WHICH
REACHED THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE BY
WAY OF PETITION FOR REVIEW, TO THE COURT
OF APPEALS AND ULTIMATELY TO THIS
HONORABLE COURT (IN G.R. NO. 159962), AND
AFTER THE PROSECUTION'S STAND
SUSTAINING THE ORIGINAL INFORMATIONS
FOR MURDER, FRUSTRATED AND ATTEMPTED
HAD BEEN MADE FINAL AND EXECUTORY, THE
RTC - COURT (A COURT OF GENERAL
JURISDICTION) AND/OR YOUR PETITIONERS
ACCUSED, ARE PRECLUDED/ PROHIBITED
FROM INVOKING SECTION 14, RULE 110 OR
SECTION 19, RULE 119 OF THE 2000 REVISED
RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ESPECIALLY
SINCE IT WAS MADE FOR THE FIRST TIME
AFTER YOUR PETITIONERS' EXECUTIVE
REMEDY FROM TFIE PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION TO A PETITION FORE REVIEW
(BEFORE THE DOJ), THE APPELLATE COURT
AND THIS HONORABLE COURT WAS
EXHAUSTED AND NOTHING MORE.[19]
In G.R. No. 178684, Limbona raises as the sole ground
for her petition to cite in contempt of court Judge Balut
and Balindong, et al. that:
Petitioner respectfully submits the foregoing acts of
Respondent in willfully disobeying the decision and
resolutions issued by the Hon. Supreme Court in G.R.
No. 159962 and G.R. 173290 (sic), which tend to
impede upon or obstruct the administration of justice,
constitutes an indirect contempt which ought to be
punished.[20]
Rulings of the Court
G.R. No. 177600
The petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 177600
is denied for being bereft of merit.
Despite conceding that the Decision promulgated in G.R.
No. 159962 had long become final and
executory,[21] Balindong, et al. insist that they were not
precluded from still seeking from the RTC as the trial
court the judicial determination of probable cause
against them because all that the Court had upheld in
G.R. No. 159962 was only the executive determination
of probable cause. They argue that the Court did not
thereby prevent their resort to available judicial
remedies, like filing the proper motions for the judicial
determination of probable cause in the trial
court,[22] anchoring their argument on Section 14, Rule
110, in relation to Section 19, Rule 119, both of
the Rules of Court
The insistence of Balindong, et al. is legally
unwarranted.
To recall, G.R. No. 159962 was an appeal by
Balindong, et al. to review the judgment the CA had
promulgated on May 22, 2003: (a) granting the petition
for certiorari of Limbona; (b) setting aside DOJ
Resolution issued on March 12, 2001 by then Secretary
of Justice Hernando Perez favorably acting on
the third motion for reconsideration of Balindong, et al.
relative to the proper offenses to be charged against them
despite the denial with finality of
their first and second motions for reconsideration; and
(c) reinstating the DOJ Resolutions dated August 4,
1999, December 1, 1999 and March 16, 2000 issued by
the predecessors of Secretary Perez.[23] It is noted that in
his assailed Resolution of March 12, 2001, Secretary of
Justice Perez had dropped Amer Oden Balindong and
Ali S. Balindong from the informations, and had directed
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Lanao del Sur
"to cause the filing of the amended information for
double homicide with multiple frustrated homicide
against Mayor Anwar Berua Balindong, Lt. Col.
Jalandoni Cota and PO1 Kennedy Balindong."[24]
In granting the petition for certiorari of Limbona, the
CA declared that Secretary of Justice Perez had
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, firstly, by totally disregarding
the clear provision of Section 13 of DOJ Circular No. 70
(governing appeals) prohibiting second or further
motions for reconsideration; and, secondly, by acting on
and granting the third motion for reconsideration despite
the grounds relied upon by Balindong, et al. being
previously raised in the first and second motions for
reconsideration and being already fully passed upon by
his predecessors in office in the guise of serving the
interest of justice and as an exception to Section 13 of
DOJ Circular No. 70.
The Court disposed in G.R. No. 159962 as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 22 May 2003
which annulled the DOJ Resolution dated 12 March
2001 and reinstated its Resolutions issued on 04 August
1999, 01 December 1999 and 16 March 2000 is
AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued
on 18 February 2004 by this Court is hereby LIFTED,
and the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
219, is ORDERED to implement its Resolution dated 03
December 2003 relative to the issuance of warrants of
arrest against all the accused. The said Court is directed
to submit a report thereon within ten (10) days from
receipt hereof.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Department
of Justice for its information and appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.[25]
The language and meaning of the Decision promulgated
in G.R. No. 159962, that the proper criminal charges
against Balindong, et al. were two counts of murder
with attempted murder, two counts of frustrated
murder, and one count of attempted murder, were
clear and forthright enough to require elaboration.
Accordingly, the Court, by thereby ordering the RTC "to
implement its Resolution dated 03 December 2003
relative to the issuance of warrants of arrest against all
the accused," did not need to dwell specifically on the
judicial determination of probable cause independently
of the executive determination. We should remind that
the trial judge, by issuing the warrants of arrest, already
found the existence of probable cause against
Balindong, et al. Indeed, the act of issuing the warrant of
arrest upon filing of the information and supporting
papers implied that the judge has determined the
existence of probable cause for the offenses charged. It
is then superfluous for the accused to seek the judicial
determination of probable cause on the pretext that the
trial court should still act and proceed independently of
the executive determination of probable cause to charge
the proper offense. Rule 112 of the Rules of
Courtrelevantly provides:
Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. — (a) By the
Regional Trial Court. — Within ten (10) days from the
filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall
personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and
its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the
case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall
issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the
accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant
issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary
investigation when the complaint or information was
filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt
on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order
the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five
(5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by
the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the
complaint or information. (bold emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Moreover, Balindong, et al. could not reasonably
support their position that they could still have the trial
court determine the existence of probable cause in their
criminal cases independently of the executive
determination of probable cause by the DOJ by relying
on Section 14, Rule 110, in relation to Section 19, Rule
119, both of the Rules of Court.
Section 14 of Rule 110 states:
Section 14. Amendment or substitution. — A complaint
or information may be amended, in form or in substance,
without leave of court, at any time before the accused
enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a
formal amendment may only be made with leave of
court and when it can be done without causing prejudice
to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which
downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or
excludes any accused from the complaint or information,
can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with
notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The
court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and
copies of its order shall be furnished all parties,
especially the offended party. (n)
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake
has been made in charging the proper offense, the
court shall dismiss the original complaint or information
upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense
in accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided the
accused would not be placed in double jeopardy. The
court may require the witnesses to give bail for their
appearance at the trial. (14a) (bold emphasis supplied)
Ostensibly, Section 14, supra, applies only to a situation
in which there has been a mistake on the part of public
prosecutor in charging the proper offense.
It becomes logical to ask: Did the public prosecutor
make a mistake in charging the proper offenses against
Balindong, et al.?
The answer is no.
There was no mistake in charging the proper offenses.
Balindong, et al. fully exhausted the procedure to
determine the proper offenses to be charged against them
by going all the way up to the Secretary of Justice. Their
quest was ultimately settled with finality by the
Secretary of Justice denying their second motion for
reconsideration and declaring that such offenses were
two counts of murder with attempted murder, two counts
of frustrated murder, and one count of attempted murder.
They thereafter attempted to undo such final
determination by filing a third motion for
reconsideration in the DOJ, and they initially succeeded
because Secretary Perez directed the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Lanao del Sur "to cause the
filing of the amended information for double homicide
with multiple frustrated homicide against Mayor Anwar
Berua Balindong, Lt. Col. Jalandoni Cota and PO1
Kennedy Balindong," and dropped Amer Oden
Balindong and Ali S. Balindong from the informations.
But their success was overturned by the CA, whose
nullification of Secretary Perez's favorable action on
their third motion for reconsideration was affirmed in
G.R. No. 159962. Thus, this Court even issued its
judicial imprimatur on the probable cause for two counts
of murder with attempted murder, two counts of
frustrated murder, and one count of attempted murder.
For Balindong, et al. to rely on Section 14, supra, as
basis for the RTC to still reach a determination of
probable cause different from those sanctioned in G.R.
No. 159962 would be untenable.
G.R. No. 178684
We next deal with the contempt charge of Limbona
against Judge Balut who, by his order of July 16, 2007,
deferred action on the Motion for Reconsideration
and/or Recall Suspend Order of Arrest of Balindong, et
al., and suspended the enforcement of the alias warrants
of arrest.[26]
Limbona claims that Judge Balut's actions constituted a
disobedience to the decisions of the Court in G.R. No.
159962 and G.R. No. 173290 because the suspension of
the enforcement of the alias warrants of arrest "has a
predilection to put the dignity of the [Court] in disrepute,
obstruct the administration of justice, or interfere with
the disposition or (sic) the court's business in the
performance of its function in an orderly
manner."[27] She also points out that the "order to
suspend the enforcement of the said warrants has the
same effect of a temporary restraining order,"[28] which,
in effect, "pre-empted the [Court's] resolution of the
prayer for the issuance of the temporary restraining
order/injunction."[29]
Let us also look at Judge Balut's order of July 16, 2007,
in which he stated as follows:
Without necessarily addressing the merit of the motion,
that is, whether or not the alias warrants of arrest issued
against the accused should be recalled or set aside, and
to avert any conflicting determinations on the matter at
hand, the Court deems it but prudent to defer any action
hereto considering that the accused's petition for review
in G.R. No. 177600 assailing the Court of Appeals'
judgment in CA-G.R. SP No. 97121, which precipitated
the issuance of the order of arrest sought to be
reconsidered/recalled by herein accused, is still pending
before the Honorable Supreme Court for final
determination.
In the meantime, while awaiting resolution of the said
petition for review in G.R. No. 177600, the enforcement
of the alias warrants of arrest, dated May 25, 2007,
issued against the accused is hereby suspended. [30]
Judge Balut has justified his actions by invoking judicial
courtesy and asserting his judicial discretion on the
matters in question, to wit:
As a backgrounder, five (5) consolidated criminal cases
were filed charging the accused Mayor Anwar Berua
Balindong et al. with murder with attempted murder,
frustrated murder and attempted murder. Thereafter, a
legal battle ensued concerned mainly on what is the
appropriate crime with which to charge the accused.
After several years of legal haggling, flip-flopping of
charges and the inhibition of five (5) trial judges, these
cases finally landed in the undersigned's sala with a
pending incident: the accused's MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION AND/OR RECALL SUSPEND
ORDER OF ARREST. Conscientious of his duty to
dispose of pending incidents with dispatch, the
undersigned, fully aware that any resolution of the said
incident would spark controversy, which would
necessarily entail another series of legal maneuverings
resulting in the further delay of the disposition of these
cases, resolved to withhold action thereon and deemed it
best to observe judicial courtesy and await this
Honorable Court's determination of the accused's
petition for review in G.R. No. 177600.
No less than the imperative of judicial courtesy impelled
the undersigned Presiding Judge to issue the order dated
July 16, 2007. A PETITION FOR REVIEW assailing
the Court of Appeals' Decision reversing and setting
aside the May 12, 2006 Order of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City (Branch 83), as well as the
October 18, 2006 Order of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City (Branch 77) is pending before this
Honorable Court. It is to be recalled that in the May 12,
2006 Order, Judge Ralph S. Lee downgraded the
offenses charged in the informations from Murder with
Attempted Murder, Frustrated Murder and Attempted
Murder, to Double Homicide with Attempted Homicide,
Multiple Frustrated Homicide and Attempted Homicide,
respectively. In the October 18, 2006 Order, Judge
Vivencio S. Baclig denied the prosecution's MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION thereof. In ordering the
suspension of the enforcement of the alias warrants of
arrest dated May 25, 2007, the undersigned, not
unmindful of the Decision dated December 16, 2004 in
G.R. No. 159962, the two Resolutions dated June 6,
2005 and December 12, 2005, and the Decision dated
November 20, 2006 in G.R. No. 173290, merely
exercised his judicial discretion. He most respectfully
submits that the issuance of the Order downgrading the
offenses is a supervening fact which now divides the
procedural antecedents of the case, i.e, "prior to the
order dated May 12, 2006" and "after said order". Prior
to the order, this Honorable Court in ordering the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 219) to
implement its Resolution dated December 3, 2003
relative to the issuance of warrants of arrest against all
the accused, resolved that there is no longer any obstacle
to the implementation of the existing warrants of arrest,
and ordered Judge Marie Christine A. Jacob (Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 100) to enforce the warrants of arrest against the
petitioners on December 3, 2004 with utmost dispatch.
In this stage, there could certainly be no question or
issue as to the enforcement of the warrants of arrest. The
Court indeed spoke with finality. However, "after the
Order, " where the undersigned is, another issue
evolved, which issue is still pending final determination
by the Honorable Court. The foundation for this
Honorable Court's issuances, "before the order" could
not be said to be the same judicial foundation now,
"after the order," as to hold the undersigned for
contempt in suspending the enforcement of the warrants
of arrest. The legal milieu has changed. x x x [31]
It is clear that Judge Balut did not thereby disobey the
decisions of the Court in G.R. No. 159962 and G.R. No.
173290. To start with, there was no indication in his
Order that bad faith had moved him to suspend the
implementation of the warrants of arrest against
Balindong, et al., or that he had thereby acted with a
willful and deliberate intent to disobey or to ignore the
Court's bidding, or to cause injustice to any of the
parties. In the absence of the clear showing of bad faith
on his part, his being prudent could only be an error of
judgment, for which he could not be held to account.
Secondly, the history of the criminal cases, from the
transfer of venue at the behest of Secretary Tuquero
from Cagayan de Oro to Quezon City; to the successive
inhibitions of several RTC Judges; to the succession of
petitions for certiorari bearing on the handling of the
criminal cases brought to the higher courts, including
this Court,[32] must have probably persuaded Judge Balut
to tread the path of prudence and caution. Indeed, he
expressed in his Order of July 16, 2007 the desire "to
avert any conflicting determinations" pending the
promulgation of the Court's Decision in G.R. No.
177600. And, thirdly, his actuations were entirely
different from those of Judge Lee's, who downgraded the
offenses from two counts of murder with attempted
murder, two counts of frustrated murder, and one count
of attempted murder to double homicide with multiple
frustrated homicide, and ordered the issuance of the
warrants of arrest for such downgraded offenses. Judge
Lee thereby directly contradicted the ruling in G.R. No.
159962.
Contempt of court is defined in jurisprudence in this
manner:
Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the
Court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and
dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or
disobedience of the courts orders, but such conduct
which tends to bring the authority of the court and the
administration of law into disrepute or in some manner
to impede the due administration of justice. Contempt of
court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of
the court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority
and administration of the law into disrespect or to
interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their
witnesses during litigation.[33]
The contempt power of the courts has been discussed
in Sison v. Caoibes, Jr.,[34] to wit:
Thus, the power to declare a person in contempt of court
and in dealing with him accordingly is an inherent power
lodged in courts of justice, to be used as a means to
protect and preserve the dignity of the court, the
solemnity of the proceedings therein, and the
administration of justice from callous misbehavior,
offensive personalities, and contumacious refusal to
comply with court orders. Indeed, the power of contempt
is power assumed by a court or judge to coerce
cooperation and punish disobedience, disrespect or
interference with the courts orderly process by exacting
summary punishment. The contempt power was given to
the courts in trust for the public, by tradition and
necessity, in as much as respect for the courts, which are
ordained to administer the laws which are necessary to
the good order of society, is as necessary as respect for
the laws themselves.[35]
Verily, the power of the courts to punish for contempt is
to be exercised cautiously, sparingly, and
judiciously.[36] Self-restraint in wielding contempt
powers should be the rule unless the act complained of is
clearly contumacious. An act, to be contumacious, must
manifest willfulness, bad faith, or deliberate intent to
cause injustice.[37]

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for

review on certiorari in G.R. No.
177600; DISMISSES the petition for contempt in G.R.
No. 178684; AFFIRMS theDecision promulgated on
April 24, 2007 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 97121; and ORDERS the petitioners in G.R. No.
177600 to pay the costs of suit.

The Regional Trial Court, Branch 76, in Quezon City

is DIRECTED to forthwith resume the proceedings in
Criminal Case No. Q-01-99892, Criminal Case No. Q-
01-99893, Criminal Case No. Q-01-100542, Criminal
Case No. Q-01-100543 and Criminal Case No. Q-01-
100594; and to report its compliance with this decision
within 30 days from notice.

SO ORDERED.
 [ ADM. CASE NO. 9612, March 13, 2013 ]
JOHNNY M. PESTO, COMPLAINANT, VS.
MARCELITO M. MILLO, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
An attorney who conceals his inefficiency and lack of
diligence by giving wrong information to his client
regarding the matter subject of their professional
relationship is guilty of conduct unbecoming an officer
of the Court. He thereby violates his Lawyer's Oath to
conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well
to the courts as to his client. He also thereby violates
Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, by which he is called upon to serve his
client with competence and diligence.
Antecedents
In this administrative case, Johnny Pesto (Johnny), a
Canadian national, charged Atty. Marcelito M. Millo
with conduct unbecoming an officer of the Court,
misleading his client, bungling the transfer of title, and
incompetence and negligence in the performance of his
duty as a lawyer.
Johnny averred that in May 1990, his wife Abella Pesto
(Abella) retained the services of Atty. Millo to handle
the transfer of title over a parcel of land to her name, and
the adoption of her niece, Arvi Jane Dizon;[1] that Johnny
and Abella gave to Atty. Millo the amounts of
P14,000.00 for the transfer of title[2] and P10,000.00 for
the adoption case;[3] that Atty. Millo thereafter
repeatedly gave them false information and numerous
excuses to explain his inability to complete the transfer
of title; that Atty. Millo likewise made them believe that
the capital gains tax for the property had been paid way
back in 1991, but they found out upon their return to the
country in February 1995 that he had not yet paid the
tax; that when they confronted him, Atty. Millo insisted
that he had already paid the same, but he could not
produce any receipt for the supposed payment; that Atty.
Millo reluctantly returned to Abella the amount of
P14,000.00 only after he stormed out of Atty. Millo's
office in exasperation over his stalling tactics; and that
Atty. Millo then further promised in writing to assume
the liability for the accrued penalties. [4]
Likewise, Johnny blamed Atty. Millo for letting the
adoption case be considered closed by the Tarlac office
of the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(Tarlac DSWD) due to two years of inaction. He stated
that Atty. Millo made him and his wife believe that an
interview with the Tarlac DSWD had been scheduled on
February 14, 1995, but when they arrived at the Tarlac
DSWD they were dismayed to be told that no such
interview had been scheduled; that adding to their
dismay, Atty. Millo could not be reached at all; that it
was only upon reaching home in Quezon City when he
received word from Atty. Millo that a hearing had again
been scheduled on February 23, 1995 at 10:00 a.m.; that
when they went to the hearing, Atty. Millo could not be
found; and that they learned after an hour of waiting in
the courthouse in Tarlac that Atty. Millo had requested
the hearing to be moved to the afternoon without their
knowledge.[5]
Exasperated by Atty. Millo's neglect and ineptitude,
Johnny brought this administrative complaint in the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on March 14,
1995, praying for disciplinary action to be taken against
Atty. Millo, and seeking the refund of P15,643.75
representing the penalties for the non-payment of the
capital gains tax, and of the P10,000.00 given for the
adoption case. Being a resident of Canada, he constituted
one Tita Lomotan as his attorney-in-fact to represent him
during his and his wife's absence from the country.
On July 10, 1995, the IBP ordered Atty. Millo to file his
answer.[6] Although an extension of the period to file was
granted at his instance,[7] he filed no answer in the
end.[8] He did not also appear at the hearings despite due
notice.[9]
In the meantime, the IBP required Johnny through
Lomotan to engage a counsel. The proceedings were
held in abeyance to await the appropriate motion from
Johnny's counsel.[10]
The administrative matter did not move for several
years. The long delay prompted Johnny to write to the
President of the IBP on October 28, 1998. [11] It was only
on April 2, 2001, however, that the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) scheduled another hearing on
June 29, 2001.[12] At that hearing, Atty. Millo appeared
through a representative, and presented a
[13]
manifestation/motion, whereby he claimed that
Johnny had meanwhile died, and that Abella would be
withdrawing the complaint against him.
On October 11, 2001, the IBP-CBD, through
Commissioner Victoria Gonzalez-De los Reyes, deemed
the case submitted for resolution.[14]
On October 4, 2010, Investigating Commissioner Victor
C. Fernandez, to whom the case had been meanwhile
transferred, submitted a report and recommendation,
whereby he found Atty. Millo liable for violating Canon
18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
recommended his suspension from the practice of law
for six months.[15]
In Resolution No. XX-2011-235 adopted on November
19, 2011,[16] the IBP Board of Governors affirmed the
findings of Investigating Commissioner Fernandez, but
lowered the suspension to two months; and ordered Atty.
Millo to return the amount of P16,000.00, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A" and
finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
and finding respondent guilty of the charges level(led)
against him, Atty. Marcelito Millo is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
two (2) months and is ordered to return the amount of
P16,000.00 to complainant.
On March 27, 2012, Atty. Millo moved for a
reconsideration, stating that he had honestly believed
that Abella had already caused the withdrawal of the
complaint prior to her own death; that he had already
caused the preparation of the documents necessary for
the transfer of the certificate of title, and had also
returned the P14,000.00 paid by Johnny; that the
adoption case had been finally granted by the trial court;
that he had lost contact with Johnny and Abella who
resided in Canada; that Juan Daquis, Abella's brother,
could have confirmed that the charge had arisen from a
simple misunderstanding, and that Abella would cause
the withdrawal of the complaint, except that Daquis had
meanwhile died in November 2011.[17]
On June 9, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors denied
Atty. Millo's motion for reconsideration.[18]
Ruling
We affirm Resolution No. XX-2011-235, but modify the
penalty.
Every attorney owes fidelity to the causes and concerns
of his clients. He must be ever mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him by the clients. His duty to
safeguard the clients' interests commences from his
engagement as such, and lasts until his effective release
by the clients. In that time, he is expected to take every
reasonable step and exercise ordinary care as his clients'
interests may require.[19]
Atty. Millo's acceptance of the sums of money from
Johnny and Abella to enable him to attend to the transfer
of title and to complete the adoption case initiated the
lawyer-client relationship between them. From that
moment on, Atty. Millo assumed the duty to render
competent and efficient professional service to them as
his clients. Yet, he failed to discharge his duty. He was
inefficient and negligent in going about what the
professional service he had assumed required him to do.
He concealed his inefficiency and neglect by giving false
information to his clients about having already paid the
capital gains tax. In reality, he did not pay the capital
gains tax, rendering the clients liable for a substantial
financial liability in the form of penalties.
Without doubt, Atty. Millo had the obligation to serve
his clients with competence and diligence. Rule 18.03,
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
expressly so demanded of him, to wit:
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT
WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
x x x x
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
A serious administrative complaint like this one should
not be taken for granted or lightly by any respondent
attorney. Yet, Atty. Millo did not take the complaint of
Johnny seriously enough, and even ignored it for a long
period of time. Despite being given several opportunities
to do so, Atty. Millo did not file any written answer. He
thereby forfeited his right and chance to reasonably
explain the circumstances behind the charges against
him. Had the complaint been untrue and unfair, it would
have been quite easy for him to refute it quickly and
seasonably. Indeed, a refutation was the requisite
response from any worthy and blameless respondent
lawyer. His belated and terse characterization of the
charge by claiming that the charge had emanated from a
mere "misunderstanding" was not sufficient. He did not
thereby refute the charge against him, which omission
indicated that the complaint had substance. It mattered
little now that he had in the meantime returned the
amount of P14,000.00 to the clients, and that the
application for adoption had been eventually granted by
the trial court. Such events, being not only post facto, but
also inevitable from sheer passage of time, did not
obliterate his liability based on the neglect and ineptitude
he had inflicted on his clients. The severe lesson that he
must now learn is that he could not ignore without
consequences the liberal opportunity the Court and the
IBP allowed him to justify his neglect and ineptitude in
serving his clients' concerns. Towards him the Court
now stays its hand of leniency, lest the Court be unfairly
seen as too willing to forego the exaction of
responsibility upon a lawyer as neglectful and inept as he
had been towards his clients.

It even seems very likely that Atty. Millo purposely
disregarded the opportunity to answer the charges
granted to him out of a desire to delay the investigation
of the complaint until both Johnny and Abella, being
residents in Canada, would have already lost interest in
prosecuting it, or, as happened here, would have already
departed this world and be no longer able to rebut
whatever refutations he would ultimately make, whether
true or not. But the Court is not about to condone such
selfish disregard. Let it be emphasized to him and to
others similarly disposed that an attorney who is made a
respondent in a disbarment proceeding should submit an
explanation, and should meet the issue and overcome the
evidence against him.[20] The obvious reason for the
requirement is that an attorney thus charged must
thereby prove that he still maintained that degree of
morality and integrity expected of him at all times.
Atty. Millo made his situation even worse by
consistently absenting himself from the scheduled
hearings the IBP had set for his benefit. His disregard of
the IBP's orders requiring his attendance in the hearings
was not only irresponsible, but also constituted utter
disrespect for the Judiciary and his fellow lawyers. Such
conduct was absolutely unbecoming of a lawyer,
because lawyers are particularly called upon to obey
Court orders and processes and are expected to stand
foremost in complying with orders from the duly
constituted authorities.[21] Moreover, in Espiritu v.
Ulep,[22] the Court saw the respondent attorney's odious
practice of repeatedly and apparently deliberately not
appearing in the scheduled hearings as his means of
wiggling out from the duty to explain his side. A similar
treatment of Atty. Millo's disregard is justified. Indeed,
he thereby manifested evasion, a bad trait that no worthy
member of the Legal profession should nurture in
himself.
Surprisingly, Atty. Millo claimed that his belated
response to the charge was due to the assurances of
Abella that she would be withdrawing the complaint.
The Court disbelieves him, however, and treats his claim
as nothing but a belated attempt to save the day for
himself. He ought to remember that the withdrawal of an
administrative charge for suspension or disbarment
based on an attorney's professional misconduct or
negligence will not furnish a ground to dismiss the
charge. Suspension or disbarment proceedings that are
warranted will still proceed regardless of the lack or loss
of interest on the part of the complainant. The Court may
even entirely ignore the withdrawal of the complaint,
and continue to investigate in order to finally determine
whether the charge of professional negligence or
misconduct was borne out by the record.[23] This
approach bespeaks the Court's consistent view that the
Legal Profession is not only a lofty and noble calling,
but also a rare privilege reserved only for the deserving.
Verily, disciplinary proceedings against attorneys are
unlike civil suits where the complainants are the
plaintiffs and the respondent attorneys are the
defendants. They neither involve private interests nor
afford redress for private grievances. They are
undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare,
for the purpose of preserving the courts of justice from
the official ministration of persons unfit to practice law
before them. Every attorney is called to answer for every
misconduct he commits as an officer of the Court. The
complainant or any other person who has brought the
attorney's misconduct to the attention of the Court is in
no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the
outcome except as all good citizens may have in the
proper administration of justice.[24]
The IBP Board of Governors recommended suspension
from the practice of law for two months as the penalty to
be imposed. The recommended penalty is not well taken.
We modify the penalty, because Atty. Millo displayed
no remorse as to his misconduct, and could not be given
a soft treatment. His professional misconduct warranted
a longer suspension from the practice of law because he
had caused material prejudice to the clients'
interest.[25] He should somehow be taught to be more
ethical and professional in dealing with trusting clients
like Johnny and Abella, who were innocently too willing
to repose their utmost trust in his abilities as a lawyer
and in his trustworthiness as a legal professional. He
should remember that misconduct has no place in the
heart and mind of a lawyer who has taken the solemn
oath to delay no man for money or malice, and to
conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his
knowledge and discretion. Under the circumstances,
suspension from the practice of law for six months is the
condign and commensurate penalty for him.
The Court notes that Atty. Millo already returned the
P14,000.00 received for the transfer of title. Although he
ought also to refund the amount of P15,643.75
representing the penalty for the late payment of the
capital gains tax, the Court cannot order him to refund
that amount because it is not a collection agency. [26] The
Court may only direct the repayment of attorneys fees
received on the basis that a respondent attorney did not
render efficient service to the client. Consequently, Atty.
Millo should refund the P10,000.00 given in connection
with the adoption case, plus interest of 6% per annum,
reckoned from the finality of this decision.
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and HOLDS Atty.
MARCELITO M. MILLO guilty of violating Canon
18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath; SUSPENDS him
from the practice of law for a period of six months
effective from notice, with the STERN WARNING that
any similar infraction in the future will be dealt with
more severely; ORDERS him to return to the heirs of
Johnny and Abella Pesto within ten days from notice the
sum of P10,000.00, plus legal interest of 6% per
annum reckoned from the finality of this decision until
full payment; and DIRECTS him to promptly submit to
this Court written proof of his compliance within thirty
days from notice of this decision.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of

the Bar Confidant, to be appended to Atty. Marcelito M.
Millo's personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines; and to the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout
the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
OCA IPI NO. 14-220-CA-J, March 17, 2015
RE: COMPLAINT DATED JANUARY 28, 2014 OF
WENEFREDO PARREÑO, ET AL., AGAINST
HON. CELIA C. LIBREA-LEAGOGO, HON.
ELIHU A. YBAÑEZ AND HON. AMY C. LAZARO-
JAVIER, ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE COURT
OF APPEALS, RELATIVE TO CA G.R. SP NO.
108807
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
We hereby resolve the administrative complaint1 brought
against Court of Appeals (CA) Associate Justice Celia C.
Librea-Leagogo, Associate Justice Elihu A. Ybañez and
Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro Javier for their undue
delay in rendering the decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No.
108807 entitled Susan Enriquez and Alma Rodriguez v.
Wenefredo Parreno, Ronnie Cuevas and Joseph
Denamarca.
Antecedents
Complainants Wenefredo Parreño and Ronnie Cuevas,
with Joseph Denamarca, filed a protest in the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources of
the National Capital Region (DENR-NCR) against the
issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
14391 and TCT No. 14188 in favor of Susan Enriquez
and Alma Rodriguez covering two lots inside the Signal
Village, Taguig.2 The DENR-NCR dismissed the
protest,3 but the dismissal was subsequently reversed by
the DENR.4 Aggrieved, Enriquez and Rodriguez
appealed to the Office of the President (OP), which
denied their appeal.5 With their motion for
reconsideration having been similarly denied,6 Enriquez
and Rodriguez appealed to the CA by petition for
review,7 and it is such appeal from which this
administrative complaint arose.
It appears that on June 26, 2012, the Special Sixteenth
(16th) Division of the CA issued its resolution submitting
C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 for decision.8 However, the
complainants lament that from the issuance of the
resolution until the filing of their complaint on February
8, 2014, the respondents, who comprised the Special
16th Division of the CA, had not rendered the decision,
which the complainants insist was in patent violation of
the mandatory period within which the respondents
should decide under Section 15(1), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution.9cralawred
The Court required the respondents to submit their
comments on the administrative complaint.
In her comment,10 Justice Librea-Leagogo narrated that
she became the Chairperson of the CA 16 thDivision
effective June 4, 2012 conformably with CA Office
Order No. 220-12-ABR, and she served as such until
July 5, 2012 in accordance with the successive
reorganizations implemented in the CA under CA Office
Order No. 198-12-ABR11 and CA Office Order No. 220-
12-ABR,12 respectively. Citing Section 1, Rule VI of the
2009 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (2009
IRCA),13 Justice Librea-Leagogo denied liability for
incurring any undue delay because of her short stint as
the Chairperson of the 16th Division, and considering
further that C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 followed Justice
Ybañez as the assigned ponente in his transfer to the
Fourteenth (14th) Division pursuant to CA Office Order
No. 220-12-ABR, and eventually to the Thirteenth (13th)
Division, the Division that ultimately promulgated the
awaited decision on February 28, 2014.14cralawred
Justice Ybañez admitted in his comment15 that C.A.-
G.R. SP No. 108807 was part of his initial caseload
following his transfer to Manila in December 2009. He
stated that he had conscientiously complied with the
Zero Backlog Project (ZBP) initiated by Presiding
Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. by giving utmost priority to
the older cases assigned to him; that he had already
assigned C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 to a member of his
legal staff, but the latter had meanwhile fallen seriously
ill; that due to lack of personnel and a heavy caseload, he
had hired a contractual-lawyer who later resigned upon
being offered a permanent position in another agency of
the Government; that after disposing of the older cases
assigned to him, he had rendered the decision in C.A.-
G.R. SP No. 108807 on February 28, 2014 before
becoming aware of the administrative complaint; and
that he had not been remiss in his duty and responsibility
to promptly administer justice by virtue of his disposing
a monthly average of 15 cases.16cralawred
Justice Lazaro-Javier explained her participation in
C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 as limited to the adoption and
promulgation on June 26, 2012 of the resolution
submitting the case for decision because only filled in
the brief vacancy occasioned by the temporary absence
of Justice Victoria Isabel Paredes, then the regular
Member of the 16th Division. She pointed out, however,
that she had nothing more to do with the case upon the
return of Justice Paredes; hence, she could not be
administratively liable for any delay in deciding the
case.17cralawred
Issue
Are the respondents liable for undue delay in deciding
C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807?
Ruling
The administrative complaint is without merit.
The Constitution mandates a lower collegiate court like
the CA to resolve a case within 12 months from the
submission of the last required pleading or as set by the
court itself. This is clear from paragraphs (1) and (2),
Section 15 of Article VIII of the Constitution, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the
effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or
resolved within twenty-four months from date of
submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced
by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower
collegiate courts, and three months for all lower courts.
(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for
decision or resolution upon the filing of the last
pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of only Fridays for the study of her cases and the resolution
Court or by the court itself.chanrobleslaw of pending incidents and issuance of the proper orders.
The Court, in reversing the sanctions, observed that "it
x x x x cralawlawlibrary would be unkind and inconsiderate on the part of the
Court to disregard respondent Judge's limitations and
Did the respondents incur any administrative liability for exact a rigid and literal compliance with the
the delay? rule."26cralawred

Although C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 was submitted for
decision by the Special 16th Division on June 26, 2012
after the parties did not file their memoranda, 18 it was the
13th Division of the CA (composed of Justice Ybañez as
the ponente, Justice Japar B. Dimaampao as the
Chairman, and Justice Melchor Quirino C. Sadang) that
promulgated the decision on February 28, 2014, or
nearly 20 months later. Accordingly, the Court answers
the query in the negative, for, pursuant to Section 1, Rule
VI of the 2009 IRCA, the adjudication of cases was the
responsibility of the assigned Justice and the Members
of the Division to which he or she then belonged.
Determining who should be administratively accountable
must consider the specific role each of the respondents
played leading to the resolution of C.A.-G.R. SP No.
108807. Under the applicable rule of the 2009 IRCA, the
liability for undue delay in resolving C.A.-G.R. SP No.
108807 might devolve only on the Members of the
13th Division who actually promulgated the decision.
The delay in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 could not be said
to have been incurred by Justice Ybañez with malice or
deliberate attempt to impede the dispensation of justice.
He assigned C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 to a member of
his legal staff, but the latter had fallen seriously ill in the
meantime, forcing him to hire a contractual-lawyer for
the purpose. The latter subsequently joined another
agency of the Government on a permanent basis. Thus,
Justice Ybañez could promulgate the decision only on
February 28, 2014. His explanation for the delay, being
entirely plausible, is accepted.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES for lack of
merit the administrative complaint against Justice Celia
C. Librea-Leagogo, Justice Elihu A. Ybanez and Justice
Amy C. Lazaro-Javier.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

Justice Librea-Leagogo and Justice Lazaro-Javier were

not accountable for the delay in rendering the judgment.
Justice Librea-Leagogo had a limited participation in
respect of C.A.- G.R. SP No. 108807 because the
reorganization of the CA ensuing after the promulgation
of the resolution by the Special 16thDivision on June 26,
2012 caused her transfer to the 15 th Division through CA
Office Order No. 220-12-ABR,19 terminating her
responsibility in C.A.- G.R. SP No. 108807. Justice
Lazaro-Javier should also be exculpated because her
participation was limited to her acting as a special
Member of the 16th Division in lieu of Justice Paredes.
Such substitution prevented a vacuum in the regular 16th
Division, and conformed to the procedure stated in
Section 6(d), Rule I of the 2009 IRCA. 20 The
constitution of the Special 16th Division was by virtue of
CA Office Order No. 220-12-ABR.21cralawred

Justice Ybañez, as the ponente for C.A. G.R. SP No.

108807, carried the case with him when he was
transferred to the 13th Division. But whether or not he
was administratively liable for the delay of eight months
should depend on the relevant circumstances. Although
often holding that a heavy caseload is insufficient reason
to excuse a Judge from disposing his cases within the
reglementary period,22 the Court has applied this rule by
considering the causes of the delay. In Marquez v.
Manigbas,23 the Court relieved the respondent judge
from liability because the delay had been caused by the
sudden deluge of cases brought about by the expansion
of the jurisdiction of the municipal trial courts. In Santos
v. Lorenzo,24 the Court held that a delay of seven months
in deciding a case could be excused because of the heavy
caseload of the trial courts in the National Capital
Judicial Region. In Lubaton v. Lazaro,25 the Court, in
sparing the respondent from the sanctions earlier
imposed for undue delay, cited the good faith of the
judge, the motivation of the complainant for bringing the
charge, and the excessively heavy caseload of 3,500
cases, 1,800 of which involved detainees, leaving her
 NATIONAL TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION v.
DANIEL CASTILLO
GR No. 154124, AUG 4, 2010
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Petitioner National Tobacco Administration (NTA)
seeks the review of the decision dated March 22, 2002
(denying NTAs petition for review),[1] and the resolution
dated June 26, 2002 (denying NTAs motion for
reconsideration),[2] both promulgated by the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 67551
entitled National Tobacco Administration v. Daniel
Castillo.
The respondent was one of the employees
adversely affected by the reorganization of NTA. He was
terminated from his employment due to the abolition of
his item as Cashier I in its Isabela Branch. He appealed
to the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which
on January 26, 2000 set aside the termination and
ordered NTA to re-appoint him to a position in the new
staffing pattern which is comparable to latters former
[3]
position under the same employment status. NTA
moved for the reconsideration of the CSC resolution, but
its motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of
merit on July 21, 2000.[4] NTA filed a second motion for
reconsideration, which the CSC also denied on October
13, 2000 because its rules allowed only one motion for
reconsideration.[5] NTA persisted by filing on December
8, 2000 a petition for the admission of the second motion
for reconsideration and of herein supplemental
[6]
manifestation. However, the CSC denied the petition
[7]
for admission on April 2, 2001.
Undaunted, NTA filed a petition for relief in the
CSC, arguing that it had been unable to appeal from the
CSCs earlier resolutions due to excusable negligence;
that it had a meritorious defense; and that the questioned
resolutions were inconsistent with the CSCs
pronouncement in Dabu v. NTA (CSC Case No. 99-
0767), a case whose facts were identical to those of this
case. It explained that its former counsels excessively
numerous duties (in addition to his being the Deputy
Administrator for Operations of NTA) had rendered his
compliance with all the legal requirements of NTAs
cases physically and mentally impossible for him,
leading him to inadvertently and erroneously file
a second motion for reconsideration instead of taking an
appeal to the CA.
On October 12, 2001, the CSC dismissed the
petition for relief on the ground that such a recourse was
not a proper remedy against an adverse decision under
its Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service; and that an appeal in due course to the CA was
the proper remedy of NTA.[8]
NTA elevated the dismissal to the CA via a
petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court. It assailed the CSCs dismissal of its petition for
relief, claiming that its failure to file its appeal had been
due to excusable negligence.
On March 22, 2002, the CA denied NTAs
petition for lack of merit, and found NTAs claims of
excusable negligence and a meritorious defense
unconvincing. The CA held that the assailed resolutions
of the CSC had also already become final and executory
by virtue of NTAs failure to appeal pursuant to
the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service and the Rules of Court.[9]
NTA moved for the reconsideration, but the CA
denied its motion for reconsideration through the
assailed resolution of June 26, 2002.[10]
Hence, this recourse, whereby NTA contends
that the CA erred in declaring that the termination of the
respondent had been without notice and hearing, and in
not finding that NTAs counsel had been guilty of
excusable negligence.
The decisive considerations are whether the
negligence of NTAs counsel was excusable, and whether
NTAs appeal was still allowable.
We rule against NTA.
NTAs argument that its former counsel faced the
herculean task of personally handling the numerous legal
cases of the petitioner without any lawyer assistant in
addition to his regular duties and responsibilities as
Deputy Administrator for Operations of the
agency,[11] even assuming it to be true, did not justify the WHEREFORE, we deny the petition for review
erroneous filing of a second motion for on certiorari, and affirm the decision dated March 22,
reconsideration and a petition for relief from judgment 2002 and the resolution dated June 26,
in the CSC where such recourses were not allowed under 2002 promulgated by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil SP No. 67551.
Service. NTAs former counsel ought to have known of
the correct recourses to take from the adverse resolution SO ORDERED.

of the CSC.

Moreover, the oversight of NTAs counsel in not

seasonably appealing to the CA was not excusable. For
one, mere volume of the work of an attorney has never
excused an omission to comply with the period to
appeal. Also, NTA itself caused its own counsel to be
overburdened with work by not employing additional
lawyers to handle its excessive legal work and avoid its
present predicament. Clearly, the neglect of counsel in
not filing the appeal on time was not something that
ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded
against.[12]

A client is generally bound by the mistakes of

his lawyer; otherwise, there would never be an end to a
litigation as long as a new counsel could be employed,
and who could then allege and show that the preceding
counsel had not been sufficiently diligent or experienced
or learned.[13] The legal profession demands of a lawyer
that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good
father of a family; such lawyer should adopt the norm of
practice expected of men of good
[14]
intentions. Moreover, a lawyer owes it to himself and
to his clients to adopt an efficient and orderly system of
keeping track of the developments in his cases, and
should be knowledgeable of the remedies appropriate to
his cases.

Compounding the dire situation of NTA was that

its appeal to the CA was too belated. Thereby, the
assailed resolution of the CSC attained finality and
became executory,[15] resulting in the CSC resolution
becoming immutable and unalterable, that is, it might no
longer be altered, modified, or reversed in any respect
even if the alteration, modification, or reversal was
meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law,
and whether the alteration, modification, or reversal
would be made by the court or office that rendered the
resolution or by the highest court of the land.[16]
 CAMPUGAN, et al v. ATTY. TOLENTINO
AC NO. 8261, MARCH 11 2015; JESSIE T.
CAMPUGAN, et al v. ATTY. CALUYA
AC NO 8725, MARCH 11, 2015
BERSAMIN, J.:
In this consolidated administrative case, complainants
Jessie T. Campugan and Robert C. Torres seek the
disbarment of respondents Atty. Federico S. Tolentino,
Jr., Atty. Daniel F. Victorio, Jr., Atty. Renato G.
Cunanan, Atty. Elbert T. Quilala and Atty. Constante P.
Caluya, Jr. for allegedly falsifying a court order that
became the basis for the cancellation of their annotation
of the notice of adverse claim and the notice of lis
pendens in the Registry of Deeds in Quezon City.
Antecedents
Atty. Victorio, Jr. had replaced Atty. Edgardo Abad as
counsel of the complainants in a civil action they
brought to seek the annulment of Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. N-290546 of the Registry of Deeds of
Quezon City in the first week of January 2007 in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Quezon City (Civil Case
No. Q-07-59598). They impleaded as defendants Ramon
and Josefina Ricafort, Juliet Vargas and the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City. They caused to be annotated on
TCT No. N-290546 their affidavit of adverse claim, as
well as the notice of lis pendens.[1] Atty. Tolentino, Jr.
was the counsel of defendant Ramon and Josefina
Ricafort.
In their sworn complaint for disbarment dated April 23,
2009 (later docketed as A.C. No. 8261), [2] the
complainants narrated that as the surviving children of
the late Spouses Antonio and Nemesia Torres, they
inherited upon the deaths of their parents a residential lot
located at No. 251 Boni Serrano Street, Murphy, Cubao,
Quezon City registered under Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. RT-64333(35652) of the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City;[3] that on August 24, 2006, they
discovered that TCT No. RT-64333(35652) had been
unlawfully cancelled and replaced by TCT No. N-
290546 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City under
the names of Ramon and Josefina Ricafort;[4] and that,
accordingly, they immediately caused the annotation of
their affidavit of adverse claim on TCT No. N-290546.
It appears that the parties entered into an amicable
settlement during the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-07-
59598 in order to end their dispute,[5]whereby the
complainants agreed to sell the property and the
proceeds thereof would be equally divided between the
parties, and the complaint and counterclaim would be
withdrawn respectively by the complainants (as the
plaintiffs) and the defendants. Pursuant to the terms of
the amicable settlement, Atty. Victorio, Jr. filed a
Motion to Withdraw Complaint dated February 26,
2008,[6] which the RTC granted in its order dated May
16, 2008 upon noting the defendants' lack of objection
thereto and the defendants' willingness to similarly
withdraw their counterclaim.[7]
The complainants alleged that from the time of the
issuance by the RTC of the order dated May 16, 2008,
they could no longer locate or contact Atty. Victorio, Jr.
despite making several phone calls and visits to his
office; that they found out upon verification at the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City that new annotations
were made on TCT No. N-290546, specifically: (1) the
annotation of the letter-request appearing to be filed by
Atty. Tolentino, Jr.[8] seeking the cancellation of the
affidavit of adverse claim and the notice oflis
pendens annotated on TCT No. N-290546; and (2) the
arinotation of the decision dated May 16, 2008 rendered
in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 by the RTC, Branch 95,
in Quezon City, granting the complainants' Motion to
Withdraw Complaint;[9] and that a copy of the letter-
request dated June 30, 2008 addressed to Atty. Quilala,
Registrar of Deeds of Quezon City, disclosed that it was
defendant Ramon Ricafort who had signed the letter.
Feeling aggrieved by their discovery, the complainants
filed an appeal en consulta with the Land Registration
Authority (LRA), docketed as Consulta No. 4707,
assailing the unlawful cancellation of their notice of
adverse claim and their notice of lis pendens under
primary entries PE-2742 and PE-3828-9, respectively.
The LRA set Consulta No. 4707 for hearing on March
30, 2009, and directed the parties to submit their
respective memoranda and/or supporting documents on
or before such scheduled hearing.[10] However, the
records do not disclose whether Consulta No. 4707 was
already resolved, or remained pending at the LRA.
Unable to receive any response or assistance from Atty.
Victorio, Jr. despite their having paid him for his
professional services, the complainants felt that said
counsel had abandoned their case. They submitted that
the cancellation of their notice of adverse claim and their
notice of lis pendens without a court order specifically
allowing such cancellation resulted from the connivance
and conspiracy between Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty.
Tolentino, Jr., and from the taking advantage of their
positions as officials in the Registry of Deeds by
respondents Atty. Quilala, the Chief Registrar, and Atty.
Cunanan, the acting Registrar and signatory of the new
annotations. Thus, they claimed to be thereby
prejudiced.
On July 6, 2009, the Court required the respondents to
comment on the verified complaint.[11]
Atty. Victorio, Jr. asserted in his Comment dated August
17, 2009[12] that complainant Robert Torres had been
actively involved in the proceedings in Civil Case No.
Q-07-59598, which included the mediation process; that
the complainants, after having aggressively participated
in the drafting of the amicable settlement, could not now
claim that they had been deceived into entering the
agreement in the same way that they could not feign
ignorance of the conditions contained therein; that he did
not commit any abandonment as alleged, but had
performed in good faith his duties as the counsel for the
complainants in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598; that he
should not be held responsible for their representation in
other proceedings, such as that before the LRA, which
required a separate engagement; and that the only
payment he had received from the complainants were
those for his appearance fees of P1,000.00 for every
hearing in the RTC.
In his Comment dated August 24, 2009,[13] Atty.
Tolentino, Jr. refuted the charge of conspiracy, stressing
that he was not acquainted with the other respondents,
except Atty. Victorio, Jr. whom he had met during the
hearings in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598; that although he
had notarized the letter-request dated June 30, 2008 of
Ramon Ricafort to the Register of Deeds, he had no
knowledge about how said letter-request had been
disposed of by the Register of Deeds; and that the
present complaint was the second disbarment case filed
by the complainants against him with no other motive
except to harass and intimidate him.
Atty. Quilala stated in his Comment dated September 1,
2009[14] that it was Atty. Caluya, Jr., another Deputy
Register of Deeds, who was the actual signing authority
of the annotations that resulted in the cancellation of the
affidavit of adverse claim and the notice of lis
pendens on TCT No. N-290546; that the cancellation of
the annotations was undertaken in the regular course of
official duty and in the exercise of the ministerial duty of
the Register of Deeds; that no irregularity occurred or
was performed in the cancellation of the annotations;
and that the Register of Deeds was impleaded in Civil
Case No. Q-07-59598 only as a nominal party, thereby
discounting any involvement in the proceedings in the
case.
[15]
Atty. Cunanan did not file any comment.
As the result of Atty. Quilala's allegation in his
Comment in A.C. No. 8261 that it had been Atty.
Caluya, Jr.'s signature that appeared below the cancelled
entries, the complainants filed another sworn disbarment
complaint dated August 26, 2010 alleging that Atty.
Caluya, Jr. had forged the signature of Atty.
Cunanan.[16] This disbarment complaint was docketed as
A.C. No. 8725, and was later on consolidated with A.C.
No. 8261[17]because the complaints involved the same
parties and rested on similar allegations against the
respondents.
Atty. Quilala filed his Comment in A.C. No. 8725 to
belie the allegation of forgery and to reiterate the
arguments he had made in A.C. No. 8261. [18] On his part,
Atty. Caluya, Jr. manifested that he adopted Atty.
Quilala's Comment.[19]
Ruling
We dismiss the complaints for disbarment for being
bereft of merit.
Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that a
lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed
either in his professional or private capacity. The test is
whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or
whether his conduct renders him unworthy to continue
as an officer of the Court.[20] Verily, Canon 7 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all
lawyers to uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of
the Legal Profession. Lawyers are similarly required
under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the same Code not to
engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or
deceitful conduct. Failure to observe these tenets of the
Code of Professional Responsibility exposes the lawyer
to disciplinary sanctions as provided in Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court, as amended, viz.:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court, grounds therefor. — A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The complainants' allegations of the respondents' acts
and omissions are insufficient to establish any
censurable conduct against them.
Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property
Registration Decree) enumerates the general duties of
the Register of Deeds, as follows:
Section 10. General functions of Registers of Deeds. - x
x x
It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds
to immediately registeran instrument presented for
registration dealing with real or personal property which
complies with all the requisites for registration. He shall
see to it that said instrument bears the proper
documentary science stamps and that the same are
properly canceled. If the instrument is not registrable, he
shall forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the
presenter of such denial in writing, stating the ground or
reason therefor, and advising him of his right to appeal
by consulta in accordance with Section 117 of this
Decree. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforementioned duty of the Register of Deeds is
ministerial in nature.[21] A purely ministerial act or duty
is one that an officer or tribunal performs in a given state
of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the
mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the
exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty
upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide
how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is
discretionary, not ministerial. The duty is ministerial
only when its discharge requires neither the exercise of
official discretion nor the exercise of judgment.[22]
In Gabriel v. Register of Deeds of Rizal,[23] the Court
underscores that registration is a merely ministerial act
of the Register of Deeds, explaining:
xxx [W]hether the document is invalid, frivolous or
intended to harass, is not the duty of a Register of Deeds
to decide, but a court of competent jurisdiction, and that
it is his concern to see whether the documents sought to
be registered conform with the formal and legal
requirements for such documents.
In view of the foregoing, we find no abuse of authority
or irregularity committed by Atty. Quilala, Atty.
Cunanan, and Atty. Caluya, Jr. with respect to the
cancellation of the notice of adverse claim and the notice
of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. N-290546.
Whether or not the RTC order dated May 16, 2008 or the
letter-request dated June 30, 2008 had been falsified,
fraudulent or invalid was not for them to determine
inasmuch as their duty to examine documents presented
for registration was limited only to what appears on the
face of the documents. If, upon their evaluation of the
letter-request and the RTC order, they found the same to
be sufficient in law and t]o be in conformity with
existing requirements, it became obligatory for them to
perform their ministerial duty without unnecessary
delay.[24]
Should they be aggrieved by said respondents'
performance of duty, complainants were not bereft of
any remedy because they could challenge the
performance of duty by bringing the matter by way
of consulta with the LRA, as provided by Section
117[25] of Presidential Decree No. 1529. But, as
enunciated in Gabriel v. Register of Deeds of Rizal,[26] it
was ultimately within the province of a court of
competent jurisdiction to resolve issues concerning the
validity or invalidity of a document registered by the
Register of Deeds.
The complainants charge Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty.
Tolentino, Jr. with having conspired with each other to
guarantee that the parties in Civil Case No. Q-59598
would enter into the amicable settlement, and then to
cause the cancellation of the affidavit of adverse claim
and notice of lis pendensannotated on TCT No. N-
290546. The complainants further fault Atty. Victorio,
Jr. with having abandoned their cause since the issuance
of the RTC of its order dated May 16, 2008.
The complainants' charges are devoid of substance.
Although it is not necessary to prove a formal agreement
in order to establish conspiracy because conspiracy may
be inferred from the circumstances attending the
commission of an act, it is nonetheless essential that
conspiracy be established by clear and convincing
evidence.[27] The complainants failed in this regard.
Outside of their bare assertions that Atty. Victorio, Jr.
and Atty. Tolentino, Jr. had conspired with each other in
order to cause the dismissal of the complaint and then
discharge of the annotations, they presented no evidence
to support their allegation of conspiracy. On the
contrary, the records indicated their own active
pjarticipation in arriving at the amicable settlement with
the defendants in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598. Hence,
they could not now turn their backs on the amicable
settlement that they had themselves entered into.
Even assuming that Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty.
Tolentino, Jr. initiated ahd participated in the settlement
of the case, there was nothing wrong in their doing so. It
was actually their obligation as lawyers to do so,
pursuant to Rule 1.04, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, viz.:
RULE 1.04 - A lawyer shall encourage his clients to
avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will admit of a fair
settlement.
In fine, the presumption of the validity of the amicable
settlement of the complainants and the defendants in
Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 subsisted.[28]
Anent the complainants' charge of abandonment against
Atty. Victorio, Jr., Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04, Canon 18
of the Code of Professional Responsibility are
applicable, to wit:
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with
competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of
the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the client's request for information.
There is no issue that the complainants engaged the
services of Atty. Victorio, Jr. as their counsel in Civil
Case No. Q-07-59598. Atty. Victorio, Jr. served as such
counsel. With Atty. Victorio, Jr. assistance, the
complainants obtained a fair settlement consisting in
receiving half of the proceeds of the sale of the
property in litis, without any portion of the proceeds
accruing to counsel as his legal fees. The complainants
did not competently and persuasively show any
unfaithfulness on the part of Atty. Victorio, Jr. as far as
their interest in the litigation was concerned. Hence,
Atty. Victorio, Jr. was not liable for abandonment.
Atty. Victorio, Jr. could not be faulted for the perceived
inattention to any other matters subsequent to the
termination of Civil Case No. Q-07-59598. Unless
otherwise expressly stipulated between them at any time
during the engagement, the complainants had no right to
assume that Atty. Victorio, Jr.'s legal representation was
indefinite as to extend to his representation of them in
the LRA. The Law Profession did not burden its
members with the responsibility of indefinite service to
the clients; hence, the rendition of professional services
depends on the agreement between the attorney and the
client. Atty. Victorio, Jr.'s alleged failure to respond to
the complainants' calls or visits, or to provide them with
his whereabouts to enable them to have access to him
despite the termination of his engagement in Civil Case
No. Q-07-59598 did not equate to abandonment without
the credible showing that he continued to come under the
professional obligation towards them after the
termination of Civil Case No. Q-07-59598.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the baseless
disbarment complaints against Atty. Federico S.
Tolentino, Jr., Atty. Renato G. Cunanan, Atty. Daniel F.
Victorio, Jr., Atty. Elbert T. Quilala and Atty. Constante
P. Caluya, Jr.
SO ORDERED.

SPOUSES JACINTO v. ATTY EMELIE BANGOT
AC NO 8494, 0CT 5 2016
BERSAMIN, J.:
A lawyer shall observe candor, honesty and fairness in
dealing with his clients, and shall only charge fair and
reasonable fees for his legal services. He should not
excessively estimate the value of his professional
services. In drawing up the terms of his professional
engagement, he should not practice deceit. The clients
are entitled to rescind the written agreement on his
professional fees if the terms thereof contravened the
true agreement of the parties.
Antecedents
This administrative case stems from the complaint
brought on December 8, 2009 by the Spouses Emilio and
Alicia Jacinto, then 81 and 76 years of age, respectively,
against Atty. Emelie P. Bangot, Jr. for the latter's unjust
and dishonest treatment of them as his clients. They
hereby seek that he be sanctioned for his actuations. [1]
The complainants averred that a private survey team had
conducted a survey of Cad. 237 Lot No. 1351 on
October 10-11, 2008 pursuant to the order of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, in Cagayan de Oro
City in connection with the reconstitution of the lost
certificate of title of said lot by the owners; that after
conducting the perimeter survey, the survey team had
tried to enter the premises owned by them but they had
prevented the team from doing so because their premises
had already been segregated by virtue of the issuance of
Original Certificate of Title No. P-3387; that their land
covered by OCT No. P-3387 had already been
subdivided into nine lots; that the survey team had then
desisted from proceeding with their survey of their land
but had nonetheless informed them that they would
return another time for the survey; and that this had
forced them to consult a lawyer on the legal remedies to
prevent the intrusion on their property.[2]
The complainants further averred that they had then
consulted with the respondent, briefing him on their
concern, and delivering to him the documents pertinent
to their land; that after scrutinizing the documents, he
had told them that he would be initiating a case
for certiorari in their behalf to nullify the order for the
reconstitution of the lost title covering Cad. 237 Lot No.
1351; that he had then insinuated that one of their lots
would be his attorney's fees; and that they had not
initially agreed to the insinuation because the lots had
already been allocated to each of their seven children,
but they had ultimately consented to giving him only a
portion of Lot No. 37926-H with an area of 250 square
meters n.[3]
It appears that soon after t he respondent unilaterally
prepared the document so-called Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA), to wit:
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
I, ATTY. EMELIE P. BANGOT, JR., of legal age,
married and a resident of Lot 13, Block 1, Xavier
Heights Subd., Upper Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City,
hereinafter referred as the FIRST PARTY; and
WE, SPOUSES EMILIO JACINTO AND ALICIA
JACINTO, both legal age, and residents of Cagayan de
Oro City, herein referred as the SECOND PARTY;
WITNESSETH:
1. That the FIRST PARTY shall be the counsel/lawyer
of the SECOND PARTY, regarding their parcel of land
formerly covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-
3387 with an area of 4,138 sq. m., located at Kauswagan,
Cagayan de Oro City, presently subdivided into 8 lots
with individual certificate of titles (sic);
2. That the First Party shall get 300 sq. m., from Lot No.
37925-G covered by TCT No. 121708
3. That this agreement shall take effect immediately
upon the signing of the parties (sic) cannot be revoked,
amended or modified by the Second Party without the
consent of the First Party.[4]
The complainants recalled that on October 17, 2008 the
respondent requested them to proceed to his law office.
What thereafter transpired and that led to the signing of
the MOA were set forth in their complaint, as follows:
On October 17, 2008, my wife received a phone call
from the office of Atty. Bangot directing us to go to his
office to sign documents they have prepared. The phone
call was relayed to me by my wife so we immediately
proceeded to his office arriving thereat at exactly 4:00
PM. The daughter of Atty. Bangot handed to us two sets
of documents for our signatures. Because of full trust to
Atty. Bangot, we did not bother reading the contents of
the documents. Per instruction, we brought the papers to
their friend lawyer for notarization and after the
notarization returned to the office where we were given
our personal file, without reading every detail of the
documents.
Upon arriving at our residence, I read the contents of the
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). Said MOA was not
signed by Atty. Bangot and did not bear the signature of
witnesses. I was surprised to know that the terms of the
(MOA) did not reflect the true intentions being
contemplated in our previous discussions. Contrary to
what I have told him, a different area which is 37925-G
under TCT No. 121708 was written. I already told him
that my other lots including the lot written in the MOA
could no longer be. disposed of because these lots were
already committed to each of my children. The lot area
was also increased from 250 sq. m. to 300 sq. m.
Because of this situation, I called my wife and children
and told them about the problem. My daughter whose
share was involved reacted badly and she was hurt
because she will then be deprived of her place to live in,
in the future. We continued our discussion and we
decided to see Atty. Bangot to have the MOA be
revoked because we felt that we were deceived, Atty.
Bangot took advantage of our old age, thus breaking the
trust and confidence the client[']s and lawyer should
uphold at all times in the exercise of one's profession.

As a gesture of acknowledging his efforts, we offered to
pay him in cash, fair enough for the services he had
rendered to us. However, he refused to revoke the MOA
because accordingly, he would consult his wife which
finally did not materialize because his wife was not
amenable which in effect showed that they have vested
interest on the property and they are bent on taking the
property at any cause. He even challenged us to file an
appropriate case in court against him rather than agree
with our pleading for payment of cash. Likewise, he
refused our offer to pay his services in cash alleging that
he already filed a Manifestation in court and claimed that
our possession would not be disturbed and that he will
be filing a case for Certiorari as promised.
To our surprise though, we came to know that the
Manifestation filed by Atty. Bangot is not a preparatory
pleading for certiorari. No way could it even stop the
intrusion into our property. Basically, we were deceived
by Atty. Bangot into believing that the Manifestation he
filed would stop any legal disturbance on our property
and the same is preparatory for certiorari.[5]
Feeling aggrieved, the complainants decided to bring
their complaint against the respondent.
On his part, the respondent denied the allegations of the
complainants. He insisted that the complaint against him
was a harassment tactic designed to intimidate him from
seeking judicial remedies to settle their dispute on the
validity of the MOA;[6] that the MOA was valid; that
the Manifestation for Information he had filed in court
prevented the intrusion into the complainants' land; that
the administrative complaint was designed to insure the
derailment of his application for a judgeship position,
and to cover up the negligence of the complainants'
counsel as the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2008-302 (for
annulment and/or rescission of agreement), which case
was dismissed for failure to comply with the requirement
for the prior barangay conciliation proceedings; and that
they had voluntarily signed the MOA without
intimidation, fraud or undue influence.[7]
On August 23, 2010, the Court referred the complaint to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. [8]
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP
In due course, IBP Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero
submitted his Report and Recommendation[9] finding the
complaint against the respondent meritorious, and
recommending that the respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for one year for his unfair and
injudicious treatment of the complainants as his clients.
In Resolution No. XX-2013-71,[10] the IBP Board of
Governors increased the duration of the respondent's
recommended penalty to suspension from the practice of
law for two years, viz.:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
unanimously ADOPTED AND APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and
finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and
considering that Respondent breached his duty of candor
and fairness to his client, Atty. Emelie P. Bangot, Jr. is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two
(2) years.
Through its Resolution No. XXI-2014-315,[11] the IBP
Board of Governors denied the respondent's motion for
reconsideration.
Issue
Did the respondent violate his ethical duties as a member
of the Bar in his dealings with the complainants?
Ruling of the Court
We find and hold that the respondent grossly violated his
Lawyer's Oath and his ethical duties as an attorney
because he did not observe candor and fairness in his
dealings with his clients.
The findings of IBP Commissioner Cachapero, which
sufficiently described the violations of the respondent,
provide an irrefutable insight into the gravity of the
violations by the respondent, as follows:
The question to ask is, "Was the MOA fair to the parties
and entered into by them in goodfaith?"
The undersigned resolves in the negative. To begin with,
the conduct of Respondent had evinced an instinctive
interest in the property of Complainants. He had the
MOA executed at the same time he filed the
Manifestation for Information before the court that was
hearing LRC Case No. 98-010. Not only that,
Respondent's proposal to have a MOA executed between
him and the Complainant was meant to impress that his
supposed attorney's fees would be paid on contingent
basis, however, a perusal of the MOA indicates that the
payment of Respondents' fee by way of a real property is
being made immediately effective upon execution of the
agreement.
As to the agreement of the Complainant and the
Respondent, the undersigned gives full faith to the
allegation of Complainant that the payment of
Respondent's attorney's fees by way of a real property
would come from TCT No. 121709 and not T-121708.
Complainants explained that the latter lot had already
been committed to their seven (7) children especially
because this lot is situated in a prime location thus they
could not have picked the same over Lot No. 121709.
The Respondent knew straightforwardly that lot 121708
was a better lot yet Respondent gave a different account
of their agreement and took advantage of the frailty and
advance ages (sic) of his clients.
But, the most shocking of all, is the apparent inequity or
disproportion between the amount of attorney's fees
(measured from the value of the property taken by
Respondent) and the effort or service already performed
or still to be performed by him. The Complainants were
not made parties to the LRC case or any other case and
Respondent filed a mere two-paged Manifestation for
Information in court which he did almost effortlessly. It
is not clear how the court had reacted to the
manifestation but Respondent did not follow it up with
[any] other action. Despite the same, Respondent stuck
to his tale that the Complainants had signed [the] MOA
and despite his minimal representation of the
Complainants in court, he held on to his idea that he had
taken from his clients valid title to a million [pesos]
worth of real estate in payment of his fees.
The undersigned does not see fairness and judiciousness
to Respondent's treatment of his clients, 81 and 76 years
old, respectively, and he need not add to his brief
disquisition in this regard.[12]
We adopt the findings and note the insights thus
expressed.
We must, therefore, highlight the following reasons why
the findings and insights should be sustained.
To determine the reasonableness of attorney's fees, the
following factors as enumerated in Rule 20.1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility may serve as a
guide, to wit: (a) the time spent and the extent of the
services rendered or required; (b) the novelty and
difficulty of the questions involved; (c) the importance
of the subject matter; (d) the skill demanded; (e) the
probability of losing other employment as a result of
acceptance of the proffered case; (f) the customary
charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of
the IBP chapter to which he belongs; (g) the amount
involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to
the client from the service; (h) the contingency or
certainty of compensation; (i) the character of the
employment, whether occasional or established; and j)
the professional standing of the lawyer.
It was not disputed that only the filing of the two-
paged Manifestation for Information constituted the
respondent's rendition of professional services for the
complainants. Although he did claim that the filing of
the Manifestation for Information had prevented any
intrusion on their property, thereby fulfilling his end of
the contract,[13] the worth of such minimal effort was
exaggerated and disproportionate when taken in the
context of the attorney's fees being Lot No. 37925-G
with 300 square meters in area. The two-
paged Manifestation for Information was not even the
procedural precursor of the promised petition
for certiorari. Moreover, he did not actually file the
petition for certiorari as he had promised. And, lastly, he
did nothing more after filing the Manifestation for
Information. He certainly transgressed the Lawyer's
Oath by receiving property of a substantial value from
the complainants after having made them believe that he
could ensure their land from intrusion by third parties.
He took advantage of them who had reposed their full
trust and confidence in his ability to perform the task by
virtue of his being a lawyer. He was definitely bent on
obtaining Lot No. 37925-G than in protecting the
complainants' interest in their property. He exhibited this
zeal by refusing their offer to give cash for his attorney's
fees instead of the land. We sadly note in this connection
that his changing the property ostensibly agreed upon
with the bigger lot as payment for his legal
services[14] reflected his deceit at the start of the
relationship. He maintained the deceit by ultimately
enforcing the MOA against them through the action for
specific performance.
Surely, the totality of the respondent's actuations
inevitably eroded public trust in the Legal Profession.
On the basis of his acts and actuations, the attorney's
fees in the form of the lot he charged from them were
unconscionable and unreasonable, and should be struck
down for failing to pass muster under the aforestated
guidelines.
The respondent appears to have impressed on the
complainants at the time of their negotiations that the
attorney's fees in the form of the lot would be delivered
to him only on a contingent basis. Again, he had
misrepresented himself to them because the express
terms of the MOA stipulated that "this agreement shall
take effect immediately upon the signing of the parties
[and] cannot be revoked, amended or modified by the
Second Party without the consent of the First Party."
As worded, the agreement was not a contingent fee
arrangement. Indeed, a contingent fee arrangement is a
contract in writing in which the fee, usually a fixed
percentage of what may be recovered in the action, is
made to depend upon the success in the effort to enforce
or defend a supposed right.[15] The amount of the
contingent fee agreed upon by the parties is subject to
the stipulation that counsel will be paid for his legal
services only if the suit or litigation prospers. A much
higher compensation is allowed as contingent fee in
consideration of the risk that the lawyer may get nothing
should the suit fail. Such arrangement is generally
recognized as valid and binding in this jurisdiction but
its terms must be reasonable.[16] Canon 13 of the Canons
of Professional Ethics states that "a contract for a
contingent fee, when sanctioned by law, should be
reasonable under all the circumstances of the case
including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation,
but should always be subject to the supervision of a
court, as to its reasonableness." A contract of this nature
is permitted because it redounds to the benefit of the
poor client and the lawyer especially in cases where the
client has a meritorious cause of action but has no means
with which to pay for the legal services unless he can,
with the sanction of law, make a contract for a
contingent fee to be paid out of the proceeds of the
litigation. Oftentimes, such arrangement is the only
means by which the poor and helpless can seek redress
for injuries sustained and have their rights vindicated.[17]
Considering that a contingent fee arrangement is
susceptible to abuse, the courts should closely scrutinize
it to protect the client from unjust charges. The court
looks in large measure at the reasonableness of the
stipulated fee under the circumstances of each
case.[18] Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court explicitly provides:
Section 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to
fees. -- An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover
from his client no more than a reasonable
compensation for his services, with a view to the
importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the
extent of the services rendered, and the professional
standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the
opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper
compensation, but may disregard such testimony and
base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge.
A written contract for services shall control the amount
to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be
unconscionable or unreasonable. (Emphasis ours)
All the foregoing circumstances established that the
respondent was deceitful, dishonest and unreasonable in
his dealings with the complainants as his clients. He thus
violated his Lawyer's Oath, whereby he vowed, among
others, to do no falsehood, and not to consent to the
doing of any falsehood, as well as not to delay any man's
cause for money or malice but to conduct himself as a
lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion "with all good fidelity as well to the courts as
to [his] clients. He also breached the following canons of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 15 A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and
loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his
clients.
Canon 17 A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his
client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him.
Canon 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
Canon 20- A lawyer shall charge only fair and
reasonable fees. Rule 20.4 A lawyer shall avoid
controversies with clients concerning his compensation
and shall resort to judicial action only to prevent
imposition, injustice or fraud.
We have said time and again, and this we cannot
overemphasize, that the Law is neither a trade nor a craft
but a profession whose basic ideal is to render public
service and to secure justice for those who seek its aid. If
the Law has to remain an honorable profession and has
to attain its basic ideal, those enrolled in its ranks should
not only master its tenets and principles but should also,
by their lives, accord continuing fidelity to such tenets
and principles.[19] The respondent's behavior and deceit
demonstrated a preference for self-gain that transgressed
his sworn duty of fidelity, loyalty and devotion to his
clients' cause. His betrayal of his clients' trust
besmirched the honorable name of the Law Profession.
These considerations justify suspending him from the
practice of law.
Moreover, the respondent made the following allegations
in his motion for reconsideration filed with the IBP
Board of Governors, to wit:
9. It is quite disturbing that to cover up Atty. Palasan's
negligence and reckless filing of Annulment and/or
Rescission of Agreement titled Spouses Emilio Jacinto
and Alicia Jacinto vs. Atty. Emelie P. Bangot docketed
as Civil Case No. 2008-302 before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 41, Cagayan de Oro City where the
subject matter was the Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) between the complainant and respondent, said
counsel resorted to another forum by filing this
administrative case where his chance of oppressing and
harassing respondent is far greater because when he filed
said administrative case Atty. Roan Libarios then one of
the Officers of the IBP National Chapter and member of
the Board of Governors, representing Eastern Mindanao,
was holding office at IBP, Ortigas Center, Pasig City as
such, his officemate or law partner at Butuan City (sic).
Unfortunately, for respondent, Atty. Libarios eventually
became the IBP National President;
x x x x
18. The statement by Commissioner Cachapero in his
Report and Recommendation, 1st sentence, 2nd par.,
thereof that: "On October 10 & 11, 2008, a survey was
conducted on Cadastral Lot No. 1351 situated at
Kauswagan, Cagayan de Oro City in connection with the
reconstitution of the lost title of the lot which was then
pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, R-
10, Cagayan de Oro City." is quite confusing and
designed to put down respondent probably at any cost
and probably by an "unseen but influential
hands (sic)";[20]
The aforequoted allegations indicated that the
respondent had readily attributed the filing of the
administrative charge to the lawyer representing the
complainants in the suit against him to annul or rescind
the MOA, as well as to "unseen but influential hands" in
the hierarchy of the IBP. The attribution was bereft of
factual and legal justifications, however, because he did
not even attempt to establish it with satisfactory proof.
We cannot but dismiss the attribution as malicious and
unfounded in view of the record establishing his serious
ethical violations. He displayed an unmitigated lack of
professionalism by casting aspersions against his peers,
and exhibited a dangerous propensity to disparage
others, which should move us to consider his violations
as aggravated.
To be now considered, therefore, is the condign penalty
of the respondent. A review of precedents shows that the
penalty of suspension, or even disbarment, has been
meted on similar violations and transgressions.
In Santeco v. Avance,[21] the respondent attorney was
suspended for five years for abandoning the cause of her
client without notice despite her having collected her
legal fees. She also failed to account for the money of
the client and constantly refused to submit herself to the
proceedings of the IBP. In Lemoine v. Balon, Jr.,[22] this
Court disbarred the respondent attorney who did not
promptly account for the funds he had received for the
benefit of his client, and for his deceit in dealings with
his client. In Overgaard v. Valdez,[23] the respondent
attorney was disbarred for assuring the complainant that
his property involved in a civil case would be
safeguarded, and then collecting the full amount of legal
fees amounting to P900,000.00, only to desert the
complainant after receiving the fees. The respondent
attorney had further failed to submit an answer as well as
to attend the proceedings before the IBP.
Although the complainants appeared to have initially
bound themselves to give a part of their land as the
respondent's professional fees, they did so apparently
because he had misrepresented to them the gravity and
extent of their legal matter. His misrepresentation was
undeniably calculated to make them part with their
valuable asset in lieu of cash. He did not thereafter
render any worthy professional legal service in their
favor. Verily, as the cliche goes, they did not get their
money's worth from him. Even if this charge was his
first infraction, the grossness of his violations of the
Lawyer's Oath and the various relevant canons of
the Code of Professional Responsibility quoted earlier
absolutely warranted his suspension from the practice of
law for five years effective upon his receipt of this
decision, with warning of sterner sanctions should he
hereafter commit a similar offense. This duration of
suspension was the penalty we prescribed in the recent
case of Mercullo v. Ramon[24] where the respondent
lawyer had deceived the complainants into parting with
the substantial sum of P350,000.00 as her attorney's fees
but did not subsequently perform her professional
undertaking.

In addition, the respondent should not be entitled to

receive any attorney's fees in view of the worthlessness
of the professional services he supposedly rendered.
There is no question, as ruled in Sanchez v.
Aguilos,[25] that every attorney is entitled to have and
receive a just and reasonable compensation for services
performed at the special instance and request of his
client; and that for as long as the attorney is in good faith
and honestly trying to represent and serve the interests of
the client, he should have a reasonable compensation for
such services. Yet, equally without question is that the
attorney should not accept the engagement that is way
above his ability and competence to handle, for there
will then be no basis for him to accept any amount as
attorney's fees; or that he should at least begin to
perform the contemplated task undertaken for the client
to entitle him to be compensated on the basis of quantum
meruit.[26]

WHEREFORE, this
Court FINDS and HOLDS respondent ATTY.
EMELIE P. BANGOT, JR. guilty of violation of the
Lawyer's Oath and of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; SUSPENDS him from the practice of
law for five (5) years effective upon notice of this
decision, with warning that sterner sanctions will be
meted on him for a similar offense;
and DECLARES that he is not entitled to recover any
attorney's fees from the complainants.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of

the Bar Confidant; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines;
and to the Office of the Court Administrator.

The Office of the Court Administrator shall disseminate

this decision to all courts of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.
 CZARINA MALVAR v. KRAFT FOOD PH. INC.
Undaunted, KFPI and Bautista assailed the adverse
G.R. No. 183952, SEPT 9 2013 outcome before the CA on certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No.
69660), contending that the NLRC thereby committed
grave abuse of discretion. However, the petition
for certiorariwas dismissed by the CA on December 22,
BERSAMIN, J.: 2004, but with the CA reversing the order of
reinstatement and instead directing the payment of
Although the practice of law is not a business, an
separation pay to Malvar, and also reducing the amounts
attorney is entitled to be properly compensated for the awarded as moral and exemplary damages. [4]
professional services rendered for the client, who is
bound by her express agreement to duly compensate the
After the judgment in her favor became final and
attorney. The client may not deny her attorney such just
executory on March 14, 2006, Malvar moved for the
compensation. issuance of a writ of execution.[5] The Executive Labor
Arbiter then referred the case to the Research and
Computation Unit (RCU) of the NLRC for the
The Case computation of the monetary awards under the
judgment. The RCU's computation ultimately arrived at
The case initially concerned the execution of a final the total sum of P41,627,593.75.[6]
decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in a labor
litigation, but has mutated into a dispute over attorney's
On November 9, 2006, however, Labor Arbiter Jaime M.
fees between the winning employee and her attorney Reyno issued an order,[7] finding that the RCU's
after she entered into a compromise agreement with her computation lacked legal basis for including the salary
employer under circumstances that the attorney has
increases that the decision promulgated in CA-G.R. SP
bewailed as designed to prevent the recovery of just
No. 69660 did not include. Hence, Labor Arbiter Reyno
professional fees. reduced Malvar's total monetary award to
P27,786,378.11, viz:
Antecedents WHEREFORE, premises considered, in so far as the
computation of complainant's other benefits and
On August 1, 1988, Kraft Foods (Phils.), Inc. (KFPI) allowances are concerned, the same are in order.
hired Czarina Malvar (Malvar) as its Corporate Planning
However, insofar as the computation of her backwages
Manager. From then on, she gradually rose from the
and other monetary benefits (separation pay, unpaid
ranks, becoming in 1996 the Vice President for Finance salary for January 1 to 26, 2005, holiday pay, sick leave
in the Southeast Asia Region of Kraft Foods pay, vacation leave pay, 13th month pay), the same are
International (KFI), KFPI's mother company. On
hereby recomputed as follows:
November 29, 1999, respondent Bienvenido S. Bautista,
as Chairman of the Board of KFPI and concurrently the 1.Separation Pay
Vice President and Area Director for Southeast Asia of 8/1/88-1/26/05 =
KFI, sent Malvar a memo directing her to explain why
16 yrs
no administrative sanctions should be imposed on her for
P344,575.83 x 16
possible breach of trust and confidence and for willful 5,513,213.28
=
violation of company rules and regulations. Following
the submission of her written explanation, an
2.Unpaid Salary
investigating body was formed. In due time, she was
1/1-26/05 = 87
placed under preventive suspension with pay. mos.
Ultimately, on March 16, 2000, she was served a notice P344,575.83 x 87
of termination. 299,780.97
=
Obviously aggrieved, Malvar filed a complaint for
3.Holiday Pay
illegal suspension and illegal dismissal against KFPI and 4/1/00-1/26/05 =
Bautista in the National Labor Relations Commission 55 holidays
(NLRC). In a decision dated April 30, 2001, [1] the Labor
P4,134,910/12
Arbiter found and declared her suspension and dismissal
mos/20.83 days x 909,825.77
illegal, and ordered her reinstatement, and the payment 55 days
of her full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other
benefits, plus attorney's fees.
Unpaid 13th month
4. 344,575.83
pay for Dec 2000
On October 22, 2001, the NLRC affirmed the decision of
the Labor Arbiter but additionally ruled that Malvar was 5.Sick Leave Pay
entitled to "any and all stock options and bonuses she
Year 1999 to 2004
was entitled to or would have been entitled to had she
= 6 yrs
not been illegally dismissed from her employment," as P344,575.88/20.83
well as to moral and exemplary damages.[2] x 15 days x 6 =
1,488,805.79
Year 2005
KFPI and Bautista sought the reconsideration of the
P344,575.83/20.83
NLRC's decision, but the NLRC denied their motion to 20,677.86 1,509,483.65
x 15/12 x 1
that effect.[3]
 Vacation Leave G.R. SP No. 99865,[12] disposing thusly:
6.
Pay
Year 1999 to 2004 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the herein
= 6 years Petition is GRANTED and the 19 April 2007 Decision
P344,575.88/20.83 of the NLRC and the 31 May 2007 Resolution in NLRC
2,183,581.83
x 22 days x 6 = NCR 30-07-02316-00 are hereby REVERSED and SET
Year 2005 ASIDE.
P344,575.83/20.83
30,327.55 2,213,909.36
x 22/12 x 1 The matter of computation of monetary awards for
10,790,788.86 private respondent is hereby REMANDED to the Labor
Arbiter and he is DIRECTED to recompute the
Backwages (from 3/7/00- monetary award due to private respondent based on her
4/30/01, award in LA Sytian's4,651,773.75 salary at the time of her termination, without including
Decision projected salary increases. In computing the said
Allowances & benefits, the Labor Arbiter is further directed
Other Benefits: to DISREGARD monetary awards arising from: (a) the
Management management incentive plan and (b) the share option
7,355,166.58
Incentive Plan grant, including cash dividends arising therefrom
Cash Dividend on without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate remedy
Philip Morris 2,711,646.00 by the private respondent in the proper forum. Private
Shares respondent's allowances for car maintenance and
Car Maintenance 381,702.92 gasoline are likewise DELETED unless private
Gas Allowance 198,000.00 respondent proves, by appropriate receipts, her
Entitlement to a entitlement thereto.
438,650.00
Company Driver
Rice Subsidy 58,650.00 With respect to the Motion to Exclude the Undisputed
Moral Damages 500,000.00 Amount of P14,252,192.12 from the coverage of the
Exemplary Writ of Preliminary Injunction and to order its
200,000.00
Damages immediate release, the same is hereby GRANTED for
Attorney's Fees 500,000.00 reasons stated therefor, which amount shall be deducted
Entitlement to from the amount to be given to private respondent after
Subject to
Philip Sch G proper computation.
"Share Option
Market Price
Grant" As regards the Motions for Reconsideration of the
27,786,378.11 Resolution denying the Motion for Voluntary Inhibition
and the Omnibus Motion dated 30 October 2007, both
SO ORDERED. motions are hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
Both parties appealed the computation to the NLRC,
which, on April 19, 2007, rendered its decision setting SO ORDERED.[13]
aside Labor Arbiter Reyno's November 9, 2006 order, Malvar sought reconsideration, but the CA denied her
and adopting the computation by the RCU. [8] motion on July 30, 2008.[14]

In its resolution dated May 31, 2007,[9] the NLRC denied Aggrieved, Malvar appealed to the Court, assailing the
the respondents' motion for reconsideration. CA's decision.

Malvar filed a second motion for the issuance of a writ
of execution to enforce the decision of the NLRC
rendered on April 19, 2007. After the writ of execution
was issued, a partial enforcement was effected by
garnishing the respondents' funds deposited with
Citibank worth P37,391,696.06.[10]
On July 27, 2007, the respondents went to the CA
on certiorari (with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) or writ of preliminary
injunction), assailing the NLRC's setting aside of the
computation by Labor Arbiter Reyno (CA-G.R. SP No.
99865). The petition mainly argued that the NLRC had
gravely abused its discretion in ruling that: (a) the
inclusion of the salary increases and other monetary
benefits in the award to Malvar was final and executory;
and (b) the finality of the ruling in CA-G.R. SP No.
69660 precluded the respondents from challenging the
inclusion of the salary increases and other monetary
benefits. The CA issued a TRO, enjoining the NLRC and
Malvar from implementing the NLRC's decision.[11]
On April 17, 2008, the CA rendered its decision in CA-
On December 9, 2010, while her appeal was pending in
this Court, Malvar and the respondents entered into a
compromise agreement, the pertinent dispositive portion
of which is quoted as follows:
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the
covenants and understanding between the parties herein,
the parties hereto have entered into this Agreement on
the following terms and conditions:
1. Simultaneously upon execution of this Agreement in
the presence of Ms. Malvar's attorney, KFPI shall pay
Ms. Malvar the amount of Philippine Pesos Forty
Million (Php 40,000,000.00), which is in addition to the
Philippine Pesos Fourteen Million Two Hundred Fifty-
Two Thousand One Hundred Ninety-Two and Twelve
Centavos (Php14,252, 192.12) already paid to and
received by Ms. Malvar from KFPI in August 2008
(both amounts constituting the "Compromise
Payment"). The Compromise Payment includes full and
complete payment and settlement of Ms. Malvar's
salaries and wages up to the last day of her employment,
allowances, 13th and 14th month pay, cash conversion of
her accrued vacation, sick and emergency leaves,
separation pay, retirement pay and such other benefits,
entitlements, claims for stock, stock options or other
forms of equity compensation whether vested or
otherwise and claims of any and all kinds against KFPI
and KFI and Altria Group, Inc., their predecessors-in-
interest, their stockholders, officers, directors, agents or
successors-in-interest, affiliates and subsidiaries, up to
the last day of the aforesaid cessation of her
employment.
2. In consideration of the Compromise Payment, Ms.
Malvar hereby freely and voluntarily releases and
forever discharges KFPI and KFI and Altria Group, Inc.,
their predecessors or successors-in-interest,
stockholders, officers, including Mr. Bautista who was
impleaded in the Labor Case as a party respondent,
directors, agents or successors-in-interest, affiliates and
subsidiaries from any and all manner of action, cause of
action, sum of money, damages, claims and demands
whatsoever in law or in equity which Ms. Malvar or her
heirs, successors and assigns had, or now have against
KFPI and/or KFI and/or Altria Group, Inc., including but
not limited to, unpaid wages, salaries, separation pay,
retirement pay, holiday pay, allowances, 13thand
14th month pay, claims for stock, stock options or other
forms of equity compensation whether vested or
otherwise whether arising from her employment
contract, company grant, present and future contractual
commitments, company policies or practices, or
otherwise, in connection with Ms. Malvar's employment
with KFPI.[15]
Here, it is the lawyer who is eaten up alive by the
warring but conspiring litigants who finally settled their
differences without the knowledge, much less,
participation, of Petitioner's counsel that labored hard
and did everything to champion her cause.
x x x x
This Motion for Intervention will illustrate an aberration
from the norm where the lawyer ends up seeking
protection from his client's and Respondents' indecent
and cunning maneuverings. x x x.
x x x x
On 18 March 2008 Petitioner engaged the
professional services of Intervenor x x x on a
contingency basis whereby the former agreed in
writing to pay the latter contingency fees amounting
to almost P19,600,000.00 (10% of her total claim of
almost P196,000,000.00 in connection with her labor
case against Respondents. x x x.
x x x x
According to their agreement (Annex "A"),
Petitioner bound herself to pay Intervenor
contingency fees as follows (a) 10% of P14, 252,
192.12 upon its collection; (b) 10% of the remaining
balance of P41,627,593.75; and (c)10% of the value of
the stock options Petitioner claims to be entitled to,
or roughly P154,000,000.00 as of April 2008.

xxxx x x x x
Thereafter, Malvar filed an undated Motion to
Dismiss/Withdraw Case,[16]praying that the appeal be Intervenor's efforts resulted in the award and partial
immediately dismissed/withdrawn in view of the release of Petitioner's claim amounting to
compromise agreement, and that the case be considered P14,252,192.12 out of which Petitioner paid Intervenor
closed and terminated. 10% or P1,425,219.21 as contingency fees pursuant to
their engagement agreement (Annex "A"). Copy of the
check payment of Petitioner payable to Intervenor's Of
Intervention Counsel is attached as Annex "C".

Before the Court could act on Malvar's Motion to x x x x

Dismiss/Withdraw Case, the Court received on February
15, 2011 a so-called Motion for Intervention to Protect
Attorney's Rights[17] from The Law Firm of Dasal,
Llasos and Associates, through its Of Counsel Retired
Supreme Court Associate Justice Josue N.
Bellosillo[18] (Intervenor), whereby the Intervenor
sought, among others, that both Malvar and KFPI be
held and ordered to pay jointly and severally the
Intervenor's contingent fees.
On 12 September 2008 Intervenor filed an exhaustive
Petition for Review with the Supreme Court containing
70 pages, including its Annexes "A" to "R", or a total of
419 pages against Respondents to collect on the balance
of Petitioner's claims amounting to at least
P27,000,000.00 and P154,000,000.00 the latter
representing the estimated value of Petitioner's stock
options as of April 2008.

The Motion for Intervention relevantly averred: x x x x

x x x x On 15 January 2009 Respondents filed their Comment to

the Petition for Review.
Lawyers, oftentimes, are caricatured as alligators or
some other specie of voracious carnivore; perceived also x x x x
as leeches sucking dry the blood of their adversaries, and
even their own clients they are sworn to serve and On 13 April 2009 Intervenor, in behalf of Petitioner,
protect! As we lay down the facts in this case, this filed its Reply to the Comment.
popular, rather unpopular, perception will be shown
wrong. This case is a reversal of this perception. x x x x

x x x x All the pleadings in this Petition have already been

submitted on time with nothing more to be done
except to await the Resolution of this Honorable
Court which, should the petition be decided in her favor,
Petitioner would stand to gain P182,000,000.00, more or
less, which victory would be largely through the efforts
of Intervenor.[19] (Bold emphasis supplied).
xxxx
It appears that in July 2009, to the Intervenor's surprise,
Malvar unceremoniously and without any justifiable
reason terminated its legal service and required it to
withdraw from the case.[20] Hence, on October 5, 2009,
the Intervenor reluctantly filed a Manifestation (With
Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for Petitioner),[21] in
which it spelled out: (a) the terms of and conditions of
the Intervenor's engagement as counsel; (b) the type of
legal services already rendered by the Intervenor for
Malvar; (c) the absence of any legitimate reason for the
termination of their attorney-client relationship; (d) the
reluctance of the Intervenor to withdraw as Malvar's
counsel; and (e) the desire of the Intervenor to assert and
claim its contingent fee notwithstanding its withdrawal
as counsel. The Intervenor prayed that the Court furnish
it with copies of resolutions, decisions and other legal
papers issued or to be issued after its withdrawal as
counsel of Malvar in the interest of protecting its interest
as her attorney.
The Intervenor indicated that Malvar's precipitate action
had baffled, shocked and even embarrassed the
Intervenor, because it had done everything legally
possible to serve and protect her interest. It added that it
could not recall any instance of conflict or
misunderstanding with her, for, on the contrary, she had
even commended it for its dedication and devotion to her
case through her following letter to Justice Bellosillo, to
wit:
July 16, 2008
Justice Josue Belocillo (sic)
Dear Justice,
It is almost morning of July 17 as I write this letter to
you. Let me first thank you for your continued and
unrelenting lead, help and support in the case. You have
been our "rock" as far as this case is concerned. Jun and
I are forever grateful to you for all your help. I just
thought I'd express to you what is in the innermost of my
heart as we proceed in the case. It has been around four
months now since we met mid-March early this year.
The most important and immediate aspect of the case at
this time for me is the collection of the undisputed
amount of Pesos 14million which the Court has clearly
directed and ordered the NLRC to execute. The only
impending constraint for NLRC to execute and collect
this amount from the already garnished amount of Pesos
41 million at Citibank is the MR of Kraft on the Order of
the Court (CA) to execute collection. We need to get a
denial of this motion for NLRC to execute immediately.
We already obtained commitment from NLRC that all it
needed to execute collection is the denial of the MR.
Jun and I applaud your initiative and efforts to mediate
with Romulo on potential settlement. However, as I
expressed to you in several instances, I have serious
reservations on the willingness of Romulo to settle
within reasonable amounts specifically as it relates to the
stock options. Let us continue to pursue this route
vigorously while not setting aside our efforts to
influence the CA to DENY their Motion on the
Undisputed amount of Pesos 14million.
At this point, I cannot overemphasize to you our need for
funds. We have made financial commitments that
require us to raise some amount. But we can barely meet
our day to day business and personal requirements given
our current situation right now.
Thank you po for your understanding and support.[22]
According to the Intervenor, it was certain that the
compromise agreement was authored by the respondents
to evade a possible loss of P182,000,000.00 or more as a
result of the labor litigation, but considering the
Intervenor's interest in the case as well as its resolve in
pursuing Malvar's interest, they saw the Intervenor as a
major stumbling block to the compromise agreement that
it was then brewing with her. Obviously, the only way to
remove the Intervenor was to have her terminate its
services as her legal counsel. This prompted the
Intervenor to bring the matter to the attention of the
Court to enable it to recover in full its compensation
based on its written agreement with her, averring thus:
x x x x
28. Upon execution of the Compromise Agreement and
pursuant thereto, Petitioner immediately received
(supposedly) from Respondents P40,000,000.00. But
despite the settlement between the parties, Petitioner did
not pay Intervenor its just compensation as set forth in
their engagement agreement; instead, she immediately
moved to Dismiss/Withdraw the Present Petition.
29. To parties' minds, with the dismissal by Petitioner of
Intervenor as her counsel, both Petitioner and
Respondents probably thought they would be able to
settle the case without any cost to them, with Petitioner
saving on Intervenor's contingent fees while
Respondents able to take advantage of the absence of
Intervenor in determining the settlement price.
30. The parties cannot be any more mistaken. Pursuant
to the Second Paragraph of Section 26, Rule 138, of the
Revised Rules of Court quoted in paragraph 3 hereof,
Intervenor is still entitled to recover from Petitioner the
full compensation it deserves as stipulated in its contract.
31. All the elements for the full recovery of Intervenor's
compensation are present. First, the contract between the
Intervenor and Petitioner is reduced into writing.
Second, Intervenor is dismissed without justifiable cause
and at the stage of proceedings where there is nothing
more to be done but to await the Decision or Resolution
of the Present Petition.[23]
xxxx
In support of the Motion for Intervention, the Intervenor
cites the rulings in Aro v. Nañawa[24] and Law Firm of
Raymundo A. Armovit v. Court of
Appeals,[25] particularly the following passage:
x x x. While We here reaffirm the rule that "the client
has an undoubted right to compromise a suit without the
intervention of his lawyer," We hold that when such
compromise is entered into in fraud of the lawyer, with
intent to deprive him of the fees justly due him, the
compromise must be subject to the said fees and that
when it is evident that the said fraud is committed in
confabulation with the adverse party who had knowledge
of the lawyer's contingent interest or such interest
appears of record and who would benefit under such
compromise, the better practice is to settle the matter of
the attorney's fees in the same proceeding, after hearing
all the affected parties and without prejudice to the
finality of the compromise agreement in so far as it does
not adversely affect the right of the lawyer. [26] x x x.
The Intervenor prays for the following reliefs:
Granting the Motion for Intervention to Protect
a)
Attorney's Rights in favor of the Intervenor;
Directing both Petitioner and Respondents jointly and
b)
severally to pay Intervenor its contingent fees;
Granting a lien upon all judgments for the payment of
c) money and executions issued in pursuance of such
judgments; and
Holding in Abeyance in the meantime the Resolution
of the Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw Case filed by
d) Petitioner and granting the Motion only after
Intervenor has been fully paid its just compensation;
and
e) Other reliefs just and equitable.[27]
Opposing the Motion for Intervention,[28] Malvar stresses
that there was no truth to the Intervenor's claim to
defraud it of its professional fees; that the Intervenor
lacked the legal capacity to intervene because it had
ceased to exist after Atty. Marwil N. Llasos resigned
from the Intervenor and Atty. Richard B. Dasal became
barred from private practice upon his appointment as
head of the Legal Department of the Small Business
Guarantee and Finance Corporation, a government
subsidiary; and that Atty. Llasos and Atty. Dasal had
personally handled her case.
Malvar adds that even assuming, arguendo, that the
Intervenor still existed as a law firm, it was still not
entitled to intervene for the following reasons, namely:
firstly, it failed to attend to her multiple pleas and
inquiries regarding the case, as when communications to
the Intervenor through text messages were left
unanswered; secondly, maintaining that this was a
justifiable cause to dismiss its services, the Intervenor
only heeded her repeated demands to withdraw from the
case when Atty. Dasal was confronted about his
appointment to the government subsidiary; thirdly, it
was misleading and grossly erroneous for the Intervenor
to claim that it had rendered to her full and satisfactory
services when the truth was that its participation was
strictly limited to the preparation, finalization and
submission of the petition for review with the Supreme
Court; and finally, while the Intervenor withdrew its
services on October 5, 2009, the compromise agreement
was executed with the respondents on December 9, 2010
and notarized on December 14, 2010, after more than a
year and two months, dispelling any badge of bad faith
on their end.
On June 21, 2011, the respondents filed their comment
to the Intervenor's Motion for Intervention.
On November 18, 2011, the Intervenor submitted its
position on the respondent's comment dated June 21,
2011,[29] and thereafter the respondents sent in their
reply.[30]
Issues
The issues for our consideration and determination are
twofold, namely: (a) whether or not Malvar's motion to
dismiss the petition on the ground of the execution of the
compromise agreement was proper; and (b) whether or
not the Motion for Intervention to protect attorney's
rights can prosper, and, if so, how much could it recover
as attorney's fees.
Ruling of the Court
We shall decide the issues accordingly.
1.
Client's right to settle litigation by compromise
agreement, and to terminate counsel; limitations
A compromise agreement is a contract, whereby the
parties undertake reciprocal obligations to avoid
litigation, or put an end to one already
commenced.[31] The client may enter into a compromise
agreement with the adverse party to terminate the
litigation before a judgment is rendered therein. [32] If the
compromise agreement is found to be in order and not
contrary to law, morals, good customs and public policy,
its judicial approval is in order.[33] A compromise
agreement, once approved by final order of the court, has
the force of res judicata between the parties and will not
be disturbed except for vices of consent or forgery. [34]
A client has an undoubted right to settle her litigation
without the intervention of the attorney, for the former is
generally conceded to have exclusive control over the
subject matter of the litigation and may at any time, if
acting in good faith, settle and adjust the cause of action
out of court before judgment, even without the attorney's
intervention.[35] It is important for the client to show,
however, that the compromise agreement does not
adversely affect third persons who are not parties to the
agreement.[36]
By the same token, a client has the absolute right to
terminate the attorney-client relationship at any time
with or without cause.[37] But this right of the client is
not unlimited because good faith is required in
terminating the relationship. The limitation is based on
Article 19 of the Civil Code, which mandates that
"[e]very person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."
The right is also subject to the right of the attorney to be
compensated. This is clear from Section 26, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 26. Change of attorneys. - An attorney may
retire at any time from any action or special proceeding,
by the written consent of his client filed in court. He may
also retire at any time from an action or special
proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the
court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on
hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to retire.
In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly
employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in
place of the former one, and written notice of the change
shall be given to the adverse party.
A client may at any time dismiss his attorney or
substitute another in his place, but if the contract
between client and attorney has been reduced to
writing and the dismissal of the attorney was without
justifiable cause, he shall be entitled to recover from
the client the full compensation stipulated in the
contract. However, the attorney may, in the
discretion of the court, intervene in the case to
protect his rights. For the payment of his
compensation the attorney shall have a lien upon all
judgments for the payment of money, and executions
issued in pursuance of such judgment, rendered in
the case wherein his services had been retained by
the client. (Bold emphasis supplied)
In fine, it is basic that an attorney is entitled to have and
to receive a just and reasonable compensation for
services performed at the special instance and request of
his client. The attorney who has acted in good faith and
honesty in representing and serving the interests of the
client should be reasonably compensated for his
service.[38]
2.
Compromise agreement is to be approved despite
favorable action on the Intervenor's Motion for
Intervention
On considerations of equity and fairness, the Court
disapproves of the tendencies of clients compromising
their cases behind the backs of their attorneys for the
purpose of unreasonably reducing or completely setting
to naught the stipulated contingent fees.[39] Thus, the
Court grants the Intervenor's Motion for Intervention to
Protect Attorney's Rights as a measure of protecting the
Intervenor's right to its stipulated professional fees that
would be denied under the compromise agreement. The
Court does so in the interest of protecting the rights of
the practicing Bar rendering professional services on
contingent fee basis.
Nonetheless, the claim for attorney's fees does not void
or nullify the compromise agreement between Malvar
and the respondents. There being no obstacles to its
approval, the Court approves the compromise
agreement. The Court adds, however, that the Intervenor
is not left without a remedy, for the payment of its
adequate and reasonable compensation could not be
annulled by the settlement of the litigation without its
participation and conformity. It remains entitled to the
compensation, and its right is safeguarded by the Court
because its members are officers of the Court who are as
entitled to judicial protection against injustice or
imposition of fraud committed by the client as much as
the client is against their abuses as her counsel. In other
words, the duty of the Court is not only to ensure that the
attorney acts in a proper and lawful manner, but also to
see to it that the attorney is paid his just fees. Even if the
compensation of the attorney is dependent only on
winning the litigation, the subsequent withdrawal of the
case upon the client's initiative would not deprive the
attorney of the legitimate compensation for professional
services rendered.[40]
The basis of the intervention is the written agreement on
contingent fees contained in the engagement executed on
March 19, 2008 between Malvar and the
Intervenor,[41] the pertinent portion of which stipulated
that the Intervenor would "collect ten percent (10%) of
the amount of PhP14,252,192.12 upon its collection and
another ten percent (10%) of the remaining balance of
PhP41,627,593.75 upon collection thereof, and also ten
percent (10%) of whatever is the value of the stock
option you are entitled to under the Decision." There is
no question that such arrangement was a contingent fee
agreement that was valid in this jurisdiction, provided
the fees therein fixed were reasonable. [42]
We hold that the contingent fee of 10% of
P41,627,593.75 and 10% of the value of the stock option
was reasonable. The P41,627,593.75 was already
awarded to Malvar by the NLRC but the award became
the subject of the appeal in this Court because the CA
reversed the NLRC. Be that as it may, her subsequent
change of mind on the amount sought from the
respondents as reflected in the compromise agreement
should not negate or bar the Intervenor's recovery of the
agreed attorney's fees.
Considering that in the event of a dispute between the
attorney and the client as to the amount of fees, and the
intervention of the courts is sought, the determination
requires that there be evidence to prove the amount of
fees and the extent and value of the services rendered,
taking into account the facts determinative thereof,[43] the
history of the Intervenor's legal representation of Malvar
can provide a helpful predicate for resolving the dispute
between her and the Intervenor.
The records reveal that on March 18, 2008, Malvar
engaged the professional services of the Intervenor to
represent her in the case of illegal dismissal. At that
time, the case was pending in the CA at the respondents'
instance after the NLRC had set aside the RCU's
computation of Malvar's backwages and monetary
benefits, and had upheld the computation arrived at by
the NLRC Computation Unit. On April 17, 2008, the CA
set aside the assailed resolution of the NLRC, and
remanded the case to the Labor Arbiter for the
computation of her monetary awards. It was at this
juncture that the Intervenor commenced its legal service,
which included the following incidents, namely:
a) Upon the assumption of its professional duties as
Malvar's counsel, a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 17, 2008
consisting of thirty-eight pages was filed before the
Court of Appeals on May 6, 2008.
b) On June 2, 2009, Intervenors filed a Comment to
Respondents' Motion for Partial Reconsideration, said
Comment consisted 8 pages.
c) In the execution proceedings before Labor Arbiter
Jaime Reyno, Intervenor prepared and filed on Malvar's
behalf an "Ex-Parte Motion to Release to Complainant
the Undisputed amount of P14,252,192.12" in NLRC
NCR Case No. 30-07-02716-00.
d) On July 29, 2000, Intervenor prepared and filed
before the Labor Arbiter a Comment to Respondents'
Opposition to the "Ex-Parte Motion to Release" and a
"Motion Reiterating Immediate Implementation of the
Writ of Execution"

e) On August 6, 2008, Intervenor prepared and filed
before the Labor Arbiter Malvar's Motion Reiterating
Motion to Release the Amount of P14,252,192.12. [44]
The decision promulgated on April 17, 2008[45] and the
resolution promulgated on July 30, 2008 [46] by the CA
prompted Malvar to appeal on August 15, 2008 to this
Court with the assistance of the Intervenor. All the
subsequent pleadings, including the reply of April 13,
2009,[47] were prepared and filed in Malvar's behalf by
the Intervenor.
Malvar should accept that the practice of law was not
limited to the conduct of cases or litigations in court but
embraced also the preparation of pleadings and other
papers incidental to the cases or litigations as well as the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf
of the clients.[48]Consequently, fairness and justice
demand that the Intervenor be accorded full recognition
as her counsel who discharged its responsibility for
Malvar's cause to its successful end.
But, as earlier pointed out, although a client may dismiss
her lawyer at any time, the dismissal must be for a
justifiable cause if a written contract between the lawyer
and the client exists.[49] Considering the undisputed
existence of the written agreement on contingent fees,
the question begging to be answered is: Was the
Intervenor dismissed for a justifiable cause?
We do not think so.
In the absence of the lawyer's fault, consent or waiver, a
client cannot deprive the lawyer of his just fees already
earned in the guise of a justifiable reason. Here, Malvar
not only downplayed the worth of the Intervenor's legal
service to her but also attempted to camouflage her
intent to defraud her lawyer by offering excuses that
were not only inconsistent with her actions but, most
importantly, fell short of being justifiable.
The letter Malvar addressed to Retired Justice Bellosillo,
who represented the Intervenor, debunked her
allegations of unsatisfactory legal service because she
thereby lavishly lauded the Intervenor for its dedication
and devotion to the prosecution of her case and to the
protection of her interests. Also significant was that the
attorney-client relationship between her and the
Intervenor was not severed upon Atty. Dasal's
appointment to public office and Atty. Llasos'
resignation from the law firm. In other words, the
Intervenor remained as her counsel of record, for, as we
held in Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo and Africa v.
Eastern Telecommunication Philippines, Inc.,[50] a client
who employs a law firm engages the entire law firm;
hence, the resignation, retirement or separation from the
law firm of the handling lawyer does not terminate the
relationship, because the law firm is bound to provide a
replacement.
The stipulations of the written agreement between
Malvar and the Intervenors, not being contrary to law,
morals, public policy, public order or good customs,
were valid and binding on her. They expressly gave rise
to the right of the Intervenor to demand compensation.
In a word, she could not simply walk away from her
contractual obligations towards the Intervenor, for
Article 1159 of the Civil Code provides that obligations
arising from contracts have the force of law between the
parties and should be complied with in good faith.
To be sure, the Intervenor's withdrawal from the case
neither cancelled nor terminated the written agreement
on the contingent attorney's fees. Nor did the withdrawal
constitute a waiver of the agreement. On the contrary,
the agreement continued between them because the
Intervenor's Manifestation (with Motion to Withdraw as
Counsel for Petitioner) explicitly called upon the Court
to safeguard its rights under the written agreement, to
wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, undersigned
counsel respectfully pray that instant Motion to
Withdraw as Counsel for Petitioner be granted and their
attorney's lien pursuant to the written agreement be
reflected in the judgment or decision that may be
rendered hereafter conformably with par. 2, Sec. 26,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Undersigned counsel further requests that they be
furnished copy of the decision, resolutions and other
legal processes of this Honorable Court to enable them
to protect their interests.[51]
Were the respondents also liable?
The respondents would be liable if they were shown to
have connived with Malvar in the execution of the
compromise agreement, with the intention of depriving
the Intervenor of its attorney's fees. Thereby, they would
be solidarily liable with her for the attorney's fees as
stipulated in the written agreement under the theory that
they unfairly and unjustly interfered with the
Intervenor's professional relationship with Malvar.
The respondents insist that they were not bound by the
written agreement, and should not be held liable under it.
We disagree with the respondents' insistence. The
respondents were complicit in Malvar's move to deprive
the Intervenor of its duly earned contingent fees.
First of all, the unusual timing of Malvar's letter
terminating the Intervenor's legal representation of her,
of her Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw Case, and of the
execution of compromise agreement manifested her
desire to evade her legal obligation to pay to the
Intervenor its attorney's fees for the legal services
rendered. The objective of her withdrawal of the case
was to release the respondents from all her claims and
causes of action in consideration of the settlement in the
stated amount of P40,000.000.00, a sum that was measly
compared to what she was legally entitled to, which, to
begin with, already included the P41,627,593.75 and the
value of the stock option already awarded to her. In other
words, she thereby waived more than what she was
lawfully expected to receive from the respondents.
Secondly, the respondents suddenly turned around from
their strong stance of berating her demand as offensive
to all precepts of justice and fair play and as a form of
unjust enrichment for her to a surprisingly generous
surrender to her demand, allowing to her through their
compromise agreement the additional amount of
P40,000,000.00 on top of the P14,252,192.12 already
received by her in August 2008. The softening
unavoidably gives the impression that they were now
categorically conceding that Malvar deserved much
more. Under those circumstances, it is plausible to
conclude that her termination of the Intervenor's services
was instigated by their prodding in order to remove the
Intervenor from the picture for being a solid obstruction
to the settlement for a much lower liability, and thereby
save for themselves and for her some more amount.
Thirdly, the compromise agreement was silent on the
Intervenor's contingent fee, indicating that the objective
of the compromise agreement was to secure a huge
discount from its liability towards Malvar.
Finally, contrary to the stipulation in the compromise
agreement, only Malvar, minus the respondents, filed the
Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw Case.
At this juncture, the Court notes that the compromise
agreement would have Malvar waive even the
substantial stock options already awarded by the NLRC's
decision,[52] which ordered the respondents to pay to her,
among others, the value of the stock options and all other
bonuses she was entitled to or would have been entitled
to had she not been illegally dismissed from her
employment. This ruling was affirmed by the CA. [53] But
the waiver could not negate the Intervenor's right to 10%
of the value of the stock options she was legally entitled
to under the decisions of the NLRC and the CA, for that
right was expressly stated in the written agreement
between her and the Intervenor. Thus, the Intervenor
should be declared entitled to recover full compensation
in accordance with the written agreement because it did
not assent to the waiver of the stock options, and did not
waive its right to that part of its compensation.
These circumstances show that Malvar and the
respondents needed an escape from greater liability
towards the Intervenor, and from the possible obstacle to
their plan to settle to pay. It cannot be simply assumed
that only Malvar would be liable towards the Intervenor
at that point, considering that the Intervenor, had it
joined the negotiations as her lawyer, would have
tenaciously fought all the way for her to receive literally
everything that she was entitled to, especially the
benefits from the stock option. Her rush to settle because
of her financial concerns could have led her to accept the
respondents' offer, which offer could be further reduced
by the Intervenor's expected demand for compensation.
Thereby, she and the respondents became joint tort-
feasors who acted adversely against the interests of the
Intervenor. Joint tort-feasors are those who command,
instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance,
cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who
approve of it after it is done, if done for their
benefit.[54] They are also referred to as those who act
together in committing wrong or whose acts, if
independent of each other, unite in causing a single
injury.[55] Under Article 2194 of the Civil Code, joint
tort-feasors are solidarily liable for the resulting damage.
As regards the extent of their respective liabilities, the
Court said in Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of
Appeals:[56]
x x x. Where several causes producing an injury are
concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which
the injury would not have happened, the injury may be
attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be
had against any or all of the responsible persons
although under the circumstances of the case, it may
appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the
duty owed by them to the injured person was not same.
No actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause
merely because it does not exceed the negligence of
other acts. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire
result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause
of the injury.
There is no contribution between joint tort-feasors whose
liability is solidary since both of them are liable for the
total damage. Where the concurrent or successive
negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons,
although acting independently, are in combination the
direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third
person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion
each contributed to the injury and either of them is
responsible for the whole injury. x x x
Joint tort-feasors are each liable as principals, to the
same extent and in the same manner as if they had
performed the wrongful act themselves. It is likewise not
an excuse for any of the joint tort-feasors that individual
participation in the tort was insignificant as compared to
that of the other.[57] To stress, joint tort-feasors are not
liable pro rata. The damages cannot be apportioned
among them, except by themselves. They cannot insist
upon an apportionment, for the purpose of each paying
an aliquot part. They are jointly and severally liable for
the whole amount.[58] Thus, as joint tort-feasors, Malvar
and the respondents should be held solidarily liable to
the Intervenor. There is no way of appreciating these
circumstances except in this light.
That the value of the stock options that Malvar waived
under the compromise agreement has not been fixed as
yet is no hindrance to the implementation of this
decision in favor of the Intervenor. The valuation could
be reliably made at a subsequent time from the finality
of this adjudication. It is enough for the Court to hold the
respondents and Malvar solidarily liable for the 10% of
that value of the stock options.
As a final word, it is necessary to state that no court can
shirk from enforcing the contractual stipulations in the
manner they have agreed upon and written. As a rule, the
courts, whether trial or appellate, have no power to make
or modify contracts between the parties. Nor can the
courts save the parties from disadvantageous
provisions.[59] The same precepts hold sway when it
comes to enforcing fee arrangements entered into in
writing between clients and attorneys. In the exercise of
their supervisory authority over attorneys as officers of
the Court, the courts are bound to respect and protect the
attorney's lien as a necessary means to preserve the
decorum and respectability of the Law
Profession.[60] Hence, the Court must thwart any and
every effort of clients already served by their attorneys'
worthy services to deprive them of their hard-earned
compensation. Truly, the duty of the courts is not only to
see to it that attorneys act in a proper and lawful manner,
but also to see to it that attorneys are paid their just and
lawful fees.[61]
WHEREFORE, the Court APPROVES the
compromise agreement; GRANTS the Motion for
Intervention to Protect Attorney's Rights;
and ORDERS Czarina T. Malvar and respondents Kraft
Food Philippines Inc. and Kraft Foods International to
jointly and severally pay to Intervenor Law Firm,
represented by Retired Associate Justice Josue N.
Bellosillo, its stipulated contingent fees of 10% of
P41,627,593.75, and the further sum equivalent to 10%
of the value of the stock option.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
LILY FLORES-SALADO, MINDA FLORES LURA,
& FE V. FLORES v. ATTY ROMAN
VILLANUEVA
AC NO 11099, SEPT 27 2016
BERSAMIN, J.:
Disbarment proceedings based on falsification or forgery
of public documents should not be the occasion to
establish the falsification or forgery. Such bases should
first be duly and competently established either in
criminal or civil proceedings appropriate for that
purpose.
The Case
We hereby consider and resolve the disbarment
complaint lodged against Atty. Roman A. Villanueva, Jr.
for allegedly falsifying a public document concerning
realty, and for allegedly concealing his true age m order
to secure his appointment as state prosecutor.
Antecedents
Lily Flores-Salado, Minda Flores-Lura, Anacorito
Flores, Angel Flores, Jr., and Fe Flores presented their
adverse claim[1] on the parcel of land situated in Nasipit,
Agusan del Norte and registered under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 7919 of the Registry of
Deeds of Agusan del Norte under the names of Spouses
Roman Villanueva, Jr. and Rosario L. Alipao. [2] The
Register of Deeds annotated the adverse claim on
January 23, 2007 as Entry No. 67251. [3] On December
27, 2007, an affidavit of waiver/withdrawal, which
appeared to have been signed by them, [4] was also
annotated on TCT No. 7919 as Entry No. 72573.[5] On
March 26, 2008, the Register of Deeds canceled TCT
No. 7919,[6] and issued two new TCTs in the name of the
respondent.[7]
On October 29, 2009, complainants Lily Flores-Salado,
Minda Flores Lura, and Fe Flores lodged their complaint
with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) charging
the respondent with gross dishonesty on the basis of their
assertion therein that they had not signed the affidavit of
waiver/withdrawal.[8] They thereby further charged him
with dishonesty for concealing his true age in order to
secure his appointment in 2006 as a state prosecutor.
They avered that he was disqualified for the position
because he had already been 70 years old at the time of
his appointment,[9] having been born on June 26, 1936;
that they submitted as proof: (1) the residence certificate
issued in the name of "Isabelo Villanueva, Jr.," whom
they claimed was the respondent himself, stating June
26, 1936 as his birthdate;[10] (2) the deed of extrajudicial
partition of the estate of Roman Villanueva, Sr. showing
that the respondent was 14 years old when he signed the
document as "Isabelo Villanueva";[11] (3) the
certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Tupi, South Cotabato[12] showing that he was 26 years
old when he got married on December 24, 1961; and (4)
the affidavits respectively executed by his siblings,
Francisca V. Flores[13] and Tarcela V. Sajulan.[14]
The respondent denied the charges, and imputed ill-
motives to the complainants in filing the disbarment
complaint against him.[15] He contended that the
complainants did not present sufficient proof showing
that he had falsified the affidavit of waiver/withdrawal;
and asserted that the basis for the partition of the
contested property had been the compromise agreement
entered into by him and his siblings, including Francisca,
the complainants' mother;[16] and that he had been born
on November 29, 1943, as indicated in his birth
certificate.[17]
IBP Report and Recommendation
After due hearing, Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez of
the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD)
submitted his report and recommendation[18] finding the
respondent liable for gross misconduct in relation to the
forged the affidavit of waiver/withdrawal, and
recommended his two-year suspension from the practice
of law. Commissioner Fernandez dismissed the charge
of dishonesty in relation to the respondent's age because
his birth certificate prevailed over the documents
submitted by the complainants.[19]
On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued
Resolution No. XX-2013-278[20] adopting the report and
recommendation of Commissioner Fernandez, viz.:
RESOLUTION NO. XX-2013-278
CBD Case No. 10-2684
Lily Salado, et al. vs.
Atty. Roman A. Villanueva, Jr.
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it 1s hereby
unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A," and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules and considering
that Respondent was guilty of gross misconduct when he
falsified an Affidavit of Waiver/Withdrawal by reason of
which TCT Nos. RT-8320 and 8381 in his name were
issued, Atty. Roman A. Villanueva, Jr. is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two
(2) years. However, the charge of falsifying his age to
qualify as DOJ Prosecutor is hereby Dismissed for lack
of merit.[21] (Bold emphasis in the original)
The pat1ies respectively sought reconsideration. [22] On
June 6, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors denied the
respondent's motion for reconsideration but granted that
of the complainants, to wit:
RESOLUTION NO. XXI-2015-417
CBD Case No. 10-2684
Lily Salado, et al.
Atty. Roman A. Villanueva, Jr.
RESOLVED to DENY Respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration, there being no cogent reason to reverse
the findings and resolution subject of the motion, it
being a mere reiteration of the matters which had already
been threshed out and taken into consideration.
RESOLVED FUTHER, to GRANT the Complainants'
Motion for Reconsideration, considering Respondent's
gross dishonesty by making himself younger when he
applied as Public Prosecutor in the Department of
Justice. Thus, Resolution No. XX-2013-278, dated
March 20, 2013, is hereby AFFIRMED with
modification, increasing the penalty imposed on Atty.
Roman A. Villanueva, Jr. to Suspension from the
practice of law for three (3) years.[23](Bold emphasis in
the original)
Issue
Should the respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for gross misconduct and gross dishonesty?
Ruling of the Court
We reverse the findings and recommendation of the IBP
Board of Governors considering that the charges were
not competently substantiated.
I been belatedly registered at his own instance.
Falsification must be proved in the
appropriate criminal or civil proceeding,
not in the disbarment proceeding
The complainants support their allegations of
falsification by presenting the affidavit of
waiver/withdrawal itself and its annotation on TCT No.
7919; and by denying their having signed the same.
However, such proof was inadequate to establish that the
respondent had been the author of the alleged
falsification of the affidavit of waiver/withdrawal.
We emphasize that allegations of falsification or forgery
must be competently proved because falsification or
forgery cannot be presumed.[24]As such, the allegations
should first be established and determined in appropriate
proceedings,[25] like in criminal or civil cases, for it is
only by such proceedings that the last word on the falsity
or forgery can be uttered by a court of law with the legal
competence to do so. A disbarment proceeding is not the
occasion to determine the issue of falsification or forgery
simply because the sole issue to be addressed and
determined therein is whether or not the respondent
attorney is still fit to continue to be an officer of the
court in the dispensation of justice.[26] Accordingly, we
decline to rule herein whether or not the respondent had
committed the supposed falsification of the affidavit of
waiver/withdrawal in the absence of the prior
determination thereof in the appropriate proceeding.
Moreover, the complainants have hereby challenged the
due execution and authenticity of the affidavit of
waiver/withdrawal, a notarized document.[27]In view of
this, the complainants' mere denial of having signed the
affidavit of waiver/withdrawal did not suffice to
overcome the positive value of it as a notarized
document.[28] It is settled that notarization converts a
private document into a public document, whereby the
document becomes entitled to full faith and credit upon
its face.[29] The notarized document then has in its favor
the presumption of regularity, and to overcome the
presumed regularity of its execution, whoever alleges the
contrary should present evidence that is clear,
convincing and more than merely preponderant. [30]
II
The birth certificate is the best evidence
of the respondent's date of birth
The complainants have also charged the respondent with
dishonesty for having concealed his true age in order to
secure his appointment as a state prosecutor. They have
presented in support of the charge the residence
certificate issued in the name of one "Isabelo Villanueva,
Jr."; an extrajudicial settlement signed by one "Isabelo
Villanueva"; the certificate issued by the Local Civil
Registrar of Tupi, South Cotabato showing that the
respondent was 26 years old when he got married in 1
961; and the affidavits of the respondent's two siblings.
In contrast, the respondent submitted his certificate of
birth that indicated his birthdate as "November 29,
1943."
Still, the complainants doubted the veracity of the
respondent's bit1h certificate on the ground of its having
The Court nonetheless finds for the respondent.
Firstly, as previously emphasized, the allegation of the
falsity of the affidavit of waiver/withdrawal should first
be determined in the appropriate criminal or civil
proceeding, not in this proceeding for disbarment.
Consequently, we desist from definitively ruling on the
weight of the evidence presented by the complainants.
Secondly, a birth certificate consists of entries related to
the fact of birth in public records, and is made in the
performance of duty by the local civil registrar as a
public officer.[31] It is thus treated as the prima
facie evidence of the fact of one's birth, and can be
rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary.[32] As such, the birth certificate submitted by
the respondent was decisive on the date of his birth in
the absence of clearer and more convincing contrary
evidence.
Thirdly, the veracity of the respondent's birth certificate
cannot be successfully assailed on the basis alone of its
being belatedly entered in the local civil registry. This is
because the State expressly allows the late registration of
births not only at the instance of the father, mother, or
guardian in case the person whose birth is to be
registered is under 18 years of age, but also at the
instance of the person himself when already of age. [33]
To accord with such policy of the State, the fact of late
registration of the respondent's birth should not
adversely affect the validity of the entries made in his
birth certificate.
And, finally, it is fitting to state that the complainants
bore the burden of proof in this disbarment proceeding
against the respondent. They must establish their charges
of falsification and dishonesty by convincing and
satisfactory proof.[34] Surmises, suspicion and
conjectures are not bases of finding his
culpability.[35] The foregoing disquisitions on the
falsification show that the complainants did not
discharge their burden of proof thereon. They also did
not convincingly establish that the respondent had
willfully adjusted his true age to secure his appointment
as a state prosecutor. Indeed, the appointment happened
on February 22, 2006[36] but his late registration of his
birth occurred on July 3, 2006.[37] If the intention for the
late registration was to make it appear that he st ill met
the age requirement for public prosecutors, he should
have effected the late registration prior to the
appointment, not several months subsequently. In
addition, he submitted a "Voter Certification" showing
him to be a registered voter of Balagtas (Bigaa), Bulacan
on September 20, 2003, and to have been born on
November 29, 1943.[38] Under the circumstances, that he
had intentionally adjusted his birthdate to enable himself
to meet the age requirement for the position of state
prosecutor three years later became plainly improbable.

III

Disbarment or suspension complaints against

lawyers
in the public service involving their qualifications
should be initially investigated by the agencies or
offices
having administrative supervision over them

The Court finds the need to clarify that although it may

entertain a disbarment or suspension complaint brought
against a lawyer employed in the government service
whether or not the complaint pertained to an act or
conduct unrelated to the discharge of his official
functions,[39] the investigation should be carried out by
the agency or office having administrative supervision
over him or her when the allegations of the complaint
relate to the qualifications of the respondent to be
appointed to the public office.

Accordingly, any questions pertaining to the

qualifications of the respondent to be appointed as a state
prosecutor should be directed to the Secretary of Justice
who had administrative supervision over him under the
law,[40] and not to this Court in the guise of the
disbarment complaint. The complaint for disbarment
is sui generis, and the proceeding thereon should focus
only on the qualification and fitness of the respondent
lawyer to continue membership in the Bar.[41]

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the disbarment

complaint against Atty. Roman A. Villanueva, Jr. for
lack of factual and legal merit.

SO ORDERED.
INTERADENT ZAHNTECHNIK PH INC. v. ATTY
REBECCA SIMBILLO
AC NO 9464, AUG 24 2016
BERSAMIN, J.:
A complaint for disbarment based on the respondent
attorney's alleged moral turpitude cannot prosper after
the criminal cases charging him with offenses involving
moral turpitude were dismissed by the competent trial
courts. The rule regarding this ground for disbarment
requires the respondent attorney's conviction of the
offense involving moral turpitude by final judgment.
Antecedents
On March 12, 2012, the Office of the Bar Confidant
(OBC) received a letter from the attorney for
complainant Intradent Zahnetchnik Philippines, Inc.
informing about several criminal cases filed and pending
against respondent Rebecca Francisco-Simbillo. The
criminal cases had been filed by the complainant to
charge the respondent with estafa and qualified theft in
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Parañaque City
(docketed as I.S. No. XV-12-INV-11-J-03189), and with
violation of Article 291 of the Revised Penal Codein the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City (docketed
as I.S. No. XV-03-INV-11-J-08553). The complainant
pointed out that the charges for estafa and qualified theft
involved moral turpitude.[1]
At the time, the results of the 2011 Bar Examinations
had just been released, and the respondent was among
those who had passed. She was in due course formally
notified by the OBC of the letter of the complainant, and
thereby required to file her comment within 15 days
from notice. The OBC also informed her that she could
join the mass oath taking for the new lawyers, but she
would not be allowed to enroll her name in the Roll of
Attorneys until the charges against her had been
cleared.[2] Upon the advice of the OBC, she had the other
option to sign the Roll of Attorneys subject to the
condition that the letter of the complainant would be
automatically converted to a disbarment complaint
against her. Choosing the latter, she signed the Roll of
Attorneys on May 3, 2012.[3]
In her comment, the respondent stated that she had been
employed by the complainant for four years; that her
employment had lasted until she was illegally dismissed;
that she instituted a labor case against the complainant;
that the criminal charges filed against her were intended
to malign, inconvenience, and harass her, and to force
her to desist from pursuing the labor case; and that at the
time of the filing of her comment, the criminal
complaints brought against her were still pending
determination of probable cause by the respective
Offices of the City Prosecutor. [4]
On June 8, 2012, the respondent filed a manifestation
stating that the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Parañaque City had already dismissed the criminal
charge docketed as XV-12-INV-11-J-03189.[5]
The complainant immediately countered that although
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Parañaque City had
dismissed its complaint for estafa and qualified theft, it
had timely brought an appeal to the Department of
Justice (DOJ); and that the criminal case against the
respondent should still be considered as pending. [6]
On February 18, 2015, the respondent filed a motion
seeking the resolution of this disbarment case, alleging
that the DOJ had denied the complainant's appeal in
respect of XV-12-INV-11-J-03189; and that as to the
criminal charge docketed as XV-03-INV-11-J-08553,
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City had
filed an information against her in the Metropolitan Trial
Court in Quezon City, but Branch 33 of that court had
eventually dismissed the information upon the
Prosecution's motion for the withdrawal of the
information with leave of court.[7]
Issue
May the disbarment complaint against the respondent
prosper?
Ruling of the Court
We rule in favor of the respondent.
We observe that this administrative case started as a
complaint to prevent the respondent from being admitted
to the Philippine Bar on the ground of the existence of
criminal charges brought against her for crimes
involving moral turpitude. Indeed, Section 2, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court requires that any applicant for
admission to the Bar must show that no charges against
him or her for crimes involving moral turpitude have
been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.
However, this administrative case has since been
converted to one for disbarment but without the
complainant, which has all the while continued to
actively participate herein, alleging any ground for
finding the respondent administratively liable except
those already averred in its letter to the OBC. The
complainant has not also shown that there were other
criminal cases involving moral turpitude filed against the
respondent.
Under Section 27,[8] Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a
lawyer may be disbarred on any of the following
grounds, namely: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross
misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5)
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6)
violation of the lawyers oath; (7) willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court; and (8) corruptly or
willfully appearing as a lawyer for a party to a case
without authority so to do. In fine, in order to hold the
lawyer amenable to disbarment by reason of his or her
having committed a crime involving moral turpitude, it
is not enough to show that there is a pending case
involving moral turpitude against him or her, because
Section 27 of Rule 138 expressly requires that he or she
must have been found by final judgment guilty of the
crime involving moral turpitude.
The complainant did not allege, much less prove, that the
respondent had been convicted by final judgment of any
criminal offense involving moral turpitude. On the
contrary, the criminal cases that were the sole bases for
the complaint for disbarment had already been dismissed
after due proceedings. Although the complainant might
have availed itself of the available remedies to review or
reverse the dismissals, it behooves the Court to terminate
this case against her now considering that, as indicated,
the mere existence or pendency of the criminal charges
for crimes involving moral turpitude is not a ground for
disbarment or suspension of an attorney.[9]

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES this disbarment

case against respondent Arty. Rebecca S. Francisco-
Simbillo.

SO ORDERED.
 GSIS v. CANCINO-ERUM
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2182 [FORMERLY A.M. NO. 08-
3007-RTJ], SEPT 25 2012
BERSAMIN, J.:
For resolution are the respondents' separate motions
seeking the reconsideration of the resolution
promulgated on June 3, 2009,[1] whereby the Court,
adopting and approving the recommendation of the
Office of the Court of Administrator (OCA), imposed a
fine of P5,000.00 on each of them for violating the rules
regulating the raffle of cases.[2]
Antecedents
This administrative complaint emanated from the filing
on July 18, 2008 by one Belinda Martizano (Martizano)
of a suit to restrain the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC), Land Transportation Office
(LTO), Stradcom Corporation (STRADCOM), Insurance
Commission, and Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) from implementing DOTC Department Order
No. 2007-28 (DO 2007-28), an issuance that constituted
the LTO the sole insurance provider of compulsory third
party liability (CTPL) that was required for the
registration of motor vehicles.
The suit, docketed as Civil Case No. MC08-3660 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Mandaluyong City,
claimed that the implementation of DO 2007-28 would
deprive Martizano of her livelihood as an insurance
agent.[3] She applied for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO). On July 21, 2008, Civil Case
No. MC08-3660 was raffled and assigned to Branch 213
of the RTC, presided by respondent Judge Carlos A.
Valenzuela.[4]
On October 2, 2008, GSIS charged respondent RTC
Judge Maria A. Cancino-Erum, the then Executive Judge
of the RTC in Mandaluyong City, with grave
misconduct, gross ignorance of the law, and violation of
the Rules of Court.[5] On the same date, GSIS also
charged Judge Valenzuela with grave misconduct, gross
ignorance of the law, violation of the Rules of Court, and
knowingly rendering an unjust order. [6]
The charges against the respondents were both based on
the non- raffling of Civil Case No. MC08-
3660. Allegedly, Judge Erum violated Section 2, Rule
20 of the Rules of Court by assigning Civil Case No.
MC083660 to Branch 213 without the benefit of a raffle.
According to the GSIS, the raffle of Civil Case No.
MC08-3660 had been set on July 21, 2008 at 1:00 p.m.
inside the courtroom of Judge Erum. On said date, all
the parties, as well as the members of the raffle
committee, namely, the respondents and RTC Judge
Esteban A. Tacla, Jr., attended. For the conduct of the
raffle, a roulette bearing the numbers 208, 212, 213 and
214 (representing the RTC Branches involved in the
raffle) was brought inside the courtroom. However,
Judge Erum announced that Civil Case No. MC08-3660
was being assigned to Branch 213 because Branches
208, 212, and 214 had already been assigned an
injunction case each, leaving only Branch 213 without
an injunction case. She then explained the practice that
once a TRO/injunction case had been raffled to a
Branch, that particular Branch would be automatically
excluded from the raffle until all the other Branches had
each been assigned a TRO/injunction case. Thus, there
being only four regular RTC Branches in Mandaluyong
City (i.e., Branches 208, 212, 213 and 214), every fourth
TRO/injunction case filed was no longer raffled but
automatically assigned to the remaining Branch.
GSIS stated that it sought a clarification from Judge
Erum on the non- raffling of Civil Case No. MC08-3660
to know which particular Supreme Court circular
authorized the rotation scheme, but Judge Erum merely
replied that the scheme had been a long-standing
practice of raffling and assigning TRO/injunction cases
in the RTC in Mandaluyong City; that it subsequently
requested the re-raffle of Civil Case No. MC08-3660
through its letter dated September 1, 2008; that Judge
Erum denied the request on the ground that there was
nothing irregular in the assignment of Civil Case No.
MC08-3660 to Branch 213; that such conduct showed
her incompetence, lack of integrity, and partiality; and
that she thereby gave rise to an anomalous situation in
which
xxx. [A]ll that a litigant with an injunction complaint in
Mandaluyong has to do is to time the filing of his her
case by waiting until the favored judge is the only sala
left without an injunction case. Considering that there
are only four salas in Mandaluyong, a litigant may not
have to wait long until this happens. Once the favored
judge is the only sala left, then the litigant is assured that
his or her case will automatically be assigned to that
judge.[7]
Against Judge Valenzuela, GSIS asserted that he showed
manifest partiality as a member of the Raffle Committee
by consenting to the assignment of Civil Case No.
MC08-3660 to his Branch without the benefit of raffle;
that despite having previously worked at FGU Insurance
Corporation, a member of the Philippine Insurance and
Reinsurance Association (PIRA) that had actively
opposed the implementation of DO 2007-28 and had
even filed a petition in the RTC in Makati City for the
nullification of DO 2007-28, he refused to inhibit
himself from handling Civil Case No. MC08-3660, and,
instead, issued a TRO restraining the implementation of
DO 2007-28 despite Martizano's failure to substantiate
her application for the TRO, and without waiting for the
opposition and comment of STRADCOM as well as
without requiring Martizano to post a bond; and that he
also unreasonably denied the motion to dismiss filed in
Civil No. MC08-3660.[8]
In her comment dated October 24, 2008, Judge Erum
took the position that the assignment of Civil Case No.
MC08-3660 to Branch 213 was by raffle, not by rotation,
contrary to GSIS's position, thus:
14. xxx The assignment of cases including TRO cases is
by raffle, and not by "rotation" in its strict sense.
Because if we say rotation, we follow the consecutive
number of the branches participating. Relative to MC08-
3660, the 1st TRO case after closing the last preceding
round was raffled to Branch 208 on July 7, 2008 raffle
(and we used the roulette). The 2nd TRO case was
raffled to Branch 212 (and we used the roulette) on July
14, 2008 raffle, and the 3rd TRO case was raffled to
Branch 214 on July 14, 2008 raffle (and we also used the
roulette). The next raffle was held on July 21, 2008, and
that's where the case of MC08-3660 was raffled for it
was during this period that it was filed, and the case was
assigned to Branch 213, still by raffle although we did
not use the roulette anymore in this particular case.
15. Had there been "rotation" in its strict sense, and not
by raffle as what complainant is saying, then the
sequence of the raffle would be Branch 208 to get the 1st
TRO case, Branch 212 to get the 2nd TRO case, Branch
213 to get the 3rd TRO case, and the last or 4th TRO
case would be Branch 214. That did not happen in this
case because as it appears in the minutes of raffle, after
Branch 208 and Branch 212 got their share, the next
Branch to which the 3rd TRO case was raffled was to
Branch 214.
Judge Erum explained that the roulette was not used in
the assignment of Civil Case No. MC08-3660 because
only Branch 213 of the four regular Branches in
Mandaluyong City had not been assigned a TRO or
injunction case. She cited the existing practice whereby a
Branch to which a TRO was already raffled would be
excluded from the next raffle, stating that the practice
was adopted by consensus among the RTC Judges in
Mandaluyong City for the purpose of equalizing the
distribution of TRO/injunction cases among the several
Branches of the station. She insisted that GSIS lodged
the charges only because Judge Valenzuela denied its
motion to inhibit and motion to dismiss filed in Civil
Case No. MC08-3660.[9]
Judge Valenzuela submitted his own comment dated
October 20, 2008, in which he maintained as follows:
3. xxx The raffle of all cases and those which includes
application for TRO/Injunction is done on a "round
system." The raffle of cases at present only involves the
four (4) RTC branches, i.e., RTC- Branch 208, RTC-
Branch 212, RTC-Branch 213, and RTC-Branch 214,
RTC-Branch 209 having been designated as a Family
Court, a special court, hence excluded from raffle of
ordinary cases, civil and criminal, the same with RTC-
Branch 210, presided by the Executive Judge, which is
likewise a special court since the same was designated as
Drug Court, and RTC- Branch 211 which at present has
no presiding judge, the raffle of cases only involves said
four regular courts.
During the said raffle of July 21, 2008, it was only this
court which has not received its share of cases with
application for TRO/Injunction for said "round" hence,
Civil Case No. MC-08-3660 was considered raffled and
automatically assigned to the court of the undersigned at
RTC-Branch 213 to close the raffle of cases with
application for TRO/Injunction for said "round."
xxxx
In short, Civil Case No. MC08-3660 was raffled on July
21, 2008 xxx, there is no need to spin the roulette, which
was used in the raffle of cases, since it was only the
court of the undersigned which has not received its share
of civil cases with application for a TRO/Injunction for
the particular "round." The raffle committee would just
be wasting time and make fool out of ourselves if we
would still spin the roulette, on that particular raffle of
July 21, 2008 for the raffle of Civil Case No.
MC083660, and wait until the pointer of the roulette
would be finally pointed to the portion where the words
"RTC 213" is located in the roulette since it is only
RTC-Branch 213 which is the only court included in the
raffle of civil cases with application for a
TRO/Injunction for the particular "round."
Judge Valenzuela justified the proceedings taken thusly:
[T]he same was agreed upon by the judges as its internal
rules so as not burden a particular judge with several
cases with application for TRO/preliminary injunction
since as aforestated, such applications requires the
immediate attention of the judge in view of the fact that
each court has hundreds or thousands of cases clogging
in its respective dockets."
Albeit admitting being a former employee of FGU
Insurance Corporation, Judge Valenzuela clarified that
FGU Insurance Corporation was not a party in Civil
Case No. MC08-3660. He assured that all the parties in
Civil Case No. MC08-3660 were given the opportunity
to argue for or against the issuance of the TRO; that
although he had granted a period of five days to
STRADCOM within which to file its
own comment/opposition to Martizano's application for
the TRO, he did not wait anymore for STRADCOM's
written comment/opposition owing to the public interest
involved and the urgency of resolving the issues
concerning DO 2007-28. He said that the non-imposition
of a bond on Martizano was justified under Rule 58,
Section 4(b) of the Rules of Court; that he denied
the motion to dismiss because the requisites for the
grounds relied upon were not met; and that the supposed
anomaly attending the raffle proceedings was only the
product of GSIS's "polluted mind."[10]
On April 1, 2009, the OCA rendered a report, stating:
A careful study of the records of the case shows that
respondent violated the procedure on the raffle of cases
by automatically assigning a case to Branch 213 on the
ground that the said procedure has been the practice of
her predecessors.
Even on the assumption, as respondent admitted, that the
procedure has been the practice prior to her assumption
as Executive Judge, she should have borne in mind that
practice is not the law. The law is very explicit on this as
expressed by Article 7 of the New Civil Code which
provides: "Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones,
and their violation or non-observance shall not be
excused by disuse, or customs or practice to the
contrary" (Ceferino Inciong vs. Honorable Leticia S.
Mariano De Guia, A.M. No. R-249-RTJ, September 17,
1987).
Circular No. 20, dated October 4, 1979, clearly provides
that all cases filed with the court in stations or groupings
where there are two or more branches shall be assigned
or distributed to the different branches by raffle. No case
may be assigned to any branch without being raffled.
Respondents could not go against Circular No. 20 of the
Supreme Court in the exercise of its rule-making power
until it is repealed or otherwise modified.[11]
The OCA recommended that: (a) both respondents be
held guilty of violating the rules on the raffle of cases
contained in Circular No. 7 dated September 23, 1974,
with stern warning that the commission of the same or
similar acts in the future would be dealt with more
severely; (b) the charge against Judge Valenzuela for
issuing the questioned orders in Civil Case No. MC08-
3660 be dismissed for lack of merit; (c) the matter be re-
docketed as a regular administrative matter; and (d) each
of the respondents be fined P5,000.00 for violating
Circular No. 7.[12]
As earlier mentioned, on June 3, 2009, the Court,
adopting and approving the OCA's recommendations,
declared the respondents guilty of violating the rules on
the raffle of cases and fined each of them P5,000.00.[13]
Hence, the separate motions for reconsideration of the
respondents,[14]which GSIS opposed.[15] The respondents
then filed their separate replies.[16]
Issue
Were the respondents properly held administratively
liable for violating the standing rules on the raffle of
cases?
Ruling
We grant the motions for reconsideration, and reconsider
and set aside the resolution dated June 3, 2009. We
absolve the respondents.
1.
Rules in Raffling of Cases
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure has expressly made
the raffle the exclusive method of assigning cases among
several branches of a court in a judicial station by
providing in Section 2 of Rule 20, as follows:
Section 2. Assignment of Cases. The assignment of cases
to the different branches of a court shall be done
exclusively by raffle. The assignment shall be done in
open session of which adequate notice shall be given so
as to afford interested parties the opportunity to be
present. (7a,R22)
Previously, under the Revised Rules of Court (1964), the
distribution of cases among different branches by raffle
was not exclusive, considering that Rule 22 then allowed
other methods, to wit:
Section 7. Assignment of cases. In the assignment of
cases to the different branches of a Court of First
Instance or their transfer from one branch to another
whether by raffle or otherwise, the parties or their
counsel shall be given written notice sufficiently in
advance so that they may be present therein if they so
desire.
The avowed purpose of instituting raffle as the exclusive
method of assigning cases among several branches of a
court in the same station is two fold: one, to equalize the
distribution of the cases among the several branches, and
thereby foster the Court's policy of promoting speedy
and efficient disposition of cases; and, two, to ensure the
impartial adjudication of cases and thereby obviate any
suspicion regarding assignment of cases to
predetermined judges.[17]
To achieve and implement this two-fold purpose, the
Supreme Court issued Circular No. 7 on September 23,
1974, which pertinently stated:
I. RAFFLING OF CASES
All cases filed with the Court in stations or groupings
where there are two or more branches shall be assigned
or distributed to the different branches by raffle. No case
may be assigned to any branch without being raffled.
The raffle of cases should be regularly conducted at the
hour and on the day or days to be fixed by the Executive
Judge. Only the maximum number of cases, according to
their dates of filing, as can be equally distributed to all
the branches in the particular station or grouping shall be
included in the raffle. Cases in excess of the number
sufficient for equal distribution shall be included in the
next scheduled raffle, subject to the exceptions provided
in paragraphs II and IV hereof.
II. NOTICE
Notice of the day and hour of the raffle shall be posted
prominently in the bulletin boards of the Courts and at a
conspicuous place at the main door of the session hall of
the Executive Judge. Other notices to the parties may be
sent as the interest of justice may require on request of
any party and with the prior approval of the Executive
Judge. There shall be no special raffle of any case except
on meritorious application in writing by any party to the
case and with the approval of the Executive Judge.
III. MANNER OF RAFFLING
The raffle must be conducted at the lawyer's table in
open court by the Executive Judge personally with the
attendance of two other Judges or, in case of the latter's
inability, of their duly authorized representatives. In
stations where there are only two salas the Judges of
both or either and the Clerk of Court or the Branch Clerk
of Court should be present. In the absence of the
Executive Judge, the Judge at the station who is the most
senior in point of appointment to the Judiciary shall
personally conduct the raffle. Under no circumstance
may any raffle be made in chambers. The raffle
proceedings should be stenographically recorded, and
minutes thereof shall be prepared by signed by the
Judges (or their representatives) and the Clerk of Court
in attendance. Immediately after the raffle on any
particular branch to which the case is assigned, the same
to be written in words and in figures on the cover of the
Rollo and on the first page of the original complaint or
information and initialed by the Executive Judge and the
other two officers who attended said raffle.

The raffle must be conducted in such manner that all the
branches of the Court in that station or grouping
including vacant salas, shall receive more or less the
same number of civil, criminal and other kinds of cases.
For purposes of facilitating implementation of the
foregoing rules, a Raffle Committee composed of the
Executive Judge and two other judges shall, as much as
practicable, be constituted.
IV. IN CASE OF URGENT OR INTERLOCUTORY
MATTERS
Whenever an incidental or interlocutory matter in a case
is of such urgent nature that it may not wait for the
regular raffle, the interested party may request the
Executive Judge in writing for a special raffle. If the
request is granted and the special raffle is conducted, the
case shall immediately be referred to the branch to which
it corresponds. The Executive Judge shall have no
authority to act on any incidental or interlocutory matter
in any case not yet assigned to any branch by raffle.
II.
Respondents did not violate the
purposes of the rule requiring raffle
Circular No. 7, supra, stated that only the maximum
number of cases, according to their dates of filing, as
could be equally distributed to all the branches in the
particular station or grouping should be included in the
raffle; and that cases in excess of the number sufficient
for equal distributionshould be included in the next
scheduled raffle.
Despite not strictly following the procedure under
Circular No. 7 in assigning Civil Case No. MC08-3660
to Branch 213, the respondents as members of the Raffle
Committee could not be held to have violated the rule on
the exclusivity of raffle because there were obviously
less TRO or injunction cases available at anytime for
raffling than the number of Branches of the RTC. Given
the urgent nature of TRO or injunction cases, each of
them had to be immediately attended to. This peculiarity
must have led to the adoption of the practice of raffling
such cases despite their number being less than the
number of the Branches in Mandaluyong City. The
practice did not absolutely contravene Circular No. 7 in
view of the circular itself expressly excepting under its
fourth paragraph, supra, any incidental or interlocutory
matter of such urgent nature (like a TRO application)
that might not wait for the regular raffle.
Still, GSIS posits that assigning Civil Case No. MC08-
3660 to Branch 213 without raffle could easily "create
an anomalous situation," which it describes in the
following terms:
They create an anomalous situation whereby all that a
litigant with an injunction complaint in Mandaluyong
has to do is to time the filing of his her case by waiting
until the favored judge is the only sala left without an
injunction case. Considering that there are only four
salas in Mandaluyong, a litigant may not have to wait
long until this happens. Once the favored judge is the
only sala left, then the litigant is assured that his or her
case will automatically be assigned to that judge."[18]
We find the position of GSIS untenable. The urgent
nature of an injunction or TRO case demands prompt
action and immediate attention, thereby compelling the
filing of the case in the proper court without delay. To
assume that a party desiring to file an injunction or TRO
case will just stand idly by and mark time until his
favored Branch is the only Branch left without an
assigned injunction or TRO case is obviously
speculative. Moreover, the "anomalous situation" is
highly unlikely in view of the uncertainty of having the
favored Branch remain the only Branch without an
injunction or TRO case following the series of raffle.
The OCA has cited Hilario v. Ocampo III[19] and Fineza
v. Rivera[20] to support its adverse recommendation
against the respondents. However, said rulings were not
on all fours with the situation of the respondents.
In Hilario v. Ocampo III, the respondent was an
executive judge who had assigned 13 related cases to the
branch to which the case having the lowest docket
number had been assigned, thereby causing the uneven
distribution of cases among the various branches of the
station. That was not true herein, because the
respondents as members of the Raffle Committee had
earlier conducted a series of raffle involving injunction
and TRO cases before assigning Civil Case No. MC08-
3660 to Branch 213 conformably with the standing
practice designed to ensure the equalization of the
distribution of cases among the several Branches in the
Mandaluyong City station. In Fineza v. Rivera, the
respondent was an executive judge who had disregarded
the procedure for the assignment of cases by relying
instead on sequencing, that is, if a case was raffled to
Branch 1, the next case was assigned to the next branch
(Branch 2), and so on. In contrast, the respondents herein
assigned Civil Case No. MC08-3660 to Branch 213
without considering their preference or without
exercising their unregulated choice of the Branch, but
entirely pursuant to their existing practice.
Even if we now absolve the respondents from
administrative liability on the basis of the foregoing, we
cannot hereafter sanction any practice that does not
conform to the raffle as the exclusive method of
assigning cases among several Branches within the
judicial station. We reiterate that the raffle should always
be the rule rather than the exception.
Henceforth, adherence to the procedure for the raffle set
forth in Circular No. 7 is demanded of all Raffle
Committees in multi-sala trial courts in order to achieve
the two-fold objectives earlier mentioned. Only the
exceptions expressly recognized under item IV of
Circular No. 7 shall be permitted.
III.
Dismissal of charges for gross ignorance of the law,
grave misconduct, and knowingly rendering
unjust judgment was proper
The dismissal of the charges of gross ignorance of the
law, grave misconduct, and knowingly rendering unjust
judgment, as the OCA recommended, was justified
because the charges were really devoid of merit.
In the absence of any showing that improper motives or
corruption had actuated the respondents, the respondents
should be presumed to have acted in utmost good faith in
assigning Civil Case No. MC08-3660 according to the
existing practice of raffling cases adopted by the Raffle
Committee. As such, they could not be held guilty of
either gross ignorance of the law or grave misconduct.
To constitute gross ignorance of the law, the acts
complained of must not only be contrary to existing law
and jurisprudence, but must also be motivated by bad
faith, fraud, dishonesty and corruption. [21] Grave
misconduct refers to a wrongful act inspired by
corruption or intention to violate the law.[22]

The charge of knowingly rendering unjust orders in Civil

Case No. MC08-3660 levelled against Judge Valenzuela
was bereft of factual support and legal basis. His
explanations for issuing the assailed orders, which the
Court finds to be fully substantiated by the records and
the pertinent laws, are sufficient. In addition, we are
puzzled that GSIS did not resort to any of several
adequate remedies, like bringing a petition
for certiorari or taking an appeal in due course, which
remedies were available at its disposal had it really
considered the issuance of the orders and Judge
Valenzuela's explanations unwarranted or in
contravention of the law.

GSIS's proceeding against Judge Valenzuela through this

administrative complaint instead was definitely not its
viable option at all.

We have always regarded as a fundamental precept that

an administrative complaint against a judge is
inappropriate as a remedy for the correction of an act or
omission complained of where the remedy of appeal
or certiorari is a recourse available to an aggrieved
party[23] Two reasons underlie this fundamental precept,
namely: (a) to hold otherwise is to render judicial office
untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or to
interpret the law in the process of administering justice
can be infallible in his judgment; and (b) to follow a
different rule can mean a deluge of complaints,
legitimate or otherwise, and our judges will then be
immersed in and be ceaselessly occupied with answering
charges brought against them instead of performing their
judicial functions.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the respondents'

separate motions for reconsideration; SETS ASIDE the
resolution dated June 3, 2009; and DISMISSES the
administrative charges against the respondents.

Henceforth, the Raffle Committees of all multi-sala

stations shall strictly adhere to t!le procedures for
assigning of cases among the Branches in the stations,
subject only to the exceptions recognized in Circular No.
7.

The Court Administrator is hereby directed to

disseminate this resolution to all trial courts for their
guidance and strict compliance.

SO ORDERED.
 RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF ENGR. OSCAR Panlungsod (Sanggunian) in order to include the
L. ONGJOCO, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD/CEO
authorization of FH-GYMNs Chairman to issue
OF FH-GYMN MULTI-PURPOSE AND
TRANSPORT SERVICE COOPERATIVE, motorized tricycle operators permit (MTOP) to its
AGAINST HON. JUAN Q. ENRIQUEZ, JR., HON. members.[4] During the ensuing scheduled public
RAMON M. BATO, JR. AND HON. FLORITO S. hearings, City Councilors Allan Ray A. Baluyut and
MACALINO, ASSOCIATE JUSTICES, COURT OF
Nolly Concepcion, together with ABC President
APPEALS
Bartolome B. Aguirre and one Noel Mendoza (an
A.M. OCA IPI No. 11-184-CA-J employee of the Sanggunian), were alleged to have
January 31, 2012 uttered statements exhibiting their bias against FH-
GYMN, giving FH-GYMN reason to believe that the
Committee members were favoring the
RESOLUTION existing franchisees Francisco Homes Tricycle

BERSAMIN, J.: Operators and Drivers Association (FRAHTODA) and

Barangay Mulawin Tricycle Operators and Drivers
Association (BMTODA).[5] Indeed, later on,
the Sanggunian, acting upon the recommendation of the
Judicial officers do not have to suffer the brunt of
Committee, denied the request of FH-GYMN.[6]
unsuccessful or dissatisfied litigants baseless and false
imputations of their violating the Constitution in
On July 15, 2005, FH-GYMN brought a complaint in the
resolving their cases and of harboring bias and partiality
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon charging
towards the adverse parties. The litigant who baselessly
Baluyut, Concepcion, Aguirre, Mendoza with violations
accuses them of such violations is not immune from
of Article 124(2)(d) of the Cooperative Code, Section
appropriate sanctions if he thereby affronts the
3(e) and (f) of the Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft
administration of justice and manifests a disrespect
and Corrupt Practices Act), and Section 5(a) of Republic
towards the judicial office.
Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct for Public Officials and
Employees). The complaint also charged Eduardo de
Antecedents
Guzman (FRAHTODA President) and Wilson de
Guzman (BMTODA President). Eventually, the
On June 7, 2011, the Court received a letter from Engr.
complaint of FH-GYMN was dismissed for insufficiency
Oscar L. Ongjoco, claiming himself to be the Chairman
of evidence as to the public officials, and for lack of
of the Board and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the
merit and lack of jurisdiction as to the private
FH-GYMN Multi-Purpose and Transport Service
respondents. FH-GYMN sought reconsideration, but its
Cooperative (FH-GYMN).[1] The letter included a
motion to that effect was denied.[7]
complaint-affidavit,[2] whereby Ongjoco charged the
CAs Sixth Division composed of Associate Justice Juan
FH-GYMN timely filed a petition for review in the CA.
Q. Enriquez, Jr. (as Chairman), Associate Justice Ramon
M. Bato, Jr., and Associate Justice Florito S. Macalino
In the meanwhile, FH-GYMN filed in the Office of the
as Members for rendering an arbitrary and baseless
President a complaint accusing Overall Deputy
decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 102289 entitled FH-GYMN
Ombudsman Orlando C. Casimiro, Deputy Ombudsman
Multi-Purpose and Transport Service Cooperative v.
Emilio A. Gonzales III, and Graft Investigator and
Allan Ray A. Baluyut, et al.[3]
Prosecution Officer Robert C. Renido with a violation of
Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 3019 arising from the
The genesis of CA-G.R. SP No. 102289 started
dismissal of its complaint.[8]
on July 26, 2004 when FH-GYMN requested the
amendment of Kautusang Bayan Blg. 37-02-97 of the
On January 31, 2011, the CAs Sixth Division denied the
City of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan through the
petition for review.[9]
Committee on Transportation and Communications
(Committee) of the Sangguniang
 FH-GYMN, through Ongjoco, moved for the
reconsideration of the denial of the petition for review,
with prayer for inhibition,[10] but the CAs Sixth Division
denied the motion.
Thereafter, Ongjoco initiated this administrative
case against the aforenamed member of the CAs Sixth
Division.
In the complaint, Ongjoco maintained that respondent
members of the CAs Sixth Division violated Section 14,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution by not specifically
stating the facts and the law on which the denial of the
petition for review was based; that they summarily
denied the petition for review without setting forth the
basis for denying the five issues FH-GYMNs petition for
review raised; that the denial was unjust, unfair and
partial, and heavily favored the other party; that the
denial of the petition warranted the presumption of
directly or indirectly becoming interested for personal
gain under Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 3019; and
that the Ombudsman officials who were probably
respondent Justices schoolmates or associates persuaded,
induced or influenced said Justices to dismiss the
petition for review and to manipulate the delivery of the
copy of the decision to FH-GYMN to prevent it from
timely filing a motion for reconsideration.[11]
Ruling
We find the administrative complaint against
respondent Justices of the Court of Appeals baseless and
utterly devoid of legal and factual merit, and outrightly
dismiss it.
Firstly, Ongjoco insists that the decision promulgated on
January 31, 2011 by the CAs Sixth Division had no legal
foundation and did not even address the five issues
presented in the petition for review; and that the
respondents as members of the CAs Sixth Division
thereby violated Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution, which provides as follows:
Section 14. No decision shall be
rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is
based.
No petition for review or motion
for reconsideration of a decision of the
court shall be refused due course or
denied without starting the legal basis
therefor.
The insistence of Ongjoco is unfounded. The essential
purpose of the constitutional provision is to require that a
judicial decision be clear on why a party has prevailed
under the law as applied to the facts as proved; the
provision nowhere demands that a point-by-point
consideration and resolution of the issues raised by the
parties are necessary.[12] Cogently, the Court has said
in Tichangco v. Enriquez,[13] to wit:
This constitutional provision deals with
the disposition of petitions for review
and of motions for reconsideration. In
appellate courts, the rule does not
require any comprehensive statement
of facts or mention of the applicable
law, but merely a statement of the
legal basis for denying due course.
Thus, there is sufficient compliance
with the constitutional requirement
when a collegiate appellate court,
after deliberation, decides to deny a
motion; states that the questions
raised are factual or have already
been passed upon; or cites some other
legal basis. There is no need to explain
fully the courts denial, since the facts
and the law have already been laid
out in the assailed Decision. (Emphasis
supplied)
Its decision shows that the CAs Sixth Division complied
with the requirements of the constitutional
[14]
provision, viz:
The petition is without merit.
Petitioner alleged that the
Ombudsman erred in not finding
respondents liable for violation of the
Cooperative Code of the Philippines
considering that their actuations
constituted acts of direct or indirect
interference or intervention with the
internal affairs of FH-GYMN and that
recommendation to deny FH-GYMNs
application was tantamount to any other
act inimical or adverse to its autonomy
and independence.
We disagree.
It is well settled that in
administrative proceedings, the
complainant has the burden of proving,
by substantial evidence, the allegations
in his complaint. Section 27 of the
Ombudsman Act is
unequivocal. Findings of fact by the
Office of the Ombudsman, when
supported by substantial evidence, are
conclusive. Conversely, when the
findings of fact by the Ombudsman are
not adequately supported by substantial
evidence, they shall not be binding upon
the courts (Marcelo vs. Bungubung, 552
SCRA 589).
In the present case, the Deputy
Ombudsman found no substantial
evidence to prove that there was
interference in the internal affairs of FH-
GYMN nor was there a violation of the
law by the respondents. As aptly ruled
by the Ombudsman:
While the utterances made
by respondents Baluyot,
Aguirre and Mendoza in the
course of public hearings
earlier mentioned indeed
demonstrate exaltation of
FRAHTODA and BMTODA,
to the apparent disadvantage
of FH-GYMN, the same does
not imply or suggest
interference in the internal
affairs of the latter
considering that said remarks
or comments were made
precisely in the lawful
exercise of the mandate of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of
the locality concerned through
the Committee on
Transporation and
Communication. It is worthy
to emphasize that were it not
for the complainants letter-
request dated July 23, 2004,
the committee concerned
would not have conducted the
aforementioned public
hearings, thus, there would
have been no occasion for the
subject unfavorable remarks
to unleash. Thus, it would be
irrational to conclude that
simply because the questioned
utterances were unfavorable
to FH-GYMN, the same
constitutes interference or
intervention in the internal
affairs of the said cooperative.
In the same vein, while
respondents Baluyot,
Concepcion and Aguirre
rendered an adverse
recommendation as against
complaints letter-request
earlier mentioned, the same
does not signify giving of
undue favors to FRAHTODA
or BMTODA, or causing of
undue injury to FH-GYMN,
inasmuch as said
recommendation or decision,
as the records vividly
show,was arrived at by the
said respondents in honest
exercise of their sound
judgment based on their
interpretation of the
applicable ordinance
governing the operation of
tricycles within their area of
jurisdiction. Evidence on
record no doubt failed to
sufficiently establish that, in
so making the questioned
recommendation, respondents
Baluyot, Concepcion and
Aguirre acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable
negligence. It is likewise
worthy to note that, contrary
to complainants insinuation,
the letter-request adverted to
was acted upon by
respondents Baluyot,
Concepcion and Aguirre
within a reasonable time and,
as a matter of fact,
complainant had been notified
of the action taken by the
former relative to his letter-
request or proposals.
Time and again, it has
been held, no less than by the
Supreme Court, that mere
suspicions and speculations
can never be the basis of
conviction in a criminal
case. Guided by the same
doctrinal rule, this Office is
not duty-bound to proceed
with the indictment of the
public respondents as
charged.Indeed well
entrenched is the rule that
(t)he purpose of a preliminary
investigation is to secure the
innocent against hasty,
malicious and oppressive
prosecution and to protect him
from an open and public
accusation of crime, from the
trouble, expense and anxiety
of a public trial, and also to
protect the state from useless
and expensive trials (Joint
Resolution, October 17, 2005,
Rollo pp. 142-143).
Moreover, petitioners failed to
rebut the presumption of regularity in
the performance of the official duties of
 respondents by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a
duty. The presumption prevails and
becomes conclusive until it is overcome
by no less than clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary. Every
reasonable intendment will be made in
support of the presumption and in case
of doubt as to an officers act being
lawful or unlawful, construction should
be in favor of its lawfulness (Bustillo vs.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
160718, May 12, 2010).
There being no substantial
evidence to reverse the findings of the
Ombudsman, the instant petition is
denied.
WHEREFORE, premises
considered the Petition for Review
is DENIED for lack of merit. The Joint
Resolution dated October 17, 2005 and
Joint Order dated April 25, 2006 of the
Deputy Ombudsman of Luzon
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Indeed, the definitive pronouncement of the CAs
Sixth Division that the Deputy Ombudsman found no
substantial evidence to prove that there was interference
in the internal affairs of FH-GYMN nor was there a
violation of the law by the respondents[15] met the
constitutional demand for a clear and distinct statement
of the facts and the law on which the decision was
based. The CAs Sixth Division did not have to point out
and discuss the flaws of FH-GYMNs petition
considering that the decision of the Deputy Ombudsman
sufficiently detailed the factual and legal bases for the
denial of the petition.
Moreover, the CAs Sixth Division expressly found that
FH-GYMN had not discharged its burden as the
petitioner of proving its allegations with substantial
evidence.[16] In administrative cases involving judicial
officers, the complainants always carried on their
shoulders the burden of proof to substantiate their
allegations through substantial evidence. That standard
of substantial evidence is satisfied only when there is
reasonable ground to believe that the respondent is
responsible for the misconduct complained of although
such evidence may not be overwhelming or even
preponderant.[17]
Secondly, Ongjoco ought to know, if he genuinely
wanted the Court to sustain his allegations of misconduct
against respondent Justices, that his administrative
complaint must rest on the quality of the evidence; and
that his basing his plain accusations on hunches and
speculations would not suffice to hold them
administratively liable for rendering the adverse
decision. Nonetheless, he exhibited disrespect for
respondent Justices judicial office by still filing this
administrative complaint against them despite conceding
in the administrative complaint itself his having no proof
of his charges, viz:
21. The petition to review in
determining probable cause in a
preliminary investigation had reached
this far and may reach the Supreme
Court due to corrupt practices and
culpable violation of the 1987
Constitution committed by Ombudsman
officials and the herein respondents of
the Court of Appeals. A Motion for
Reconsideration was submitted with
prayer for the respondents to inhibit
themselves to act on it. Otherwise, it
will add to congest the court docket
which this Honorable Court should
intercede to look deeper into this
matter by exercising its disciplinary
functions over herein
respondents. The arbitrary denial of the
Petition for Review rendered by the
herein respondents is meant that there is
no sufficient ground out of the five (5)
issues raised to engender a well-founded
belief that no single offense has been
committed.[18]
xxx
24. Though there was no clear
evidence to link Ombudsman officials,
they may have persuaded, induced or
influenced the herein respondents,
who are either their schoolmates or
associates, to deny the Petition for
Review in their bid to establish
innocence on the related offense charged
against them on 18 August 2010 before
the Office of the President docketed as
OP-DC Case No. 11-C-006. Likewise,
they may have manipulated the delivery
of a copy of Decision intended for the
petitioner in order for the latter to fail in
submitting a motion for reconsideration
purposely to make the Decision final
and executory by which the said
Ombudsman officials could use such
Decision to attain impunity on
complaint against them filed with the
Office of the President.[19] (emphasis
supplied)
It is evident to us that Ongjocos objective in filing the
administrative complaint was to take respondent Justices
to task for the regular performance of their sworn duty of
upholding the rule of law. He would thereby lay the
groundwork for getting back at them for not favoring his
unworthy cause. Such actuations cannot be tolerated at
all, for even a mere threat of administrative investigation
and prosecution made against a judge to influence or
intimidate him in his regular performance of the judicial
office always subverts and undermines the independence
of the Judiciary.[20]
We seize this occasion, therefore, to stress once
again that disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions
brought against any judge in relation to the performance
of his official functions are neither complementary to
nor suppletory of appropriate judicial remedies, nor a
[21]
substitute for such remedies. Any party who may feel
aggrieved should resort to these remedies, and exhaust
them, instead of resorting to disciplinary proceedings
and criminal actions. We explained why in In Re:
[22]
Joaquin T. Borromeo:
Given the nature of the judicial function,
the power vested by the Constitution in
the Supreme Court and the lower courts
established by law, the question submits
to only one answer: the administrative
or criminal remedies are neither
alternative or cumulative to judicial
review where such review is available,
and must wait on the result thereof.
Simple reflection will make this
proposition amply clear, and
demonstrate that any contrary
postulation can have only intolerable
legal implications. Allowing a party
who feels aggrieved by a judicial order
or decision not yet final and executory
to mount an administrative, civil or
criminal prosecution for unjust
judgment against the issuing judge
would, at a minimum and as an
indispensable first step, confer the
prosecutor (Ombudsman) with an
incongruous function pertaining, not to
him, but to the courts: the determination
of whether the questioned disposition is
erroneous in its findings of fact or
conclusions of law, or both. If he does
proceed despite that impediment,
whatever determination he makes could
well set off a proliferation of
administrative or criminal litigation, a
possibility hereafter more fully
explored.
Such actions are impermissible and
cannot prosper. It is not, as already
pointed out, within the power of public
prosecutors, or the Ombudsman or his
Deputies, directly or vicariously, to
review judgments or final orders or
resolutions of the Courts of the land.
The power of reviewby appeal or special
civil actionis not only lodged
exclusively in the Courts themselves but
must be exercised in accordance with a
well-defined and long established
hierarchy, and long standing processes
and procedures. No other review is
allowed; otherwise litigation would be
interminable, and vexatiously repetitive.
In this regard, we reiterate that a judges failure
to correctly interpret the law or to properly appreciate
the evidence presented does not necessarily incur
administrative liability,[23] for to hold him
administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling
or decision he renders, assuming he has erred, will be
nothing short of harassment and will make his position
doubly unbearable. His judicial office will then be
rendered untenable, because no one called upon to try
the facts or to interpret the law in the process of
administering justice can be infallible in his
[24]
judgment. Administrative sanction and criminal
liability should be visited on him only when the error is
so gross, deliberate and malicious, or is committed with
evident bad faith,[25] or only in clear cases of violations
by him of the standards and norms of propriety and good
behavior prescribed by law and the rules of procedure, or
fixed and defined by pertinent jurisprudence. [26]
What the Court sees herein is Ongjocos
proclivity to indiscriminately file complaints. His
proclivity reminds us now of Joaquin T. Borromeo
whom this Court pronounced guilty of indirect contempt
of court he repeatedly committed over time, despite
warnings and instructions given to him.[27] The Court
imposed the penalty for contempt of court to the end that
he may ponder his serious errors and grave misconduct
and learn due respect for the Courts and their
authority.[28]
Having determined that the administrative
charge against respondent Justices had no factual and
legal bases, we cannot hesitate to shield them by
immediately rejecting the charge. We do so because
unfounded administrative charges do not contribute
anything worthwhile to the orderly administration of
justice; instead, they retard it.
 Nor should we just let such rejected charge pass
and go unchallenged. We recognize that unfounded
administrative charges against judges really degrade the
judicial office, and interfere with the due performance of
their work for the Judiciary. Hence, we deem to be
warranted to now direct Ongjoco to fully explain his act
of filing an utterly baseless charge against respondent
Justices.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court:
(a) DISMISSES the administrative complaint against
Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., Associate Justice
Ramon M. Bato, Jr., and Associate Justice Florito S.
Macalino for its utter lack of merit; and
(b) ORDERSEngr. Oscar L. Ongjoco to show cause in
writing within ten (10) days from notice why he should
not be punished for indirect contempt of court for
degrading the judicial office of respondent Associate
Justices of the Court of Appeals, and for interfering with
the due performance of their work for the Judiciary.

SO ORDERED.
 AC NO. 7297, SEPT 29, 2009 of the property to herself through the fraudulent
IMELDA BIBES-ULASO v. ATTY. EDITA NOE- execution of the deed of sale.[3]
LACSAMANA

DECISION
The amended complaint of Bides contained a so-
called amended verification and affidavit of non-forum
shopping dated June 18, 2003, on which was a signature

BERSAMIN, J.: preceded by the word for above the printed name IRENE
BIDES. The signature bore a positive resemblance to the
The decisive question to be resolved in this respondents signature as the notary on the jurat of
administrative proceeding is whether or not the the amended verification and affidavit of non-forum
notarization of the jurat of the amended verification and shopping.[4] Seeing the defective execution of
affidavit of non-forum shopping attached to the initiatory the amended verification and affidavit of non-forum
pleading even before the plaintiff-client has affixed her shopping, Ulaso and her co-defendants filed a motion to
own signature amounts to censurable conduct on the part dismiss on July 22, 2003,[5] citing the defect as a ground,
of the notary-counsel. along with another.

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)

found respondent Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana, the
Through the respondent as her counsel, Bides opposed
notary-counsel, guilty of gross negligence and of a
the motion to dismiss on August 6, 2003, claiming an
violation of the Notarial Law; and recommended her
inadvertent mistake committed in relation to the
suspension from the practice of law for six
signature appearing above the printed name of the
months.[1] She now pleads her cause before us.[2]
affiant, but offering the excuse that the
defective amended verification and affidavit of non-
Antecedents forum shopping had actually been only a sample-
draft intended to instruct Irene Mallari, the respondents
new secretary, on where Bides, as affiant, should sign.
Bides also claimed that the respondents signature above
The respondent was the counsel of Irene Bides (Bides)
the printed name of the affiant had not been intended to
when the latter filed a civil action in the Regional Trial
replace the signature of Bides as the affiant; that the
Court (RTC) in Pasig City against complainant Imelda
correct amended verification and affidavit of non-forum
Bides-Ulaso (Ulaso), her own niece; Alan Ulaso
shopping to be appended to the amended complaint had
(Ulasos husband); Bartolome Bides (Ulasos father and
been executed only on June 23, 2003 due to her (Bides)
Bides brother); the Register of Deeds of Region II,
delayed arrival from her home province of Abra; and
Metro Manila; and the Revenue District Office of San
that Mallari had failed to replace the defective document
Juan, Metro Manila. The action was docketed as Special
with the correct amended verification and affidavit of
Civil Action (SCA) No. 2481 and raffled to Branch 167
non-forum shopping.[6]
of the RTC.

The RTC denied the motion to dismiss and even declared

Bides amended the complaint on June 23, 2003
Ulaso and her co-defendants in default. The RTC
to demand the declaration of nullity of the deed of
ultimately decided the action in favor of Bides, granting
sale dated May 27, 1996 pertaining to the parcel of land
reliefs like the nullification of the deed of sale between
situated in San Juan, Metro Manila of which Bides was
Bides, as seller, and Ulaso, as buyer.[7]
the registered owner. Bides averred that Ulaso had taken
her owners certificate of title during her absence from
her residence and that Ulaso had then caused the transfer
 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
RTCs judgment.[8]
Bides and the respondent brought other proceedings
against Ulaso. On September 26, 2003, Bides sued Ulaso
and others for ejectment in the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) in San Juan, Metro Manila, to evict them from
the premises of Bides property subject of the RTC
case.[9] She next formally charged Ulaso and two others
with falsification of a public document in the Manila
Prosecutors Office for the execution of the nullified deed
of sale, resulting in the criminal prosecution of Ulaso
and the others before the MeTC, Branch 17,
in Manila.[10] The respondent actively prosecuted the
criminal charge against Ulaso after being granted by the
MeTC the express authority for that purpose pursuant to
the Rules of Court.[11] The respondent
herself commenced disbarment proceedings in the IBP
against Atty. Yolando Busmente, Ulasos counsel; and
proceedings for usurpation against Elizabeth de la Rosa,
for appearing as Ulasos other counsel although she had
not been a member of the Philippine Bar.[12] The
disbarment proceedings against Atty. Busmente were
docketed as CBD Case No. 05-1462.
To counteract the aforestated moves of Bides and the
respondent, Ulaso initiated this proceeding against the
respondent on March 2, 2005, praying for the latters
disbarment due to her act of signing the amended
verification and affidavit of non-forum
shopping attached to the amended complaint of Bides
and notarizing the document sans the signature of Bides
and despite the non-appearance of Bides before her.[13]
On July 21, 2005, Bides and Ulaso entered into a
compromise agreement to settle the criminal case for
falsification, whereby Bides agreed to drop the criminal
charge against Ulaso in exchange for, among others,
Ulasos withdrawal of the disbarment complaint against
the respondent.[14] The MeTC, Branch 17,
in Manila approved the compromise agreement.
The agreement on the dropping of the criminal
case notwithstanding, the complaint for disbarment
continued against the respondent. The IBP Committee
on Bar Discipline designated Atty. Patrick M. Velez as
Investigating Commissioner. After due hearing, Atty.
Velez submitted his report and
[15]
recommendation dated December 8, 2005, in which
he rendered the following resolution and findings, viz:
IV. RESOLUTION AND FINDINGS
We are not impressed with the
excuses presented by the
respondent. The lapse committed by the
respondent is clear based on the facts
and pieces of evidence submitted in this
case.
The respondent admits signing the
questioned verification and there is also
no dispute that she notarized the
same. Even if her tale is true, the fact
that she notarized her own signature is
inexcusable. It cannot even be pardoned
as a simple act of negligence as the
standards set by notarial law are
stringent enough to require all notaries
public to exercise caution in order to
protect the integrity and veracity of
documents.
We also cannot understand the
fact that all the pleadings submitted to
the court do not bear the corrected
verification and certification. It may be
easy to convince us that she is really
innocent of the charges if at least one of
those documents or even that one copy
furnished to the other party in that case
would bear at least one such corrected
verification. But no, there was none at
all. This certainly militates against the
position that respondent lawyer took.
We have already stated earlier that
lawyers may be disciplined for
misconduct as a notary public, and now
emphasize that the respondent can not
even hide behind the mantle of good
faith or throw blame to her
secretary. Even as the Supreme Court
stated that:
 If the document he
notarized turned out to
have been falsified,
without the fact being
known to him at the time,
he may still be
admonished for not taking
pains to ascertain the
identity of the person who
acknowledged the
instrument before
him. (Cailing vs.
Espinoza, 103 Phil. 1165)
Indeed, we may even consider her
being grossly negligent in allowing her
secretary to commit that error. She gave
her secretary blanket authority where
she should have exercise sufficient
prudence to protect the integrity of her
documents. The burden of preparing a
complete pleading falls on counsels
shoulders, not on the messenger (Tan v.
Court of Appeals, 295 SCRA 765
[1998]) and not even on the secretary.
Besides, even if the story she tells
us is true, it would appear that the
document was pre-notarized based on
the very averments made in Irene
Mallaris Affidavit of Merit when she
stated that:
3. Atty. Lacsamana
was scheduled for an out-
of-town trip on Monday,
June 23, 2003, thus she
hurriedly notarized
another prepared set of
Amended Verification
dated June 23, 2003, and
repeatedly told me to file
the amended complaint
not later than that
afternoon to this
Honorable Court after
replacing its old June 18,
2003-Amended
Verification;
4. Irene Bides
arrived only after lunch
and after her niece cause
her to sign the amended
verification, I replaced the
last page of the sets of the
Amended Complaint
without knowing that I
missed its original copy
and the copy I hurriedly
sent to the counsel for the
respondent.
Respondent was not around when
the document was signed by the
respondents client. That is a violation of
notarial law and deceitful conduct of the
part of a lawyer, since he is notarizing a
document which he did not actually
witness being signed in his presence.
Even page 8 of the respondents
notarial register will not help her in this
case.All that it shows is the alleged
document no. 36, but what about
document no. 35 which should appear in
page 7 of Book no. 1? The second
document was notarized on another page
and it is incumbent on the respondent to
show that the same was really not
recorded as such. The failure of
respondent to present such evidence
should be treated as disputable
presumption that the same would be
detrimental to his interests if so
presented. Thus, when the
circumstances in proof tend to fix the
liability on a party who has it in his
power to offer evidence of all facts as
they existed and rebut the inference
which the circumstances in proof tend to
establish, and he fails to offer such
proof, the natural conclusion is that
proof if produced, instead of rebutting,
would support the inference against him,
and the court is justified in acting upon
that conclusion (Herrera, Remedial Law,
VI, 1999 ed p. 63 citing Worcester vs.
Ocampo, 22 Phil. 42).
This commission feels that
respondent is not being truthful with her
defenses.The problem with using such
unjustified excuses is that one lie will
pile up over the other. Somewhere along
the way, the story will leak out its sordid
details exposing the excuse as a mere
concocted tale and nothing more.

We have the impression that
respondent is trying to mislead this
Commission, which we cannot allow.
The issue in this case is really
limited and focused on the signature and
the notarization of the verification and
certification against forum shopping for
Irene Bides. Does it constitute
actionable misconduct? The other
matters raised by the respondent have
little bearing herein because it refers to
other cases which she has against the
complainant. But the causes of action
are different so we will deign to
entertain such other matters.
The practice of law is a privilege
and respondent has gravely abused the
same:
The practice of law
is a privilege burdened
with
conditions.Adherence to
rigid standards of mental
fitness, maintenance of
the highest degree of
morality and faithful
compliance with the rules
of the legal profession are
the conditions required for
remaining member of
good standing of the bar
and for enjoying the
privilege to practice
law.Any breach by lawyer
of any of these conditions
makes him unworthy of
the trust and confidence
which courts and clients
must, by necessity, repose
in him or unfit to continue
in the exercise of his
professional privilege. His
misconduct justifies
disciplinary action against
him or the withdrawal of
his privilege to practice
law. (Agpalo, Legal
Ethics, 1989 Ed., 392;
citation of cases omitted.)
What is far worse is that the
respondent has taken a habit of making
such excuses for similar mistakes she
committed. This Commission notes that
the respondent herein is also a
complainant in a different case against
Atty. Yolando Busmente docketed as
CBD case no. 05-1462. In that case,
again no certification against non-forum
shopping was made in that case, but
instead of admitting the lack thereof (as
it is not absolutely required in CBD
cases) she went on to create a different
story that her lawyer was
negligent. Unfortunately said lawyer is
already dead and cannot answer her
accusations. She tried to pass off another
set of certification which allegedly was
not included with the original
documents. What is however telling is
that in all the seven (7) copies submitted
to the CBD and that one (1) copy
furnished to the respondents in that case,
no such certification appears.
This unacceptable pattern of
behavior compels us to recommend
stricter measures to ensure that
respondent lawyer is reminded of her
solemn duty and obligation to be
truthful and honest.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby
recommended that the respondent
lawyer, Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana be
suspended from the practice of law for a
period of not less than two (2) years and
that she be required to take three (3)
units of MCLE required legal ethics
before she may be allowed to practice
law again.[16]
In its Resolution No. XVII-2006-272 dated May
26, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors approved
the report and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner with modification,[17] to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and
APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED
and APPROVED, with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the
 above-entitled case, herein made part of COMPELLING HER TO ENTREAT
this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding THE HONORABLE BAR
the recommendation fully supported by CONFIDANT TO ASSESS AND
the evidence on record and the RECONSIDER THE UNJUST AND
applicable laws and rules, and for SPECULATIVE PORTRAYAL OF
notarizing a verification which she has INVESTIGATING COMMISSIONER
executed, gross negligence and violation PATRICK M. VELEZ IN HIS
of the notarial law, Atty. Edita Noe- DECEMBER 8, 2005-REPORT AND
Lacsamana is RECOMMENDATION TO THE IBP,
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice THAT RESPONDENT IS GUILTY OF
of law for six (6) months. DISHONESTY AND/OR GROSS
NEGLIGENCE, WITH
AN UNACCEPTABLE PATTERN OF
BEHAVIOR, WHICH ALTHOUGH
NOT SPECIFIED, IS COMPATIBLE
Respondents Motion for Reconsideration WITH A DEROGATORY
CONCLUSION THAT SHE LACKS
THE REQUIRED CANDOR,
INTEGRITY AND PROFESSIONAL
DECORUM OF A MEMBER OF THE
BAR, IN REPUGNANCE TO THE
On August 29, 2006, the respondent came to the
MANDATE IN MANUBAY VS.
Court to seek the overturning of the IBP resolution, GARCIA, 330 SCRA 237, THAT:
contending that:

The lawyers guilt

I. cannot be
presumed. Allegation is
never equivalent to proof
and a bare charge cannot
THE METED 6-MONTH
be equated with liability.
SUSPENSION FROM THE LAW
PRACTICE OF THE RESPONDENT
IS REPUGNANT TO THE FAILURE
OF THE COMPLAINANT TO SHOW III.
PROOF OF HER ALLEGED GROSS
NEGLIGENCE AND VIOLATION OF
THE NOTARIAL LAW, AS THE FALLACIES OF THE
EVENTUALLY SELF-MANIFESTED COMPLAINANT WERE MISSED,
BY THE COMPLAINANT, WHO, DELIBERATELY OR OTHERWISE,
ABSENT KNOWLEDGE OR IN THE INVESTIGATION OF THIS
INVOCATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE,
RESPONDENT, WITHDREW HER PARTICULARLY ON THE FACT
INSTANT COMPLAINT, AS THAT THE COMPLAINT IS
EMBODIED IN THE JULY 22, 2005- CONFINED ON A REHASH OF THE
DECISION OF HON. GERMANO QUESTIONED AMENDED
FRANCISCO D. LEGASPI OF VERIFICATION AND AFFIDAVIT
BRANCH 17, METROPOLITAN OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING, TWO
TRIAL COURT OF MANILA. (2) YEARS AFTER ITS DISPUTE
WAS SETTLED AT THE LOWER
COURT AND AT THE COURT OF
II. APPEALS, THUS, FILED OUT OF
RANCOR OF THE COMPLAINANT
FOR HAVING LOST ALL HER
CASES AGAINST THE
THE BLEMISH CAUSED ON
RESPONDENTS PRO BONO CLIENT,
THE MORE THAN 26-YEARS OF
THUS, SHE WAS UNJUSTLY
UNSULLIED REPUTATION OF THE
DENIED OF THE RULE IN SANTOS
RESPONDENT AS A LAWYER IS
VS. DICHOSO, 84 SCRA 622, THAT:

The success of a
lawyer in his profession
depends almost entirely
on his
reputation. Anything
which will harm his good
name is to be
deplored. Private persons
and particularly
disgruntled opponents
may not, therefore, be
permitted to use the
courts as vehicles through
which to vent their rancor
on members of the bar.
(underscoring supplied)
Ruling
We affirm the findings against the respondent.
A. Preliminary Considerations
The respondent argues that this proceeding
should be abated by virtue of its withdrawal by Ulaso
pursuant to the compromise agreement concluded in the
criminal case and approved by the trial court.
The respondents argument is unwarranted.
The agreement between Bides and Ulaso
stipulating the withdrawal of the disbarment case against
the respondent did not terminate or abate the jurisdiction
of the IBP and of this Court to continue the present
administrative proceeding against the respondent as a
member of the Philippine Bar. We explained why
in Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos,[18] viz:
The affidavit of withdrawal of
the disbarment case allegedly executed
by complainant does not, in any way,
exonerate the respondent. A case of
suspension or disbarment may proceed
regardless of interest or lack of interest
of the complainant. What matters is
whether, on the basis of the facts borne
out by the record, the charge of deceit
and grossly immoral conduct has been
duly proven. xxx. The complainant or
the person who called the attention of
the court to the attorney's alleged
misconduct is in no sense a party, and
has generally no interest in the outcome
except as all good citizens may have in
the proper administration of
justice. Hence, if the evidence on record
warrants, the respondent may be
suspended or disbarred despite the
desistance of complainant or
his withdrawal of the charges. xxx.
The respondent next contends that we should
reject the disbarment complaint because it was filed
only after the lapse of two years from the occurrence of
the cause; and that personal vendetta impelled its
filing.
The respondents contention cannot be upheld.
Neither the lapse of time from the occurrence of
the cause nor the motivation for the filing of the
complaint diminished the Courts inherent power to
discipline a member of the Bar whenever appropriate.
First of all, the ordinary statutes of limitation had no
application to disbarment or suspension
proceedings against members of the Bar.[19] Indeed,
such proceedings are sui generis. They are not akin to
the trials of actions or suits in which interests and rights
are enforced by the plaintiffs against the defendants, but
are rather investigations into the conduct of the members
of the Bar made by the Supreme Court within the
context of its plenary powers expressly granted by the
Constitution to regulate the practice of law.[20] The
proceedings, which the Court may even motu
proprio initiate, have neither plaintiffs nor prosecutors.
The public interest is their primary objective, the true
question for determination being whether or not the
respondent members of the Bar are still fit to be allowed
to retain their memberships and to enjoy the privileges
appurtenant to such memberships.[21]
 the amendedverification and affidavit of non-forum

B. Basis for Disciplinary Action shopping was intended to replace the original one
attached to the initiatory pleading of Bides. Thus, bad
faith did not motivate the respondent into notarizing the
amended verification and affidavit of non-forum
Ulaso insists that the respondents act of signing
shopping.
the amended verification and affidavit of non-forum
shopping for Bides as plaintiff-affiant violated the penal
law, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the Lawyers
The lack of bad faith notwithstanding, we
Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the
nonetheless concur with the findings of Investigating
Notarial Law.
Commissioner Velez that the respondents notarizing
the amendedverification and affidavit of non-forum
shopping in the absence of Bides as the affiant
In contrast, the respondent maintains that her
constituted a clear breach of the notarial protocol and
signature was made not to fool the trial court, but only to
was highly censurable.[22]
illustrate to her new secretary how and where Bides
should sign the form; and that the amended verification
and affidavit of non-forum shopping, merely a sample-
The jurat is that end part of the affidavit in
draft, was wrongly attached.
which the notary certifies that the instrument is sworn to
before her. As such, the notarial certification is essential.
Considering that notarization is not an empty,
Investigating Commissioner Velez found that
meaningless, routinary act,[23] the faithful observance
the respondent had deliberately and with malice led the
and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the oath in
trial court to believe that her signature in
the juratare sacrosanct.[24]
the amendedverification and affidavit of non-forum
shopping had been that of Bides.

Specifically, the notarial certification contained

in the jurat of the amendedverification and affidavit of
We regard the finding of deliberation and malice
non-forum shopping SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO
to be unjustified. The admitted precedence by the
BEFORE ME, on this 18th day of June 2003, affiant
word for of the signature on the amended verification
IRENE BIDES, showing to me her CTC Nos. 11833475
and affidavit of non-forum shopping was an indicium
issued on November 21, 2002, in Manila[25] indicated
that the respondent did not intend to misrepresent the
both the necessity for the physical presence of Bides as
signature as that of Bides. The apparent resemblance of
the affiant and the fact that the signing was done in the
the signature after the word for with the respondents
presence of the respondent as the notary. The physical
signature as the notary executing the jurat rendered
presence of Bides was required in order to have her as
improbable that the respondent had intended to deceive,
the affiant swear before the respondent that she
considering that the respondent would have instead
was that person and in order to enable the respondent as
written the name Irene Bides or forged the signature of
the notary to ascertain whether Bides had voluntarily and
Bides had she wanted to pass the signature off as that of
freely executed the affidavit.[26] Thus, the respondent, by
Bides.
signing as notary even before Bides herself could appear
before her, failed to give due observance and respect to
the solemnity.
The respondent, by notarizing the
document sans the signature of Bides, was only
anticipating that Bides would subsequently sign,
Being a lawyer commissioned as a notary, the
because, after all, Bides had already signed the original
respondent was mandated to discharge with fidelity the
verification and affidavit. Ostensibly,
sacred duties appertaining to her notarial office. Such
duties being dictated by public policy and impressed
with public interest, she could not disregard the
requirements and solemnities of the Notarial Law. [27] It
was emphatically her primary duty as a lawyer-notary to
obey the laws of the land and to promote respect for the
law and legal processes.[28] She was expected to be in the
forefront in the observance and maintenance of the rule
of law. She ought to have remembered that a graver
responsibility was placed upon her shoulders by virtue of
her being a lawyer.[29]

In imposing the penalty upon the respondent,

however, we opt to reprimand her instead of suspending
her from the practice of law for three months, as the IBP
recommended. This we do after we take into account,
firstly, the absence of bad faith in her notarizing the
unsigned document; secondly, the fact that the infraction
was the first lodged against her in her long years of
membership in the Bar; and thirdly, her recuperating
from the debilitating stroke that had left her unable to
perform any work since July 11, 2007.[30]

ACCORDINGLY, we modify the

recommendation of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines by reprimanding respondent Atty. Edita
Noe-Lacsamana, with a warning that a similar infraction
in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
[ A.M. No. 08-5-305-RTC, July 09, 2013 ]
RE: FAILURE OF FORMER JUDGE ANTONIO A.
CARBONELL TO DECIDE CASES SUBMITTED
FOR DECISION AND TO RESOLVE PENDING
MOTIONS IN THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 27, SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This administrative case originates from the judicial
audit conducted by the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) on March 3 and 4, 2008 in the Regional Trial
Court of San Fernando, La Union, Branch 27, in view of
the disability retirement of Presiding Judge Antonio A.
Carbonell on December 31, 2007.
According to the Audit Team's Report, Branch 27 had a
total caseload of 231 cases, consisting of 147 criminal
cases and 84 civil cases, and Judge Carbonell failed to
decide 41 criminal cases (one inherited) and 22 civil
cases (four inherited), namely: Criminal Case Nos.
1183, 4559, 5117, 3532, 3672, 5165, 5007, 5946, 6934,
5763, 7014, 5991, 4724, 6311, 6076, 4789, 6297, 5424,
4928, 6403, 6816, 5635, 5666, 5134, 5865, 6284, 6454,
5394, 6770, 5375, 5356, 7557, 5940, 6311, 6333, 7729,
7111, 6325, 6068, 6517, and 7766; and Civil Case Nos.
3009, 4564, 4563, 4714, 3647, 4362, 6041, 4798, 4561,
6989, 2882, 6185, 7153, 7163, LRC 2332, SCA 7198,
7310, 3487, 7327, 7331, 7298, and 7323.[1]
Judge Carbonell was also reported to have failed to
resolve pending motions or incidents in four criminal
cases and 12 civil cases, to wit: Criminal Case Nos.
7559, 6409, 7787, and 7788; and Civil Case Nos. 4793,
LRC 1308, 7064, 4973, SP 2901, SP 2952, AC 1797,
7100, 7152, 7060, SP 2986, and SP 2987. [2]
In a Memorandum dated May 15, 2008, the OCA
recommended to the Court that a fine of P50,000.00 be
imposed upon Judge Carbonell for gross inefficiency for
failing to promptly decide the cases and to resolve
pending motions and incidents.[3]
On June 17, 2008, the Court directed the Clerk of Court
to furnish Judge Carbonell with a copy of the Audit
Team's Report, and ordered him to submit his comment
on the report within ten days from notice. [4]
Not having received the comment from Judge Carbonell
despite the lapse of the time given, the Court resolved on
September 21, 2010 to require him to show cause why
he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in
contempt.[5]
Judge Carbonell replied,[6] stating that he had
incorporated his comment/compliance to the June 17,
2008 resolution in the letter dated July 17, 2008 (Re:
Very Urgent Request for Release of Disability
Retirement Benefits and Money Value of Accrued Leave
Credits) he had sent to Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno.[7] He remarked that the Court had actually granted
his request for the payment of his disability retirement
benefits subject to the retention of P200,000.00 pending
resolution of the pending administrative cases against
him.[8]
In his July 17, 2008 letter to Chief Justice Puno, Judge
Carbonell surmised that the Audit Team might have
overlooked the fact that he had inherited some of the
undecided cases from the predecessor judge; that
said cases had no transcripts of stenographic notes,
because of which he was impelled to require the parties
to submit their respective memoranda; that the cases
would only be considered submitted for decision after
the parties would have filed their respective memoranda;
and that he had undergone a quadruple heart bypass
operation in 2005 that had adversely affected his pace in
deciding the cases.
On November 23, 2010, the Court referred Judge
Carbonell's letter to the OCA for evaluation, report, and
recommendation.[9]
In its Memorandum dated February 2, 2011,[10] the OCA
reiterated its recommendation to impose a fine of
P50,000.00 on Judge Carbonell, noting that he had failed
to render any valid reason for his delay in deciding the
cases submitted for decision and in resolving the
pending motions or incidents in other cases. The OCA
noted that only five cases submitted for decision had
been inherited; and that the case records did not bear any
requests for extension of time or any directive for the
transcription of stenographic notes. It stressed that heavy
caseload would not justify the failure to promptly decide
and resolve cases because he could have simply asked
the Court for an extension of time.
The recommendation of the OCA is well-taken, subject
to the modification of the penalty to be imposed.
As a frontline official of the Judiciary, a trial judge
should at all times act with efficiency and probity. He is
duty-bound not only to be faithful to the law, but also to
maintain professional competence. The pursuit of
excellence ought always to be his guiding principle.
Such dedication is the least that he can do to sustain the
trust and confidence that the public have reposed in him
and the institution he represents.[11]
The Court cannot overstress its policy on prompt
disposition or resolution of cases.[12] Delay in the
disposition of cases is a major culprit in the erosion of
public faith and confidence in the judicial system, as
judges have the sworn duty to administer justice without
undue delay.[13] Thus, judges have been constantly
reminded to strictly adhere to the rule on the speedy
disposition of cases and observe the periods prescribed
by the Constitution for deciding cases, which is three
months from the filing of the last pleading, brief or
memorandum for lower courts.[14] To further impress
upon judges such mandate, the Court has issued
guidelines (Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated
January 15, 1999) that would insure the speedy
disposition of cases and has therein reminded judges to
scrupulously observe the periods prescribed in the
Constitution.
Nonetheless, the Court has been mindful of the plight of
our judges and understanding of circumstances that may
hinder them from promptly disposing of their
businesses. Hence, the Court has allowed extensions of
time to decide cases beyond the 90-day period. All that a
judge needs to do is to request and justify an extension
of time to decide the cases, and the Court has almost
invariably granted such request.
Judge Carbonell failed to decide a total of 63 cases and
to resolve 16 pending motions or incidents within the 90-
day reglementary period. He intimated that his poor
health affected his pace in deciding the cases. Had such
been the case, then he should have explained his
predicament to the Court and asked for an extension of
time to decide the cases. Unfortunately, he failed to do
so.
Judge Carbonell claims that some of the inherited cases
had no transcripts of stenographic notes, thereby
preventing him from resolving the cases on time. He
posits that a case would not be considered submitted for
decision if the parties did not yet file their respective
memoranda.
The Audit Team's Report shows that, in an apparent
attempt to suspend the running of the 90-day period to
decide the cases, Judge Carbonell liberally gave the
parties in most of the overdue cases several extensions of
time to file their respective memoranda. Some
extensions were even for indefinite periods, with the
parties being simply given "ample time to file their
memo," as the relevant court orders stated.
In view of the foregoing, Judge Carbonell's excuses are
futile in the light of the following provisions of
Administrative Circular No. 28, dated July 3, 1989, viz:
A case is considered submitted for decision upon the
admission of the evidence of the parties at the
termination of the trial. The ninety (90) days period
(3)for deciding the case shall commence to run from
submission of the case for decision without
memoranda; in case the Court requires or allows its
filing, the case shall be considered submitted for
decision upon the filing of the last memorandum or
the expiration of the period to do so, whichever is
earlier. Lack of transcript of stenographic notes shall
not be a valid reason to interrupt or suspend the
period for deciding the case unless the case was
previously heard by another judge not the deciding
judge in which case the latter shall have the full
period of ninety (90) days from the completion of the
transcripts within which to decide the same.
The court may grant extension of time to file
(4)memoranda, but the ninety (90) day period for
deciding shall not be interrupted thereby.
Without a doubt, Judge Carbonell's failure to decide
several cases within the reglementary period, without
justifiable and credible reasons, constituted gross
inefficiency, warranting the imposition of administrative
sanctions,[15]like fines. The fines imposed have varied in
each case, depending chiefly on the number of cases not
decided within the reglementary period and other
factors, including the presence of aggravating or
mitigating circumstances like the damage suffered by the
parties from the delay, the health condition and age of
the judge, etc.[16] Thus, in one case, the Court mitigated
the liability of a Judge who had been suffering from
illnesses and who had later retired due to disability, and
imposed upon him a fine of P20,000.00 for failure to
decide 31 cases.[17]
Considering that Judge Carbonell similarly retired due to
disability, the Court believes that his poor health
condition greatly contributed to his inability to
efficiently perform his duties as a trial judge. That
mitigated his administrative liability, for which reason
the Court reduces the recommended penalty of fine
from P50,000.00 to P20,000.00.
WHEREFORE, Retired Judge Antonio A. Carbonell
is ORDERED to pay a fine of P20,000.00 to be
deducted from the P200,000.00 that was withheld from
his retirement benefits, and the balance to be
immediately released to him.
SO ORDERED.
 JUDGE JUANITA GUERRERO v. TERESITA Guerrero denied the imputed improprieties, averring that
ONG
she resolved the incidents in Civil Case No. 03-045
AM NO. P-0-2676, DEC. 16, 2009
based on the evidence presented by the parties during the
DECISION
hearings; that no bias or partiality could be noted on the
assailed orders; that her process server had gone to see
the defendant in Civil Case No. 03-045 only to serve the
BERSAMIN, J.:
court notices; that although she had said that Meralco
was a pader,she denied saying: Wala kayong
magagawa; and that she had already recused herself
Litigant Reynaldo N. Garcia, a plaintiff in Civil Case
from hearing Garcia's cases.
No. 03-045, entitled Spouses Reynaldo and Lydia Garcia
v. Spouses Joselito and Merle Arevalo, brought an
administrative complaint against Judge Juanita T.
As stated, Judge Guerreros comment incorporated an
Guerrero, Presiding Judge of Branch 204 of the Regional
administrative complaint against Ong. Therein, Judge
Trial Court (RTC) in Muntinlupa City, charging her with
Guerrero insisted that any acts of impropriety relative to
bias and irregularities in relation to her disposition of the
Civil Case No. 03-045 had been committed by Ong, a
application for a writ of preliminary prohibitory and
tenant of Garcia, who had gone to her chambers on
mandatory injunction in said case.
several occasions in the guise of making a courtesy call
on her, and had then discussed the merits of the case
with her; that Ong had engaged in name-dropping to
Answering Garcias administrative complaint,
urge her to resolve in favor of Garcia; that Ong had
Judge Guerrero incorporated a formal charge for
attended the hearings of the case in her Supreme Court
improper conduct against respondent Teresita V. Ong,
uniform; and that Ong had told her Acting Branch Clerk
Court Stenographer of Branch 260, RTC,
of Court that she (Judge Guerrero) and the defendants ay
in Paraaque City, which is now the subject matter of this
nagkatapatan na,which Ong had implied to mean that
decision.
the Judge (had) received consideration from the
defendants.

Antecedents

In its memorandum dated November 22, 2004,[3] the

OCAd found that Judge Guerrero had committed no act
of impropriety, and recommended that the complaint
In his complaint-affidavit against Judge
against Judge Guerrero be dismissed for lack of merit,
Guerrero,[1] Garcia averred that he and his wife, the
with a reminder to Judge Guerrero to exercise caution in
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 03-045, had sought
her utterances, like remarking that Meralco
the enforcement of an easement of right of way. He
was pader,lest they be misconstrued as bias in favor of a
imputed the following acts of impropriety to Judge
party litigant. The OCAd further recommended that Ong
Guerrero, namely: (1) that she had issued an unjust order
be required to comment on the allegations of improper
in the action; (2) that her process server had been seen in
conduct made against her by Judge Guerrero.
the premises involved in the litigation looking for Lito
Arevalo, the defendant; and (3) that in another case
involving him (Garcia) and the Manila Electric
Through the resolution dated January 19, 2005,[4] the
Company (Meralco), she had urged him (Garcia) to
Court adopted the recommendations of the OCAd;
settle his obligations by telling him: Kinakalaban po
dismissed the complaint against Judge Guerrero; and
namin ay pader at wala kaming magagawa.
required Ong to comment on Judge Guerreros
Required by the Office of the Court Administrator allegations of impropriety against her within 10 days
(OCAd) to comment on Garcias complaint,[2] Judge from notice.
 occasions, she had not filed applications for leave and
had not reflected her undertime in her daily time records
In due course, Ong submitted her comment on July 18,
(DTRs).
2005.[5]

The Court referred Ongs comment to the OCAd for

evaluation, report and recommendation.[6]

Justice Atienza recommended, therefore, that:

In turn, the OCAd recommended that the

administrative matter against Ong be referred for
investigation to a consultant of the OCAd in order to
ascertain every act of impropriety imputed against her.
Accordingly, on February 13, 2006,[7] the Court
referred the administrative matter against Ong to retired
Justice Narciso T. Atienza for investigation. Justice
Atienza submitted his report on July 31, 2006.[8]
On August 12, 2009, the case was re-docketed
as a regular administrative case.
1) Ms. Teresita V. Ong be
reprimanded for improper conduct with
a warning that commission of the same
or similar acts of impropriety in the
future shall be dealt with more severely;
and,
2) Advise Ms. Ong to log out
before leaving the Office during office
hours and log in upon return, but when
leaving the office is not on official
business, the undertime should be
reflected in the Daily Time Record.[9]

Justice Atienza's Report and Recommendation Ruling

During the investigation, Ong explained that her

attendance at the hearings and ocular inspection had
The Court agrees with the findings of Justice Atienza,
been made only upon the request of Garcia, whose plea
which were entirely substantiated by the records, but
for moral support she could not refuse; that she had not
differs with his recommendation of the penalty. Ong was
filed applications for leave because her superior had
guilty of grave misconduct, for using her official
permitted her to attend the hearings and the ocular
position as a court employee to secure benefits for
inspection; and that her sole purpose for talking with
Garcia; and of dishonesty, for committing serious
Judge Guerrero had been only to inform the latter about
irregularities in the keeping of her DTRs.
the case pending in her sala.

I. Use of Official Position to Secure Benefits

Justice Atienza regarded Ong's defense as incredible,
and observed that Ong's real intention in talking with
Judge Guerrero in her chambers while in office uniform
All court personnel, from the lowliest employees to the
had been to influence Judge Guerrero to resolve the
clerks of court, are involved in the dispensation of
pending incident in Garcias favor. He concluded that
justice like judges and justices, and parties seeking
Ong had attended several hearings and the ocular
redress from the courts for grievances look upon them
inspection in Civil Case No. 03-045 in her office
also as part of the Judiciary.[10] In performing their duties
uniform and during office hours; and that on those
and responsibilities, court personnel serve as sentinels of
justice, that any act of impropriety they commit
immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the
Judiciary and the people's confidence in the
Judiciary.[11] They are, therefore, expected to act and
behave in a manner that should uphold the honor and
dignity of the Judiciary, if only to maintain the peoples
confidence in the Judiciary.
A court employee is not prohibited from helping
individuals in the course of performing her official
duties, but her actions cannot be left unchecked when the
help extended puts under suspicion the integrity of the
Judiciary.[12] Indeed, she is strictly instructed not to use
her official position to secure unwarranted benefits,
privileges, or exemptions for herself or for others. [13] The
evident purpose of the instruction is precisely to free the
court employees from suspicion of misconduct.
Ong did not comply with the instruction.
Instead, she used her official position as an employee of
the Judiciary to attempt to influence Judge Guerrero to
rule in favor of litigant Garcia, her landlord. She was
thereby guilty of misconduct, defined as a transgression
of some established or definite rule of action; or, more
particularly, an unlawful behavior on the part of a public
officer or employee.[14] Her misconductwas grave, which
the Court explains in Imperial v. Santiago,[15] viz:
In grave misconduct, as distinguished from
simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear
intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of
established rule must be manifest.[16] Corruption as an
element of grave misconduct consists in the act of an
official or employee who unlawfully or wrongfully uses
her station or character to procure some benefit for
herself or for another, contrary to the rights of
others.[17] It is established herein that
Ong knowingly and corruptly tried to influence Judge
Guerrero to favor Garcia in the latters pending civil
action.
Ongs grave misconduct was a grave offense that
deserved the penalty of dismissal for the first offense
pursuant to Sec. 52, A, of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.[18] However,
there being no record of her having previously
committed a similar offense, the penalty of suspension of
one year without pay and a fine of P20,000.00, coupled
with a warning that a repetition shall be dealt with more
severely, is just and proper. The penalty is
commensurate with the penalty meted in Salazar v.
Barriga,[19] whereby the Court imposed on a sheriff
found guilty of grave misconduct the penalty of
suspension of one year without pay and a fine
of P20,000.00, upon considering the length of his
government service as a mitigating circumstance.

Misconduct is a transgression of
II. Making False Entries in the DTR
some established and definite rule of
action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by the
public officer. To warrant dismissal
from the service, the misconduct must Justice Atienza found that Ong had made false entries in
be grave, serious, important, weighty, her DTRs by indicating therein that she had been at work
momentous and not trifling.
The misconduct must imply wrongful although she had been elsewhere. We sustain the finding
intention and not a mere error of of Justice Atienza and pronounce Ong administratively
judgment. The misconduct must also
have a direct relation to and be liable for committing irregularities in the keeping of her
connected with the performance of his DTRs.[20] Her false entries in the DTRs constituted
official duties amounting either to
dishonesty,[21] an act that Section 52, Rule IV, Uniform
maladministration or willful,
intentional neglect or failure to Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,
discharge the duties of the office. classifies as a grave offense for which the penalty of
There must also be reliable evidence
showing that the judicial acts dismissal from the service even for the first commission
complained of were corrupt or is imposable.
inspired by an intention to violate the
law.
 Again, the Court opts not to wield the axe of
outright dismissal, a penalty that may be too extreme. As
earlier observed, there is no record of Ong having been
previously charged with and penalized for any
administrative offense. Section 53, Rule IV of
the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Servicegrants the disciplining authority the
discretion to consider mitigating circumstances in the
imposition of the proper penalty.[22] The Court thus
imposes upon her the penalty of suspension of one year
without pay, with warning that a repetition of the offense
will surely be dealt with more severely.

WHEREFORE, we find and declare Court

Stenographer Teresita V. Ong separately liable for the
two administrative offenses of gross misconduct and
dishonesty, and, accordingly, suspend her for one year
without pay for each offense, to be served consecutively,
plus a fine of P20,000.00 for the grave misconduct, with
a warning that the repetition of either offense shall be
dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this decision be attached to the personnel

records of respondent Ong in the Office of the
Administrative Services, Office of the Court
Administrator.

SO ORDERED.
 EDUARDO OLAGUER v. JUDGE ALFREDO
AMPUAN
AM NO. MTJ-10-1769, OCT 6, 2010
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Before us is an administrative complaint against
Presiding Judge Alfredo D. Ampuan of Branch 33,
Metropolitan Trial Court, in Quezon City.
The complainant charged respondent Judge with delay in
rendering a decision, gross inefficiency, and conduct
unbecoming of a judge relative to his handling of Civil
Case No. 27653 entitled JOS Managing Builders, Inc. v.
Land Bank of the Philippines, et al. The said civil case
had been already pending for eight years because
respondent Judge had allowed the case to drag
unnecessarily. The complainant claimed that respondent
had failed to render a decision despite the lapse of six
months and had likewise failed to act on the last two
motions he had filed. The complainant averred that the
Branch Clerk of Court had informed him that the cause
of delay had been the reconstruction of the various
transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs), which should
not be true considering that the original TSNs had earlier
been provided to the parties.[1]
It appears that on August 5, 2008, the
complainant filed an ex partemanifestation in Civil Case
No. 27653 praying for its submission for decision for
failure of the defendants to file their memorandum, but
respondent Judge rendered no decision despite the lapse
of three months. The complainant then filed motions to
resolve on December 12, 2008 and on February 18,
2009. Still, respondent Judge did not decide Civil Case
No. 27653 until only on June 2, 2009, which was way
beyond the three-month reglementary period.[2]
In his comment,[3] respondent Judge explained that he
had inherited Civil Case No. 27653 from two
predecessors, and that he had started handling it only
on November 18, 2005, but only for the last five
hearings. He averred that the stenographers who had
taken the TSNs had transferred to another court, causing
a delay in the submission of the TSNs; and that the
charges against him were unfair, stressing that he
conducted daily hearings because his sala was
designated as a Special Court for Tax Cases, Election
Court, and Small Claims Court.
On August 3, 2010, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCAd) found respondent Judge guilty of
gross inefficiency and recommended the penalty of
reprimand with a stern warning that a repetition of the
same or similar act would be dealt with more severely. [4]
We agree with the finding and recommendation of the
OCAd, which were supported by the uncontroverted
records.
Respondent Judge really failed in his duty to promptly
and expeditiously dispose of Civil Case No. 27653. In so
failing, he ran afoul of Supreme Court Administrative
Circular No. 28 dated July 3, 1989, whose paragraph
three provides:
A case is considered submitted for
decision upon the admission of the
evidence of the parties at the termination
of the trial. The ninety (90) day period
for deciding the case shall commence
to run from submission of the case for
decision without memoranda; in case
the court requires or allows its filing,
the case shall be considered submitted
for decision upon the filing of the last
memorandum or upon the
expiration of the period to do so,
whichever is earlier. Lack of transcript
of stenographic notes shall not be a valid
reason to interrupt or suspend the period
for deciding the case unless the case was
previously heard by another judge not
the deciding judge in which case the
latter shall have the full period of ninety
(90) days for the completion of the
transcripts within which to decide the
same.
The respondent should have forthwith issued the order
directing the stenographers to submit the TSNs after the
complainant had manifested that the defendants had not
filed their memorandum. Yet, he did not, but instead
took more than seven months before issuing such order
on March 15, 2009.
Moreover, we state that the additional court assignments
or designations imposed upon respondent Judge did not
make him less liable for the delay.[5] Verily, a judge
cannot by himself choose to prolong the period for
deciding cases beyond that authorized by law. Had his
additional court assignments or designations unduly
prevented him from deciding Civil Case No. 27653,
respondent Judge could have easily sought additional
time by requesting an extension from the Court, through
the OCAd, but he did not avail himself of this remedy.
Without an order of extension granted by the Court, his
failure to decide within the required period
constituted gross inefficiency that merited administrative
sanction.[6]

Nevertheless, the Court recognizes that

respondent judge inherited a total of 1,605 cases upon
his assumption on August 10, 2005, and that the
omission complained of is the first and only
administrative charge against him. We are inclined to
mitigate his liability, and opt to impose a reprimand,
with stern warning that a repetition of the offense or the
commission of a similar offense shall be dealt with more
severely.
WHEREFORE, respondent Presiding Judge
Alfredo D. Ampuan of Branch 33 of the Metropolitan
Trial Court in Quezon City is reprimanded, with stern
warningthat a repetition of the offense or the
commission of a similar offense shall be dealt with more
severely.

SO ORDERED.
 LOURDES FERRER & PROSPERIDAD
ARANDEZ v. JUDGE ROMEO RABACA
AM NO. MTJ-05-1580, OCT 6, 2010
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This administrative case charges Hon. Romeo A.
Rabaca, then the Presiding Judge of Branch 25 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC), with
ignorance of the law, disregard of the law, dereliction of
duty, knowingly rendering an unjust interlocutory order,
and violation of the Code of Conduct for Government
Officials.
The complainants were the President and the
Executive Director of the plaintiff in Civil Case No.
176394-CV of the MeTC, an ejectment suit
entitled Young Womens Christian Association, Inc. v.
Conrado Cano. After trial, Civil Case No. 176394-CV
was decided on June 22, 2004 by respondent
[1]
Judge, who disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant ordering the latter as follows:
(a) to vacate the premises located
at Ground Floor, YMCA, 1144 Gen.
Luna St., Ermita, Manila; and surrender
possession thereof to plaintiff;
(b) to pay plaintiff the sum of
Php45,211.80 representing his arrears in
rentals from February 2003 to July 2003
at Php7,535.30 a month plus the further
sum of Php7,535.30 a month as
reasonable value for the continued use
and occupation of the premises starting
August 2003 until the same is finally
vacated and possession thereof is turn-
over to plaintiff;
(c) to pay the plaintiff the sum of
Php20,000 as attorneys fees; and
(d) to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
On July 12, 2004, the plaintiffs counsel filed
a motion for immediate execution,praying that a writ of
execution be issued for the immediate execution of the
aforesaid Judgment. The plaintiff cited Section 19, Rule
70 of the Rules of Court as basis for its motion.[2]
In his order dated July 14, 2004, however,
respondent Judge denied the motion for immediate
execution,[3] stating:
A Notice of Appeal dated July 9, 2004,
having been seasonably filed by counsel
for the defendant, let the records of the
above-captioned case be, as it is hereby
ordered, elevated to the Regional Trial
Court of Manila for appropriate
proceedings and disposition.
In view thereof, no more action shall be
taken on the Motion for Execution
dated July 8, 2004 filed by the plaintiff
thru counsel.
SO ORDERED.
According to the complainants, their counsel talked with
respondent Judge about the matter. Allegedly,
respondent Judge told their counsel that if you think the
court is wrong, file a motion for reconsideration. With
that, the plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration,
which respondent Judge nonetheless denied in his order
dated July 28, 2004,[4] thuswise:
Considering that the Court has already
given due course to the appeal of the
defendant which was perfected within
the reglementary period, no more action
will be taken on the Motion for
Reconsideration dated July 19, 2004
filed by the plaintiff thru counsel.
The Branch Clerk of Court is hereby
directed to immediately forward the
records of this case to the Regional Trial
Court, Manila.
SO ORDERED.
The complainants averred that respondent Judges denial
of their motions had rendered their victory inutile, and
had unfairly deprived the plaintiff of the possession of
the premises. They further averred that respondent
Judges refusal to perform an act mandated by the Rules
of Court had given undue advantage to the defendant to
the plaintiffs damage and prejudice.
The Court required respondent Judge to comment on the
administrative complaint against him.
 In his comment dated September 16,
2004,[5] respondent Judge denied the charges. He
explained that he had honestly thought that his court had
lost jurisdiction over the case pursuant to the provision
of Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court(which
provides that in appeals by notice of appeal, the court
loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the
appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to
appeal of the other parties) once he had given due course
to the defendants notice of appeal. He claimed that he
had issued the orders in good faith and with no malice
after a fair and impartial evaluation of the facts,
applicable rules, and jurisprudence; and that if he had
thereby committed lapses in the issuance of the orders,
his doing so should be considered as error of judgment
on his part.
judgment did not absolve him of liability, because he
had grossly neglected his duties mandated by law by
failing and refusing to act on their motion for immediate
execution and motion for reconsideration and by giving
due course to the appeal despite no supersedeas bond
having been filed and approved by the trial court.
In his memorandum dated January 13, 2005,[7] then
Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., now
Associate Justice of the Court, recommended that the
administrative complaint against respondent Judge be re-
docketed as a regular administrative matter; and that
respondent Judge be fined in the amount of P5,000.00
with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act
would be dealt with more severely, based on an
evaluation of the charges, as follows:

He lastly insisted that he did not know personally the EVALUATION: We agree with the
complainants that respondent erred
parties in Civil Case No. 176394-CV, and had absolutely when he did not act on complainants
no reason to give undue favor or advantage to the motion for immediate execution.
defendant; that the complainants did not submit evidence Section 19, Rule 70 of the 1997 Revised
to show that the orders had been issued for a Rules on Civil Procedure provides:
consideration, material or otherwise, or that his issuance
SEC. 19. If judgment is
of the orders had been motivated by ill-will or bad faith. rendered against the
defendant, execution shall
issue immediately upon
In their reply dated September 22, 2004,[6] the motion, unless an appeal has
complainants contended that respondent Judge exhibited been perfected and the
defendant to stay execution
his ignorance of the law and procedure in relying on files a supersedeas bond,
Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court which referred approved by the Municipal
Trial Court and executed in
to appeals from the Regional Trial Court; that Rule 40,
favor of the plaintiff to pay
which contained provisions on appeal from the the rents, damages, and costs
Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts, and accruing down to the time of
the judgment appealed from,
which provided in its Section 4 that the perfection of the and unless, during the
appeal and the effect of such perfection should be pendency of the appeal, he
deposits with the appellate
governed by the provisions of Section 9 of Rule 41, court the amount of rent due
concerned appeals by notice of appeal in general; and from time to time under the
contract, if any, as determined
that instead, the applicable rule should be Section 19,
by the judgment of the
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Municipal Trial Court.
XXXXXXXX XXXX.

The complainants pointed out that respondent Judge It is clear from the foregoing that the
apparently did not know that appeal in forcible entry and perfection of an appeal by itself is not
sufficient to stay the execution of the
detainer cases was not perfected by the mere filing of a judgment in an ejectment case. The
notice of appeal (as in ordinary actions) but by filing of a losing party should likewise file a
notice of appeal and a sufficient supersedeas bond supersedeas bond executed in favor of
the plaintiff to answer for rents,
approved by the trial judge executed to the plaintiff to damages and costs, and, if the judgment
pay the rents, damages and costs accruing down to the of the court requires it, he should
likewise deposit the amount of the rent
time of the judgment appealed from. They asserted that before the appellate court from the time
respondent Judges invocation of good faith and error of during the pendency of the
appeal. Otherwise, execution becomes
ministerial and imperative.(Philippine
Holding Corporation vs. Valenzuela,
104 SCRA 401 as cited in Hualam
Construction and Development
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 214
SCRA 612, 626).
In the case at bar, defendant seasonably
filed his Notice of Appeal dated 9 July
2004on 13 July 2004; he however failed
to file any supersedeas bond. Prior to
the filing of such notice of appeal, more
specifically on 12 July 2004,
complainants have already filed their
Motion for Execution dated 8 July
2004. Instead of acting on the Motion
for Execution, respondent Judge Rabaca
gave due course to the appeal in an
Order dated 14 July 2004 and directed
his Branch Clerk of Court to elevate the
records of the case to the Regional Trial
Court (RTC). The Branch Clerk of
Court however failed to forward the
records to the RTC. This fact is clear
from Judge Rabacas Order dated 28 July
2004 wherein he directed the Branch
Clerk of Court to forward the records of
the case to the Manila Regional Trial
Court immediately.
From the foregoing, it is clear that when
the complainant moved for the
immediate execution of Judge Rabacas
decision, the latter still had jurisdiction
over the case. He therefore clearly erred
when he refused to act on the Motion for
Execution. The relevant question that
we should resolve however is whether
such error is an error of judgment or an
error amounting to incompetence that
calls for administrative discipline.
Judge Rabaca claims that he refused to
act on the complainants Motion for
execution because he honestly thought
that when he gave due course to the
defendants appeal which was seasonably
filed, and ordered the elevation of the
records to the appellate court, his court
already lost jurisdiction over the
case.. In making his ruling, respondent
asserts he relied on the provisions of
Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court. This provision reads as follows:
In appeals by notice of
appeal, the court loses
jurisdiction over the case upon
the perfection of the appeals
filed in due time and the
expiration of the time to
appeal of the other parties.
He likewise allegedly relied on the
ruling of the Court in Administrative
Matter OCA IPI No. 03-1513-MTJ:
Susana Joaquin Vda. De Agregado vs.
Judge Thelma Bunyi-Medina,
MeTJ wherein the Court said that-
Respondent Judge is
correct in saying that she had
lost jurisdiction to entertain
the motion for execution after
the perfection of the appeal
and after she issued an order
to transmit the records of the
case to the appellate court for
review.
The facts of the case against Judge
Bunyi-Medina are however different
from those prevailing in the instant
case. In the Medina case, the fifteen (15)
day period within which to perfect the
appeal had already lapsed before the
complainant therein moved for the
execution of the execution
judgment. Clearly therefore, appeal had
already been perfected. In the instant
case, although the defendant had filed
his appeal, the period to appeal had not
yet lapsed since the plaintiff still had his
own period to appeal from the judgment
and such period had not yet lapsed. The
provision relied upon by judge Rabaca,
more specifically, Section 9, Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court, clearly states that, In
appeals by notice of appeal, the court
loses jurisdiction over the case upon
perfection of the appeals filed on due
time and the expiration of the time to
appeal of the other parties. Moreover
and more importantly, the herein
complainants filed their Motion for
Execution even before the defendant had
filed his Notice of Appeal. Such motion
was therefore still well within the
jurisdiction of the lower court.
It is basic rule in ejectment cases
that the execution of judgment in favor
of the plaintiff is a matter of right and
mandatory. This has been the consistent
ruling of the Court in a number of cases
involving the same issue posed before
the respondent judge. Respondent Judge
is expected to know this and his
justification of erroneous application of
the law, although mitigating, could not
exculpate him from liability.
We agree with and adopt the evaluation of the Court
Administrator.
Indeed, respondent Judge should have granted the
plaintiffs motion for immediate execution considering
that the defendant did not file the sufficient supersedeas
bond despite having appealed. Granting the
plaintiffs motion for immediate executionbecame his
ministerial duty upon the defendants failure to file the
sufficient supersedeas bond. Section 19, Rule 70, of herein. And, thirdly, given that his court, being vested
the Rules of Court clearly imposes such duty, viz: with original exclusive jurisdiction over cases similar to
Civil Case No. 176394-CV, had been assigned many
Section 19. Immediate execution such cases, he was not a trial judge bereft of the
of judgment; how to stay same. If
judgment is rendered against the pertinent prior experience to act on the issue of
defendant, execution shall issue immediate execution, a fact that further exposed the
immediately upon motion, unless an
appeal has been perfected and the abject inanity of his excuses.
defendant to stay execution files a
sufficient supersedeas bond, approved
We agree with the complainants insistence, therefore,
by the Municipal Trial Court and
executed in favor of the plaintiff to that respondent Judges omission to apply Section 19 was
pay the rents, damages, and costs inexcusable. He had ignored the urging to follow the
accruing down to the time of the
judgment appealed from, and unless, clear and explicit provision of the rule made in the
during the pendency of the appeal, he plaintiffs motion for immediate execution. Had he any
deposits with the appellate court the
amount of rent due from time to time genuine doubt about his authority to grant the motion for
under the contract, if any, as immediate execution, as he would have us believe, he
determined by the judgment of the
could have easily and correctly resolved the doubt by a
Municipal Trial Court. In the absence
of a contract, he shall deposit with the resort to the Rules of Court, which he well knew was the
Regional Trial Court the reasonable repository of the guidelines he was seeking for his
value of the use and occupation of the
premises for the preceding month or judicial action. Neither was it relevant that he did not
period at the rate determined by the know any of the parties, or that he did not corruptly
judgment of the lower court on or before
the tenth day of each succeeding month favor the defendant by his omission. His mere failure to
or period. The supersedeas bond shall be perform a duty enjoined by the Rules of Court sufficed
transmitted by the Municipal Trial
to render him administratively accountable.
Court, with the other papers, to the clerk
of the Regional Trial Court to which the
action is appealed. This case is an opportune occasion to remind judges of
xxx
the first level courts to adhere always to the mandate
under Section 19, Rule 70, of the Rules of Court to issue
Respondent Judges excuse, that he had lost jurisdiction
writs of execution upon motion of the plaintiffs in
over the case by virtue of the defendants appeal, was
actions for forcible entry or unlawful detainer when the
unacceptable in light of the clear and explicit text of the
defendant has appealed but has not filed a sufficient
aforequoted rule. To begin with, the perfection of the
supersedeas bond. The summary nature of the special
appeal by the defendant did not forbid the favorable
civil action under Rule 70 and the purpose underlying
action on the plaintiffs motion for immediate execution.
the mandate for an immediate execution, which is to
The execution of the decision could not be stayed by the
prevent the plaintiffs from being further deprived of their
mere taking of the appeal. Only the filing of the
rightful possession, should always be borne in mind.
sufficient supersedeas bond and the deposit with the
appellate court of the amount of rent due from time to
The recommended penalty of P5,000.00 with warning
time, coupled with the perfection of the appeal, could
that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt
stay the execution. Secondly, he could not also credibly
with more severely is also correct. The Court
justify his omission to act according to the provision by
Administrator rationalized the recommendation of the
claiming good faith or honest belief, or by asserting lack
penalty thuswise:
of malice or bad faith. A rule as clear and explicit as
Section 19 could not be misread or misapplied, but Under A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC,
should be implemented without evasion or hesitation. To Gross Ignorance of the Law or
Procedure is classified as serious offense
us, good faith, or honest belief, or lack of malice, or lack
for which the imposable penalty ranges
of bad faith justifies a non-compliance only when there from a fine to dismissal. However, we
is an as-yet unsettled doubt on the meaning or find respondents acts not ingrained with
malice or bad faith. It is a matter of
applicability of a rule or legal provision. It was not so public policy that in the absence of
 fraud, dishonesty or corrupt motive, the
acts of a judge in his judicial capacity
are not subject to disciplinary action
even though such acts are erroneous.
In Domingo vs. Judge Pagayatan, A.M.
No. RTJ-03-1751, 10 June 2003, the
penalty of fine in the amount of five
thousand pesos was deemed sufficient
where it was held that respondents lack
of malice or bad faith frees him from
administrative liability but not for gross
ignorance of the law.

We concur with the rationalization of the Court

Administrator. Verily, even if respondent Judges
omission would have easily amounted to gross
ignorance of the law and procedure, a serious offense
under Section 8,[8] Rule
140, of the Rules of Court, as amended, the fact that the
complainants did not establish that malice or bad faith
impelled his omission to act, or that fraud, dishonesty, or
a corrupt motive attended his omission to act demands a
downgrading of the liability. In the absence of any
showing that he had been held guilty of any other
administrative offense,[9] and without our attention being
called to other circumstances that might demonstrate
respondent Judges dark motives for his inaction, we
should find and consider the recommended penalty
of P5,000.00 with warning that a repetition of the same
or similar act would be dealt with more severely to be
commensurate to the offense.[10]

WHEREFORE, we find respondent JUDGE ROMEO

A. RABACA, Presiding Judge of Branch 25,
Metropolitan Trial Court, in Manila guilty of ignorance
of the law and procedure, and, accordingly, impose upon
him a fine of P5,000.00 with warning that a repetition of
the same or similar act would be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.
 RE: CASES SUBMITTED B-6377 12-26-03
FOR DECISION BEFORE JUDGE DAMASO A. B-2035 12-30-03
HERRERA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, B-5763 01-15-04
BRANCH 24, BIAN, LAGUNA. B-6041 01-30-04
B-5651 02-02-04
B-5321 02-17-04
A.M. No. RTJ-05-1924 B-6032 03-04-04
B-6381 03-04-04
October 13, 2010 B-2648 04-04-04
B-2939 04-13-04
RESOLUTION B-5893 04-29-04
B-6244 06-20-03
B-6432 03-24-04
BERSAMIN, J.: B-2957 05-23-04
B-2425 05-09-04
B-4565 05-26-04
B-6505 06-29-04
Judge Damaso A. Herrera, the former Presiding Judge of
Branch 24 of the Regional Trial Court in Bian,
CRIMINAL CASE NO. DUE DATES
Laguna, filed an application for optional retirement
effective April 5, 2004. The Court approved his 7051-B 02-04-02
application through the resolution issued on July 5, 6074-B 05-11-03
11114-B 05-23-03
2004 in Administrative Matter No. 11570-Ret. 9812-B 09-08-03
7006-B 11-29-03
4337-B 06-27-02
Then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, 10355-B 01-15-04
Jr., now a Member of the Court, initiated 8777-B 02-03-04
7658-B 03-27-04
an administrative matter for agenda dated October 1,
11941-B 04-14-04
2004 to report on the cases submitted for decision before 10195-B 05-17-04
newly-retired Judge Herrera, citing 55 of such cases
mentioned in the March 2004 monthly report of Judge
The report further indicated that the cases submitted for
Herreras branch, some of which were already beyond the
decision as reported in the December 2003 monthly
reglementary period to decide, [1] to wit:
report totaling 26 increased to 55 in the March 2004
CIVIL CASE NO. DUE DATES monthly report due to the addition of 29 cases; that
Judge Herrera failed to request the extension of his time
B-1304 07-24-84
B-4958 10-22-97 to decide the cases; that Branch 24 did not submit the
B-5632 Appealed monthly reports of cases within the period required
B-4010 10-07-02
B-5926 01-10-02 under Administrative Circular No. 4-2004; and that most
B-3827 12-04-02 of the cases submitted for decision had not been
B-5075 06-22-02
reflected in the submitted reports.
B-5801 09-07-02
B-6087 06-24-04
B-6448 06-15-04 Acting on the recommendation of the Court
B-6449 06-15-04 [2]
B-6450 06-15-04 Administrator, the Court resolved to:
B-6465 06-11-04
B-6115 12-13-02 (a) DIRECT Judge Damaso A. Herrera
B-5215 02-05-01 to explain within ten (10) days
B-5761 02-05-03 from notice his failure to decide the
B-2738 02-08-03 subject cases;
B-5056 03-19-03
B-6139 05-06-03 (b) DIRECT Judge Damaso A. Herrera
B-5489 06-21-03 and Acting Clerk of Court Julian R.
B-3082 09-20-03 Orfiano, Jr. to EXPLAIN within ten
B-3181 10-18-03 (10) days from notice their failure to
B-6287 09-06-03 submit their monthly reports of
B-5411 10-25-03 cases on time and why the actual
B-6334 10-28-03 number of cases submitted for
B-5316 11-29-03 decision are not reflected in said
B-2974 12-05-03 reports and why they should not be
 held administratively liable for the ample time to prepare the TSNs in view of his court
delay incurred in the submission of
the monthly reports of cases.[3] having him and another judge assigned to assist him.

Judge Herrera contended that he had requested

In his explanation dated January 21, 2005,[4] Acting
extensions of time to decide cases; that he had exerted
Clerk of Court Orfiano, Jr. stated that he was serving as
earnest efforts to decide the cases; that his heavy
both OIC/Acting Branch Clerk of Court and Legal
workload and hectic court schedules had prevented him
Researcher; that he did not submit the monthly reports of
from deciding his cases within the prescribed period;
cases on time because of: (a) the heavy case load that
that that his delay in the submission of monthly reports
already totaled 1076 cases as of January 2003; and (b)
and the inaccuracy of the data reflected thereon were
the late submission by the criminal and civil docket
caused by his branchs heavy workload and by the fact
clerks of the required data for the preparation of the
that his Acting Branch Clerk of Court had also
monthly reports despite his constant reminders to them.
functioned as Legal Researcher.

For his part, Judge Herrera submitted

[5]
In its memorandum dated April 21, 2005,[6] the Office of
his explanation dated February 2, 2005, essentially
the Court Administrator (OCAd) reported on the
praying for the Courts kind understanding and
administrative matter and recommended that: (a) the
consideration. He alleged that prior to his retirement on
administrative matter be re-docketed as a regular
April 4, 2004 he had decided four of the cases included
administrative complaint against Judge Herrera for gross
in the list of undecided cases (i.e., Civil Case No. B-
inefficiency; and (b) a fine of P11,000.00 be imposed
6287, Criminal Case No. 6074-B, Criminal Case No.
upon him, to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
11114-B and Criminal Case No. 9812-B); and that he
could not act on two other cases (i.e., Criminal Case No.
By his letter dated May 16, 2005,[7] Judge Herrera
11941-B and Criminal Case No. 10195-B) whose due
informed the Court that his application for early
dates for decision fell on April 14, 2004 and May 17,
retirement had been approved effective April 4, 2004;
2004, respectively, because of the prohibition for him to
and prayed for the release of his retirement benefits after
act under Supreme Court Circular No. 16 dated
withholding P40,000.00 from the total amount to which
December 2, 1986, to wit:
he was entitled pending the resolution of the instant
4. When the specified date of administrative matter.
retirement is reached without the
applicant receiving any notice of
In a memorandum dated May 31, 2005,[8] the
approval or denial of his application, he
shall cease working and discharging his OCAd considered the letter of Judge Herrera as a motion
functions, unless directed otherwise. for the early resolution of the administrative matter.

Denying any intention not to decide the cases or to delay
the submission of the reports, Judge Herrera cited his
heavy workload, lack of sufficient time, health reasons,
and the physical impossibility of complying with the
requirements in his explanation. He mentioned that his
court had inherited about 1,000 cases, many of which
included voluminous records and some of which
required the retaking of testimonies due to unavailability
of the transcript of stenographic notes (TSNs). He
claimed that his regular Branch Clerk of Court had been
appointed an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, leaving
him to do his work without any assistance by a Branch
Clerk of Court; and that the stenographers had lacked
Thus, on June 20, 2005, the Court directed the
re-docketing of the case as a regular administrative
matter.[9]
In another letter dated June 8, 2009,[10] Judge
Herrera prayed for the early resolution of the
administrative matter, and reminded that he had been
retired for already five years and was already entitled to
receive his monthly pension and other benefits as a
retired RTC Judge. He cited his lack of income due to
his not having engaged in the private practice of law
since his retirement due to poor health requiring his
continuous medication.
 It appears that on September 21, 2005, through a
resolution issued in Administrative Matter No. 12086-
Ret.
entitled Re: Application for OptionalRetirement under
R.A. 910, as amended, of Judge Damaso A. Herrera,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Binan, Laguna, the
Court ordered the release of Judge Herreras retirement
benefits but withheld the amount of P40,000.00 subject
to the outcome of this administrative matter.[11]
After considering the circumstances of the
administrative matter concerning Judge Herrera, the
Court adopts the recommendation of the OCAd
embodied in itsmemorandum dated April 21, 2005.
Section 15(1), Article VIII, of the Constitution requires a
trial judge to dispose of all cases or matters within three
months from the time of their submission for decision.
Conformably with the constitutional prescription, Rule
3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct admonishes all judges to dispose of their courts
business promptly and to decide cases within the
required period. Unless every trial judge earnestly,
painstakingly, and faithfully complies with this mandate
of efficiency, the present clogged dockets in our judicial
system cannot be cleared.[12]
In Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC,
[13]
Br. 22, Kabacan, North Cotabato, the Court has
impressed upon trial judges the need to decide cases
promptly and expeditiously to accord with the time
honored precept that justice delayed is justice
denied, viz:
Every judge should decide cases with
dispatch and should be careful,
punctual, and observant in the
performance of his functions for delay
in the disposition of cases erodes the
faith and confidence of our people in the
judiciary, lowers its standards and
brings it into disrepute. Indeed, a judge
must display that interest in his office
which stops not at the minimum of the
days labor fixed by law, and which
ceases not at the expiration of official
sessions, but which proceeds diligently
on holidays and by artificial light and
even into vacation periods. Only thus
can he do his part in the great work of
speeding up the administration of justice
and of rehabilitating the judiciary in the
estimation of the people.
Judge Herrera was guilty of undue delay in the
disposition of the cases pending him his court. Prior to
his early retirement, he had not decided 49 cases already
due for decision, which total did not include the four
cases that Judge Herrera claimed to have by then decided
and the two that had supposedly become due for decision
already within the period of prohibition for him to act in
view of his application for early retirement.
Judge Herreras failure to decide his cases with dispatch
constituted gross inefficiency and warranted the
[14]
imposition of administrative sanctions upon him. As
the Court has pointed out in Re: Judicial Audit of the
RTC, Br. 14, Zamboanga City, Presided over by Hon.
Ernesto R. Gutierrez:[15]
We cannot overstress this policy on
prompt disposition or resolution of
cases. Delay in case disposition is a
major culprit in the erosion of public
faith and confidence in the judiciary and
the lowering of its standards. Failure to
decide cases within the reglementary
period, without strong and justifiable
reason, constitutes gross inefficiency
warranting the imposition of
administrative sanction on the defaulting
judge.
Judge Herreras plea of heavy workload, lack of
sufficient time, poor health, and physical impossibility
could not excuse him. Such circumstances were not
justifications for the delay or non-performance, given
that he could have easily requested the Court for the
extension of his time to resolve the cases. Our awareness
of the heavy caseload of the trial courts has often moved
us to allow reasonable extensions of the time for trial
judges to decide their cases. But we have to remind
Judge Herrera and other trial judges that no judge can
choose to prolong, on his own, the period for deciding
cases beyond the period authorized by the law. Without
an order of extension granted by the Court, a failure to
decide even a single case within the required period
rightly constitutes gross inefficiency that merits
[16]
administrative sanction.
Judge Herrera should have sought additional
time by simply filing a request for extension if, to him,
rendering a decision or resolve a matter beyond the
reglementary period became unavoidable. That he did
not so seek additional time reflected his indifference to
the prescription to decide within the time limits of the
law. Thus, we choose not to consider seriously his
excuses as exempting him from the due observance of
the time limits of the law or as exonerating him from
administrative liability. The excuses, assuming they
were true, could only be treated as mitigating
circumstances vis--vis the properly imposable
[17]
penalty. In this regard, the fact that the more than
1,000 inherited cases added to Judge Herreras workload
can be treated as a mitigating circumstance.

Under Section 9(1), in relation to Section 11 (B),

of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended, undue
delay in rendering a decision is a less serious charge that
merits the penalty of either (a) suspension from office
without salary and other benefits for not less than one
nor more than three months; or (b) a fine more
than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.

Anent the penalty, the OCAd recommended a fine

of P11,000.00. We approve of the recommendation, for
his offense is equivalent to gross inefficiency, but we
take into account the mitigating circumstance earlier
mentioned.

Acting Branch Clerk of Court Orfiano, Jr.s explanation

of the late submission of the monthly reports is accepted,
but he is reminded to comply faithfully with the period
prescribed for the submission of the reports. He is
warned that the same infraction will be dealt with more
severely.

WHEREFORE, retired Judge Damaso A. Herrera is

ordered to pay a fine of P11,000.00 to be deducted from
the amount of P40,000.00 withheld from his retirement
benefit. The Court directs the immediate payment of the
balance to him, unless lawful grounds warrant the
continued retention of the balance in relation to other
cases involving him.

SO ORDERED.
 ASSISTANT SPECIAL PROSECUTOR
III ROHERMIA
J. JAMSANI-RODRIGUEZ v. JUSTICES
GREGORY S. ONG, JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, and
RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA,
SANDIGANBAYAN
A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J, August 24, 2010
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Rohermia J. Jamsani-Rodriguez, an Assistant
Special Prosecutor III in the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, Office of the Ombudsman initiated this
administrative matter by filing an affidavit-
complaint dated October 23, 2008 to charge
Sandiganbayan Justices Gregory S. Ong (Justice Ong);
Jose R. Hernandez (Justice Hernandez); and Rodolfo A.
Ponferrada (Justice Ponferrada), who composed the
Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division),
with Justice Ong as Chairman, at the time material to the
complaint, with (1) grave misconduct, conduct
unbecoming a Justice, and conduct grossly prejudicial to
the interest of the service; (2) falsification of public
documents; (3) improprieties in the hearing of cases; and
(4) manifest partiality and gross ignorance of the law. [1]
Before anything more, the Court clarifies that
this decision is limited to the determination of the
administrative culpability of the respondent Justices, and
does not extend to the ascertainment of whatever might
be the effects of any irregularity they committed as
members of the Fourth Division on the trial proceedings.
This clarification stresses that the proceedings, if
procedurally infirm, resulted from the acts of the
Sandiganbayan as a collegial body, not from their acts as
individual Justices. The remedy against any procedural
infirmity is not administrative but judicial.
Details of the Charges
A.
Grave Misconduct, Conduct Grossly
Prejudicial to the Interest
of the Service, and Falsification of
Public Documents
Under Section 1, Rule IV of the Revised Internal
Rules of the Sandiganbayan, cases originating
from Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao shall be heard in the
region of origin, except only when the greater
convenience of the parties and of the witnesses or
other compelling considerations require
the contrary.[2] Thus, for the period from April
24 to April 28, 2006, the
Fourth Division scheduled sessions for the trial of
several cases in the Hall of Justice in Davao City.
Prior to the scheduled sessions, or on April 17, 2006, the
complainant sent a memorandum to Special Prosecutor
Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio (Special Prosecutor Villa-
Ignacio) to invite his attention to the irregular
arrangement being adopted by the Fourth Division in
conducting its provincial hearings.[3] The memorandum
reads as follows:
The Prosecution Bureau IV is due
to leave for Davao City on April 23,
2006 for their scheduled hearing which
will be held on April 24 to 28, 2006. In
conducting provincial hearing, the
Fourth Division has adopted a
different procedure. They do not sit as
collegial body, instead they divide the
division into two. In such a manner,
the Chairman will hear some of the
cases alone and the other members
will hear other cases, conducting
hearing separately and
simultaneously.
We find this procedure to be
advantageous to the Prosecution and
also commendable on the part of the
Justices. While there are no
objections manifested by the defense
lawyers, we are apprehensive of the
consequences, considering that this
constitutes procedural lapses. In a case
 decided by the Supreme Court, the
conviction of the accused by the
Sandiganbayan (Second Division) was
invalidated by the court when it was
shown that the members of the court
who heard his case were constantly
changing. The Petitioner assailed the
decision of the Sandiganbayan in its
capacity as a trial court.
In one of her hearings, the
undersigned has already called the
attention of the Hon. Chairman and
expresses (sic) her concern on the
matter, and even opined that they
might be charged of falsification, by
issuing orders that they heard the
cases as a collegial body, when in fact
only the Chairman was present
during the trial and the other
members are hearing cases in the
other chamber.
The Chairman, however,
welcomes any question on the procedure
they are presently adopting.
We do not want to take
chances. In cases where conviction are
issued, the accused would surely assail
this procedure.
For your information and
[4]
appropriate action.
The complainant stated in her affidavit-complaint that
Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio responded to
her memorandum by instructing her and the other
Prosecutors to object to the arrangement and to place
their objections on record.
During the hearing in Davao City, the Fourth Division
did not sit as a collegial body. Instead, Justice Ong heard
cases by himself, while Justice Hernandez and Justice
Ponferrada heard the other cases together. Complying
with Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacios instructions, the
complainant objected to the arrangement, but her
objections were brushed aside.[5]
The complainant averred that her recording of her
continuing objections incurred for her the ire of the
Justices; and that faced with such predicament and out of
her desire to avoid any procedural defects, she decided
to forego the presentation of NBI Investigator Atty. Roel
Plando as her witness in Criminal Cases Nos. 28103 to
28104 entitled People of the Philippines v. Payakan
Tilendo in the last hearing date of April 27,
2006. Instead, she requested another Prosecutor to
inform the Fourth Division that she was then suffering
from migraine, and to request the cancellation of the
hearing.
The complainant was surprised to learn later on
that the Fourth Division had issued a warrant for the
arrest of Atty. Plando for his non-appearance at the
hearing.
On May 8, 2006, Atty. Plando filed a motion to lift
bench warrant,[6] in which he explained that he had
arrived in Davao City in the morning of April 27, 2006
in order to appear in court, and had called up the
complainant, who had told him that she would not be
presenting him as a witness due to lack of time for the
necessary conference; and that she had also told him
about her having migraine on that morning.
On May 15, 2006, the Fourth Division directed the
complainant to comment on Atty. Plandos motion. In
her comment dated May 24, 2006,[7] the complainant
averred that she had decided not to proceed with the
presentation of Mr. Plando on April 27, 2006 due to her
apprehension that the Honorable Court might again
conduct the hearing in division; and that incurring the ire
of the Justices by her continuing objections to the
hearing procedure had been a stressful situation that had
induced her migraine.
Although lifting the warrant of arrest issued against Atty.
Plando through the order dated May 26, 2006,[8] the
Fourth Division directed the complainant in the
same order to answer questions from the court itself
on June 6, 2006 relative to statements made in [her]
Comment dated May 24, 2006.
For the June 6, 2006 hearing, the complainant was
accompanied by Acting Director Elvira Chua of Bureau
IX, Director Somido, and Stenographer Yolanda Pineda.
According to the complainant, Justice Hernandez berated
her for bringing her own stenographer. The Fourth
Division then directed Stenographer Pineda to show
cause why she should not be cited in contempt for taking
notes without prior leave of court.[9]
Complying with the directive to show cause,
Pineda submitted
[10]
anexplanation/compliance, explaining that Director
Chua had asked her to attend the hearing on June 6,
2006, and to take stenographic notes of the proceedings.
Director Chua confirmed Pinedas explanation in her
own manifestation and explanation,[11] stating that the
complainant had requested that a stenographer from the
Office of the Special Prosecutor be tasked to take notes
at the hearing; and that on 27 April 2006 when
Prosecutor Rohermia Rodriguez was supposed to present
her NBI Agent witness in Davao City, she left Davao at
4:30 in the morning of the said date so that it would be
physically impossible for her to be in court at 8:30 in the
morning.
The Fourth Division issued an order on June 20,
[12]
2006, directing the complainant to comment on
Director Chuas manifestation and explanation, and to
explain why she should not be cited in contempt of court
for failing to present the NBI agent as a witness on April
26 and 27, 2006. She complied by submitting
[13]
her compliance on July 10, 2006. The incident has
remained unresolved by the Fourth Division.
The complainant contended that by not acting as a
collegial body, respondent Justices not only contravened
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1606, but also committed
acts of falsification by signing their orders, thereby
making it appear that they had all been present during
the hearing when in truth and in fact they were not.
B.
Improprieties During Hearings
Amounting to Gross Abuse of Judicial
Authority and Grave Misconduct
Allegedly, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez made the
following intemperate and discriminatory utterances
during hearings.
Firstly, the complainant alleged that Justice Ong
uttered towards the complainant during the hearing held
in Cebu City in September 2006 the following:
We are playing Gods here, we will
do what we want to do, your contempt is
already out, we fined you eighteen
thousand pesos, even if you will appeal,
by that time I will be there, Justice of the
Supreme Court.
Secondly, Justice Ong often asked lawyers from
which law schools they had graduated, and frequently
inquired whether the law school in which Justice
Hernandez had studied and from which he had graduated
was better than his (Justice Ongs) ownalma mater. The
complainant opined that the query was manifestly
intended to emphasize that the San Beda College of
Law, the alma mater of Justice Ong, and the UP College
of Law, that of Justice Hernandez, were the best law
schools.
Thirdly, on another occasion in that hearing
in Cebu City in September 2006, Justice Hernandez
discourteously shouted at Prosecutor Hazelina Tujan-
Militante, who was then observing trial from the
gallery: You are better than Director Somido? Are you
better than Director Chua? Are you here to supervise
Somido? Your office is wasting funds for one prosecutor
who is doing nothing.
 Finally, Justice Hernandez berated
Pangalangan, the father of former UP Law Dean Raul
Pangalangan, thus:
Just because your son is always
nominated by the JBC to Malacaang,
you are acting like that! Do not forget
that the brain of the child follows that of
their (sic) mother.
C.
Justices Ong, Hernandez, and
Ponferradas Gross Ignorance of the
Law Amounting to Manifest
Partiality for Dismissing Criminal
Case No. 25801,
Entitled People v. Puno, upon a
Demurrer to Evidence
In imputing manifest partiality to respondent
Justices, the complainant cited the
Divisions resolution granting accused Ronaldo V. Punos
demurrer to evidence in Criminal Case No. 25801, and
dismissing the case upon a finding that the assailed
[14]
contracts had never been perfected, which finding was
contrary to the evidence of the Prosecution.
The complainant insisted that the conclusion that
the assailed contracts had never been perfected was
based on a National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM)
resolution, which the Fourth Division appreciated in the
guise of taking judicial notice. She contended that taking
judicial notice of the NAPOLCOM resolution upon a
demurrer to evidence was highly erroneous, and
constituted gross ignorance of the law.
Comments of Respondents
Atty. Maintaining their innocence of the charges, Justice Ong
and Justice Hernandez filed their joint
[15]
comment. Although admitting having tried cases in
the provinces by apportioning or assigning the cases
scheduled for hearing among themselves, they
emphasized that they had nonetheless ensured at the
outset that: first, there was a quorum, i.e., all the three
members of the Division were present in the same
courtroom or venue, thereby preserving the collegial
nature of the Division as required by law, specifically
Section 3 of PD 1606; second, the members of the
Division were within hearing or communicating distance
of one another, such that they could readily confer with
each other in order to address or resolve any issue that
arose in the cases separately being heard by them;
and, third, the parties did not object to the arrangement,
and thus could not later on assail the proceedings to
which they had given their full assent, based on the
equitable principle of estoppel.
Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez averred that their
arrangement had been adopted in the best interest of the
service, because they had thereby expedited the
disposition of their cases, resulting in considerable
savings in time, effort, and financial resources of the
litigants, lawyers, witnesses, and the court itself; but that
Fourth they had meanwhile discontinued the arrangement after
it had piled up so much work at a much faster pace than
the Fourth Division could cope with. They argued that
even assuming, arguendo,that the arrangement had been
irregular, it could only be the subject of a petition
for certiorari on the ground of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, not an
administrative complaint, due to its amounting only to a
mere procedural lapse.
Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez refuted the
complainants allegation on their use of intemperate and
discriminatory language by attaching the transcript of
stenographic notes to prove that there was no record of
the intemperate and discriminatory utterances on the date
specified by the complainant.[16] Justice Ong dared the
complainant to produce a copy of the order that
contained his following alleged utterance:
 We are playing Gods here, we will
do what we want to do, your contempt is
already out, we fined you eighteen
thousand pesos, even if you will appeal,
by that time I will be there, Justice of the
Supreme Court.
Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez admitted
having asked the lawyers appearing before them about
the law schools they had graduated from, but explained
that they had done so casually and conversationally, with
the scenario playing out between two Justices teasing
each other from time to time. They claimed that their
queries were usually made in jest, and were intended to
break the monotony and seriousness of the courtroom
setting.
Justice Hernandez denied having shouted at Prosecutor
Tujan-Militante, but conceded the possibility of having
observed that her presence in Cebu City was a waste of
government funds, because she was not one of the
Prosecutors assigned to prosecute any of the scheduled
cases.
On the charge of gross ignorance of the law amounting
to manifest partiality (relating to the grant of the
demurrer to evidence in Criminal Case No. 25801),
Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez pointed out that the
Supreme Court had already sustained their action by
dismissing the petition for review of the Special
Prosecutor through the resolution issued in G.R. No.
171116 on June 5, 2006.[17]
Justice Ponferradas separate comment[18] echoed his co-
respondents assertions in their joint comment.
Report of the Court Administrator
In our resolution dated January 20, 2009,[19] we noted
the comments of respondent Justices, and referred the
matter to the Court Administrator for evaluation, report
and recommendation.
In his report dated October 6, 2009,[20] then Court
Administrator Jose P. Perez, now a Member of the
Court, recommended the dismissal of the charges for
lack of merit, because:
Viewed in the foregoing light, the
charge of grave misconduct cannot
stand. It is understood that grave
misconduct is such which affects a
public officers performance of his
duties as such officer and not only that
which affects his character as a private
individual and requires reliable
evidence showing that the judicial act
complained of were corrupt or inspired
by an intention to violate the law.Our
perusal of the record shows that
respondents adoption of the assailed
practice was not motivated by
corruption and/or an illegal purpose.
Indeed, the best interest of the service
was clearly aimed at. To justify the
taking of drastic disciplinary action, the
law requires that the error or mistake if
there be such must be gross or patent,
malicious, deliberate or in bad faith.
For the very same reasons, respondents
cannot likewise be held liable for
falsification of public documents
arising out of the alleged falsity of the
collegiality reflected in the minutes
and/or stenographic notes taken during
the proceedings in which the assailed
practice was adopted. For liability to be
assessed for the offense of falsification
of official documents thru untruthful
narration of the facts, the rule is settled
that the following elements should
concur, viz: (a) the offender makes in a
document an untruthful statement in a
narration of facts; (b) the offender has a
legalobligation to disclose the truth of
the facts narrated; (c) the facts narrated
by the offender are absolutely false;
and (d) the perversion of truth in the
narration of facts was made with
wrongful intent to injure a third
person. The absence of the enumerated
elements clearly discounts respondents
liability for said offense.
Inasmuch as mere allegation is not
evidence, it is a fundamental
evidentiary rule that the party who
alleges a fact must prove the same. For
all of complainants imputations against
respondents, the record is bereft of any
showing that the latter are guilty of
oppressive conduct and/or grave
misconduct, particularly with reference
to the comment the former was
required to file regarding the motion to
lift bench warrant filed by the witness
Roel Plando in Criminal Case Nos.
28103-104. Given the variance
between the allegations in said motion
and the reasons complainant initially
advanced for the non-presentation of
said witness at the April 27, 2006
hearing in said cases, respondents were
clearly acting within their prerogative
when they decided to clarify the matter
from the former and her colleague,
Prosecutor Almira Abella-
Orfanel. Although subsequently
required to explain why she should not
be cited for contempt in the June 20,
2006 order issued in the case, the
record is, more importantly, bereft of
any showing that complainant was, in
fact, declared in contempt of court or
actually fined in the sum of P18,000.00
as purportedly threatened by
respondents.
Squarely refuted in the affidavits
executed by her colleagues, namely,
Prosecutors Cornelio Somido, Almira
Abella-Orfanel, Elvira Chua and
Rabenranath Uy, complainants bare
allegations clearly deserve scant
consideration insofar as they impute
such further irregularities against
respondents as threatening or
humiliating her during the hearing/s
conducted in the aforesaid cases and/or
causing disrespect to Special
Prosecutor Dennis Villa-Ignacio or
otherwise allowing interference in the
latters handling of a case. Because
administrative proceedings like the one
at bench are governed by the
substantial evidence rule, the same may
be said of the disparaging comments
respondents are supposed to have made
regarding the barongand/or intelligence
of practitioners appearing before them
which are, on the whole, devoid of any
bases in the record outside of
complainants averments and the
affidavit belatedly executed by
Assistant Special Prosecutor Ma.
Hazelina Tujan-Militante. By
substantial evidence is meant such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
will accept as adequate to support a
conclusion and does not mean just any
evidence in the record of the case for,
otherwise, no finding of fact would be
wanting in basis. The test is whether a
reasonable mind, after considering all
the relevant evidence in the record of a
case, would accept the findings of fact
as adequate.
As regards the charge of improprieties,
it appears that the complainant has not
discharged the onus of proof by
substantial evidence. The intemperate
and immoderate statements attributed
to respondents are, to repeat, without
sufficient substantiation. What comes
near to but is not equivalent to
impropriety is the jocular banter
admitted by respondents about their
respective alma maters, the intention
being to break the usual monotony and
seriousness of the courtroom setting or
to put practitioners appearing before
them at ease. It cannot be said that
public confidence in the Judiciary was
eroded by the conduct. No discourtesy
was shown towards either the parties or
to each other.
As for the charge of manifest partiality
insofar as the grant of the demurrer in
Criminal Case No. 25801 is concerned,
suffice it to say that members of the
bench like respondents are presumed to
have acted regularly and in the manner
that preserves the ideal of the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge.
Because notatu dignum is the
presumption of regularity in the
performance of a judges function, the
rule is settled that bias, prejudice and
undue interest cannot be presumed
lightly. Mere suspicion that the judge is
partial to a party is, consequently, not
enough; there should be adequate
evidence to prove the charge. As a
matter of policy, the acts of a judge in
his judicial capacity are not subject to
disciplinary action- he cannot be
subject to civil, criminal or
administrative liability for any of his
 official acts, no matter how erroneous,
as long as he acts in good faith. These
principles find resonance in the case at
bench where, in addition to the total
dearth of evidence to prove the charge
of manifest partiality, it appears that
respondents grant of the demurrer in
Criminal Case No. 25801 was affirmed
in the following wise in the June 5,
2006 resolution issued by the Second
Division of the Supreme Court in G.R.
No. 171116, to wit:
G.R. No. 171116
(PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES VS.
REYNALDO
PUNO). xx xx On the basis
thereof, the Court resolves to
DENY the petition for review
on certiorari dated 2 March
2006 assailing the resolutions
of the Sandiganbayan for
petitioners failure to submit a
valid affidavit of service of
copies of the petition on
respondent and the
Sandiganbayan in accordance
with Sections 3 and 5, Rule 45
and Section 5(d), Rule 56 in
relation to Section 13, Rule 13
of the Rules, there being no
jurat and signature of the
affiant in the attached
affidavit of service of the
petition.
In any event, the petition
is an improper remedy
and failed to sufficiently show
that the Sandiganbayan had
committed any reversible
error in the questioned
judgment to warrant the
exercise by this Court of its
discretionary appellate
jurisdiction in this case x x x.
(emphasis supplied)
Ruling of the Court
The Court partly adopts the findings
recommendations of the Court Administrator.
A.
Respondents Violation of the
provisions of PD 1606
and Revised Internal Rules of the
Sandiganbayan
Respondent Justices contend that they preserved the
collegiality of the Fourth Division despite their having
separately conducted hearings, considering that the three
of them were in the same venue and were acting within
hearing and communicating distance of one another.
The contention is not well-taken.
Section 3 of PD 1606,[21] the law establishing the
Sandiganbayan, provides:
Section 3. Division of the Courts;
Quorum. - The Sandiganbayan shall
sit in three divisions of three Justices
each. The three divisions may sit at
the same time.
Three Justices shall constitute a
quorum for sessions in division;
Provided, that when the required
quorum for the particular division
cannot be had due to the legal
disqualification or temporary disability
of a Justice or of a vacancy occurring
therein, the Presiding Justice may
designate an Associate Justice of the
Court, to be determined by strict
rotation on the basis of the reverse order
of precedence, to sit as a special
member of said division with all the
rights and prerogatives of a regular
member of said division in the trial and
determination of a case or cases
assigned thereto, unless the operation of
the court will be prejudiced thereby, in
which case the President shall, upon the
recommendation of the Presiding
Justice, designate any Justice or Justices
of the Court of Appeals to sit
and temporarily therein.
An implementing rule is Section 3, Rule II of
the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, viz:
Section 3. Constitution of the
Divisions. - The Sandiganbayan shall
sit in five (5) Divisions of three (3)
Justices each, including the Presiding
Justice. The five (5) Divisions may sit
separately at the same time. Each of the
five (5) most senior Associate Justices
including the Presiding Justice, shall be
the Chairman of a Division; each of the
five (5) Associate Justices next in rank
shall be the Senior Member of a
Division; and each of the last five (5)
Associate Justices shall be the Junior
Member of a Division.
Under the foregoing provisions, the Sandiganbayan is a
collegial court. Collegial is defined as relating to a
collegium or group of colleagues. In turn, a collegium is
an executive body with each member having
approximately equal power and authority. [22] In a
collegial court, therefore, the members act on the basis
of consensus or majority rule. Thus, PD 1606, as
amended, and the Revised Internal Rules of the
Sandiganbayan, supra, call for the actual presence of the
three Justices composing the Division to constitute a
quorum to conduct business and to hold trial
proceedings. Necessarily, the exclusion or absence of
any member of a Division from the conduct of its
business and from the trial proceedings negates the
existence of a quorum and precludes collegiality.
As if underscoring the need for all three members to be
actually present and in attendance during sessions,
Section 3 of PD 1606, as amended, further requires that:-
xxx when the required quorum for
the particular division cannot be had
due to the legal disqualification or
temporary disability of a Justice or of
a vacancy occurring therein, the
Presiding Justice may designate an
Associate Justice of the Court, to be
determined by strict rotation on the
basis of the reverse order of
precedence, to sit as a special member
of said division with all the rights and
prerogatives of a regular member of
said division in the trial and
determination of a case or cases
assigned thereto, unless the operation
of the court will be prejudiced thereby,
in which case the President shall, upon
the recommendation of the Presiding
Justice, designate any Justice or Justices
of the Court of Appeals to sit
temporarily therein.
Respondent Justices cannot lightly regard the
legal requirement for all of them to sit together as
members of the Fourth Division in
the trial and determination of a case or cases assigned
thereto. The information and evidence upon which the
Fourth Division would base any decisions or other
judicial actions in the cases tried before it must be
made directly available to each and every one of its
members during the proceedings. This necessitates
the equal and full participation of each member in the
trial and adjudication of their cases. It is simply not
enough, therefore, that the three members of the Fourth
Division were within hearing and communicating
distance of one another at the hearings in question, as
they explained in hindsight, because even in those
circumstances not all of them sat together in session.
Indeed, the ability of the Fourth Division to
function as a collegial bodybecame impossible when not
all of the members sat together during the trial
proceedings. The internal rules of the Sandiganbayan
spotlight an instance of such impossibility. Section 2,
Rule VII of the Revised Internal Rules of the
Sandiganbayanexpressly requires that rulings on oral
motions made or objections raised in the course
of the trial proceedings or hearings are be made by the
Chairman of the Division.Obviously, the rule cannot be
complied with because Justice Ong, the Chairman, did
not sit in the hearing of the cases heard by the other
respondents. Neither could the other respondents
properly and promptly contribute to the rulings of Justice
Ong in the hearings before him.
 Moreover, the respondents non-observance of
collegiality contravened the very purpose of trying
criminal cases cognizable by Sandiganbayan before a
Division of allthree Justices. Although there are criminal
cases involving public officials and employees triable
before single-judge courts, PD 1606, as
amended, has alwaysrequired a Division of three Justices
(not one or two) to try the criminal cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan, in view of the accused in such cases
holding higher rank or office than those charged in the
former cases. The three Justices of a Division, rather
than a single judge, are naturally expected to exert
keener judiciousness and to apply broader
circumspection in trying and deciding such cases. The
tighter standard is due in part to the fact that the review
of convictions is elevated to the Supreme Court
generally via the discretionary mode of petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45, Rules of Court,
which eliminates issues of fact, instead of via ordinary
appeal set for the former kind of cases (whereby the
convictions still undergo intermediate review before
ultimately reaching the Supreme Court, if at all).
In GMCR, Inc. v. Bell Telecommunication
Philippines, Inc.,[23] the Court delved on the nature of a
collegial body, and how the act of a single member,
though he may be its head, done without the
participation of the others, cannot be considered the act
of the collegial body itself. There, the question presented
was whether Commissioner Simeon Kintanar, as
chairman of the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC), could alone act in behalf of and
bind the NTC, given that the NTC had two other
commissioners as members. The Court ruled:
First. We hereby declare that the
NTC is a collegial body requiring a
majority vote out of the three members
of the commission in order to validly
decide a case or any incident
therein. Corollarily, the vote alone of the
chairman of the commission, as in this
case, the vote of Commissioner
Kintanar, absent the required
concurring vote coming from the rest of
the membership of the commission to at
least arrive at a majority decision, is not
sufficient to legally render an NTC
order, resolution or decision.
Simply put, Commissioner Kintanar
is not the National Telecommunications
Commission. He alone does not speak for
and in behalf of the NTC. The NTC acts
through a three-man body, and the three
members of the commission each has
one vote to cast in every deliberation
concerning a case or any incident
therein that is subject to the jurisdiction
of the NTC. When we consider the
historical milieu in which the NTC
evolved into the quasi-judicial agency it is
now under Executive Order No. 146 which
organized the NTC as a three-man
commission and expose the illegality of all
memorandum circulars negating the
collegial nature of the NTC under
Executive Order No. 146, we are left with
only one logical conclusion: the NTC is a
collegial body and was a collegial body
even during the time when it was acting as
a one-man regime.
The foregoing observations made in GMCR, Inc. apply
to the situation of respondent Justices as members of the
Fourth Division. It is of no consequence, then, that no
malice or corrupt motive impelled respondent Justices
into adopting the flawed procedure. As responsible
judicial officers, they ought to have been well aware of
the indispensability of collegiality to the valid conduct of
their trial proceedings.
We find that the procedure adopted by
respondent Justices for their provincial hearings was in
blatant disregard of PD 1606, as amended, the Rules of
Court, and the Revised Internal Rules of the
Sandiganbayan. Even worse, their adoption of the
procedure arbitrarily denied the benefit of a hearing
before a duly constituted Divisionof the Sandiganbayan
to all the affected litigants, including the State, thereby
rendering the integrity and efficacy of their proceedings
open to serious challenge on the ground that a hearing
before a duly constituted Division of the Sandiganbayan
was of the very essence of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to due process of law.
Judges are not common individuals whose gross
errors men forgive and time forgets.[24] They are
expected to have more than just a modicum
acquaintance with the statutes and procedural
[25]
rules. For this reason alone, respondent Justices
adoption of the irregular procedure cannot be dismissed
as a mere deficiency in prudence or as a lapse in
judgment on their part, but should be treated as simple
misconduct, which is to be distinguished from either
gross misconduct or gross ignorance of the law. The
respondent Justices were not liable for gross misconduct
defined as the transgression of some established or
definite rule of action, more
[26]
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence,
the corrupt or persistent violation of the law or
disregard of well-known legal rules[27] considering that
the explanations they have offered herein, which the
complainant did not refute, revealed that they strove to
maintain their collegiality by holding their separate
hearings within sight and hearing distance of one
another. Neither were they liable for gross ignorance of
the law, which must be based on reliable evidence to
show that the act complained of was ill-
motivated, corrupt, or inspired by an intention to violate
the law, or in persistent disregard of well-known legal
rules;[28] on the contrary, none of these circumstances
was attendant herein, for the respondent Justices have
convincingly shown that they had not been ill-motivated
or inspired by an intention to violate any law or legal
rule in adopting the erroneous procedure, but had been
seeking, instead, to thereby expedite their disposition of
cases in the provinces.
Nonetheless, it remains that the respondent
Justices did not ensure that their proceedings accorded
with the provisions of the law and procedure. Their
insistence that they adopted the procedure in order to
expedite the hearing of provincial cases is not a
sufficient reason to entirely exonerate them, even if no
malice or corruption motivated their adoption of the
procedure. They could have seen that their procedure
was flawed, and that the flaw would prevent, not
promote, the expeditious disposition of the cases by
precluding their valid adjudication due to the nullifying
taint of the irregularity. They knew as well that the need
to expedite their cases, albeit recommended, was not the
chief objective of judicial trials. As the Court has
reminded judges in State Prosecutors v. Muro,[29] viz:
Although a speedy determination of
an action or proceeding implies a
speedy trial, it should be borne in
mind that speed is not the chief
objective of a trial. Careful and
deliberate consideration for the
administration of justice is more
important than a race to end the
trial. A genuine respect for the rights
of all parties, thoughtful consideration
before ruling on important questions,
and a zealous regard for the just
administration of law are some of the
qualities of a good trial judge, which
or are more important than a reputation
for hasty disposal of cases.
xxx xxx xxx
What is required on the part of judges is
objectivity. An independent judiciary
does not mean that judges can resolve
specific disputes entirely as they please.
There are both implicit and explicit
limits on the way judges perform their
role. Implicit limits include accepted
legal values and the explicit limits are
substantive and procedural rules of law.
The judge, even when he is free, is still
not wholly free. He is not to innovate
at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant,
roaming at will in pursuit of his own
ideal of beauty or goodness. He is to
draw his inspiration from consecrated
principles. He is not to yield to
spasmodic sentiment, to vague and
unregulated benevolence. He is to
exercise a discretion informed by
tradition, methodized by analogy,
disciplined by system, and
subordinate to the primordial
necessity of order in the social life.
Relevantly, we do not consider the respondent Justices
signing of the orders issued during the flawed
proceedings as a form of falsification or dishonesty, in
that they thereby made it appear that they had all been
physically present when the truth was different. Such act
merely ensued from the flawed proceedings and cannot
be treated as a separate offense.
B.
Unbecoming Conduct of Justice Ong
and Justice Hernandez
The Court approves the Court Administrators
finding and recommendation that no evidence supported
the complainants charge that Justice Ong and Justice
Hernandez had uttered the improper and intemperate
statements attributed to them.
A review of the transcripts of the stenographic
notes for the hearings in which the offensive statements
were supposedly uttered by them has failed to
substantiate the complainants charge. In the absence of a
clear showing to the contrary, the Court must accept
such transcripts as the faithful and true record of the
proceedings, because they bear the certification of
correctness executed by the stenographers who had
prepared them.
Even so, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez admitted
randomly asking the counsels appearing before them
from which law schools they had graduated, and their
engaging during the hearings in casual conversation
about their respective law schools. They thereby
publicized their professional qualifications and
manifested a lack of the requisite humility demanded of
public magistrates. Their doing so reflected a vice of
self-conceit. We view their acts as bespeaking their lack
of judicial temperament and decorum, which no judge
worthy of the judicial robes should avoid especially
during their performance of judicial functions. They
should not exchange banter or engage in playful teasing
of each other during trial proceedings (no matter how
good-natured or even if meant to ease tension, as they
want us to believe). Judicial decorum demands that they
behave with dignity and act with courtesy towards all
who appear before their court.
Indeed, Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary clearly
enjoins that:
Section 6. Judges shall maintain
order and decorum in all proceedings
before the court and be patient,
dignified and courteous in relation to
litigants, witnesses, lawyers and
others with whom the judge deals in
an official capacity.Judges shall require
similar conduct of legal representatives,
court staff and others subject to their
influence, direction or control.
We point out that publicizing professional
qualifications or boasting of having studied in and
graduated from certain law schools, no matter how
prestigious, might have even revealed, on the part of
Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez, their
bias for or against some lawyers. Their conduct was
impermissible, consequently, for Section 3, Canon 4 of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary, demands that judges avoid situations that may
reasonably give rise to the suspicion or appearance of
favoritism or partiality in their personal relations with
individual members of the legal profession who practice
regularly in their courts.
Judges should be dignified in demeanor, and
refined in speech. In performing their judicial duties,
they should not manifest bias or prejudice by word or
conduct towards any person or group on irrelevant
grounds.[30] It is very essential that they should live up to
the high standards their noble position on the Bench
demands. Their language must be guarded and
measured, lest the best of intentions be misconstrued. In
this regard, Section 3, Canon 5 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, mandates
judges to carry out judicial duties with appropriate
consideration for all persons, such as the parties,
witnesses, lawyers, court staff, and judicial colleagues,
without differentiation on any irrelevant ground,
immaterial to the proper performance of such duties.
In view of the foregoing, Justice Ong and Justice
Hernandez were guilty of unbecoming conduct, which is
defined as improper performance. Unbecoming
conduct applies to a broader range of transgressions of
rules not only of social behavior but of ethical practice
or logical procedure or prescribed method.[31]
C.
Respondent Justices Not Guilty of
Manifest Partiality
The charge of manifest partiality for issuing
the resolution granting the demurrer to evidence of the
accused in Criminal Case No. 25801 is dismissed. As
already mentioned, this Court upheld the
assailed resolution on June 5, 2006 in G. R. No. 171116
by declaring the petition of the Office of the Special
Prosecutor assailing such dismissal to have failed to
sufficiently show that the Sandiganbayan had committed
any reversible error in the questioned judgment to
warrant the exercise by this Court of its discretionary
appellate jurisdiction.
 At any rate, it is worth stressing that a judge will
be held administratively liable for rendering an unjust
judgment only if he acts with bad faith, malice, revenge,
or some other similar motive.[32]
D.
Penalties
Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10SC, classifies the offense
of simple misconduct as a less serious charge, viz:
Section 9. Less Serious
Charges. Less serious charges include:
xxx xxx xxx
7. Simple Misconduct.
Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules
Court alternatively prescribes the sanctions on judges
and justices guilty of a less serious charge, as follows:
Section 11. Sanctions. xxx
xxx xxx xxx
B. If the respondent is guilty of a
less serious charge, any of the following
sanctions shall be imposed:
1. Suspension from office without
salary and other benefits for not less
than one (1) nor more than three (3)
months; or
2. A fine of more than P10,000.00
but not exceeding P 20,000.00.
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, unbecoming conduct is a
light charge under Section 10, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, thus:
Section 10. Light Charges. Light
charges include:
1. Vulgar and unbecoming
conduct;
xxx xxx xxx
and is punishable under Section 11(C), Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court by a fine of not less than P1,000.00,
but not exceeding P10,000.00; and/or censure,
reprimand, or admonition with warning.
Analogizing from Section 55 of the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, in an
instance where the respondent is guilty of two or more
charges, the penalty is that corresponding to the most
serious charge, and the rest of the charges are considered
as aggravating circumstances.
of That respondent Justices responsibilities as
members of a Division were different compels us to
differentiate their individual liabilities.
1.
Justice Ong
Without doubt, the Chairman, as head of the
Division under the internal rules of the Sandiganbayan,
is primus inter pares.[33] He possesses and wields powers
of supervision, direction, and control over the conduct of
the proceedings coming before the Division.
In exercising his powers as Chairman of the
Fourth Division, Justice Ong exuded an unexpectedly
dismissive attitude towards the valid objections of the
complainant, and steered his Division into the path of
procedural irregularity. He thereby wittingly failed to
guarantee that his Divisions proceedings came within the
bounds of substantive and procedural rules. We cannot,
of course, presume that he was unaware of or unfamiliar
with the pertinent law and correct procedure, considering
his already long tenure and experience as of then as a
Justice of the Sandiganbayan, having risen from
Associate Justice to Chairman of his Division.
We hold that the condign and commensurate
penalty to impose on Justice Ong is a fine of P15,000.00,
after taking into consideration the mitigating
circumstance that this administrative offense was his
first and the aggravating circumstance of the light charge
of unbecoming conduct. The penalty goes with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar of such
offenses shall be dealt with more severely.
2.
Justice Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada
As mere members of the Fourth Division, Justice
Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada had no direction and
control of how the proceedings of the Division were
conducted. Direction and control was vested in Justice
Ong, as the Chairman. Justice Hernandez and Justice
Ponferrada simply relied without malice on the
soundness and wisdom of Justice Ongs discretion as
their Chairman, which reliance without malice
lulled them into traveling the path of reluctance to halt
Justice Ong from his irregular leadership. We hold that
their liabilities ought to be much diminished by their
lack of malice.
In addition, the fact that this is the first case for
Justice Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada is a mitigating
circumstance in their favor.
Although Justice Hernandez is liable for the less
serious charge of simple misconduct, aggravated by a
light charge but appreciating his reliance without malice
and the mitigating circumstance of this offense being his
first, the Court admonishes him with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar offenses shall be dealt
with more severely.
The liability of Justice Ponferrada for the less
serious charge of simple misconduct, without any
aggravating circumstance, is obliterated by his reliance
without malice and the mitigating circumstance of its
being a first offense. However, he is warned to be more
cautious about the proper procedure to be taken in
proceedings before his court.
Final Note
It becomes timely to reiterate that an honorable,
competent and independent Judiciary exists to
administer justice in order to promote the stability of
government and the well-being of the people.[34] We
warn, therefore, that no conduct, act, or omission on the
part of anyone involved in the administration of justice
that violates the norm of public accountability and
diminishes the faith of the people in the Judiciary shall
be countenanced.[35] Public confidence in the judicial
system and in the moral authority and integrity of the
Judiciary is of utmost importance in a modern
democratic society; hence, it is essential for all judges,
individually and collectively, to respect and honor the
judicial office as a public trust and to strive to enhance
and maintain confidence in the judicial system.[36]
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES as follows:
1. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE GREGORY S.
ONG is ordered to pay a fine of P15,000.00, with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar offenses
shall be dealt with more severely;
2. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE JOSE R.
HERNANDEZ is admonished with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar offenses shall be dealt
with more severely; and
3. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE RODOLFO A.
PONFERRADA is warned to be more cautious about
the proper procedure to be taken in proceedings before
his court.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[ A.C. No. 9401, October 22, 2013 ]
JOCELYN DE LEON, COMPLAINANT, VS.
ATTY. TYRONE PEDRENA, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
A lawyer who commits overt acts of sexual harassment
against a female client is guilty of reprehensible conduct
that is unbecoming of a member of the Bar, and may be
condignly punished with suspension from the practice of
law.
Antecedents
Jocelyn de Leon filed with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) a complaint for disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law against Atty. Tyrone
Pedreña, a Public Attorney. She averred in her complaint
affidavit that Atty. Pedreña had sexually harassed her as
follows:
1. On January 30, 2006, at about 10:00 in the morning, I
went to the Public Attorney's Office in Parañaque City,
in order to inquire from ATTY. TYRONE PEDRENA
about the status of my case for support for my two minor
children against my husband, which case is being
handled by Atty. Pedreña;
2. At that time, said Atty. Pedreña was at a court hearing,
so I waited at his office until he arrived at about II :45
a.m. Atty. Pedreña told me to go ahead to Tita Babes
Restaurant so we could take our lunch together and to
talk about my said case;
3. While we were eating at the said restaurant, he asked
me many personal matters rather than to discuss my said
case. But still, I answered him with respect, for he was
my lawyer;
4. After we took our lunch, he told me to just go back on
February I, 2006 at 10:00 a.m. because according to him,
my said case was quite difficult, that he needed more
time to study;
5. Since Atty. Pedreña was also already going home
then, he told me then to ride with him and he would just
drop me by the jeepney station;
6. Although I refused to ride with him, he persistently
convinced me to get in the car, and so I acceded to his
request so as not to offend him;
7. Right after we left the parking lot and not yet too far
from the City Hall, Atty. Pedreña immediately held my
left hand with his right hand, insisted me to get closer
with him and laid me on his shoulder;
8. I immediately responded by saying "AYOKO HO!"
But he persisted in trying to get hold of my hand and he
also tried very hard to inserting (sic) his finger into my
firmly closed hand. Thus, I became very afraid and at the
same time offended for his lack of respect for me at that
moment;
9. Despite my resistance, he continued rubbing my left
leg. I was then attempting to remove his hand on my leg,
but he grabbed my hand and forced it to put (sic) on his
penis;
10. Because I was already really afraid at that moment, I
continued to wrestle and struggle, and as I saw that we
were already approaching the 7-Eleven Store, the place
where I was supposed to get off, Atty. Pedreña made
another move of pressing his finger against my private
part;
11. I thereafter tried at all cost to unlock the car's door
and told him categorically that I was getting off the car.
But because the traffic light was on green, he accelerated
a bit more instead, but sensing my insistence to get off,
he stopped the car, and allowed me to get off. He then
reminded me to see him on February 1, 2006 at 10:00
a.m. for the continuation of hearing of my case;
12. That on February 1, 2006, I had to come for my case,
but this time, I brought with me my five-year-old child
to avoid another incident. I was not able to see Atty.
Pedreña then, so I just signed some documents; [1]
In his answer, Atty. Pedreña averred that De Leon's
allegations were unsubstantiated; that entertaining such a
complaint would open the gates to those who had evil
desires to destroy the names of good lawyers; that the
complaint was premature and should be dismissed on the
ground of forum shopping because De Leon had already
charged him with acts of lasciviousness in the Parañaque
City Prosecutor's Office; and that he had also filed a
complaint for theft against De Leon.[2]
Attached to Atty. Pedreña's answer were his counter-
affidavit in the criminal case for acts of lasciviousness
and his complaint-affidavit for theft. In his counter
affidavit, Atty. Pedreña admitted giving a ride to De
Leon, but he vehemently denied making sexual advances
on her, insisting that she had sat very close to him during
the ride that even made it hard for him to shift gears, and
that the ride had lasted for only two to three
minutes.[3] He claimed that De Leon was allowing
herself to be used by his detractors in the Public
Attorney's Office (PAO) after he had opposed the
practice of certain PAO staff members of charging
indigent clients for every document that they prepared.
In his complaint affidavit for theft, he stated that he had
another passenger in his car at the time he gave a ride to
De Leon, who did not notice the presence of the other
passenger because the ride lasted for only two to three
minutes; and that the other passenger was Emma Crespo,
who executed her own affidavit attesting that she had
witnessed De Leon's act of taking his (Pedreña)
cellphone from the handbrake box of the car. [4]
Only De Leon appeared during the hearing. [5] Hence,
Atty. Pedreña was deemed to have waived his right to
participate in the proceedings.[6]
Thereafter, the IBP Investigating Commissioner
recommended the disbarment of Atty. Pedreña and the
striking off of his name from the Roll of
Attorneys.[7] Holding that a disbarment case was sui
generis and could proceed independently of the criminal
case that was based on the same facts; and that the
proceedings herein need not wait until the criminal case
for acts of lasciviousness brought against Atty. Pedreña
was finally resolved, the IBP Investigating
Commissioner found that Atty. Pedreña. had made
sexual advances on De Leon in violation of Rule
1.01[8] and Rule 7.03[9] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
In its Resolution No. XVIII-2007-83 dated September
19, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved with modification the report and
recommendation of the IBP Investigating Commissioner,
and imposed upon Atty. Pedreña suspension from the
practice of law for three months. [10]
Atty. Pedreña filed a motion for reconsideration with the
IBP,[11] which adopted and approved Resolution No.
XX-2012-43 dated January 15, 2012, denying the motion
and affirming with modification its Resolution No.
XVIII-2007-83 by increasing the period of suspension to
six months.[12]
On February 28, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors
transmitted to the Court Resolution No. XX-2012-43 and
the records of the case for final approval. [13]
In the Resolution dated April 24, 2012, the Court noted
the IBP Board of Governors' notice ofResolution No.
XX-2012-43.[14]
Ruling
The report and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner stated thusly:
There is no doubt that Complainant was able to prove
her case against the Respondent. During the clarificatory
hearing, she was straightforward and spontaneous in
answering the questions propounded on her. Her account
of the incident that happened on 30 January 2006 was
consistent with the matters she stated in her Complaint
and Verified Position Paper.
On.the other hand, Respondent's defenses are not
credible enough to rebut the claims of Complainant. His
defenses are replete with inconsistencies and his
actuations in the entire proceedings show lack of
integrity in his dealings with both the Complainant and
this Commission.
xxxx
We find no merit at all in the defenses put forth by
Respondent. The Theft case filed by Respondent is a
mere afterthought on his part. We note that such criminal
complaint hinged on a claim that there was another
person during that incident who allegedly saw
Complainant stealing Respondent's mobile phone. Yet,
in Respondent's Position Paper and in his Counter-
Affidavit to the Acts of Lasciviousness case, which was
executed after the institution of the criminal complaint
for Theft, Respondent never mentioned anything about a
third person being present during the incident. If the
presence of this third person was crucial to prove his
case against herein Complainant, there is no reason why
this allegation would be omitted in his Position Paper
and Counter-Affidavit to at least support his defense.
Furthermore, Respondent's contention that Complainant
is being used by his detractors is self-serving. His memo
regarding the amount of RATA he receives is a
relatively harmless query to a higher authority, which
could not possibly motivate his colleagues to prod other
people to file cases against Respondent.[15]
We adopt the findings and conclusions of the
Investigating Commissioner, as sustained by the IBP
Board of Governors, for being substantiated by the
evidence on record.
The records show that Atty. Pedreña rubbed the
complainant's right leg with his hand; tried to insert his
finger into her firmly closed hand; grabbed her hand and
forcibly placed it on his crotch area; and pressed his
finger against her private part. Given the circumstances
in which he committed them, his acts were not merely
offensive and undesirable but repulsive, disgraceful and
grossly immoral. They constituted misconduct on the
part of any lawyer. In this regard, it bears stressing that
immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to
constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under
such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock
the community's sense of decency.[16]
The possession of good moral character is both a
condition precedent and a continuing requirement to
warrant admission to the Bar and to retain membership
in the Legal Profession. Members of the Bar are clearly
duty bound to observe the highest degree of morality and
integrity in order to safeguard the reputation of the Bar.
Any errant behavior on the part of a lawyer that tends to
expose a deficiency in moral character, honesty, probity
or good demeanor, be it in the lawyer's public or private
activities, is sufficient to warrant the lawyer's suspension
or disbarment.[17] Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, provides that a member of the Bar may be
disbarred or suspended for grossly immoral conduct, or
violation of his oath as a lawyer. Towards that end, we
have not been remiss in reminding members of the Bar
to live up to the standards and norms of the Legal
Profession by upholding the ideals and principles
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Atty. Pedreña's misconduct was aggravated by the fact
that he was then a Public Attorney mandated to provide
free legal service to indigent litigants, and by the fact
that De Leon was then such a client. He also disregarded
his oath as a public officer to serve others and to be
accountable at all times, because he thereby took
advantage of her vulnerability as a client then in
desperate need of his legal assistance.
Yet, even as we agree with the findings of the IBP, we
consider the recommended penalty of suspension for six
months not commensurate with the gravity of the
offensive acts committed.
Verily, the determination of the penalty to impose on an
erring lawyer is within the Court's discretion. The
exercise of the discretion should neither be arbitrary nor
despotic, nor motivated by any animosity or prejudice
towards the lawyer, but should instead be ever controlled
by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity
and independence of the Bar and to exact from the
lawyer strict compliance with his duties to the Court, to
his client, to his brethren in the profession, and to the
general public.[18]
In determining the appropriate penalty to be imposed on
Atty. Pedreña, therefore, we take into consideration
judicial precedents on gross immoral conduct bearing on
sexual matters. Although most of the judicial precedents
dealt with lawyers who engaged in extramarital affairs,
or cohabited with women other than their wives, [19] they
are nonetheless helpful in gauging the degree of
immorality committed by the respondent.
In Advincula v. Macabata,[20] the Court held that the
errant lawyer's acts of turning his client's head towards
him and then kissing her on the lips were distasteful, but
still ruled that such acts, albeit offensive and
undesirable, were not grossly immoral. Hence, the
respondent lawyer was merely reprimanded but
reminded to be more prudent and cautious in his dealings
with clients.
In Barrientos v. Daarol,[21] the respondent lawyer was
disbarred, but the severest penalty was imposed not only
because of his engaging in illicit sexual relations, but
also because of his deceit. He had been already married
and was about 41 years old when he proposed marriage
to a 20-year-old girl. He succeeded in his seduction of
her, and made her pregnant. He not only suggested that
she abort the pregnancy, but he also breached his
promise to marry her, and, in the end, even deserted her
and their child.
In Delos Reyes v. Aznar,[22] the Court adjudged the
respondent lawyer, a married man with children, highly
immoral for having taken advantage of his position as
the chairman of the College of Medicine of his school in
enticing the complainant, then a student in the college, to
have carnal knowledge with him under the threat that she
would flunk in all her subjects should she refuse. The
respondent was disbarred for grossly immoral conduct.
Without diminishing the gravity of the complainant's sad
experience, however, we consider the acts committed by
Atty. Pedreña to be not of the same degree as the acts
punished under the cited judicial precedents. Neither did
his acts approximate the act committed by the
respondent lawyer in Calub v. Suller,[23] whereby we
disbarred the respondent lawyer for raping his neighbor's
wife notwithstanding that his guilt was not proved
beyond reasonable doubt in his criminal prosecution for
the crime. We further note that, unlike
in Barrientos where there was deceit and in Delos
Reyes where there were threats and taking advantage of
the respondent lawyer's position, Atty. Pedreña did not
employ any scheme to satiate his lust, but, instead, he
desisted upon the first signs of the complainant's firm
refusal to give in to his advances.
In view of these considerations, the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for two years is
fitting and just.
WHEREFORE, the Court SUSPENDS ATTY.
TYRONE PEDRENAfrom the practice of law for two
years effective upon receipt of this decision, with
a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of
the Bar Confidant, to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and to the Office of the Court Administrator
for dissemination to all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.

RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DISBARMENT
OF AMA LAND INC. AGAINST ASSOC JUSTICES
HON. DANTON BUESER, HON. SESINANDO
VILLON & HON. RICARDO ROSARIO
OCA IPI N 12-204-CA-J
MARCH 11, 2014
BERSAMIN, J.:
In the resolution promulgated on July 15, 2014,[1] the
Court: (a) declared Joseph B. Usita guilty of two counts
of indirect contempt of court under Section 3(d), Rule 71
of the Rules of Court, but deferred the determination and
imposition of the penalties against him; (b) ordered Usita
to disclose the names of all the members of the Board of
Directors of AMA Land, Inc. (AMALI) who had
authorized him to bring the two administrative charges
against respondent Associate Justices of the Court of
Appeals (CA); and (c) required Usita and a certain Garry
de Vera to shed light on the true interest or participation
of the so-called JC-AT-JC Law Offices whose office
address de Vera had stated as his in the affidavit of
service he had executed for purposes of this case.
Consequently, Usita submitted his compliance dated
August 11, 2014,[2]wherein he again apologized for his
actions, but appealed for the understanding and
forgiveness of the Court. He denied having disobeyed
the decision of March 11, 2014, and pointed out that the
other complaint against respondent Associate Justices of
the CA dated October 2, 2012 (OCA-IPI No. 12-202-
CA-J entitled Re: Verified Complaint for Disbarment of
AMA Land, Inc. Represented by Joseph B. Usita v. Hon.
Danton Q. Bueser, Hon. Sesinado E. Villon and Hon.
Ricardo R. Rosario, Associate Justices of the Court of
Appeals) had been filed earlier than the present
complaint; that he had filed the present complaint
against respondent Associate Justices of the CA "in good
faith and merely to petition this Honorable Court for
redress of what he believed to be a judicial
wrong;"[3] and that he was anyway withdrawing the
complaint in OCA-IPI No. 12-202-CA-J as a
manifestation of his "good faith and sincere remorse for
his inaction (sic)."[4]
Regarding the participation of the so-called JC-AT-JC
Law Office, Usita explained that de Vera was an
employee of AMALI rendering messengerial services to
the JC-AT-JC Law Office, one of the retained counsels
of AMALI; and that the JC-AT-JC Law Office did not
have any involvement in the filing of the administrative
complaints.
De Vera submitted a salaysay ng
pagpapaliwanag,[5] which contained explanations similar
to those made by Usita.
Finally, Usita disclosed by name the members of the
AMALI Board of Directors who had authorized him to
file the present complaint, as follows: (a) Atty. Vicente
Acsay; (b) Felizardo R. Colambo; (c), Arnel F. Hibo; (d)
Darwin V. Dominguez; and (e) Alberto L. Buenviaje.
On September 30, 2014, the Court directed the
abovenamed officers of AMALI to show cause in
writing why they should not be held liable for indirect
contempt for degrading the judicial office of respondent
Associate Justices of the CA, and for interfering with the
due performance of their work for the Judiciary. [6]
The aforenamed members of the AMALI Board, with
the exception of Atty. Acsay who had meanwhile passed
away on March 29, 2014,[7] uniformly manifested that
only Atty. Acsay, Hibo and Dominguez had taken part in
the meeting of the Board of Directors at which the
resolution to file the present complaint had been
adopted; that it was Atty. Acsay who had moved for the
approval of the resolution; and that they had caused the
filing of the administrative complaint in their belief that
they were thereby raising a valid legal issue, without any
intention of offending or disrespecting respondent
Associate Justices of the CA.[8] It was further manifested
that Colambo and Buenviaje had been absent from the
meeting when the resolution to file the complaint had
been tackled.[9]
Ruling of the Court
We first deal with the penalties to be meted on Usita.
Usita's assertion that he did not disobey and defy the
decision promulgated on March 11, 2014 is hollow in
light of the solid and firm findings of the Court about
AMALI having been prone to bring charges against
judicial officers who had ruled against it in its cases. On
the contrary, such assertion constitutes his continuing
refusal to own his contumacious part in the filing of
frivolous administrative charges against respondent
Associate Justices of the CA. His tendered withdrawal of
the complaint in OCA-IPI No. 12-202-CA-J is even
irrelevant now considering that we dismissed his charges
therein last January 15, 2013 due to their patent lack of
merit. Verily, his filing of two unfounded identical
administrative complaints against respondent Associate
Justices of the CA displayed his utter lack of respect for
their judicial office. His plea for understanding and
forgiveness should be ignored for being actually
insincere and frivolous.
Nonetheless, we have frequently reminded that the
power to punish for contempt must be used sparingly,
with caution, restraint, judiciousness, deliberation, and in
due regard to the provisions of the law and the
constitutional rights of the individual.[10] This approach
impels us now to hold Usita responsible for only one
count of indirect contempt by considering his forthright
compliance with our directive for him to identify the
members of AMALI's Board of Directors who had
caused him to bring the unfounded charges as a
mitigating circumstance.
Anent the liability of the abovenamed members of
AMALI's Board of Directors, the general rule is that a
corporation and its officers and agents may be held liable
for contempt of court for disobeying judgments, decrees,
or orders of a court issued in a case within its
jurisdiction,[11] or for committing any improper conduct
tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or
degrade the administration of justice.[12] So it must be
herein.
The abovenamed members of the AMALI Board of
Directors specifically claimed that they had brought the
complaints against respondent Associate Justices of the
CA in their belief in good faith that they were thereby
raising a valid legal issue. Their claim is preposterous,
however, because the complaints were identical, and
palpably designed to intimidate or influence respondent
Associate Justices of the CA in respect of AMALI's case
in their Division. The abovenamed members of the
AMALI Board of Directors could not allowed to hide
behind the shield of good faith because their charges
were from the beginning bereft of factual and legal
merit. In this regard, we observed in our decision of
March 11, 2014, as follows:
The filing of the meritless administrative complaints by
AMALI was not only repulsive, but also an outright
disrespect of the authority of the CA and of this Court.
Unfounded administrative charges against judges truly
degrade the judicial office, and interfere with the due
performance of their work for the Judiciary. Although
the Court did not then deem fit to hold in the first
administrative case AMALI or its representative
personally responsible for the unfounded charges
brought against respondent Justices, it is now time,
proper and imperative to do so in order to uphold the
dignity and reputation of respondent Justices, of the
CA itself, and of the rest of the Judiciary. AMALI
and its representatives have thereby demonstrated
their penchant for harassment of the judges who did
not do its bidding, and they have not stopped doing
so even if the latter were sitting judges. To tolerate
the actuations of AMALI and its representatives
would be to reward them with undeserved impunity
for an obviously wrong attitude towards the Court
and its judicial officers.[13]
Moreover, there is no doubt that the abovenamed
members of the AMALI Board of Directors, led by the
late Atty. Acsay, were well aware, or, at least, ought to
have known that no judicial officer could be legitimately
held administratively accountable for the performance of
his duties as a judicial officer for the reason that such
performance was a matter of discharging a public duty
and responsibility.
The abovenamed members of AMALI's Board of
Directors are hereby found and pronounced guilty of
indirect contempt of court for thereby causing the
bringing of the unfounded and unwarranted
administrative charges against respondent Associate
Justices of the CA in order to intimidate or harass them,
thereby directly or indirectly impeding, obstructing or
degrading the administration of justice.
Any sanction, to be proper, should be commensurate to
the contumacious conduct of Usita and the abovenamed
members of AMALI's Board of Directors. The sanction
should be meaningful and condign; otherwise, it would
be mocked and derided, rendering it inutile for the
purpose. It must also be within the bounds of Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court, whose Section 7 relevantly provides:
SEC. 7. Punishment for indirect contempt. - If the
respondent is adjudged guilty of indirect contempt
committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of
equivalent or higher rank, he may be punished by a fine
not exceeding thirty thousand pesos or imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) months, or both. x x x
Although the conduct we hereby seek to punish tended
to obstruct and degrade the administration of justice by
respondent Associate Justices of the CA, fine, instead of
imprisonment, will suffice, provided the amount thereof
is not petty or trivial. The need to deter litigants and
those acting upon their bidding from ever trying to
intimidate or influence sitting judges in the performance
of their sworn duties should be recognized. This instance
is a good occasion to do so.
We have judicial precedents to serve as guides in
determining the proper amount of fine. In Ang Bagong
Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
Elections,[14] the Court meted on the COMELEC
Chairman and four COMELEC Commissioners a fine of
P20,000.00 each for various actions, including issuing
three resolutions that were outside of the jurisdiction of
the COMELEC, for degrading the dignity of the Court,
for brazen disobedience to the lawful directives of the
Court, and for delaying the ultimate resolution of the
many incidents of the party-list case to the prejudice of
the litigants and of the country. It is notable that the
Court prescribed a fine of P5,000.00 each on the two
remaining Commissioners whose actions were deemed
less serious in degree. In Heirs of Trinidad de Leon Vda.
de Roxas v. Court of Appeals,[15] we imposed a fine of
P10,000.00 on the corporate officer who had caused the
preparation and filing of the unwarranted complaint for
reconveyance, damages and quieting of title in the trial
court, an act that tended to impede the orderly
administration of justice. In Lee v. Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 85,[16] the corporate officers who
had acted for the corporation to frustrate the execution of
the immutable judgment rendered against the
corporation by a resort to various moves merited the
maximum fine of P30,000.00 for each of them. Based on
these precedents, the amount of the fine is fixed at
P20,000.00 each for Usita, Dominguez and Hibo by
virtue of their direct participation in the filing of the
frivolous and contumacious complaints.
Considering that Colambo and Bucnviaje did not take
part in the meeting of the Board of Directors of AMALI,
they are absolved of liability for indirect contempt of
court. Likewise, Garry de Vera is absolved of any
liability because he was a mere messenger of AMALI.
WHEREFORE, the Court:
ABSOLVES and PURGES Felizardo R. Colambo,
(1)Alberto L. Buenviaje and Garry de Vera of any act of
contempt of court:
DECLARES and PRONOUNCES Joseph B. Usita,
Darwin V. Dominguez and Arnel F.
Hibo GUILTY of INDIRECT CONTEMPT for
degrading the judicial office of respondent Associate
Justices of the Court of Appeals, and for obstructing
(2)
and impeding the due performance of their work for
the Judiciary, and, ACCORDINGLY, metes on each
of Usita, Dominguez and Hibo a fine of P20,000.00,
the same to be paid within 10 days from notice of this
resolution.
AMA Land, Inc., Joseph B. Usita, Darwin V.
Dominguez and Arnel F. Hibo are WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with
more severely in the future.
SO ORDERED.
 OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v.
JUDGE EDWIN LARIDA JR
AM NO RTJ-08-2151, MARCH 11 2014
BERSAMIN, J.:
A mysterious early Sunday morning fire in the records
room of a courthouse set off a series of red flags pointing
to anomalous acts allegedly committed by its
inhabitants. It led to the resignation of a clerk of court
after he had formally denounced the Presiding Judge for
committing various anomalies and irregularities that are
now the subjects of this administrative case against the
Presiding Judge.
Antecedents
At around 7:50 a.m. on October 12, 2008, a Sunday, a
fire occurred at the records room of Branch 18 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City. The fire,
although declared under control by 8:10 a.m., was
extinguished only ten minutes later. Recovered from the
records room were a 1.5 liter plastic bottle containing
gasoline, a container of glue, and a candle. [1] Atty.
Stanlee D.C. Calma, the Branch Clerk of Court of
Branch 18, immediately reported the fire as a clear case
of arson to the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA).[2] On October 13, 2008, then Court
Administrator Jose Portugal Perez, now a Member of the
Court, formed and dispatched an investigative team
consisting of lawyers from the OCA to conduct an
investigation upon the instructions of Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno. The investigative team started
interviewing the personnel of Branch 18, including Atty.
Calma, in the afternoon of October 13, 2008, and their
declarations aided the review starting on October 14,
2008 of the records of the cases decided and pending in
Branch 18.
In the course of its investigation, the investigative team
uncovered anomalies supposedly committed by
Presiding Judge Edwin G. Larida (Judge Larida),
namely:
1. violation of Administrative Circular No. 28-2008, in
authorizing the detail of locally-funded employees to his
court without obtaining permission from the Supreme
Court, and in allowing them to take custody of court
records and to draft court orders and decisions for him;
2. knowingly allowing detailed employees Jason
Marticio, Larry Laggui and Napoleon Cabanizas to
demand commissions from bonding companies in
exchange for the issuance of release orders;
3. extorting money from detained accused Raymund
Wang, with the help of Jason Marticio and Larry Laggui;
4. defying the directive of the Supreme Court in
Administrative Order No. 132-2008, dated 15 September
2008, to stop from trying and hearing cases and to
instead, decide cases already submitted for decision;
5. releasing the accused on bail in Criminal Case No.
TG-4382-03 for Violation of Section 8, Article II, RA
9165 (Manufacturing or Engaging in the Manufacture of,
in a Clandestine Laboratory, Large Quantity of
Metamphetamine Hydrochloride, Commonly Known as
Shabu) despite their positive identification as the
perpetrators of the crime;
6. granting a motion to quash the information in
Criminal Case No. TG-5307-06 without a case record
and without requiring a comment from the prosecutor;
and
7. granting a petition for the issuance of owner's
duplicate copies of various titles in LRC case No. TG-
06-1183 under questionable circumstances.[3]
Upon recommendation of the OCA, and on the basis of
the investigation report, the Court resolved on November
18, 2008 to:
a) x x x
b) DIRECT Judge Larida to cease and desist from
hearing and deciding cases at RTC, Branch 18, Tagaytay
City;
c) DESIGNATE Judge Larida as Assting Judge of RTC,
Branch 74, Malabon City to decide inherited cases
submitted for decision and already beyond the
reglementary period to decide in the aforesaid court;
d) DIRECT Messrs. Jayson A. Marticio and Larry G.
Laggui to report back to the City Government of
Tagaytay, effective immediately;
e) PROHIBIT Messrs. Marticio, Laggui and Napoleon
Cabanizas, Jr., from entering the premises of RTC,
Branch 18, Tagaytay City;
x x x x
i) REVOKE the designation of Judge Emma S. Young,
RTC, Branch 36, Manila, as Assisting Judge of RTC,
Branch 18, Tagaytay City, pursuant to Administrative
Order No. 132-2008 dated September 15, 2008, and
instead, DESIGNATE Judge Young as Acting Presiding
Judge thereat effective immediately and to continue until
further orders from the Court. x x x
The Court further Resolved to REFER the instant
administrative complaint against Judge Larida to (a) the
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals for RAFFLE
among the justices thereat within five (5) days from
notice hereof and (b) the Court of Appeals Justice to
whom the complaint will be raffled for
INVESTIGATION, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION thereon within sixty (60) days
from the date of the raffle.[4]
In the meantime, Jayson A. Marticio, a locally-funded
employee formerly detailed in Branch 18, and who was
among those barred by the Court from entering the
RTC's premises in the aftermath of the arson incident,
presented a letter-complaint dated October 20,
2008[5] whereby he denounced the following anomalies
and irregularities committed by the RTC staff of Branch
18, to wit:
 1. That the court staff are practicing the "duty
system" wherein a court employee will be
assigned to report early in order to punch in their
daily time cards;
2. That a certain "Rommel" and other court
employees were asking commissions from
bondsmen, specifically, the Monarch Insurance
Company which he avers has connections with
the Office of the Clerk of Court;
3. That Clerk of Court Stanlee Calma and Legal
Researcher Diana Ruiz are soliciting monetary
considerations from litigants in exchange for fast
and favorable decisions;
4. That Clerk of Court Calma received a huge
amount of money and a Pajero from a certain
"Norma" in exchange for a favorable decision in
an election protest; and
5. That there are court employees who seek his
assistance in drafting decisions/orders and use
the same to ask for considerations from
litigants.[6]
Marticio's letter-complaint was consolidated with A.M.
RTJ-08-2151, the case involving Judge Larida.[7] The
consolidated cases were assigned to Associate Justice
Ricardo R. Rosario of the Court of Appeals (CA) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
On February 20, 2009, Investigating Justice Rosario re-
set the pre-trial of the cases to March 5, 2009, with a
specific order for Marticio to personally appear on that
date.[8] On March 5, 2009, Marticio did not appear at the
pre-trial. The Process Server's Return
[9]
showed, however, that the order for Marticio to
personally appear before the Investigating Justice was
not served on him because he had meanwhile ceased to
be connected with the City Government of Tagaytay
City, and could not also be found at his last known
address. Whereupon, the staff members of Branch 18
whom Marticio had denounced sought the immediate
dismissal of his letter complaint.[10]Deeming Marticio's
failure to inform the Investigating Justice and the OCA
of his whereabouts as a manifestation of his lack of
interest to pursue the matter, the Investigating Justice
recommended the dismissal of his letter-complaint.[11]
The representatives of the OCA and Judge Larida
appeared before the Investigating Justice and presented
their evidence.
The Investigating Justice thereafter submitted a report on
his findings to the Court, and recommended as follows:
1. for failing to strictly comply with the provisions of
Administrative Circular No. 28-2008, it is recommended
that respondent Judge Edwin G. Larida, Jr. be
STERNLY WARNED that the commission of a similar
act will be dealt with more severely;
2. for failing to supervise and control his subordinates
diligently, it is recommended that respondent Judge
Edwin G. Larida, Jr. be REPRIMANDED with warning
that a commission of a similar act will be dealt with
more severely;
3. for immediately granting Jayson Espiritu's motion to
quash in Criminal Case No. TG-5307-06 without giving
the prosecution a chance to comment thereon or file an
opposition thereto, it is recommended that respondent
Judge Edwin G. Larida, Jr. be STERNLY WARNED
that a repetition of a similar act will warrant a more
severe penalty.
There being no substantial evidence to support the
charges of
a) extorting money from detained accused Raymund
Wang;
b) defying the directive of Supreme Court in
Administrative Order No. 132-2008;
c) improperly granting bail in Criminal Case No. TG-
4382-03;
d) receiving a bribe in exchange for granting Jayson
Espiritu's motion to quash the information in Criminal
Case No. TG-5307-06;
e) granting a petition for the issuance of owner's
duplicate copies of various titles in LRC Case No. TG-
06-1183 under questionable circumstances; and
f) involvement in the fire that razed RTC, Branch 18,
Tagaytay City;
it is recommended that the foregoing charges be
DISMISSED and respondent Judge Edwin G. Larida, Jr.,
be ABSOLVED of liability for the same.[12]
Ruling
The Court partly adopts the findings and
recommendations of the Investigating Justice.
1.
Violation of Administrative Circular No. 28-2008 by
authorizing the detail of locally-funded employees to
Branch 18 without obtaining permission from the
Court, and by allowing them to take custody of court
records and to draft court orders and rulings for him
Administrative Circular No. 28-2008 dated March 11,
2008 (Guidelines in the Detail of Locally-Funded
Employees to the Lower Courts)[13] relevantly stated as
follows:
The Presiding Judge/Executive Judge shall submit to the
SC through the OCA, within one (1) month from receipt
of this administrative circular, an inventory of all
locally-funded employees detailed in their respective
court branches including the OCC, specifying their
names, position titles, assigned duties and duration of the
detail. In addition, the Presiding Judge/Executive Judge
shall regularly review the necessity for such details as
well as the performance of the locally-funded
employees, and recommend to the SC through the OCA
the revocation of the detail for those whose services are
no longer necessary in the lower courts or those with
unsatisfactory or poor performance.

As of October 14, 2008, the locally-funded employees
detailed in Branch 18 were Ofelia Parasdas, Myrna
Lontoc, Jayson Marticio, Larry Laggui and Jaime
Apaga.[14] However, Judge Larida did not submit or
cause to be submitted to the Court within one month
from receipt of Administrative Circular No. 28-2008 an
inventory of all locally-funded employees detailed in
Branch 18.
Atty. Calma claimed further that Judge Larida had
allowed Marticio to draft orders and decisions for
Branch 18 in contravention of paragraph 3 of
Administrative Circular No. 28-2008,[15] viz:
Considering the confidentiality of court records and
proceedings, locally-funded employees shall simply
assist in the performance of clerical works, such as
receiving of letters and other communications for the
office concerned, typing of address in envelopes for
mailing, typing of certificate of appearance, and typing
of monthly reports. They shall not be given duties
involving custody of court records, implementation of
judicial processes, and such other duties involving court
proceedings. However, they may perform functions
appertaining to that of a messenger, janitor and driver, if
these positions are provided in the plantilla of the Local
Government Unit (LGU).[16]
To support Atty. Calma's claim, the OCA presented
copies of the court orders drafted by Marticio in the
period from February 4 to February 15, 2008 bearing
Marticio's initials and signatures on which Judge Larida
had either written the word "Finalize" or signed in other
instances.[17]
Likewise, Atty. Calma attested that Judge Larida had
allowed Laggui to handle confidential court records in
violation also of paragraph 3 of Administrative Circular
No. 28-2008.[18]
In his judicial affidavit, Judge Larida asserted that he
had tasked Atty. Calma to make and send to the Court
the inventory of the detailed locally-funded employees,
but the latter did not comply.[19] He denied that Marticio
had continued drafting court orders after the effectivity
of Administrative Circular No. 28-2008 on March 11,
2008, because Marticio had been limited to doing legal
research afterwards.[20] He admitted that Laggui had
handled court records at his behest, but insisted that such
handling had been limited to the physical carrying of
records between his chambers and the staff room for
only a fleeting moment.[21]
The Investigating Justice rendered the following
evaluation of the charges and the corresponding
explanations of Judge Larida, to wit:
Based on the foregoing evidence, this Investigating
Justice finds that although respondent Judge failed to
comply with the submission of an inventory of locally-
funded personnel detailed to his office, pursuant to
Administrative Circular No. 28-2008, it cannot be said
that such failure was entirely his fault.
In the first place, the preparation of such inventory is an
administrative function that properly pertains to the
Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Calma. Since it was Atty.
Calma who first read about Administrative Circular No.
28-2008 in the newspaper and even brought the same to
the attention of respondent Judge, he should have
prepared the required inventory for respondent Judge's
signature. The record is bereft of any evidence or
allegation that despite a prepared inventory ready for his
signature, respondent Judge willfully refused to sign and
submit the same to the Supreme Court.
Second, aside from the orders prepared by Jayson
Marticio between 4 and 15 February 2008, there is no
showing that he continued to draft court orders after the
effectivity of Administrative Circular No. 28-2008 on 11
March 2008.
Third, Larry Laggui's act of physically carrying court
records to and from respondent Judge's chambers and the
staff room appears to be a messengerial activity allowed
by Administrative Circular No. 28-2008. Laggui can
hardly be said to have exercised "custody" over the court
records since he had no participation in their
safekeeping.
Nevertheless, respondent Judge's act of not submitting
the required inventory, allowing detailed employees to
draft court orders and/or have access to court records
evinces laxity in respondent Judge's control and
supervision over his office. A judge is tasked with the
administrative supervision over his personnel and he
should always see to it that his orders are promptly
enforced and that case records are properly stored. It is,
therefore, incumbent upon the judge to see to it that the
personnel of the court perform their duties well and to
call the attention of the clerk of court when they fail to
do so.
Having failed to strictly comply with the provisions of
Administrative Circular No. 28-2008, it is recommended
that respondent Judge be STERNLY WARNED that the
commission of a similar act will be dealt with more
severely.[22]
We find Judge Larida to have committed several lapses,
specifically the non-submission to the Court of the
required inventory of locally-funded employees, and his
allowing Marticio to draft court orders. Such lapses
manifested a wrong attitude towards administrative rules
and regulations issued for the governance and
administration of the lower courts, to the extent of
disregarding them, as well as a laxity in the control of
his Branch and in the supervision of its functioning staff.
The omission to submit the inventory should not be
blamed on Atty. Calma as the Branch Clerk of Court.
Although it was very likely that Judge Larida had tasked
Atty. Calma to do and submit the inventory in his behalf,
Judge Larida as the Presiding Judge himself remained to
be the officer directly burdened with the responsibility
for doing so. The basis for saying so is the text of
Administrative Circular No. 28-2008 itself. Judge Larida
could neither shirk from, nor avoid, nor evade the
responsibility of submitting the inventory within one
month from notice under any guise or reason. This
meant that if Atty. Calma did not comply with his
instruction, Judge Larida should have himself assumed
the responsibility of compliance. With Administrative
Circular No. 28-2008 being effective on March 11, 2008
yet, his failure to send the inventory as late as October
2008 definitely established his non-compliance with its
directive.
Paragraph 3 of Administrative Circular No. 28-2008 also
confined the service of locally-funded employees to
giving assistance in the performance of clerical works,
like receiving letters and other communications for the
Branch, typing of addresses on envelopes for mailing,
typing of certificates of appearance, and typing of
monthly reports. Such employees were not to have the
custody of court records, or to have anything to do with
the implementation of judicial processes, or to discharge
other duties involving court proceedings beyond the
merely clerical. The prohibition was intended to preserve
the confidentiality of court records and proceedings,
because such employees were not employed in the
Judiciary.
Judge Larida admitted in his judicial affidavit that
Marticio had drafted court orders and had done legal
research in Branch 18. Under the circumstances, his
claim of discontinuing Marticio's drafting activities upon
the effectivity of Administrative Circular No. 28-2008
on March 11, 2008, assuming it to be true, did not
diminish or excuse his violation if he still permitted
Marticio to do legal research work thereafter. Legal
research was an activity that was more than clerical.
Clearly, Judge Larida did not comply with
Administrative Circular No. 28-2008, which was a less
serious charge under Section 9 of Rule 140, Rules of
Court, as amended.[23]
Section 11 of Rule 140, Rules of Court, as amended,
delineates the sanctions to be meted out for a less serious
charge, as follows:
Section 11. Sanctions. x x x
x x x x
B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any
of the following sanctions shall be imposed:
1. Suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3)
months; or
2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding
P20,000.00.
xxxx
However, Judge Larida's unrebutted explanation that he
had instructed Atty. Calma to prepare and send the
inventory, while not entirely absolving him, evinced his
intention to comply. Trial judges have usually delegated
various reporting tasks to their clerks of court or other
members of their staff in order to gain more time for
their adjudications and other important written work. We
should presume, therefore, that malice had not motivated
his non-compliance with Administrative Circular No.
28-2008. His explanation to that effect merited treating
his lack of malice as a mitigating circumstance in his
favor.
2.
Knowingly allowing detailed employees
to solicit commissions from bonding companies
Regarding this charge, the Investigating Justice found
thusly:
The OCA next charges respondent Judge with having
allowed detailed employees, Jayson Marticio and Larry
Laggui, and respondent Judge's personal driver,
Napoleon Cabanizas, Jr., to solicit commissions from
bonding and surety companies.
According to the judicial affidavit of former Branch
Clerk of Court, Atty. Stanlee D.C. Calma, the manager
of Monarch Insurance Company, Inc. complained to him
that despite the proper filing of the bail bond policy and
the payment of legal fees, there would be a delay of up
to 3 days in the issuance of release orders for the accused
unless the bonding company gave the "commission"
solicited by Jayson Marticio, Larry Laggui and
Napoleon Cabanizas, Jr. Monarch Insurance Insurance
and other bonding companies supposedly told Atty.
Calma that Jayson Marticio, Larry Laggui and Napoleon
Cabanizas, Jr. solicited "commissions" ranging from
P500.00 up to 2% of the amount of bail imposed.
By way of illustration, the OCA presented Criminal Case
No. TG-5955-08 entitled People vs. Benito Bobis. In said
case, Monarch Insurance posted the bail bond on 17 June
2008, respondent Judge signed the release order of the
accused on 18 June 2008, but the release order was
issued only on 20 June 2008.
In accordance with his duties as Branch Clerk of Court,
Atty. Calma reported the improper solicitation to
respondent Judge, who allegedly remarked, "Sabi ko nga
sa kanila mag 'lie low muna."
Thereafter, respondent Judge confronted Jayson
Marticio, Larry Laggui and Napoleon Cabanizas, Jr. in
the presence of the representative of Monarch Insurance
and told them to stop asking for commissions. However,
according to Atty. Calma, what respondent Judge really
said was that Marticio et al. should refrain from
demanding "commissions" and it was up to the bonding
companies to give them any amount.[24]
Based on the foregoing, Judge Larida was not unaware
of the solicitations by Marticio, Laggui and Cabanizas
from the complaining bonding company. The
solicitations were surely irregular and improper activities
undertaken by persons visibly working for the courts.
Considering that such activities were committed with his
knowledge, Judge Larida should have done more than
merely confronting them in the presence of the
representative of the complaining bonding company, and
then and there merely telling them to stop the
solicitations. He should have instead immediately caused
or called for their investigation and, if the evidence
warranted, seen to their proper criminal prosecution. The
firmer action by him would have avoided the undesirable
impression that he had perversely acquiesced to their
activities. He thus contravened the Code of Judicial
Conduct, which imposed on him the duty to take or
initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against court
personnel for unprofessional conduct of which he would
have become aware, to wit:
Rule 3.10 A judge should take or initiate appropriate
disciplinary measures against lawyers or court personnel
for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may have
become aware.
Accordingly, Judge Larida was guilty of unbecoming
conduct, a light charge under Section 10, Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court, as amended.[25]
3.
Charge of soliciting money from the accused
in Criminal Case No. TG-2969-98.
On this charge, the Investigating Justice found and
recommended as follows:
In Criminal Case No. TG-2969-98, the accused,
Raymund Wang, was charged with selling 275.9665
grams of shabu. According to former Branch Clerk of
Court, Atty. Calma, a certain Necita Ramos (kumare of
Raymund Wang) called him up to ask if there was
already a decision in the case. Further, Necita Ramos
informed Atty. Calma that a certain "Jake" or "James"
had visited Wang in the Trece Martirez Provincial Jail to
ask P100,000.00 allegedly "pang birthday ni Judge."
Wang gave "Jake" or "James" the cellphone number of
Necita Ramos and the two purportedly negotiated the
amount down to P50,000.00. However, Necita Ramos
did not pay the amount solicited.
After receiving the information, Atty. Calma supposedly
informed respondent Judge that certain people might be
using his name but the latter only said that the problem is
that people are accusing others but are afraid to show up.
Thereafter, Atty. Calma did his own investigation and
found out that the cellphone number calling Necita
Ramos belonged to Jayson Marticio. Armed with this
information, Atty. Calma and Necita Ramos went to the
Office of the City Prosecutor. However, no statements
were taken and no action was done. Upon verification by
the audit team of the OCA, the Office of the City
Prosecutor opined that the suspicion of Atty. Calma and
Necita Ramos would not prosper since their bases were
all hearsay.
For his part, respondent Judge denied that Atty. Calma
informed him of this incident. In his Judicial Affidavit,
respondent Judge averred that he had asked his legal
researcher, Diana Ruiz, to prepare a digest of the case
but she prepared, instead a decision acquitting Wang.
This allegedly triggered a suspicion in respondent Judge
that Diana Ruiz and Atty. Calma were selectively
preparing decisions and placing them inside his
chambers, but before he could investigate, a fire gutted
the court.
Based on the foregoing testimonies on record, it is
apparent that the charge against respondent Judge of
soliciting money from accused Wang has not been
proved. Apart from the hearsay testimony of Atty.
Calma, there is no legal or factual basis to conclude that
"James" or "Jake" is actually Jayson Marticio and that
"James" or "Jake" solicited money from Wang with the
authority of respondent Judge. Therefore, it is
recommended that this charge against respondent Judge
be DISMISSED.[26]
We adopt the findings and recommendation of the
Investigating Justice, and dismiss the charge for lack of
evidence proving that Judge Larida solicited a bribe
from the accused in Criminal Case No. TG-2969-98.
It is truly proper to emphasize at this point that a charge
of bribery against a judge is easy to concoct and difficult
to disprove; hence, the Court always demands that the
complainant present a panoply of evidence in support of
the accusation.[27] A mere affidavit attesting that a judge
demanded a bribe in exchange for the exoneration of an
accused being tried before him is not sufficient. In order
that an accusation of this nature is not to be considered a
fairy tale, competent and reliable evidence other than the
testimony of a lone witness needs to be adduced. Every
administrative complaint levelled against a sitting judge
must be examined with a discriminating eye, therefore,
because its consequential effects are by their nature
highly penal, to the extent that the respondent judge may
face the sanction of dismissal from the service. Indeed,
no judge should be disciplined for misconduct unless the
evidence against him is competent and
sufficient.[28]Accordingly, the Court rightfully rejects
any imputation of judicial misconduct in the absence of
sufficient proof to sustain it.
4.
Defying Administrative Order No. 132-2008
In Administrative Order No. 132-2008, promulgated on
September 15, 2008, the Court directed Judge Larida: (1)
to cease and desist from trying cases; (2) to concentrate
on deciding the cases submitted for decision, whether
before him or before his predecessors; and (3) to give
priority to cases submitted for decision for more than
five years already. The administrative order designated
Judge Emma S. Young as the Assisting Judge for Branch
18, with authority to conduct hearings.
The OCA charged Judge Larida with wilfully violating
Administrative Order No. 132-2008 by antedating
several orders in order to anticipate or circumvent the
effectivity of the administrative order.
Anent this charge, the Investigating Justice has reported:
In his Judicial Affidavit, former Branch Clerk of Court,
Atty. Calma, accused respondent Judge of continuing to
issue interlocutory orders in certain cases even after the
effectivity of Administrative Order No. 132-2008 on 15
September 2008. Atty. Calma's testimony is supported
by the Judicial Affidavit of civil docket clerk, Anita
Goboy. Together, they enumerate the orders issued by
respondent Judge allegedly in violation of the
Administrative Order, to wit:
1. Order dated 15 August 2008, granting the
motions to consolidate and set for pre-trial Civil
 Case Nos. TG-07-2588 entitled Tagaytay
Properties & Holdings Corp. vs. Sps. Pascua,
TG-07-2589 entitled Tagaytay Properties &
Holdings Corp. vs dela Vega; TG-07-2590
entitled Tagaytay Properties & Holdings Corp.
vs. Sps. Catolico; and TG-07-2592
entitled Tagaytay Properties & Holdings Corp.
vs. Sps. Mirandilla; but denying consolidation of
TG-07-2591 entitled Tagaytay Properties &
Holdings Corp. vs. Sps. Lomerio, Sr.with said
cases;
2. Order, dated 15 September 2008, granting
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion (to resolve motion to
cancel notice of lis pendens) in Civil Case No.
TG-08-2743 entitled Osato-Agro Industrial
Development Corporation vs. AB Capital &
Investment Corporation;
3. Order, dated 18 September 2008, granting
plaintiff's prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction in SP No. TG-05-2519
entitled Metro Alliance vs. Phil. Trust Co.; and,
4. Order, dated 19 September 2008, denying
defendant's motion to dismiss in SCA-TG-08-
2593 entitled Tagaytay Resort Development
Corporation vs. Nazareno.
It is Atty. Calma's conclusion that said orders were
intentionally ante-dated by respondent Judge based on
the fact that the latter, through Larry Laggui, gave such
orders to civil docket clerk Anita Goboy only on 26
September 2008 although they all appear to have been
signed or promulgated on earlier dates, as above-
enumerated. Since Administrative Order No. 132-2008
was already in effect by then, Atty. Calma reasoned that
the sole purpose of ante-dating the orders could only be
the circumvention of said Administrative Order.
For his part, respondent Judge declared that he signed
the orders in question on the dates indicated thereon and
released them to the civil docket clerk on the same day.
Respondent Judge, thus, was surprised to find out that
said orders were all uniformly released by Larry Laggui
to the civil docket clerk only on 26 September 2008. In
any event, respondent Judge pointed out that since the
civil docket clerk had brought the matter to Atty.
Calma's attention, the latter-being aware of the
effectivity of Administrative Order No. 132-2008 should
have informed him about it and stopped the
promulgation on said date to avoid a violation of the
Administrative Order.[29]
We declare that the interlocutory orders concerned were
signed on the dates indicated therein. The claim of Atty.
Calma and Anita Goboy to the effect that the foregoing
orders had been antedated to circumvent the mandate of
Administrative Order No.132-200 was improbable in
light of the following relevant observations of the
Investigating Justice, viz:
x x x. If it were true that Atty. Calma believed that their
release on a date different from the date of their signing
amounted to an anomaly, then he should have
immediately brought the same to the attention of the
presiding Judge. Atty. Calma's act of instructing civil
docket clerk Anita Goboy to merely indicate at the back
of said orders the date when she actually received them
evinces a certain degree of malice incongruent with his
key and noble position in the court.[30]
It is worth noting that only two of the affected orders
were issued after the effectivity of Administrative Order
No. 132-2008, to wit:
1. the Order, dated 18 September 2008, granting
plaintiff's prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction in SP No. TG-05-2519
entitled Metro Alliance vs. Phil Trust Co.; and
2. the Order, dated 19 September 2008, denying
private defendant's motion to dismiss in SCA-
TG-08-2593 entitled Tagaytay Resort
Development Corporation vs. Nazareno.[31]
The two orders were issued by Judge Larida two and
three days after the effectivity of Administrative Order
No. 132-2008. Even if the administrative order had taken
effect immediately, the time when he acquired actual
notice of Administrative Order No. 132-2008 was not
shown. On the other hand, that our administrative
circulars and issuances take time to reach the lower
courts is a matter proper for judicial notice. As such, his
intent to violate or circumvent Administrative Order No.
132-2008 was not proved.
Moreover, the Investigating Justice's following
observations are cogent, to wit:
According to the Memorandum submitted by the OCA
to the Hon. Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
"the administrative order was issued in view of the 139
cases submitted for decision in RTC, Branch 18,
Tagaytay City which are already beyond the
reglementary period to decide as reflected in the
monthly report of cases submitted by the aforesaid court
for the month of April 2008."
Given the purpose of Administrative Order No. 132-
2008, it would appear that the mandate given to
respondent Judge to "cease and desist from trying cases"
was not meant to penalize him but was given only as a
remedial measure to ensure that he will spend his
time writing the decisions of the long-pending 139
undecided cases instead of trying and hearing other
cases.
Hence, respondent Judge's issuance of the 2 orders in
question, on 18 and 19 September 2008, respectively,
while not in strict compliance with the letter of the
Administrative Order, also do not prevent the attainment
of its purpose. Indeed, there is nothing on record to even
hint at an improper motive on the part of respondent
Judge in issuing said orders apart from the obvious
reason that they were necessary in the disposition of
interlocutory matters in these cases.[32]
Hence, we dismiss the charge of circumventing
Administrative Order No. 132-2008.

5.
Releasing the accused in Criminal Case
No. TG-432-03 on bail despite their being
positively identified as the perpetrators of the crime
The Investigating Justice found and recommended on
this charge thuswise:
In Criminal Case No. TG-4382-03, the accused Leandro
Go y Ling, Wen Li Chen, Daniel Co, Wilson Li, Michael
Fandag and Arnel Villaser were charged with Violation
of Section 8, Article II, RA 9165 (Manufacturing or
Engaging in the Manufacture of, in a Clandestine
Laboratory, Large Quantity of Metamphetamine
Hydrochloride, Commonly Known as Shabu).
From the Memorandum of the OCA to the Hon. Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno, it appears that arraignment
proceeded on 7 December 2004; pre-trial commenced on
8 August 2005; and trial ensued on 19 October 2005. On
24 March 2006, the Chinese accused (Go, Li Chen, Co
and Li) filed a petition to fix bail for their provisional
liberty. The prosecution did not object thereto, and,
instead filed a formal offer of evidence on 3 May 2007,
as it had, by then, finished with its presentation of
evidence. On 1 June 2007, the Chinese accused filed a
memorandum in support of their petition for bail. On
June 14, 2007, respondent Judge granted the petition for
bail of the accused.
In this administrative charge against respondent Judge,
the OCA questions his grant of bail to the accused for
the reasons that: (1) the crime they are accused of is a
capital offense, and the transcript of stenographic notes
taken during the presentation of the evidence for the
prosecution indicates that 2 witnesses positively
identified the accused as the perpetrators of the crime;
and (2) there are suspicious circumstances surrounding
the release of the resolution granting bail to the
accused.[33]
x x x x
In this case, after the prosecution finished presenting its
evidence, respondent Judge came to the conclusion that
the evidence of the accused's guilt was not strong and so
granted their petition for bail.
However, the OCA disputes respondent Judge's
assessment of the guilt of the accused based on the
evaluation made by Branch Clerk of Court Atty. Stanlee
D.C. Calma of the transcript of stenographic notes on the
case that 2 witnesses for the prosecution had positively
identified the accused as the perpetrators of the
crime. [34]
x x x x
On the other hand, respondent Judge defends his grant of
bail in his Judicial Affidavit as follows:
Q: OCA was faulting you for stating in your resolution
that there was no positive identification of the accused
when the transcript of stenographic notes say otherwise.
What can you say to this?
A: The lack or the improper identification of the accused
was just one of the grounds I cited to grant the petition.
My assessment of the evidence on this matter was
arrived at on two grounds: 1. failure of police officer
Eusebio to positively identify the accused in his direct
testimony, and 2. the failure of another prosecution
witness Mr. Basilio to positively identify the accused
taking his entire testimony into consideration, the direct
and cross.
x x x x
52. Q: What can you say to the allegations of Atty.
Calma that you had a meeting together with some
concerned court personnel in your chamber purposely to
discuss the resolution specifically on the matter of
positive identification?
A: Indeed it transpired but I stood pat on my decision.
The matter of determining whether or not the evidence is
strong is a matter of judicial discretion that remains with
the judge. Such discretion must be sound and exercised
within reasonable bounds. In this case, it appears that
respondent Judge gave a lot of thought to the petition for
bail before granting it, even going to the extent of
consulting with some of his court personnel on the
matter after receiving the evidence of the prosecution.
After much cogitation, respondent Judge exercised his
judicial discretion and came to the conclusion that the
evidence against the accused was not strong and they
were not positively identified as the perpetrators of the
crime.
Respondent Judge's appreciation of the evidence against
the accused lies within his sound discretion. This
mandated duty to exercise discretion has never been
reposed on the Branch Clerk of Court, who cannot be
allowed to supplant his personal opinions for that of the
judge. As long as there was no irregularity in the
proceedings adopted in the grant of bail, judicial
discretion must be respected and considered to have
been rendered within reasonable bounds.
Respondent Judge's lack of malice or bad faith in
granting bail to the accused in Criminal Case No. TG-
4382-03 is underscored by the proceedings that
transpired thereafter. According to the Memorandum of
the OCA to the Hon. Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, on
2 July 2007, the prosecution filed a motion for
reconsideration of the 14 June 2007 resolution granting
bail. The motion was set for hearing and the accused
were mandated to appear before the court. Upon failure
of the accused (except Li and Li Chen) to attend the
hearing, respondent Judge canceled their cash bail and
issued warrants for their arrest. Further, upon motion of
the prosecution, respondent Judge issued a hold-
departure order against the accused on 23 July 2007.[35]
We concur with the foregoing findings and
recommendation of the Investigating Justice.
Verily, the determination of whether or not the evidence
of guilt of the accused in Criminal Case No. TG-4382-03
was strong for purposes of resolving the petition for bail
was a matter of judicial discretion for Judge Larida as
the trial judge. Only he could competently resolve the
matter of bail. His exercise of discretion must be sound
and reasonable. In the view of the Investigating Justice,
Judge Larida, having given a lot of thought to the
petition for bail before granting it, soundly and
reasonably exercised his discretion thereon. Unless an
appropriate judicial review would show him to have
acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or whimsically in doing
so, his granting of the petition for bail should be upheld
and respected.
This administrative investigation could not be the
occasion to review Judge Larida's granting of bail. Only
the proper superior court could say whether his exercise
of discretion in resolving the petition for bail was sound
and reasonable. Thus, Atty. Calma's adverse conclusion
based on the transcript of the proceedings to the effect
that the Prosecution's witnesses had positively identified
the accused could not effectively contradict Judge
Larida's determination of the issue of bail.
Whether the identification in Criminal Case No. TG-
4382-03 was positively made or not was a matter for the
judicial perception of Judge Larida only. In these
proceedings, he explained his reasons for granting bail.
We must respect his explanation. The accused in
Criminal Case No. TG-4382-03 were charged with the
manufacture of methamphetamine hydrochloride. The
relevant testimony of the Prosecution's witnesses was to
the effect that at the time the police arrested them on
July 12, 2003 the accused were loading boxes unto
various trucks and vans, with the boxes being later on
determined to contain illegal substances.[36] As such, the
testimony did not establish the manufacture of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, the non-bailable
offense charged, but a bailable lesser offense. Judge
Larida's June 14, 2007 resolution granting the petition
for bail reflected the distinction, viz:
In the ensuing enforcement of the search warrant issued
by the Municipal Trial Court of Silang, Cavite, several
containers and sacks were found in the house described
therein which were suspected to be essential chemicals
in the manufacture of methamphetamine hydrochloride,
a prohibited drug. But there was no evidence to establish
that the accused had something to do with the presence
of these alleged illegal substances in the house subject of
the search warrant. The accused were not caught inside
the house which the prosecution claims to be a
clandestine shabu laboratory. But the "Chinese-looking
persons" were apprehended outside the clandestine
laboratory, outside its gates. They were arrested in
flagrante delictoloading the containers of illegal
substances onto the vans/trucks outside the house.
Loading them onto a motor vehicle does not fall within
the purview of the word "manufacture" of prohibited
drugs otherwise, we are stretching the meaning of the
term a bit too far.[37]
Aside from assailing the resolution granting the petition
for bail, Atty. Calma maintained that the resolution had
been released under suspicious circumstances
considering that the defense counsel, Atty. Albert T.
Villaseca, had already gone to the RTC ready to post the
cash bail of P200,000.00 for each of the accused even
prior to the release of the June 14, 2007 resolution
granting bail.[38]
Anent this, Atty. Villaseca explained his presence in
Branch 18 in the following manner:
2. Q: On June 18, 2007 at about 9:00 o'clock in the
morning, where were you?
A: I was at the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Imus,
Cavite before the Honorable Judge Norberto J.
Quisumbing, Jr. I just came from the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 19, Bacoor, Cavite as I initially attended
the hearing of Criminal Case No. B-2002-623 titled
"People of the Philippines, Plaintiff, versus, Benedicto
Baraquilles Maliksi, Accused," for Homicide. The case
was postponed as the Prosecutor in said case was sick. I
have with me a "Certified True Copy" of the "Minutes"
which I signed together with the "Order" of the
Honorable Judge Eduardo Israel Tanguangco both dated
June 18, 2007.
3. Q: What were you doing at that time before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Imus, Cavite at the sala
of the Honorable Judge Norberto J. Quisumbing, Jr.?
A: I attended the hearing and appeared as counsel for
both of the accused in the case of People of the
Philippines, Plaintiff, versus, Guillermo Silla y Legaspi
and Paulino Silla y Purificacion, Accused, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 10242-02 for Homicide.
4. Q: What document or documents, if any, do you have
to show before this Honorable Court that on June 18,
2007 at about 9:00 o'clock in the morning you attended
and appeared before a criminal case at the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 21, Imus, Cavite before the sale (sic) of
Honorable Judge Norberto J. Quisumbing, Jr.?
A: I have with me the "Original Copy" of the Honorable
Court's "Order" dated June 18, 2007 together with a
"Certified True Copy of my "Appearance" indicated by
my two signatures therein and the "Minutes of the
Proceedings" in the case of People of the Philippines,
Plaintiff, versus, Guillermo Silla y Legaspi and Paulino
Silla y Purificacion, Accused, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 10242-02 for Homicide.
5. Q: At about what time did you leave the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 21, Imus, Cavite after you attended
and appeared in the case you are handling?
A: I left the courtroom at around 10:30 o'clock in the
morning after my case was called.
6. Q: What did you [do] after you left the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 21, Imus, Cavite at around 10:30 o'clock
in the morning of June 18, 2007?
A: I went to my office to get the records of another case
I was handling that day in the afternoon and briefly
prepared for its afternoon hearing.
7. Q: what is this case all about?
A: It is a civil case for Annulment of Deed of Sale,
Annulment of Title and Damages docketed as Civil Case
No. TG-2209 titled Benjamin Q. Diwa, et. al., Plaintiffs,
versus, Maxima R. Matias and International Exchange
Bank, Defendants, pending before the Regional Trial 15. Q: What happened next, if any?
Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City at the sala of the
Honorable Judge Edwin G. Larida, Jr. which is A: I personally received a copy of the Honorable Court's
scheduled to be heard in the afternoon of June 18, 2007 Resolution and, thereafter, immediately and excitedly
at around 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon. informed the aunt of one of my clients as I know she
would be very happy about it as my clients have been
8. Q: What happened next after you arrived at your innocently lingering in jail for almost four years and
office to get the records and prepared (sic) for this other have already lost faith and hope of ever having
case that you are handling in the afternoon of June 18, temporary liberty.
2007?
16. Q: What happened next, if any?
A: At around 11:30 o'clock in the morning, I left my
office in Imus, Cavite and together with my driver and A: I informed the aunt of one of my clients the amount
one of my office personnel, proceeded [to] Tagaytay of the bond required to (be) posted in cash and she told
City to attend to the hearing of my case. me to meet her at the Provincial Jail at Trece Martires
City, Province of Cavite and give her a copy of the
9. Q: What happened next, if any? Honorable Court's Resolution and she would provide for
the amount of the cash bond required by the Honorable
A: I arrived at the parking ground of the Regional Trial Court.
Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City at around 12:30 o'clock
in the afternoon. 17. Q: What happened next, if any?

10. Q: Then, what happened next?
A: Upon arriving at the office of the personnel and staff
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, I
was informed by my clients and a court personnel that
all the cases scheduled in the afternoon would be
rescheduled to another date as there was an unusual
incident which transpired inside the courtroom earlier.
11. Q: What is that unusual incident which transpired
earlier in the courtroom of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 18, Tagaytay City?
A: I was informed that one of the accused in a rape case
from the Provincial Jail of the Province of Cavite took
hostage of one of the court employees and that is the
reason why all the cases scheduled to be heard in the
afternoon were rescheduled to another date.
12: Q: What document, if any, do you have to show
before this Honorable Court that there was a hostage
taking incident that transpired in the morning of June 18,
2007 in side(sic) the courtroom of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City?
A: I inquired from one of the court personnel that if we
could post a cash bail bond that afternoon, could my
clients be ordered released, and what other documents
the court requires to immediately avail of the "order of
Release."
18. Q: What happened next, if any?
A: After I was informed by one of the court personnel
that since there are no cases to be heard that afternoon
and since all the cases will just be rescheduled to another
date, they have a lot of time to take care of the "Order of
Release" of my clients as long as all the other court
requirements for the posting of the cash bail bond are
complied with. I wasted no time and hurriedly left the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City.
Proceeded to the Provincial Jail at Trece Martires City,
Province of Cavite to inform my clients about the
Honorable Court's Resolution and to meet the aunt of
one of my clients who will take care of the cash bail
bond required. On my way, I informed the aunt of my
client about the other requirements for the posting of the
cash bail bond and prepared the Cash Bond Undertaking
of my clients in my laptop computer.

A: I have with me a "Certified True Copy" of the Police 19. Q: What happened next, if any?
Blotter issued by SPO4 Samuel Baybay of the Tagaytay
City Police Station. A: I arrived at the Provincial Jail at Trece Martires City,
Province of Cavite before 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon.
13. Q: What did you do after that? Delivered a copy of the Honorable Court's Resolution to
the Provincial Jail Warden and met the aunt of one of my
A: I provided the court personnel with my available date, clients who provided me with the cash in the amount of
briefly talked to my clients and knowing that our case P400,000.00 for the cash bail bond required, pictures of
was already postponed I inquired about the status of my the accused together with the other requirements for the
other cases pending before the Regional Trial Court, cash bail bond. I explained the consequences of a Cash
Branch 18, Tagaytay City. Bond Undertaking to my clients, have (sic) them sign
and subscribe to it and then notarized it.
14. Q: What happened next, after that?
20. Q: What happened next, if any?
A: As I (was) browsing upon the records of Criminal
Case No. TG-4382-03 titled The People of the A: I wasted no time and hurriedly left for Tagaytay City.
Philippines, Plaintiff, versus, Leandro Go y Lim, et al, Thereafter, I posted the cash bail bond and submitted all
Accused, for Violation of Sec. 8, Art. 2, RA 9165, I the requirements to secure an "Order of Release" for my
came across the resolution of the Honorable Court in our clients.
petition for bail.
21. Q: What happened next, if any?

A: All documents I submitted were found in order by the
personnel in charge. I was able to secure an "Order of
Release" for my clients. Thereafter, I again proceeded to
the Provincial Jail at Trece Martires City, Province of
Cavite and delivered to the Provincial Jail Warden an
copy of the "Order of Release."[39]
Atty. Calma's bare allegations, which were obviously
based on surmise and speculation, cannot be preferred
because Atty. Villaseca's foregoing explanation of his
presence in Branch 18 was supported by authentic
documents. Accordingly, we dismiss the charge of Judge
Larida's having improperly granted bail in Criminal Case
No. TG-4382-03.
6.
Charge of granting the motion to quash the
information
in Criminal Case No. TG-5307-06 without a case
record and without
requiring a comment from the public prosecutor
The Investigating Justice said regarding this charge:
In Criminal case No. TG-5307-06, Jayson Espiritu,
among others, was charged with Murder and was
arrested on 6 August 2008 and detained at the Provincial
Jail. On 22 August 2008, Jayson Espiritu filed a motion
to quash/dismiss information on the ground that he was a
minor at the time of the commission of the offense.
In an Order, dated 5 September 2008, respondent Judge
set the motion to quash for hearing on October 3, 2008
and gave the prosecution 15 days to file its
comment/opposition thereto. However, without waiting
for the 15-day period to expire, respondent Judge
granted Jayson Espiritu's motion to quash on 15
September 2008.
According to the Judicial Affidavit of former Branch
Clerk of Court Atty. Stanlee D.C. Calma, aside from not
giving the prosecution a chance to oppose Jayson
Espiritu's motion to quash, respondent Judge personally
drafted the Order granting said motion without access to
the records of the case. Moreover, respondent Judge
allegedly gave an advance copy of the Order granting the
motion to quash to the father of Jayson Espiritu, who, in
turn, showed the same to the warden of the Provincial
Jail even before the court had personally served the same
upon said warden on 26 September 2008. According to
Atty. Calma, he was informed by the widow of the
victim in said criminal case that respondent Judge had
been paid off to quash the information against Jayson
Espiritu.
In his defense, respondent Judge explained that he
granted Jayson Espiritu's motion to quash pursuant to
RA 9344 because Jayson Espiritu was only a minor at
the time of the commission of the offense, as proved by
his birth certificate attached to the motion. Respondent
Judge denied having received a pay-off to quash the
information against Jayson Espiritu, and explained that
he did not wait for the comment/opposition of the
prosecution because he followed the substance of the
law and acted swiftly in the best interests of the minor
accused. Respondent Judge asserts that he personally
prepared the order on 15 September 2008. [40]
Jayson Espiritu, the accused in Criminal Case No. TG-
5307-06, was a minor of 15 years and 11 months at the
time of the commission of the offense charged as borne
out by the copy of his birth certificate attached to the
motion to quash. He was for that reason entitled to the
quashal of the information filed against him for being
exempt from criminal liability based on Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare
Act of 2006), which states as follows:
Section 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A
child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the
commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal
liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an
intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen
(18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from
criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention
program, unless he/she has acted with discernment,
in which case, such child shall be subjected to the
appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established
does not include exemption from civil liability, which
shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.
(Emphasis supplied)
The foregoing notwithstanding, Judge Larida should not
have acted on Espiritu's motion to quash without first
giving the public prosecutor the opportunity to comment
on the motion. That opportunity was demanded by due
process.[41] As a judge, he should exercise patience and
circumspection to ensure that the opposing sides are
allowed the opportunity to be present and to be
heard.[42] Only thereby could he preclude any suspicion
on the impartiality of his actuations.[43] But he cannot
now be sanctioned because it is a matter of public policy
that in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the
acts of a judge done in his judicial capacity are not
subject to disciplinary action although they are
erroneous.[44] Considering that there was no fraud,
dishonesty or corruption that attended the omission of
prior notice, we simply caution him against a repetition
of the omission of prior notice.
The Investigating Justice found the charge of bribery
against Judge Larida unsupported by competent
evidence.[45] We concur. The records are bereft of the
evidence that would establish the charge. Innuendo and
hearsay will not establish the accusation. We insist that
any accusation of bribery against a judicial officer
should be made upon hard and firm evidence of it.
Hence, we dismiss the charge of bribery.
7.
Charge of granting under questionable
circumstances
the petition for the issuance of owner's duplicate
copies
of various TCTs in LRC Case No. TG-06-1183

In its report, the investigating team from the OCA made
the following observations with respect to LRC Case No.
TG-06-1183, to wit:
1. There was no hearing conducted to establish the
jurisdiction of the court and subsequent referral of the
reception of evidence ex parte to Clerk of Court Desiree
Macaraeg as commissioner;
2. There was no proof to establish that the Register [of]
Deeds of Tagaytay City, although furnished with a copy
of the petition, had actually received it;
3. There was no commissioner's report attached to the
record relative to the reception of evidence ex parte
conducted on 5 & 10 May 2006;
4. The affidavit of loss of titles was presented by
petitioner Santos to the Register of Deeds only on 5 May
2006 at the same time the petition was allegedly heard
by the commissioner;
5. Per minutes dated 10 May 2006, there appears the
name [of] Fiscal Manuel D. Noche, for the government,
yet the TSN state[s] that there was no appearance of
Fiscal Noche on 10 May 2006 or even the 5 May 2006
ex-parte hearing.
6. Petitioner's formal offer of evidence was admitted on
10 May 2007 when the same was filed only on 11 May
2007. The order also made it appear that there is no
objection interposed by the City Prosecutor despite non-
appearance thereof.
7. The comment of the Register of Deeds on petitioner's
Urgent Manifestation alleging that the Register of Deeds
delivered the TCT's to Marie Cruz although stated 4
September 2006 was filed in court only on 4 December
2006.[46]
The Investigating Justice recommended the dismissal of
the charge of irregularity for lack of evidence and
substantiation, thusly:
Although the Investigation Report details the legal
proceedings in LRC Case No. TG-06-1183, and certain
documents from the case were offered in evidence for
the complainant, the OCA did not fully elaborate on the
exact nature of this charge against respondent Judge.
Moreover, during the cross-examination of Diana Ruiz,
the latter manifested a lack of knowledge over the events
that transpired in said LRC case. No other witnesses
were presented to substantiate this charge. Therefore, it
is recommended that this charge against respondent
Judge be DISMISSED.[47]
The finding and recommendation by the Investigating
Justice are well-taken. The mere specification of
accusations against Judge Larida could not demonstrate
the veracity of the accusations notwithstanding the
attachment of all the documents allegedly in support of
the accusations. Evidence that was relevant and
competent must have been adduced to support the
accusation. Diana Ruiz's judicial affidavit attesting that
the corresponding documents in support of the
investigating team's accusations were faithful
reproductions of the originals that formed part of LRC
Case No. TG-06-1183, without more, did not suffice to
establish the commission of irregularities in the
disposition of the case. It is important to stress that the
proceedings upon administrative charges made against
judicial officers should be viewed with utmost care, and
such proceedings are governed by the rules of law
applicable to criminal cases, with the charges to be
proved beyond reasonable doubt, by virtue of their
nature as highly penal in character.[48]
8.
Charge of liability for the fire
that occurred on October 12, 2008
Anent the fire that occurred in the records room of
Branch 18, we absolve Judge Larida because no
evidence directly linking him to the arson incident was
presented.[49] It further appears that at the time of the
occurrence of the fire, Judge Larida was hospitalized for
a kidney injury that he had sustained from a fall on the
night of October 9, 2008.[50]
Nevertheless, the OCA insisted on Judge Larida's
responsibility for the fire based on certain circumstances,
namely: (a) the report of the Bureau of Fire Protection
revealed that access to the courthouse was through the
rear entrance,[51] and he admitted that such entrance was
his access to the courthouse;[52] (b) despite his being the
Presiding Judge of Branch 18, he did not actively take
part in the investigation of the arson incident, thereby
manifesting his lack of interest in or concern over the
burning of the courthouse;[53] and (c) he had a motive to
burn the courthouse in order to destroy the court's case
records that would reveal his wrongdoings. [54]
However, Atty. Calma disclosed that aside from Judge
Larida, utility workers Ofelia Parasdas and Romelito
Fernando, Judge Young, and Marticio all had keys to the
entrance doors of the courthouse (i.e., two front doors
and one back door),[55] and that he (Atty. Calma), along
with the clerk-in-charge of the civil docket Anita Goboy
and criminal docket clerk Romelito Fernando, were the
only ones who had access to the records room because
only they knew the location of the key to the records
room.[56]
Equally notable is that the forensic report denominated
as Dactyloscopy Report No. F-129-08 issued by the
Philippine National Police Cavite Provincial Crime
Laboratory Office on November 21, 2008 [57] showed that
one of the latent prints lifted from the crime scene
belonged to Romelito Fernando, a personnel who had
testified against Judge Larida during the investigation.
Judge Larida denied his supposed lack of interest in the
investigation of the arson incident by reminding that he
had immediately requested the NBI to investigate the
arson incident upon learning about it.[58] He explained
that he had refrained from further actively participating
in the investigation because he had been barred by the
OCA from reporting for work;[59] that unlike the staff
members of RTC Branch 18 who had continued to report
for work and had been interviewed by the investigating
team, he had not been summoned for any interview; and
that he also learned from the NBI agents themselves that
they had been ordered to cease from further investigating prosecute it.
the fire upon the entry of the OCA in the
investigation.[60] SO ORDERED.

Imputing to Judge Larida the motive to burn the

courthouse in order to destroy case records that could
expose his wrongdoings was baseless and speculative.
We reject the imputation. Before any judge should be
disciplined for any offense, the evidence presented
against him must be competent and derived from
personal knowledge. The judge ought not to be
sanctioned except upon a proper charge, and only after
due investigation and with competent proof.[61]

9.
Consolidated Penalty for Judge Larida

Judge Larida has been found guilty of a less serious

charge for not complying with the directive of
Administrative Circular No. 28-2008 to send an
inventory of locally-funded employees to the Supreme
Court within one month from notice of the circular, and
of allowing locally funded employees to perform more
than merely clerical tasks; and of a light charge for
unbecoming conduct for not causing the investigation of
the solicitations of commission from a bonding company
committed by three employees assigned to his court.

It is the sense of the Court to consolidate the imposable

sanctions on Judge Larida into a single penalty of
suspension from office without pay for a period of two
months, to be effective immediately upon notice.

10.
Letter-complaint of Jayson Marticio

Pursuant to the recommendation of the Investigating

Justice, we dismiss the letter complaint of Marticio for
lack of substantiation by him.

WHEREFORE, the Court:

1. IMPOSES ON Judge Edwin G. Larida, Jr. the penalty

of SUSPENSION FROM OFFICE WITHOUT PAY
FOR A PERIOD OF TWO MONTHS, to be effective
immediately upon notice, with a warning that sterner
sanctions will be meted out to him upon his commission
of similar acts or omissions;

2. DISMISSES the following charges against Judge

Larida, Jr. for lack of evidence to support them, namely:
(a) Extorting money from detained accused Raymund
Wang; (b) Defying the directive of the Supreme Court in
Administrative Order No. 132-2008; (c) Improperly
granting bail to the accused in Criminal Case No. TG-
4382-03; (d) Receiving a bribe in exchange for granting
Jayson Espiritu's motion to quash the information in
Criminal Case No. TG-5307-06; (e) Granting under
questionable circumstances the petition for the issuance
of owner's duplicate copies of various certificates of title
in LRC Case No. TG-06-1183; and (f) Involvement in
the fire that razed the records room of Branch 18 of the
Regional Trial Court in Tagaytay City; and

3. DISMISSES the letter-complaint of Jayson Marticio

dated October 20, 2008 due to his lack of interest to
 A.M. No. 2008-23-SC September 30, 2014
ALLEGED LOSS OF VARIOUS BOXES OF COPY
PAPER DURING THEIR TRANSFER FROM THE
PROPERTY DIVISION, OFFICE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES (OAS), TO THE
VARIOUS ROOMS OF THE PHILIPPINE
JUDICIAL ACADEMY.
x-----------------------x
A.M. No. 2014-025-Ret.
RELEASE OF COMPULSORY RETIREMENT
BENEFITS UNDER R.A. No. 8291 OF MR. ISIDRO
P. AUSTRIA, FORMER SUPPLY OFFICER II,
PHILIPPINE JUDICIAL ACADEMY, SUPREME
COURT.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Before us is the administrative matter inquiring into the
loss of 140 reams of long copy paper,and 40 reams of
short copy paper, valued at ₱27,000.00, delivered to the
Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA). The loss was
criminal theft by all means.
Also for our consideration now is the application for the
release of his retirement benefits due to his intervening
compulsory retirement from the service on his 65th
birthday on August 17, 2012 of one of the employees
under investigation.
Antecedents
On October 23, 2008, Boc‘s Trading Co., Inc. delivered
1,300 reams of short copy paper and 1,100 reams of long
copy paper to the Supreme Court intended for the
Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA). As instructed by
Administrative Officer Ma. Christina M. Recio, the
delivery was initially accepted by Ryan Orcullo, the
Property Custodian of the PHILJA, because Supply
Officer II Isidro Austria and Store Keeper IV Lenin
Mario Ordoñez, both of the Property and Supply
Section, PHILJA Administrative Office, were then not
around. The first batch of copy paper, consisting of 300
reams long copy paper and 800 reams of short copy
paper, were unloaded under the supervision of Orcullo
and broughtdirectly to the stock rooms and available
spaces at the premises of the PHILJA. When Orcullo left
for his lunch break, Ordoñez took over. The rest of the
delivery were unloaded from the delivery truck at the
Centennial Building of the Court upon the instruction of
Ordoñez.
With the help of Judicial Staff Employee II Elizalde S.
Carmona, Ordoñez then initiated the transfer of the copy
paper to the stockroom and the Reproduction Room
(Repro Room) of the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) in the Supreme Court Multipurpose Building
located in the SC New Building. In the afternoon of
October 23, 2008, Orcullo informed Administrative
Officer Recio that 400 reams of short copy paper and 40
reams of long copy paper were missing.
In his letter dated October 27,2008, Atty. Rodel O.
Hernandez formally reported the missing boxes of copy
paper belonging to the PHILJA to PHILJA Vice
Chancellor Justice Justo P. Torres, Jr., disclosing that the
preliminary investigation conducted by Administrative
Officer Recio and HR Officer III Ma. Lourdes Pelaus
revealed that: (a) Austria had admitted having used the
SC‘s Lite Ace van with Plate No. SEF 868 to unload 50
reams of short bond paper contained in five boxes in
Intramuros to pay his outstanding personal debt of
₱5,000.00; but had denied any involvement in the loss of
the other boxes of copy paper; (b) Ordoñez had claimed
that he supervised and made the transfer of 300 reams in
30 boxes of long bond paper to the OCA stock room, but
the verification had shown only 270 reams in 27 boxes;
he had admitted riding the PHILJA van with Plate No.
SFV 785 to deliver the reams of copy paper to the Repro
Room without the proper trip ticket, leaving the boxes
ofcopy paper there without padlocking the stockrooms;
(c) driver Eusebio M. Glor of the Administrative
Division had admitted driving the Lite Ace van with
Plate No. SEF 868 to Intramuros with Austria on board,
and had acknowledged facilitating the unlawful transfer
of 50 reams of copy paper in 50 boxes; but had denied
knowledge of the remaining missing boxes of copy
paper; and (d) Carmona had driven the PHILJA van with
Plate No. SFV 785 upon the request of Ordoñez without
the corresponding trip ticket, and had assisted Ordoñez
only in the transfer of the boxes from the OCA
stockroom to the Repro Room.1
The Office of Administrative Services (OAS) directed
Austria, Ordoñez, Glor and Carmona to submit their
respective comments, and to show cause why they
should not be held administratively liable for grave
misconduct, and/or conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. They were further summoned to
appear before the OAS for investigation.
In his comment,2 Ordoñez reiterated his denial of any
knowledge of the loss of the 30 boxes of long copy paper
from the OCA stockroom, but admitted that he had
initiated the transfer upon the instructions of
Administrative Officer Recio. He claimed that he had
merely endorsed the copy paper to Orcullo as the
PHILJA Property Custodian tasked with overseeing the
supplies in the stockroom; that it was already the
practice in the PHILJA to bring to or take supplies from
the Repro Room with the help of any available PHILJA
drivers even without any corresponding trip tickets
although the drivers might have other driving
assignments; and that even the guards were aware of the
practice.
On his part, Austria conceded that he had used the 50
reams of papers to pay for the copy paper he had
borrowed from one "Mr. Roy" of the Jimmy Roy
Trading, a supplier of toners, inks, and sometimes copy
paper. He denied that the copy paper was payment for
his personal loan, maintaining that he had only borrowed
the copy paper in order to avoid delays for an upcoming
PHILJA training. Recalled by the OAS, however,
Austria retracted, and pointed to Glor as having taken
the copy paper. According to him, Glor even planned
their purported escape.
Glor declared that Austria had instructed him to load five
boxes of short copy paper in the van, and directed him to
proceed to a place in Intramuros, where someone else
unloaded the copy paper. Recalled by the OAS, Glor
likewise recanted, averring instead that the paper had
been unloaded by Austria on Orosa St. near the Philam
Insurance Company; and that he had been coached by
Austria on what their version would be.3
After conducting the investigation,the OAS concluded
that Ordoñez had failed to exercise the required
diligence in the performance of his task in overseeing the
delivery of the copy paper by not seeing to the safe
storage of the copy paper, and by not properly endorsing
the copy paper to his office or to the security guard
assigned in the areawhere he had left the reams of copy
paper. The OAS pointed out that the loss of the copy
paper from the OCA stockroom had been Ordoñez‘s
fault, because he was the person in charge of the
stockroom; that Ordoñez‘s negligence had facilitated the
theft of the 50 reams by Austria and Glor; and that the
theft had resulted in the loss of approximately
₱27,000.00 by the Court.4
The OAS found that Austria and Glor had committed
perjury by giving false statements, as borne outby the
incongruence of their initial narration of facts and their
subsequent statements blaming each other as the
perpetrator of the theft of the copy paper; that it was
clear that their act of taking the copy paper without
authorityconstituted theft; that they were liable for
serious dishonesty considering that their acts were
attended by certain circumstances that rendered their
offense serious, namely: (a) damage and prejudice to the
Government; (b) moral depravity; and (c) employment
of fraud or falsification ofofficial documents in
committing the dishonest acts.5
As to Carmona, the OAS observed that he was still
responsible for securing the trip ticket as a driver even if
he had been requested to help Ordoñez,6
The OAS ultimately recommended as follows:
A. x x x
I. For having been found guilty of Gross Dishonesty,
Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service, Mesrs. Isidro T. Austria and
Eusebio M. Glor, be meted with the penalty of
DISMISSAL from the service with forfeiture of benefits
except accrued leave credits;
II. For having been found guilty ofGross Neglect of
Duty, Mr. Lenin Mario M. Ordoñez, be meted the
penalty of DISMISSAL from the service with forfeiture
of benefits except accrued leave credits;
III. Mesrs. Austria, Glor and Ordoñez, be directed to
restitute to the Court the copy papers stolen; and
IV. For driving without a trip ticket to the PHILJA
Reproduction Room, Mr. Elizalde S. Carmona, be
WARNED that a repetition of similar acts in the future
shall be dealt with more severely.
B. The Security Division be reminded to strictly
implement the Resolution of the Court dated July 11,
1989, Re: Security Guidelines for the Supreme Court;
and directed toenforce the use of trip tickets with
corresponding Gate Pass, Requisition and Issue Slip
(RIS), or transfer slip, whichever is appropriate for the
property/ies or supplies to be brought outside the Court‘s
premises.
C. This Office submits for the Court‘s information, the
Memorandum with supporting documents dated
February 20, 2009 of Justice Justo P. Torres, Jr., Vice
Chancellor, PHILJA, providing (a) their stock position
as of December 2008; (b) documents showing
distribution of supplies and materials to the various
PHILJA offices/divisions; (c) information that the
PHILJA has implemented stricter rules in order to
resolve any form or (sic) waste or pilferage at PHILJA.
For the Court‘s consideration.7
Meanwhile, on May 4, 2009, Ordoñez resigned from the
PHILJA, citing the approval of his family‘s visa
application for immigrant status in Canada as the reason
for his resignation.8 On June 23, 2009, the Court En
Banc approved his resignation, subject tothe usual
clearance requirements and without prejudice to the
outcome of this administrative case.9 Subsequently, the
parties manifested that they were submitting the case for
resolution upon the pleadings filed.10
On August 20, 2014, the Third Division directed the
consolidation of A.M. No. 2014-025-Ret. with A.M. No.
2008-23-SC.11 The Banc accepted the consolidation on
September 9, 2014.
Ruling
After reviewing the records, we are satisfied with and
adopt the findings of the OAS.
There is grave misconduct when the elements of
corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant
disregard of established rule are present.12 Dishonesty is
defined as a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty,
probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straight forwardness.13 Both gross misconduct and
dishonesty are grave offenses that are punishable by
dismissal even for the first offense.14 Conduct
prejudicial to the best interestof the service is also
classified as a grave offense under Section 22(t) of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive
Order No. 292 and other pertinent Civil Service laws,
with the penalty for the first offense being suspension for
six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year, and for
the second offense being dismissal.15 The Civil Service
laws and rules contain no description of what specific
acts constitute the grave offense of conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service. However, jurisprudence
has been instructive, with the Court having considered
the following acts or omissions as constitutive of
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service,
namely: (a) misappropriation of public funds; (b)
abandonment of office; (c) failure to report back to work
without prior notice; (d) failure to keep public records
and property safe; (e) making false entries in public
documents; and (f) falsification of court orders.16
In Court Administrator v. Sevillo,17 the act of stealing
mail matter by the respondent, a process server in the
Municipal Circuit Court of Jordan Buenavista-Nueva
Valencia, Guimaras, was held to constitute "grave
dishonesty and grave misconduct or conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service," with the Court
opining:
It can never be said often enough that the conduct of
judges and court personnel must not only be
characterized by propriety and decorum at all times but
must also be above suspicion. In this regard, respondent
Sevillo has been grossly deficient. By stealing mail
matters he has blatantly degraded the judiciary and
diminished the respect and regard of the people for the
court and its personnel. Every employee of the judiciary
should be an example of integrity, uprightness and
honesty. Lamentably, respondent has become no better
than a common thief; consequently, he does not deserve
to stay a minute longer in the judicial service.
In Re: Pilferage of Supplies in the Stockroom of the
Property Division, OCA Committed by Teodoro L.
Saquin, Clerk II,18 the respondent admitted stealing
office supplies from the OCA, and selling the supplies to
sidewalk vendors in front of the Isetann Department
Store along Recto Avenue corner Quezon Boulevard,
Manila. The Court meted the penalty of dismissal from
the service, with forfeiture of all leave credits and
retirement benefits, and with prejudice to re-entry to any
Government entity or any Government-owned or
Government-controlled corporation; and further directed
the referral of the records of the case to the Department
of Justice for investigation with a view to the filing, if
warranted, of the appropriate criminal proceedings.
For making false statements, committing perjury and
stealing the copy paper, Austria and Glor are guilty of
grave misconduct,19 gross dishonesty, and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Their
dismissal from the service is the proper penalty, with
forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave
credits, and perpetual disqualification from
reemployment in the Government. In addition, the
records of the case should be referred to the Department
of Justice for investigation with a view to the filing, if
warranted, of the appropriate criminal proceedings.
On August 17, 2012 and during the pendency of A.M.
No. 2008-23-SC, Austria turned 65 years old and was
deemed compulsorily retired from the service. He
applied for retirement benefits under Republic Act No.
8291 (The Government Service Insurance Act of 1997),
and his application was docketed as A.M. No. 2014-025-
Ret. The OAS recommended on July 30, 2104 that the
benefits of Austria under Republic Act No. 8291 could
be paid to him by the Government Service Insurance
System "subject to the usual clearance requirements." As
stated, the Third Division of the Court directed the
consolidation of A.M. No. 2014-025-Ret. with A.M. No.
2008-23-SC, and the Banc accepted the consolidation on
September 9, 2014.
The fact that Austria meanwhile reached the compulsory
retirement age did not render A.M. No. 2008-23-SC
moot, let alone release him from whatever liability he
had incurred while in the active service. The jurisdiction
acquired by the Court continues despite his compulsory
retirement. Indeed, the Court retains its jurisdiction to
declare a respondent either innocent or guilty of the
charge even in the extreme case of the respondent‘s
supervening death. If innocent, the respondent receives
the vindication of his name and integrity by declaring his
service in the Government to be well and faithful; if
guilty in anyway, he deserves the sanction just and
appropriatefor his administrative sin.20
Where a respondent is found guilty ofa grave offense but
the penalty of dismissal is no longer possible because of
his compulsory retirement, the Court has nevertheless
imposed the just and appropriate disciplinary measures
and sanctions by decreeing the forfeiture of all benefits
to which he may be entitled, except accrued leave
credits, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or
instrumentality of the Government, including
Government-owned and Government-controlled
corporations,21 and by imposing a fine to be deducted
from the retirement benefits. In Orfila v. Arellano,
respondent Human Rights Resource Management
Officer II, being guilty of misconduct, was meted a fine
equivalent toher salary for six (6) months to be deducted
from whateverleave and retirement benefits or privileges
she was entitled to.22
Austria is now being held guilty of the grave offenses of
gross dishonesty and grave misconduct, (either of which
is punishable by dismissal for the first offense), as well
as of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service, but since the penalty of dismissal could no
longer be imposed on him, the Court forfeits all benefits
to which hecould be entitled, except accrued leave
credits, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch
or instrumentality of the Government, including
Government-owned and Government-controlled
corporations, and fines him in the amount equivalent to
his salary for his last six (6) months in the service to be
deducted from whatever accrued leave benefits remained
for him.Hence, his request in A.M. No. 2014-025-Ret.
for the release of his compulsory retirement benefits
under R.A. No. 8291 is denied.
Ordoñez is guilty of gross neglect of duty. Even if he did
not have a direct hand in the theft of the copy paper,his
negligence facilitated the theft. As correctly found by the
OAS, he failed to safely store and to endorse the copy
paper to the assigned security personnel; and that he did
not also conduct an actual count and make a record of all
the reams of copy paper delivered to his safekeeping.
Had hebeen diligent in performing his tasks and
responsibilities as a Storekeeper IV,23 Austria and Glor
would not have managed to take out the reams of copy
paper out ofthe stockroom, of which he was then in
charge. Indeed, he soadmitted this during the
investigation.24
Neglect of duty is the failure to giveone‘s attention to a
task expected of him. Gross neglect is such neglect that,
from the gravity of the case or the frequency of
instances, becomes so serious in its character as to
endanger or threaten the public welfare. The term does
not necessarily include willful neglect or intentional
official wrongdoing.25 Those responsible for such act or
omission cannot escape the disciplinary power of this
Court.26 The imposable penalty for gross neglect of duty
is dismissal from the service.
Ordoñez resigned effective May 4, 2009, purportedly to
migrate to Canada.27 His resignation would not extricate
him from the consequences of his gross neglect of duty,
because the Court has not allowed resignation to be an
escape or an easy way out to evade administrative
liability or administrative sanction.28 Ordoñez remains
administratively liable, but his resignation prevents his
dismissal from the service. A fine can be imposed,
instead, and its amount is subject to the sound discretion
of the Court. Section 56 (e) of Rule IV of the
RevisedUniform Rules provides that fine as a penalty
shall be in an amount not exceeding the salary for six
months had the respondent not resigned, the rate for
which is that obtaining at the time of his resignation.29
The fine shall be deducted from any accrued leave
credits, with the respondent being personally liable for
any deficiency that should be directly payable to this
Court. He is further declared disqualified from any
future government service.
The recommended sanction for Cardona is warning.
Such sanction is sufficient considering that Ordoñez
merely solicited the help of Cardona in transferring the
reams of copy paper from the OCA stockroom to the
Repro Room in the SC New Building. Although
Carmona admittedly used a trip ticket not authorized for
the transfer, we cannot appreciate that fact against him
because the rule on securing trip tickets was notyet
strictly implemented at that time. At any rate, it nowhere
appeared that Carmona directly participated in the
theft.1âwphi1
CORPORATIONS, and is ORDERED TO PAY A FINE
equivalent to his salary for six months computed at the
salary rate of his former position at the time of his
resignation, to be deducted from whatever accrued leave
benefits remained for him;
2. LENIN MARIO M. ORDOÑEZ guilty of gross
neglect of duty, and, accordingly, he is ORDERED TO
PAY A FINE equivalent to his salary for six months
computed at the salary rate of his former position at the
time of his resignation; and he is declared
DISQUALIFIED FROM RE-EMPLOYMENT IN ANY
BRANCH OR INSTRUMENTALITY OF THE
GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING GOVERNMENT-
OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS.
The Court DENIES the application of ISIDRO T.
AUSTRIA in A.M. No. 2014-025-Ret. for the release of
his compulsory retirement benefits under Republic Act
No. 8291.

The Court ORDERS EUSEBIO M. GLOR, ISIDRO T.

We emphasize that all court employees, being public
servants in the Judiciary, must always act with a high
degree of professionalism and responsibility. Their
conduct must not only be characterized by propriety and
decorum, but must also be inaccordance with the law
and court regulations. To maintain the people‘s respect
and faith in the Judiciary, they should be upright, fair
and honest. Theyshould avoid any act or conduct that
tends to diminish public trust and confidence in the
courts.30
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDSand DECLARES:
AUSTRIA and LENIN MARIO M. ORDONEZ to
restitute to the Court the amount of ₱27,000.00 as cost of
the copy paper stolen. ELIZALDE S. CARMONA is
WARNED that a repetition of a similar act in the future
shall be dealt with more severely.
The Office of the Court Administrator is instructed to
refer the records of this administrative case to the
Department of Justice for investigation and filing, if
warranted, of the appropriate criminal proceedings
against ISIDRO T. AUSTRIA, EUSEBIO M. GLOR and
LENIN MARIO M. ORDONEZ.

1. EUSEBIO M. GLORandISIDRO T. AUSTRIAguilty

SO ORDERED.
of gross dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and,
accordingly;

(a) EUSEBIO M. GLORis DISMISSED FROM THE

SERVICE WITH FORFEITURE OF ALL BENEFITS
EXCEPT ACCRUED LEAVE CREDITS; and

(b) ISIDRO T. AUSTRIA FORFEITS all his retirement

benefits, except accrued leave credits, WITH
PREJUDICE TO REEMPLOYMENT IN ANY
BRANCH OR INSTRUMENTALITY OF THE
GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING GOVERNMENT-
OWNED AND GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED
 CITY GOVERNMENT OF BUTUAN AND CITY
MAYOR LEONIDES THERESA B. PLAZA v.
CONSOLIDATED BROADCASTING SYSTEM
GR No. 157315. Dec 1 2010
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Petitioners City Government of Butuan and City Mayor
Leonides Theresa B. Plaza (petitioners) appeal the
adverse decision dated October 28, 2002 (dismissing
their petition for certiorari and prohibition to challenge
the grant by the trial judge of the application for a writ of
preliminary injunction after reconsidering his earlier
self-inhibition),[1] and the resolution dated January 29,
2003 (denying their motion for reconsideration), both
promulgated by the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R.
SP No. 69729 entitled City Government of Butuan and
City Mayor Leonides Theresa B. Plaza, the latter in her
personal capacity and as representative of her co-
defendant v. Consolidated Broadcasting System (CBS),
Inc., doing business under the name and style DXBR
Bombo Radyo Butuan, represented by its Manager,
Norberto P. Pagaspas, and the Hon. Rosarito F.
Dabalos, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 2, of Agusan
del Norte and Butuan City.
Antecedents[2]
In February, 2002, City Mayor Plaza (Mayor Plaza)
wrote to the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Butuan City to
solicit its support for her decision to deny the application
for mayors permit of respondent Bombo
Radyo/Consolidated Broadcasting System (CBS), and to
eventually close down CBSs radio station. She justified
her decision by claiming that CBSs operating its
broadcasting business within the Arujiville Subdivision,
a residential area, had violated the Citys zoning
ordinance. Her letter pertinently reads:
In 1994, Bombo
Radyo/Consolidated Broadcasting
System manifested their intention to
operate on their current site at Arujiville
Subdivision which is a residential area.
They were informed that they cannot
situate their business in the area as it
violates our zoning ordinance. However,
they have pleaded and was agreeable to
operate in the area by virtue of a
Temporary Use Permit (TUP) xxx.
The TUP allowed them to operate
in the area but only for a very limited
period. As a matter of fact, the TUP was
good only for one year, which can be
renewed every year for a maximum of
five (5) years or until 1999. Thus, right
from the beginning they have been
informed and forewarned that they
cannot operate in the area forever and
that they have to relocate to a proper
area.
Bombo Radyo renewed its TUP
only in 1995 and 1996. They have failed
to renew their TUP up to today.
This office has received numerous
complaints against Bombo Radyo for
violation of private rights, inciting
people to go rise against the
government, malicious imputations,
insinuations against people not of their
liking, false or fabricated news, etc. The
list is so long to enumerate. Copies of
the petitions, manifestos from various
groups is hereto attached for your
perusal.
Thus, for violation of the city
zoning ordinance, the expiration of their
TUP, which was never renewed since
1997, failure to secure ECC and the
numerous complaints against the station
of the residents within the immediate
vicinity of their premises and the threat
they are causing to the peace and order
of the City, I have decided to deny their
application for a mayor's permit and
thereafter to close the radio station.
 In view of the foregoing premises, xxx
I am forwarding this matter to the
Sangguniang Panlungsod to solicit your a) That the undersigned
resolution of support on the matter. was the object of its
(plaintiff's) attacks and
criticism which are
judgmental and not
This is not a decision calculated to inquisitorial in the comments
deprived (sic) Radio Bombo of its over the air;
freedom of speech or expression. This is
just a simply matter of whether or not b) That the undersigned
Radyo Bombo has complied with was shouted at disrespectfully
existing laws and ordinances. by one of plaintiff's
reporters/news gatherers in
the vicinity of the Hall of
Justice;
Thereupon, the Sangguninang Panlungsod
adopted Resolution-057-2002 to strongly support the
decision of the City Mayor to deny the application of c)
Consolidated Broadcasting System Development That plaintiff's commentaries
Corporation (Bombo Radyo-Butuan) for a Mayors are making pronouncements
on legal matters, substantive
Permit and thereafter close the radio station. [3]
and procedural, based on its
perception and not on laws;

On February 18, 2002, the Citys licensing officer served

on CBSs station manager a final/last notice of violation d) That in its
commentaries in attacking
and demand to cease and desist illegal operation, with a
public officials as well as
warning that he would recommend the closure of its private individuals, words
business in case of non-compliance. which are disrespectful and
indecent are used.

On February 19, 2002, CBS and its manager, Norberto

Pagaspas, filed a complaint
prohibition, mandamus, and damages against
petitioners in the Regional Trial Court in Butuan City
(RTC),[4] with prayer for a temporary restraining order
(TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the
petitioners from closing its station, or from disturbing
and preventing its business operations. The case,
docketed as Civil Case No. 5193, was raffled to Branch
2, presided by Judge Rosarito P. Dabalos.
On February 20, 2002, Judge Dabalos voluntarily
inhibited and directed the return of Civil Case No. 5193
to the Office of the Clerk of Court for re-raffle.[5] He
cited the circumstances that might affect his objectivity
and impartiality in resolving the controversy as his
justification, to wit:
and the net effect and result of its
for commentaries over the air causes
the confusion on the minds of the public,
including the young that the court and
government offices and public officials
will lose their credibility and respect
which are due them.
The court is aware of press
freedom is enshrined in our constitution
but such freedom should not be abused
because in every right there is a
concomitant obligation.
Let therefore this case be returned
immediately to the office [of the] Clerk
of Court VI for re-raffling.
SO ORDERED.
 On the same day, Judge Victor Tomaneng,
Presiding Judge of Branch 33, issued an order also
inhibiting himself from handling Civil Case No. 5193,
and in his capacity as Vice Executive Judge (in lieu of
Executive Judge Cipriano B. Alvizo, Jr., then on sick
leave) directed the assignment of Civil Case No. 5193 to
[6]
Branch 5 without raffle, viz:
xxx Considering that the
Executive Judge Hon. Cipriano B.
Alvizo, the Presiding Judge of RTC-
Branch 4 and Acting-Designate
Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch 3, but
who is now in Cebu City for medical
treatment, it would be impractical to
include his courts in the re-raffling of
cases for the reason that the case is for
prohibition, mandamus, injunction, etc.,
that needs immediate action. The herein
Vice-Executive Judge who is the
Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch 33,
could not also act on this case on the
ground of 'delicadeza' considering that
defendant Hon. Mayor Leonides
Theresa B. Plaza is his 'kumadre' plus
the fact that before becoming judge he
was the legal counsel of the LDP party
here in Butuan City, in the election of
1992 and 1995, which is the political
party of the Plazas. RTC-Branch 1,
being the exclusive Family Court cannot
also be included in any raffle.
In view of the foregoing, and on
the ground of expediency, the Clerk of
Court is ordered to send this case to
RTC-Branch 5, without raffle anymore,
it being the only practical available
court in this jurisdiction as of this
moment.
Civil Case No. 5193 was forwarded to Branch 5,
presided by Judge Augustus L. Calo, who recused
because his wife had been recently appointed
by Mayor Plaza to the Citys Legal Office. Judge Calo
ordered the immediate return of the case to the Clerk of
Court for forwarding to Vice Executive Judge
Tomaneng.
Without any other judge to handle the case, Judge
Tomaneng formally returned Civil Case No. 5193 to
Judge Dabalos, stating in his letter that Judge Dabalos
reason for inhibition did not amount to a plausible
ground to inhibit. Judge Tomaneng instructed Judge
Dabalos to hear the case unless the Supreme Court
approved the inhibition.[7]
On February 21, 2002, Judge Tomaneng issued a
TRO,[8] to wit:
The Court believes that there is a
need to maintain the status quo until all
the other issues in the complaint shall
have been duly heard and determined
without necessarily implying that
plaintiff is entitled to the prayers for
injunction. The Court hereby resolves in
the meantime to grant a temporary
restraining order.
WHEREFORE, defendants City
Gov't of Butuan and City Mayor
Leonides Theresa B. Plaza, their
attorneys, agents, employees, police
authorities and/or any person acting
upon the Mayors order and instruction
under her authority are hereby enjoined
to cease, desist and to refrain from
closing or padlocking RADYO
BOMBO or from preventing, disturbing,
or molesting its business operations,
including but not limited to the use and
operation of its building, structures and
broadcasting facilities, and the ingress
or egress of its employees therein.
As this Court cannot issue a
seventy-two (72) hour Temporary
Restraining Order because of the
incoming delay on Monday, February
25, 2002, a temporary restraining order
is hereby issued effective for twenty
(20) days from issuance (Sec. 5, Rule
58, 1997 Revised Rules on Civil
Procedure).
Meanwhile, let this case be set for
summary hearing on March 11,
2002 at 8:30in the morning to resolve
 the pending application for injunction
and for the defendants to show cause
why the same shall not be granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
On February 25, 2002, the petitioners filed
an urgent motion to lift or dissolve temporary
restraining order in Branch 2 (sala of Judge Dabalos).
On February 26, 2002, Judge Dabalos referred
his order of inhibition in Civil Case No. 5193 to the
Court Administrator for consideration, with a request for
the designation of another Judge not stationed
in Butuan City and Agusan del Norte to handle the
case.[9]
Consequently, CBS requested the Court to designate
another judge to hear its application for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction, the hearing of which
Judge Tomaneng had set on March 11, 2002.[10]
In the meanwhile, or on March 8, 2002, the petitioners
filed their answer to the complaint, alleging affirmative
and special defenses and praying for the dismissal of the
complaint, the lifting of the TRO, the denial of the
prayer for preliminary injunction, and the granting of
their counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages,
attorneys fees, and litigation expenses.
During the hearing on March 11, 2002 of CBSs
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, at which the petitioners and their counsel did
not appear, CBSs counsel manifested that he was
desisting from his earlier request with the Court for the
designation of another judge to hear Civil Case No.
5193. Judge Dabalos noted the manifestation but reset
the hearing of the application for preliminary injunction
on March 12, 2002, to give the petitioners an
opportunity to show cause why the writ prayed for
should not issue. For the purpose of the resetting, Judge
Dabalos caused a notice of hearing to be served on the
petitioners.[11]
Upon receipt of the notice of hearing, the petitioners
moved to quash the notice and prayed that the TRO be
lifted, insisting that Judge Dabalos had already lost his
authority to act on Civil Case No. 5193 by virtue of his
inhibition.[12]
Nonetheless, Civil Case No. 5193 was called on March
12, 2002. The parties and their respective counsel
appeared. At the close of the proceedings on that date,
Judge Dabalos granted CBSs prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction,[13] to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing as the defendants did not
introduce any evidence in spite of the
order of the Court to show cause why no
writ of preliminary injunction be issued
and the repeated directive of the court in
open court for the defendants to present
evidence which the defendants firmly
refused to do so on flimsy grounds, the
Court resolves to issue a writ of
preliminary injunction as the complaint
under oath alleges that plaintiff is a
grantee of a franchise from the Congress
of the Philippines and the act threatened
to be committed by the defendants
curtail the constitutional right of
freedom of speech of the plaintiff which
the Court finds that it should be looked
into, the defendants' refusal to
controvert such allegations by evidence
deprived the Court [of] the chance to be
guided by such evidence to act
accordingly that it left the court no
alternative but to grant the writ prayed
for, the City Government of Butuan and
City Mayor Leonides Theresa B. Plaza,
their attorneys, agents, employees,
police authorities and/or any person
acting upon the Mayor's order or
instructions or under her authority are
hereby enjoined to cease and desist and
to refrain from closing or padlocking
RADYO BOMBO or from preventing,
disturbing or molesting its business
operations, including but not limited to
the use and operation of its building,
structures, broadcasting facilities and the
ingress or egress of its employees
therein upon plaintiff's putting up a bond
in the amount of P200,000.00 duly
 approved by this court which injunction
bond shall be executed in favor of the
defendants to answer for whatever
damages which the defendants may
sustain in connection with or arising
from the issuance of this writ if, after all
the court will finally adjudge that
plaintiff is not entitled thereto.
This order is without prejudice to
the findings of the court after a formal
hearing or a full blown trial.
Furnish copies of this order to the
Hon. Supreme Court and the Hon. Court
Administrator.
SO ORDERED.[14]
Thus, the petitioners commenced in the CA a
special civil action for certiorariand prohibition (with
prayer for TRO or writ of preliminary injunction).
The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and
prohibition upon a finding that Judge Dabalos had
committed no grave abuse of discretion in acting upon
CBSs application for preliminary injunction, given the
peculiar circumstances surrounding the raffling and
assignment of Civil Case No. 5193, and the urgent need
to resolve the application for preliminary injunction due
to the expiration of Judge Tomanengs TRO by March
13, 2002. The CA held that the writ of preliminary
injunction had properly issued, because the petitioners
had threatened to defeat CBSs existing franchise to
operate its radio station in Butuan City by not issuing
the permit for its broadcast business.

Following CBSs posting of P200,000.00 as the

required injunction bond, Branch 2 issued the writ of Issues
preliminary injunction on March 15,
2002,[15]commanding and directing the provincial sheriff
to:

Hence, this appeal via petition for review on certiorari,

xxx forthwith enjoin the City with the petitioners contending that:[16]
Government of Butuan and the Hon.
City Mayor Leonides Theresa B. Plaza,
their attorneys, agents, employees, I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
police authorities and/or any person IN NOT FINDING THAT
acting upon the mayor's order or RESPONDENT JUDGE
instruction or under her authority to ROSARITO F. DABALOS ACTED
cease and desist and to refrain from WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
closing or padlocking RADIO BOMBO DISCRETION WHEN, ON
or from preventing disturbing or MARCH 12, 2002, WITHOUT
molesting its business operations, SUFFICIENT NOTICE TO
including the use and operation of its PETITIONERS, HE AGAIN TOOK
building, structures, broadcasting COGNIZANCE OF AND RE-
facilities and the ingress and egress of ASSUMED JURISDICTION
its employees therein. Copies of the writ OVER CIVIL CASE NO. 5193
of preliminary injunction, bond and AFTER HE HAD ALREADY
other pertinent documents thereto be EFFECTIVELY INHIBITED
served on the defendants and thereafter HIMSELF FROM HEARING THE
make a return of your service of this SAME IN TWO EARLIER
writ within the period required by law ORDERS HE HAD ISSUED
and the Rules of Court. DATED FEBRUARY 20
AND FEBRUARY 26,
2002 RESPECTIVELY.
 II. ASSUMING THAT RESPONDENT Victor A. Tomaneng, noting that there is
JUDGE ROSARITO DABALOS no other judge to handle the case,
COULD VALIDLY RE-ASSUME directed the return thereof to the public
JURISDICTION OVER CIVIL respondent in view of the extreme
CASE NO. 5193 AFTER HE HAD urgency of the preliminary relief therein
EARLIER ISSUED TWO ORDERS prayed for. Under the circumstances
VOLUNTARILY INHIBITING then obtaining, the respondent judge
HIMSELF FROM HEARING SAID could do no less but to act thereon. So it
CASE, THE COURT OF is that he proceeded with the scheduled
APPEALS ERRED IN NOT hearing on the application for
FINDING THAT RESPONDENT preliminary injunction on March 11,
COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE 2002 and thereafter reset it for
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN continuation the following day to afford
ISSUING A WRIT OF the petitioners an opportunity to oppose
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION the application and show cause why the
WITHOUT REQUIRING writ prayed for should not issue. The
PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO urgency of the action demanded of the
PRESENT EVIDENCE TO SHOW respondent judge is further accentuated
WHETHER SAID PRIVATE by the fact that the TRO issued by Judge
RESPONDENT HAS A CLEAR Tomaneng was then about to expire on
RIGHT THERETO. March 13, 2002, not to mention the
circumstance that Executive Judge
Cipriano B. Alvizo, Jr., who happened
to be around, advised the respondent
judge to resolve the issues to the best of
Ruling his discretion. xxx

The petitioners disagree, and insist that Judge

Dabalos lost the authority to act upon CBSs application
The appeal lacks merit. We find that the CA did not
for preliminary injunction by virtue of his prior self-
commit any error in upholding the questioned orders of
inhibition from hearing Civil Case No. 5193.
the RTC.
We cannot sustain the petitioners insistence.

I Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, which

Judge Dabalos lawfully re-assumed contains the rule on inhibition and disqualification of
judges, states:
jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 5193

In its decision, the CA ruled that Judge Dabalos
did not gravely abuse his discretion in re-assuming
jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 5193 in the light of the
obtaining circumstances cogently set forth in its assailed
decision, to wit:[17]
Seemingly, petitioners lost sight of the
reality that after the respondent judge
issued his order of inhibition and
directed the return of the case to the
Office of the Clerk of Court for re-raffle
to another judge, Vice-Executive Judge
Section 1. Disqualification of
judges. No judge or judicial officer shall
sit in any case in which he, or his wife
or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir,
legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in
which he is related to either party within
the sixth degree of consanguinity or
affinity, or to counsel within the fourth
degree, computed according to the rules
of civil law, or in which he has been
executor, administrator, guardian,
trustee or counsel, or in which he has
presided in any inferior court when his
ruling or decision is the subject of
review, without the written consent of
 all parties-in-interest, signed by them
and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of
his sound discretion, disqualify himself
from sitting in a case, for just and valid
reasons other than those mentioned
above.
The self-inhibition of Judge Dabalos was one
taken in accordance with the second paragraph of
Section 1. Our resolution herein turns, therefore, on the
proper interpretation and application of the second
paragraph.
The second paragraph of Section 1 (unlike the
first paragraph) does not expressly enumerate the
specific grounds for inhibition. This means that the
determination of the grounds is left to the sound
discretion of the judge, who must discern with only his
or her conscience as guide on what may be just and valid
reasonsfor self-inhibition. The vesting of discretion
necessarily proceeds from the reality that there may be
many and different grounds for a judge to recuse from a
case, and such grounds cannot all be catalogued in
the Rules of Court. Thus did the Court cogently point out
in Gutang v. Court of Appeals:[18]
xxx The import of the rule on the
voluntary inhibition of judges is that the
decision on whether or not to inhibit is
left to the sound discretion and
conscience of the trial judge based on
his rational and logical assessment of
the circumstances prevailing in the case
brought before him. It makes clear to the
occupants of the Bench that outside of
pecuniary interest, relationship or
previous participation in the matter that
calls for adjudication, there might be
other causes that could conceivably
erode the trait of objectivity, thus calling
for inhibition. That is to betray a sense
of realism, for the factors that lead to
preference or predilections are many and
varied.
In his case, Judge Dabalos clearly discerned
after the return of Civil Case No. 5193 to him by the
Vice Executive Judge that his self-doubt about his ability
to dispense justice in Civil Case No. 5193 generated by
the airing of criticisms against him and other public
officials by CBSs commentators and reporters would not
ultimately affect his objectivity and judgment. Such re-
assessment of the ground for his self-inhibition, absent a
showing of any malice or other improper motive on his
part, could not be assailed as the product of an unsound
exercise of his discretion.That, it seems to us, even the
petitioners conceded, their objection being based only on
whether he could still re-assume jurisdiction of Civil
Case No. 5193.
We hold that although a trial judge who
voluntarily inhibits loses jurisdiction to hear a case, [19] he
or she may decide to reconsider the self-inhibition and
re-assume jurisdiction after a re-assessment of the
circumstances giving cause to the inhibition. The
discretion to reconsider acknowledges that the trial judge
is in the better position to determine the issue of
inhibition, and a reviewing tribunal will not disturb the
exercise of that discretion except upon a clear and strong
finding of arbitrariness or whimsicality.[20] Thus, Judge
Dabalos re-assumption of jurisdiction was legally
tenable, having come from his seizing the opportunity to
re-assess the circumstances impelling his self-inhibition
upon being faced with the urgent need to hear and
resolve CBSs application for preliminary injunction.
Such action was commendable on his part, given that the
series of self-inhibitions by the other RTC Judges had
left no competent judge in the station to hear and resolve
the application. It can even be rightly said that a refusal
by Judge Dabalos to re-assess and reconsider might have
negated his sacred and sworn duty as a judge to dispense
justice.
In this connection, the urgency for the RTC to
hear and resolve the application for preliminary
injunction factually existed. In fact, CBS had
communicated it to the Court in its letter dated March 5,
2002,[21] to wit:

If not for the temporary restraining order
issued on February 21, 2002 by the
Honorable Judge VICTOR A.
TOMANENG, Vice-Executive Judge
and Presiding Judge of Branch 33 of
said court xxx violent confrontations
would have continued between
supporters of plaintiff RADIO BOMBO
BUTUAN, on the one hand, and the
loyalists of City Mayor LEONIDES
THERESA PLAZA (including some
city employees) led by the Mayor
herself and her husband, former Mayor
DEMOCRITO PLAZA II, on the other
hand.
xxx
As set forth in the temporary restraining
order, the hearing on the application for
a writ of preliminary injunction is set
on Monday, March 11, 2002 because the
twenty-day lifetime of the temporary
restraining order would expire on March
13, 2002. A repeat of the violent
scenario of February 21 may occur
unless the application is heard as
scheduled by a Regional Trial Court
Judge who had not inhibited himself.
xxx
Verily, Judge Dabalos decision to hear the application
for preliminary injunction pending the Courts resolution
of the query on whether or not another Judge sitting
outside the City of Butuan should take cognizance
of Civil Case No. 5193 did not constitute or equate to
arbitrariness or whimsicality. He had reasonable grounds
to do so in the context of the tight circumstances that
had developed in Civil Case No. 5193 following his self-
inhibition. Surely, his decision to reconsider did not
proceed from passion or whim, but from his faithful
adherence to his solemn oath to do justice to every man.
He thereby neither violated any law or canon of judicial
conduct, nor abused his juridical authority.
II.
Petitioners to adduce evidence after granting of TRO
The petitioners submit that Judge Dabalos improperly
resolved CBSs application for preliminary injunction by
not first requiring the applicant to adduce evidence in
support of the application.
We do not agree with the petitioners.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at
any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the
judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, an
agency, or a person to refrain from a particular a
particular act or acts.[22] It may also require the
performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it is
known as a preliminary mandatory injunction. [23] Thus,
a prohibitory injunction is one that commands a party to
refrain from doing a particular act, while a mandatory
injunction commands the performance of some positive
act to correct a wrong in the past.[24]
As with all equitable remedies, injunction must
be issued only at the instance of a party who possesses
sufficient interest in or title to the right or the property
sought to be protected.[25] It is proper only when the
applicant appears to be entitled to the relief demanded in
the complaint,[26] which must aver the existence of the
right and the violation of the right,[27] or whose
averments must in the minimum constitute
a primafacie showing of a right to the final relief
sought.[28] Accordingly, the conditions for the issuance
of the injunctive writ are: (a) that the right to be
protected exists prima facie; (b) that the act sought to be
enjoined is violative of that right; and (c) that there is an
urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent
serious damage. An injunction will not issue to protect a
right not in esse, or a right which is merely contingent
and may never arise; or to restrain an act which does not
give rise to a cause of action; or to prevent the
perpetration of an act prohibited by statute. [29]Indeed, a
right, to be protected by injunction, means a right clearly
founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a
matter of law.[30]
While it is true that CBS was not required to present
evidence to prove its entitlement to the injunctive writ,
the writ was nonetheless properly granted on the basis of
the undisputed facts that CBS was a grantee of a
franchise from the Legislature, and that the acts
complained against (i.e., refusal of the Mayors permit
and resulting closure of the radio station) were imminent
and, unless enjoined, would curtail or set at naught CBSs
rights under the franchise. In this regard, worthy of
mention is that even the Vice
Executive Judge, acknowledging that CBS had stood to s WHEREFORE, we deny the petition for review
uffer grave on certiorari, and affirm the decision dated October 28,
2002 promulgated by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R.
injustice and irreparable injury should its radio station SP No. 69729.
suffer closure, had issued ex parte the TRO.
Costs of suit to be paid by the petitioners.
It was error on the part of the petitioners to insist that the
evidence of CBS should have first been required before SO ORDERED.
Judge Dabalos issued the writ of preliminary injunction.
Rule 58 of the Rules of Court clearly lays the burden on
the shoulders of the petitioners, as the parties against
whom the TRO was issued, to show cause why the
application for the writ of preliminary injunction should
not issue,[31] thus:

Section 5. Preliminary injunction

not granted without notice; exception.
No preliminary injunction shall be
granted without hearing and prior notice
to the party or person sought to be
enjoined. If it shall appear from facts
shown by affidavits or by the verified
application that great or irreparable
injury would result to the applicant
before the matter can be heard on notice,
the court to which the application for
preliminary injunction was made, may
issue ex parte a temporary restraining
order to be effective only for a period of
twenty (20) days from service on the
party or person sought to be enjoined,
except as herein provided. Within the
said twenty-day period, the court
must order said party or person to
show cause, at a specified time and
place, why the injunction should not
be granted, determine within the
same period whether or not the
preliminary injunction shall be
granted, and accordingly issue the
corresponding order.

xxx

In fine, Judge Dabalos properly directed the

petitioners to first present evidence why the application
for the writ of preliminary injunction should not be
granted. By their refusal to comply with the directive to
show cause by presenting their evidence to that effect,
the petitioners could blame no one but themselves.
 IPI No. 12-203-CA-J December 10, 2013
[formerly A.M. No. 12-8-06-CA]
RE: LETTERS OF LUCENA B. RALLOS, FOR
ALLEGED ACTS/INCIDENTS/OCCURENCES
RELATIVE TO THE RESOLUTION(S) ISSUED IN
CA-G.R. SP No. 06676 BY COUIRT OF APPEALS
EXECUTIVE JUSTICE PAMPIO ABARINTOS and
ASSOCIATE JUSTICES RAMON PAUL
HERNANDO and VICTORIA ISABEL PAREDES.
x---------------x
A.M. No. 12-9-08-CA
RE: COMPLAINT FILED BY LUCENA B.
RALLOS AGAINST JUSTICE GABRIEL T.
INGLES, PAMELA ANN MAXIMO, and
CARMELITA S. MANAHAN.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Judicial officers cannot be subjected to administrative
disciplinary actions for their performance of duty in
good faith.
Antecedents
In Civil Case No. CEB-20388 of the Regional Trial
Court in Cebu City (RTC), the Heirs of Vicente Rallos,
one of whom is complainant Lucena B. Rallos (Rallos),
and other parties collectively referred to as Vicente
Rallos, et al. sought just compensation from the city
government of Cebu City (Cebu City) for two parcels of
land pertaining to the estate that Cebu City had been
maintaining as public roads without their consent. On
January 14, 2000, the RTC (Branch 9) rendered its
decision holding Cebu City liable to pay just
compensation to the Heirs of Vicente Rallos, et al.; and
directing the creation of a board of commissioners that
would determine the amount of just compensation.1
Cebu City sought the reconsideration of the decision, but
its motion was denied.2
Upon submission by the board of commissioners of its
report on the just compensation, the RTC rendered
another decision on July 24, 2001 ordering Cebu City to
compensate the Heirs of Vicente Rallos, et al. in the
amount of P34,905,000.00 for the parcels of land plus
interest of 12% per annum computed from the date of
the decision until fully paid; P50,000.00 as attorney‘s
fees; and P50,000.00 as litigation expenses.3
The RTC granted the motion of the Heirs of Vicente
Rallos, et al. for the execution pending appeal of the July
24, 2001 decision. In implementing the execution
pending appeal, the RTC issued three separate orders, all
dated December 21, 2001. Both parties sought the
reconsideration of the orders dated December 21, 2001.4
On March 21, 2002, the RTC issued its consolidated
order resolving the motions for reconsideration of the
parties.5
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA),
Visayas Station. The Heirs of Vicente Rallos, et al.
assailed the July 24, 2001 decision and the March 21,
2002 consolidated order of the RTC. On its part, Cebu
City challenged the decisions of January 14, 2000, July
24, 2001, and March 21, 2002. On May 29, 2007, the
CA promulgated its decision dismissing the appeal of
Cebu City for its failure to file a record on appeal.6 Cebu
City moved for are consideration, but the CA denied its
motion in there solution promulgated on August 30,
2007. Thence, Cebu City filed its petition for review in
this Court (G.R. No. 179662), but the Court denied the
petition for review.7
The Heirs of Vicente Rallos, et al. thereafter moved in
the RTC for the execution of the July 24, 2001 decision
and the March 21, 2002 consolidated order. The RTC
granted the motion. Subsequently, however, upon
finding that the RTC had erred in executing the decision
and the consolidated order, the Heirs of Vicente Rallos,
et al. lodged an appeal with the CA, Visayas Station, to
compel the RTC to comply strictly with the tenor of the
decision and the consolidated order (CA-G.R.
CEBSP.No. 04418). On June 11, 2010, the CA decided
CA-G.R. CEB SP. No. 04418 by requiring the RTC to
execute the RTC‘s July 24, 2001 decision and its March
21, 2002 consolidated order strictly in accordance with
their tenor.8 After its motion for reconsideration was
denied, Cebu City appealed by petition for review (G.R.
No. 194111). However, the Court denied Cebu City‘s
appeal on December 6, 2010.9
On motion for execution by the Heirs of Vicente Rallos, 1. Copy of Sangguniang Panlungsod Resolution No. 12-
et al., the RTC directed on September 23, 2011 the 1330-2011 that is attached to the Petition, while
issuance of a writ of execution in accordance with the ostensibly a certified true copy, is in fact just a
ruling in CA-G.R. CEBSP. No. 04418.10 In reaction, photocopy.
Cebu City presented an omnibus motion to quash the
writ of execution and to lift the notice of garnishment,
but the RTC denied the omnibus motion through its
2. Atty. Joseph L. Bernaldez, the Notary Public in both
orders of October 26, 2011,11 January 26, 2012,12 and the Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping
February 27, 2012. and Affidavit of Good Faith, did not indicate therein his
notarial commission number and the province/city where
he is commissioned, in violation of Sec. 2, Rule VIII of
On March 26, 2012, Cebu City brought in the CA, the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
Visayas Station, a petition for the annulment of the
RTC‘s decisions of January 14, 2000 and July 24, 2001,
and the consolidated order dated March 21, 2002(CA- 3. Atty. Marie Velle P. Abella, the Notary Public in the
G.R. CEBSP. No. 06676), alleging that Vicente Rallos
Affidavit of Service did not reflect therein the
and his heirs had been obliged under a compromise province/city where she is commissioned as a notary
agreement called convenio, as approved on October 18, public, in violation of Sec. 2, Rule VIII of the 2004
1940 by the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Rules on Notarial Practice.
Cebu (CFI) in Civil Case No. 616 and Civil Case No.
626, to donate, cede, and transfer the parcels of landin
question to Cebu City; that Cebu City should not be
made to pay just compensation for the parcels of land in Petitioner is DIRECTED to RECTIFY the foregoing
question despite the final and executory decision in Civil defects within ten (10) days from notice. Meanwhile, the
Case No. CEB-20388 because of the ruling by the CFI in Court shall hold in abeyance any action on the Petition
Civil Case No. 616 and Civil Case No. 626 to the effect and TRO application pending compliance with the order
that the parcels of land in question had been donated to of rectification of defects.16
Cebu City; and that the concealment of the existence of
the convenio by the Heirs of Vicente Rallos, including
Rallos, during the proceedings in Civil Case No. CEB- Cebu City complied with the resolution on April 12,
20388 constituted extrinsic fraud, which was 2012.17
"unmasked" only when Cebu City discovered the
existence of the convenio in 2011.13 Accordingly, Cebu
City sought the nullification of the RTC decisions and
Through the Manifestation with Urgent Motion for the
consolidated order; and the issuance of a temporary
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order filed on
restraining order(TRO)and/or writ of preliminary
April 4, 2012, Cebu City informed the CA of its receipt
injunction "to prevent the hasty, if not unlawful release
of the Notice to Parties of Sale on Execution that set the
of government funds."14
sale on April 10, 2012 and April 17, 2012; and alleged
that the sale on execution could render the proceedings
in CA-G.R. CEB SP. No. 06676 moot and academic.18
CA-G.R. CEBSP.No. 06676 was raffled to the 18th
Division of the CA, Visayas Station, whose members
then were respondents Justice Pampio A. Abarintos, as
Acting on the aforesaid urgent motion of Cebu City, the
the Chairman, Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando, as the
CA, through Justice Hernando, issued a TRO on April
Senior Member, and Justice Victoria Isabel A. Paredes,
13, 2012, viz:
as the Junior Member.15 On March 28, 2012, the 18th
Division, through Justice Hernando, promulgated a
resolution directing Cebu City to rectify certain defects
in its petition, to wit: Proceeding now to the supplication for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) by the petitioner,
the Court perceives more than adequate grounds for its
grant. Firstly, is there urgency involved on the matter, as
Perusal of the above-captioned Petition for Annulment
an execution sale has been scheduled not just on April
of Final Decision/s and Order/s, with prayer for the
10, 2012 but also on April 17, 2012. Secondly, if such
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
sale pushes through, it may well render moot the
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction (WPI), reveals the
proceedings before this Court. Thirdly, there appears, at
following infirmities:
least preliminarily, a right on the part of petitioner that
needs protection, that is, its right not to be deprived of its
property if the fraud it alleges –that of concealment of
the convenio–is unmasked to be such. Thus, grave or
irreparable injury may therefore be suffered, in Our
estimation at this stage of the proceedings, by the
petitioner should a TRO be not forthcoming.
The Court now therefore resolves to GRANT the
petitioner‘s application for a TRO, effective for sixty
(60) days from notice by respondents. By virtue of the
TRO, the respondents or anyone acting in their behalf,
are enjoined from executing the Decision dated January
14, 2000 and July 24, 2001, the Order dated February 9,
2001, Consolidated Order dated December 21, 2001 and
Order dated February 27, 2012 of respondent court, the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 9 of Cebu City and from
causing the release of any funds of the petitioner in
satisfaction thereof.
Petitioner is DIRECTED to post the corresponding TRO
Bond, herein fixed at Php 1 Million, within ten (10) days
from notice. The TRO issued by the Court shall be
effective immediately upon receipt by respondents.
However, the failure of the petitioner to comply with the
posting of the bond within the ten-day period shall result
in the lifting of the restraining order.19
Cebu City posted the required TRO bond of
P1,000,000.00.20
On April 23, 2012, Justice Hernando inhibited from
further participation in CA-G.R. CEBSP. No. 06676.21
During the raffle of April 24, 2012, CA-G.R. CEB
SP.No. 06676 was assigned to Justice Paredes, with
Justice Gabriel T. Ingles being designated as the new
third member.22
On April 26, 2012, the CA set the hearing on Cebu
City‘s application of the writ of preliminary injunction
on May 23, 2012.23
On May 7, 2012, the Heirs of Vicente Rallos moved to
set aside the April 13, 2012 resolution; to lift the TRO;
and to dismiss the petition for annulment.24 On May 23,
2012, the CA held the hearing on Cebu City‘s
application for the writ of preliminary injunction. The
counsels for both parties attended the hearing, where the
Heirs of Vicente Rallos moved to be allowed to submit
their formal offer of exhibits in support of their
opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction. The CA granted their motion, and further
directed the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.25
On June 5, 2012, CA-G.R. CEB SP.No. 06676 was
assigned to Justice Abarintos in view of the intervening
transfer of Justice Paredes to Manila.26 However, two
days later, Justice Abarintos inhibited himself from
further participation in CA-G.R. CEB SP.No. 06676.27
By the raffle conducted on June 7, 2012, CA-G.R. CEB
SP.No. 06676 was next assigned to Justice Edgardo L.
Delos Santos, while Justice Carmelita S. Manahan was
designated as the new third member of the Division.28
On June 14, 2012, however, Justice Delos Santos also
inhibited himself from participation in the case.29 Thus,
CA-G.R. CEB SP.No. 06676 was assigned by raffle to
Justice Ingles, whowas designated as the Chairman of
the 18th Divisionfor purposes of the case. Justice Pamela
Ann Abella Maxino and Justice Manahan were assigned,
respectively, as the Senior and the Junior Members of
the Division.30
On June 26, 2012, the CA granted CebuCity‘s
application for the writ of preliminary injunction, to wit:
xxxx
A writ of preliminary injunction issues to prevent
threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of
the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied
and adjudicated. Its sole office is to preserve the status
quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully. To be
entitled to a writ of injunction, a party must establish the
following requisites: (a) the right of the complainant is
clear and unmistakable; (b) the invasion of the right
sought to be protected is material and substantial; and (c)
there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to
prevent serious damage.
We find the foregoing requisites satisfied.
First, the initial evidence satisfactorily demonstrates
petitioner‘s clear and unmistakable right as a beneficiary
or prospective donee in a Convenio executed on
September 22, 1940. Petitioner submitted as exhibit in
its application for WPI, the Decision of the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Cebu, 8thJudicial District
dated October 18, 1940. The Decision reproduced
verbatim the judicially-approved Convenio, which
provided for a stipulation pour autrui in petitioner‘s
favor, whereby Lots 485-D and 485-E, the subjects of
Civil Case No. CEB-20388, were supposed to be
donated and transferred to it by respondent‘s
predecessor, Father Vicente Rallos. The Convenio also
provided that should petitioner not accept the donation,
the road lots would still be for public use.
Respondents question the authenticity of the Decision
embodying the Convenio since the same is purportedly
unsigned. This challenge shall be fully contended with
when we evaluate the merits of the petition, but at this
juncture, suffice it to say that our inclination to regard
the Decision as authentic, for purposes of resolving the
propriety of the herein ancillary remedy, is anchored on
these reasons: (1) the 1940 decision is more than thirty
(30) years old; and (2) it was produced from a custody in
which it would be naturally found if genuine.
Respondents‘ counsel, Atty. Glenn Cañete, admitted
during the hearing that he personally went to RTC
Branch 9, and found out for himself that indeed, there is
a copy of the said Decision in the records of the court.
Moreover, respondent Maurillo Rallos, likewise, attested
in his Affidavit that he personally went to the Offcie of
the RTC Clerk of Court and upon personally examining
its records, saw for himself that the decision was actually
in the custody of the clerk.
Second, the invasion of petitioner‘s right sought to be
protected is material and substantial. It appears, from the
sampling of evidence, that respondents deliberately
suppressed Convenio when they lodged Civil Case No.
CEB-20388, seeking for forfeiture of improvements and
payment of fair market value with damages, litigation
expenses and attorneys fees, against petitioner. The non-
disclosure of the Convenio resulted in the violation of
petitioner‘s right to for it is now made to pay, with the
use of public funds, just compensation for properties that
were supposed to be donated and transferred to it
without cost. In fact, petitioner already paid Fifty Six
Million One Hundred Ninety Six thousand, three
hundred sixty nine and 42/100 Pesos (P56,196,369.42)
in 2001 and 2009.
Third, there is urgent and paramount necessity for the
writ to prevent serious damage. In propounding its
application for WPI, petitioner alleged that public
respondent issued an Order (Order) dated February 27,
2012, directing : 1) the depositary banks of the City of
Cebu to release to the Sheriff, certifications as to the
correct account numbers under petitioner‘s name in
order to cater to the final judgment in Civil Case No.
CEB-20388; (2) the plaintiffs to demand the
Sangguniang Panlungsod to enact the appropriation
ordinance; and (3) the depositary banks to release the
amount for the satisfaction of the money judgment upon
presentment of the appropriation ordinance. In a
Manifestation with Urgent Motion it subsequently filed,
petitioner informed this Court that it had received the
following from the sheriff: (1) Notice to Parties of Sale
on Execution; (b)(sic) Notice of Execution Sale at Public
Auction; and (3) Amended Writ of Execution.
To date, the foregoing issuances have not been recalled,
such that, when the limited life of the previously granted
TRO expires, the sheriff can proceed with garnishing
petitioner‘s bank deposits and selling its patrimonial
property described in the Notice of Execution Sale of
Public Auction. The involvement of public funds and
property justifies the urgency and necessity of the
issuance of a WPI to prevent serious damage to
petitioner. It is best to preserve the status quo pending
the final determination of this case, otherwise, whatever
Decision hereon will be rendered ineffectual and
nugatory.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, let a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction issue enjoining respondents, their
successors, agents, representatives, assigns, and any and
all persons acting under their supervision, direction and
on their behalf, from executing the Decisions dated
January 14, 2000 and July 24, 2001, the Order dated
Febraury 9, 2001, Consolidated Order dated December
21, 2001 and Order dated February 27, 2012 of the
respondent court, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9,
Cebu City, and from causing the release of any funds, or
the auction of property/ies of petitioner in satisfaction
thereof, until further orders from the Court.31
The Heirs of Vicente Rallos moved for there
consideration of the grant of the application for the writ
of preliminary injunction.32
On August 10, 2012, the Court received the letter-
complaint from Rallos requesting an investigation of the
allegedly unlawful and unethical conduct of Justice
Abarintos, Justice Hernando and Justice Paredes as
Members of the 18thDivision in dealing with CA-G.R.
CEB SP.No. 06676.33 On August 30, 2012, the Court
received another letter from Rallos requesting
permission to amend her letter-complaint and to admit
her attached amended letter-complaint.34 The Court
docketed the amended letter-complaint as A.M. No. 12-
8-06-CA.35
On September 12, 2012, the Court received an affidavit-
complaint from Rallos, whereby she also charged Justice
Ingles, Justice Maxino and Justice Manahan with
administrative and criminal offenses. The Court
docketed the affidavit-complaint as A.M. No. 12-9-08-
CA.36
On September 18, 2012, the Court promulgated a
resolution in A.M. No. 12-9-08-CA requiring Justice
Ingles, Justice Maxino and Justice Manahan to comment
on the affidavit-complaint of Rallos, and consolidating
A.M. No. 12-9-08-CA with A.M. No. 12-8-06-CA.37
On December 13, 2012, the Court received the joint
comment/answer of Justice Ingles, Justice Maxino and
Justice Manahan, whereby they prayed for the dismissal
of the charges in A.M. No. 12-9-08-CA for lack of
merit.38
On January 8, 2013, the Court re-docketed A.M. No. 12-
8-06-CA as OCA I.P.I. No. 12-203-CA-J, and ordered
Justice Abarintos, Justice Hernando and Justice Paredes
to comment on the letter-complaint.39 They separately
complied, but all of them prayed for the dismissal of the
letter-complaint for lack of merit.40
Chargesin IPI No. 12-203-CA-J
(formerly A.M. No. 12-8-06-CA)
In her amended letter, Rallos averred that the issuance of
the March 28, 2012 resolution in CA-G.R. CEB SP. No.
06676 directing the rectification of the "fatal" defects of
the petition for the issuance of the TRO had been
erroneous; that the fatally defective petition should
instead be out rightly dismissed inasmuch as the
decisions and the consolidated order thereby sought to
be annulled had been already affirmed by the Court in
G.R. No. 179662 and G.R. No. 194111; that Cebu City
should carry the responsibility for making its petition
compliant with the Rules of Court; that the respondent
Justices had thus acted as legal consultants of Cebu City;
and that it was a matter of public knowledge that
petitions filed in the CA were being routinely dismissed
even for minor deficiencies.41
Rallos contended that it was improper for Justice
Abarintos to have participated in CA.G.R. CEB SP. No.
06676 despite having previously inhibited himself in
CA-G.R. CEBSP.No.06364,because Cebu City was the
petitioner and the Heirs of Vicente Rallos were the
respondents in both cases; that Justice Abarintos did not
have "the cold impartiality of a neutral judge" to
determine CA-G.R. CEB SP. No. 06676; that the
"appearance of impropriety" became more apparent
when Justice Abarintos and several other Justices
inhibited themselves from participation in CA-G.R.
CEBSP.No. 06676; and that Justice Hernando was
biased because he inhibited himself in CA-G.R. CEB
SP. No. 06676 immediately after rendering the March
28, 2012 and April 13, 2012 resolutions.42
Rallos argued that litigants in the CA had the right to be
informed of the inhibition of the Justices, and to object if
the inhibition was invalid; that a Justice could not simply
inhibit from a case because doing so would raise doubts
on the integrity of the judicial process; and that the
inhibitions of the respondent Justices raised the
suspicion of manipulation wherein the Justices who were
unwilling to issue the writ of preliminary injunction
sought by Cebu City were forced to inhibit themselves in
order that other Justices sympathetic towards Cebu City
couldbe put in their places.
Rallos prayed that the respondent Justices be held
administratively and criminally liable, and in the
meantime be temporarily suspended to avoid influencing
the investigation of the letter-complaint; and that the CA
be directed to furnish her with the list of inhibitions and
replacements of the respondent Justices in CA-G.R. SP
No. 06676,and the grounds for the inhibitions and
replacements.43
Allegations in A.M. No. 12-9-08-CA
Rallos asserted that respondent Justice Ingles, Justice
Maxino and Justice Manahan had "knowingly
disobeyed" the resolutions promulgated onDecember 5,
2007 in G.R. No. 179662 and on December 6, 2010 in
G.R. No. 194111by their issuance of the June 26, 2012
resolution granting Cebu City‘s application for the writ
of preliminary injunction; that the issuance constituted
serious misconduct and a violation of Article 206 of the
Revised Penal Code, Republic Act No. 6713 and
Republic Act No. 3019; that the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction was on the basis of the convenio,
a document that had not been formally offered in
evidence by Cebu City during the hearing for the
issuance of writ of preliminary injunction; that even had
the convenio been formally offered in evidence, it should
still not have been considered because:(1) it was only a
machine copy and was even unsigned; (2) Cebu City was
not a party to the convenio;
and (3) the supposed donation to Cebu City was void
because it had not been accepted in a public document
by Cebu City during the lifetime of the purported
donor.44
Rallos further asserted that the June 26, 2012 resolution
reflected the negligence and bias of the respondent
Justices because:(1) it enjoined the execution of orders
dated February 9, 2001 and December 21, 2001
allegedly issued in Civil Case No. CEB-20388 that did
not existin fact; (2) it stopped the execution of the order
dated February 27, 2012 that was still the subject of a
motion for reconsideration; (3) it unduly interfered with
the Court‘s rulings in G.R. No. 194111 and G.R. No.
179662; and (4) it unduly interfered with the final and
executory orders issued in Civil Case No. CEB-20388.45
She maintained that the CA was barred from entertaining
Cebu City‘s petition and application for the issuance of
the writ of preliminary injunction because Cebu City had
previously appealed the decisions rendered on January
14, 2000 and July 24, 2001 as well as the consolidated
order of March 21, 2002 (CA-G.R. CV No. 76656) but
had lost the appeal; and that respondent Justices violated
her right to have the Court‘s resolutions in G.R. No.
179662 and G.R. No. 194111 executed without undue
delay, thereby denying toher the fruits of her court
victory.
As relief, Rallos prayed that the respondent Justices be
held guilty of serious misconduct, and meted the penalty
of removal from office and perpetual disqualification
from holding office or employment in the Government;
that they be further criminally prosecuted for violating
Republic Act No. 6713, Republic Act No. 3019, and
Article 206 of the Revised Penal Code; that they be
disbarred for violating the Code of Judicial Conduct and
the Code of Professional Responsibility; and that they be
transferred to other CA stations and be prohibited from
participating in cases where she was a party.46
Ruling
We dismiss both administrative complaints for their
lackofbasis.
1.
Administrative complaints are not proper remedies
to assail alleged erroneous resolutions of respondent
Justices
Considering that the assailed conduct under both
complaints referred to the performance of their judicial
functions by the respondent Justices, we feel compelled
to dismiss the complaints for being improper remedies.
We have consistently held that an administrative or
disciplinary complaint is not the proper remedy to assail
the judicial acts of magistrates of the law, particularly
those related to their adjudicative functions. Indeed, any
errors should be corrected through appropriate judicial
remedies, like appeal in due course or, in the proper
cases, the extraordinary writs of certiorari and
prohibition if the errors were jurisdictional. Having the
administrative or disciplinary complaint be an alternative
to available appropriate judicial remedies would be
entirely unprocedural.47 In Pitney v. Abrogar,48 the
Court has forthrightly expressed the view that extending
the immunity from disciplinary action is a matter of
policy, for "[t]o hold otherwise would be to render
judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try
the facts or interpret the law in the process of
administering justice can be infallible in his judgment."
In addition, the Court reminds that the disregard of the
policy by Rallos would result in the premature filing of
the administrative complaints–a form of abuse of court
processes.49
In IPI No. 12-203-CA-J, Rallos clearly wanted to
challenge the resolutions promulgated on March 28,
2012 and April 13, 2012. Although she should have filed
motions for reconsideration vis-à-vis such resolutions in
due course, she filed a motion for reconsideration only
with respect to the resolution of April 13, 2012. Her
resorting to the filing of the letter-complaint instead of
the motion for reconsideration vis-à-vis the March 28,
2012 resolution was improper because she could not
substitute the administrative to the proper judicial
recourse. Anent the April 13, 2012 resolution, she should
have waited for the action of the CA on her motion for
reconsideration, and should the motion be eventually
denied, her proper remedy was to appeal.
In A.M. No. 12-9-08-CA, although Rallos had moved
for the reconsideration of the June 26, 2012 resolution,
she did not anymore wait for the resolution of the motion
for reconsideration. Instead, she filed the complaint-
affidavit. That, too, was impermissible, because her
appropriate recourse was to await the resolution of the
motion for reconsideration and then to appeal should the
CA deny the motion. It is to be mentioned, too, that the
CA had not yet resolved Cebu City‘s main suit for the
annulment of judgment on the merits; hence, it was
premature and unprocedural for her to insist that the
respondent Justices could have already ruled on the
grounds for annulment. That resolution should be
awaited because the issue on the validity and
effectiveness of the convenio would precisely still
require the CA‘s appreciation of the convenio as
evidence. Nor were the principle of immutability of
judgment and the applicability of any law or
jurisprudence to bar Cebu City‘s action for annulment of
judgment already in effect, considering that the CA still
had to discharge its adjudicatory function respecting the
matter of the validity and effectiveness of the convenio.
2.
Truth of the allegations of bias, negligence or
improper motives against respondent Justices
cannot be presumed but must be substantiated
In their comment/answer regarding the issuance of the
March 28, 2012 resolution, the respondent Justices
declared that they had resolved not to outrightly dismiss
the petition of Cebu City despite its several defects
because:(1) the defects had been minor or non-essential;
(2) the petition had alleged the discovery of the convenio
that would supposedly show that Cebu City should not
be obliged to expend the huge amount of public funds to
compensate the Heirs of Vicente Rallos; (3) the petition
must be decided on the merits rather than on technicality
because the release of a huge amount of public funds
would be involved; (4) the rules of procedure should not
be utilized as tools to defeat justice; and (5) even with
the foregoing being weighty enough, they had still
imposed the condition that any action on the petition and
the application for the TRO application would be held in
abeyance pending compliance with the order for the
rectification of the defects.
As to the April 13, 2012 resolution, the respondent
Justices stated:
3. The CA Resolution granting the TRO was issued
based on the appellate court‘s fair and objective
estimation that indeed, there was a compelling and
urgent ground for its grant. The Sheriff of the Regional
Trial Court was in the act of implementing the lower
court‘s writ of execution on the properties of the
applicant and there was, at that point, a necessity to stop
the implementation, particularly since Cebu City had
shown at least at that stage of the proceedings, that the
Rallos heirs had conveniently withheld from it the
existence of a Deed of Donation (Convenio) whereby the
Rallos family had previously donated the property that
was subsequently expropriated by Cebu City.
4. In short, the impression of the appellate court at the
time is why should Cebu City be made to pay just
compensation by the Rallos heirs for the expropriation of
their property which had been donated by the Rallos
family to Cebu City in the first place? This
circumstance, in the appellate court‘s fair and objective
view, justified the grant of the injunctive relief.
Otherwise, the Rallos heirs, which includes the
complainant, would unduly enrich themselves at the
expense of Cebu City and essentially swindle it of its
assets (that were about to be executed upon by the RTC
Sheriff) when they acceded to the expropriation of their
property that should have been delivered by them to the
city as a piece of donated property.x x x.50
xxxx
Furthermore, the grant or denial of a temporary
restraining order is discretionary on the part of the court.
The matter is judicial in nature, and as such, the party‘s
remedy if prejudiced by the orders of a judge/justice
given in the course of a trial, is the proper reviewing
court, and not with the OCA by means of an
administrative complaint.51 With regard to the June 26,
2012 resolution, the respondent Justices elucidated in
their comment/answer:
Indeed, the judgment sought to be executed is already
final, and the general rule is that, as there is nothing left
to be done the final judgment has to be executed or
enforced. This rule, however, is not absolute. It admits of
exceptions, to wit:
xxxx
In the instant case, the stay of execution of the judgment
paying just compensation to petitioner for the properties
in litigation is warranted by the fact that there is still a
pending case regarding the ownership of the said
properties, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 06364 entitled
City of Cebu vs. Lucena B. Rallos, et. al. In that case,
the City of Cebu seeks to nullify the 13 October 1998
Order in Spec. Proc. No. 107-R entitled "Testate Estate
of Vicente Rallos, deceased, Vicente Gullas, Executor",
with prayer to direct the administratix of the testate
estate of Vicente Rallos to execute a deed of donation
thereby donating the disputed lots in favour of the City
of Cebu, pursuant to a "convenio".x x x

It bears stressing that the cases before the respondent
justices involve public funds, more specifically, city
funds to be used in the delivery of basic services to
constituents of the City of Cebu. As defined "public
funds are those moneys belonging to the State or to any
political subdivision of the State; more specifically,
taxes, customs duties and moneys raised by operation of
law for the support of the government or for the
discharge of its obligations." For this reason alone, there
is the need to protect government funds–for which the
City of Cebu is accountable, and this should not be
jeopardized through the supposed violation by the city
government of petitioner‘s right to enjoy the fruits of the
final judgment in her favour when government
protection can be done and is being done without
adverse effects to petitioner‘s rights should the case be
eventually resolved in her favour.
Indeed, to go ahead with the execution when there are
matters involving the ownership of the subject properties
that need to be threshed out may prove to be detrimental
to the interest of the government and public, as well.
That is precisely why the courts are directed to proceed
with extreme prudence and caution in satisfying
judgements involving public funds. "In Administrative
Circular No. 10-2000 dated 25 October 2000, all judges
of lower courts were advised to exercise utmost caution,
prudence and judiciousness in the issuance of writs of
execution to satisfy money judgments against
government agencies and local government units.
Judges, thus, cannot indiscriminately issue writs of
execution against the government to enforce money
judgments."
xxxx
Therefore, pending determination as to who has legal
right to the subject properties, there is a patent,
imperative need to be provisionally enjoin execution to
prevent release of public funds or sale of any of the
city‘s property for payment of just compensation, or, to
restrain acts that may render moot and academic the
judgment or order that may be rendered in this case.52
A reading of them easily shows that the questioned
resolutions exhaustively explained their factual and legal
bases. Apparently, the respondent Justices concerned
promulgated the questioned resolutions with prudence
and fairness, and upon due consideration of the
surrounding circumstances. Contrary to the posture of
Rallos, therefore, the respondent Justices‘ issuance of the
questioned resolutions was not tainted by bias,
negligence or any improper motives.
Moreover, the respondent Justices conducted a hearing
before issuing the writ of preliminary injunction in favor
of Cebu City. In that hearing, the counsels of the parties
attended, and were granted ample opportunity to argue
for their respective sides.
Anent the voluntary inhibitions of the respondent
Justices concerned, it serves well to note that Section 1,
Rule 137 of the Rules of Court set standing guidelines
for that purpose. The guidelines have required just and
valid causes to justify voluntary inhibitions. Thereby, the
discretion to decide whether to voluntarily inhibit or not
could not be unfettered, for, as fittingly said in Abrajano
v. Heirs of Augusto F. Salas, Jr.:53
x x x. The rule on inhibition and disqualification of
judges is laid down in Sec. 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of
Court:
Sec. 1.Disqualification of judges. — No judge or judicial
officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or
child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor
or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party
within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to
counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to
the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been
executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or
in which he has presided in ny inferior court when his
rulingor decision is the subject of review, without the
written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them
and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion,
disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid
reasons other than those mentioned above.
Thus stated, the rule contemplates two kinds of
inhibition: compulsory disqualification assumes that a
judge cannot actively or impartially sit on a case for the
reasons stated in the first paragraph, while voluntary
inhibition under the second paragraph leaves to the
judge‘s discretion whether he should desist from sitting
in a case for other just and valid reasons with only his
conscience to guide him.
The issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of
conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge.
This discretion is an acknowledgement of the fact that
judges are in a better position to determine the issue of
inhibition, as they are the ones who directly deal with the
parties-litigants in their courtrooms. The decision on
whether he should inhibit himself, however, must be
based on his rational and logical assessment of the
circumstances prevailing in the case brought before him.
The rule does not give the judge the unfettered discretion
to decide whether he should desist from hearing a case.
The inhibition must be for just and valid causes. The
mere imputation of bias, partiality and prejudgment will
not suffice in the absence of clear and convincing
evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge
will undertake his noble role to dispense justice
according to law and evidence and without fear or favor.
The disqualification of a judge cannot be based on mere
speculations and surmises or be predicated on the
adverse nature of the judge‘s rulings towards the movant
for inhibition.54 (Bold underscoring supplied for
emphasis)
Rallos contends that Justice Abarintos improperly
participated in CA.G.R. CEB SP. No. 06676 despite
having previously inhibited himself in CA-G.R. CEB
SP. No. 06364,whichhadinvolved Cebu City as the
petitioner and the Heirs of Vicente Rallos as the
respondents, on the ground that some of the siblings and
relatives of Rallos were his friends.55
We disagree with the contention of Rallos.
It appears that Rallos, in her capacity as the
administratix of the estate of Vicente Rallos, had
submitted in Special Proceeding No. 1017-R entitled
Testate Estate of Vicente Rallos, deceased; Vicente
Gullas, Executor a supplemental inventory of the
properties of the estate that included the two parcels of
land that were later the subject of CA.G.R. CEB SP.No.
06676.The probate court issued an order on October 13,
1998 directing the transfer of the properties listed in the
supplemental inventory to Rallos and her co-heirs.
Feeling aggrieved, Cebu City appealed to the CA to
nullify the October 13, 1998 order, and also to pray that
Rallos as the administratix of the testate estate of
Vicente Rallos be directed to execute a deed of donation
respecting the disputed lots in favor of Cebu City
pursuant to the convenio (CA-G.R. CEB SP. No.
06364).
To recall, the resolution of March 28, 2012 concerned
the preliminary matter of having Cebu City comply with
the deficiencies of its petition in CA-G.R. CEB SP. No.
06676, while the resolution of April13, 2012 involved
the issuance of the TRO to prevent the execution of the
decisions and the consolidated order by the RTC that
would probably render the consideration and
adjudication of CA-G.R. CEB SP. No. 06676 moot and
academic. If, at that stage of the proceedings in CA-G.R.
CEB SP.No. 06676, Justice Abarintos believed himself
to be capacitated to take part, the Court is in no position
to dispute his capacity to do so in the absence of any
clear and persuasive showing by Rallos that he would
not be objective and impartial as far as the issues and the
parties were concerned. Indeed, at that stage of the
proceedings, any decision to voluntarily inhibit was
primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on
his part. The discretion, according to Abrajano v. Heirs
of Augusto F. Salas, Jr., supra, "is an acknowledgement
of the fact that judges are in a better position to
determine the issue of inhibition, as they are the ones
who directly deal with the parties-litigants in their
courtrooms," provided the decision is based on a
"rational and logical assessment of the circumstances
prevailing in the case brought before him." Thus, based
on the guidelines set in Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules
of Court, the participation of Justice Abarintos in the
initial stage of the proceedings in CA-G.R. CEB SP. No.
06676 despite having previously inhibited himself in
CA-G.R. CEB SP. No. 06364 could not be held as
improper under the circumstances.
In any event, Justice Abarintos subsequently saw the
need for his voluntary inhibition when CA-G.R. CEB
SP. No. 06676 came to be assigned to him following the
transfer to Manila of Justice Paredes. His voluntary
inhibition occurred on June 7, 2012. What is note worthy
is that Rallos could have filed a motion for his inhibition
if she considered the participation of Justice Abarintos in
CA-G.R. CEB SP. No. 06676 as improper. That she
raises the issue of his inhibition only before this Court in
this administrative proceeding leaves the Court no
choice but to regard her imputation of impropriety and
bias against him as a mere after thought considering that
she does so only after the CA had issued the writ of
preliminary injunction sought by Cebu City.
Rallos charges Justice Hernando with bias because he
voluntarily inhibited himself in CA-G.R. CEB SP. No.
06676 only after the promulgation of the March 28, 2012
and April 13, 2012 resolutions.56
Again, we cannot agree with Rallos.
In the notice he sent to the CA Raffle Committee, Justice
Hernando stated the reasons why he decided to inhibit
himself from the case, to wit:
It has come to the attention of the undersigned that prior
to the official issuance of the Court‘s Order dated
April13, 2012 in the above-cited case which granted
petitioner‘s prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order,
an alleged representative of the petitioner‘s City Legal
Office attempted to secure a copy of said Order, citing a
purported instruction from the u[n]dersigned to the City
Legal Office to procure it. For the record, the
undersigned strongly accentuates that he never did so,
nor is he familiar, either personally or by acquaintance,
with the fellow in question.
This event has now rendered it completely untenable for
the undersigned to participate in the proceedings
concerning this case if only to obviate suspicions of
undue influence by him, or by the petitioner itself.
Hence, I am voluntarily inhibiting myself from this
litigation. May I therefore request for its re-raffle to
another Justice to replace me as ponente.57
The fact that Justice Hernando voluntarily inhibited
himself after writing the assailed resolutions did not
establish his bias against Rallos and her co-heirs
considering that the inhibition was for the precise
objective of eliminating suspicions of undue influence.
The justification of Justice Hernando was commendable,
and should be viewed as a truly just and valid ground for
his self-disqualification as a judicial officer in a specific
case.
Rallos insists that she was entitled to be informed about
the inhibitions of the Justices and about their reasons for
the inhibitions.
Rule V of the 2009 Internal Rules of the Court of
Appeals expressly provides the rules on inhibition of
Justices, viz:
Rule V
INHIBITION OF JUSTICES
Section 1. Mandatory Inhibition of Justices. –When a
Justice is disqualified under any of the grounds
enumerated in the first paragraph of Sec. 1, Rule 137 of
the Rules of Court and in Rule 3.12 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, he/she shall immediately notify the
Raffle Committee and the members of his/herDivision.
SEC. 2. Voluntary Inhibition of a Justice. –An inhibition
of a Justice, whether mandatory or voluntary, must be
made within ten (10) working days from his/her
discovery of a just and valid reason to inhibit.
Copies of the action of the Justice shall be furnished to
the other members of the Division, the Presiding Justice,
the Raffle Committee and the Division Clerk of Court.
SEC. 3. Motion to Inhibit a Division or a Justice. – A
motion for inhibition must be in writing and under oath
and shall state the grounds therefor. A motion for
inhibition of a Division or a Justice must be acted upon
by the Division or the Justice concerned, as the case may
be, within ten (10) working days from its/his/her receipt
thereof except when there is an application for a
temporary restraining order, in which case, the motion
must be acted upon immediately.
No motion for inhibition of a Justice or Division will be
granted after a decision on the merits or substance of the
case has been rendered or issued by any Division except
for a valid or just reason, e.g. allegation of corrupt
motives. [Pursuant to AM No. 02-6-13-CA dated June
19, 2007 of the Supreme Court].
One who files a motion for inhibition without basis and
manifestly for delay may be cited in contempt of court.
A lawyer who assists in the filing of such baseless and
dilatory motion may be referred by the Justice concerned
or by the Court motu proprio to the Supreme Court for
appropriate disciplinary action.
SEC. 4. Action on Inhibition. –The action on the
inhibition shall be attached to the rollo and paged.
SEC.5. Right of Replacement. – When a Justice inhibits
himself/herself from a case, the Justice to whom it is
raffled may replace it with another case of similar nature
and status, subject to Sec. 4 (c), Rule III.
As the foregoing rules indicate, there are two kinds of
inhibition, the mandatory and the voluntary. In
mandatory inhibition, the disqualified Justice must notify
the Raffle Committee and the Members of the Division
of the decision to inhibit. Involuntary inhibition, the
inhibiting Justice must inform the other Members of the
Division, the Presiding Justice, the Raffle Committee,
and the Division Clerk of Court of the decision to inhibit
and the reason for the inhibition. There is nothing in
Rule V or in any other part of the Internal Rules of the
Court of Appeals that specifically requires that the party-
litigants be informed of the mandatory or voluntary
inhibition of a Justice.
Nevertheless, a party-litigant who desires to be informed
of the inhibition of a Justice and of the reason for the
inhibition must file a motion for inhibition in the manner
provided under Section 3, Rule V of the Internal Rules
of the Court of Appeals, supra. Upon the filing of the
motion, the party-litigant becomes entitled to be notified
of the CA‘s action on the motion for inhibition and of
the reasons for the action. Likewise, the party-litigant
may seek the reconsideration or may appeal to the Court
any action on the part of the CA on the motion for
inhibition or motion for reconsideration. Alas, Rallos did
not submit a motion for the inhibition of any of the
respondent Justices.
or inhibition has not been resorted to in order to cause
injustice to or to prejudice any party or cause.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the
administrative complaints against Court of Appeals
Associate Justice Pampio A. Abarintos, Associate
Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando, Associate Justice
Victoria Isabel A. Paredes, Associate Justice Gabriel T.
Ingles, Associate Justice Pamela Ann Maxino and
Associate Justice Carmelita S. Manahan for their lack of
merit and substance.
The Court DIRECTS that henceforth all the parties in
any action or proceedings shall be notified within five
(5) days of the mandatory disqualification or voluntary
inhibition of a Judge or Justice who has participated in
any action of the court, stating the reason or reasons for
the mandatory disqualification or voluntary inhibition.
The Court Administrator is ORDERED to disseminate
this decision to all courts of the Philippines for their
guidance and strict compliance.

We do not subscribe to Rallos‘ suggestion that the series

of inhibitions in CA-G.R. SP No. 06676 constituted a
scheme to favor Cebu City. She presented no proof to SO ORDERED.
validate her suggestion. In fact, she herself conceded that
she was thereby only voicing out her suspicion of an
irregularity. To stress, their good faith and regularity in
the performance of official duties, which are strong
presumptions under our laws, should prevail unless
overcome by contrary proof.1âwphi1 Worth noting in
that regard is that there was even no valid reason that
could have prohibited the Justices charged in A.M. No.
12-9-08-CAfrom participating in CA-G.R. SP No.
06676. It serves well to consider, too, that none of the
respondent Justices charged in IPI No. 12-203-CA-J is
anymore participating in CA-G.R. SP No. 06676; and
that the respondent Justices charged in A.M. No. 12-9-
08-CA were chosen by raffle as required under pre-
existing rules and regulations to replace the Justices who
had meanwhile voluntarily inhibited themselves from
further participation for valid reasons.

The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court holds,

conformably with the urging of Justice Arturo D. Brion,
that hence forth all the parties in any action or
proceedings should be immediately notified of any
mandatory disqualification or voluntary inhibition of the
Judge or Justice who has participated in any action of the
court, stating the reason for the mandatory
disqualification or voluntary inhibition. The requirement
of notice is a measure to ensure that the disqualification
 A.M. No. 2010-11-SC March 15, 2011 Publication Division, PIO

RE: EMPLOYEES INCURRING HABITUAL

TARDINESS IN THE SECOND SEMESTER OF 8. Mary Jingle M. Villocero
2009 Court Stenographer III
11
Judicial Supervision & Monitoring Division,
DECISION CMO-OCA

BERSAMIN, J.:
Employees of the Judiciary should observe punctuality
in reporting to work. Tardiness, if habitual, prejudices
the efficiency of the service being rendered by the
Judiciary to the people, and cannot be tolerated. Thus,
we sanction certain administrative employees of the
Court for their habitual tardiness.
On July 5, 2010, the OAS directed the concerned
employees to explain in writing why no administrative
disciplinary action should be taken against them for their
habitual tardiness during the covered period, which
habitual tardiness was in violation of Civil Service
Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular No. 04,
Series of 1991, viz:

This administrative matter emanated from the reports An employee shall be considered habitually tardy if he
dated June 16, 2010 and June 17, 2010 made by the incurs tardiness, regardless of the number of minutes, ten
Leave Division under the Office of Administrative (10) times a month for at least two (2) months in a
Services (OAS) to the Complaints and Investigation semester or at least two (2) consecutive months during
Division, also under the OAS, to the effect that the the year. xxx
following employees had been habitually tardy in the
second semester of 2009, viz: The concerned employees subsequently rendered their
respective explanations, which the OAS summarized
1
thuswise:
No. of times Reported Tardy for the 2nd
Semester of 2009
Names A. Employees previously penalized for habitual
tardiness:
Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec
1. Mr. ALBERT C. SEMILLA – He was tardy
1. Mr. Marc Reman A. Bessat for twelve (12) times in the month of September
Computer Maintenance Technologist III and ten (10) times in the month of November. In
10 10 dated July 9, 2010, Mr. Semilla
his explanation
Systems Planning & Project Evaluation Division,
readily admitted having incurred those tardiness
MISO
and humbly submitted to any disciplinary action
for the offense. He stated that due to financial
2. Mr. Melquiades A. Briones difficulties, he reports to work and likewise
Clerk III 14 15 returns home through his bicycle. He supports
Office of the Clerk of Court, En Banc his family as a solo parent and even enrolled in a
short course for Medical Transcriptionists in an
attempt to improve their plight. He added that in
3. Mr. Benjie B. Cajandig the summer of 2009, his blood pressure started
Judicial Staff Assistant II to rise abnormally. It was the cause why he was
12 10 to the
rushed 12hospital twice. Since May 2009, he
Mediation Planning & Research Division
PHILJA was under the care of the SC Clinic for Benign
Prostatic Hyperthropy, which ailment caused
him many sleepless nights.
4. Ms. Sherrylyn A. Nate-Cruz
Fiscal Clerk II 10 As shown by the records,
10 this is Mr. Semilla‘s fourth
Finance Division, FMBO incursion of habitual tardiness. He was
REPRIMANDED for his first incursion of the offense
pursuant to the Court En Banc resolution dated August
5. Mr. Florentino A. Pascual 8, 2000 in A.M. No. 00-6-09-SC, Re: Imposition of
Human Resource Management Officer II 10
Corresponding 11
Penalties to Employees Committing
Personnel Division, OAS-OCA Habitual Tardiness; SUSPENDED for five (5) days for
committing habitual tardiness for the second time
pursuant to A.M. No. 00-6-09-SC dated November 27,
6. Mr. Albert C. Semilla
2002, Re: Imposition of Corresponding Penalties for
Computer Operator III Habitual 12Tardiness committed during the Second
10
Records Division Semester of 2000; and SUSPENDED for ten (10) days
Office of the Chief Attorney for committing the same offense for the third time
pursuant to A.M. No. 00-06-09-SC dated March 16,
2004, Re: Imposition of Corresponding Penalties for
7. Ms. Jolina Pauline T. Tuazon 11 11committed during the 1st and 2nd
Habitual Tardiness
Executive Assistant II Semester of 2003.
His service records show that Mr. Semilla entered the
government service in the Supreme Court as Messenger
on November 7, 1979. He was promoted as Clerk on
July 1, 1983, Clerk III on July 1, 1989, and Computer
Operator III on October 17, 2006, the position he is
holding at present. His performance ratings for the 1st
and 2nd semesters of the year 2009 show that he
performed his work very satisfactorily. Since 2003, this
is the only time again that he has incurred tardiness.
2. Mr. FLORENTINO A. PASCUAL – He was
tardy for ten (10) times in the month of
September and eleven (11) times in the month of
October. In his letter dated July 7, 2010, he
explained that his tardiness was caused by his
unstable blood pressure and the traffic situation.
He manifested that to the best of his ability, he
will try to be punctual despite his present health
condition caused by a mild stroke.
As shown by the records, this is Mr. Pascual‘s second
incursion of habitual tardiness. He was
REPRIMANDED for his first incursion of the offense
pursuant to the Court En Banc Resolution dated March
16, 2004 in A.M. No. 00-06-09-SC, Re: Habitual
Tardiness for the 1st and 2nd Semester of 2003.
B. Employees incurring habitual tardiness for the first
time:
1. Mr. MARC REMAN A. BESSAT – He was
tardy for ten (10) times each for the months of
July and October. In his explanation dated July
9, 2010, he stated that during the said period, he
experienced abdominal cramping, bloating,
gassiness and painful bowel habits, especially on
mornings. He claimed that he consulted a
Gastroenterologist on March 2010 and was
diagnosed with Internal Hemorrhoids. He
promised to do everything to improve his time
of arrival.
2. Mr. MELQUIADES A. BRIONES – He was
tardy for fourteen (14) times in the month of
July and fifteen (15) times in the month of
August. In his letter dated July 6, 2010, Mr.
Briones explained that during those times, he
was the only one who could manage to
accompany his son in going to school and was
always caught in traffic. His wife could not
replace him in accompanying their son to school
because she has fatal diabetes and could hardly
move and travel far. He added that during the
said period, he was also having his medication
concerning his allergies in both hands and feet.
3. Mr. BENJIE B. CAJANDIG – He was tardy
for twelve (12) times each in the months of July
and October, and ten (10) times in the month of
October. In his letter dated July 7, 2010, Mr.
Cajandig explained that his tardiness was mostly
due to the distance of his residence from the
office and due to heavy traffic which he
encounters when traveling from Marcos
Highway to the LRT 2 Santolan Station. He
averred that this was aggravated during the rainy
season since most of his tardiness were incurred
during those months. He manifested that he will
do his best to address his tardiness.
4. Ms. SHERRYLYN A. NATE-CRUZ – She
was tardy for ten (10) times each in the months
of July and October. In her letter dated July 6,
2010, Ms. Cruz explained that due to the
alarming increase in her blood sugar during
those days, she was required to have a regular
medical checkup that resulted to her tardiness in
reporting for work. She added that at present,
she is six (6) months pregnant on her second
child and has pre-gestational diabetes. But she
said she will try her best not to be late for work.
5. Ms. JOLINA PAULINE T. TUAZON – She
was tardy for eleven (11) times each in the
months of September and October. In her letter
dated July 8, 2010, she explained that during the
said period, she was preparing for an entrance
examination scheduled for November aside from
the reviews she had in the evening. Thus during
the months of September and October, she had
been going home late which at times caused her
to be late for work the next day. She expressed
regret in committing the offense and promised to
avoid the same violation.
6. Ms. MARY JINGLE M. VILLOCERO – She
was tardy for eleven (11) times in the month of
July and ten (10) times in the month of October.
In her explanation dated July 8, 2010, Ms.
Villocero stated that her tardiness was caused by
the fact that she has three (3) children and
without any maid to assist her in taking care of
them. Her husband is under medication with
anti-depressant, thus, she sometimes cannot
compel him to take care of everything and attend
to all her children‘s needs. She averred that she
is also a working student with classes during
Saturdays and Sundays, and has been working
hard for the advancement of her career. She
added that she has been trying her best to meet
her duties and obligations, both as a responsible
employee of the judiciary and as a mother, but in
the process, she still incurred tardiness. She
vowed not to violate again the rules on tardiness.
The OAS concluded that the concerned employees had
incurred habitual tardiness and that their justifications
were unacceptable. Thus, it recommended the penalties
to be imposed on the concerned employees,2 as follows:
1. Mr. Albert Semilla, for having been found
habitually tardy for the fourth time, be meted the
penalty of SUSPENSION for three (3) months
without pay with a FINAL WARNING that a
repetition of the same offense will be dealt with
more severely;
2. Mr. Florentino A. Pascual, for having been
found habitually tardy for the second time, be
meted the penalty of SUSPENSION for five (5)
days with a WARNING that a repetition of the
same shall be dealt with more severely;
 3. Messrs. Marc Remman A. Bessat, Melquiades
A. Briones, Benjie B. Cajandig, Mmes.
Sherrylyn A. Nate-Cruz, Jolina Pauline T.
Tuazon, and Mary Jingle M. Villocero, for
having been found habitually tardy for the first
time, be meted the penalty of REPRIMAND
with the same warning that a repetition of the
same shall be dealt with more severely.
Ruling
We adopt the evaluation of the OAS.
It is a canon under the Constitution that a public office is
a public trust.3 This canon includes the mandate for the
observance of prescribed office hours and the efficient
use of every moment of such hours for the public
service, because only thereby may the public servants
recompense the Government and the people for
shouldering the costs of maintaining the
Judiciary.4 Accordingly, court officials and employees
must at all times strictly observe official hours to inspire
the public‘s respect for the justice system.5
The exacting standards of ethics and morality imposed
upon court officials and employees reflect the premium
placed on the image of the courts of justice. That image
is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or
otherwise, of the men and women who work in the
Judiciary. It thus becomes the imperative duty of
everyone involved in the dispensation of justice, from
the judge to the lowliest clerk, to maintain the courts‘
good name and standing as true temples of justice.6
There is no question that all the concerned employees
incurred habitual tardiness within the context of CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 1991, supra.
Thereby, they fell short of the standard of conduct
demanded from everyone connected with the
administration of justice. Worthy of stress is that the
nature and functions of the employment of the officials
and employees of the Judiciary require them to be role
models in the faithful observance of the constitutional
canon that public office is a public trust. They are always
accountable to the people, whom they must serve with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency.
They can surely inspire public respect for the justice
system by strictly observing official time, among others.
Absenteeism and tardiness are, therefore,
impermissible.7
The respective justifications of the concerned employees
(consisting of illness or poor health, travel difficulties,
household responsibilities, and similar causes) are not
unacceptable. Already in Re: Supreme Court Employees
Incurring Habitual Tardiness in the 2nd Semester of
2005,8 we enunciated that justifications for absences and
tardiness falling under the categories of illness, moral
obligation to family and relatives, performance of
household chores, traffic and health or physical
condition are neither novel nor persuasive, and hardly
evoke sympathy. If at all, such justifications may only
mitigate liability.
We next discuss the penalties.
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 1999,
considers habitual tardiness as a light offense with the
following penalties:
First Offense Reprimand
Second Offense Suspension
Third Offense Dismissal
The penalties recommended by the OAS are well taken.
However, in the case of Albert C. Semilla, we moderate
the recommended penalty of suspension for three months
without pay to one month suspension without pay but
with a final warning that a repetition will be dealt with
more severely upon humanitarian considerations.
Although we insist that every official or employee of the
Judiciary must meet the standards of public service, we
must practice compassion in deserving cases to avoid the
wrong and unwanted impression that the Court wields
only mailed fists. Semilla deserves a degree of
mitigation. In that regard, Section 53 of Rule IV of the
Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service9 grants the disciplining authority the
discretion to consider mitigating circumstances in the
imposition of the proper penalty. Thus, the mitigating
factors in Semilla‘s favor are the following:
(a) His length of service and satisfactory
performance (i.e., having started as messenger of
the Court on November 7, 1979 and having
served continuously until the present, with his
performance in the first and second semesters of
2009, the year in question, being satisfactory);
(b) The fact that this infraction of habitual
tardiness was his first since 2003; and
(c) His pleas for compassion (due to his medical
condition of benign prostatic hyperthropy, for
which he was under the care of the SC Clinic
since May 2009, and due to his reporting to
work and returning home through his bicycle to
add to his financial capacity as a solo parent of
his family).
Even so, we hereby emphatically hold all the concerned
employees to their respective promises that they will not
commit the same infraction hereafter, or else they will be
at the end of the mailed fists of the Court. Our
compassion, which is not limitless but discriminating,
should not be taken for granted.
WHEREFORE, we find and pronounce:
1. Albert Semilla guilty of habitual tardiness for
the fourth time and suspended for one (1) month
without pay, with a final warning that a
repetition of the same offense will be dealt with
more severely;
2. Florentino A. Pascual guilty of habitual
tardiness for the second time and suspended for
five (5) days without pay, with a warning that a
repetition of the same offense will be dealt with
more severely; and
 3. Marc Remman A. Bessat, Melquiades A.
Briones, Benjie B. Cajandig, Sherrylyn A. Nate-
Cruz, Jolina Pauline T. Tuazon, and Mary Jingle
M. Villocero guilty of habitual tardiness for the
first time and reprimanded, with warning that a
repetition of the same offense will be dealt with
more severely.

SO ORDERED.
 A.M. No. CA-13-51-J July 2, 2013
RE: LETTER COMPLAINT OF MERLITA B.
FABIANA AGAINST PRESIDING JUSTICE
ANDRES B. REYES, JR., ASSOCIATE JUSTICES
ISAIAS P. DICDICAN AND STEPHEN C. CRUZ;
CARAG JAMORA SOMERA AND VILLAREAL
LAW OFFICES AND ITS LAWYERS ATTYS.
ELPIDIO C. JAMORA, JR. AND BEATRIZ O.
GERONILLA-VILLEGAS, LAWYERS FOR
MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION AND
VISAYAN SURETY AND INSURANCE
CORPORATION.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This administrative matter stems from the claim for
death benefits by the heirs of the late Marlon Fabiana
(heirs of Fabiana) against manning agent Magsaysay
Maritime Corporation and its principal Air Sea Holiday
GMBH-Stable Organizations Italia.
Complainant Merlita B. Fabiana, Marlon‘s surviving
spouse, hereby accuses Court of Appeals (CA) Presiding
Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr., Associate Justice Isaias P.
Dicdican and Associate Justice Stephen C. Cruz, as the
former Members of the CA‘s First Division, of having
openly defied the resolution promulgated by the Court
on January 13, 2010 in G.R. No. 189726 entitled Heirs
of the Late Marlon A. Fabiana, [herein represented by
Merlita B. Fabiana] v. Magsaysay Maritime Corp., et al.,
whereby the Court had allegedly "fixed with finality
complainant‘s claims for death benefits and other
monetary claims, including damages and attorney‘s fees,
against the Maritime Company arising from the death of
her husband."1
The relevant antecedents follow.
On December 19, 2007, the Labor Arbiter granted the
following claims to the heirs of Fabiana, to wit:
WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing premises,
respondents are liable to pay the following to the
complainants:
US $82,500.00 death benefits to complainant Merlita B.
Fabiana;
US $16,500.00 to complainant Jomari Paul B. Fabiana;
Salary differentials from July 17, 2006 to April 23, 2007
computed at US $1,038 deducting the US $424.00
monthly salaries already paid by the respondents;
The difference of 1,500.00 Euro contributed by fellow
Filipino seafarer and US $1,000 remitted by respondents
computed at the rate of exchange at the time of payment;
Sick benefits from April 23, 2007 to May 11, 2007
computed at US $1,038.00 monthly salary rate;
US $331.00 guaranteed overtime pay;
₱7,574.00 actual damages;
₱100,000.00 for moral damages;
₱1,000,000.00 exemplary damages;
Ten percent (10%) attorney‘s fees computed on the total
awards.2
On December 10, 2008, the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) rendered its decision,3 disposing:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the
appeal is MODIFIED in the sense that the award of
moral and exemplary damages are reduced to
₱50,000.00 each while the other awards are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
The parties then separately brought their respective
petitions for certiorari to the CA, specifically:
(a)
C.A.-G.R. SP No. 109382 entitled Heirs of the late
Marlon A. Fabiana, herein represented by Merlita B.
Fabiana v. National Labor Relations Commission,
Magsaysay Maritime Corporation and Air Sea Holiday
GMBH-Stab[i]le Organizations Italia (Hotel), assailing
the jurisdiction of the NLRC in entertaining the appeal
of Magsaysay Maritime Corporation and its principal,
and seeking the reinstatement of the moral and
exemplary damages as awarded by the Labor Arbiter
(first petition);4 and
(b)
C.A.-G.R. SP No. 109699 entitled Magsaysay Maritime
Corporation, Eduardo Manese, Prudential Guarantee
(Surety), and Air Sea Holiday GMBH-Stable
Organizations, Italia v. Heirs of the late Marlon Fabiana,
and National Labor Relations Commission challenging
the propriety of the monetary awards granted to the heirs
of Fabiana (second petition).5
In the second petition, the petitioners averred that the
late Marlon Fabiana had died from a non-work related
disease after his employment contract had terminated.
On August 20, 2009, when the heirs of Fabiana filed
their comment vis-à-vis the second petition, they sought
the consolidation of the two petitions. Their request for
consolidation was not acted upon, however, but was
soon mooted a month later by the First Division of the
CA promulgating its decision on the first petition (C.A.-
G.R. No. 109382) on September 29, 2009, 6 to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
partly GRANTED. Accordingly, the challenged
Decision is AFFIRMED but MODIFIED insofar as
interest at the rate of six percent per annum (6% p.a.) is
imposed on all the monetary awards, reckoned from the
Labor Arbiter‘s judgment on 19 December 2007, except
moral and exemplary damages to which the same rate of
interest is imposed, but reckoned from the time the
aforementioned decision was promulgated on 10
December 2008 by the NLRC Sixth Division. An
additional interest of twelve percent per annum (12%
p.a.) is applied on the total amount ultimately awarded
upon finality of the decision until fully paid.
The petitioners‘ motion for preliminary mandatory
injunction is deemed resolved by this decision.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Magsaysay Maritime Corporation filed on October 25,
2009 a motion for clarification in C.A.-G.R. No. 109382
instead of a motion for reconsideration. 7 In response, the
CA issued its clarification on November 26, 2009 by
stating that the "affirmance with modification" was but
the "consequence of the certiorari petition being merely
‗partially granted.‘"8
On their part, the heirs of Fabiana filed a motion for
reconsideration in C.A.-G.R. No. 109382, which the CA
denied. Hence, on November 23, 2009, they appealed to
the Court by petition for review on certiorari (G.R. No.
189726). However, the Court, through the Third
Division,9 denied the petition for review on certiorari
through the resolution of January 13, 2010,10 quoted as
follows:
Acting on the petition for review on certiorari assailing
the Decision dated 29 September 2009 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 109382, the Court resolves
to DENY the petition for failure to sufficiently show that
the appellate court committed any reversible error in the
challenged decision as to warrant the exercise by this
Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction.
A careful consideration of the petition indicates a failure
of the petitioners to show any cogent reason why the
actions of the Labor Arbiter, the National Labor
Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals which
have passed upon the same issue should be reversed.
Petitioners failed to show that their factual findings are
not based on substantial evidence or that their decisions
are contrary to applicable law and jurisprudence.
SO ORDERED.
In the meanwhile, on October 16, 2009, the heirs of
Fabiana moved to dismiss the second petition (C.A.-
G.R. SP. No. 109699) on the ground that the intervening
promulgation on September 29, 2009 by the First
Division of the decision on the first petition (C.A.-G.R.
No. 109382) had rendered the second petition moot and
academic.11
On June 4, 2010, however, the First Division of the CA,
then comprised by Presiding Justice Reyes, Jr.,
Associate Justice Dicdican (ponente) and Associate
Justice Cruz, denied the motion to dismiss filed in C.A.-
G.R. SP. No. 109699,12 holding thusly:
This has reference to the motion filed by the private
respondents, through their counsel, to dismiss the
petition in the case at bench on the ground that it has
been rendered moot and academic by the decision
promulgated on September 29, 2009 by this Court in
CA-G.R. SP No. 109382.
After a judicious scrutiny of the whole matter, we find
the said motion to dismiss to be wanting in merit. It is
not true that the petition in this case has been rendered
moot and academic by the decision promulgated by this
Court on September 29, 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No.
109382. The said decision rendered by this Court passed
upon two limited issues only, namely, the NLRC‘s
jurisdiction to allow the petitioners‘ appeal thereto
despite flaws in their verification and non-forum
shopping papers and the propriety of the reduction by the
NLRC of the amount of damages awarded to the private
respondents. A reading of the said decision will
unmistakably bear this out. However, in the case at
bench, the petitioners have assailed omnibously the
NLRC‘s awards in favor of the private respondents for
death benefits, sickness allowance, salary differentials
and other monetary claims. We have to pass upon the
propriety of all these monetary awards.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, we
hereby DENY the aforementioned motion to dismiss
filed in this case.
We hereby give the parties a fresh period of fifteen (15)
days from notice hereof within which to file memoranda
in support of their respective sides of the case.
SO ORDERED.
The second petition (C.A.-G.R. SP. No. 109699) was
ultimately resolved on September 16, 2011 by the Sixth
Division of the CA, composed of Associate Justice
Amelita G. Tolentino, Associate Justice Normandie B.
Pizarro (ponente) and Associate Justice Rodil V.
Zalameda, dismissing the petition upon not finding the
NLRC to have gravely abused its discretion.
As earlier adverted to, the complainant accuses Presiding
Justice Reyes, Jr., Associate Justice Dicdican and
Associate Justice Cruz with thereby willfully disobeying
the resolution of January 13, 2010 promulgated by the
Court.
The complaint lacks merit.
In administrative proceedings, the burden of
substantiating the charges falls on the complainant who
must prove her allegations in the complaint by
substantial evidence.13 Here, the allegation of willful
disobedience against respondent CA Justices was
unsubstantiated and baseless. The issues raised in the
first petition (C.A.-G.R. No. 109382) were limited to the
NLRC‘s jurisdiction over the appeal by Magsaysay
Maritime Corporation and its principal, and to the
reduction of the amounts awarded as moral and
exemplary damages. In contrast, the second petition
(C.A.-G.R. SP. No. 109699) concerned only the
propriety of awarding monetary benefits. Under the
circumstances, the promulgation by the Court of the
resolution of January 13, 2010 in G.R. No. 189726 did
not divest the respondents as members of the First
Division of the CA of the jurisdiction to entertain and
pass upon the second petition (C.A.-G.R. SP. No.
109699), something that they sought to explain through
their resolution promulgated on June 4, 2010. The
explanation, whether correct or not, was issued in the
exercise of judicial discretion. It is not for us to say now
in a resolution of this administrative complaint whether
the explanation was appropriate or not, nor for the
complainant to herself hold them in error. The recourse
open to the heirs of Fabiana, including the complainant,
was to move for the correction of the resolution, if they
disagreed with it, and, should their motion be denied, to
assail the denial in this Court through the remedy
warranted under the law.
The complainant‘s initiation of her complaint would take
respondent Justices to task for their regular performance
of their office. Yet, as the surviving spouse of the late-
lamented Marlon, she was understandably desirous of
the most favorable and quickest outcome for the claim
for death benefits because his intervening demise had
rendered her and her family bereft of his support.
Regardless of how commendable were her motives for
initiating this administrative complaint, however, she
could not substitute a proper judicial remedy not taken
with an improper administrative denunciation of the
Justices she has hereby charged. That is impermissible.
If she felt aggrieved at all, she should have resorted to
the available proper judicial remedy, and exhausted it,
instead of resorting to the unworthy disciplinary charge.
Truly, disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions
brought against any Judge or Justice in relation to the
performance of official functions are neither
complementary to nor suppletory of appropriate judicial
remedies, nor a substitute for such remedies. 14 The Court
has fittingly explained why in In Re: Joaquin T.
Borromeo,15 to wit:
Given the nature of the judicial function, the power
vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court and the
lower courts established by law, the question submits to
only one answer: the administrative or criminal remedies
are neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review
where such review is available, and must wait on the
result thereof.
Simple reflection will make this proposition amply clear,
and demonstrate that any contrary postulation can have
only intolerable legal implications. Allowing a party
who feels aggrieved by a judicial order or decision not
yet final and executory to mount an administrative, civil
or criminal prosecution for unjust judgment against the
issuing judge would, at a minimum and as an
indispensable first step, confer the prosecutor
(Ombudsman) with an incongruous function pertaining,
not to him, but to the courts: the determination of
whether the questioned disposition is erroneous in its
findings of fact or conclusions of law, or both. If he does
proceed despite that impediment, whatever
determination he makes could well set off a proliferation
of administrative or criminal litigation, a possibility
hereafter more fully explored.
Such actions are impermissible and cannot prosper. It is
not, as already pointed out, within the power of public
prosecutors, or the Ombudsman or his deputies, directly
or vicariously, to review judgments or final orders or
resolutions of the Courts of the land. The power of
review—by appeal or special civil action—is not only
lodged exclusively in the Courts themselves but must be
exercised in accordance with a well-defined and long
established hierarchy, and long standing processes and
procedures. No other review is allowed; otherwise
litigation would be interminable, and vexatiously
repetitive.
Moreover, in Re: Verified Complaint of Engr. Oscar L.
Ongjoco, Chairman of the Board/CEO of FH-Gymn
Multi-Purpose and Transport Service Cooperative,
against Hon. Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., Hon. Ramon M.
Bato, Jr. and Hon. Florito S. Macalino, Associate
Justices, Court of Appeals,16 the Court ruminates:
In this regard, we reiterate that a judge‘s failure to
correctly interpret the law or to properly appreciate the
evidence presented does not necessarily incur
administrative liability, for to hold him administratively
accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he
renders, assuming he has erred, will be nothing short of
harassment and will make his position doubly
unbearable. His judicial office will then be rendered
untenable, because no one called upon to try the facts or
to interpret the law in the process of administering
justice can be infallible in his judgment. Administrative
sanction and criminal liability should be visited on him
only when the error is so gross, deliberate and malicious,
or is committed with evident bad faith, or only in clear
cases of violations by him of the standards and norms of
propriety and good behavior prescribed by law and the
rules of procedure, or fixed and defined by pertinent
jurisprudence.1âwphi1
To be clear, although we do not shirk from the
responsibility of imposing discipline on the erring
Judges or Justices and employees of the Judiciary, we
shall not hesitate to shield them from baseless charges
that only serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly
administration of justice.17
Even as we dismiss the administrative charge, we deem
it necessary to observe further, in the exercise of our
administrative supervision over the CA, that the matter
addressed here was really simple and avoidable if only
the CA had promptly implemented its current procedure
for the consolidation of petitions or proceedings relating
to or arising from the same controversies. Section 3(a),
Rule III of the 2009 Internal Rules of the Court of
Appeals has forthrightly mandated the consolidation of
related cases assigned to different Justices, viz:
Section 3. Consolidation of Cases. – When related cases
are assigned to different justices, they shall be
consolidated and assigned to one Justice.
(a) Upon motion of a party with notice to the other
party/ies, or at the instance of the Justice to whom any or
the related cases is assigned, upon notice to the parties,
consolidation shall ensue when the cases involve the
same parties and/or related questions of fact and/or law.
(Emphases supplied)
xxxx
A perusal of the two petitions showed that they involved
the same parties and the same facts. Even their issues of
law, albeit not entirely identical, were closely related to
one another. It could not also be denied that they assailed
the same decision of the NLRC. For these reasons alone,
the request for consolidation by the heirs of Fabiana
should have been granted, and the two petitions
consolidated in the same Division of the CA.
The consolidation of two or more actions is authorized
where the cases arise from the same act, event or
transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend
largely or substantially on the same evidence, provided
that the court has jurisdiction and that consolidation will
not give one party an undue advantage or that
consolidation will not prejudice the substantial rights of
any of the parties.18 As to parties, their substantial
identity will suffice. Substantial identity of parties exists
when there is a community of interest or privity of
interest between a party in the first case and a party in
the second, even if the latter has not been impleaded in
the first case.19 As to issues, what is required is mere
identity of issues where the parties, although not
identical, present conflicting claims.20 The justification
for consolidation is to prevent a judge from deciding
identical issues presented in the case assigned to him in a
manner that will prejudice another judge from deciding a
similar case before him.
We are perplexed why the CA did not act on and grant
the request for consolidation filed on August 20, 2009 by
the heirs of Fabiana. In fact, the consolidation should
have been required as a matter of course even without
any of the parties seeking the consolidation of the
petitions, considering that the two cases rested on the
same set of facts, and involved claims arising from the
death of the late Marlon Fabiana.
It is true that under the Rules of Court, 21 the
consolidation of cases for trial is permissive and a matter
of judicial discretion.22 This is because trials held in the
first instance require the attendance of the parties, their
respective counsel and their witnesses, a task that surely
entails an expense that can multiply if there are several
proceedings upon the same issues involving the same
parties. At the trial stage, the avoidance of unnecessary
expenses and undue vexation to the parties is the primary
objective of consolidation of cases.23 But the
permissiveness of consolidation does not carry over to
the appellate stage where the primary objective is less
the avoidance of unnecessary expenses and undue
vexation than it is the ideal realization of the dual
function of all appellate adjudications. The dual function
is expounded thuswise:
An appellate court serves a dual function. The first is the
review for correctness function, whereby the case is
reviewed on appeal to assure that substantial justice has
been done. The second is the institutional function,
which refers to the progressive development of the law
for general application in the judicial system.
Differently stated, the review for correctness function is
concerned with the justice of the particular case while
the institutional function is concerned with the
articulation and application of constitutional principles,
the authoritative interpretation of statutes, and the
formulation of policy within the proper sphere of the
judicial function.
The duality also relates to the dual function of all
adjudication in the common law system. The first
pertains to the doctrine of res judicata, which decides the
case and settles the controversy; the second is the
doctrine of stare decisis, which pertains to the
precedential value of the case which assists in deciding
future similar cases by the application of the rule or
principle derived from the earlier case.
With each level of the appellate structure, the review for
correctness function diminishes and the institutional
function, which concerns itself with uniformity of
judicial administration and the progressive development
of the law, increases.24
In the appellate stage, therefore, the rigid policy is to
make the consolidation of all cases and proceedings
resting on the same set of facts, or involving identical
claims or interests or parties mandatory. Such
consolidation should be made regardless of whether or
not the parties or any of them requests it. A mandatory
policy eliminates conflicting results concerning similar
or like issues between the same parties or interests even
as it enhances the administration of justice.
In this connection, the Court reminds all attorneys
appearing as counsel for the initiating parties of their
direct responsibility to give prompt notice of any related
cases pending in the courts, and to move for the
consolidation of such related cases in the proper courts.
This responsibility proceeds from their express
undertakings in the certifications against forum-shopping
that accompany their initiatory pleadings pursuant to
Section 5 of Rule 7 and related rules in the Rules of
Court, to the effect that they have not theretofore
commenced any actions or filed any claims involving the
same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial
agency and, to the best of their knowledge, no such other
actions or claims are pending therein; that if there were
such other pending actions or claims, to render complete
statements of the present status thereof; and if they
should thereafter learn that the same or similar actions or
claims have been filed or are pending, they shall report
that fact within five days therefrom to the courts wherein
the said complaints or initiatory pleadings have been
filed.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the
administrative complaint against Presiding Justice
Andres B. Reyes, Jr., Associate Justice Isaias P.
Dicdican and Associate Justice Stephen C. Cruz of the
Court of Appeals for its lack of merit.
The Court of Appeals is DIRECTED to forthwith adopt
measures that will ensure the strict observance of
Section 3, Rule III of the 2009 Internal Rules of the
Court of Appeals, including the revision of the rule itself
to make the consolidation of cases and proceedings
concerning similar or like issues or involving the same
parties or interests mandatory and not dependent on the
initiative of the parties or of any of them.
All attorneys of the parties in cases brought to the third
level courts either on appeal or interlocutory review (like
certiorari) are REQUIRED to promptly notify the
reviewing courts of the pendency of any other cases and
proceedings involving the same parties and issues
pending in the same or other courts.
Let this decision be FURNISHED to the Court of
Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals and the
Office of the Court Administrator for their guidance; and
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for dissemination
to all its chapters.

SO ORDERED.
 OCA IPI No. 12-204-CA-J
Re: VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DISBARMENT
OF AMA LAND, INC. (REPRESENTED BY
JOSEPH B. USITA) AGAINST COURT OF
APPEALS ASSOCIATE JUSTICES HON.
DANTON Q. BUESER, HON. SESINANDO E.
VILLON AND HON. RICARDO R. ROSARIO
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Unfounded administrative charges against sitting judges
truly degrade their judicial office, and interfere with the
due performance of their work for the Judiciary. The
complainant may be held liable for indirect contempt of
court as a means of vindicating the integrity and
reputation of the judges and the Judiciary.
AMA Land, Inc., (AMALI) brought this administrative
complaint against Associate Justice Danton Q. Bueser,
Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon and Associate
Justice Ricardo R. Rosario, all members of the Court of
Appeals (CA), charging them with knowingly rendering
an unjust judgment, gross misconduct, and violation of
their oaths on account of their promulgation of the
decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 118994 entitled Wack
Wack Residents Association, Inc. v. The Honorable
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 264,
Assigned in San Juan, and AMA Land, Inc.
Antecedents
AMALI is the owner and developer of the 37-storey
condominium project located along Epifanio Delos
Santos Avenue corner Fordham Street in Wack Wack,
Mandaluyong City.1 Due to the project‘s location,
AMALI would have to use Fordham Street as an access
road and staging area for the construction activities. In
that regard, AMALI needed the consent of the Wack
Wack Residents Association, Inc. (WWRAI).
Accordingly, AMALI sent a notice to WWRAI, which
ignored the notice. Left with no option, AMALI set up a
field office along Fordham Street that it enclosed with a
temporary fence. WWRAI allegedly tried to demolish
the field office and set up a fence to deny access to
AMALI‘s construction workers, which prompted
AMALI to file a petition for the enforcement of an
easement of right of way in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Pasig City. The petition, which included an
application for a temporary restraining order (TRO)
and/or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
(WPMI), was docketed as Civil Case No. 65668.2 On
July 24, 1997, the RTC granted AMALI‘s prayer for the
WPMI.3
In the meantime, AMALI converted the condominium
project into a 34-storey building of mixed use (to be
known as the AMA Residences) after AMALI‘s petition
for corporate rehabilitation was approved.4
On January 26, 2010, WWRAI filed in Civil Case No.
65668 an urgent motion to set for hearing its prayer for a
TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction (WPI)
contained in its answer. The denial of the prayer for
injunction by the RTC impelled WWRAI to bring a
petition for certiorari with an application for a TRO
and/or writ of preliminary injunction in the CA to enjoin
the RTC from proceeding in Civil Case No. 65668.5
After hearing, the CA issued a TRO, which prompted
AMALI to file an Urgent Motion to Lift and/or Dissolve
Temporary Restraining Order and later on a Compliance
and Motion for Reconsideration.
On July 28, 2011, the CA issued a preliminary
injunction and required AMALI to file its Comment.
AMALI complied and filed a Comment which also
served as its motion for partial reconsideration of the
July 28, 2011 Resolution. On October 12, 2011, AMALI
filed an Urgent Motion to Resolve and to Approve
Counterbond. Allegedly, these motions were left
unresolved when the CA Tenth Division, which included
Associate Justices Bueser and Rosario, required the
parties to submit their respective memoranda.6
On June 14, 2012, the Special Former Tenth Division of
the CA promulgated a decision granting the petition of
WWRAI.7
AMALI consequently filed a petition for review on
certiorari in this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 202342,
entitled AMA Land, Inc. v. Wack Wack Residents
Association, Inc.8
AMALI then brought this administrative complaint,
alleging that respondent Justices had conspired with the
counsels of WWRAI, namely: Atty. Archibald F. de
Mata and Atty. Myra Jennifer D. Jaud-Fetizanan, in
rendering an unjust judgment. AMALI stated that the
decision of the CA had been rendered in bad faith and
with conscious and deliberate intent to favor WWRAI,
and to cause grave injustice to AMALI. In thereby
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, respondent
Justices were guilty of gross misconduct, and violated
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 1, Rules 10.01 and 10.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Issue
Are the respondent Justices liable for knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment and violating Canon 1,
Rule 1.01; Canon 10, Rules 10.01 and 10.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility; and Section 27, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court?
Ruling
The administrative complaint is bereft of merit.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the
burden of proving the allegations of the complaint by
substantial evidence.9 Failure to do so will lead to the
dismissal of the complaint for its lack of merit. This is
because an administrative charge against any official of
the Judiciary must be supported by at least substantial
evidence.10 But when the charge equates to a criminal
offense, such that the judicial officer may suffer the
heavy sanctions of dismissal from the service, the
showing of culpability on the part of the judicial officer
should be nothing short of proof beyond reasonable
doubt, especially because the charge is penal in
character.11
AMALI fell short of the requirements for establishing its
charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment
against respondent Justices.
Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment constitutes a
serious criminal offense. Article 204, Revised Penal
Code, provides that any judge who "knowingly render[s]
an unjust judgment in any case submitted to him for
decision" is punished with prision mayor and perpetual
absolute disqualification. To commit the offense, the
offender must be a judge who is adequately shown to
have rendered an unjust judgment, not one who merely
committed an error of judgment or taken the unpopular
side of a controversial point of law.12 The term
knowingly means "sure knowledge, conscious and
deliberate intention to do an injustice."13 Thus, the
complainant must not only prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the judgment is patently contrary to law or not
supported by the evidence but that it was also made with
deliberate intent to perpetrate an injustice. Good faith
and the absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper
consideration are sufficient defenses that will shield a
judge from the charge of rendering an unjust decision.14
In other words, the judge was motivated by hatred,
revenge, greed or some other similar motive in issuing
the judgment.15 Bad faith is, therefore, the ground for
liability.16 The failure of the judge to correctly interpret
the law or to properly appreciate the evidence presented
does not necessarily render him administratively
liable.17
But who is to determine and declare that the judgment or
final order that the judicial officer knowingly rendered
or issued was unjust? May such determination and
declaration be made in administrative investigations and
proceedings like a preliminary investigation by the
public prosecutor? The answers to these queries are
obvious – only a superior court acting by virtue of either
its appellate or supervisory jurisdiction over the judicial
actions involved may make such determination and
declaration. Otherwise, the public prosecutor or
administrative hearing officer may be usurping a basic
judicial power of review or supervision lodged by the
Constitution or by law elsewhere in the appellate court.
Moreover, AMALI‘s allegations directly attacked the
validity of the proceedings in the CA through an
administrative complaint. The attack in this manner
reflected the pernicious practice by disgruntled litigants
and their lawyers of resorting to administrative charges
against sitting judges instead of exhausting all their
available remedies. We do not tolerate the practice. In
Re: Verified Complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco,
Chairman of the Board/CEO of FH-GYMN Multi-
Purpose and Transport Service Cooperative, against
Hon. Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., Hon. Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and
Hon. Florito S. Macalino, Associate Justices, Court of
Appeals,18 we emphatically held that the filing of
administrative complaints or even threats of the filing
subverted and undermined the independence of the
Judiciary, to wit:
It is evident to us that Ongjoco‘s objective in filing the
administrative complaint was to take respondent Justices
to task for the regular performance of their sworn duty of
upholding the rule of law. He would thereby lay the
groundwork for getting back at them for not favoring his
unworthy cause. Such actuations cannot be tolerated at
all, for even a mere threat of administrative investigation
and prosecution made against a judge to influence or
intimidate him in his regular performance of the judicial
office always subverts and undermines the independence
of the Judiciary.
We seize this occasion, therefore, to stress once again
that disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions
brought against any judge in relation to the performance
of his official functions are neither complementary to
nor suppletory of appropriate judicial remedies, nor a
substitute for such remedies. Any party who may feel
aggrieved should resort to these remedies, and exhaust
them, instead of resorting to disciplinary proceedings
and criminal actions. (Bold emphasis supplied)
It appears that AMALI is prone to bringing charges
against judicial officers who rule against it in its cases.
That impression is not at all devoid of basis.1âwphi1
The complaint herein is actually the second one that
AMALI has brought against respondent Justices in
relation to the performance of their judicial duty in the
same case. In its first complaint entitled Re: Verified
Complaint of AMA Land, Inc. against Hon. Danton Q.
Bueser, Hon. Sesinando E. Villon and Hon. Ricardo R.
Rosario, Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals,19
AMALI accused respondent Justices of: (a) dishonesty
and violation of Republic Act No. 3019, gross
misconduct, and knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment or order, in violation of Section 8, Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court; and (b) violating provisions of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct. The Court dismissed the
first complaint upon finding that it centered on the
propriety of the interlocutory orders issued by
respondent Justices in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 118994. The
Court appropriately observed:
A perusal of the records of the case as well as the
parties‘ respective allegations disclosed that the acts
complained of relate to the validity of the proceedings
before the respondent CA Justices and the propriety of
their orders in CA-G.R. SP No. 118994 which were done
in the exercise of their judicial functions. Jurisprudence
is replete with cases holding that errors, if any,
committed by a judge in the exercise of his adjudicative
functions cannot be corrected through administrative
proceedings, but should instead be assailed through
available judicial remedies. Disciplinary proceedings
against justices do not complement, supplement or
substitute judicial remedies and, thus, cannot be pursued
simultaneously with the judicial remedies accorded to
parties aggrieved by their erroneous orders or judgments.
xxxx
In this case, AMALI had already filed a petition for
review on certiorari challenging the questioned order of
the respondent CA justices which is still pending final
action by the Court. Consequently, a decision on the
validity of the proceedings and propriety of the orders of
the respondent CA Justices in this administrative
proceeding would be premature. Besides, even if the
subject decision or portions thereof turn out to be
erroneous, administrative liability will only attach upon
proof that the actions of the respondent CA Justices were
motivated by bad faith, dishonesty or hatred, or attended
by fraud or corruption, which were not sufficiently
shown to exist in this case. Neither was bias as well as
partiality established. Acts or conduct of the judge
clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice must be
clearly shown before he can be branded the stigma of
being biased and partial. In the same vein, bad faith or
malice cannot be inferred simply because the judgment
or order is adverse to a party. Here, other than AMALI‘s
bare and self-serving claim that respondent CA Justices
"conspired with WWRAI‘s counsel in knowingly and in
bad faith rendering an unjust judgment and in
committing xxx other misconduct," no act clearly
indicative of bias and partiality was alleged except for
the claim that respondent CA Justices misapplied the law
and jurisprudence. Thus, the presumption that the
respondent judge has regularly performed his duties shall
prevail. Moreover, the matters raised are best addressed
to the evaluation of the Court in the resolution of
AMALI‘s petition for review on certiorari.
Finally, resort to administrative disciplinary action prior
to the final resolution of the judicial issues involved
constitutes an abuse of court processes that serves to
disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of
justice and further clog the courts‘ dockets. Those who
seek relief from the courts must not be allowed to ignore
basic legal rules and abuse of court processes in their
efforts to vindicate their rights. (Bold emphasis supplied)
This administrative case is no different from the first.
They are identical, with the complaint herein containing
only a few but insignificant changes in relation to the
first. Both were intended to intimidate or to disparage
respondent Justices in the performance of their judicial
functions.
The filing of the meritless administrative complaints by
AMALI was not only repulsive, but also an outright
disrespect of the authority of the CA and of this Court.
Unfounded administrative charges against judges truly
degrade the judicial office, and interfere with the due
performance of their work for the Judiciary. Although
the Court did not then deem fit to hold in the first
administrative case AMALI or its representative
personally responsible for the unfounded charges
brought against respondent Justices, it is now time,
proper and imperative to do so in order to uphold the
dignity and reputation of respondent Justices, of the CA
itself, and of the rest of the Judiciary. AMALI and its
representatives have thereby demonstrated their
penchant for harassment of the judges who did not do its
bidding, and they have not stopped doing so even if the
latter were sitting judges. To tolerate the actuations of
AMALI and its representatives would be to reward them
with undeserved impunity for an obviously wrong
attitude towards the Court and its judicial officers.
Indeed, no judicial officer should have to fear or
apprehend being held to account or to answer for
performing his judicial functions and office because such
performance is a matter of public duty and
responsibility. The office and duty to render and
administer justice area function of sovereignty, and
should not be simply taken for granted. As a recognized
commentator on public offices and public officers has
written:20
It is a general principle, abundantly sustained by
authority and reason, that no civil action can be
sustained against a judicial officer for the recovery of
damages by one claiming to have been injured by the
officer‘s judicial action within his jurisdiction. From the
very nature of the case, the officer is called upon by law
to exercise his judgment in the matter, and the law holds
his duty to the individual to be performed when he has
exercised it, however erroneous or disastrous in its
consequences it may appear either to the party or to
others.
A number of reasons, any one of them sufficient, have
been advanced in support of this rule. Thus it is said of
the judge: "His doing justice as between particular
individuals, when they have a controversy before him, is
not the end and object which were in view when his
court was created, and he was selected to preside over or
sit in it. Courts are created on public grounds; they are to
do justice as between suitors, to the end that peace and
order may prevail in the political society, and that rights
may be protected and preserved. The duty is public, and
the end to be accomplished is public; the individual
advantage or loss results from the proper and thorough
or improper and imperfect performance of a duty for
which his controversy is only the occasion. The judge
performs his duty to the public by doing justice between
individuals, or, if he fails to do justice as between
individuals, he may be called to account by the State in
such form and before such tribunal as the law may have
provided. But as the duty neglected is not a duty to the
individual, civil redress, as for an individual injury, is
not admissible."21
Accordingly, we now demand that AMALI‘s authorized
representative, Joseph B. Usita, its Senior Assistant Vice
President, and the Members of the Board of Directors of
AMALI who had authorized Usita to file the present
complaint, to show cause in writing why they should not
be held in indirect contempt of court for bringing the
unfounded and baseless charges against respondent
Justices not only once but twice. To be clear, the filing
of unfounded and baseless administrative charges
against sitting judicial officers may constitute indirect
contempt under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court, to wit:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge
and hearing. — After a charge in writing has been filed,
and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment
thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court
and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of
any of the following acts may be punished for indirect
contempt:
(a)Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the
performance of his official duties or in his official
transactions;
(b)Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ,
process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act
of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected
from any real property by the judgment or process of any
court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or
induces another to enter into or upon such real property,
for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or
possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession
given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;
(c)Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the
processes or proceedings of a court not constituting
direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule;
(d)Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly,
to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of
justice;
(e)Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court,
and acting as such without authority;
(f)Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g)The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or
property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order
or process of a court held by him.
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to
prevent the court from issuing process to bring the
respondent into court, or from holding him in custody
pending such proceedings. (3a)
ACCORDINGLY, the Court (a) DISMISSES the
administrative complaint against Associate Justice
Danton Q. Bueser, Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon
and Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario for its utter
lack of merit; and (b) ORDERS Joseph B. Usita, the
Senior Assistant Vice President of AMA Land, Inc., and
all the members of the Board of Directors of AMA Land,
Inc. who had authorized Usita to bring the administrative
complaint against respondent Associate Justices to show
cause in writing within 10 days from notice why they
should not be punished for indirect contempt of court for
degrading the judicial office of respondent Associate
Justices, and for interfering with the due performance of
their work for the Judiciary.
SO ORDERED.

Anent indirect contempt, the Court said in Lorenzo

Shipping Corporation v. Distribution Management
Association of the Philippines:22

Contempt of court has been defined as a willful

disregard or disobedience of a public authority. In its
broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience
to, the rules or orders of a legislative or judicial body or
an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior
or insolent language in its presence or so near thereto as
to disturb its proceedings or to impair the respect due to
such a body. In its restricted and more usual sense,
contempt comprehends a despising of the authority,
justice, or dignity of a court. The phrase contempt of
court is generic, embracing within its legal signification
a variety of different acts.

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all

courts, and need not be specifically granted by statute. It
lies at the core of the administration of a judicial system.
Indeed, there ought to be no question that courts have the
power by virtue of their very creation to impose silence,
respect, and decorum in their presence, submission to
their lawful mandates, and to preserve themselves and
their officers from the approach and insults of pollution.
The power to punish for contempt essentially exists for
the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and for
the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of
the courts, and, consequently, for the due administration
of justice. The reason behind the power to punish for
contempt is that respect of the courts guarantees the
stability of their institution; without such guarantee, the
institution of the courts would be resting on a very shaky
foundation.23 (Bold emphasis supplied)
 WILSON B. TAN v. JESUS HERNANDO In his report and recommendation dated June 29,
AM No P-08-2501, AUG 28 2009 2001,[6] Judge Chiu recommended the following
alternative courses of action, namely:
DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.: a) That the decision on the matter be

held in abeyance until after a verdict

All Judiciary employees are expected to be was promulgated in Criminal Case

exemplars of fairness and honesty in both their official No. L-345 of the Municipal Trial

conduct and their personal actuations, including their Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 2,

business and commercial transactions. The community Dumaguete City (that is, the

sees them in no other light. Thus, we insist upon this criminal case the complainant had

standard in dealing with the administrative complaint filed against Hernando charging him

against an employee in the Office of the Clerk of Court with other deceits), because said

of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Dumaguete City, case was based on the same facts

Negros Oriental. involved in the administrative

matter; or

The antecedents follow.

b) That Hernando be suspended for 5

By his letter-complaint dated July 5, days, without pay, for dishonesty

1999,[1] complainant Wilson Tan charged respondent due to his failure to keep his

Jesus F. Hernando, Clerk IV, with dishonesty, moral promise to pay to the complainant

turpitude and conduct unbecoming a public officer. He the obligation of P3,000.00.

alleged that on October 1, 1998, Hernando, then with the

Office of the Clerk of Court, went to his store to On December 10, 2001, the Court resolved to

borrow P3,000.00 because Hernando then needed hold in abeyance its action on the evaluation, report and

money; that as payment Hernando promised to deliver recommendation in order to await the final outcome of

his October 1998 half-month salary check Criminal Case No. L-345.[7]

worth P3,000.00 upon receiving it, which promise was

reflected on an acknowledgement receipt; that Hernando On May 8, 2007, the Office of the Court

reneged on his promise and did not pay his obligation Administrator (OCAd) received from the complainant a

despite repeated demands; and that the act of Hernando certified copy of the decision promulgated in Criminal

compelled him to commence a criminal case Case No. L-345 on August 9, 2004 by the MTCC,

for estafa against Hernando.[2] Branch 2, in Dumaguete City,[8] together with the entry
of final judgment.[9]

In his comment dated September 9,

1999,[3] Hernando admitted that he had On October 1, 2007, the Court referred the

borrowed P3,000.00 from the complainant on October 1, matter to the Executive Judge, RTC,

1998, but insisted that he had already paid the loan in in Dumaguete City for evaluation, report and

full on January 27, 1999. However, the acknowledgment recommendation.

receipt[4] issued by the complainant stated that Hernando

still had a balance of P1,500.00. Through her letter dated January 14,
2008,[10] RTC Executive Judge Fe Lualhati D.

On March 12, 2001, we referred the matter to Bustamante reported that the decision in Criminal Case

Executive Judge Eleuterio E. Chiu of the RTC No. L-345 rendered by the MTCC, Branch 2,

in Dumaguete City for investigation, report and in Dumaguete City had absolved Hernando criminally

recommendation.[5] but had ordered him to pay to the complainant the

amount of P3,000.00 and interest at the rate of 12% per
annum from October 1, 1998 until the amount was fully
satisfied. She noted that Hernando had reached the Considering the foregoing, we
recommend that Respondent be found
compulsory age of retirement on December 25, 2004. guilty of willful failure to pay just debts
which is classified as a light offense and
punishable as follows: 1st offense -
In the same report, Executive Judge Bustamante reprimand; 2nd offense - suspension for
also made the following recommendation, to wit: one (1) day to thirty (30) days;
3rd offense - dismissal. Just debts refer to
(1) claims adjudicated by a court of law;
Mr. Hernando is in the twilight of
or (2) claims the existence and justness
his years. In his youth, he may have
of which are admitted by the debtor.
committed certain indiscretions. But he
was a model employee, well-liked and
This being respondents first
steadfast in his work as clerk in the
offense, the imposable penalty would
Office of the Clerk of Court of the then
have been a reprimand. However, since
Court of First Instance and later the
respondent already reached the
Regional Trial Court. He married late
compulsory retirement age on 25
and had children who are still of tender
December 2004 and is no longer
ages (the youngest is ten years old). This
reporting to work, the penalty of fine
is the reason why he had to resort to
should be imposed instead.
borrowing as his salary is not enough to
support a growing family as the wife is
WHEREFORE, premises
unemployed. Mr. Hernando was humble
considered, it is respectfully
enough to admit that as of the moment,
recommended that the instant complaint
he could not pay his obligation to Dr.
be re-docketed as a regular
Tan as he is living on a day to day basis
administrative matter and that
as his salary was cut off upon
respondent Jesus F. Hernando be
retirement.
FINED in the amount of P5,000.00.
The undersigned therefore
recommends that the Court adopts the
findings of his honor, Roderick A. We adopt the recommendation of the Court
Maxino, who found that he is civilly
liable to Dr. Wilson B. Tan in the Administrator because it was supported by the evidence
amount of P3,000.00 and that he be on record.
ordered to pay the aforesaid amount
with interest of 12% from 1 October
1998 until fully paid. Having incurred just debts, Hernando had
the moral and legal duty to pay them when they became
The undersigned humbly
recommends that Mr. Hernando be due. As a court employee, he must comply with his valid
allowed to retire so that the retirement contractual obligation, act fairly and adhere to high
benefits due him be released.
ethical standards to preserve the Judiciarys integrity and
reputation. Unfortunately, he failed to prove that he had
On March 12, 2008, we referred the matter to
adequately discharged his obligation. Hence, his
the OCAd for evaluation, report and recommendation.[11]
actuations warrant condign disciplinary action.
The law on disciplinary action for nonpayment
In the memorandum dated May 8,
of just debts is Section 46(b)(22), Chapter 7, Subtitle A
2008,[12] Court Administrator Zenaida Elepao stated:
(Civil Service Commission), Title I, Book V of
The trial court absolved Executive Order (EO) No. 292 (The Revised
respondent of the crime of other deceits Administrative Code of 1987), which pertinently states:
but found him civilly liable to
complainant in the amount of P3,000.00
Sec. 46. Discipline: General
with interest at the rate of 12% per
Provisions. (a) No officer or employee
annum from October 1, 1998 until the
in the Civil Service shall be suspended
amount is fully satisfied. The trial court
or dismissed except for cause as
explained that respondents civil liability
provided by law and after due process.
was pegged at P3,000.00, the full
amount of the loan, in view of the
(b) The following shall be
parties failure to show proof of the
grounds for disciplinary action:
amount that has been paid by the
xxx
respondent, thus, leaving the
(22) Willful failure to pay just
outstanding balance uncertain.
debts or willful failure to pay taxes due
to the government;
 xxx SO ORDERED.
Under Section 22, Rule XIV of the Rules
Implementing Book V of EO No. 292, as modified by
Section 52(C)(10), Rule IV of Resolution No. 991936 of
the Civil Service Commission (Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service), just debts
include: 1) claims adjudicated by a court of law; or 2)
claims the existence and justness of which are admitted
by the debtor. Hernandos obligation falls under both
classifications.

Hernando cannot escape administrative

responsibility. As we said in Orasa v. Seva:[13]

The Court cannot overstress the

need for circumspect and proper
behavior on the part of court employees.
While it may be just for an individual to
incur indebtedness unrestrained by the
fact that he is a public officer or
employee, caution should be taken to
prevent the occurrence of dubious
circumstances that might inevitably
impair the image of the public office.
Employees of the court should always
keep in mind that the court is regarded
by the public with
respect. Consequently, the conduct of
each court personnel should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of
(sic) onus and must at all times be
characterized by, among other things,
uprightness, propriety and decorum.

The Court Administrator recommends a fine

of P5,000.00, in lieu of reprimand, the penalty for the
violation to be imposed on a first-time offender like
Hernando. The recommendation is premised on the fact
that he had meanwhile retired from the service,
rendering reprimand an impractical and ineffectual
penalty. Although we agree that a fine is appropriate
under the circumstances, we hold that the amount be
only P1,000.00 considering that Hernando had already
been adjudged by the MTCC in the criminal case to pay
to the complainant the amount of P3,000.00.

WHEREFORE, respondent Jesus F. Hernando

is fined in the amount of P1,000.00.

In the interest of justice and for humanitarian

reasons, the Court directs that the respondents retirement
benefits be released to him at the soonest possible time.
 A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1321-P July 16, 2013
CONCERNED CITIZEN, Complainant,
vs.
NONITA V. CATENA, COURT STENOGRAPHER
III, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 50,
PUERTO PRINCESA, PALAWAN, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Gross dishonesty on the part of an employee of the
Judiciary is a very serious offense that must be severely
punished. Dismissal may be meted on the employee,
unless she had meanwhile ceased to be an employee, in
which case a high fine shall be imposed.
Antecedents
This administrative case stemmed from an undated
anonymous letter-complaint charging respondent Nonita
Catena (Catena), a Court Stenographer III of Branch 50
of the Regional Trial Court in Puerto Princesa City,
Palawan (RTC) with gross dishonesty she allegedly
committed in connection with her Civil Service
eligibility accusing her of having caused another person
to take the Civil Service Eligibility Examination in her
stead.
1
The letter reads, thus:
Sir:
I would like to bring to your attention an anomaly
brought about by one Noneta Catina.
She is permanently employed as stenographer under the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 50 here in the
Justice Hall of Puerto Princesa City.
In 1998, somebody took the stenographer‘s examination
in her behalf in Leyte. She allegedly passed said
examination that gave her the permanent position of
stenographer in 1998.
May I request for a verification and if found guilty, I
hope CSC will do something in fairness to those who are
taking your Stenographer‘s examination.
Thank you very much and more power!
Concerned Citizen
On January 18, 2002, Justice Jose P. Perez, a Member of
this Court, as Deputy Court Administrator, forwarded
the complaint against Catena for investigation by the
Legal Division of the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA). The investigation revealed discrepancies
between the pictures, signatures and other details
contained in the Career Service Examination permit
submitted to the Civil Service Commission (CSC), on
one hand, and the 201 file of Catena, on the other.2
On February 21, 2002, Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, a
Member of this Court, the Court Administrator then,
directed Catena to comment within ten days on the
anonymous complaint.3
Catena implored the OCA for a 30-day extension of the
period within which to submit her comment. 4 Despite
her request being granted, she failed to submit a
comment, causing the Court to issue a tracer letter on
September 24, 2002,5 but still enjoining her to comply
with the previous directive to file a comment within five
days from notice, or else the complaint would be
resolved without her comment.
On August 13, 2003, the OCA recommended that a
resolution addressed to Catena‘s home and office
addresses requiring her to comment within 10 days from
notice be issued.6 On October 1, 2003, therefore, the
Court, after noting the anonymous complaint, required
Catena to comment on it within 10 days from notice. 7
Catena still failed to comment on the complaint
thereafter, prompting the Court to require her on March
17, 2004 to show cause why she should not be
disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such
failure, and to comply with the October 1, 2003
resolution by submitting the comment within 10
days.8 Subsequently, on November 24, 2004, the Court
issued another resolution to reiterate the show-cause
order of March 17, 2004.9
On March 9, 2005, however, Judge Nelia Yap-
Fernandez of the RTC formally informed the Court that
Catena had already resigned from her position effective
on January 2, 2003.10
In view of this communication, the Court resolved on
April 11, 2005, to await the compliance of Catena with
the resolution dated November 24, 2004.11 On
September 26, 2005, the Court required Judge Yap-
Fernandez to provide Catena‘s current and correct
address within 15 days from notice because Catena
continued to ignore the previous resolutions.12
Eventually on February 12, 2007, the Court directed the
Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC to provide Catena‘s
current and correct address within 10 days13 because of
Judge Yap-Fernandez‘s intervening disability
14
retirement. In turn, Ms. Jessie C. Gipal, as Officer-in-
Charge of the RTC, complied, and furnished Catena‘s
current and correct address to be at Purok Sandiwa,
Brgy. New Princess 5300, Puerto Princesa City, 15 which
compliance was duly noted on June 25,
2007.16 Subsequently, on February 4, 2008, the Court
considered as served on Catena the previous resolutions
of June 25 2007, October 1, 2003, March 17, 2004 and
November 24, 2004 because of the return on the service
at that address being "Return to Sender-unclaimed."17
On April 28, 2008, the Court resolved anew to await
Catena‘s comment,18 and decided to dispense with her
comment only on August 20, 2008, and to refer the
complaint to the OCA for evaluation, report and
recommendation.19
The complaint was later on re-docketed as a regular
administrative matter on the basis of the
recommendation made on October 7, 2009 by Justice
Perez, then already the Court Administrator, who
recommended that Catena be held liable for dishonesty
and be dismissed from the service with prejudice to re-
employment in any branch, agency, instrumentality of
the government, including government owned and
controlled corporations.20
On October 26, 2009, the Court required Catena to
manifest if she was willing to submit the case for
resolution on the basis of the records and pleadings filed
within 10 days from notice.21 On December 13, 2010,
the Court resent the resolution because the postal carrier
reported that Catena as the addressee had been "out of
town" and did not receive the mail matter.22
After the subsequent attempt to serve still failed because,
as noted on the envelope, Catena as the addressee had
"moved out," the Court deemed the resolution of
October 26, 2009 as served on her on April 13, 2011. 23
Still, on May 30, 2011,24 the Court directed the Director
of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to locate
the whereabouts of Catena and to submit a report thereon
within 10 days from notice.
On August 5, 2011, Head Agent (HA) Rosauro D.
Bautista of the NBI District Office in Puerto Princesa
City sent the following report, viz:
Respondent, NONITA V. CATENA was located at her
residence in Purok Sandiwa, Barangay Tiniguiban,
Puerto Princesa but refused to sign the herein NOTICE,
nevertheless received the document. Agent of the Puerto
Princesa District Office served the herein NOTICE on
respondent on July 25, 2011 and the same was
communicated to the Office of the Deputy Director for
Operations Services in Manila. Photograph of herein
respondent was taken for identitifcation and reference
purposes.25
On August 9, 2011, NBI Director Magtanggol Gatdula,
citing and quoting the foregoing report of HA Bautista,
submitted his compliance with the resolution of May 30,
2011,26 praying that the compliance be accepted.
Hence, we resolve.
Ruling
Based on its investigation, the OCA found discrepancies
between the pictures, signatures and other details
contained in Catena‘s Career Service Examination
permit submitted to the CSC, on one hand, and those
found in her 201 file,27 on the other; and concluded that
she was thereby guilty of gross dishonesty. It
recommended her dismissal from the service, with
prejudice to re-employment in any branch, agency,
instrumentality or agency of the government including
government-owned and -controlled corporations.28
The findings and recommendation of the OCA, being
based on established facts, are well-taken, but we modify
the recommended sanction in view of Catena‘s
intervening resignation from the service effective on
January 2, 2003.
Let it be said at the outset that Catena‘s resignation from
the service did not cause the Court to lose its jurisdiction
to proceed against her in this administrative case. Her
cessation from office by virtue of her intervening
resignation did not warrant the dismissal of the
administrative complaint against her, for the act
complained of had been committed when she was still in
the service. Nor did such cessation from office render
the administrative case moot and academic. Indeed, the
Court‘s jurisdiction at the time of the filing of the
administrative complaint was not lost because the
respondent had ceased in office during the pendency of
the case.29 Otherwise, exacting responsibility for
administrative liabilities incurred would be easily
avoided or evaded.
The point of the complaint against Catena is that she
misrepresented in her Personal Data Sheet (PDS) that
she held a Sub-Professional Civil Service Eligibility, but
in truth another person had taken the Civil Service
Examination in her place. Her claim that she held a Sub-
Professional Civil Service Eligibility with a rating of
86.48%, as stated in her PDS submitted to the Court,
was, therefore, entirely false.30
Attempting to disprove the charge that she did not take
the eligibility examination herself, Catena submitted her
approved leave application and her daily time records
corresponding to the period of the eligibility
examination. Her submission was really not enough,
however, because said documents did not establish that
she had herself taken the examination, or that she had
been personally at the testing site on the date of the
examination. At best, the approved leave application
attested only that she had applied for a leave of absence
from work, and that her application had been approved,
while her daily time records affirmed only that she did
not report to her office on the dates that she had
supposedly gone on leave.
Perhaps anticipating that her submission of the daily
time records and approved leave application would not
suffice to support her explanation, she stated in her
request for the 30-day extension to file the comment that
she would be needing the time to gather the documents
she would submit as her evidence to disprove the charge
of gross dishonesty,31 specifically: (1) a certification
from the head office of the Negros Navigation Company
in Manila, to show that she had travelled from Puerto
Princesa City to Iloilo City, and from Cebu City to Leyte
on the date of the examination; (2) affidavits of residents
of Leyte attesting to her being in the locality of the
examination and to her taking the examination herself;
(3) records on file with the CSC office in Leyte; and (4)
other evidence of similar nature. But ultimately she did
not come forward with the promised documentary
evidence, notwithstanding her awareness of the desire of
the Court to hear her side.
Compounding Catena‘s situation was her unusual silence
on the complaint despite the very ample opportunity
accorded her to comment. Being conscious of the gravity
of the complaint against her, she should have come
forward to explain her side. In that regard, too, we have
to stress that the directives for her to comment were not
mere requests to be lightly taken, but firm commands to
be obeyed without the least delay.32 What her silence
signified was that she had no desire to clear her name
and to save her employment in the Judiciary. Worse, her
silence now also signifies that she had nothing to say in
her own defense, because it was naturally expected of
her based on the natural instinct of man for self-
preservation to resist the serious charge if it was untrue
and unfair. Her silence in the face of the accusation of
gross dishonesty was justifiably construed as her implied
admission of the truth thereof.33
Considering that Catena‘s misrepresentation of her
eligibility concerned a material fact that enabled her to
secure her appointment equated to her deliberate
fabrication of the truth concerning her eligibility, she
was guilty of gross dishonesty. She should not be
allowed to remain in the service of the Judiciary,
because no other office in the Government exacted a
greater demand for mortal righteousness from an official
or employee than a position in the Judiciary.34
A finding of dishonesty against an employee in the Civil
Service carries with it the penalty of dismissal. Under
Rule IV Section 52 (A) (1) of the Revised Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service Rules
(Revised Uniform Rules), dishonesty is classified as a
grave offense that is already punishable by dismissal
from the service even at the first offense.
In addition, Section 57 and Section 58 of the Revised
Uniform Rules provide as follows:
Section 57. Administrative Disabilities/Accessories to
Administrative Penalties.
a. Cancellation of eligibility
b. Forfeiture of retirement benefits.
c. Disqualification for reinstatement or
reemployment.
d. Disqualification for promotion.
e. Bar from taking any Civil Service
Examination
Section 58. Administrative Disabilities Inherent in
Certain Penalties.
a. The penalty of dismissal shall carry with it
that of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of
retirement benefits, and the perpetual
disqualification for reemployment in the
government service, unless otherwise provided
in the decision.
b. The penalty of transfer shall carry with it
disqualification for promotion for a period of six
(6) months from the date of respondent reports
to the new position or station.
c. The penalty of demotion shall carry with it
disqualification for promotion at the rate of two
(2) months for every step or one (1) month for
every range of salary by which he was demoted
to be computed from the date respondent reports
to the new position or station.1âwphi1
d. The penalty of suspension shall carry with it
disqualification for promotion corresponding to
the period of suspension.
e. The penalty of fine shall carry with it
disqualification for promotion for a period of
twice the number of days he was fined.
f. The penalty of fine shall be paid to the agency
imposing the same, computed on the basis of
respondent‘s salary at the time the decision
becomes final and executor.
g. The following are the Guidelines for the
payment of fine:
xxxx
In Civil Service Commission v. Macud,35 the penalty of
dismissal was prescribed with the accessory penalties
against respondent who had been found guilty of making
a false declaration in her PDS that she had passed the
Professional Board Examination for Teachers. In Cruz v.
Civil Service Commission36 and Civil Service
Commission v. Sta. Ana,37 the employees found guilty of
similar offenses were dismissed. In Cruz, Zenaida Paitim
had masqueraded as Gilda Cruz, and had taken the Civil
Service examination in lieu of Cruz. Both Paitim and
Cruz were meted the penalty of dismissal from the
service. In Sta. Ana, another person had taken the Civil
Service examination for Sta. Ana, who was held guilty
of dishonesty and dismissed from the service.
We do not deviate from such precedents. Catena‘s
dismissal from the service is the appropriate penalty,
with her eligibility to be cancelled, her retirement
benefits to be forfeited, and her disqualification from
reemployment in the government service to be perpetual.
Nonetheless, we do not forfeit her accrued leave credits
to accord with the ruling in Sta. Ana.38
Catena‘s intervening resignation necessarily means that
the penalty of dismissal could no longer be implemented
against her. Instead, fine is imposed, the determination
of the amount of which is subject to the sound discretion
of the Court.39 As earlier clarified, the resignation did
not prevent this resolution from being made, because
resignation should not be used as a convenient means or
strategy to evade administrative liability.40
Section 56 (e) of Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules
provides that the penalty of fine shall be in an amount
not exceeding the salary for six months had respondent
not resigned, the rate for which is that obtaining upon at
the time of her resignation.
Finally, even though her penalty is a fine, she should still
suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification
from re-employment in the Government that the penalty
of dismissal carried. A contrary holding would have the
undesirable effect of giving the erring employee the
means to avoid the accessory penalty by the simple
expedient of resigning.
Let it be stressed that all court employees of the
Judiciary, being public servants in an office dispensing
justice, must always act with a high degree of
professionalism and responsibility. Their conduct must
not only be characterized by propriety and decorum, but
must also be in accordance with the law and court
regulations. They should be models of uprightness,
fairness and honesty, for that is the only way to maintain
the people's respect for and faith in the Judiciary. They
should avoid any act or conduct that would diminish
public trust and confidence in the courts.41

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and DECLARES

NONITA V. CATENA, former Court Stenographer III,
Branch 50, Regional Trial Court in Puerto Princesa City,
Palawan, GUILTY of GROSS DISHONESTY; and
ORDERS her to pay a FINE equivalent to her salary for
six months computed at the salary rate for her former
position at the time of her resignation, with prejudice to
her re-employment in any branch of the Government,
including government-owned or -controlled
corporations.

In the event that her leave credits are insufficient to

answer for the fine, NONITA V. CATENA shall pay the
fine to the Court within 10 days from the date of finality
of this decision.

SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 6732, Oct 22, 2013
ATTY. OSCAR EMBIDO v. ATTY. SALVADOR
PE
BERSAMIN, J.:
A lawyer who forges a court decision and represents it as
that of a court of law is guilty of the gravest misconduct
and deserves the supreme penalty of disbarment.
The Case
Before this Court is the complaint for disbarment against
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Atty. Salvador N. Pe, Jr.
(respondent) of San Jose, Antique for his having
allegedly falsified an inexistent decision of Branch 64 of
the Regional Trial Court stationed in Bugasong, Antique
(RTC) instituted by the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI), Western Visayas Regional Office, represented by
Regional Director Atty. Oscar L. Embido.
Antecedent
On July 7, 2004, Atty. Ronel F. Sustituya, Clerk of
Court of the RTC, received a written communication
from Mr. Ballam Delaney Hunt, a Solicitor in the United
Kingdom (UK). The letter requested a copy of the
decision dated February 12, 1997 rendered by Judge
Rafael O. Penuela in Special Proceedings Case No. 084
entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive
Death of Rey Laserna, whose petitioner was one Shirley
Quioyo.[1]
On September 9, 2004, the RTC received another letter
from Mr. Hunt, reiterating the request for a copy of the
decision in Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In
the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of
Rey Laserna.[2]
Judge Penuela instructed the civil docket clerk to
retrieve the records of Special Proceedings Case No. 084
entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive
Death of Rey Laserna. It was then discovered that the
RTC had no record of Special Proceedings No. 084
wherein Shirley Quioyo was the petitioner. Instead, the
court files revealed that Judge Penuela had decided
Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the
Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rolando
Austria, whose petitioner was one Serena Catin Austria.
Informed that the requested decision and case records
did not exist,[3] Mr. Hunt sent a letter dated October 12,
2004 attaching a machine copy of the purported decision
in Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of
the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey
Laserna that had been presented by Shirley Quioyo in
court proceedings in the UK.[4]
After comparing the two documents and ascertaining
that the document attached to the October 12, 2004 letter
was a falsified court document, Judge Penuela wrote Mr.
Hunt to apprise him of the situation. [5]
The discovery of the falsified decision prompted the
Clerk of Court to communicate on the situation in
writing to the NBI, triggering the investigation of the
falsification.[6]
In the meanwhile, Dy Quioyo, a brother of Shirley
Quioyo, executed an affidavit on March 4,
2005,[7] wherein he stated that it was the respondent who
had facilitated the issuance of the falsified decision in
Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the
Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna for a
fee of P60,000.00. The allegations against the
respondent were substantially corroborated by Mary
Rose Quioyo, a sister of Shirley Quioyo, in an affidavit
dated March 20, 2005.[8]
The NBI invited the respondent to explain his side, [9] but
he invoked his constitutional right to remain silent. The
NBI also issued subpoenas to Shirley Quioyo and Dy
Quioyo but only the latter appeared and gave his sworn
statement.
After conducting its investigation, the NBI forwarded to
the Office of the Ombudsman for Visayas the records of
the investigation, with a recommendation that the
respondent be prosecuted for falsification of public
document under Article 171, 1 and 2, of the Revised
Penal Code, and for violation of Section 3(a) of
Republic Act 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act).[10] The NBI likewise recommended to the
Office of the Court Administrator that disbarment
proceedings be commenced against the
respondent.[11] Then Court Administrator Presbitero J.
Velasco, Jr. (now a Member of the Court) officially
endorsed the recommendation to the Office of the Bar
Confidant.[12]
Upon being required by the Court, the respondent
submitted his counter-affidavit,[13] whereby he denied
any participation in the falsification. He insisted that Dy
Quioyo had sought his opinion on Shirley's petition for
the annulment of her marriage; that he had given advice
on the pertinent laws involved and the different grounds
for the annulment of marriage; that in June 2004, Dy
Quioyo had gone back to him to present a copy of what
appeared to be a court decision;[14] that Dy Quioyo had
then admitted to him that he had caused the falsification
of the decision; that he had advised Dy Quioyo that the
falsified decision would not hold up in an investigation;
that Dy Quioyo, an overseas Filipino worker (OFW),
had previously resorted to people on Recto Avenue in
Manila to solve his documentation problems as an OFW;
and that he had also learned from Atty. Angeles Orquia,
Jr. that one Mrs. Florencia Jalipa, a resident of
Igbalangao, Bugasong, Antique, had executed a sworn
statement before Police Investigator Herminio Dayrit
with the assistance of Atty. Orquia, Jr. to the effect that
her late husband, Manuel Jalipa, had been responsible
for making the falsified document at the instance of Dy
Quioyo.[15]
Thereafter, the Court issued its resolution[16] treating the
respondent's counter-affidavit as his comment, and
referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In a report and recommendation dated June 14,
2006,[17] Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the IBP
Investigating Commissioner, found the respondent guilty
of serious misconduct and violations of the Attorney's
Oath and Code of Professional Responsibility, and
recommended his suspension from the practice of law
for one year. She concluded that the respondent had
forged the purported decision of Judge Penuela by
making it appear that Special Proceedings No. 084
concerned a petition for declaration of presumptive death
of Rey Laserna, with Shirley Quioyo as the petitioner,
when in truth and in fact the proceedings related to the
petition for declaration of presumptive death of Rolando
Austria, with Serena Catin Austria as the
petitioner;[18] and that the respondent had received
P60,000.00 from Dy Quioyo for the falsified decision.
She rationalized her conclusions thusly:
Respondent's denials are not worthy of merit.
Respondent contends that it was one Manuel Jalipa
(deceased) who facilitated the issuance and as proof
thereof, he presented the sworn statement of the widow
of Florencia Jalipa (sic). Such a contention is hard to
believe. In the first place, if the decision was obtained in
Recto, Manila, why was it an almost verbatim
reproduction of the authentic decision on file in Judge
Penuela's branch except for the names and dates?
Respondent failed to explain this. Secondly, respondent
did not attend the NBI investigation and merely invoked
his right to remain silent. If his side of the story were
true, he should have made this known in the
investigation. His story therefore appears to have been a
mere afterthought. Finally, there is no plausible reason
why Dy Quioyo and his sister, Mary Rose Quioyo would
falsely implicate him in this incident.[19]
In its Resolution No. XVII-2007-063 dated February 1,
2007,[20] the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved, with modification, the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner by
suspending the respondent from the practice of law for
six years.
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors
passed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-709[21] denying the
respondent's motion for reconsideration and affirming
Resolution No. XVII-2007-063. The IBP Board of
Governors then forwarded the case to the Court in
accordance with Section 12(b), Rule 139-B[22] of
the Rules of Court.
On January 11, 2011, the Court resolved: (1) to treat the
respondent's comment/opposition as his appeal by
petition for review; (2) to consider the complainant's
reply as his comment on the petition for review; (3) to
require the respondent to file a reply to the complainant's
comment within 10 days from notice; and (4) to direct
the IBP to transmit the original records of the case
within 15 days from notice.
Ruling
We affirm the findings of the IBP Board of Governors.
Indeed, the respondent was guilty of grave misconduct
for falsifying a court decision in consideration of a sum
of money.
The respondent's main defense consisted in blanket
denial of the imputation. He insisted that he had had no
hand in the falsification, and claimed that the
falsification had been the handiwork of Dy Quioyo. He
implied that Dy Quioyo had resorted to the shady
characters in Recto Avenue in Manila to resolve the
problems he had encountered as an OFW, hinting that
Dy Quioyo had a history of employing unscrupulous
means to achieve his ends.
However, the respondent's denial and his implication
against Dy Quioyo in the illicit generation of the
falsified decision are not persuasive. Dy Quioyo's
categorical declaration on the respondent's personal
responsibility for the falsified decision, which by nature
was positive evidence, was not overcome by the
respondent's blanket denial, which by nature was
negative evidence.[23] Also, the imputation of
wrongdoing against Dy Quioyo lacked credible specifics
and did not command credence. It is worthy to note, too,
that the respondent filed his counter-affidavit only after
the Court, through the en banc resolution of May 10,
2005, had required him to comment.[24] The belatedness
of his response exposed his blanket denial as nothing
more than an afterthought.
The respondent relied on the sworn statement
supposedly executed by Mrs. Jalipa that declared that her
deceased husband had been instrumental in the
falsification of the forged decision. But such reliance
was outrightly worthless, for the sworn statement of the
wife was rendered unreliable due to its patently hearsay
character. In addition, the unworthiness of the sworn
statement as proof of authorship of the falsification by
the husband is immediately exposed and betrayed by the
falsified decision being an almost verbatim reproduction
of the authentic decision penned by Judge Penuela in the
real Special Proceedings Case No. 084.
In light of the established circumstances, the respondent
was guilty of grave misconduct for having authored the
falsification of the decision in a non-existent court
proceeding. Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility demands that all lawyers should uphold at
all times the dignity and integrity of the Legal
Profession. Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states that "a lawyer shall not engage in
conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave
in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession." Lawyers are further required by Rule 1.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility not to engage
in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or fraudulent transactions can justify a
lawyer's disbarment or suspension from the practice of
law.[25] Specifically, the deliberate falsification of the
court decision by the respondent was an act that reflected
a high degree of moral turpitude on his part. Worse, the
act made a mockery of the administration of justice in
this country, given the purpose of the falsification, which
was to mislead a foreign tribunal on the personal status
of a person. He thereby became unworthy of continuing
as a member of the Bar.
It then becomes timely to remind all members of the
Philippine Bar that they should do nothing that may in
any way or degree lessen the confidence of the public in
their professional fidelity and integrity.[26] The Court will
not hesitate to wield its heavy hand of discipline on
those among them who wittingly and willingly fail to
meet the enduring demands of their Attorney's Oath for
them to:

x x x support [the] Constitution and obey the laws as

well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities
therein; xxx do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in court; x x x not wittingly or willingly promote or
sue on groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid
nor consent to the same; x x x delay no man for money
or malice, and x x x conduct [themselves as lawyers]
according to the best of [their] knowledge and discretion
with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [their]
clients x x x.

No lawyer should ever lose sight of the verity that the

practice of the legal profession is always a privilege that
the Court extends only to the deserving, and that the
Court may withdraw or deny the privilege to him who
fails to observe and respect the Lawyer's Oath and the
canons of ethical conduct in his professional and private
capacities. He may be disbarred or suspended from the
practice of law not only for acts and omissions of
malpractice and for dishonesty in his professional
dealings, but also for gross misconduct not directly
connected with his professional duties that reveal his
unfitness for the office and his unworthiness of the
principles that the privilege to practice law confers upon
him.[27] Verily, no lawyer is immune from the
disciplinary authority of the Court whose duty and
obligation are to investigate and punish lawyer
misconduct committed either in a professional or private
capacity.[28] The test is whether the conduct shows the
lawyer to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity, and good demeanor, and whether the conduct
renders the lawyer unworthy to continue as an officer of
the Court.[29]

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS AND

PRONOUNCES ASST. PROVINCIAL
PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR. guilty of
violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, and Rule 7.03 of Canon
7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
and DISBARS him effective upon receipt of this
decision.

The Court DIRECTS the Bar Confidant to remove the

name of ASST. PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR
SALVADOR N. PE, JR. from the Roll of Attorneys.

This decision is without prejudice to any pending or

contemplated proceedings to be initiated against ASST.
PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE,
JR.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of

the Bar Confidant, the Office of the Court Administrator
for dissemination to all courts of the country, and to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.