NGO TE vs.
YU-TE presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the
579 SCRA 193 | February 13, 2009
Witnesses; Expert Witnesses; By the very nature of Article 36 of the
Family Code, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of
decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as
decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties.— The parties’ whirlwind relationship
lasted more or less six (6) months. They met in January 1996, eloped
in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June.
The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties
psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s behavioral pattern falls
under the classification of dependent personality disorder, and
respondent’s, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder.
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary
task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead,
must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The presentation of expert proof
presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe
and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.— Hernandez v.
Court of Appeals, 320 SCRA 76 (1999) emphasizes the importance of
presenting expert testimony to establish the precise cause of a party’s
psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of
the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos, 343 SCRA 755 (2000) asserts,
there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself. This is not to mention, but we mention
nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe
and incurable presence of psychological incapacity. Parenthetically, the
Court, at this point, finds it fitting to suggest the inclusion in the Rule
on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages, an option for the trial judge to refer the case to
a court-appointed psychologist/expert for an independent assessment
and evaluation of the psychological state of the parties. This will assist
the courts, who are no experts in the field of psychology, to arrive at an
intelligent and judicious determination of the case. The rule, however,
does not dispense with the parties’ prerogative to present their own
expert witnesses.
FACTS:
Kenneth met Rowena in a Filipino-Chinese gathering on campus. They
did not have interest with each other at first but they developed a
certain degree of closeness due to the fact that they share the same
angst with their families. In 1996, while still in college, Rowena
proposed that they should elope. Kenneth initially refused on the
ground that he is young and jobless but due to Rowena’s persistence
Kenneth complied bringing with him P80K. The money soon after
disappeared and they found themselves forced to return to their
respective home. Subsequently, Rowena’s uncle brought the two
before a court and had had them be married. After marriage, Kenneth
and Rowena stayed with her uncle’s house where Kenneth was treated
like a prisoner. Kenneth was advised by his dad to come home
otherwise he will be disinherited. One month later, Kenneth was able
to escape and he was hidden from Rowena’s family. Kenneth later
contacted Rowena urging her to live with his parents instead. Rowena
however suggested that he should get his inheritance so that they could
live together separately or just stay with her uncle. Kenneth however
was already disinherited. Upon knowing this, Rowena said that it is
better if they live separate lives from then on. Four years later, filed for
an annulment of their marriage. Rowena did not file an answer. The
City Prosecutor, after investigation, submitted that he cannot
determine if there is collusion between the 2 parties hence the need to
try the merits of the case. The opinion of an expert was sought wherein
the psychologist subsequently ruled that both parties are
psychologically incapacitated. The said relationship between Edward
and Rowena is said to be undoubtedly in the wreck and weakly-
founded. The break-up was caused by both parties’ unreadiness to
commitment and their young age. He was still in the state of finding
his fate and fighting boredom, while she was still egocentrically
involved with herself. The trial court ruled that the marriage is void
upon the ruling of the expert psychologist. The OSG appealed and the
CA ruled in favor of the OSG. The OSG claimed that the
psychological incapacity of both parties was not shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable (Molina case). The
clinical psychologist did not personally examine respondent, and relied
only on the information provided by petitioner. Further, the
psychological incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity,
juridical antecedence and incurability. All these were requirements set
forth in the Molina case to be followed as guidelines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the expert opinion of the psychologist should be
admitted in lieu of the guidelines established in the landmark case of
Molina.
HELD:
The SC ruled that admittedly, the SC may have inappropriately
imposed a set of rigid rules in ascertaining PI. So much so that the
subsequent cases after Molina were ruled accordingly to the doctrine
set therein. And that there is not much regard for the law’s clear
intention that each case is to be treated differently, as “courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience,
the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines,
and by decisions of church tribunals.” The SC however is not
abandoning the Molina guidelines, the SC merely reemphasized that
there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should
govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under
Article 36 such as in the case at bar. The principle that each case must
be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for
emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis;
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
The SC then ruled that the marriage of Kenneth and Rowena is null
and void due to both parties’ psychological disorder as evidenced by
the finding of the expert psychologist. Both parties being afflicted with
grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity. Kenneth cannot
assume the essential marital obligations of living together, observing
love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is
unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others. He is
too dependent on others. Rowena cannot perform the essential marital
obligations as well due to her intolerance and impulsiveness.
The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties
psychologically incapacitated. Edward’s behavioral pattern falls under the
classification of dependent personality disorder, and Rowena’s, that of the
narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder. There is no requirement that
the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally
examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show
a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological
incapacity, the precipitous marriage that they contracted on April 23, 1996 is
thus, declared null and void.
Republic v CA and Molina
Set of Strict Standards in the Interpretation of Art 36 of the FC
Established in the Molina Case (RP vs Molina)
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to
the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence
and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it “as
the foundation of the nation.” It decrees marriage as legally
“inviolable,” thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be “protected” by the
state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological—not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that
the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so
as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
ofejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the
celebration” of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness
was existing when the parties exchanged their “I do’s.” The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but
the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must
be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily
to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them
but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of
the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild
characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts” cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element
in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard
to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in
the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It
is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision
Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which
became effective in 1983 and which provides:

“The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are

unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of
psychological nature.”

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to

harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it
stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive
weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally
— subject to our law on evidence—what is decreed as canonically
invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose
of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious
interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the
Church—while remaining independent, separate and apart from each
other—shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal
of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable
base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall
be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification,
which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons
for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall
submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the
date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
PEOPLE vs. DOMASIAN
219 SCRA 245 | March 01, 1993
Criminal Law; Kidnapping; Evidence; Credibility of Witness; Finding
on the credibility of the witnesses by the trial judge is received with
much respect by the appellate court.—First, on the credibility of the
witnesses. This is assessed in the first instance by the trial judge,
whose finding in this regard is received with much respect by the
appellate court because of his opportunity to directly observe the
demeanor of the witnesses on the stand.
Same; Same; Same; Alibi; Domasian's alibi cannot stand against his
positive identification by Enrico, Grate and Ferreras let alone the
contradictions made by his corroborating witness; Tan's alibi is not
convincing either.—Domasian's alibi cannot stand against his positive
identification by Enrico, Grate and Ferreras, let alone the
contradictions made by his corroborating witness, Dr. Irene Argosino,
regarding the time he was in the optical clinic and the manner of his
payment for the refraction. Tan's alibi is not convincing either. The
circumstance that he may have been in Manila at the time of the
incident does not prove that he could not have written the ransom note
except at that time.
Same; Same; Same; Handwriting expert; The value of the opinion of a
handwriting expert depends not upon his mere statements of whether a
writing is genuine or false but upon the assistance he may afford in
pointing out distinguishing marks, characteristics and discrepancies in
and between genuine and false specimens of writing which would
ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed observer.—
We have held that the value of the opinion of a handwriting expert
depends not upon his mere statements of whether a writing is genuine
or false, but upon the assistance he may afford in pointing out
distinguishing marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and between
genuine and false specimens of writing which would ordinarily escape
notice or detection from an unpracticed observer. The test of
genuineness ought to be the resemblance, not the formation of letters
in some other specimens but to the general character of writing, which
is impressed on it as the involuntary and unconscious result of
constitution, habit or other permanent course, and is, therefore itself
permanent.
FACTS:
March 11, 1982 morning: While Enrico was walking with Tirso
Ferreras, his classmate, along Roque street in the poblacion of Lopez,
Quezon, he was approached by Pablito Domasian who requested his
assistance in getting his father's signature on a medical certificate.
Enrico agreed to help and rode with the man in a tricycle to
Calantipayan, where he waited outside while the man went into a
building to get the certificate. Enrico became apprehensive and started
to cry when, instead of taking him to the hospital, the man flagged a
minibus and forced him inside, holding him firmly all the while. The
man told him to stop crying or he would not be returned to his father.
When they alighted at Gumaca, they took another tricycle, this time
bound for the municipal building from where they walked to the
market. Here the man talked to a jeepney driver and handed him an
envelope addressed to Dr. Enrique Agra, the boy's father. The two then
boarded a tricycle headed for San Vicente. As Enrico was crying and
being firmly held, Alexander Grate, the tricycle driver became
suspicious and asked Domasian about his relationship with the boy
who told him they were brothers. Their physical differences and the
wide gap between their ages made Grate doubt so he immediately
reported the matter to two barangay tanods when his passengers
alighted from the tricycle. Grate and the tanods went after the two and
saw the man dragging the boy. Noticing that they were being pursued,
Domasian was able to escape, leaving Enrico behind. Enrico was on
his way home in a passenger jeep when he met his parents, who were
riding in the hospital ambulance and already looking for him.
At about 1:45 in the afternoon of the same day, after Enrico's return,
Agra received an envelope containing a ransom note. The note
demanded P1 million for the release of Enrico and warned that
otherwise the boy would be killed. Agra thought the handwriting in the
note was familiar. After comparing it with some records in the
hospital, he gave the note to the police, which referred it to the NBI for
examination. March 11, 1982 1:45 pm: Agra received an envelope
containing a ransom note demanding P1 million otherwise Enrico will
be killed. . Agra thought the handwriting in the note was familiar so
he referred it to the NBI for examination and it turned out to be Dr.
Samson Tan’s signature.
Domasian and Tan were subsequently charged with the crime of
kidnapping with serious illegal detention in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon
- Domasian’s alibi: at the time of the incident he was watching a
mahjong game in a friend's house and later went to an optical
clinic with his wife for the refraction of his eyeglasses
- Dr. Tan’s alibi: he was in Manila
Enrico, Tirso Ferreras and Grate all pointed Domasian.
RTC: Domasian and Tan guilty as charged and sentenced them to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and all accessory penalties.
Appealed.
ISSUE:
W/N Domasian and Tan is guilty of kidnapping kidnapping with
serious illegal detention
HELD:
YES. Appealed decision is AFFIRMED.
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention may consist not
only in placing a person in an enclosure but also in detaining him or
depriving him in any manner of his liberty.
- Tan claims that the lower court erred in not finding that the
sending of the ransom note was an impossible crime which he
says is not punishable.
- Tan conveniently forgets the first paragraphs of the same
article, which clearly applies to him, thus:
Art. 4. Criminal liability. — Criminal liability shall be
incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
Even before the ransom note was received, the crime of kidnapping
with serious illegal detention had already been committed. The act
cannot be considered an impossible crime because there was no
inherent improbability of its accomplishment or the employment of
inadequate or ineffective means. The sending of the ransom note
would have had the effect only of increasing the penalty to death under
the last paragraph of Article 267 although this too would not have been
possible under the new Constitution.
On the issue of conspiracy, we note first that it exists when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it, whether they act through physical
volition of one or all, proceeding severally or collectively. These acts
were complementary to each other and geared toward the attainment of
the common ultimate objective, viz., to extort the ransom of P1 million
in exchange for Enrico's life.
The motive for the offense is not difficult to discover. According to
Agra, Tan approached him 6 days before the incident happened and
requested a loan of at least P15,000.00. Agra said he had no funds at
that moment and Tan did not believe him, angrily saying that Agra
could even raise a million pesos if he really wanted to help.
Relevant portion in the case:

Concerning the note, Rule 132, Section 22, of the Rules of Court provides as
follows: The handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes
it to be the handwriting of such person and has seen the person write, or has seen
writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged and
has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. Evidence
respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the
witness or the court with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party
against whom the evidence is offered or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of
the judge.
and he had seen that handwriting every day in Tan's prescriptions and daily
reports.
Cesar v. Sandiganbayan is not applicable because that case involved a
forgery or the deliberate imitation of another person's signature. In the case
before us, there was in fact an effort to disguise the ransom note writer's
penmanship to prevent his discovery.

Two expert witnesses were presented in the case at bar, one from the NBI,
who opined that the ransom note and the standard documents were written
by one and the same person, and another from the PC/INP who expressed a
contrary conclusion. The trial court chose to believe the NBI expert because
his examination and analysis "was more comprehensive than the one
conducted by the PC/INP handwriting expert, who virtually limited his
reliance on the perceived similarities and dissimilarities in the pattern and
style of the writing, thereby disregarding the basic principle in handwriting
identification that it is not the form alone nor anyone feature but rather a
combination of all the qualities that identify."

We have held that the value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends
not upon his mere statements of whether a writing is genuine or false, but
upon the assistance he may afford in pointing out distinguishing marks,
characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine and false
specimens of writing which would ordinarily escape notice or detection from
an unpracticed observer. The test of genuineness ought to be the
resemblance, not the formation of letters in some other specimens but to the
general character of writing, which is impressed on it as the involuntary and
unconscious result of constitution, habit or other permanent course, and is,
therefore itself permanent.
Presented with the conflicting opinions of the witnesses in the case at bar, the
Court feels that the scales should tilt in favor of the prosecution.
Significantly, the NBI opinion was bolstered by the testimony of Agra, who
believed that the ransom note was written by Tan, with whose handwriting he
was familiar because they had been working in the hospital for four years
PEOPLE vs. SUYU
499 SCRA 177 | August 16, 2006
Criminal Law; Robbery with Rape; Evidence; Witnesses; In the
absence of any clear showing that the trial court overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied facts or circumstances of weight and
substance, which would have affected the result of the case, the
findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to
the highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. —To begin
with, the rule is that, in the absence of any clear showing that the trial
court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied facts or circumstances
of weight and substance, which would have affected the result of the
case, the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are
entitled to the highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. The
stringency with which appellate tribunals have observed this rule is
predicated on the undisputed vantage of the trial court in the
evaluation and appreciation of testimonial evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The credibility of complainant’s testimony
is a primordial consideration in rape cases for the accused may be
convicted solely on the testimony of the victim, provided it is credible,
natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal
course of things.—The trial court found Clarissa’s testimony to be
consistent, believable, and credible, hence, is worthy of full faith and
credit. The CA reviewed Clarissa’s testimony and found the same to be
clear, sincere and could have only come from the mouth of a victim.
During the grueling cross-examination conducted by three separate
counsels of appellants, she remained steadfast in her testimony that she
was raped. The credibility of complainant’s testimony is a primordial
consideration in rape cases for the accused may be convicted solely on
the testimony of the victim, provided it is credible, natural, convincing
and consistent with human nature
and the normal course of things. When the testimony of a rape victim
is simple and straightforward, unshaken by rigorous cross examination
and unflawed by any serious inconsistency or contradiction, the same
must be given full faith and credit.
Same; Alibi; It is a time-honored rule that alibi is a weak defense when
unsubstantiated by credible and plausible testimonies.—The common
defense of alibi used by the appellants cannot, moreover, prevail over
Clarissa’s clear and convincing narration of the events that transpired
and her positive identification of her assailants. It is a time-honored
rule that alibi is a weak defense when unsubstantiated by credible and
plausible testimonies. To merit approbation, clear and convincing
evidence must be adduced that the accused was in a place other than
the situs of the crime at the time the crime was committed, such that it
was physically impossible for him to have committed the crime.
Same; Same; Courts generally view the defenses of denial and alibi
with disfavor on account of the facility with which an accused can
concoct them to suit his defense.—After going over the voluminous
records, We find no error in the aforesaid observations of the trial court
as affirmed by the CA. Courts generally view the defenses of denial
and alibi with disfavor on account of the facility with which an
accused can concoct them to suit his defense. Again, these weak
defenses cannot stand against the positive identification and
categorical testimony of a rape victim. Clarissa, in this case, as
aforesaid, passed the test of credibility in her account of her ordeal;
positively identified her assailants; and had no ill-motive to falsely
implicate them to the commission of a crime, other than her desire to
seek justice for a wrong. Where an alleged rape victim says she was
sexually abused, she says almost all that is necessary to show that rape
had been inflicted on her person, provided her testimony meets the test
of credibility.
FACTS:
At around 7:15 in the evening on January 13, 1996, Clarissa Angeles, a
third-year student of St. Paul University, was with her boyfriend,
William Ferrer. They were eating snacks inside a pick-up truck parked
in a vacant lot. Suddenly, a man, who turned out to be Rommel
Macarubbo, appeared in front of the truck, pointed a gun at them and
said: "This is a holdup. If you will start the engine of the car, I will
shoot you." Thereafter, another man, who turned out to be Willy Suyu,
lifted the lock on William's side and entered the pick-up. Willy Suyu
then took Ferrer's wallet which contained around P150.00. A third
man, who turned out to be Francis Cainglet, took Clarissa's jewelry
valued at around P2, 500.00 and cash amounting to P10.00. Thereafter,
Willy Suyu clubbed William and dragged him out of the truck.
Fortunately, William was able to escape and immediately went to the
police station to report the incident. Meanwhile, Willy Suyu lifted the
lock of the pick-up truck at Clarissa's side. Macarubbo then opened the
door. The two and Cainglet dragged the girl to a hilly place, not far
away. Macarubbo and Willy Suyu held her by the arms, while Cainglet
poked a fan knife at her. There, they ravished her.
ISSUE:
What was the crime committed?
examination, her deportment was not of that of a rape victim and the
examination of her cervix did not even suggest forcible assault.The
said argument is, however, without merit. Hymenal lacerations which
are usually inflicted when there is complete penetration are not
essential in establishing the crime of rape as it is enough that a slight
penetration or entry of the penis into the lips of the vagina takes place.
Partial penile penetration is as serious as full penetration; the rape is
deemed consummated in either case. Dr. Pintucan further found
contusion and hematoma on the victim, which bolsters Clarissa's
recount that she was dragged, forced to lie down, and raped.
The conviction thus of appellants for robbery with rape defined and
penalized under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code is
correct. The intent to rob must precede the rape. In robbery with rape,
the intention of the felony is to rob and the felony is accompanied by
rape. The rape must be contemporaneous with the commission of the
robbery. There is only one single and indivisible felony of robbery
with rape and any crimes committed on the occasion or by reason of
the robbery are merged and integrated into a single and indivisible
felony of robbery with rape.

HELD:
Robbery with rape defined and penalized under Article 294, paragraph
1 of the RPC. While it is true that the victim initially did not reveal to
the authorities the fact that she was raped after the robbery, this does
not cast doubt on her testimony for it is not uncommon for a rape
victim right after her ordeal to remain mum about what really
transpired. Jurisprudence has established that delay in revealing the
commission of rape is not an indication of a fabricated charge, and the
same is rendered doubtful only if the delay was unreasonable and
unexplained.
Appellants also assert that the medical report issued by Dr. Pintucan
does not conclusively suggest that Clarissa was raped, for during the