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The Demography of Indonesia in

Comparative Perspective
a
Peter McDonald
a
The Australian National University
Published online: 24 Mar 2014.

To cite this article: Peter McDonald (2014) The Demography of Indonesia in

Comparative Perspective, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 50:1, 29-52, DOI:
10.1080/00074918.2014.896236

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 Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol. 50, No. 1, 2014: 29–52

THE DEMOGRAPHY OF INDONESIA IN

COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Peter McDonald
The Australian National University

Having reduced its fertility rate over the past 40 years, Indonesia has reached a
new demographic crossroad. Its fertility rate is now around 2.5 births per woman,
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which, if sustained, would add substantial numbers to Indonesia’s population in

the future. There are concerns within Indonesia that the present level of population
growth is an obstacle to continued economic development and, accordingly, that
fertility should be reduced to the replacement level of 2.1 births per woman as soon
as possible. Yet a comparative perspective indicates that countries such as Singa-
pore, Japan, and Thailand are concerned about the effects that their very low rates
of fertility are having on their labour forces and their rates of population ageing.
This article suggests that with the right policy settings Indonesia can avoid this out-
come yet continue to reduce its fertility. It discusses the implications of Indonesia’s
population growth and distribution for its economy, as well as the poor quality of
demographic data.

Keywords: population growth, age structure, urbanisation, fertility, mortality, population

and development

JEL classification: J11, J21, J61, O15

INTRODUCTION
Reducing the rate of population growth by reducing the fertility rate has been a
central component of Indonesia’s development planning agenda since the late
1960s. This has also been the position of most comparator countries in Southeast
Asia and East Asia. In effect, the aim has been to reduce the fertility rate to around
two births per woman. Today that aim is close to being achieved in Indonesia,
and in some provinces the fertility rate has fallen below this level. Indonesia’s
population will continue to grow, however, because of ‘population momentum’,
in which future population growth is driven by increasingly higher numbers of
women in the reproductive ages and, hence, by more births than deaths.
One of the main justifications for the introduction in the 1960s and 1970s of
policies to reduce fertility in developing countries was that in the 20 to 40 years
following the fall in fertility, the age distribution of the population would con-
centrate in the working ages. Without the economic burden of large numbers of
children and large family sizes, nations and families alike could apply capital to
productive investment rather than to consumption, resulting in higher GDP per
capita. In the interim, the smaller numbers of children would mean that a greater

ISSN 0007-4918 print/ISSN 1472-7234 online/14/00029-24 © 2014 Indonesia Project ANU

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00074918.2014.896236
 30 Peter McDonald

level of expenditure could be applied to the education of each child (Jones 1971).
Over time, the country would experience a leap forward in human capital as the
next, smaller generation was educated to higher levels. Universal primary educa-
tion was an associated feature of these policies. Today this approach is referred
to as the ‘demographic dividend’ or ‘demographic bonus’. It has been argued
that the demographic dividend was a central component of the economic suc-
cesses in countries such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore (Bloom
and Williamson 1998; Kinugasa 2013). Its logic was also part of the rationale for
China’s adoption of the one-child policy. Deng Xiaoping was a major sponsor of
the one-child policy, based on his expressed view that China would not be able
to develop its economy or raise the living standards of its people unless the birth
rate fell rapidly (Potts 2006). There is also a reasonable argument that the contrast-
ing economic development pathways of Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines
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over the past 40 years have been associated with the relative timing and extent of
the decline in fertility in these countries.
The use of fertility reduction as a policy approach to development arose out
of the Cold War. In the years immediately after the Second World War, Ameri-
can demographers such as Frank Notestein and Ansley Coale were able to con-
vince the US government that declining fertility was a necessary prerequisite for
economic development. This was something of a reversal of the previous theo-
retical position, demographic transition theory, by which fertility fell only as a
consequence of development (Szreter 1993). Demographic transition theory had
strong theoretical underpinnings. In contrast, the view that fertility could fall
prior to economic development was based not so much on a theory of how this
might occur as on the consequences if it did occur. More than any other source,
the evidence for this consequential argument was provided by the book Popula-
tion Growth and Economic Development in Low-Income Countries (Coale and Hoover
1958). In the context of the Cold War battle for the hearts and minds of people
in developing countries, lowering fertility was presented as a means to rapidly
increase living standards, so that they would be won over to the capitalist way.
By 1967, 30 heads of government, including the newly appointed General Soe-
harto, acting president of Indonesia, had signed a strikingly worded Declaration
on Population:

As Heads of Governments actively concerned with the population problem, we

share these convictions: We believe that the population problem must be recog-
nised as a principal element in long-range national planning if governments are
to achieve their economic goals and fulfill the aspirations of their people. We be-
lieve that the great majority of parents desire to have the knowledge and the means
to plan their families; that the opportunity to decide the number and spacing of
children is a basic human right. We believe that lasting and meaningful peace will
depend to a considerable measure upon how the challenge of population growth
is met. We believe the objective of family planning is the enrichment of human life,
not its restriction; that family planning, by assuring greater opportunity to each per-
son, frees man to attain his individual dignity and reach his full potential. (Turbay
Ayala and Caradon 1968, 3)

This statement has been the mainstay of population policy in Indonesia since
1967. A vigorous national family-planning program began in Indonesia in the
1970s, and, as I describe later in this article, Indonesia’s fertility rate has more
 The Demography of Indonesia in Comparative Perspective 31

than halved since that time. The centre point of Indonesian population policy has
been, and still is, to reduce the rate of population growth as rapidly as possible by
controlling fertility.
The family-planning approach to development aims to reduce the national
fertility rate to around two births per woman, on average. This level of fertil-
ity produces zero population growth in the longer term. In several countries in
Southeast and East Asia, however, fertility has fallen well below two births per
woman, giving rise to concerns about rapid ageing of their populations and the
adequacy of future labour supplies. Japan, Taiwan, the Republic of Korea, and
Singapore have all taken pronatalist stances in a desire to increase their fertil-
ity rates (Westley, Choe, and Retherford 2010). Thailand has also moved in this
direction, in its 11th National Economic and Social Development Plan 2012–2016
(NESDB 2012). While the efforts to reduce fertility from high levels to around
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two births per woman have been remarkably successful in most cases, attempts
to raise the birth rate from very low levels, both in Europe and in East Asia, have
been largely unsuccessful. In recognition of this, Singapore has recently published
a white paper advocating relatively large-scale immigration in order to slow the
ageing of its population and to meet current and future labour demand (NPTD
2013). As described below, migration to Singapore has run at a very high level in
the past five to eight years. In demographic terms, immigration can be effective in
offsetting very low fertility in a country with a small population, like Singapore,
but the levels of immigration required to offset very low fertility in large popula-
tions, such as those of Japan or Thailand, or possibly in Indonesia in the future,
are not credible. There are also cultural obstacles to large-scale migration—as evi-
denced, to this point, by Japan. In the context of its very low fertility rate, there is
considerable debate about the appropriateness of China continuing its one-child
policy (Feng, Cai, and Gu 2012).
The spectre of very low fertility is very much on the policy agenda in countries
where fertility has fallen to or is approaching two births per woman. Given the
experience of other Asian countries with longer histories of fertility decline, what
approach should Indonesia be taking to its future level of fertility? Will internal
migration from higher-growth provinces be able to compensate for labour short-
ages that may arise in low-fertility regions? How rapid is the ageing of Indonesia’s
population and how big an issue is this for policy? Migration to the metropolises
of East Asia has led to the populations of the cities being relatively young while
the rural areas are ageing rapidly. What are the implications of demographic dif-
ferences in the core and the periphery? Will Indonesia supply labour to coun-
tries in the region (and further afield) experiencing labour shortages? This article
addresses these questions in comparative perspective, but first it gives attention
to uncertainties about the demography of Indonesia—it is difficult to plan for the
future if there is uncertainty about the present.

CONTEMPORARY DEMOGRAPHIC UNCERTAINTY

In contrast with the relatively high level of certainty about Indonesian demo-
graphic trends that underpinned development planning in the 1970s and 1980s,
today there is a great deal of uncertainty. This uncertainty, which is hampering
the formulation of new policy initiatives, has arisen for several reasons. Most
important, difficulties associated with the conduct of the 2000 Population Census
 32 Peter McDonald

TABLE 1  Intercensal Population Growth in Indonesia, 1971–2010

(%)

Raw census counts UN 2010 Revision UN 2012 Revision

1971–1980 2.30 2.42 2.43

1980–1990 1.95 2.01 2.05
1990–2000 1.42 1.46 1.57
2000–2010 1.41 1.17 1.41

Source: Author’s calculations based on data from BPS (Badan Pusat Statistik) and the United Nations
(UN) Population Division’s World Population Prospects.

of Indonesia affected the results in ways that have not yet been adequately
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assessed. The 2000 census was conducted relatively soon after the country moved
to a democratic political system and decentralised management of core-service
delivery (Hull 2001). While the need for data to be available at the district (kabu-
paten) level of government was expected, the 2000 census was carried out soon
after the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis. As a result, the ambitious aims of the cen-
sus extended well beyond the budget capacity to achieve them. Terry Hull has
reported on the deficiencies of the 2000 census:

The resulting data set was seriously flawed in at least two ways. First, shortcomings
in the training and management of interviewers meant that large numbers of peo-
ple and households were not properly canvassed. It is known that some interview-
ers simply failed to cover their territories adequately, while others apparently filled
in fictitious material, or copied information from local government family registra-
tion data rather than seeking out and interviewing the householders. (Hull 2009)

In addition, enumeration was difficult in certain regions of the country, for rea-
sons of political insecurity. The technology used to scan the paper questionnaires
was also not of sufficiently high quality, and the scanning machines often con-
fused digits such as 8, 3, and 5. The relatively low quality of the 2000 census dis-
couraged analysis of its results and thus contributed to a vacuum of demographic
information that extends back at least to the 1990 census. This vacuum has led
to considerable contemporary uncertainty about Indonesia’s demography. Some
assert that Indonesia is now experiencing a new ‘population explosion’ (see dis-
cussion below). This assertion is based on intercensal population growth rates
derived from the raw counts of population in the successive censuses, as shown
in the second column of table 1. By these numbers, population growth stopped
falling in Indonesia as far back as 1990 and there has been a slight rise in the
past decade. The implication of this result is that the Indonesian fertility rate has
hardly fallen at all or has risen in the past two decades.
Uncertainty about the trend in the growth rate of the Indonesian population is
evidenced by the substantial changes that were made to the estimated intercensal
growth rates between the 2010 and the 2012 Revisions of World Population Pros-
pects, prepared by the United Nations (UN) Population Division (table 1). Between
June 2011 and June 2013, the UN Population Division switched its viewpoint on
Indonesia’s population growth from a strong and steady downward trend to one
 The Demography of Indonesia in Comparative Perspective 33

TABLE 2  Excess of United Nations Population Estimates over Raw Census Counts
(%)

UN 2010 Revision UN 2012 Revision

1971 1.5 –2.2

1980 2.6 –1.0
1990 3.2 0.0
2000 3.6 1.5
2010 1.1 1.5

Source: Author’s calculations based on data from BPS (Badan Pusat Statistik) and the United Nations
(UN) Population Division’s World Population Prospects.
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that mirrors the trend based on the raw counts. Table 2 compares the raw cen-
sus counts of population with the UN estimates in the 2010 and 2012 Revisions,
respectively. The UN in its 2012 Revision is implying that the 1971 and 1980 raw
counts overestimated the actual population, while the 1990 raw count was the
same as the UN estimates in the 2012 Revision. The extent of the undercount is
then considered to be the same in the carefully taken 2010 census (Hull 2010) as it
was in the poorly taken 2000 census. The logic of the changes in the UN estimates
is somewhat mystifying, which underlines the need for an intensive investiga-
tion of Indonesia’s demography from 1970 to 2010.1 Varying estimates continue to
appear with the new official population projections showing the estimated popu-
lation of Indonesia in 2000 to be 205.1 million, lower than the census count and
almost four million lower than the latest UN estimate for 2000 (BPS 2014).
To add to the argument of uncertainty, as described in appendix 1, the recorded
population growth rates based on raw counts for many of the provinces of Indo-
nesia over the past three decades (1980–90, 1990–2000, and 2000–2010) display
trajectories that challenge plausibility. For example, several provinces show a pat-
tern in which the growth rates in 1990–2000 were considerably lower than those
in 1980–90 and 2000–2010.2
Uncertainty applies not only to the population total but also to some of its char-
acteristics. From the results of the 2010 post-enumeration survey (PES), 20% of
the population had inconsistent ages reported between the census and the PES
and 35% had inconsistent levels of education. Marital status was inconsistently
reported for 10% of the population (BPS 2011a).
As discussed below, uncertainty about population growth in Indonesia is
founded on poor measurement of the components of its population change:

1. Such an intensive investigation will be undertaken through an Australian Research

Council Linkage Project grant awarded to researchers at The Australian National Universi-
ty and The University of Adelaide, in association with the Australian Government Depart-
ment of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the United Nations Population Fund in Indonesia, BPS,
and Indonesia’s National Family Planning Coordination Agency (Badan Kependudukan
dan Keluarga Berencana Nasional).
2. West Sumatra, Jambi, Lampung, DKI Jakarta, DI Yogyakarta, South Kalimantan, East
Kalimantan, Southeast Sulawesi, Maluku, and West Papua.
 34 Peter McDonald

fertility and mortality rates and net international migration. Indonesia has failed
to develop reliable ways of measuring these components of change. Along with
the current age structure, these components of change are the determinants of
past and future population growth.

INDONESIA’S DEMOGRAPHY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

To place Indonesia in comparative perspective, I use demographic data provided
by the UN Population Division in its 2012 Revision.3 I compare Indonesia with
12 other countries in the Asia-Pacific region: Iran, India, Bangladesh, Myanmar
(Burma), Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, China, Japan, the Philippines,
and Australia. This group includes all the major countries of Southeast Asia, as
well as China, India, and Iran as countries with large populations in Asia. It also
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includes Japan, Singapore, and Australia as regional developed-country compar-

ators. As shall be seen, the conventional wisdom that developing countries have
high rates of population growth and developed countries have low rates is not
borne out by this regional comparison.

Population Size
The first and most obvious point to make is that Indonesia’s population is very
large, by now the fourth largest in the world. While population size tells us lit-
tle about economic or social development, McNicoll (1999) and others (Jackson
and Howe 2008) argue that population size matters more and more as the eco-
nomic disparities between countries become less divergent. Conventional mili-
tary power also depends on how many soldiers a country has in its army, given
the increasing capacity to arm those soldiers relatively cheaply. Writing in 1999,
McNicoll said that Indonesia ‘is likely to retain an effectively heavyweight if not
hegemonic role in Southeast Asia’, very largely because of its population size
(McNicoll 1999, 423).
Conversely, any positive rate of growth applied to a very large population gen-
erates a very large number of additional people. This consideration has influenced
the minds of policymakers in Indonesia for decades. Today, in Indonesia, there is
considerable concern in many circles that current population growth constitutes
a ‘population explosion’ (ledakan penduduk) that has negative implications for
almost every aspect of life.4 The concern has been expressed most significantly by
Sonny Harmadi, director of the Demographic Institute of the University of Indo-
nesia (for one example, see Harmadi, ‘Pesan Kependudukan 2011’ (Kompas, 11
Jan 2011). Harmadi was expressing concern about a population explosion before
the release of the 2010 census count and, using raw rates similar to those shown
in the second column of table 1, he confirmed his fear after the census results
became available. His concerns have been mirrored by other luminaries such as

3. This is not to say that I endorse the estimates made by this organisation for Indonesia.
Indeed, prior to more intensive analysis, I find the UN estimates over time to be very con-
fusing. However, the 2012 Revision revised the UN’s prior estimates substantially for other
countries besides Indonesia. Thus, in the interests of maintaining cross-national consist-
ency, I have used the estimates from the 2012 Revision.
4. This concern is immediately evident from an online search of ‘ledakan penduduk’.
 The Demography of Indonesia in Comparative Perspective 35

the then head of the Coordinating Board for National Family Planning (Badan
Koordinasi Keluarga Berencana Nasional [BKKBN]) Sugiri Syarief (Antara News,
25 Nov 2011) and presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto (Tribunnews.com, 30
May 2013).

Rates of Population Growth

In policy terms, the important issue is not so much the current level of Indone-
sia’s population growth as its trend. If the aim is to reduce population growth to
zero, the UN 2010 Revision data for Indonesia are evidence providing support
for more of the same policy approach; the raw data and the UN 2012 Revision
data are evidence calling for a radical change in policy. My own sense, subject to
revision after more intensive investigation, is that the Indonesian fertility decline
may have been exaggerated in the decades prior to 2000. The population growth
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rate has probably been falling consistently, but with levels of growth higher than
those shown in table 1.
Figures 1 and 2 show Indonesia’s rate of population growth (based on UN 2012
Revision data) in comparison with those of 12 other countries of the region for
two periods of time. In 1970–75, the nine developing countries confirmed their
expected pattern of high rates of growth (above 2% per annum) while the three
more developed countries (Japan, Australia, and Singapore) had the lowest rates.
At 2.5%, Indonesia had the fifth highest rate. By 2005–10, Indonesia had the sixth
highest rate, 1.4%, but only because two of the developed countries, Singapore
and Australia, had jumped from the low end to the high end. Both these countries
were by then supporting higher population growth through large-scale migration
programs (figure 4). Both were also producing their own form of ‘demographic
dividend’ by importing workers directly into the younger working-age groups.
Indonesia’s 2005–10 growth rate was a little higher than that of Iran, a coun-
try in which recent policy debate has focused on whether the birth rate should
be stimulated (Abbasi-Shavazi, pers. comm.). Iran fears that its fertility is falling
below replacement levels and that it will experience the anguish about very low
fertility now expressed in countries such as Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and
Thailand. There is no such concern in Indonesia, despite the apparent similarity
of current population growth rates.5
Figure 4 shows the breakdown of recent population growth in the selected coun-
tries into net migration and natural increase. Most noticeable is Singapore’s very
high net migration rate of 1.9% per annum. Australia also has a high net migra-
tion rate of more than 1% per annum. The UN estimates that net international
migration for all the other countries is very small in relative terms. For Indonesia,
a net outmigration of 148,000 persons per annum is estimated for 2005–10, but
this may well be an underestimate. Hugo (2009), citing Ananta and Arifin (2008),

5. The UN projects Indonesia’s and Iran’s rates of population growth to be similarly posi-
tive in 2030–35 (figure 3). Indonesia’s rate of 0.66% per annum implies an increase of popu-
lation at that time of almost two million people per annum. The 2030–35 projected popu-
lation growth rates show that large countries like India, Bangladesh, and the Philippines
would still have quite high rates of growth. At the other extreme, Thailand, Japan, and
China will have relatively large negative rates of growth, which is highly concerning now
at least to Japan and Thailand and, predictably, to China at some future point.
 FIGURE 1  Annual Rate of Population Growth, Selected Countries, 1970–75
(%)
Philippines
Thailand
Iran
Bangladesh
Indonesia
Malaysia
Myanmar (Burma)
China
India
Vietnam
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Singapore
Australia
Japan
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
Source: United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision.

FIGURE 2  Annual Rate of Population Growth, Selected Countries, 2005–10

(%)
Singapore
Australia
Malaysia
Philippines
India
Indonesia
Iran
Bangladesh
Vietnam
Myanmar (Burma)
China
Thailand
Japan
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
Source: United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision.
 FIGURE 3  Annual Rate of Population Growth, Selected Countries, 2030–35
(%)
Philippines
Australia
Malaysia
Indonesia
India
Bangladesh
Iran
Singapore
Vietnam
Myanmar (Burma)
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China
Thailand
Japan
–0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5
Source: United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision.

FIGURE 4  Annual Rates of Net Migration and Natural Increase,

Selected Countries, 2005–10
(%)
Malaysia
Philippines
India
Indonesia
Iran
Bangladesh
Vietnam
Myanmar (Burma)
Australia
China
Singapore
Thailand
Japan Net migration Natural increase

–0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5

Source: United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision.
 38 Peter McDonald

states that there were 2.7 million documented migrants from Indonesia in other
countries, in addition to large numbers of undocumented migrants. In contrast,
if most of these migrants are temporary contract workers who will eventually
return to Indonesia, which seems to be the case, this would be consistent with low
net migration.

Age Distributions
Associations between economic development and demography are based most
often on the nature of the age distribution of the population—in particular, on
the balance between those of working age and those in the younger and older
dependent ages. Countries with high birth rates have relatively large numbers of
young dependents; countries with low birth rates, in time, have relatively large
numbers of old dependents. This section discusses Indonesia’s age distribution
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in comparative perspective. Comparison is made with Thailand, in particular,

because it has recently moved to implement pronatalist policies, whereas debate
in Indonesia is concerned with policies to address a perceived births-led popula-
tion explosion; yet both countries had similar age distributions around 1970, and
both have experienced substantial fertility declines.
In 1970, 43% of Indonesia’s population was aged 15 and under, compared with
44% of Thailand’s (figures 5 and 6). Thailand’s rate of population growth at the
time was a little higher (figure 1), because its fertility rate was higher. But, since
then, Thailand’s rate of growth (and its fertility) has fallen faster than that of Indo-
nesia. The varying speeds of decline have had differing effects on the age struc-
tures of the two countries (figures 5 and 6) and important implications for policy.
The Thai age pyramid in 2010 is undercut at the younger ages; the largest five-
year age group is those aged 35–39. As the large cohort aged 30–49 in 2010 has
passed through the working ages, it has, in theory, generated the demographic
dividend in a classic form, because the numbers have been smaller at the younger
and older ages. As this age group moves into the older ages, also in classic fash-
ion, the population will age considerably and population ageing will emerge as
a central issue of population policy. The UN projects that the percentage of the
population aged 65 and over in Thailand will increase from 9% in 2010 to 23% in
2050, a higher level than is projected for Australia in 2050 (figure 7). In Australia,
migrants and their subsequent births, along with a relatively high birth rate, are
projected to keep the population at the young end of the spectrum of developed
countries (McDonald and Temple 2010). In 2012, the Thai government shifted its
policy agenda to one that is similar in form to those of many countries in Europe
and East Asia, where fertility rates are very low (NESDB 2012). The policy pro-
posals include pronatalist financial measures (such as lower taxes for those with
more children) and family-friendly workplace policies, including flexible work-
ing hours, paid parental leave, and childcare.
The new Thai agenda also promotes policies for older people, including incen-
tives to continue working rather than to retire, tax incentives for self-support
through personal savings, the development of a national income support scheme
for the aged, systems and incentives for the support of older people by their fami-
lies, and better health and welfare infrastructure. The Thai government’s policy
document also focuses on improving the productivity of the economy through
higher human capital and higher multifactor productivity. The simple argument
is that a richer country, one with high GDP per capita, will be in a better position
 FIGURE 5  Age Distributions of Indonesia, 1970, 2010, and 2050
(population in millions)
1970 85+ 2010 and 2050
Males 80–84
Females 75–79
70–74
65–69
60–64
55–59
50–54
45–49
40–44
35–39
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30–34
25–29
20–24
15–19
10–14
5–9
0–4
0
2
4
6
8
-8
-6
-4
-2

0
2
4
6
8
-8
-6
-4
-2
-14
-12
-10

10
12
14

-14
-12
-10

10
12
14
Source: United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision.

Note: The projected age distribution for 2050 is represented by the dashed lines.

FIGURE 6  Age Distributions of Thailand, 1970 and 2010

(population in millions)
1970 85+ 2010
Males 80–84
Females 75–79
70–74
65–69
60–64
55–59
50–54
45–49
40–44
35–39
30–34
25–29
20–24
15–19
10–14
5–9
0–4
0
1
2

3
4

0
1
2

3
4
-4
-3

-2
-1

-4
-3

-2
-1

Source: United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision.
 40 Peter McDonald

FIGURE 7  Share of Population Aged 65 and Over, Selected Countries, 2010 and 2050
(%)
Japan
Singapore
China
Thailand
Australia
Vietnam
Iran
Indonesia
Myanmar (Burma)
Malaysia
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Bangladesh
India 2010
Philippines 2050

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Source: United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision.

to support its aged population (see Lutz and K. C. [2013] for an exposition of this
argument).
Population ageing will occur much more slowly in Indonesia. Owing to a
slower decline in fertility between 1970 and 2010 than was the case in Thailand,
Indonesia’s age pyramid in 2010 is not as undercut: the largest age group is the
youngest (those aged 0–4), and the size of this group may well be understated. By
2010, 30% of Indonesia’s population was aged 15 and under, compared with 19%
of Thailand’s. According to the UN projections, the percentage aged 15 and under
in Indonesia in 2050 will be 20%, still higher than the Thai percentage in 2010.
Having more time to adjust to an ageing population could be an advantage
for Indonesia. Figure 7 provides one view of the country’s demographic future.
It shows a projection of Indonesia’s present population and age structure to 2050,
based on the assumption that the fertility rate will fall to 2.1 births per woman by
2015. The result shows substantial population ageing by 2050; but the age struc-
ture remains relatively flat-sided, and the population growth rate at that time
would be approximately zero. By this projection, the total population of Indone-
sia in 2050 would be 323 million. The policy question for Indonesia is whether a
slow movement to zero population growth would provide better outcomes than
the pathway that Thailand is on, despite the ultimately large population size of
Indonesia. Should a country trade a larger population size for a more sustainable
longer-term age structure? The policy approaches being taken by countries facing
population decline and very rapid ageing suggest that they would prefer to trade
a somewhat higher population size for an age structure that was more amenable
to economic and social policy.
The projection in figure 5 is only one potential pathway for Indonesia. Some
would argue that Indonesia could attain low fertility and then face problems
similar to those of Thailand. Others would argue that Indonesia’s future may look
more like India’s, in which only 14% of the population would be aged 65 and over
in 2050 (figure 7). My own sense is that ageing in Indonesia will occur slowly, and
 The Demography of Indonesia in Comparative Perspective 41

that Indonesia’s fertility is very unlikely to be below 1.5 births per woman in the
foreseeable future, if ever. Nevertheless, the demographic future of Indonesia is
inherently uncertain and, because of poor data measurement and a lack of accu-
racy about the prevailing levels of fertility and mortality, more uncertain than for
other comparator countries. Demographic futures are important in areas of plan-
ning with long lead times, such as large-scale infrastructure and education and
health services.

Fertility
Fertility in Indonesia is estimated directly and indirectly. Direct estimates are
obtained from the results of the infrequent Indonesian Demographic and Health
Survey (IDHS). Indirect estimates are obtained every 10 years from the census
results, by using the own-children method, which links children in a household
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to their mothers and produces a table showing the ages of children by the ages of
their mothers (see Abbasi-Shavazi [1997] for an evaluation of the method).
The census-based own-children method is not robust to under-enumeration in
the census of the number of children (for example, those aged 0–4) relative to the
number of women of childbearing age, and this may be a considerable problem in
Indonesia.6 In countries with relatively good vital registration data, such as India
and Iran, the own-children estimates of fertility are lower than those based on
birth registration data.
In the IDHS, a sample of women is asked to report the details of all their preg-
nancies, which makes it possible to calculate fertility directly from the number
of births reported by the women surveyed. The accuracy of the result depends
on whether the sample truly represents the population. In the last two IDHS col-
lections, in 2007 and 2012, the age-specific proportions of married women were
much higher than those recorded in other data collections, such as Susenas and
the 2000 and 2010 censuses. In other words, there is strong evidence that the IDHS
tends to miss women who are not married. Single women have few children, so
the fertility rates from the IDHS tend to be too high (assuming that the number of
births is accurately reported).7
In summary, the census-based own-children estimates of fertility are likely to
underestimate fertility in Indonesia, whereas the IDHS is likely to overestimate it.
IDHS estimates suggest that Indonesian fertility rates have hardly changed since
the mid-1980s, and that the decline has stalled at around 2.6 births per woman
(Hull and Hartanto 2009; Hull pers. comm.). By the own-children estimates from
the censuses, fertility fell to around 2.3 births in the late 1990s, but rose slightly to
about 2.4 births in the latter years of the 2000s (BPS 2011b).

6. For example, if we estimate the population aged 0–4 at the time of the 2000 census by
reverse surviving the population aged 10–14 at the 2010 census, this estimate is approxi-
mately 12% higher than that recorded in 2000. The own-children estimate of the total fer-
tility rate from the 2000 census was 2.27 births per woman, but with a 12% correction it
would have been 2.54. This is a large variation to consider when trying to measure the
trend in fertility.
7. The 2007 IDHS estimated the total fertility rate to be 2.57 in 2002–3, and the 2012 IDHS
estimated it to be 2.60 in 2007–8. If the IDHS proportions married by age are adjusted to
those obtained in the 2000 and 2010 censuses, the IDHS estimates of fertility for these years
fall respectively to 2.35 and 2.20 (Hull and Hartanto 2009; Hull pers. comm.).
 42 Peter McDonald

FIGURE 8  Total Fertility Rates, Selected Asian Countries, 1970, 1985, 1995, and 2010
(births per woman)

Philippines

Indonesia

India

Malaysia

Bangladesh

Vietnam
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Myanmar (Burma)

Australia

Iran

China

Thailand

Japan 1970
1985
1995
Singapore 2010
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Source: United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision.

The argument has been made that Indonesia’s family-planning program has
been disrupted by decentralisation (Habsjah 2009; Hull and Hartanto 2009), and
that this is why fertility has remained constant for a long period (as shown by
the IDHS estimates). This argument has also been used to justify a rise in fer-
tility, using own-children estimates, between the 2000 and 2010 censuses. It has
also been suggested that democracy has stimulated a shift to a more conservative
(Islamic) society, and that this shift has stimulated the birth rate. On the other side,
fertility has fallen sharply in almost all other Islamic countries, and sharp rises in
education and urbanisation are very likely to have pushed the Indonesian fertility
rate downwards. The age pattern of fertility also shifts to older ages between the
own-children estimates of 2000 and 2010 (BPS 2011b). This kind of shift in the age
pattern of fertility is usually associated with a fall in the fertility rate.
For comparative purposes, figure 8 uses the estimates provided by the UN Pop-
ulation Division (2012 Revision). The estimates show Indonesia’s fertility level
drifting up in rank from the ninth highest among the 13 countries around 1970 to
the second highest around 2010. The UN estimates are more in keeping with the
IDHS estimates than with the census-based estimates, despite the criticisms that
have been made of the IDHS estimates. As a consequence, Indonesia’s fertility
around 2010 is estimated to be above that of India, Malaysia, and Bangladesh.
Iran has the largest downward movement, from 7.0 births per woman in 1985 to
 The Demography of Indonesia in Comparative Perspective 43

1.85 in 2010 (see Abbasi-Shavazi, McDonald, and Hosseini-Chavoshi 2009). The

UN estimates that the fertility rates of China and Thailand have now fallen into
the ‘very low’ range, under 1.5 births per woman. The Philippines, not unexpect-
edly, has the highest fertility rate, and there are those who argue, in keeping with
the demographic-dividend theory, that high fertility has been an obstacle to eco-
nomic growth in that country.
The latest UN estimates of fertility for Indonesia question the conventional
wisdom of rapidly declining fertility. They indicate that the Indonesian govern-
ment may need to take stronger action in addressing the country’s stalling decline
in fertility. Yet if the UN estimates are too high, as some would argue they are,
an overly vigorous approach to fertility reduction may push Indonesian fertility
rates in the direction of ‘very low’ fertility—which is also not desirable. The ideal
outcome for Indonesia is to have fertility fall to around two births per woman
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and then be sustained at that level. The countries that have achieved this (without
fertility falling to very low levels) have accepted that couples may have more than
two children, and have also provided support for families with children.

Mortality
While there is uncertainty about the level of fertility in Indonesia, there is no reli-
able information about mortality for people over the age of five. Planners need
accurate information on adult mortality, both to project the numbers at older
ages and to plan aged-related services. This section shows that a change in the
method of measurement could transform Indonesia from one of the best perform-
ers among the comparator countries in reducing mortality to one of the worst.
The conventional way of measuring adult mortality in Indonesia is to associ-
ate a model life table—most commonly that of Coale and Demeny’s (1966) West
model—with the estimate of child mortality (mortality below age five) to obtain
estimates of mortality at all other ages and life expectancy at birth. The West
model life tables are based very largely on the mortality experience in Europe,
Australia, and New Zealand in the 19th century, and questions remain about their
appropriateness to countries like Indonesia in the 21st century because the regime
of causes of death and the state of medical knowledge are very different in today’s
developing countries compared with 19th-century Western experience.
Child mortality in Indonesia is most commonly estimated by using data on the
number of live births that women have had and the number of those live births
that are still alive at the time of the census or the survey, according to the women’s
ages at the time of the survey. The methodology dates back to the 1960s and was
designed to measure child mortality in situations where mortality is very high—
say, around 200 deaths under the age of five from 1,000 live births—and where
childbearing begins at a young age. When child mortality falls to a much lower
level and childbearing begins at older ages, as is the case in Indonesia today, this
method is not robust enough to measure the much smaller movements in child
mortality.8 Applying this method to 2010 census data, Statistics Indonesia (Badan
Pusat Statistik [BPS]) estimated the rate of child mortality to have been 30 deaths
per 1,000 births in 2006 (BPS 2011c). Another method of estimation, used in the

8. If the age distribution of mothers at the time of birth were to be older than the distribu-
tion assumed in the model, the level of child mortality would tend to be underestimated.
 44 Peter McDonald

FIGURE 9  Life Expectancy at Birth, Selected Countries, 1970–75 and 2005–10

(years)
Japan
Australia
Singapore
Vietnam
China
Malaysia
Thailand
Iran
Indonesia
Bangladesh
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Philippines
India 1970–75
Myanmar (Burma) 2005–10

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Source: United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision.

IDHS, involves asking women about the dates of birth and death (if applicable)
of each of their children. Such data can be used to make direct estimates of child
mortality. This method, however, tends to underestimate child mortality because
the birth and death of children who died shortly after birth are often not reported.
The most recent survey shows a child mortality rate, based on this method, of
32 deaths per 1,000 live births during 2008–12 (BPS et al. 2012). This estimate is
largely consistent with that of the 2010 census, but both may be consistently low.9
In its 2012 Revision, the UN Population Division estimated life expectancy in
Indonesia in 2005–10 to be 69.6 years (figure 9). This is consistent with the estimate
for 2006 (70.7 years) published by BPS (2011c). However, Muhidin and Nasrun’s
(2012) estimate of 60.8 years from the 2010 census, which also refers to about 2006,
is a very different result.10 These contrasting estimates show that the level of mor-
tality in Indonesia is highly speculative, and much more so than the fertility rate.
Figure 9 shows that Indonesia’s life expectancy, at 60.8 years, would easily be the
lowest among the comparator countries, the lowest of which is currently Myan-
mar (Burma), at 64.2 years. Much consideration needs to be given to improving
the estimation of mortality in Indonesia.

Population Distribution and Internal Migration

The movement of population from densely settled Java to other islands is a policy
approach that originated in the Dutch colonial period, and the idea of population

9. There is little consistency at the provincial level between the census-based estimates and
the IDHS estimates—the former appears to be particularly low in the eastern provinces.
10. Muhidin and Nasrun (2012) also use West model life tables, but they include an analy-
sis of the change in age cohort sizes between the 2000 and 2010 censuses (the intercensal
survival method).
 The Demography of Indonesia in Comparative Perspective 45

TABLE 3  Growth of the Regions of Indonesia, 1971–2010

(ratio of population, 2010 to 1971)

Java 1.80 Sumatra 2.43

Kalimantan 2.68 Remainder 2.23
Sulawesi 2.04 Indonesia 1.99

Source: Author’s calculations based on data from BPS.

TABLE 4  Net Migration, Provinces of Java, 2005–10

Banten 272,000 East Java –285,000

Central Java –678,000 West Java 453,000
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DI Yogyakarta 124,000 Java –354,000

DKI Jakarta –239,000

Source: BPS (2011d).

redistribution is embedded in the minds of most Indonesians at primary school.

In addition, fertility fell earlier and further in the provinces of Java than in those
outside Java. For these reasons, we would expect a redistribution of population
away from Java. Yet urban economic development has been concentrated in Java’s
largest cities, which have grown substantially. The once-wide boundaries of DKI
Jakarta long ago became inadequate to contain the city’s growth, and Jakarta now
abuts on the neighbouring cities of Depok, Bekasi, and Tangerang. This section
considers the extent to which the redistribution of population from Java to the
outer islands is taking place today.
The net effect of these demographic trends is that Java has grown a lot more
slowly than all the other regions of Indonesia. The fastest growing region has
been Kalimantan; East Kalimantan’s population increased almost five times
during 1971–2010 (table 3). Growth within Java is quite diverse, with West Java
(including Banten) increasing 2.5 times but Central and East Java each increasing
only 1.5 times. The high growth rate of West Java reflects Jakarta’s spreading into
that province.
The slower growth of Java, at least in recent years, owes little to outmigra-
tion from Java. Table 4 shows that net migration from Java during 2005–2010
amounted to only 354,000, or just 71,000 per annum, a number that is trivial com-
pared with the total population of the island (BPS 2011d). The table also shows
that DKI Jakarta, which has experienced net outmigration since the late 1980s,
recorded negative net migration of 239,000 in this period, as people moved out of
the province to housing estates in the areas of West Java and Banten contiguous
with DKI Jakarta. The even larger in-migration to West Java and Banten shown
in table 4 can also be attributed to the growth of the megacity of Jakarta. Central
Java is the largest source of out-migrants, with a net loss of 136,000 per annum in
the five years before the 2010 census.
The difficulty of defining city boundaries hinders cross-country comparisons
of cities and their growth. For example, the UN Population Division recorded the
population of the urban agglomeration of Jakarta in 2010 to be 9.6 million, which
 46 Peter McDonald

FIGURE 10  Share of Population Living in Urban Areas, Selected Countries,

1970, 2010, and 2030
(%)

Singapore
Australia
Malaysia
Iran
Japan
China
Philippines
Indonesia
Myanmar (Burma)
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Thailand
Vietnam
1970
Bangladesh 2010
India 2030
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Source: United Nations Population Division, World Urbanization Prospects: The 2011 Revision.

is precisely the population recorded for the province at the 2010 census. Yet it is
accepted that the city has now sprawled into West Java and Bantan, and that its
real urban agglomeration is considerably larger.11
Definitions of rural and urban areas are also notoriously inconsistent across
countries. Glossing over this problem, figure 10 shows that urbanisation has been
a very powerful force in Indonesia since 1970. Yet in 2010, the urban population
remained below 50% of the total population (a higher proportion than in five
of the comparator countries: Myanmar [Burma], Thailand, Vietnam, Bangladesh,
and India). The World Bank has recently argued that urban agglomerations pro-
vide major advantages for development, and that Indonesia’s relatively high
level of urbanisation may present it with considerable opportunities to increase
productivity (World Bank 2013). However, the UN’s projections of urbanisation
suggest that the growth of the urban segment will be slow in all the developing
countries shown in figure 10. In Indonesia, for example, the urban proportion is
projected to increase from 44% to just 54% in the next 20 years. This slow rate of
urbanisation does not seem to be in keeping with the increases in education that
will take place in this period. The UN projections also do not take into account the
results of the 2010 Indonesian census, which shows a higher level of urbanisation
in 2010 (49.8%) than the 44% taken as the starting point for the UN projections
(BPS 2011e). Probably more reliably, new official estimates project urbanisation in
Indonesia reaching 66.6% in 2035, 77.6% in Java, and a remarkable 89.9% among
the 85 million people who are projected to be living in Jakarta, West Java, and
Banten by 2035 (BPS 2014).

11. Around 23 million according to Knowledge@Wharton and around 26 million according

to World Atlas (http://www.worldatlas.com/citypops.htm).
 The Demography of Indonesia in Comparative Perspective 47

CONCLUSION AND POLICY DIRECTIONS

The central conclusion from the analysis is that there is a very definite need for
clarity about the trends of fertility, mortality, and population growth in Indonesia.
We need this clarity in order to conclude whether population growth and fertility
ceased declining in the 1990s or whether they have continued to decline in line
with long-term Indonesian population policy. It is the trends that are important,
not the levels. At present, without this clarity, policy is torn between placing a
major new emphasis on family planning, especially outside of Java, or proceeding
with the present settings.
Some of Indonesia’s regional comparators have very low fertility rates, which
will see their populations age excessively rapidly at the same time as the size of
their labour forces starts to fall. The aim of fertility control programs in develop-
ing countries in Asia was not to reduce fertility to these very low levels but to
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have fertility stop falling at about the level of an average of two births per woman.
With fertility at two births per woman, the population ages at a slower pace and
the size of the labour force does not fall, although the labour force will age. Pro-
moting multifactor productivity, especially by reskilling the labour force, can then
lead to reasonable economic growth and increases in GDP per capita, even though
the labour force is not growing.
In countries such as Thailand, Singapore, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, very
low fertility is associated with high rates of non-marriage and higher levels of
female participation in the labour force. Women have been educated to the point
where they are able to have well-paid, full-time jobs, but the possibilities for them
to combine work with family are very restricted. So, many women do not marry
or, if they do marry, have one or no children. There is little evidence of these cir-
cumstances applying in Indonesia today. Marriage is still close to universal and
still occurs, on average, at a relatively young age for women. The first birth is
usually not delayed within the marriage. In the big cities, mothers of young chil-
dren generally do not have full-time jobs in the formal sector. In the 2010 Greater
Jakarta Transition to Adulthood Survey, 67% of mothers aged 20–34 years were
not employed (McDonald 2011). At the wealthier and higher-paid end of the spec-
trum (in the top 6%–7% in Jakarta), mothers of young children have household
help to assist them in combining work and family. The province of Jakarta has the
lowest fertility rate in Indonesia (1.82), based on the own-children estimates of
fertility from the 2010 census (BPS 2011b)—still well above the very low fertility
bound of 1.5 births per woman.
A declining population in a crowded island like Java can be desirable for many
reasons. Yet when numbers decline because of a large and rapid fall in the num-
ber of births, it distorts the age structure of the population. If a population is to
decline, it is better for the decrease to occur slowly rather than rapidly. It seems
that Indonesia and Java are on this latter path. Nevertheless, the gradual intro-
duction of family-support policies like early-childhood education and care, par-
ticularly in urban areas, will help to ensure that fertility lands softly around the
replacement level (McDonald 2011).
The UN Population Division projects only relatively modest growth of Indo-
nesia’s urban population. With the substantial exception of Greater Jakarta, other
major cities in Indonesia seem likely to remain at a relatively manageable size.
As the Indonesian economy modernises and diversifies, it can be expected that
urbanisation will be stimulated to an extent similar to the latest official projections.
 48 Peter McDonald

In China, this process has involved the growth of a very large number of medium-
sized cities well connected by transport infrastructure. Even some of China’s
smaller towns have grown by ‘urbanisation in situ’ (Zhu 2002), which has taken
the pressure off its megacities (although they still face substantial difficulties). It
would be wise for Indonesia to follow a similar strategy, but this would require
much better urban planning than has occurred to this point. Of course, Indone-
sia’s archipelago geography also presents different transport and communication
problems to those faced by China. Overall, there are likely to be advantages in
having people remain in their own provinces and for those provinces to urban-
ise. Interisland migration would then be likely to remain fairly modest in scale,
except to some of the resource-rich provinces such as East Kalimantan, Riau, and
Southeast Sulawesi.
With urbanisation comes the problem of demographic differences between the
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periphery and the core. In particular, the cities will remain relatively young while
the rural areas age rapidly. Ageing is not the prominent macroeconomic policy
issue in Indonesia that it is in countries like Thailand and Singapore, but local-
ised ageing may still be prominent. Much old-age support in Indonesia remains
informal and depends on the family unit. There may be ways that the govern-
ment can assist families living in towns or cities to support their older members
in rural areas. The shorter the distance that rural–urban migrants move, the easier
it is to implement such a policy regime and to justify stimulating urbanisation
in situ—which, in any case, has a relatively long history in Java (McDonald and
Sontosudarmo 1976).
I have not dealt with international migration in this article, because the data
sources remain poor. I acknowledge, however, that there is large-scale labour
migration from Indonesia to the Middle East, to Malaysia, and, increasingly, to
East Asia. Some East Asian countries are supporting their aged-care system by
importing carers from Indonesia—Taiwan being a case in point. This is an out-
come of the very large wage differentials between Indonesia and the destination
countries, and these differences are likely to continue for some years.
In economic terms, as fertility in Indonesia seems to have declined more slowly
than previously thought, the potential advantages deriving from a population
concentrated in the working ages (the demographic dividend) are smaller than
in the comparator countries in Asia with higher levels of development. Indonesia
must therefore focus even more intently on developing its human capital and not
rely on an illusory bonus from its age structure. It must consider the skills that
will best serve its economy not just today but over the next 20 years, by which
time the labour requirements will have shifted.
Indonesia has been very successful in providing school education to children,
even in remote areas, but it has been much less successful in imbuing them with
ideas about appropriate occupational pathways. Employment problems for edu-
cated young people increase in severity as distance from Jakarta increases. Out-
side of a small number of major cities, young tertiary graduates often still hope
to find jobs mainly in the public sector, and there is a danger that decentralisation
will encourage a proliferation of publicly funded jobs as opposed to more produc-
tive forms of employment and investment. While new tertiary-sector investment
continues to be focused in Jakarta, educated young people outside Jakarta have
limited employment opportunities, and at least some drift to Jakarta in the hope
 The Demography of Indonesia in Comparative Perspective 49

of finding appropriate work. This problem of employment inequality between

the centre and the periphery is found in almost all countries, but it is especially
problematic in Indonesia because of the country’s geography and the rapid rise
in education levels.
Rapid population ageing is often considered problematic for Indonesia, yet if
fertility declines more slowly than previously thought, ageing will also be slow.
The present priorities should be productive investment and appropriate training
and jobs for young people. Should this strategy succeed, the ensuing creation of
income and wealth will provide resources for supporting an ageing population,
when that becomes necessary. As I have discussed, however, local-level ageing
remains a problem in rural areas.
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 The Demography of Indonesia in Comparative Perspective 51

APPENDIX 1. RATES OF POPULATION GROWTH IN THE PROVINCES

Appendix table A1 (overleaf) presents data equivalent to that in the first column
of table 1, but based on 1971 provincial boundaries. The trajectory of growth rates
between the decades 1971–80 and 1980–90 seem to be reasonable and in keeping
with expectations. However, the growth rates in the following two decades often
fluctuate. In West Sumatra, for example, the growth rate falls between 1980–90
and 1990–2000, from 1.6% to 0.6%, but then rises again in 2000–2010, to 1.32%. A
similarly severe fluctuation is evident across these two decades for Jambi, Lam-
pung, Jakarta, South Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, Southeast Sulawesi, Maluku,
and West Papua.
If there were enumeration problems in the 2000 census (table 2), the complete-
ness of enumeration seems to have varied enormously across provinces. This var-
iability is confirmed by the estimates of the net census undercount for provinces
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at the 2010 census, as derived from the 2010 PES (final column of table 2). The net
undercount ranged from 0.4% in South Sulawesi to 9.8% in Papua.
 APPENDIX TABLE A1  Intercensal Annual Rates of Population Growth, Based on
Census Counts, Provinces of Indonesia, 1971–2010
(%)

Estimated
undercount,
2010 census
1971–1980 1980–1990 1990–2000 2000–2010 (%)

Aceh 2.92 2.69 1.40 1.34 2.7

North Sumatra 2.59 2.04 1.27 1.08 1.1
West Sumatra 2.21 1.61 0.60 1.32 3.4
Riau 3.09 4.21 4.06 3.76 6.2
Jambi 4.03 3.35 1.78 2.48 4.4
South Sumatra 3.30 3.10 2.11 1.06 5.4
Bengkulu 4.35 4.29 2.85 0.90 3.4
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Lampung 5.67 2.63 1.01 1.33 3.2

Sumatra 3.30 2.65 1.69 1.58
DKI Jakarta 3.90 2.39 0.16 1.36 7.6
West Java 2.52 2.54 2.14 2.03 3.4
Central Java 1.65 1.17 0.91 0.36 2.5
DI Yogyakarta 1.11 0.57 0.69 1.02 3.5
East Java 1.49 1.08 0.68 0.75 2.9
Java 1.98 1.64 1.20 1.18
Bali 1.70 1.17 1.26 2.11 5.0
West Nusa Tenggara 2.36 2.12 1.74 1.16 4.8
East Nusa Tenggara 1.96 1.77 1.90 1.70 5.6
West Kalimantan 2.31 2.62 2.23 0.86 3.4
Central Kalimantan 3.41 3.81 2.85 1.75 4.6
South Kalimantan 2.17 2.30 1.39 1.95 3.8
East Kalimantan 5.63 4.32 2.69 3.70 8.5
Kalimantan 2.95 3.03 2.19 1.96
North Sulawesi 2.31 1.58 1.39 1.51 4.5
Central Sulawesi 3.83 2.83 2.60 1.72 2.7
South Sulawesi 1.75 1.41 1.44 1.32 0.4
Southeast Sulawesi 3.08 3.59 1.62 3.41 1.3
Sulawesi 2.22 1.85 1.61 1.66
Maluku 2.87 2.75 0.69 2.56
Irian Jayaa 2.67 3.40 2.98 4.81
Bangka–Belitung Islands 5.4
Riau Islands 7.6
Banten 5.4
Maluku 4.1
North Maluku 6.6
West Papua 7.7
Papua 9.8

Sources: Columns 1–4: author’s calculations based on data from Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS). Column
5: BPS (2011a).

Note: Table uses provincial boundaries from 1971.

a Now Papua and West Papua.