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ABAKADA GURO PARTYLIST VS PURISIMA

Petition for prohibition seeking to prevent respondents from implementing RA 9335 (Attrition Act 2005)

Facts:

RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue generation capability and collection of BIR and BOC

Said RA intends to encourage employees to exceed revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and
sanctions through the creation of rewards and incentives fund and the revenue performance evaluation board

Fund sourced from the collection of BIR and BOC in excess of their revenue targets for the year as determined
by DBCC. Any incentive or reward is taken from the fund and allocated to the BIR and BOC in proportion to
their contribution in the excess collection of the targeted amount of tax revenue

DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC were tasked to promulgate and issue the implementing rules and
regulations of RA 9335 to be approved by a joint congressional oversight committee

Petitioners as taxpayers filed the petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation

They contend that:


A. In establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law transforms employees of BIR and BOC into
mercenaries and bounty hunters bec. They will do their best only in consideration of such rewards
(invites corruption)
B. Limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to officials and employees of BIR and
BOC violates guarantee of equal protection because it has no valid basis for distinction and
classification as to why such a system shouldn’t apply to officials and employees of all other gov’t
agencies
C. law unduly delegated power to fix revenue targets as it lacks sufficient standards. While sec 7(b) and
(c) of RA 9335 provides that they can be dismissed if their revenue collection fall short of the target of
atleast 7.5%, law doesn’t fix the revenue targets to be achieved.
D. Creation of a congressional oversight committee violates the doctrine of sep. of powers because
creation of a cong. Oversight committee permits legislative participation in the implementation of law

Respondents:
A. questions the petition for being premature as there’s no actual case or controversy
B. Mere speculation that the reward systems will breed mercenaries
C. Law validly classifies BIR and BOC bec their functions are distinct from those of other gov’t agencies
D. Law provides sufficient standards
E. Creation of Cong Oversight Com enhances not violates sep. of powers

SC: petitioners failed to overcome the presumption of validity of constitutionality in favor of RA 9335

ISSUES:

I. actual case and ripeness

-petitioner must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or injury to himself
-petitioner failed to assert any specific and concrete legal claim or to demonstrate any direct
adverse effect of the law on them.

II. accountability of public officials (sec 1, Art II)

RA 9335- system of rewards and incentives.


Presumption is disputable but proof to the contrary is required to rebut it. it can’t be overturned
by mere conjecture specially in this case where it’s an underlying principle to advance public policy.
To justify nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the consti
RA 9335 establishes safeguards to ensure that the reward will not be claimed if it will be the fruit of
bounty hunting or mercenary activity (according to sec 8 of RA 9335)

III. equal protection

-Victoriano v elizalde rope workers union- guarantee of equal protection of laws isn’t a guarantee of
equality in the application of laws upon all citizens of the state. It guarantees equality, not identity of
rights. Consti doesn’t require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as the same. Equal
protection doesn’t forbid discrimination as to things that are different.
-allows reasonable classification based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences. It
must be germane to the purpose of law and must not be limited to existing conditions only. It must
apply equally to each member of the class
-RA 9335- its expressed public policy is the optimization of the revenue generations capability and
collection of the BIR and BOC. Incentives or sanctions provided in the law logically pertain to said
agencies. They have a common distinct primary function of generating revenues for the national
government through collection of taxes, fees and charges

IV. undue delegation

Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power:


(1) the completeness test and
(2) the sufficient standard test.

A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate.
It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map
out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot
To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate’s authority, announce the
legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.
-RA 9335 has standards (according to Sec 2 and 4 of the said RA)
Sec 7 limits the authority of the Board
Therefore, RA 9335 doesn’t violate security of tenure because it lays down a reasonable yardstick for
removal with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection

V. Separation of Powers

The joint congressional oversight committee was created for the purpose of approving the IRR
formulation by DOF, CSC, DBM, BIR, BOC and NEDA. It was approved but then, became functus
officio and ceased to exist. The alleged encroachment on the exectutive function of implementing and
enforcing the law is moot and academic

(under this issue, the constitutionality of the Joint congressional oversight committee was mentioned)
it is constitutional because it is integral to the checks and balances inherent to a democratic system of
gov’t. it even enhances the sep of powers as it prevents over accumulation of power in the exec.
Branch.

Moreover, the requirement that the implementing rules of a law be subjected to approval by Congress
as a condition for their effectivity violates the cardinal constitutional principles of bicameralism and the
rule on presentment.52
VI. Considered Opinion of
Mr. Justice Dante O. Tinga

Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution states:

Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by
the provision on initiative and referendum.

Additionally, Section 27(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides:

Section 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to
the President.

In sum, two steps are required before a bill becomes a law.

First, it must be approved by both Houses of Congress

Second, it must be presented to and approved by the President. (The final step is submission to the
President for approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law after the required publication)

From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its
members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of
powers and is thus unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision that requires Congress or its members to
approve the implementing rules of a law after it has already taken effect shall be unconstitutional, as is a
provision that allows Congress or its members to overturn any directive or ruling made by the members of the
executive branch charged with the implementation of the law.

Following this rationale, Section 12 of RA 9335 should be struck down as unconstitutional. While there may be
similar provisions of other laws that may be invalidated for failure to pass this standard, the Court refrains from
invalidating them wholesale but will do so at the proper time when an appropriate case assailing those
provisions is brought before us.

what is the effect of the unconstitutionality of Section 12 of RA 9335 on the other provisions of the law? Will it
render the entire law unconstitutional? No because of the separability clause in sec 13 of RA 9335.

To be effective, administrative rules and regulations must be published in full if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The IRR of RA 9335 were published on May 30, 2006 in
two newspapers of general circulation and became effective 15 days thereafter. Until and unless the contrary is
shown, the IRR are presumed valid and effective even without the approval of the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Section 12 of RA 9335 creating a Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the implementing rules and regulations of the law is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and therefore NULL and VOID. The constitutionality of the remaining
provisions of RA 9335 is UPHELD. Pursuant to Section 13 of RA 9335, the rest of the provisions remain in
force and effect.