EMOTIONS-AS-JUDGMENTS:

TOWARD A STOIC-CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY OF EMOTION

Dylan Pahman

Kuyper College, Grand Rapids, MI

 The doctrine of God’s impassibility has, in recent years, received renewed attention as

scholars more carefully study the Hellenistic understanding of passions and thus also the

impassibility of God. A number of scholars, such as Charles Hartshorne, Clark Pinnock, and

Gregory Boyd, et al., have attacked the doctrine of impassibility, viewing it as utterly

incompatible with the biblical witness and with the idea of a personal, loving deity.1 Yet, more

recently, Paul L. Gavrilyuk has argued that a more careful, historical investigation of what

impassibility means does not lead to the conclusion that God does not love or hate, but simply

that God transcends our human concepts of passion.2 While Gavrilyuk’s research may help

correct older caricatures of the impassible God as void of emotion, little work has been done on

how a proper reading of the passions affects our understanding of human passion. Although this

paper makes no claim to offer a comprehensive theory of emotion, I argue that the best fit for

Christian theological anthropology can be found in the ancient theory of emotion advocated by

the Stoics.

The Stoic view of emotion has been unpopular and often misunderstood in the Christian

West, even before the rise of Aristotelianism in the medieval period.3 St. Augustine of Hippo, for

example, conflated one of the Stoics’ key distinctions—that between first-movements

1
See, e.g., Charles Hartshorne, The Divine Relativity (New Haven: Yale, 1964), p. 18ff and A Natural
Theology for Our Time (La Salle: Open Court, 1973), p. 127ff; Clark H. Pinnock, Most Moved Mover (Carlisle:
Paternoster, 2001), p. 114ff; Gregory A. Boyd, Is God to Blame? (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2003), p.35ff and
God of the Possible (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2000), p. 69; Daniel A. Dombrowski, Analytic Theism, Hartshorn, and
the Concept of God (Albany: State University of New York, 1996), p. 13ff; Richard E. Creel, Divine Impassibility
(Cambridge: Cambridge, 1986), p. 113ff; Jay Wesley Richards, Modal Metaphysics and the Christian Doctrine of
God (Ann Arbor: UMI, 1999), pp. 272-273.
2
Gavrilyuk argues that the term “impassible” actually functions in Greek and Patristic thought as an
apophatic qualifier to, rather than a denial of, divine emotion. See Paul L. Gavrilyuk, The Suffering of the Impassible
God (Oxford: Oxford, 2004), p. 47ff. For a much older historical treatment of the term, see, e.g., J. K. Mozley, The
Impassibility of God (Cambridge: Cambridge, 1926).
3
Which, incidentally, seems to have helped to retain it in some cases, such as St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa
Theologica 2.2, q. 154, a. 5. See Richard Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind (New York: Oxford, 2000), p.
382n28.

1
(propatheia) and emotions-as-judgments4 (pathos),5 likely contributing to its lack of popularity.

Even today, the caricature of the Stoic view as the indiscriminate eradication of all emotion has

not disappeared from scholarship.6 What such uncharitable portraits overlook is that the Stoic

ideal of apatheia is not the total eradication of all emotions, but only the eradication of those

emotions that the Stoics deemed irrational, while promoting those that they termed eupatheia or

rational (i.e., good) emotions.7 In this light, Stoic apatheia is better thought of as an ancient

understanding of emotional intelligence rather than its modern characterization as total apathy or

complete passionlessness (in the modern sense).

4
There exists some discussion over whether the standard Stoic view is that emotions are judgments or the
result of judgments. Sellars notes that Chrysippus seems to have held to the former view while other Stoics seem to
prefer the latter. However, Sellars also comments that what is important is that all the Stoics agreed in viewing
emotions as dependant upon judgments, which serves as a sufficient definition for the purposes of this paper. See
John Sellars, Stoicism (Berkely: University of California, 2006), p. 115. See also Robert W. Sharples, “Philosophy
for Life” in The Cambridge Companion to the Hellenistic World, ed., Glenn R. Bugh (Cambridge: Cambridge,
2006), p. 235. Therefore, while the term “emotions-as-judgments” may be used in this paper to represent the Stoic
view in general, it is not my intention to weigh in on the debate over what precisely is the orthodox Stoic position of
this particular nuance.
5
See, e.g., St. Augustine, City of God 9.4-6 and Questions on the Heptateuch 1.30. Layton points out that
both Origen and Didymus the Blind found the Stoic distinction useful (p. 262f). Also, it is notable that he mentions
how this was actually adopted by St. Jerome as propassio and continued into medieval thought in the school of Laon
(p. 262n2). See Richard A. Layton, “Propatheia: Origen and Didymus on the Origin of the Passions,” Vigiliae
Christianae 54:3 (2000), pp. 262-282. Additionally, Sorabji demonstrates that the Stoic distinction between
propatheia and pathos was retained by a majority of the Greek fathers, but, as mentioned above, conflated by St.
Augustine. See Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind, p. 375ff.
6
See, e.g., Will Durant, The Story of Philosophy (Garden City: Simon and Schuster, 1927) p. 108.
7
See, e.g., Seneca, De Ira 2.1.1-4 in Roger L’Estrange, Seneca’s Morals (New York: Duyckinck, 1817),
pp. 203-205, from which I have taken my English quotation (see below); Diog. Laert. 7.115 (no title given), Ps.-
Andronicus, On Emotion 6, Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 4.12 in Stoicorum Veterum Fragmentum 3.7.3.431, 432,
438 (respectively), ed., Ioannes ab Arnim (Berlin: B. G. Teubneri, 1923), pp. 105-107; Philo of Alexandria, QGen
4.15-16—while Philo is not merely Stoic in his philosophy, he here draws upon the Stoics, affirming that both joy
and apatheia can coexist. Graver demonstrates the usefulness of Philo for understanding the history of these Stoic
concepts. See Margaret Graver, “Philo of Alexandria and the Origins of the Stoic Προπάθειαι,” Phronesis, 44:4
(Nov., 1999), p. 312. See also A. A. Long, Stoic Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge, 1996), p.119; Tad Brennen, The
Stoic Life (Oxford: Oxford, 2005), p.97f; Marcia L. Colish, The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle
Ages 1 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1990), p. 42f; John Sellars, Stoicism (Berkely: University of California, 2006), p. 118f;
Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind, p. 375f; Robert W. Sharples, “Philosophy for Life” in The Cambridge
Companion to the Hellenistic World, ed., Glenn R. Bugh (Cambridge: Cambridge, 2006), p. 235f.

2
 In this paper, I contend that it is precisely the Stoic distinction between propatheia and

pathos which make the most sense of certain didactic passages of the New Testament (NT) that

exhort Christians to take control of their emotions (especially James 1:2-3). My argument

consists of three parts. In part one, I offer an exposition of the Stoic distinction between first-

movements and emotions-as-judgments in order to demonstrate the proper understanding of

Stoic apatheia. In part two, building on the research of Martin Hengel, David Winston, and

Peder Borgen, et al., I argue that, in what one might call an ancient, inter-religious dialogue,

much of Stoic ethical teaching had been assimilated into Hellenistic and Second-Temple Judaism

even before the birth of the Christian Church and Scriptures.8 I argue that this backdrop gives

8
In making this case, I draw on the following: Martin Hengel, Judaism and Hellenism, trans., John
Bowden (London: SCM, 1974), The ‘Hellenization’ of Judaea in the First Century after Christ, trans., John Bowden
(London: SCM, 1989), and Jews, Greeks and Barbarians, trans., John Bowden (Philedelphia: Fortress, 1980); Larry
R. Helyer, Exploring Jewish Literature of the Second Temple Period (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2002); Erich S.
Gruen, Diaspora (Cambridge: Harvard, 2002); David Winston, The Ancestral Philosophy, ed., Gregory E. Sterling
(Providence: Brown, 2001); Erich S. Gruen, Heritage and Hellenism (Berkely: University of California, 1998); John
J. Collins, Jewish Cult and Hellenistic Culture (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill, 2005); Pieter W. van der Horst, Japheth
in the Tents of Shem (Lueven: Peeters, 2002); Shem in the Tents of Japheth, ed., James L. Kugel (Leiden: Brill,
2002); Erwin Ramsdell Goodenough, On the History of Religion and on Judaism, eds., Ernest S. Frerichs and Jacob
Neusner (Atlanta: Scholars, 1986); Elias J. Bickerman, The Jews in the Greek Age (Cambridge: Harvard, 1988); Lee
I. Levine, Judaism & Hellenism in Antiquity (Seattle: University of Washington, 1998); Hellenism in the Land of
Israel, eds., John J. Collins and Gregory E. Sterling (Notre Dame: Notre Dame, 2001); Hellenica et Judaica, eds., A.
Caquot, M. Hadas-Lebel, and J. Riaud (Paris: Leuven, 1986); Paul Beyond the Judaism/Hellenism Divide, ed.,
Troels Engberg-Pedersen (Louiville: Westminister, 2001); Peder Borgen, Paul Preaches Circumcision and Pleases
Men (Dragvoll: University of Trondheim, 1983); New Testament Backgrounds, eds., Craig A. Evans & Stanley E.
Porter (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997); William Fairweather, Jesus and the Greeks (Edinburgh: T. & T.
Clark, 1924); Pieter W. van der Horst, Hellenism – Judaism – Christianity (Kampen: Kok Pharos, 1994); G. H. C.
Macgregor and A. C. Purdy, Jew and Greek: Tutors unto Christ (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1936);
Leonard Alston, Stoic & Christian in the Second Century (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1906); Emil
Schürer, The Literature of the Jewish People in the Time of Jesus (New York: Schocken, 1972); Jews in the
Hellenistic and Roman Cities, ed., John R. Bartlett (London: Routledge, 2002); Anthony J. Tomasino, Judaism
Before Jesus (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2003); The Cambridge Companion to the Hellenistic World, ed., Glenn
R. Bugh (Cambridge: Cambridge, 2006); James D. Newsome, Greeks, Romans, Jews (Philadelphia: Trinity Press
International, 1992); Harry Austryn Wolfson, Philo 1 & 2 (Cambridge: Harvard, 1948); Neotestamentica et
Philonica, eds., David E. Aune, Torrey Seland, and Jarl Henning Ulrichsen (Leiden: Brill, 2003); David T. Runia,
Philo in Early Christian Literature (Van Gorcum: Fortress Press, 1993); Lala Kalyan Kumar Dey, The Intermediary
World and Patterns of Perfection in Philo and Hebrews (Missoula: Scholars, 1975); Sidney G. Sowers, The
Hermeneutics of Philo and Hebrews (Zürick: EVZ-Verlag, 1965); Calum M. Carmichael, The Story of Creation
(Ithaca: Cornell, 1996); Peder Borgen, Bread from Heaven (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1965) and Philo, John, and Paul
(Atlanta: Scholars, 1987); Both Literal and Allegorical, David M. Hay (Atlanta: Scholars, 1991); Thomas H. Tobin,
“Romans 10:4: Christ the Goal of the Law” in The Studia Philonica Annual 4, eds. David T. Runia, et al. (Atlanta:
Scholars, 1991), pp. 272-280. For opponents, I draw on the following: Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality
(New York: Macmillan, 1978); Nicholas Wolterstorff, “God is Everlasting” in Philosophy of Religion, eds., Michael

3
warrant to reconsider the relevance of the Stoic theory of emotion in NT studies as well as

justification for early Christian assimilation of Stoic ethics in general outside of the NT. Finally,

in part three, I conclude by reexamining a select few didactic passages of the NT which presume

that Christians are expected to exercise control over their emotions, demonstrating that a proper

NT understanding of emotion should begin with the Stoics.

Stoic Apatheia as Emotional Intelligence

Since certain key nuances to the Stoic understanding of emotion have been often

overlooked, I will examine each significant aspect, beginning with the distinction between first-

movements and emotions. What we generally think of today as emotion or pathos—an

involuntary impression concerning a given event, sensation, or circumstance—the Stoics define

as propatheia. To the Stoics, emotions are dependant upon mistaken judgments. All involuntary

impressions are not, therefore, emotions, but merely first-movements that are dependent upon the

assent of the will to become genuine emotions. As John Sellars notes, to the Stoics “an emotion

involves a conscious act of assent to an impression.”9 For example, Seneca writes, “The first

movement of anger is in truth, involuntary, and only a kind of menacing preparation towards

Peterson, et al. (Oxford : Oxford, 1996); John S. Feinberg, No One Like Him (Wheaton: Crossway, 2001); C. Robert
Mesle, Process Theology (St. Louis: Chalice, 1973); Craig A. Evans, “Introduction: Finding a Context for Jesus” in
The Missing Jesus (Boston: Brill, 2002); Pinnock, Most Moved Mover. Robert K. Gnuse, The Old Testament and
Process Theology (St. Louis: Chalice, 2000); John Sanders “Historical considerations” in The Openness of God,
eds., Clark Pinnock, et al. (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1994).
9
John Sellars, Stoicism (Berkeley: University of California, 2006), p. 118. It is important to note that
Sellars links impressions (phantasia) with first-movements (pp. 65-66) and seems to imply that they are the effect of
sense impressions before a person forms a judgment (p. 116). For the purposes of this paper, however, such nuances
are irrelevant—whether an author refers to impressions or first-movements as precursors to emotions, I have cited
them as supporting the distinction since the two are so closely related that impressions imply first-movements. See
also Brennan, The Stoic Life, pp. 92-93; See also Margaret Graver, “Philo of Alexandria and the Origins of the Stoic
Προπάθειαι,” Phronesis, 44:4 (Nov., 1999), p. 312; Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind, pp. 66-67.

4
it.”10 Thus, while an involuntary jump after a sudden noise, for example, might look like fear, to

the Stoics this would only be a first-movement.11 True fear would be present if, after hearing a

loud noise, a person mistakenly judged that this was a bad thing and started to panic, rather than

recovering a temperate mindset and acting according to reason.

Additionally, it is also commonly overlooked that the Stoics did not categorically reject

all emotions, but made a further distinction between emotions proper (pathos), which arise from

mistaken judgments, and good emotions or eupatheia which arise from rational judgments.12 For

example, Diogenes Laertius writes, “But being among good emotion [eupatheias], with a report

of three, [are] joy, caution, [and] wishing.”13 To the Stoics, these three rational emotions are

counterparts to three of the four basic irrational emotions: joy to pleasure, caution to fear, and

wishing to desire, respectively.14 Though no Stoics allow for a good form of grief, Philo of

Alexandria, interpreting this distinction through the filter of Jewish tradition, seems to indicate

something of the sort.15 The basic idea is that while some emotions are irrational and lead to

vice, other emotions are good to the extent that they assist in the attainment of virtue.

10
Seneca, De Ira 2.2.1.
11
See, e.g., Seneca, De Ira 2.1.1-4; Philo of Alexandria, QGen 1.79; Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind,
pp. 66-67; Sellars, Stoicism, p. 116-118; Graver, “Philo of Alexandria and the Origins of the Stoic Προπάθειαι,”
Phronesis, 44:4 (Nov., 1999), pp. 300-301; Brennan, The Stoic Life, pp. 92-93.
12
See, e.g., Ps.-Andronicus, On Emotion 6; Diog. Laert. 7.115; Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 4.12;
Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind, pp.47-51, 375f; Long, Stoic Studies, p.119; Brennen, The Stoic Life, p.97f;
Colish, The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages 1, p. 42f; Sellars, Stoicism, p. 118f; Graver,
“Philo of Alexandria and the Origins of the Stoic Προπάθειαι,” Phronesis, 44:4 (Nov., 1999), p. 312; Sharples,
“Philosophy for Life” in The Cambridge Companion to the Hellenistic World, p. 235f.
13
Diog. Laert. 7.115, author’s translation.
14
See, e.g., Diog. Laert. 7.115; Ps.-Andronicus, On Emotion 6; Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 4.12;
Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind, pp.47-51, 375f; Long, Stoic Studies, p.119; Brennen, The Stoic Life, p.97f;
Colish, The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages 1, p. 42f; Sellars, Stoicism, p. 118f; Graver,
“Philo of Alexandria and the Origins of the Stoic Προπάθειαι” Phronesis, 44:4 (Nov., 1999), p. 312; Sharples,
“Philosophy for Life” in The Cambridge Companion to the Hellenistic World, p. 235f.
15
See Philo, QGen 2.57.

5
 Stoic apatheia, then, should be viewed as an ancient form of emotional intelligence,

rather than a total numbness to all feeling or emotion. The sage properly interprets his/her

feelings and does not assent to irrational impressions which cloud proper judgment. Furthermore,

the sage acknowledges that some emotions can help cultivate virtue and are therefore rational

and good. While this correction of the typical caricature of Stoic apatheia may be fascinating, we

do not yet have warrant to apply it to our understanding of the NT. First, we must establish the

possibility of Hellenistic, and especially Stoic, influence on the NT.

Stoic Currents in Second-Temple Judaism and Early Christianity

It has become increasingly popular in recent times to dismiss the Church Fathers on the

grounds that they were “seduced” by Greek philosophy and that their understanding of the faith

displays the cultural milieu of the day, rather than proper biblical exegesis.16 Many scholars

believe that attempting to read the Bible as the Fathers did is fundamentally incorrect. Charles

Hartshorne, for example, argues, “The Biblical writers were not discussing Greek philosophical

issues, and it is at our own peril that we interpret them as if they were discussing these.”17

Others, such as Whitehead and Pinnock, et al., seem to think that the worlds of Greek and Jew

were drastically opposed to one another in the centuries leading up to the NT, and, therefore, any

attempt to interpret it with the assistance of Greek philosophy should be viewed as a corruption

16
See, e.g., Pinnock, Most Moved Mover, p. 114, 65ff; Gnuse, The Old Testament and Process Theology,
p.6f; John Sanders “Historical considerations” in The Openness of God, p. 59-100.
17
Charles Hartshorne, Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes (Albany: State University of New
York), p. 2.

6
of the Scriptures.18 As Nicholas Wolterstorff asserts, “The patterns of classical Greek thought are

incompatible with the pattern of biblical thought.”19

While both Greeks and Jews were at times hostile to the other, both also acknowledged

truth in the other school of thought and each employed aspects of the other to suit one’s own

needs. This popular idea of Jewish isolation from Hellenistic influence, even in Palestine, is an

unfounded oversimplification of a very complex meeting of cultures. As Erich S. Gruen notes,

“‘Judaism’ and ‘Hellenism’ were neither competing systems nor incompatible concepts.”20 What

decades of scholarship have actually found is a fascinating type of ancient, inter-religious

dialogue, where Jews and Greeks acknowledged the wisdom of the other, accepting and

employing what fit within their own traditions, while rejecting whatever did not.21 These

rejections may not have been the sort of respectful disagreements that people have today, but

their lack of civility does not give warrant to overlook the many areas in which these two worlds

overlapped.

Accordingly, despite what some would like to claim, the extent of the Hellenization of

Jewish life and thought by the first century A. D. should not be limited to the Diaspora. In fact,

some, such as Martin Hengel, have demonstrated the thorough infiltration of Hellenism into

Palestine from the third century B. C. onward.22 We find that by the first century A. D., Greek

18
See, e.g., Whitehead, Process and Reality, pp. 342-343; Evans, “Introduction: Finding a Context for
Jesus” in The Missing Jesus, p. 1; Woltersdorf, “God is Everlasting” in Philosophy of Religion, p. 127; Feinberg, No
One Like Him, p. 482; Mesle, Process Theology, p. 4. See also notes 16 and 17 above.
19
Woltersdorff, “God is Everlasting,” in Philosophy of Religion, p. 127.
20
Gruen, Heritage and Hellenism, p. xiv; see also pp. xv, 292ff. See also Goodenough, On the History of
Religion and on Judaism, p. 41; Borgen, Bread from Heaven, p.3.
21
See, e.g., Carl R. Holladay, “Hellenism in the Fragmentary Hellenistic Jewish Authors: Resonance and
Resistance” in Shem in the Tents of Japhet, p. 66ff.
22
See, e.g., Hengel, Judaism and Hellenism 1, p. 58ff, 87. See also Newsome, Greeks, Romans, Jews, pp.
39, 56; Gruen, Heritage and Hellenism, p. 292ff; van der Horst, Japheth in the Tents of Shem, 12; Borgen, Paul

7
language and culture had affected literally every level of Jewish society. Furthermore, we even

find that in cases of the most extreme opposition to Hellenization, such as the Maccabees, 1

Enoch, and Ben Sira,23 there still existed elements of Greek language, culture, and thought, even

in the midst of anti-Hellenist polemics.24 Furthermore, the significant influence of Hellenism on

the Jews of the Diaspora is well established25 since the attitude among such Jews towards Greek

philosophy was much more favorable. In fact, Harry Austryn Wolfson notes, “The Scripture-

trained Jew unconsciously approached other gods with the attitude of a student of comparative

religion.”26 None of this is meant to portray Second-Temple Judaism as syncretistic but merely

to demonstrate that Jews of this time period, whether consciously or unconsciously,

acknowledged that the light of God’s truth had shone among the Greeks as well, albeit in a

somewhat diminished form.

Additionally, we must also consider the significant force of Jewish and other Semitic

influence on Hellenistic culture, as well as the growing Greek fascination with “barbarian

wisdom” in the centuries preceding the birth of the Christian Church.27 In fact, Dale B. Martin

notes, “Most scholars nowadays agree . . . that all forms of Greek culture in the same period had

Preaches Circumcision and Pleases Men, p. 75f; Heyler, Exploring Jewish Literature, pp. 76-77ff; Lester L.
Grabbe, “The Hellenistic City of Jerusalam” in Jews in the Hellenistic and Roman Cities, pp. 6-21.
23
For Ben Sira, see Newsome, Greeks, Romans, Jews, p. 193; for the Maccabees, see Martin Hengel,
Judaism and Hellenism 1, p. 60; for 1 Enoch, see Helyer, Exploring Jewish Literature of the Second Temple Period,
p. 86.
24
Winston, The Ancestral Philosophy, pp. 16-18, 35-43; Martin Hengel, Judaism and Hellenism 1, pp. 148,
160; Helyer, Exploring Jewish Literature, p. 86.
25
See, e.g., Newsome, Greeks, Romans, Jews, pp. 65, 206, 234-237; Gruen, Heritage and Hellenism, p.
xiv, Diaspora, p. 213-214; Collins, Jewish Cult and Hellenistic Culture, p. 2ff; Ellen Birnbaum, “Allegorical
Interpretation” in Neotestamentica et Philonica, p. 309.
26
Wolfson, Philo 1, p. 9. See also Newsome, Greeks, Romans, Jews, p.93f; Gruen, Heritage and
Hellenism, p. xv; Collins, Jewish Cult and Hellenistic Culture, p. 24.
27
Hengel, Judaism and Hellenism 1, p. 149. See also Bickerman The Jews in the Greek Age, pp.15-19.

8
been influenced by ‘oriental’ cultures, to ask whether something is Hellenistic or Jewish would

seem to be a misleading question.”28 Interestingly, this influence is partly due to the rise of

Stoicism and the ideas of “world citizenship” and Hellenism through education.29 Furthermore,

the Stoic appreciation for “barbarian wisdom” leads Hengel to conclude that “in one sense the

Jewish adoption of Stoic notions from Ben Sira and Aristobulus down to Philo was an oriental

interpretation taken back again.”30

With this sort of cross-pollination taking place, we should not be surprised to find traces

of Stoic affinities in many works of Second-Temple Jewish literature such as Ecclesiasticus, the

Wisdom of Solomon, and the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, among others,31 as well as

the works of Philo of Alexandria, who, while familiar with nearly every school of Greek

philosophy, explicitly affirms the Stoic distinctions between propatheia, pathos, and eupatheia,

employing them as exegetical tools.32 While it is widely held that Ben Sira and Wisdom, et al.,

28
Dale B. Martin, “Paul and the Judaism/Hellenism Dichotomy” in Paul Beyond the Judaism/Hellenism
Divide, p. 30. See also Hengel, Jews, Greeks and Barbarians, p. 78; Philip S. Alexander, “Hellenism and
Hellenization as Problematic Historiographical Categories” in Paul Beyond the Judaism/Hellenism Divide, p.79.
29
Hengel, Jews, Greeks and Barbarians, p. 68. See, e.g., Epictetus in Arrian, Discourses 1.9.1 in The
Golden Sayings of Epictetus, trans., Hastings Crossly in The Harvard Classics: The Apology,Phaedo, and Crito of
Plato; the Golden Sayings of Epictetus; The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius, ed., Charles W. Elliot (New York: P.
F. Collier and Son, 1937), pp. 121-122.
30
Hengel, Judaism and Hellenism 1, p. 149, see also p. 86.
31
For Ecclesiasticus, see: Winston, The Ancestral Philosophy, pp. 16-18, 35-43; Hengel, Judaism and
Hellenism 1, pp. 86f, 149f; for The Wisdom of Solomon, see: Winston, The Ancestral Philosophy, pp. 19-20, 91-93;
Helyer, Exploring Jewish Literature, pp. 291-294; Schurer, The Literature of the Jewish People in the Time of Jesus,
pp. 233-234; for The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, see: Newsome, Greeks, Romans, Jews, p.88; for
Aristobulus, see: Carl R. Holladay, “Hellenism in the Fragmentary Hellenistic Jewish Authors: Resonance and
Resistance” in Shem in the Tents of Japhet, p. 72; Borgen, Paul Preaches Circumcision and Pleases Men, p. 180ff;
Hengel, Judaism and Hellenism 1, pp. 86f, 149f; for 4 Maccabees, see: Winston, The Ancestral Philosophy, p. 22;
Gruen, Diaspora, p. 217; Helyer, Exploring Jewish Literature, p. 405ff; Schurer, The Literature of the Jewish
People in the Time of Jesus, p. 244f; for Josephus, see: Chaim Milikowsky, “Josephus Between Rabbinic Culture
and Hellenistic Historiography” in Shem in the Tents of Japhet, p. 180; Helyer, Exploring Jewish Literature, p. 344f.
32
See Philo, Leg. All. 3.7.22, Sacr. 31, 103, Migr. 39, 219, Praem. 27, 160, QGen. 1.55, 2.57, 3.56, 4.15-
17, 73 and Abr. 39, 204, 256-257. See also, Wolfson, Philo 2, pp. 275-276, esp. n49; Margaret Graver, “Philo of
Alexandria and the Origins of the Stoic Προπάθειαι,” Phronesis, 44:4 (Nov., 1999), p. 300-325.

9
have directly influenced the NT,33 there are so many parallels between the works of Philo and the

NT34 that we must, at least, presume a common influence between the two. Furthermore, the

widespread use of Greek thought in the patristic period, including these specific Stoic ethical

distinctions,35 contributes even greater evidence in support of their use as exegetical tools. If this

is the way that the earliest Christian interpreters understood the faith, why are we so eager to

abandon it today with little reason for doing so? In the end, we simply cannot get around the

possibility of Greek and especially Stoic influence on the NT, giving us warrant to reexamine its

usefulness for NT studies, as well as justification for its use by the Fathers of the Church.

33
For 1 Enoch, see: Newsome, Greeks, Romans, Jews, pp. 81-85; Helyer, Exploring Jewish Literature, pp.
86-92, 138-139; for the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, see: Newsome, Greeks, Romans, Jews, p. 89-90; for
Wisdom of Solomon, see: Martin Hengel, Judaism and Hellenism 1, p. 167-168; Collins, Jewish Cult and
Hellenistic Culture, p. 24; for Ben Sira, see: Helyer, Exploring Jewish Literature, pp. 101-107.
34
See, e.g., Thomas H. Tobin, “Romans 10:4: Christ the Goal of the Law” in The Studia Philonica Annual
4, pp. 272-280; Wolfson, Philo 1, pp. 460-461; ibid 2, pp. 64, 432; Borgen, Paul Preaches Circumcision and
Pleases Men, pp. 37-41, 58-71, Logos was the True Light, pp. 30-31, 38, 100-101, 128-131, and Bread From
Heaven, p. 188f; Carmichael, The Story of Creation, pp.36-40; Runia, Philo in Early Christian Literature, pp. 63-
86. It should be noted that, in his considerably sizable work, Philo and the Epistle to the Hebrews, Ronald
Williamson concludes that Philo had absolutely no influence on Hebrews. Despite the thoroughness of Williamson’s
study, many scholars disagree with his conclusion that Philo and the Epistle to the Hebrews do not share common
thoughts. In the end, (among other things) I believe that his analysis is hampered by faulty assumptions about both
Philo and Hebrews, such as Philo’s supposed total disregard for history. In fact, ironically, we may rightly criticize
him for ignoring the spirit of the texts and looking only to the letter, i.e., neglecting to take the time to properly
understand the ideas the texts portray, while devoting instead too much energy to linguistics. See Ronald
Williamson, Philo and the Epistle to the Hebrews (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1970), pp. 576-580. For a direct criticism of
Williamson’s lexigraphical study, as well as the findings of his own study, see Kare Fuglseth, “Common Words in
the New Testament and Philo” in Neotestamentica et Philonica, pp. 408-414. For those who come to other
conclusions than Williamson, though they may not cite him at all, see: Kalyan Kumar Dey, The Intermediary World
and Patterns of Perfection in Philo and Hebrews, pp.151f, 179f, 209f, 229f; Sowers, The Hermeneutics of Philo and
Hebrews, p. 66-73; Runia, Philo in Early Christian Literature, pp. 63-86.
35
See, e.g., St. Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis 6.9; Origen, On First Principle, 3.2.2, Commentary on
Matthew 15.4-17, Commentary on Romans 6.14, Commentary on John 20.29, and Commentary on Joshua 15.3; St.
Basil the Great, Ascetic Sermons 1.1-2; St. Gregory the Theologian, Letters 32 and Oration, 26.13; St. Gregory of
Nyssa, On the Soul and the Resurrection 53C, 61C, 68A; Evagrius of Pontus, Practical Treatise 6; St. John Cassian,
Conferences 12. For a brief history, to which I am indebted for most of these references, see Sorabji, Emotion and
Peace of Mind, pp. 385-399, esp. nn16, 21, 49, 57, 58, 64, 67, and 102. See also J. Warren Smith, Passion and
Paradise (New York: Crossroad, 2004), pp. 75-76. Though Smith does not here acknowledge Stoic influence on St.
Gregory of Nyssa, her description of his view of the passions as “mistaken or corrupt judgments of the mind” is
clearly Stoic, implying the Stoic distinction between propatheia and pathos.

10
 Before moving on, however, I would like to be very clear that it is not my intention to

promote Greek influence over/against Jewish, nor do I suppose that the writers of the NT blindly

adopt Greek concepts. Rather, as the Second-Temple Jews “circumcised” Greek philosophy

through their tradition, the first Christians “baptized” it through their faith in Christ. My concern

is with the widespread influence of Greek philosophy on Second-Temple Judaism and, by

extension, NT Christianity. To deny this Greek influence on the NT is to deny a significant

portion of Jewish thought, echoed throughout the NT. Having said this, I do not believe that the

Christian faith is merely a creative combination of Greek and Jewish thought, but rather that it

transcends them both. To quote St. Paul, in the newness of the Christian faith, “there is neither

Greek nor Jew . . . but Christ is all and in all.”36

Stoic Currents in Didactic Passages of the New Testament

Having established sufficient warrant for assuming Stoic influence on the NT, I will now

examine a few passages that, I believe, demonstrate agreement with the Stoic distinctions

between propatheia, pathos, and eupatheia. In particular, I will focus on James 1:2-3, which

states, “My brethren, count it all joy when you fall into various trials, knowing that the testing of

your faith produces patience.” If we read a modern understanding of emotion into this passage,

St. James’s exhortation makes little sense. How can we be expected to be joyful when we are

bombarded with every impression of fear, frustration, anxiety, and pain that comes from

“fall[ing] into various trials”? However, if we view this passage from an ancient, Stoic

perspective, we need only to acknowledge that these impressions, however strong they may be,

36
Colossians 3:11. Incidentally, David E. Aune uses a similar lens in his examination of 2 Corinthians
4:16-5:10. See David E. Aune, “Anthropological Duality in the Eschatology of 2 Cor 4:16-5:10” in Paul Beyond the
Judaism/Hellenism Divide, pp. 215-239.

11
are merely first-movements and not genuine emotions. We still have a judgment to make. St.

James tells us to “count it all joy,” assuming that we actually have the power to do so. St.

James’s exhortation is reasonable if and only if emotions are within our control. Under a modern

view of emotion, they are not. However, under the Stoic view, they are: emotion per se is the

product of the will, and therefore first movements do not qualify; only our voluntary response

qualifies. St. James, therefore, is not offering an exhortation regarding our natural first

movements, which, by definition, do not depend on the will. Rather, he is exhorting our will to

scrutinize those movements from a Christian perspective, accepting whatever is beneficial while

correcting the detrimental.

We may additionally note that, while elsewhere St. James, like the Stoics, condemns the

passions of desire (1:14; 4:1), pleasure (4:1; 4:3; 5:5), and anger (1:19-20), he here promotes joy.

On what grounds, we might ask? Christians are exhorted to take joy in the midst of trying times,

“knowing that the testing of [their] faith produces patience.” To St. James, just like the Stoics

and Philo of Alexandria before him, joy is a good emotion to the extent that it promotes virtue,

and in the case of this passage that virtue is patience.

St. James is not alone in this sort of emotional instruction. The NT is full of passages that

exhort Christians to take control of their emotions. Christ commands us not to worry37 and to

rejoice when we are persecuted.38 St. Paul cautions us about worldly, hopeless sorrow which

leads to death,39 while (following Philo?) promoting “godly sorrow [which] produces repentance

leading to salvation”40 and telling us to “rejoice in the Lord always.”41 Can these commandments

37
Matthew 6:25; Luke 12:22.
38
Matthew 5:12.
39
2 Corinthians 7:10; 1 Thessalonians 4:13.
40
2 Corinthians 7:10; cf. James 4:8-9 and Philo, QGen 2.57.

12
be taken seriously apart from a distinction between first-movements and emotions-as-judgments?

If, in fact, emotion depends upon the will, then all of these commands are possible. Calling to

mind the psalmists who, in the midst of hardship, delighted themselves in the Lord, we can see

how it would be natural and even fitting for the earliest Christians to see the Stoic view of

emotion as a helpful contribution to their understanding of faith. And I would merely ask, what

prevents us from reaching the same conclusion?

Concluding Remarks

After correcting some common misconceptions about the Stoic understanding of

emotion, it becomes clear that the Stoic view may contain the best explanation of NT exhortation

to take control of emotion. Despite claims that Greek philosophy only corrupts Christian

theology, we have seen that the denial of its influence on the NT, and therefore its rightful use as

an exegetical tool, has no historical justification and greatly handicaps our interpretation of

certain didactic passages in Scripture. However, when we allow for Hellenistic influence on the

NT, we find reasonable grounds for a robust philosophy of emotion, built in part on the

foundation of the Stoics. If anyone, therefore, wishes to formulate a comprehensive theory of

emotion from a proper Christian perspective, he/she must begin with the Stoic influence on the

NT and the like-minded testimony of the Fathers of the Church.

41
Philippians 4:4.

13