Casebook 2.2 Semi Final

Persons and Family
Relations
Compilation of Case Digests
Aguilar, S. Atanacio, C. Aquino, G. Baguiwan, J. Casildo, C.

Diaz, C. De Guzman, C. Malapit, C.Pagtailan, A. Pic-it, C.
Tejero, D. Tumayan, J. Wachayna, G.
10/1/2012
Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 1
Lara v. Del Rosario ......................................................................................................... 1
EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS ........................................... 3

Effectivity of Laws.....................................................................................................3
Tañada v. Tuvera ............................................................................................................ 3
Tañada v. Tuvera ............................................................................................................ 5
Phil. International Trading Corp. v. Angeles..................................................................... 7
Phil. Veterans Bank Employees Union v. Hon. Vega......................................................... 9
Ignorantia Legis Non Excusat .................................................................................11
Yao Kee v. Sy Gonzales ................................................................................................. 11
Board of Commissioners v. Dela Rosa ........................................................................... 13
Laureano v. CA ............................................................................................................. 15
Lex Prospicit, Non Respicit .....................................................................................17
Aruego Jr. v. CA ........................................................................................................... 17
Bernabe v. Alejo ........................................................................................................... 19
Waiver of Rights .....................................................................................................21
Guy v. CA ..................................................................................................................... 21
People v. Morial ............................................................................................................ 23
Judicial Application and Interpretation of Laws ...................................................... 26
Ting v. Ting .................................................................................................................. 26
Ayala Corp v. Rosa Diana Realty ................................................................................... 28
Rules on Application and Interpretation of Laws ....................................................30
People v. Veneracion ..................................................................................................... 30
Phil . Rabbit Bus Lines v. Arciaga ................................................................................. 32
Cesario Ursua v. CA ..................................................................................................... 34
CIR v. Primetown .......................................................................................................... 36
Labad v. University of Southern Philippines .................................................................. 38
How Laws Lose Their Effectivity..............................................................................40
CIR v. Primetown .......................................................................................................... 40
Binding Effects of Laws .......................................................................................... 42
Assali v. Commissioner of Customs ............................................................................... 42
Theory of Statutes/ Conflict of Law Rules............................................................... 44
Recio v. Recio ............................................................................................................... 44
Llorente v. CA ............................................................................................................... 46
Van Dorn v. Romillo ..................................................................................................... 48
ii
Aznar v. Garcia ............................................................................................................. 50
Bellis v. Bellis ............................................................................................................... 52
PCIB v. Escolin ............................................................................................................. 54
American Airlines v. Court of Appeals ........................................................................... 56
HUMAN RELATIONS .................................................................... 58

Standards / Norms of Human Conduct ..................................................................58
Go v. Cordero ............................................................................................................... 58
Villanueva v. Rosqueta ................................................................................................. 61
Manuel v. People .......................................................................................................... 63
University of the East v. Jader ...................................................................................... 65
Cruz v. NLRC ............................................................................................................... 67
Globe Mackay v. Barrios ............................................................................................... 69
RCPI v. CA ................................................................................................................... 70
Nikko Hotel v. Reyes ..................................................................................................... 72
Acts Contrary to Morals, Good Customs or Public Policy ........................................74
Hermossisima v. CA...................................................................................................... 74
Galang v. CA ................................................................................................................ 76
Gashem Shookat Baksh v. CA....................................................................................... 78
Wassmer v. Velez .......................................................................................................... 80
Unjust Enrichment.................................................................................................82
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Ong ............................................................................. 82
Respect for Personality and Dignity of Others ......................................................... 86
Concepcion v. CA ......................................................................................................... 86
Neglect or Refusal of Public Servant .......................................................................88
Amonoy v. Spouses Gutierrez........................................................................................ 88
Action for Damages based on Crime / Delict .......................................................... 91
Guaring v. CA............................................................................................................... 91
Manantan v. CA ........................................................................................................... 93
Independent Civil Actions ....................................................................................... 95
Bonite v. Zosa .............................................................................................................. 95
People v. Bayotas .......................................................................................................... 97
Mansion Biscuits v. CA ................................................................................................. 99
Cojuangco v. CA ......................................................................................................... 101
Alcuaz v. PSBA ........................................................................................................... 103
Non v. Dames ............................................................................................................. 106
Arafiles v. Philippine Journalists ................................................................................. 109
International Flavors v. Argo ....................................................................................... 112
Marcia v. CA ............................................................................................................... 114
iii
Ruiz v. Ucol ................................................................................................................ 116
Barredo v. Garcia ....................................................................................................... 118
Prejudicial Questions ........................................................................................... 120
Beltran v. People ........................................................................................................ 120
City of Pasig v. COMELEC .......................................................................................... 122
Merced v. Diez ............................................................................................................ 125
Donato v. Luna ........................................................................................................... 127
PERSONS AND PERSONALITY ................................................... 129

Natural Persons.................................................................................................... 129
Geluz v. CA ................................................................................................................ 129
Catalan v. Basa .......................................................................................................... 131
Domingo v. CA ........................................................................................................... 133
Mendezona v. Ozamiz ................................................................................................. 135
People v. Bayotas ........................................................................................................ 138
DOMICILE .................................................................................. 140

Marcos v. COMELEC .................................................................................................. 140
MARRIAGE ................................................................................. 142

Aruego Jr. v. CA ......................................................................................................... 142
Bernabe v. Alejo ......................................................................................................... 144
Espinosa v. Atty. Omaña ............................................................................................ 146
Estrada v. Escritor ..................................................................................................... 148
Ancheta v. Ancheta ..................................................................................................... 150
People v. Borromeo ..................................................................................................... 152
Corpus v. Corpus ....................................................................................................... 154
Rivera v. IAC .............................................................................................................. 156
Abadilla v. Tabiliran ................................................................................................... 158
Dela Rosa v. Heirs of Delgado ..................................................................................... 160
Eugenio v. Velez ......................................................................................................... 163
Garcia vda. De Chua v. CA ......................................................................................... 165
Requisites of a Valid Marriage .............................................................................. 167
RP v. Silverio .............................................................................................................. 167
RP v. Cagandahan ...................................................................................................... 169
Donato v. Luna ........................................................................................................... 171
Atienza v. Brillantes .................................................................................................... 174
Beso v. Judge Daguman ............................................................................................. 176
Alcantara v. Alcantara ................................................................................................ 178
Sevilla v. Cardenas ..................................................................................................... 180
iv
Aranes v. Occiano ....................................................................................................... 182
Republic v. CA ............................................................................................................ 188
Sy v. CA ..................................................................................................................... 191
Carino v. Carino ......................................................................................................... 193
Morigo v. People ......................................................................................................... 196
Moreno v. Bernabe ..................................................................................................... 198
Navarro v. Dumagtoy .................................................................................................. 200
Foreign Divorce .................................................................................................... 202
Tanchavez v. Escano .................................................................................................. 202
RP v. Iyoy ................................................................................................................... 204
Van Dorn v. Romillo ................................................................................................... 207
Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera ................................................................................................. 209
Quita v. CA ................................................................................................................ 211
San Luis v. San Luis ................................................................................................... 213
Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas .................................................................................................. 215
Recio v. Recio ............................................................................................................. 217
RP v. Orbecido III........................................................................................................ 220
Void Ab Initio Marriages ....................................................................................... 222
Moreno v. Moreno ....................................................................................................... 222
Navarro v. Domagtoy .................................................................................................. 224
Alcantara v. Alcantara ................................................................................................ 226
Sevilla v. Cardenas ..................................................................................................... 228
Mallion v. Alcantara .................................................................................................... 230
Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma .............................................................................................. 232
Carino v. Carino ......................................................................................................... 234
Trinidad v. Trinidad .................................................................................................... 236
Manzano v. Sanchez ................................................................................................... 241
Ninal v. Bayadog......................................................................................................... 243
Sy v. CA ..................................................................................................................... 245
Cosca v. Palaypayon ................................................................................................... 247
Jarillo v. People .......................................................................................................... 249
Macarrubo v. Macarrubo ............................................................................................ 251
Tenebro v. Tenebro ..................................................................................................... 254
Quita v. CA ................................................................................................................ 256
Vda. de Mijares v. Villaluz ........................................................................................... 259
Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy .................................................................................................. 262
Balogbog and Balogbog v. CA ...................................................................................... 264
v
Tamano v. Ortiz .......................................................................................................... 266
Republic v. CA ............................................................................................................ 268
Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino ...................................................................................... 271
Republic v. Nolasco .................................................................................................... 273
Valdez v. Republic ...................................................................................................... 276
Bienvenido v. CA ........................................................................................................ 278
Manuel v. People ........................................................................................................ 281
Calisterio v. Calisterio ................................................................................................. 283
Carino v. Carino ......................................................................................................... 285
Mercado v. Tan ........................................................................................................... 287
Domingo v. CA ........................................................................................................... 291
Beltran v. People ........................................................................................................ 293
Chi Ming Tsoi v. CA and Lao ....................................................................................... 295
Santos v. CA............................................................................................................... 297
Republic v. CA and Olaviano ....................................................................................... 299
Barcelona v. CA .......................................................................................................... 303
Tongol v. Tongol ......................................................................................................... 305
Ochosa v. Ochosa ....................................................................................................... 307
Yambao v. Republic .................................................................................................... 309
Marable v. Marable ....................................................................................................... 313
Agraviador v. Agraviador ............................................................................................. 315
Ligeralde v. Patalinghug .............................................................................................. 320
Reyes v. Reyes ............................................................................................................ 323
Toring v. Toring .......................................................................................................... 325
Suazo v. Suazo ........................................................................................................... 327
Azcueta vs. Republic ................................................................................................... 329
Alcazar v. Alcazar ....................................................................................................... 333
Aspillaga v. Aspillaga .................................................................................................. 337
Najera v. Najera .......................................................................................................... 339
Te v. Te ...................................................................................................................... 340
Paras v. Paras ............................................................................................................ 342
Zamora v. CA ............................................................................................................. 344
Ferraris v. Ferraris ..................................................................................................... 346
Antonio v. Reyes ......................................................................................................... 348
RP v. Iyoy ................................................................................................................... 350
Siayngco v. Siayngco .................................................................................................. 352
Villalon v. Villalon ...................................................................................................... 353
Buenaventura v. CA ................................................................................................... 355
vi
RP v. Hamano ............................................................................................................ 357
Dedel v. CA ................................................................................................................ 361
RP v. Dagdag .............................................................................................................. 363
Pesca v. Pesca ............................................................................................................ 365
Marcos v. Marcos ....................................................................................................... 366
Hernandez v. CA ......................................................................................................... 368
Enrico v. Heirs ........................................................................................................... 369
Catalan v. CA ............................................................................................................. 371
Ninal v. Bayadog......................................................................................................... 373
Ablaza v. Republic ...................................................................................................... 375
Carlos v. Sandoval ...................................................................................................... 377
Mallion v. Alcatara ...................................................................................................... 379
Maquilan v. Maquilan ................................................................................................. 381
RP v. Cuison-Melgar ................................................................................................... 382
Corpus v. Ochotorena ................................................................................................. 384
Macias v. Macias ........................................................................................................ 386
Sin v. Sin ................................................................................................................... 388
Ancheta v. Ancheta ..................................................................................................... 389
Tuason v. CA and Tuason ........................................................................................... 391
Pacete v. Carriaga, Jr. ................................................................................................ 392
Silva v. CA .................................................................................................................. 394
Jarillo v. People .......................................................................................................... 396
Carino v. Carino ......................................................................................................... 398
Leonor v. CA and Beldia ............................................................................................. 400
Balogbog and Balogbog v. CA ...................................................................................... 402
Tamano v. Ortiz .......................................................................................................... 404
Domingo v. CA ........................................................................................................... 406
Beltran v. People ........................................................................................................ 407
Bobis v. Bobis ............................................................................................................ 409
Ty v. CA ..................................................................................................................... 411
Valdes v. Valdes ......................................................................................................... 413
Voidable / Annullable Marriages .......................................................................... 415
Villanueva v. CA ......................................................................................................... 415
Anaya v. Palaroan ....................................................................................................... 417
Buccat v. Buccat ........................................................................................................ 419
Villanueva v. CA ......................................................................................................... 421
vii
People v. Santiago ...................................................................................................... 426
Reyes v. Zaballero ....................................................................................................... 428
Alcazar v. Alcazar ....................................................................................................... 430
Villanueva v. CA ......................................................................................................... 432
Jimenez v. Canizares .................................................................................................. 434
Jimenez v. Republic .................................................................................................... 436
Pacete v. Carriaga, Jr. ................................................................................................ 438
Tuason v. CA .............................................................................................................. 440
Legal Separation................................................................................................... 443
Ong v. Ong ................................................................................................................. 443
Banez v. Banez ............................................................................................................ 445
Gaudionco v. Penaranda ............................................................................................. 447
Prima Partosa-Jo v. CA ............................................................................................... 449
Arroyo v. CA ............................................................................................................... 451
Bugayong v. Ginez ...................................................................................................... 454
People v. Zapata and Bondoc ...................................................................................... 457
Ocampo v. Florenciano ............................................................................................... 460
Matubis v. Praxedes ................................................................................................... 462
People v. Schnckenberger ........................................................................................... 464
People v. Sensano ....................................................................................................... 466
Benedicto De La Rama v. De La Rama ......................................................................... 468
Brown v. Yambao ....................................................................................................... 470
De Ocampo v. Florenciano .......................................................................................... 472
Contreras v. Macaraig ................................................................................................. 474
Araneta v. Concepcion ................................................................................................ 476
Pacete v. Carriaga ....................................................................................................... 478
Somosa-Ramos v. CA .................................................................................................. 480
Sabalones v. CA.......................................................................................................... 482
Espiritu and Layug v. CA ............................................................................................ 484
Lapuz Sy v. Eufemio ................................................................................................... 487
Laperal v. Republic ..................................................................................................... 489
Siochi v. Gozon ........................................................................................................... 491
Rights and Obligations of Spouses ....................................................................... 494
Ilusorio v. Ilusorio ...................................................................................................... 494
Arroyo v. Vasquez de Arroyo ....................................................................................... 497
Goitia v. Campos Rueda ............................................................................................. 499
Tenchavez v. Escano ................................................................................................... 501
Cuenca v. Cuenca ...................................................................................................... 503
viii
Go v. CA ..................................................................................................................... 505
Property Relations Between Spouses .................................................................... 507
Arcaba v. De Batocael ................................................................................................. 507
Matabuena v. Cervantes ............................................................................................. 509
Grecio v. Sun Life ....................................................................................................... 511
Harding v. Commercial Union ..................................................................................... 513
Imani v. Metrobank .................................................................................................... 514
Navarro v. Judge Escobido .......................................................................................... 516
Villanueva v. CA ......................................................................................................... 518
Ching v. CA ................................................................................................................ 520
Tan v. CA ................................................................................................................... 522
Ros and Aguete v. PNB Laoag...................................................................................... 524
Go v. CA ..................................................................................................................... 526
Siochi v. Gozon ........................................................................................................... 527
Aggabao v. Parulan ..................................................................................................... 530
Fuentes v. Roca .......................................................................................................... 532
Sps. De Leon v. De Leon ............................................................................................. 535
Sps. Bautista v. Silva .................................................................................................. 537
Homeowner Savings and Loan Bank v. Dailo ............................................................... 539
Abalos v. Macatangay ................................................................................................. 540
Roxas v. CA ................................................................................................................ 541
Nicolas v. CA .............................................................................................................. 542
Muller v. Muller .......................................................................................................... 543
Cruz v. Cristobal ........................................................................................................ 545
Go v. Yamane ............................................................................................................. 547
Oligario v. CA ............................................................................................................. 549
Nable-Jose v. Nable-Jose ............................................................................................ 551
Luna v. Linatoc .......................................................................................................... 552
Cuenca v. Cuenca ...................................................................................................... 554
Wong v. CA................................................................................................................. 555
Prima Partosa Jo v. CA ............................................................................................... 557
De Ocampo v. Delizo ................................................................................................... 559
Vda. de Consegrua v. GSIS ......................................................................................... 561
Salvador v. CA ............................................................................................................ 563
Sarmiento v. Ordonez ................................................................................................. 565
Villanueva v. IAC ........................................................................................................ 567
Tan v. CA ................................................................................................................... 569
Manotok Realty v. CA ................................................................................................. 571
ix
Ong v. CA ................................................................................................................... 573
Ravina v. Abrille ......................................................................................................... 575
Titan Construction Corporation v. David .................................................................... 578
Ching v. CA ................................................................................................................ 581
Castro v.Miat .............................................................................................................. 583
Francisco v. CA .......................................................................................................... 585
Diaz v. CA .................................................................................................................. 587
Ayala Investments v. CA ............................................................................................. 589
Salvador v. CA ............................................................................................................ 591
Ros and Aguete v. PNB Laoag...................................................................................... 593
Domingo v. Reed......................................................................................................... 596
Embrado v. CA ........................................................................................................... 598
Carlos v. Abelardo ...................................................................................................... 600
BA Finance v. CA ........................................................................................................ 602
Johnson and Johnson v. CA ....................................................................................... 604
Fuentes v. Roca .......................................................................................................... 606
Bautista v. Silva ......................................................................................................... 609
Alfredo v. Borras......................................................................................................... 610
Jardeleza v. Jardeleza ................................................................................................. 612
Guiang v. CA .............................................................................................................. 614
Nicolas v. CA .............................................................................................................. 616
Uy v. CA ..................................................................................................................... 618
Sabalones v. CA.......................................................................................................... 620
Relucio v. Lopez .......................................................................................................... 622
Nable-Jose v. Nable-Jose ............................................................................................ 624
Heirs of Reyes v. Mijares ............................................................................................. 629
Castro v. Miat ............................................................................................................. 631
Perez v. CA ................................................................................................................. 633
In re Bermas .............................................................................................................. 637
Lacson v. Lacson ........................................................................................................ 638
Maxey v. CA ............................................................................................................... 640
Valdes v. RTC ............................................................................................................. 642
Dino v. Dino ............................................................................................................... 644
Buenaventura v. CA ................................................................................................... 645
Gonzales v. Gonzales .................................................................................................. 648
Flora v. Pardo ............................................................................................................. 649
x
Mercado-Fehr v. Fehr ................................................................................................. 651
Carino v. Carino ......................................................................................................... 652
Tumlos v. Fernandez .................................................................................................. 654
Malang v. Moson ........................................................................................................ 656
Metrobank v. Pascual ................................................................................................. 658
Francisco v. Master Ironworks .................................................................................... 661
Joaquino v. Reyes ....................................................................................................... 663
Mallilin Jr v. Castillo .................................................................................................. 665
FACTS: ....................................................................................................................... 665
Saguid v. CA............................................................................................................... 665
Carino v. Carino ......................................................................................................... 667
Uy v. CA ..................................................................................................................... 669
Belcodera v. CA .......................................................................................................... 671
Juaniza v. Jose........................................................................................................... 673
Adriano v. CA ............................................................................................................. 674
THE FAMILY .............................................................................. 677

Guerrero v. RTC ......................................................................................................... 677
Esquivias v. CA .......................................................................................................... 680
Hiyas Savings v. Acuna ............................................................................................... 683
Martinez v. Martinez ................................................................................................... 685
Hontiveros v. RTC of Iloilo City .................................................................................... 687
Vda. De Manalo v. CA ................................................................................................. 689
Uy v. Chua ................................................................................................................. 691
Santos v. CA............................................................................................................... 693
Mendoza v. CA............................................................................................................ 696
Versoza v. Versoza ...................................................................................................... 698
Trinidad Ramos v. Pangilinan ..................................................................................... 700
Modequillo v. Breva .................................................................................................... 702
Trinidad Ramos v. Pangilinan ..................................................................................... 704
Equitable PCI v. OJ Mark Trading ............................................................................... 706
Josef v. Santos ........................................................................................................... 709
Kelley v. Planters Products .......................................................................................... 712
Gomez v. Ines ............................................................................................................. 714
Manacop v. CA ........................................................................................................... 716
Taneo v. CA ................................................................................................................ 718
PATERNITY AND FILIATION ....................................................... 720

De Asis v. CA .............................................................................................................. 720
Fernandez v. Fernandez .............................................................................................. 722
xi
Legitimate Children .............................................................................................. 724
Concepcion v. CA ....................................................................................................... 724
Angeles v. Maglaya ..................................................................................................... 726
Jao v. CA.................................................................................................................... 731
Andal v. Macaraig ....................................................................................................... 733
Babiera v. Catotal ....................................................................................................... 735
Benitez-Badua v. CA ................................................................................................... 737
Liyao v. Tanhoti-Liyao................................................................................................. 739
De Jesus v. Estate of Juan Dizon ................................................................................ 742
Tijing v. CA................................................................................................................. 744
Go Kim Huy v. Go Kim Huy ........................................................................................ 746
Tecson v. COMELEC ................................................................................................... 748
In Re: Julian Lin Wang ............................................................................................... 751
Illegitimate Children ............................................................................................. 753
Tayag v. Tayag-Gallor ................................................................................................. 753
Verceles v. Posada ...................................................................................................... 755
Rodriguez v. Lim ......................................................................................................... 757
Cabatania v. Regodos ................................................................................................. 759
Eceta v. Eceta............................................................................................................. 761
Alberto v. CA .............................................................................................................. 763
De Jesus v. Estate of Dizon ......................................................................................... 765
Aparicio v. Paraguya ................................................................................................... 767
Rivero v. CA ............................................................................................................... 769
People v. Bayani ......................................................................................................... 771
People v. Manahan ..................................................................................................... 773
Nepomuceno v. Lopez ................................................................................................. 775
Rivera v. Heirs of Villanueva ....................................................................................... 777
Cruz v. Cristobal ........................................................................................................ 779
Cabatania v. CA ......................................................................................................... 781
Lagabala v. Santiago ................................................................................................... 783
Locsin v. Locsin .......................................................................................................... 785
Ilano v. CA ................................................................................................................. 787
Fernandez v. CA ......................................................................................................... 789
Rodriguez v. CA .......................................................................................................... 791
Jison v. CA ................................................................................................................. 793
Pe Lim v. CA ............................................................................................................... 795
Tijing v. CA................................................................................................................. 797
xii
Agustin v. CA ............................................................................................................. 799
Herrera v. Alba ............................................................................................................. 801
People v. Vallejo.......................................................................................................... 803
People v. Yatar............................................................................................................ 805
Rules on DNA Evidence .............................................................................................. 807
Reyes v. Mauricio ....................................................................................................... 809
Estate of Ong v. Diaz .................................................................................................. 811
Guy v. CA ................................................................................................................... 813
Rivero v. CA ............................................................................................................... 815
Briones v. Miguel ........................................................................................................ 817
Herrera v. Alba ........................................................................................................... 819
Marquino v. IAC ......................................................................................................... 821
Tayag v. CA ................................................................................................................ 823
People v. Bayani ......................................................................................................... 825
Republic v. Abadilla .................................................................................................... 827
In re: Adoption of Stephanie Garcia ............................................................................. 831
Briones v. Miguel ........................................................................................................ 833
People v. Glabo ........................................................................................................... 835
Tonog v. CA ................................................................................................................ 838
RP v. Abadilla ............................................................................................................. 841
Mossesgeld v. CA ........................................................................................................ 843
Silva v. CA .................................................................................................................. 846
David v. CA ................................................................................................................ 849
Legitimated Children ............................................................................................ 851
De Santos v. Angeles .................................................................................................. 851
Abadilla v. Tabiliran ................................................................................................... 854
Adopted Children ................................................................................................. 857
Republic v. Hughes ..................................................................................................... 857
Republic v. Toledano .................................................................................................. 859
Republic v. Hernandez ................................................................................................ 861
Republic v. CA ............................................................................................................ 863
Republic v. Dye .......................................................................................................... 865
In Re: Michelle and Michael Lim ................................................................................. 867
Landingin v. Republic ................................................................................................. 869
Cang v. CA ................................................................................................................. 871
In Re: Adoption of Stephanie Garcia ............................................................................ 873
DSWD v. Belen ........................................................................................................... 875
xiii
Teotico v. Del Val ........................................................................................................ 877
Lahom v. Sibulo ......................................................................................................... 879
SUPPORT ................................................................................... 881

Lacson v. Lacson ........................................................................................................ 881
Briones v. Miguel ........................................................................................................ 883
Quimiguing v. Icao ..................................................................................................... 885
Francisco v. Zandueta ................................................................................................ 887
Ruiz v. CA .................................................................................................................. 889
Sps. Lim v. Lim .......................................................................................................... 892
Mangonon v. CA ......................................................................................................... 896
De Guzman v. Perez.................................................................................................... 899
Lam v. Chua............................................................................................................... 901
Reyes v. Ines-Luciano ................................................................................................. 903
Santero v. CFI ............................................................................................................ 905
Lacson v. Lacson ........................................................................................................ 907
PARENTAL AUTHORITY AND CUSTODY .................................... 909

Thornton v. Thornton ................................................................................................. 909
Madrinan v. Madrinan ................................................................................................ 912
De Guzman v. Perez.................................................................................................... 915
Tonog v. CA ................................................................................................................ 915
Vancil v. Belmes ......................................................................................................... 918
Bondagiy v. Bondagiy ................................................................................................. 920
Sagala-Eslao v. CA ....................................................................................................... 922
Dacasin v. Dacasin ....................................................................................................... 924
Gamboa Hirsch v. CA ................................................................................................. 926
Gualberto v. Gualberto ............................................................................................... 928
Santos v. CA............................................................................................................... 930
Golangco v. CA ........................................................................................................... 932
Silva v. CA .................................................................................................................. 934
David v. CA ................................................................................................................ 936
Espiritu and Layug v. CA and Masauding .................................................................... 938
Perez v. CA ................................................................................................................. 940
Sagala-Eslao v. CA and Cordero-Ouye ......................................................................... 942
Oreta v. CA and Dandan ............................................................................................. 944
Libi v. IAC .................................................................................................................. 946
Tamargo v. CA ............................................................................................................ 948
Hebron v. Loyola......................................................................................................... 950
xiv
Landingin v. Republic ................................................................................................. 953
Sombong v. CA ........................................................................................................... 955
Aquinas School v. Sps. Inton ...................................................................................... 957
St. Joseph's College v. Miranda ................................................................................... 959
St. Mary's Academy v. Carpitanos ............................................................................... 961
Amadora v. CA ........................................................................................................... 963
Salvosa v. IAC ............................................................................................................ 965
PSBA v. CA ................................................................................................................. 967
NAMES AND SURNAMES ........................................................... 969

Remo v. The Honorable Secretary of Foreign Affairs ..................................................... 969
Yasin v. Sharia District Court ..................................................................................... 972
In re: Adoption of Stephanie Garcia ............................................................................. 974
In Re: Julian Lin Wang ............................................................................................... 976
People v. Estrada ........................................................................................................ 978
Cesario Ursua v. CA ................................................................................................... 980
Absence...................................................................................... 982
Bienvenido v. CA ........................................................................................................ 982
Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo .................................................................................... 985
Silverio v. Republic ..................................................................................................... 988
RP v. Cagandahan ...................................................................................................... 990
In re: Change of Name of Julian Wang ........................................................................ 992
Baldos v. CA ............................................................................................................... 994
Lee v. CA .................................................................................................................... 997
xv
INTRODUCTION
Lara v. Del Rosario
MANUEL LARA ET AL. ,petitioner,

vs.
PETRONILO DEL ROSARIO, respondent
G.R. No. L-6339 April 20, 1954
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
FACTS:
In 1950, the defendant, del Rosario, owner of 25 taxi cabs or cars, operated a taxi
business. He employed 3 mechanics and 49 chauffeurs. In September 1950, Del Rosario sold
his 25 cabs to La Mallorca, a transportation company, without giving said mechanics and drivers
30 days advance notice. They lost their jobs because the transportation company failed to
continue their employment. The case was brought against del Rosario to recover compensation
provided for in Art. 302 of the Code of Commerce. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss for
the ground of lack of action. The trial court dismissed the case, with the Eight-Hour Labor Law,
Sections 1-4 (Commonwealth Act no. 444) as its basis. Plaintiffs, Lara et. al., were former taxi
drivers of the defendant, appealed to the CA.
ISSUES:
(1)Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to extra compensation for work performed in
excess of 8 hours a day, Sundays and holidays included.
(2)Whether or not the New Civil Code took effect on August 30, 1949.
RULINGS:
(1)No. The last part of section 3 of Commonwealth Act 444 provides for extra
compensation for over-time work, section 2 of the same act excludes from the application
1
thereof laborers who preferred to be on piece work basis. The claim of plaintiffs for overtime
compensation under the Eight-Hour Labor Law has no valid support. The month pay (mesada)
under Art. 302 of the Code of Commerce, Art. 2270 of the new Civil Code appears to have
repealed the Art. 302. The repeal took place on August 30, 1950, one year after its publication
in the Official Gazette. The termination of the services of plaintiffs took place on September 2,
1950.
(2)No. In this case, the Supreme Court in an obiter dictum held that the new Civil Code
of the Philippines took effect on August 30, 1950. This date is exactly one year after the Official
Gazette publishing the Code was released for circulation, the said release having been made on
August 30, 1949. The plaintiffs then are not entitled to any compensation, the New Civil Code
having repealed the Code of Commerce.
FALLO:
The order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellants.
2
EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS
Effectivity of Laws
Tañada v. Tuvera
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ET. AL., petitioners,

vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TO THE
PRESIDENT, ET. AL, respondents.
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
ESCOLIN, J.:
Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish,
and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and
administrative orders.
FACTS:
The petitioners, Lorenzo M. Taňada, Abraham F. Sarmiento, and Movement of Attorneys
for Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), were seeking a writ of mandamus to
compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication of laws in the Official
Gazette. However, respondents through Solicitor General would have this case dismissed on
the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non
requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity
date.
They pleaded likewise that the date of publication is material in determining the date of
effectivity, that is, the fifteenth day following the publication, as provided in Article 2 of the New
Civil Code, but not when the law itself provides its own date of effectivity. Otherwise, there
would be no room for the application of the maxim “ignorantia legis non excusat,” for it
3
prejudices the right of due process since these presidential issuances are “of public nature” or
“of general applicability.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the publication of presidential issuances in the Official Gazette is not
indispensable for their effectivity.
RULING:
No. The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application,
which have not been published, shall have no force and effect. The enforcement of presidential
decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is an “operative fact which may have
consequence which cannot be justly ignored.” Wherefore, the Court hereby orders respondents
to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general
application.
FALLO:
The Court orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall
have no binding force and effect.
4
Tañada v. Tuvera
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ET. AL., petitioners,

vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA. IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TO THE
PRESIDENT, ET AL., respondents.
G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986
CRUZ, J.:
The petitioners filed for motion for reconsideration/clarification of the decision on April
24, 1985, affirming the necessity for the publication of some of the decrees.
FACTS:
After the decision of the Court on 24 April 1985 affirming the necessity for the publication
of some of the decrees, Taňada, et. al., are before the Court again to suggest that there should
be no distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are not; that publication
should be complete; and the same should be made in the Official Gazette.
ISSUES:
(1)Whether or not there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability
and those which are not.
(2)Whether or not the publication means complete publication.
(3)Whether or not the publication must be made in the Official Gazette only.
RULINGS:
(1)Yes. The clause in Art. 2 of the Civil Code “unless otherwise provided” refers to the
date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself. The term “laws” should refer to
all laws and not only to those of general application.
(2)Yes. Publication is indispensible in every case. All statutes shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity. Publication must be in full or complete as its purpose is to inform
the public of its contents.
(3)No. The publication must not be in the Official Gazette only, because it is not readily
available to the public and it comes out infrequently. Newspapers of general circulation could
better perform the function of communicating the laws to the people.
5
All laws should be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after
15 days from their publication, or another date specified. This is in accordance with Art. 2 of the
Civil Code.
FALLO:
All laws shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be
published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen days from their
publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the
Civil Code.
*(Executive Order 200, dated June 18, 1987, has modified Article 2 of the Civil Code, which
provides for the publication of laws either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines as a requirement for effectivity.)
6
Phil. International Trading Corp. v. Angeles
PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
ANGELES, respondent
G.R. No. 108461 October 21, 1996
TORRES, JR., J.:

The PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION (PITC) filed this Petition
for Review on Certiorari, seeking the reversal of the Decision dated January 4, 1993 of public
respondent Hon. Zosimo Z. Angeles. Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 58, in civil Case No.92-158 entitled Remington Industrial Sales Corporation, et. al. vs.
Philippine Industrial Trading Corporation.
The said decision upheld the Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus of REMINGTON
INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION (Remington) and FIRESTONE CERAMICS, INC.
(Firestone), and, in the process, declared as null and void and unconstitutional, PITC’s
Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 and its appurtenant regulations.
FACTS:
On August 30, 1989, the administrative order no. SOCPEC 89-08-01 was issued by the
Philippine International Coporation (PITC). The relevant provision therein was that organizations
which wanted to trade with the People’s Republic of China (PROC) had to do so under certain
conditions: Imports must be made with a corresponding number or percentage or exports.
Desiring to make importations form PROC, private respondents Remington and Firestone, both
domestic corporations, individually applied for the deal and executed respective undertaking to
balance their imports and exports. After importation, both private respondents failed to comply in
submitting corresponding export credits. The PITC subsequently barred private respondents
from future importation from PROC.
Eventually, private respondents came together came together in a petition against PITC
(petition for Prohibition and Mandamus, with prater for issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order). The regional trial court rendered its decision on January 4, 1992. the court sided with
herein private respondents citing among a host of reasons that PITC’s authority to create laws
had already been repealed by E.O. No. 133, issued on February 27, 1987. Another
7
considerable point was that the administrative order was null and void since the same was not
published as was required by Article 2 of the Civil Code.
Petitioner then came to the Supreme Court on petition for review on certiorari. While the
Supreme Court was deliberating, President Fidel V. Ramos came to an agreement with PROC
and forged Executive Order No. 244. The executive order essentially abrogated the
administrative order. There however remained, the matter of outstanding obligations of the
respondents for the charges relating to the 0.5%. Counter Export Development Service in favor
of PITC, for the period when the questioned Administrative Order was still in effect.
ISSUES:
(1)Whether or not the administrative orders are subject to Article 2 of the Civil Code.
(2)Whether or not the legal authority of PITC emanating from LOI No. 444 and P.D. No.
244 has been repealed by E.O. No. 133.
RULINGS:
(1)Yes. The Administrative Order is not exempt from Article 2 of regulations must also be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation. The administrative order issued by PITC dated on August 30, 1989 was not
published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. Hence, the law was
invalid when obligations were supposed to take effect.
(2)No. LOI No. 444 and P.D. No. 244 were not repealed by E.O. No. 13 since the
executive order itself, as worded, was silent as to the abolition or limitation of the powers
granted to the PITC.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court, to the effect that judgment
was hereby rendered in favor of the private respondents.
FALLO:
The assailed decision of the lower court is affirmed.
8
Phil. Veterans Bank Employees Union v. Hon. Vega
PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK EMPLOYEES UNION-N.U.B.E and PERFECTO B.

FERNANDEZ, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE BENJAMIN VEGA, respondents.
G.R. No. 105364 June 28, 2001
KAPUNAN, J.:
FACTS:
In 1985, Central Bank of the Philippines filed a petition for assistance in the liquidation of
the Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB), in the RTC of Manila. The PVB employees union,
petitioner, filed claim for accrued and unpaid employee wages and benefits.
On January 24, 1992, President Cory Aquino signed into law “An Act to Rehabilitate the
Philippine Veterans Bank Created under Act. No. 3518 Providing The Mechanisms Therefore,
And For Other Purposes (RA 7169),” which was published in the Official Gazette on February
24, 1992 and provides in part for the reopening of the Philippine Veterans Bank together with all
its branches within the period of three years from the date of the reopening of the head office.
The petitioners filed with the labor tribunals their residual claims for benefits and for
reinstatement upon reopening of the bank.
In May 1992, Central Bank issued a certificate of authority allowing the PVB to reopen
despite the late mandate for rehabilitation and reopening, respondent Judge Vega continued
with the liquidation proceedings of the bank alleging further that RA 7169 became effective only
on March 10, 1992 or 15 days after its publication in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992.
On June 3, 1992, the liquidator filed A Motion for the Termination of the Liquidation
Proceedings of the Philippine Veterans Bank with the respondent judge. And in a Resolution
dated June 8, 1992, the Court issued a temporary restraining order in the instant case
restraining respondent judge from further proceeding with the liquidation of PVB. On the other
hand, on June 22, 1992, VOP Security and Detective Agency and its 162 security guards filed a
Motion for Intervention with prayer that they be excluded from the operation of the Temporary
Restraining Order issued by the Court. They alleged that they had filed a motion before Branch
39 of the RTC Manila praying that the said court order PVB to pay backwages and salary
differentials by authority of RA No. 6727, Wage Orders; and that said court in an Order dated
9
June 5, 1992, approved therein movants’ case and directed the bank liquidator to pay
backwages and differentials in accordance with the computation incorporated in the order.
On August 3, 1992, the Philippine Veterans Bank reopened.
ISSUES:
(1)Whether or not RA 7169 became effective on January 2, 1992.
(2)Whether or not a liquidation court may continue with liquidation proceedings of the
Philippine Veterans Bank when Congress had mandated its rehabilitation and reopening.
RULINGS:
(1)Yes. The Supreme Court upheld that while as a rule laws take effect after 15 days
following completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines, the legislature has the authority to provide for exceptions as
indicated in the clause “unless otherwise provided”. Citing Tanada vs Tuvera, this clause refers
to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication, which cannot in any event be
omitted. The reason is that such omission would affect due process in so far as it would deny
the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it.
(2)No. The concept of liquidation is diametrically opposed or contrary to the concept of
rehabilitation, such that both cannot be undertaken at the same time. To allow the liquidation
proceedings to continue would seriously hinder the rehabilitation of the subject bank. The
enactment of the Republic Act No. 7169 has rendered the liquidation court functus de officio
which was signed into law by President Corazon C. Aquino and became effective on the date
indicated. Therefore, liquidation cannot go further proceedings.
FALLO:
The instant petition is granted. Respondent Judge is permanently enjoined from further
proceeding with Civil Case No. SP- 32311.
10
Ignorantia Legis Non Excusat
Yao Kee v. Sy Gonzales
YAO KEE, petitioner,

vs.
SY-GONZALES, respondent
G. R. L-55960 November 24, 1988
CORTES, J.:
FACTS:
Sy-Kiat, a Chinese national, died on Jan. 17, 1977 in Caloocan City leaving behind real
and personal properties here in the Philippines worth P300, 000.00 more or less. Thereafter,
Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy filed a petition for the grant
of letters of administration in said petition, they alleged among others that a) they are the
children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillago; b) they do not acknowledge Sy-Kiat’s marriage
to Yao-Kee. The petition was opposed by Yao-Kee, Sze Sook Wan, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun
Kiat. After the hearing, the probate court affirmed that Sy-Kiat was legally married to Yao-Kee.
On appeal, the CA held that respondents are the acknowledged natural children of Sy-
Kiat and that Sy-Kiat’s marriage with Yao-Kee had not been proven to be valid in the both the
Philippine and Chinese laws. As testified by Yao-Kee, she was married to Sy-Kiat on Jan. 19,
1931, in Fookien, China; that she is not in possession of their marriage certificate; that their
marriage was an agreement of their parents who were as well the signatories of the certificate;
that they were wed by a village leader; that she cannot provide the said document containing
the signatures of the couple’s parents and that she cannot provide any legal document proving
that their wedding was indeed part of China’s custom or China’s laws.
Hence, both parties moved for reconsideration to which the Supreme Court granted.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the fact of marriage in accordance with Chinese law was duly proven.
11
RULING:
No. Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that Philippine courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and proven as any other fact. To establish
the validity of marriage, the existence of foreign law as a question of fact and the alleged
marriage must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. If not, processual presumption will
take place.
For failure to prove the foreign law or custom and consequently of the marriage, the
marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat in China cannot be recognized as valid. Thus, the
marriage is presumed to be the same as ours. Since their marriage was not solemnized by an
authorized person, it was considered invalid.
FALLO:
The decision of the CA is affirmed.
12
Board of Commissioners v. Dela Rosa
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION),

et.al., petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSELITO DELA ROSA, Presiding Judge, RTC Manila, Branch 29, WILLIAM T.
GATCHALIAN, respondents
G.R. Nos. 95122-23 May 31, 1991
BIDIN, J.:p
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the Solicitor General seeking 1) to
set aside the Resolution/Temporary Restraining Order, issued by respondent Judge de la Rosa
in which denied petitioners' motion to dismiss and restrained petitioners from commencing or
continuing with any of the proceedings which would lead to the deportation of respondent
William Gatchalian, as well as the Order of respondent Judge Capulong which likewise enjoined
petitioners from proceeding with the deportation charges against respondent Gatchalian, and 2)
to prohibit respondent judges from further acting in the aforesaid civil cases.
FACTS:
On July 6, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was
recognized by the BOI as a native born Filipino citizen. Santiago Gatchalian testified that he has
5 children.
On June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian then a twelve year old minor arrived in Manila and
sought admission as Filipino citizen which was eventually granted by the board of special
inquiry. However, the Secretary of Justice issued a memorandum setting aside all decisions and
directed the Board of Commissions to review all cases where entry was allowed among which
was that of William Gatchalian.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage of Gatchalian in China is valid in accordance with Philippine
law.
13
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of the evidence to the contrary foreign
laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. This is
known as “processual presumption.” In this case, there being no proof of Chinese law relating to
marriage, there arises a presumption that it is the same of that of Philippine law the said
marriage then is declared valid. Therefore, William Gatchalian following the citizenship of his
father is a Filipino citizen.
FALLO:
The petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted, the Resolution/Temporary
Restraining Order issued by respondent Judge Dela Rosa, as well as the Order of respondent
Judge Capulong are set aside; and that the respondent William Gatchalian is not a Philippine
citizen is re-affirmed.
14
Laureano v. CA
MENANDRO B. LAUREANO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED, respondents.
G.R. No. 114776 February 2, 2000
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to reverse
the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated October 29, 1993, in C.A. G.R. No. CV 34476, as
well as its Resolution dated February 28, 1994, which denied the motion for reconsideration.
FACTS:
In 1978, plaintiff Menandro B. Laureano, then Director of Flight Operations and Chief
Pilot of Air Manila, applied for employment with defendant company through its Area Manager in
Manila. Plaintiff’s appointment was confirmed effective July 21, 1979. On the said date, the
defendant also offered plaintiff an extension of his two-year contract to five (5) years effective
January 21, 1979 to January 20, 1984 subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the
contract of employment, which the latter accepted.
Sometime in 1982, defendant initiated cost-cutting measures due to recession.
Seventeen (17) expatriate captains in the Airbus fleet were found in excess of the defendant’s
requirements. Defendant informed its expatriate pilots including plaintiff of the situation and
advised them to take advance leaves. It did not however immediately terminate A-300 pilots. It
reviewed their qualifications for possible promotion to the B-747 fleet. Among the 17 Airbus
pilots reviewed, 12 were found qualified. Unfortunately, plaintiff was not one of the 12. On
October 5, 1982, defendant informed plaintiff of his termination effective November 1, 1982 and
that he will be paid three (3) months salary in lieu of three months notice but defendant gave
only two (2) months notice and one (1) month salary.
Aggrieved, plaintiff on June 29, 1983, instituted a case for illegal dismissal before the
Labor Arbiter. Defendant on February 11, 1987 filed a motion to dismiss on jurisdictional
grounds since the plaintiff was employed in Singapore and all other aspects of his employment
contract were executed in Singapore, therefore, Singapore laws should apply.
15
ISSUE:
Whether or not Philippine laws should be applied and Philippine courts should have
jurisdiction over the instant case.
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court concurred in the assumption of jurisdiction by the RTC which
rightly ruled on the application of Philippine laws. The SC further stated that neither can the
court determine whether the termination of Laureano is legal under Singapore laws because of
the Airline’s failure to show which proves the applicability of the foreign law. It is a well settled
rule that the party who claims the applicability of a foreign law has the burden of proof and
where said party has failed to discharge the burden, Philippine laws apply. The defendant has
failed to do so. Therefore, Philippine law should be applied.
FALLO:
The instant petition is dismissed. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
16
Lex Prospicit, Non Respicit
Aruego Jr. v. CA
JOSE E. ARUEGO, JR., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, respondent
G.R. No. 112193 March 13, 1996
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:p
FACTS:
On March 7, 1983, a Complaint for Compulsary Recognition and Enforcement of
Successional Rights was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila by the minors, Antonia
F. Aruego and her alleged sister Evelyn F. Aruego, born on October 5, 1962 and September 3,
1963, respectively, represented by their mother, Luz M. Fabian. The complaint prayed for an
order praying that Antonia and Evelyn be declared the illegitimate children of Jose Aruego, Sr.
who died on March 30, 1982; that the petitioners be compelled to recognize and acknowledge
them as the compulsory heirs of the deceased; and that their share and participation in the
estate of their deceased father be determined and ordered delivered to them. The main basis of
the action for compulsory recognition is their alleged “open and continuous possession of the
status of illegitimate children.”
On June 15, 1992, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Antonia Aruego,
declaring her as the illegitimate daughter of the deceased. Petitioners filed a motion for partial
reconsideration of the decision alleging loss of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court over the
complaint by virtue of the passage of E.O. No. 209 or the Family Code of the Philippines. Said
motion was denied. Another petition to the Court of Appeals was likewise denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Family Code of the Philippines or E.O. 209 be given retroactive
effect.
17
RULING:
No. The present law cannot be given retroactive effect insofar as the instant case is
concerned, as its application will prejudice the vested right of the respondent, Antonia Aruego,
to have her case decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. The right was vested to her by the
fact that she filed her action under the regime of the Civil Code.
The trial court, which acquired jurisdiction over the case by the filing of the complaint,
never lost jurisdiction over the same despite the passage of E.O. No. 209. The ruling reinforces
the principle that the jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once attached
cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events.
FALLO:
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the trial court.
18
Bernabe v. Alejo
ERNESTO BERNABE, plaintiff,

vs.
CAROLINA ALEJO, defendant
G.R. No. 140500 January 21, 2002
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The right to seek recognition granted by the Civil Code to illegitimate children who were
still minors at the time the Family Code took effect cannot be impaired or taken away. The
minors have up to four years from attaining majority age within which to file an action for
recognition.
FACTS:
The late Fiscal Ernesto A. Bernabe allegedly had a son with plaintiff-appellant Carolina
Alejo. The child was born on September 18, 1981 and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal
Bernabe died on August 13, 1993, and his wife Rosalina died on December 3 of the same year;
thus, Ernestina, their daughter is the sole surviving heir. On May 16, 1994, the appellant filed a
complaint praying that Adrian be declared an illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and be given his
share in Fiscal Bernabe’s estate. On July 16, 1995, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the
complaint for recognition on the ground that, under Article 175 of the Family Code, the action for
recognition should have been filed during the lifetime of the alleged father to give him the
opportunity to either affirm or deny the child’s filiation.
The Court of Appeals ruled that Adrian should be allowed to prove that he was the
illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe. Since Adrian was born in 1981, his rights are governed by
Article 285 of the Civil Code, which allows an action for recognition to be filed within four years
after the child has attained the age of majority.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondent had four years from
the attainment of age of majority to file an action for recognition as provided in Art. 285 of the
Civil Code.
19
RULING:
No. Adrian’s right to an action for recognition, which was granted by Article 285 of the
Civil Code, is already vested prior to the enactment of the Family Code. Article 285 of the Civil
Code provides the period for filing an action for recognition before the expiration of four years
from the attainment of his majority. Under Article 172 of the Family Code the action may be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent; and under Art. 255 of the same code, it states
that it shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
Thus, illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect
and whose putative parent died during their minority are thus given the right to seek recognition,
under Article 285 of the Civil Code, for a period of up to four years from attaining majority age.
This vested right was not impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family Code.
FALLO:
Petition is denied and the assailed Decision and Resolution is affirmed. Costs against
petitioner.
20
Waiver of Rights
Guy v. CA
GUY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, defendant
G.R. No. 163707 September 15, 2006
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the January 22, 2004 Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79742, which affirmed the Orders dated July 21, 2000 and July
17, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138 in SP Proc. Case No. 4549
denying petitioner's motion to dismiss; and its May 25, 2004 Resolution denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
FACTS:
On June 13, 1997, private respondent-minors Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes
Wei, represented by their mother Remedios Oanes, filed a petition for letters of administration
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Private respondents alleged that they are the
duly acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who died in Makati City on October 29,
1992, leaving an estate consisting of real and personal properties. His known heirs are his
surviving spouse Shirley Guy and children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael, all
surnamed Guy. Private respondents prayed for the appointment of a regular administrator for
the orderly settlement of Sima Wei's estate.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition. In a Manifestation/Motion as
Supplement to the Joint Motion to Dismiss, petitioner and his co-heirs alleged that private
respondents' claim had been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished by reason of
Remedios' June 7, 1993 Release and Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the financial
and educational assistance received from petitioner, Remedios and her minor children
discharge the estate of Sima Wei from any and all liabilities.
The Regional Trial Court denied the Joint Motion to Dismiss as well as the Supplemental
Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals which
21
affirmed the orders of the Regional Trial Court. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion
for reconsideration, hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Release and Waiver of Claim executed by Remedios released and
discharged the Guy family and the estate of Sima Wei from any claims or liabilities.
RULING:
No. Remedios’ Release and Waiver of claim does not bar private respondents from
claiming succession rights. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and
equivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit
which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not be attributed to a person when its terms do not
explicitly and clearly show an intent to abandon a right. Article 1044 of the Civil Code, provides:
Any person having the free disposal of his property may accept or repudiate an inheritance. Any
inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted by their parents or
guardians.
Even assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of her children, such
waiver does not bar the latter’s claim. Article 104 of the Civil Code requires judicial authorization
of the said waiver which it lacks. Since the affiliation of the private respondents as co heirs to
Sima Wei’s Estates, it would thus be inconsistent to rule that they waived their hereditary rights
when they do not have such right.
FALLO:
The instant petition is denied. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in affirming the
denial of petitioner's motion to dismiss; and its Resolution denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, are affirmed.
22
People v. Morial
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EDWIN MORIAL, LEONARDO MORIAL alias "CARDING" NONELITO ABIÑON * alias
"NOLY", defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. 129295 August 15, 2001
PER CURIAM:
Two of the three appellants herein were sentenced to death by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Southern Leyte for Robbery with Homicide. The other was sentenced to suffer only the
penalty ofreclusion perpetua on account of minority. The judgment of conviction is now before
this Court on automatic review.
FACTS:
The accused committed the robbery on January 6, 1996 so they would have money to
spend for the dance later that night. To obtain the money or to silence any witnesses, the
accused killed the occupants of the house, Paula Bandibas and her three-year old grandson
Albert. Gabriel Guilao, 62, had just finished pasturing his horses and was on his way home. He
was passing through the road near the house of Benjamin Morial when he heard the voice of
Paula Bandibas pleading. From where he stood, Gabriel saw accused Nonelito Abiñon slap
Paula Bandibas' neck. Paula fell and was stabbed by accused Edwin Morial with a small, sharp,
pointed weapon. Accused Leonardo Morial stood outside the house.
Edwin and Leonardo were brought to the police station for investigation. The suspects
were interrogated. After being tormented by the policemen, Leonardo admitted that Nonelito
Abiñon and Edwin Morial were responsible for the death of Paula Bandibas.
Leonardo's statements were then reduced into writing. A policeman informed him that
they were going to contact a lawyer to assist him during the investigation, Atty. Aguilar.
Leonardo denied that Atty. Aguilar examined his body for any injuries. Atty. Aguilar did ask
Leonardo if he was forced or intimidated to execute the extra-judicial confession. Leonardo,
however, did not tell his lawyer about his injuries since a police officer had warned him that he
would be mauled again should he do so. Midway into the investigation of Leonardo, after the
police investigator had asked "all the material points," Atty. Aguilar asked the investigator that
he be given leave as he had a very important engagement. Before leaving, Atty. Aguilar asked
23
Leonardo if he was willing to answer the questions in his absence. Leonardo then signed the
extra-judicial confession, after which Atty. Aguilar affixed his. The signing over, Leonardo was
brought back to the police station. Later in court, Leonardo claimed that he merely made up all
the statements in the document because he was afraid.
The RTC rendered a decision convicting all the three accused.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Leonardo Morial's extra-judicial confession is invalid since he was
effectively deprived of his right to counsel during the custodial investigation.
RULING:
Yes. As appellant Leonardo Morial was effectively deprived of his right to counsel during
custodial investigation, his extra-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence against him.
A custodial investigation is understood to mean as "any questioning initiated by law
enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant manner." A person under custodial investigation is
guaranteed certain rights, which attach upon the commencement thereof. These are the rights
(1) to remain silent, (2) to competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice,
and (3) to be informed of the two other rights. The prosecution must prove with clear and
convincing evidence that the accused was accorded said rights before he extra-judicially
admitted his guilt to the authorities.
The Court has stressed that an accused under custodial interrogation must continuously
have a counsel assisting him from the very start thereof. The right of appellant to counsel was
therefore completely negated by the precipitate departure of Atty. Tobias before the termination
of the custodial investigation. Even granting that appellant consented to Atty. Aguilar's departure
during the investigation and to answer questions during the lawyer's absence, such consent
was an invalid waiver of his right to counsel and his right to remain silent. Under Section 12 (3),
Article III of the Constitution, these rights cannot be waived unless the same is made in writing
and in the presence of counsel. No such written and counseled waiver of these rights was
offered in evidence.
FALLO:
Leonardo Morial and Nonelito Abiñon are sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by
lethal injection, while Edwin Morial, on account of his minority, is sentenced to the indeterminate
24
penalty of from ten (10) years and one (1) day ofprision mayor as minimum; to seventeen (17)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day ofreclusion temporal as maximum.
25
Judicial Application and Interpretation of Laws
Ting v. Ting
BENJAMIN G. TING, petitioner,

vs.
CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING, respondent
G.R. No. 166562 March 31, 2009
NACHURA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the Amended Decision
of the Court of Appeals, and its Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 59903. The appellate court, in its
assailed decision and resolution, affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23,
Cebu City, declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
FACTS:
On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to petitioner and while
their youngest child was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of
Cebu City praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the
Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the
time of the celebration of their marriage, which, however, only became manifest thereafter. On
January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its decision declaring the marriage between petitioner
and respondent null and void. The RTC gave credence to Dr. Oñate’s findings and the
admissions made by Benjamin in the course of his deposition, and found him to be
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
On October 19, 2000, the petitioner appealed to the CA, reversing the trial court’s ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of psychological
incapacity for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family
Code has been liberalized.
26
RULING:
No, by the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and
understandable to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the
psychological temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical
antecedence, gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions,
while highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of
nullity of marriage. At best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable
evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. The trial court, as in any other
given case presented before it, must always base its decision not solely on the expert opinions
furnished by the parties but also on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the
proceedings. But where, as in this case, the parties had the full opportunity to present
professional and expert opinions of psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability
of a party’s alleged psychological incapacity, then such expert opinion should be presented and,
accordingly, be weighed by the court in deciding whether to grant a petition for nullity of
marriage.
FALLO:
The petition for review on certiorari is granted. The Amended Decision and the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59903 are accordingly reversed and set
aside.
27
Ayala Corp v. Rosa Diana Realty
AYALA CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
ROSA-DIANA REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent
G.R. No. 134284 December 1, 2000
DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of a decision rendered
by the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. C.V. No. 4598 entitled, “Ayala Corporation vs. Rosa-Diana
Realty and Development Corporation,” dismissing Ayala Corporation’s petition for lack of merit.
FACTS:
Petitioner Ayala Corporation was the registered owner of a parcel of land.On April 20, 1976,
Ayala sold the lot to Manuel Sy married to Vilma Po and Sy Ka Kieng married to Rosa Chan.
The Deed of Sale executed between Ayala and the buyers contained Special Conditions of Sale
and Deed Restrictions. Manuel Sy and Sy Ka Kieng failed to construct the building in violation of
the Special Conditions of Sale. Notwithstanding the violation, Manuel Sy and Sy Ka Kieng, in
April 1989, were able to sell the lot to respondent Rosa-Diana Realty and Development
Corporation with Ayala’s approval. As a consideration for Ayala to release the Certificate of
Title of the subject property, Rosa-Diana, on July 27, 1989 executed an Undertaking promising
to abide by said special conditions of sale executed between Ayala and the original vendees.
Upon the submission of the Undertaking, together with the building plans for a condominium
project, known as “The Peak”, Ayala released title to the lot, thereby enabling Rosa-Diana to
register the deed of sale in its favor and obtain Certificate of Title No. 165720 in its name. The
title carried as encumbrances the special conditions of sale and the deed restrictions.
Thereafter, Rosa-Diana submitted to the building official of Makati another set of building
plans for “The Peak” which were substantially different from those that it earlier submitted to
Ayala for approval. During the construction of Rosa-Diana’s condominium project, Ayala filed an
action with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati with application for a writ of preliminary
injunction/temporary restraining order against Rosa-Diana Realty.
The lower court denied Ayala’s prayer, enabling Rosa-Diana to complete the construction of
the building.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court, citing “Ayala Corporation vs. Ray
Burton Development Corporation” ruling that Ayala is barred from enforcing the deed restrictions
28
in dispute. Hence, the present appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court in holding that the
doctrine of the law of the case, or stare decisis, operated to dismiss Ayala’s appeal.
RULING:
Yes. The doctrine of the law of the case operates only in the particular case and only as a
rule of policy and not as one of law. Stare decisis proceeds from the first principle of justice that,
absent powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike.
The fact alone that respondent Rosa-Diana conveniently prepared two sets of building
plans - with one set which fully conformed to the Deed Restrictions and another in gross
violation of the same - should have cautioned the trial court to conclude that respondent Rosa-
Diana was under the erroneous impression that the Deed Restrictions were no longer
enforceable and that it never intended to be bound by the Undertaking signed by its President
and Chairman. Contractual obligations have the force of law between parties and unless the
same are contrary to public policy morals and good customs, they must be complied by the
parties in good faith. The party guilty of violating the deed restrictions may only be held
alternatively liable for substitute performance of its obligation, that is, for the payment of damages.
FALLO:
The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution C.A. G.R. C.V. No.
4598, are reversed and set aside.
29
Rules on Application and Interpretation of Laws
People v. Veneracion
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.

HON. LORENZO B. VENERACION, HENRY LAGARTO y PETILLA and ERNESTO
CORDERO, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 119987-88 October 12, 1995
KAPUNAN, J.:
The sole issue in the case at bench involves a question of law. After finding that an
accused individual in a criminal case has, on the occasion of Rape, committed Homicide, is the
judge allowed any discretion in imposing either the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua or Death?
FACTS:
On the basis of sworn statements of witnesses, booking sheets, arrest reports and the
necropsy report of the victim, Abundio Lagunday, a.k.a. Jr. Jeofrey of no fixed address, and
Henry Lagarto y Petilla, of 288 Area H. Parola Compound, Tondo, Manila were later charged
with the crime of Rape with Homicide in an Information dated August 8, 1994 filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, National Capital Judicial Region. Said Information, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 94-138071. After trial and presentation of the evidence of the prosecution
and the defense, the trial court rendered a decision on January 31, 1995 finding the defendants
Henry Lagarto y Petilla and Ernesto Cordero y Maristela guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Rape with Homicide and sentenced both accused with the "penalty of reclusion
perpetua with all the accessories provided for by law." Disagreeing with the sentence imposed,
the City Prosecutor of Manila on February 8, 1995, filed a Motion for Reconsideration, praying
that the Decision be "modified in that the penalty of death be imposed" against respondents
Lagarto and Cordero, in place of the original penalty (reclusion perpetua). Refusing to act on the
merits of the said Motion for Reconsideration, respondent Judge, on February 10, 1995, issued
an Order denying the same for lack of jurisdiction.
30
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion and in excess
of jurisdiction when he failed and/or refused to impose the mandatory penalty of death under RA
7659, after finding the accused guilty of the crime of Rape with Homicide.
RULING:
Yes. A government of laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary
powers by those acting under its authority. Under this system, judges are guided by the Rule of
Law, and ought “to protect and enforce it without fear or favor,” resist encroachments by
governments, political parties, or even the interference of their own personal beliefs.
Under the law the penalty imposable for the crime of rape with homicide is NOT
reclusion perpetua but death. A court of law is no place for a protracted debate on the morality
or propriety of the sentence, where the law itself provides for the sentence of death as a penalty
in specific & well-defined instances. Rules of Court mandates that after an adjudication of guilt,
the judge should impose the proper penalty and civil liability provided for by the law on the
accused.
FALLO:
The instant petition is granted. The case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court for the
imposition of the penalty of death upon private respondents.
31
Phil . Rabbit Bus Lines v. Arciaga
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. LUDIVICO D. ARCIAGA, TAURINO SINGSON AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents
No. L-29701 March 16,1987.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the August 5, 1968 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 41582R * which dismissed petitioner's petition for certiorari and
mandamus with preliminary injunction on the ground that the allegations made therein are
insufficient to justify further process.
FACTS:
On August 24, 1960, Taurino Singson filed a complaint against Philippine Rabbit Bus
Lines Inc. for sustaining multiple serious physical injuries when the bus crashed against an
acacia tree. The case was set for trial on December 25, 1965 but upon the motion of both
counsel, it was transferred to February 3 and 4 1966. No pre-trial has ever been conducted,
until when April 29, 1967, only the defendant Philippine Rabbit appeared and upon motion of its
counsel, the court dismissed the case for non-appearance of plaintiff.
The order of dismissal of April 29, 1976 alluded to was sent to Atty. Constante Pimentel,
counsel for plaintiff, by registered mail on May 3, 1967 and was received on May 6, 1967. On
July 6, 1967 (61 days from receipt of dismissal), counsel for plaintiff filed a Petition for Relief
accompanied by an affidavit alleging that Taurino Singson upon attending the trial of his case
had encountered engine trouble causing him to be late. On August 16, 1967, lower court
granted plaintiff’s petition for relief and denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner on
November 28, 1967 on the ground that the petition for relief under Rule 38 is premised on
equity. On July 9, 1968, petitioner Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines Inc, filed a petition for certiorari
and mandamus with preliminary injunction in the Court of Appeals but it was denied on August
5, 1968. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied on October 1, 1968. Hence, the
instant petition for review on certiorari.
32
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Petition for Relief under Rule
38 is premised on equity.
RULING:
Yes. The court found that the petition is impressed with merits. Sec 3. of Rule 38 of the
Rules of Court provides for a petition to be filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns
of the judgment and in this case the Petition for Relief was filed 61 days after the receipt of the
notice of the dismissal. Furthermore, the counsel for private respondents did not move for
reconsideration of the Order for dismissal, nor for new trial. Neither did he appeal, thereby
allowing the decision to become final and executory.
The private respondent could have availed of the sixty day period provided for by Rule
38 to file Petition for relief of judgment but he allowed the opportunity to lapse, thus, the rule of
equity is not applicable in this case. Moreover, the petitioner did not satisfactory showed that he
has faithfully and strictly complied with the provisions of the said Rule. He cannot invoke equity
as a ground for the reopening of the case. Indeed, to him is applicable, the well known maxim
that, “equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights.” The court, thus, ruled that
the decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed and set aside and said Civil Case is declared
terminated.
FALLO:
The resolution of the Court of Appeals and the questioned Order of Judge Ludivico D.
Arciaga are reversed and set aside; and said Civil Case is declared terminated.
33
Cesario Ursua v. CA
CESARIO URSUA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent
G.R. No. 112170 April 10,1996.
BELLOSILLO, J.:p
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
conviction of petitioner by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City for violation of Sec. 1 of C.A.
No. 142, as amended by R.A. No. 6085, otherwise known as "An Act to Regulate the Use of
Aliases".
FACTS:
Petitioner Cesario Ursua, a Community Environment and Natural Resources Ofiicer
assigned in Kidapawan, Cotabato, had a complaint against him for bribery, dishonesty, abuse of
authority and giving of unwarranted benefits.
On August 1 1987, Atty. Francis Palmores, counsel of the petitioner requested to the
Office of the Ombudsman in Manila that he be furnished a copy of the complaint against
petitioner. He then asked his client Ursua to take his letter request to the office of the
Ombudsman because his law firm’s messenger, Oscar Perez, had to attend to some personal
matters.
When petitioner arrived at the Office of the Ombudsman, he wrote the name “Oscar
Perez” on the visitor’s logbook and upon receipt of the acknowledged by writing. Loida
Kahulugan, who handed the copy of complaint, learned that the person who introduced himself
as Oscar Perez was actually the petitioner, Cesario Ursua. She reported the matter to the
Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner be charged.
The trial court found him guilty of violating Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A.
No. 6085. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision on May 31, 1993. The petitioner asks for
review on his conviction in Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner violated C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085
otherwise known as “An Act to Regulate the Use of Alias.
34
RULING:
No. Cesario Ursua is acquitted of the crime charged. C.A No. 142, approved on
November 7, 1936 entitled “An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases”, was amended by R.A. No.
6085on August 4 1969. C.A. No. 142 as amended was made primarily to penalize the act of
using an alias name publicly and in business transactions in addition to his real name unless
such alias was duly authorized by proper judicial proceeding.
The fact that the petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the Ombudsman as “Oscar
Perez” served only the request of his lawyer to obtain a copy of the complaint in which the
petitioner was a respondent. There is no evidence showing that he had used or was intending to
use that name as his second name in addition to his real name. Hence, the use of a fictitious
name or a different name belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign or
indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that
day forth does not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A.
6085. There exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by
a legislative measure and that a construction of which the statue is fairly susceptible is favored.
FALLO:
The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial
Court of Davao City is reversed and set aside, and petitioner is acquitted of the crime charged.
35
CIR v. Primetown
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and ARTURO V. PARCERO, petitioners,

vs.
PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP INC., respondent
G.R. No. 162155 August 28,2007.
CORONA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the August 1, 2003 decision of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 64782 and its February 9, 2004 resolution denying
reconsideration.
FACTS:
On May 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent Primetown Property Group Inc.,
applied for the refund or credit of income tax respondent paid in 1997. He explained in his letter
to the petitioner Revenue District Officer Arturo Parcero of Revenue District No. 049 (Makati) of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) that he suffered loses and caused industry to slow down.
Nevertheless, respondent paid its quarterly corporate income tax and remitted creditable
withholding tax from real estate sales to the BIR in the total amount of P26,318,398.32.
Therefore, respondent was entitled to tax refund or tax credit.
On May 13, 1999, Revenue Officer Elizabeth Santos required the respondent to submit
additional documents to support its claim. Respondents complied but its claim was not acted
upon. Thus on April 14, 2000, it filed a petition for review in the Court of Tax Appeal (CTA) but
was dismissed because it was filed beyond two-year prescription period for filing a judicial claim
for tax refund based on Sec. 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) and Art. 13 of
the Civil Code.
Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, it filed an appeal in the
Court of Appeal which reversed the decision of Court of Tax Appeal because Art. 13 of the Civil
Code did not distinguish between a leap year and a regular year.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but was denied, thus, petitioners ask for review on
certiorari to Supreme Court.
36
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent filed its petition for review in the CTA within the two-year
prescriptive period provided in Sec. 229 of the NIRC.
RULING:
No. The court affirms the decision of the CTA but the basis is however not correct.
Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law speaks of a year, it is understood to be
equivalent to 365 days regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap year. However, EO
292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted. Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book 1 provides
that “year” shall be understood to be twelve calendar months. Both deal with the same subject
matter- the computation of legal periods. There obviously exists incompatibility in the manner of
computing legal periods under the Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. For this
reason, we hold that Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book 1 of the Administrative Code of 1987, being
the more recent law, governs the computation of legal periods.
Applying Section 31,Chapter VIII, Book 1 of Administrative Code of 1987, the
respondent’s petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was filed on the last day of the 24th calendar
month from the day respondent filed its final adjusted return. Hence, it was filed within the
reglementary period.
FALLO:
The petition is denied. The case is remanded to the Court of Tax Appeals.
37
Labad v. University of Southern Philippines
MA. VILMA S. LABAD, plaintiff,

vs.
THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHEASTERN PHILIPPINES, defendant
G. R. No. 139665 August 9, 2001.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the
Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals dated February 24, 1999 in the case entitled "Ma. Vilma S.
Labad vs. The University of Southeastern Philippines" dismissing the appeal of Ma. Vilma S.
Labad herein petitioner and the Resolution dated July 22, 1999 denying the motion for
reconsideration of petitioner.
FACTS:
Petitioner was a probationary faculty member of the University of Southeastern
Philippines (hereafter respondent) Laboratory (high school) and designated as the adviser for
the school’s yearbook “TRAIL 95,” the regular organ “INSIGHTS” and the school’s government
known as the school’s government known as the “LSOCSG.”
On February 1, 1996, the officers and members of respondent university’s Parents
Teachers Association filed a letter-complaint with the president of respondent university,
charging petitioner with “Dishonesty,” Grave Misconduct, and “Unfitness as a Teacher.”
The respondent’s university Board of Regents subsequently approved and adopted the
report of the Investigating Committee – that it rendered a report recommending the penalty of
dismissal from service through the non-renewal of petitioner’s probationary status on the ground
of dishonesty and misconduct – as its decision.
The petitioner appealed said decision to Civil Service Commission. However, the CSC,
issued a resolution on April 14, 1998 affirming the decision of respondent’s university Board of
Regents. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration to CSC but it was denied.
On December 28, 1998, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for extension
of period to file petition for Review asking for 15 days from December 28, 1998 until January 12,
1999 to do so. The petitioner filed her petition for Review with the Court of Appeals on the latter
date.
The counsel of the petitioner received a copy of resolution dated February 24, 1999 on
March 10, 1999, issued by the CA, former 4th division, dismissing the petitioner for review. The
38
petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration on March 24, 1999. But it was denied on July
29, 1999 resolution issued by the CA dated July 27, 1999.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the review by petitioner before it
on the ground that the petition was filed late.
RULING:
Yes. Based on Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court and as applied in several cases,
where the last day for doing any act required or permitted by law falls on a Saturday, a Sunday,
or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working
day. In this case, petitioner still had until December 28, 1998, a Monday and the next business
day to move for a 15-day extension considering that December 26, 1998, the last day for
petitioner to file her petition for review fell on a Saturday. The motion for extension filed on
December 28, 1998 was thus filed on time since it was filed before the expiration of the time
sought to be extended.
As a rule, the extension should be attacked to the original period and commence
immediately after the expiration of such period. However, in Moskowsky vs. Court of Appeals
and Vda. De Capulong vs. Workmen’s Insurance Co., Inc., the SC allowed the extended period
to commence from the specific time prayed for in the motion for extension. In this case, the
petitioner specifically manifested that she be granted an extension of 15, days from December
28, 1998 or until January 12, 1999 for her petition for review. Hence, the period for reckoning
the commencement of the additional 15 days should have been from December 28, 1998, and
not December 26, 1998. thus, the petition filed petitioner with the Court of Appeals on January
12, 1998, exactly 15 days from December 28, 1998, was filed on time.
FALLO:
The petition is granted and the case is remanded to the appellate court for further
proceedings. No cost.
39
How Laws Lose Their Effectivity
CIR v. Primetown
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and ARTURO V. PARCERO, petitioners,

vs.
PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP INC., respondent
G.R. No. 162155 August 28,2007
CORONA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the August 1, 2003 decision of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 64782 and its February 9, 2004 resolution denying
reconsideration.
FACTS:
On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent Primetown Property Group,
Inc., applied for the refund or credit of income tax respondent paid in 1997. According to Yap,
because respondent suffered losses, it was not liable for income taxes. Nevertheless,
respondent paid its quarterly corporate income tax and remitted creditable withholding tax from
real estate sales to the BIR in the total amount of P26,318,398.32. Therefore, respondent was
entitled to tax refund or tax credit.
On December 15, 2000, the CTA dismissed the petition. The CTA found that respondent
filed its final adjusted return on April 14, 1998. Thus, its right to claim a refund or credit
commenced on that date. Thus, according to the CTA, the two-year prescriptive period under
Section 229 of the NIRC for the filing of judicial claims was equivalent to 730 days. Because the
year 2000 was a leap year, respondent's petition, which was filed 731 days after respondent
filed its final adjusted return, was filed beyond the reglementary period.
Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, it filed an appeal in the
CA. On August 1, 2003, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the CTA. It ruled that
Article 13 of the Civil Code did not distinguish between a regular year and a leap year.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Thus, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 229 of the NIRC should be strictly applied against respondent
40
inasmuch as it has been consistently held that the prescriptive period (for the filing of tax
refunds and tax credits) begins to run on the day claimants file their final adjusted returns.
RULING:
Yes. The rule is that the two-year prescriptive period is reckoned from the filing of the
final adjusted return. Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law speaks of a year, it
is understood to be equivalent to 365 days. However, in 1987, EO 292 or the Administrative
Code of 1987 was enacted. Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I thereof provides: “Year” shall be
understood to be twelve calendar months.
A law may be repealed expressly or impliedly. Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of
the Administrative Code of 1987 states a repealing clause: laws, decrees, orders, rules and
regulation, or portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly. A repealing clause like Sec. 27 is not an express repealing clause because it fails
to identify or designate the laws to be abolished.1[32] Thus, the provision above only impliedly
repealed all laws inconsistent with the Administrative Code of 1987.
The respondent's petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was filed on the last day of the 24 th
calendar month from the day respondent filed its final adjusted return. Hence, it was filed within
the reglementary period.
FALLO:
The petition is denied. The case is remanded to the Court of Tax Appeals.
41
Binding Effects of Laws
Assali v. Commissioner of Customs
ILLUH ASAALI, HATIB ABDURASID, INGKOH BANTALA, BASOK INGKIN, and

MOHAMMAD BANTALA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, respondent.
No. L-24170, December 16, 1968
FERNANDO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Acting Commissioner of Customs in Customs
decreeing the forfeiture of five (5) sailing vessels (kumpits) named 'Iroc-Iroc,' 'Lahat-lahat,'
'Liberal Wing III,' 'Sulu Area Command,' and 'Business,' with their respective cargoes of blue
seal cigarettes and rattan chairs for violation of Section 1363(a) of the Revised Administrative
Code and Section 20 of Republic Act No. 426 in relation with Section 1363(f) of the Revised
Administrative Code.
FACTS:
A customs patrol team on board Patrol Boat ST-23 intercepted the five sailing vessels in
the high seas, between British North Borneo and Sulu on September 10, 1950. After ordering
the vessels to stop, the custom officers boarded and found on board their cargoes which were
not covered by the required import license. These five vessels, which were all of the Philippine
registry, owned and manned by Filipino residents of Sulu were heading towards Tawi-Tawi,
Sulu carrying cigarettes and some pieces of rattan chairs without the require import license,
hence smuggled.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the interception and seizure by custom officials on the high seas is valid
on the contention that the seizure was effected outside our territorial waters.
RULING:
Yes. The SC held that it is a settled doctrine of International Law that a state has the
right to protect itself and its revenues, a right not limited to its own territory but extending to the
high seas. The Revised Penal Code leaves no doubt as to its application and enforceability not
42
only within the Philippines, its interior waters and maritime zone but also outside of its
jurisdiction while on Philippine ship.
FALLO:
The decision of respondent Court of Tax Appeals is affirmed. With costs against
petitioners-appellants.
43
Theory of Statutes/ Conflict of Law Rules
Recio v. Recio
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner,

vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent.
G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001
PANGANIBAN, J.:
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the
Decision and the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 28. The assailed
Decision declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio solemnized on
January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can now remarry under
existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties. The assailed Order denied
reconsideration of the Decision.
FACTS:
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to an Australian citizen, Editha Samson, in
Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving
a marriage, was issued by an Australian family court. The respondent became an Australian
citizen on June 26, 1992 when the Australian government issued a Certificate of Australian
citizenship.
On January 12, 1994, the respondent, claiming that he is single, married the petitioner, a
Filipina, in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City. On March 3, 1998, petitioner
filed a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy, believing that
the respondent’s prior marriage to Editha Samson still subsists. However, the respondent
contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce
decree obtained in Australia in 1989; thus, he is legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.
While the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending, respondent was able to secure a
divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia.
44
ISSUE:
Whether or not a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our
jurisdiction
RULING:
Yes. The Court decided that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in
the Philippine jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the
foreigner. Thus, the Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A.
Recio, a naturalized Australian citizen, solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as
dissolved and both parties can now remarry under existing and applicable laws to any and/or
both parties.
FALLO:
The case is remanded to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which
conclusively show respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring
the parties' marriage void on the ground of bigamy.
45
Llorente v. CA
LORENZO LLORENTE, petitioner,

vs.
G.R. NO. 124371 November 23, 2000
PARDO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals modifying that of the
Regional Trial Court, Camarines Sur, Branch 35, Iriga City declaring respondent Alicia F.
Llorente, as co-owners of whatever property she and the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente, may
have acquired during the twenty-five years that they lived together as husband and wife.
FACTS:
On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo Llorente and petitioner Paula Llorente were married in
Nabua, Camarines Sur. On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States
citizenship and Certifiacte of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the United
States District Court, Southern District of New York. In 1945, he discovered that his wife Paula
was pregnant and was “living in” and having an adulterous relationship with his brother,
Ceferino Llorente. On February 2, 1946, the couple drew a written agreement to the effect that
Llorente would not support Paula, the dissolution of their marital union, and that Lorenzo would
not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act. On November 27, 1951, Lorenzo obtained a divorce
in California. On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final. On January 16, 1958,
Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila and begot three children in his later years.
ISSUE:
Whether or not foreign laws can be made applicable in the Philippines.
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court and
recognized the validity of the divorce granted in favor of Lorenzo. The Court also remanded the
cases to the court of origin for determination of successional rights allowing proof of foreign law.
46
FALLO:
The petition is granted. The decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside.
47
Van Dorn v. Romillo
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,

vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR. AND RICHARD UPTON, respondents
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set
aside the Orders, issued by respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case,
and her Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order.
FACTS:
Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent
Richard Upton is a citizen of the United States. They were married in Hongkong in 1972 and
established residence in the Philippines afterwards. The parties were divorced in Nevada,
United States in 1982. Petitioner re-married also in Nevada with Theodore Van Dorn. Dated
June 8, 1983, private respondents filed suit against petitioner claiming that the latter’s properties
in Manila were conjugal and that private respondent had a rightful claim to its management.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the suit claiming that the private respondent acknowledged that he
and petitioner had no “community property” in the divorce proceedings. The Regional Trial Court
denied the dismissal on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so
that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this
certiorari proceeding.
ISSUES:
(1)Whether or not a certiorari proceeding is justifiable.
(2)Whether or not the Philippines can recognize divorce.
RULINGS:
(1)Yes. The petition was granted, and respondent judge was hereby ordered to dismiss
the complaint filed where respondent judge denied her motion to dismiss said case, and her
motion for reconsideration of the dismissal order. When the lower court acts in a manner
equivalent to a lack of jurisdiction then it devolves upon the Supreme Court in a certiorari
proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority and to correct the error committed.
48
(2)Yes. Owing to the nationality principle embodied in article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippines nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces. Aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. A divorce decree granted by a U.S. Court between a Filipina and her
American husband is binding on the American husband. Since the couple had obtained a
divorced in Nevada, the husband is estopped from asserting his rights over supposed conjugal
property. The American husband in this instance who was granted absolute divorce with his
Filipina wife is cut off from marital and successional rights with the latter.
FALLO:
The Petition is granted.
49
Aznar v. Garcia
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.

ADOLFO C. AZNAR, EXECUTOR AND LUCY CHRISTENSEN, HEIR OF THE DECEASED,
EXECUTOR AND HEIR-APPELLEES,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente
N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, approving among things the
final accounts of the executor, directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the
amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria
Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in
case of death without issue, one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C.
Borton, etc., in accordance with the provisions of the will of the testator Edward E. Christensen.
FACTS:
Edward E. Christensen, the deceased, who domiciled in the Philippines and/but a citizen
of California, made a will executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 stating that Maria Lucy
Christensen was his only child and that a certain Maria Helen Christensen, though baptized as
Christensen, was not in any way related nor adopted by him. With this, Maria Helen Christensen
was just granted with 3,000 pesos, Philippine currency to be deposited in trust with the Davao
Branch of the Philippine National Bank and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos,
Philippine currency per month until the principal thereof as well as any interest which may have
accrued thereon, was exhausted while all that was left by the deceased be given to Maria Lucy
Christensen.
Since Maria Helen Christensen was declared by the Court in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an
acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward Christensen, opposition to the approval of
the project of partition was filed by Helen, insofar as it deprives her legitime as an
acknowledged natural child.
However, the court ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United
States and of the Sate of California at the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic
validity of the provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of California. Oppositor Helen
50
Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions for reconsideration, but were denied. Some
of which claimed that the lower court erred in ignoring the decision of the SC that Helen was
acknowledged as a natural child; recognizing the calling for the application of International Law;
recognizing that the validity of the testamentary disposition of the distribution of estate should be
governed by the Philippine laws; declaring the schedule of distribution was contrary to Philippine
laws.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Philippine law will determine and recognize the validity of testamentary
provisions and the disposition of the bequeathed of the deceased given that his domicile was
the Philippines but his citizenship is in California.
RULING:
Yes. Art. 16 of the Philippine Civil Code states that “…intestate and testamentary
successions…shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country where
said property may be found. Since Edward Christensen was a California citizen, the Philippines
where he executed his testament referred back to the laws of which he was a citizen of –
California, USA. However, no single American law governing the validity of testamentary
provisions was found, therefore it referred to no other than the private law of the state of which
the decedent was a citizen – State of California. Referring then to California Civil Code, Article
946 authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the testator’s domicile.
Finding therefore that Philippines is the domicile of the deceased, the validity of the provisions
of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be governed by the
Philippine Law, pursuant to the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of California.
FALLO:
Judgment is therefore reversed and the case returned to the lower court with instructions
that the partition be made as the Philippine Law on succession provides.
51
Bellis v. Bellis
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased. PEOPLE’S

BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, executor. MARIA CRISTINA
BELLIS AND MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees
G. R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
BENGZON, J.P., J.:

This is a direct appeal upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Manila approving the project of partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No.
37089 therein.
FACTS:
Amos G. Bellis was born in Texas and a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United
States. At the time of his death, he was a resident thereof. Before he died, he made two wills,
one disposing of his Texas properties, the other, disposing of his Philippine properties. In both
wills, his recognized illegitimate children were not given anything. Texas has no conflicts rule –
rule of Private International Law – governing successional rights. Furthermore, under Texas
Law, there are no compulsory heirs and therefore no legitimes. The illegitimate children
opposed the wills on the ground that they have been denied of their right to inherit to which they
would be entitled if Philippine law were to be applied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not they are entitled to their legitimes.
RULING:
No. The said children are not entitled to their legitimes for under Texas Law which must
be applied – because it is the national law of the deceased – there are no legitimes.
The renvoi doctrine, applied in Testate Estate of Edward Christensen, Adolfo Aznar v.
Christensen Garcia cannot be applied. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is
a national of one country and a domiciliary of Texas at the time of his death. So that even
assuming that Texas has a conflicts of law rule providing that the law of the domicile should
52
govern, the same would not result in a renvoi to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law
because the deceased was both a citizen and a domiciliary of Texas.
The contention that the national law of the deceased should be disregarded because of
Article 17 which in effect states that our prohibitive laws should not be rendered nugatory by
foreign laws, is wrong. This is because Article 16 and Article 1039 are special provisions while
Article 17 is merely a general provision. Moreover, because Congress deleted the phrase
“notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article” when it incorporated
Article 11 of the old Civil Code as Article 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without
substantial change, the second paragraph of Article 10 of the old Civil Code as Article 16 of the
new.
Pointed out by the oppositor that the decedent, executing two wills intended Philippine
Law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent’s intention, a
provision in a foreigner’s will in accordance with the Philippine law and not with his national law
is illegal and void for his national law.
FALLO:
The order of the probate court is affirmed.
53
PCIB v. Escolin
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, petitioner

vs.
VENICIO ESCOLIN, ET AL., respondent
56 S 266
BARREDO, J.:p
The petition is directed against the orders of the court denying petitioner’s motion of April
22, 1966 and its order of July 18, 1967 denying the motion for reconsideration of said order.
FACTS:
On May 23, 1957, Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo City leaving a will. On May 27, 1957,
her widower- Hodges, had been appointed as SpecialAdministrator. Barely four months before
his death, he executed an affidavit wherein he ratified and confirmed all that he stated in his
estate tax returns as to his having renounced what was given him bu his wife’s will. Thereafter,
Atty. Leon Gellada, who had been previously acting as counsel for Hodges in his capacity as
special executor of his wife’s estate, and as such had filed the aforequoted motions and
manifestations; that the most trusted employee of both spouses Linnie Jane Hodges and C.N
Hodges, who had been employed for around 30 years, in the person of Miss Avelina Magno,
should be appointed as administrator of the estate and at the same time, a special administrator
of the estate of Charles Newton Hodges.
On January 24, 1964, virtually al of the heirs of C.N Hodges, who claim to be the sole
beneficiaries of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and various legal counsel representing the
aforementioned parties, entered into anamicablesettlement, wherein the partied thereto agreed
that certain sums of money were to be paid in settlement of different claims against the 2
estates and that the asets of both estates would be administrered jointly by the PCIB as
administrator of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, subject, however, that PCIB’s claim to
exclusive possession and ownership of 100% of all assets owned by Charles Newton Hodges or
Linnie Jane Hodges situated here in the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Philippine law should govern the successional rights of the heirs.
54
RULING:
Yes. Applying the “renvoi doctrine,” asenunciated and applied by this honorable court in
the case of “In reChristensen,” there can be no question that Philippine law governs the
testamentary provisions in the Last Will and Testament of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, as
well as the successional rights to her estate, both with respect to movables, as well as
immovables in the Philippines.
FALLO:
Judgment is rendered dismissing the petition.
55
American Airlines v. Court of Appeals
AMERICAN AIRLINES, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. BERNARD L. SALAS and DEMOCRITO MENDOZA, respondents
G.R No. 116044-45 March 9, 2000
GONZAGA_REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in the
consolidated cases, petitions for certiorari and prohibition. The petitioner assails the trial court’s
order denying the petitioner’s motion to dismiss the action for damages filed by the private
respondent for lack of jurisdiction under section 28 (1) of the Warsaw Convention; and the
petitioner challenges the validity of the trial court’s order striking off the record the deposition of
the petitioner’s security officer taken in Geneva, Switzerland for failure of the said security
officer to answer the cross interrogatories propounded by the private respondent.
FACTS:
It is undisputed that the private respondent purchased from Singapore Airlines in Manila
conjunction tickets for Manila-Singapore-Athens-Larnaca-Rome-Turin-Geneva-Copenhagen-
New York. American Airlines was not a participating airline in any of the segments. In Geneva,
private respondent decided to forego his trip to Copenhagen and to go straight to New York and
in the absence of a direct flight under his conjunction tickets from Geneva to New York; the
private respondent on June 7, 1989 exchanged the unused portion of the conjunction ticket for a
one-way ticket to New York from American Airlines. Am. Airlines issued its own ticket to the
private respondent in Geneva and claimed the value of the unused portion of the conjunction
ticket from the clearing house in Geneva. In Sept. 1989, private respondent filed an action for
damages before the RTC of Cebu for the alleged embarrassment and mental anguish he
suffered at the Geneva Airport when the Am. Airline’s security officers prevented him from
boarding the plane only after all the other passengers have boarded.
The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction of Philippine courts to
entertain the said proceedings under Art. 28 of the Warsaw Convention. The petitioner contends
that since the Philippines is not the place where the contract of carriage was made between the
parties herein, Philippine courts do not have jurisdiction over this action for damages. Petitioner
lays stress on the fact that the plane ticket for a direct flight from Geneva to New York was
56
purchased by the private respondent from the petitioner by “exchange and cash” which signifies
that the contract of carriage with Singapore Airlines was terminated and a second contract was
perfected. Moreover, the second contract of carriage cannot be deemed to have been an
extension of the first as the petitioner airline is not a participating airline in any of the
destinations under the first contract.
The RTC denied the motion. The order of denial was elevated to the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Both RTC and CA held that the suit may be brought in the
Philippines under the pool partnership among the IATA (International Air Transport Association)
members, which include Singapore Airlines and American Airlines, wherein the members act as
agents of each other in the issuance of tickets to those who may need their services.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippines has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action for
damages filed by the private respondent against petitioner in view of Art 28 (1) of the Warsaw
Convention.
RULING:
Yes. The Warsaw Convention to which the Philippines is a party and which has the force
and effect of law in this country applies to all international transportation of persons, baggage, or
goods performed by an aircraft gratuitously or for hire. The threshold issue of jurisdiction of
Philippine courts under Art. 28 must first be resolved before any pronouncements may be made
on the liability of the carrier thereunder. Art. 3 of the Warsaw Convention clearly states that a
contract of air transportation is taken as a single operation whether it is founded on a single
contract or a series of contracts. The number of tickets issued does not detract from the
oneness of the contract of carriage as long as the parties regard the contract as a single
operation. The third option of the plaintiff under Art. 28 of the Warsaw Convention e.g., to sue in
the place of business of the carrier wherein the contract was made, is therefore, Manila, and
Philippine courts are clothed with jurisdiction over this case. We note that while this case was
filed in Cebu, the issue of venue is no longer an issue.
FALLO:
The judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.
57
HUMAN RELATIONS
Standards / Norms of Human Conduct
Go v. Cordero
ALLAN C. GO, doing business under the name and style “ACG Express Liner,”,
petitioner,
vs.
MORTIMER F. CORDERO, respondent
G.R. No. 164703 May 4, 2010
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

For review is the Decision as modified by the Resolution of the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed with modifications the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 85
in Civil Case No. 98-35332.
FACTS:
Sometime in 1996, Mortimer F. Cordero, Vice-President of Pamana Marketing
Corporation (Pamana), ventured into the business of marketing inter-island passenger vessels.
After contacting various overseas fast ferry manufacturers from all over the world, he came to
meet Tony Robinson, an Australian national based in Brisbane, Australia, who is the Managing
Director of Aluminium Fast Ferries Australia (AFFA).
Between June and August 1997, Robinson signed documents appointing Cordero as the
exclusive distributor of AFFA catamaran and other fast ferry vessels in the Philippines. After
negotiations with Felipe Landicho and Vincent Tecson, lawyers of Allan C. Go who is the
owner/operator of ACG Express Liner of Cebu City, a single proprietorship, Cordero was able to
close a deal for the purchase of two (2) SEACAT 25 as evidenced by the Memorandum of
Agreement dated August 7, 1997.
Cordero made two (2) trips to the AFFA Shipyard in Brisbane, Australia, and on one (1)
occasion even accompanied Go and his family and Landicho, to monitor the progress of the
building of the vessel. He shouldered all the expenses for airfare, food, hotel accommodations,
transportation and entertainment during these trips. He also spent for long distance telephone
calls to communicate regularly with Robinson, Go, Tecson and Landicho.
58
However, Cordero later discovered that Go was dealing directly with Robinson when he
was informed by Dennis Padua of Wartsila Philippines that Go was canvassing for a second
catamaran engine from their company which provided the ship engine for the first SEACAT 25.
Cordero tried to contact Go and Landicho to confirm the matter but they were nowhere to be
found, while Robinson refused to answer his calls. Cordero immediately flew to Brisbane to
clarify matters with Robinson, only to find out that Go and Landicho were already there in
Brisbane negotiating for the sale of the second SEACAT 25. Despite repeated follow-up calls,
no explanation was given by Robinson, Go, Landicho and Tecson who even made Cordero
believe there would be no further sale between AFFA and ACG Express Liner.
On August 21, 1998, Cordero instituted Civil Case No. 98-35332 seeking to hold
Robinson, Go, Tecson and Landicho liable jointly and solidarily for conniving and conspiring
together in violating his exclusive distributorship in bad faith and wanton disregard of his rights,
thus depriving him of his due commissions (balance of unpaid commission from the sale of the
first vessel in the amount of US$31,522.01 and unpaid commission for the sale of the second
vessel in the amount of US$328,742.00) and causing him actual, moral and exemplary
damages, including P800,000.00 representing expenses for airplane travel to Australia,
telecommunications bills and entertainment, on account of AFFA’s untimely cancellation of the
exclusive distributorship agreement. Cordero also prayed for the award of moral and exemplary
damages, as well as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
ISSUES:
(1)Whether or not petitioner Cordero has the legal personality to sue the respondents for
breach of contract.
(2)Whether or not the respondents may be held liable for damages to Cordero for his
unpaid commissions and termination of his exclusive distributorship appointment by the
principal, AFFA.
RULINGS:
(1)Yes. While it is true that a third person cannot possibly be sued for breach of contract
because only parties can breach contractual provisions, a contracting party may sue a third
person not for breach but for inducing another to commit such breach. Article 1314 of the Civil
Code provides:
Art. 1314. Any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for
damages to the other contracting party. The elements of tort interference are: (1) existence of a
59
valid contract; (2) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of a contract; and
(3) interference of the third person is without legal justification. The presence of the first and
second elements is not disputed.
(2)Yes. The rule is that the defendant found guilty of interference with contractual relations
cannot be held liable for more than the amount for which the party who was inducted to break
the contract can be held liable. Respondents Go, Landicho and Tecson were therefore correctly
held liable for the balance of petitioner Cordero’s commission from the sale of the first SEACAT
25, in the amount of US$31,522.09 or its peso equivalent, which AFFA/Robinson did not pay in
violation of the exclusive distributorship agreement, with interest at the rate of 6% per annum
from June 24, 1998 until the same is fully paid. Respondents having acted in bad faith, moral
damages may be recovered under Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
FALLO:
The petitions are denied. The Decision as modified by the Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69113 are affirmed with modification.
60
Villanueva v. Rosqueta
TITUS B. VILLANUEVA, petitioner,

vs.
EMMA M. ROSQUETA, respondent
G.R. No. 180764 January 19, 2010
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the right to recover damages for alleged abuse of right committed by
a superior public officer in preventing a subordinate from doing her assigned task and being
officially recognized for it.
FACTS:
Respondent Emma M. Rosqueta, formerly Deputy Commissioner of the Revenue
Collection and Monitoring Group of the Bureau of Customs, tendered her courtesy resignation
from that post on January 23, 2001, shortly after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed
office. But five months later on June 5, 2001, she withdrew her resignation, claiming that she
enjoyed security of tenure and that she had resigned against her will on orders of her superior.
On July 13, 2001 President Arroyo appointed Gil Valera to respondent Rosqueta’s
position. Challenging such appointment, Rosqueta filed a petition for prohibition, quo warranto,
and injunction against petitioner Titus B. Villanueva, then Commissioner of Customs, the
Secretary of Finance, and Valera with the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case 01-
101539.On August 27, 2001 the RTC issued a temporary restraining order (TRO), enjoining
Villanueva and the Finance Secretary from implementing Valera’s appointment.
On August 28, 2001 the trial court superseded the TRO with a writ of preliminary
injunction. Petitioner Villanueva, Valera, and the Secretary of Finance challenged the injunction
order before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 66070. On September 14, 2001 the CA
issued its own TRO, enjoining the implementation of the RTC s injunction order. But the TRO
lapsed after 60 days and the CA eventually dismissed the petition before it.
On November 22, 2001 while the preliminary injunction in the quo warranto case was
again in force, petitioner Villanueva issued Customs Memorandum Order 40-2001, authorizing
Valera to exercise the powers and functions of the Deputy Commissioner.
On February 28, 2002 respondent Rosqueta filed a complaint for damages before the
RTC of Quezon City against petitioner Villanueva in Civil Case Q-02-46256, alleging that the
latter maliciously excluded her from the centennial anniversary memorabilia.
61
The RTC found that Villanueva had validly and legally replaced her as Deputy
Commissioner seven months before the Bureau’s centennialanniversary. But the CA reversed
the RTC’s decision.
With the denial of his motion for reconsideration, Villanueva filed this petition for review
oncertiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in holding petitioner Villanueva liable in damages to
respondent Rosqueta for ignoring the preliminary injunction order that the RTC issued in the
quo warranto case (Civil Case 01-101539), thus denying her of the right to do her job as Deputy
Commissioner of the Bureau and to be officially recognized as such public officer.
RULING:
No. Under the abuse of right principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a person
must, in the exercise of his legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead
acts in bad faith, with intent to prejudice another. Complementing this principle are Articles 20
and 21 of the Civil Code which grant the latter indemnity for the injury he suffers because of
such abuse of right or duty.
Petitioner Villanueva claims that he merely acted on advice of the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG)when he allowed Valera to assume the office as Deputy Commissioner since
respondent Rosqueta held the position merely in a temporary capacity and since she lacked the
Career Executive Service eligibility required for the job.
FALLO:
The Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals with
modification.
62
Manuel v. People
EDUARDO P. MANUEL, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent
G.R. No. 165842 November 29, 2005
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of Court of Appeals
affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, convicting the petitioner for the
crime of bigamy.
FACTS:
Eduardo P. Manuel, herein petitioner, was first married to Rubylus Gaña on July 18,
1975, who, according to the former, was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned
and was never seen again by him after his last visit. Manuel met Tina B. Gandalera in January
1996 when the latter was only 21 years old. Three months after their meeting, the two got
married through a civil wedding in Baguio City without Gandalera’s knowledge of Manuel’s first
marriage. In the course of their marriage, things got rocky and Gandalera learned that Eduardo
was in fact already married when he married him. She then filed a criminal case of bigamy
against Eduardo Manuel. The latter’s defense being that his declaration of “single” in his
marriage contract with Gandalera was done because he believed in good faith that his first
marriage was invalid and that he did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the
nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina. The Regional Trial Court ruled against
him sentencing him of imprisonment of from 6 years and 10 months to ten years, and an
amount 0f P200,000.00 for moral damages.
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA where he alleged that he was not criminally
liable for bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and
without any malicious intent. The CA ruled against the petitioner but with modification on the
RTC’s decision. Imprisonment was from 2 years, months and 1 day to ten years. Pecuniary
reward for moral damages was affirmed.
63
ISSUES:
(1)Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it ruled
that petitioner’s wife cannot be legally presumed dead under Article 390 of the Civil Code as
there was no judicial declaration of presumptive death as provided for under Article 41 of the
Family Code.
(2)Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it
affirmed the award of Php200,000.00 as moral damages as it has no basis in fact and in law.
RULINGS:
(1)No. The petition is denied for lack of merit. The petitioner is presumed to have acted
with malice or evil intent when he married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of
fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such
defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse
because everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. Where a
spouse is absent for the requisite period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent
marriage only after securing a judgment declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse
to avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have to adduce
evidence that he had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. Such
judgment is proof of the good faith of the present spouse who contracted a subsequent
marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is later charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse
reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime. The court rules against the petitioner.
(2)No. The Court rules that the petitioner’s collective acts of fraud and deceit before,
during and after his marriage with the private complainant were willful, deliberate and with
malice and caused injury to the latter. The Court thus declares that the petitioner’s acts are
against public policy as they undermine and subvert the family as a social institution, good
morals and the interest and general welfare of society. Because the private complainant was an
innocent victim of the petitioner’s perfidy, she is not barred from claiming moral damages.
Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court finds the award of P200,000.00
for moral damages to be just and reasonable.
FALLO:
The petition is denied. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
64
University of the East v. Jader
UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST, petitioner,

vs.
ROMEO A. JADER, respondent.
G.R. No. 132344. February 17, 2000.
May an educational institution be held liable for damages for misleading a student into
believing that the latter had satisfied all the requirements for graduation when such is not the
case? This is the issue in the instant petition for review premised on the following undisputed
facts as summarized by the trial court and adopted by the Court of Appeals.
FACTS:
Plaintiff Romeo A. Jader was enrolled in the defendant’s College of Law from 1984 up to
1988. In the first semester of his last year (SY 1987-1988), he failed to take the regular final
examination in Practice Court I for which he was given an incomplete grade. He enrolled fro the
second semester as fourth year law student and on February 1, 1988 he filed an application for
the removal of the incomplete grade given him by Professor Carlos Ortega which was approved
by Dean Celedonio Tiongson. He took the examination on March 28, 1988. On May 30, 1988,
his grade of five (5) was submitted by Professor Ortega.
In the deliberations conducted by the Dean and the Faculty Members of the College of
Law, the plaintiff’s name appeared in the Tentative List of Candidates for graduation for the
Degree of Bachelor of Laws. Plaintiff’s name also appeared in the invitation for the 35 th
Investitures and Commencement Ceremonies for the candidates of Bachelor of Laws.
The plaintiff attended the investiture ceremonies on April 16, 1988. during the program of
which he went up the stage, his mother and brother placed his Hood, his Tassel turned from left
to right, and he was thereafter handed by Dean Celedonio a rolled white sheet of paper
symbolical of the Law Diploma.
He thereafter prepared himself for the bar examination. He took a leave of absence from
his job from April 20, 1988 to September 30, 1988 and enrolled at the pre-bar review class in
Far Eastern University. Having learned of the deficiency, he dropped his review class and was
not able to take the bar examination.
65
Plaintiff-appellee sued defendant-appellant for damages alleging that he suffered moral
shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless
nights when he was not able to take the 1988 bar examinations arising from the latter’s
negligence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not plaintiff-appellee can claim for moral and exemplary damages for the
abuse of rights under Article 19 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court ordered that petitioner should pay respondent the sum of Thirty-
five Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Pesos (P35, 470.00), with legal interest of 6% per annum
computed from the date of filing of the complaint until fully paid but not entitled to moral
damages. The court does not believe that respondent suffered shock, trauma and pain because
he could not graduate and could not take the bar examinations. The court stated that it
behooved on respondent to verify for himself whether he has completed all necessary
requirements to be eligible for the bar examinations. Respondent should have been responsible
enough to ensure that all his affairs, specifically those pertaining to his academic achievement,
are in order.
FALLO:
The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed with modification.
66
Cruz v. NLRC
VIOLA CRUZ, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, NORKIS DISTRIBUTORS, INC., JOSE
RAMIRO A. CARPIO, JR., WESSIE QUISUMBING, and ELIZALDE AMPALAYO,
respondents
G.R. No. 116384, 2000 February 7, 2000
PURISIMA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court ascribing grave abuse
of discretion to the National Labor Relations Commission in issuing its Resolution dismissing for
lack of merit petitioner's complaint against the respondents. Norkis Distributors. Inc., Jose
Ramiro A. Carpio. Jr., Wessie Quisumbing, and Elizalde Ampalayo; and the subsequent Order,
denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
FACTS:
Respondent Norkis Distributor, Inc., a domestic corporation with principal office and
business address at A. S. Fortuna Street, Mandaue City, Cebu, is engaged in the business of
selling motorcycles and household appliances, with branches all over the country. One of the
branches is in Valencia, Bukidnon where petitioner Viola Cruz was employed as cashier/
bookkeeper. For her loyalty and dedication to the company, petitioner Cruz was given
compensating salary adjustment of One Hundred (P100.00) Pesos, effective July 1, 1990.
In October 14, 1990, while petitioner and her co-employees were busy packing up and
making inventory of the things to be moved because of a scheduled transfer of the Valencia
branch, the petitioner suddenly collapsed. She was rushed to the Monsanto General Hospital in
Valencia, Bukidnon and was later on transferred to the Capitol College General Hospital in
Cagayan de Oro City on October 17, 1990. She was diagnosed to be suffering from “CNS
Infection: TB Meningitis vs. Cryptococcal Meningitis.” She was later transferred to the Maria
Reyna Hospital, where she was confined from October 25 to December 5, 1990, and treated for
“ Cryptococcal Meningitis, Pott’s Disease, and Diabetes Mellitus Type II.
Starting October 15, 1990, the petitioner stopped reporting for work. Two days after
petitioner’s collapse, respondent Norkis was able to recruit a replacement cashier/ bookkeeper
in the person of Hernando Juaman.
67
On December 28, 1990, petitioner sent a letter to respondent Norkis to verify the status
of her employment. As an answer, she received a termination latter dated November 2, 1990
citing health reasons as the cause for her dismissal.
On March 18, 1991, petitioner lodged a complaint for illegal dismissal against private
respondents before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC in Cagayan De Oro City. On May 28,
1993, Labor Arbiter Leon P. Murillo rendered a decision but both parties appealed to the NLRC.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner was illegally dismissed by private respondents on ground of
illness and so she was entitled to recover moral and exemplary damages.
RULING:
Yes. Private respondents illegally dismissed the petitioner because they failed to comply
with the requirement that an employee to be dismissed should be given two written notices. The
first notice is to apprise the employee of the particular acts or omissions by reason of which her
dismissal has been decided upon; and the second is to inform the employee of the employer’s
decision to dismiss him. Having failed to do the requirement, respondents have not given the
petitioner due process which makes their act illegal and void. For this, petitioner is entitled to
recover moral and exemplary damages.
FALLO:
The petition is granted; the resolution of National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC
Case No. M-001458-93 is set aside; and the resolution of the Labor Arbiter, in NLRC RAB Case
No. 10-03-00211-91 is reinstated, with modification.
68
Globe Mackay v. Barrios
GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE & RADIO CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
GEORGE G. BARRIOS AND OLGA THERESA CRUZ-BARRIOS, respondents
G. R. No. L-60859 December 27, 1982
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J .:
The Petition for Review in this case would not merit being given due course because a
close scrutiny of its allegations, the Comment of respondents thereon, and the Reply to said
Comment shows that the issue of negligence involved is basically factual.
FACTS:
The petitioner cable company failed to deliver to respondent-spouses, both physicians, a
cablegram from Mercy Hospital, Buffalo, New York, admitting respondent-wife for a rotating
internship in said hospital. As a consequence of which, she was unable to signify her
acceptance and the position was given to someone else. The Trial Court and the Court of
appeals found that the petitioner was grossly negligent in having admittedly failed to deliver the
cablegram which caused respondents financial difficulties in New York, due to loss of earnings
for approximately six months, serious anxiety, and sleepless nights, for which the petitioner
should be held liable, and which should be corrected for the public good.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the award of damages is excessive.
RULING:
Yes. A telegraph company is a public service corporation owing duties to the general
public ands is liable to any member of the public whom it owes a duty for damages proximately
flowing from a violation of that duty. However, the petitioner is a quasi-public corporation also
affected with public interest and the award of damages made by the Trial Court and affirmed by
the Court of Appeals was found by the Supreme Court to be excessive. The decision of the
Supreme Court modified that of the lower courts by reducing the award.
FALLO:
The Decision appealed from is modified. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
69
RCPI v. CA
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI), petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND LORETO DIONELA, respondents
G. R. No. L-44748 August 29, 1986
PARAS, J.:
This is a Petition for Review by certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals,
modifying the decision of the trial court in a civil case for recovery of damages against petitioner
corporation by reducing the award to private respondent Loreto Dionela of moral damages from
P40,000 to Pl5,000, and attorney's fees from P3,000 to P2,000.
FACTS:
The complaint against the defendant corporation is based on a telegram sent through its
Manila Office to the offended party, Loreto Dionela. Plaintiff-respondent Dionela alleged that the
defamatory words (“sa iyo walang pakinabang dumating-ka diyan-wala kang padala ditto-kahit
bulbul mo”) on the telegram sent to him not only wounded his feelings but also caused him
undue embarrassment and affected adversely his business as well because other people have
come to know of the said defamatory words. Defendant-corporation as a defense, alleged that
the additional words in Tagalog was a private joke between the sending and receiving operators
and that they were not addressed to or intended for plaintiff and therefore did not form part of
the telegram and that the Tagalog words are not defamatory.
The trial court ruled that the additional words in Tagalog are libelous and that they
clearly impute a vice or defect of the plaintiff. Whether or not they were intended for the plaintiff,
the effect on the plaintiff is the same. There is sufficient publication of the libelous Tagalog
words for they are open to view and inspection by third parties. The Court of Appeals affirmed
with modification the Trial Court’s decision by reducing the award of damages. A motion for
reconsideration was denied, hence, the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not award of moral damages based on documentary evidence without
supporting oral testimonies is proper.
70
RULING:
Yes. In most cases, negligence must be proved in order that plaintiff may recover.
However, since negligence may be hard to substantiate in some cases, we may apply the
doctrine of RES IPSA LOQUITUR or “the thing speaks for itself,” by considering the presence of
facts or circumstances surrounding the injury.
FALLO:
The judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.
71
Nikko Hotel v. Reyes
NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners,

vs.
ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. "AMAY BISAYA," respondent
G.R. No. 154259 February 28, 2005
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila Garden and Ruby
Lim assail the Decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, as well as the Resolution of the Court of Appeals which denied
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. CA held petitioner liable for damages to Roberto Reyes
aka “Amang Bisaya”, an entertainment artist.
FACTS:
There are two versions of the story:
Mr. Reyes: On the eve of October 13, 1994, Mr. Reyes while having coffee at the lobby
of Nikko Hotel was approached by Dr. Violet Filart, a friend several years back. According to
Mr. Reyes, Dr. Filart invited him to join a birthday party at the penthouse for the hotel’s former
General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka. Plaintiff agreed as Dr. Filart agreed to vouch for him and
carried a basket of fruits, the latter’s gift. He lined up at the buffet table as soon as it was ready
but to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, Ruby Lim, Hotel’s Executive Secretary,
asked him to leave in a loud voice enough to be heard by the people around them. He was
asked to leave the party and a Makati policeman accompanied him to step-out the hotel. All
these time, Dr Filart ignored him adding to his shame and humiliation.
Ms. Ruby Lim: She admitted asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not in the manner
claimed by the plaintiff. Ms. Lim approached several people including Dr. Filart’s sister, Ms.
Zenaida Fruto, if Dr. Filart did invite him as the captain waiter told Ms. Lim that Mr. Reyes was
with Dr. Filart’s group. She wasn’t able to ask it personally with Dr. Filart since the latter was
talking over the phone and doesn’t want to interrupt her. She asked Mr. Reyes to leave
because the celebrant specifically ordered that the party should be intimate consisting only of
those who part of the list. She even asked politely with the plaintiff to finish his food then leave
the party.
During the plaintiff’s cross-examination, he was asked how close was Ms. Lim when she
approached him at the buffet table. Mr. Reyes answered “very close because we nearly kissed
72
each other”. Considering the close proximity, it was Ms. Lim’s intention to relay the request only
be heard by him. It was Mr. Reyes who made a scene causing everybody to know what
happened.
ISSUES:
(1)Whether or not the Doctrine of Volenti Non Fit Injuria is applicable in the case at bar.
(2) Whether or not Lim acted abusively in asking Reyes, a.k.a. "Amay Bisaya," to leave
the party where he was not invited by the celebrant thereof thereby becoming liable under
Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.
RULINGS:
(1)Yes. Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti
non fit injuria, they cannot be made liable for damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk
of being asked to leave (and being embarrassed and humiliated in the process) as he was a
"gate-crasher." The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to which a person assents is not esteemed
in law as injury" ) refers to self-inflicted injury or to the consent to injury which precludes the
recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger,
even if he is not negligent in doing so. As formulated by petitioners, however, this doctrine does
not find application to the case at bar because even if respondent Reyes assumed the risk of
being asked to leave the party, petitioners, under Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code, were
still under obligation to treat him fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and
shame.
(2)No. Supreme Court held that petitioners did not act abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to
leave the party. Plaintiff failed to establish any proof of ill-motive on the part of Ms. Lim who did
all the necessary precautions to ensure that Mr. Reyes will not be humiliated in requesting him
to leave the party. Considering almost 20 years of experience in the hotel industry, Ms. Lim is
experienced enough to know how to handle such matters. Hence, petitioners will not be held
liable for damages brought under Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code.
FALLO:
The petition filed by Ruby Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden is granted. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution are reversed and set aside. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon Cityis affirmed. No costs.
73
Acts Contrary to Morals, Good Customs or Public Policy
Hermossisima v. CA
FRANCISCO HERMOSSISIMA, plaintiff,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, et.al., defendant
G. R. No.L-14628 September 30, 1960
CONCEPCION, J.:
An appeal by certiorari, taken by petitioner Francisco Hermosisima, from a decision of
Court of Appeals modifying that of the Court of First Instance of Cebu.
FACTS:
Since 1950, Soledad Cagigas was then a teacher in the Sibonga Provincial High School
in Cebu, and Francisco Hermosima, who was almost 10 years younger than she was her
boyfriend. They were regarded as engaged although he had made no promise of marriage prior
thereto. In 1951, she gave up teaching and became a life insurance underwriter in the City of
Cebu, where intimacy between them developed. One evening in 1953, after coming from the
movie house, they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on board M/V “Escana” to which he was
then attached as apprentice pilot. In February 1954, she was in the family way, whereupon he
promised to marry her. Their child Chris Hermosima was born on June 17,1954, in a private
maternity and clinic. However on July24, 1954, Francisco married Romanita Perez. Hence, the
present action was commenced on or about October 4 1954.
ISSUE:
Whether or not moral damages are recoverable under our laws for breach of promise to
marry.
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court held that under the Civil Code, there can be no recovery of
moral damages for a breach of promise to marry, as such the omission in the Civil Code of the
proposed Chapter on breach of Promise Suits is a clear manifestation of legislative intent not to
sanction as such, suits for breach of promise to marry, otherwise “many innocent man may
74
become the victims of designing and unscrupulous females.” However, if there be seduction,
moral damages may be recovered under Art. 2219, Par.3 of Civil Code of the Philippines.
Francisco was morally guilt of seduction in this case. Soledad, the complainant, who was 10
years older, surrendered herself to him because overwhelmed by her love for him; she wanted
to bind him by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of the clergy.
He was, therefore, ordered to pay a monthly pension of P30.00 for the support of the child;
P4500.00 representing the income that complainant had allegedly failed to earn during her
pregnancy and shortly after the birth of the child as actual compensatory damages; P5000.00 as
moral damages; and P500.00 as attorney’s fees.
FALLO:
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
75
Galang v. CA
BEATRIZ GALANG, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MAXIMO QUINIT and RODRIGO QUINIT, respondents.
G.R. No. L-17248 January 29, 1962
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is an action against Rodrigo Quinit and his father Maximo Quinit to recover
damages claimed to have been sustained by plaintiff Beatriz Galang for an alleged breach of
promise on the part of Rodrigo Quinit to marry her. The case is before the Supreme Court on
appeal by certiorari taken by plaintiff Beatriz Galang.
FACTS:
Beatriz Galang, herein petitioner and Rodrigo Quinit started their love relations in 1953
and exchanged a long series of love letters. Petitioner tried to prove that she and Rodrigo were
engaged despite the opposition of the latter’s mother and that the father of Rodrigo agreed to
give dowry and defray the expenses of the marriage. The father even took them to the house of
one Adolfo Dagawan located at Colorado Falls, Tuba, Mountain Province for them to stay
as husband and wife.
However, when Rodrigo was not able to secure a marriage license for lack of a
residence certificate, he went back to his hometown, Sison, Pangasinan, to get such certificate
but never returned. Rodrigo sought to establish that he and petitioner were engaged but his
parents defied the marriage. He was agreeable to marry the petitioner after his graduation but
the latter was impatient and wanted the marriage to be held at an earlier date. Rodrigo’s parents
told him to leave the parental home in view of his continued relations with Beatriz. Knowing what
Rodrigo’s parents did, the petitioner convinced him to go to Dagawan’s house where she
followed and stayed thereafter.
Because of Rodrigo’s continued refusal to marry the petitioner, the latter’s relatives,
accompanied by policemen and constabulary soldiers, intimidated him. He was allowed to go
home and was then placed under the custody of a mayor of a neighboring town in Pangasinan
by his parents. He refused to acknowledge the marriage application which was provided by
Dagawan for him to sign. When he did not appear before a notary public, petitioner filed an
76
action against him and his father, Maximo Quinit, to recover damages for breach of promise on
the part of Rodrigo to marry her.
The Court of First Instance of Baguio rendered judgment in favor of Beatriz Galang
sentencing the defendants jointly and severally to pay sums of P275.00 by way of actual
damages; P5000.00 as moral damages and P500.00 as attorney’s fees, apart from the costs.
On appeal taken by the defendants, the Court of Appeals absolved Maximo Quinit, and
accordingly reversed said decision insofar as he is concerned, and modified it as regards
Rodrigo Quinit by eliminating the awards for moral damages and attorney’s fees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not moral damages are recoverable under our laws for breach of promise to
marry.
RULING:
No. The Court of Appeals considered petitioner’s evidence unworthy of credence
notwithstanding that the petitioner urged that said Court had erred in not awarding moral
damages to her. She insists that moral damages for breach of promise to marry are collectible
under our laws, but this question has already been settled adversely to petitioner’s pretense in
Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals. Moral damages for breach of promise to marry are not
collectible under Philippine laws. Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of Court of
Appeals.
FALLO:
The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, therefore, without
special pronouncement as to cost. It is so ordered.
77
Gashem Shookat Baksh v. CA
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.
G. R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to review and
set aside the Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 which
affirmed in toto the 16 October 1939 Decision of Branch 38 of the Regional Trial Court of
Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 16503. Presented is the issue of whether or not damages may be
recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
FACTS:
Gashem Shookat Baksh, herein petitioner, a twenty nine-year old Iranian exchange
student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Pangasinan, courted
and proposed to marry Marilou Gonzales, herein private respondent, a twenty two-year old
Filipina, high school graduate and a former waitress on a luncheonette. Private respondent
accepted petitioner’s love on the condition that they would get married after the end of the
school semester. The petitioner visited private respondent’s hometown in Bugallion, Pangasinan
to secure her family’s approval to their marriage and later forced her to live with him in his
apartment. Holding on to the petitioner’s promise to marry her, private respondent surrendered
her virginity, but then the latter started maltreating and threatening her. Upon confrontation with
a representative of the Barangay Captain of Guilig, Dagupan City, petitioner repudiated their
marriage agreement and asked the private respondent not to live with him anymore because he
is already married to someone living in Bacolod City.
The private respondent filed a complaint for damages against the petitioner for the
alleged violation of their agreement to get married before the Regional Trial Court of
Pangasinan with a prayer for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages,
reimbursements for actual expenses, and attorney’s fees and costs. On the other hand, the
petitioner also filed a counter claim, denying and reversing the allegations against him by the
private respondent. The Regional Trial Court applied the Article 21 of the Civil Code and the
78
decision was held in favor of the private respondent. The petitioner appealed to the Court of
Appeals contending that the trial court erred in not dismissing the case for lack of factual and
legal basis and in ordering him to pay moral damages, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and
costs. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial courts’ ruling stating that petitioner’s acts
are undoubtedly against morals, good customs, and public policy, and are even gravely and
deeply derogatory and insulting to Filipino women. Thus, unfazed by his second defeat,
petitioner filed an instant petition contradicting the applicability of Article 21 of the Civil Code in
this case and criticizing the trial court for liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions and
culture, and ignoring the fact that he is a foreigner and an Iranian Muslim who is not conversant
with such.
ISSUE:
Whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the
basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that, in the existing rule under our Civil Law, a breach of
promise to marry itself is not an actionable wrong. The Supreme Court found out the true
character and motive of the petitioner, that is, he used deception and took advantage of the
situation of the private respondent, a high school graduate and is financially unstable, by
proposing to support and marry her, just so he can satisfy his lust. He clearly violated the
Filipino’s concept of morality and defied the traditional respect when he was not going to marry
her after all, thus, he should indeed be made to compensate for the moral damages and injury
that he had caused private respondent as the lower court ordered him to do in its decision in this
case pursuant to Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Therefore, finding no reversible
error in the challenged decision, the instant petition was denied with costs against the petitioner.
FALLO:
Wherefore, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition is
hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner.
79
Wassmer v. Velez
BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964
BENGZON, J.P., J.:

The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and hopes, followed by
appropriate planning and serious endeavors, but terminated in frustration and, what is worse,
complete public humiliation.
FACTS:
Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their promise to love, decided to get
married. Two days before their marriage, Francisco wrote Beatriz telling her that their marriage
had to be postponed as his mother opposes it. A day before his marriage, he sent a telegram
informing her that nothing has changed and she must be rest assured that he is returning soon.
Despite the fact that everything was already prepared, from invitations to matrimonial bed and
other accessories, and in fact bridal showers were given and gifts already received, Francisco
was never heard from again.
Beatriz sued for damages for breach of promise to marry. The defendant filed no answer
and the judgment was rendered ordering the same to pay the plaintiff for actual damages, moral
and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs. The defendant filed a Petition for Relief
from orders, judgment and proceedings and motion for new trial and reconsideration. But the
court ordered the parties and their attorneys to appear before it to explore the possibility of
arriving at an amicable settlement. It added that should any of the parties fail to appear the
petition for relief and the opposition thereto will be deemed submitted for resolution. The
defendant failed to appear and another chance for settlement was given by the court in its order.
However, the defendant's counsel informed the court that chances of settling the case amicably
were nil. The defendant filed an appeal contending that there is no provision of the
law authorizing an action for breach of promise to marry. However, the court did not find this
defense meritorious because even though it is true that there is no law for breach of promise to
marry, the plaintiff still suffered frustration and public humiliation.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong.
RULING:
No. Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong but to formally set a
wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the
matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably
contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in
accordance with Article 21 of the Civil Code. This is not a case of mere breach to marry. The
extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for
Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides that “any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate
the latter for the damages.”
When a breach of promise to marry is actionable under Article 21 of the Civil Code,
moral damages may be awarded under Article 2219 (10) of the said Code. Exemplary damages
may also be awarded under Article 2232 of said Code where it is proven that the defendant
clearly acted in a wanton, reckless and oppressive manner. Hence, the court affirmed the
previous judgment and ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff moral damages for the
humiliation she suffered; actual damages for the expenses incurred and exemplary damages
because the defendant acted fraudulently in making the plaintiff believe that the wedding will
push through.
FALLO:
The argument is devoid of merit as under the circumstances of this case defendant
clearly acted in a wanton, reckless and oppressive manner. This Court's opinion, however, is
that considering the particular circumstances of this case, P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages is deemed to be a reasonable award. Premises considered, with the above-indicated
modification, the lower court's judgment is hereby affirmed, with costs.
81
Unjust Enrichment
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Ong
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
ALFREDO ONG, respondent.
G.R. No. 190755 November 24, 2010
VELASCO, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the October 20, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-CV No. 84445 entitled Alfredo Ong v. Land Bank of the Philippines, which affirmed the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 17 in Tabaco City, Albay.
FACTS:
Spouses Johnson Sy and Evangeline Ong-Sy secured a loan from Land Bank of the
Philippines Legazpi City branch in the amount of 16,000,000.00 pesos which was secured by
three (3) residential lots, five (5) cargo trucks, and a warehouse. The Notice of Loan Approval
contained an acceleration clause wherein any default in payment of amortizations or other
charges would accelerate the maturity of the loan. However, the spouses Sy found they could
no longer pay their loan so they sold three (3) of their mortgaged parcels of land for 150,000.00
pesos to Angelina Gloria Ong, Evangeline’s mother, under a Deed of Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage.
Alfredo Ong, Evangeline’s father, later went to Land Bank to inform it about the sale and
assumption of mortgage. Atty. Hingco, the bank’s Branch Head, told Alfredo and his counsel
that there was nothing wrong with the agreement with the Spouses Sy. They were also told that
he should pay part of the principal which was computed at 750,000.00 pesos and to update due
or accrued interests on the promissory notes so that Atty. Hingco could easily approve the
assumption of mortgage. He issued a check for 750,000.00 pesos and personally gave it to Atty.
Hingco and then, a receipt was issued for his payment. He also submitted the other documents
required by Land Bank, such as financial statements for 1994 and 1995. Atty. Hingco then
informed him that the certificate of title of the Spouses Sy would be transferred in his name but
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this never materialized and no notice of transfer was sent to him. He later found out that his
application for assumption of mortgage was not approved by Land Bank.
The bank learned from its credit investigation report that the Ongs had a real estate
mortgage in the amount of 18,300,000.00 pesos with another bank that was past due. Land
Bank foreclosed the mortgage of the Spouses Sy after several months and Alfredo only learned
of the foreclosure when he saw the subject mortgage properties included in a Notice of
Foreclosure of Mortgage and Auction Sale at the Regional Trial Court in Tabaco, Albay. His
other counsel subsequently talked to Land Bank’s lawyer and was told that the 750,000.00
pesos he paid would be returned to him, but it was not.
Alfredo Ong initiated an action for recovery of sum of money with damages against Land
Bank and maintained that Land Bank’s foreclosure without informing him of the denial of his
assumption of the mortgage was done in bad faith. On the other hand, Atty. Hingco claimed
during trial that as branch manager she had no authority to approve loans and could not assure
anybody that their assumption of mortgage would be approved. According to her, the bank
processes an assumption of mortgage as a new loan, since the new borrower is considered a
new client and they used character, capacity, capital, collateral, and conditions in determining
who can qualify to assume a loan. Plaintiff’s proposal to assume the loan was referred to a
separate office, the Lending Center, which rejected the former’s loan application; therefore, it
was the Lending Center and not her that should have informed the plaintiff about the denial of
his and his wife’s assumption of mortgage.
The trial court ruled that under the principle of equity and justice, the bank should return
the amount the plaintiff had paid with interest at 12% per annum computed from the filing of the
complaint and ordered the same to pay plaintiff’s attorney’s fees and litigation expenses for
being compelled to litigate. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision
and ruled that it would be incorrect to consider Alfredo Ong a third person with no interest in the
fulfillment of the obligation under Article 1236 of the Civil Code. Although Land Bank was not
bound by the Deed between Alfredo and the Spouses Sy, the appellate court found that Alfredo
and Land Bank’s active preparations for the former’s assumption of mortgage essentially
novated the agreement. Land Bank filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the
Court of Appeals for lack of merit. Hence, Land Bank appealed to the Supreme Court.
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ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the respondent should have sought recourse against the spouses Sy
instead of Land Bank of the Philippines based on Article 1236 of the Civil Code.
2. Whether or not there is novation on the contract between parties to the instant case
considering that a substitution of debtors was made without its consent.
3. Whether or not the petitioner is liable for the return of the 750,000.00 pesos based on
the principle of unjust enrichment.
RULING:
1. No. Article 1236 of the Civil Code provides that the creditor is not bound to
accept payment or performance by a third person who has no interest in the fulfillment of the
obligation, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary. Whoever pays for another may demand
from the debtor what he has paid, except that if he paid without the knowledge or against the
will of the debtor, he can recover only insofar as the payment has been beneficial to the debtor.
The Supreme Court agreed with Land Bank on the first part of paragraph 1 of Article 1236 that it
was not bound to accept Alfredo’s payment, since as far as the former was concerned, he did
not have an interest in the payment of the loan of the Spouses Sy. However, in the context of
the second part of said paragraph, Alfredo was not making payment to fulfill the obligation of the
Spouses Sy. Alfredo made a conditional payment so that the properties subject of the Deed of
Sale with Assumption of Mortgage would be titled in his name. It is clear from the records that
Land Bank required Alfredo to make payment before his assumption of mortgage would be
approved. He was informed that the certificate of title would be transferred accordingly. He,
thus, made payment not as a debtor but as a prospective mortgagor.
2. No. The Supreme Court do not agree with the Court of Appeals in holding that
there was a novation in the contract between the parties because not all elements of novation
were present and that it was not expressly consented to. The conflicting intention and acts of
the parties underscore the absence of any express disclosure or circumstances with which to
deduce a clear and unequivocal intent by the parties to novate the old agreement. Land Bank
did not intervene in the contract between Spouses Sy and Spouses Ong and did not expressly
give its consent to this substitution. In order that an obligation may be extinguished by another
which substitutes the same, it is imperative that it be so declared in unequivocal terms, or that
the old and the new obligations be on every point incompatible with each other. The test of
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incompatibility is whether or not the two obligations can stand together, each one having its
independent existence. Article 1293 of the Civil Code states that novation which consists in
substituting a new debtor in the place of the original one, may be made even without the
knowledge or against the will of the latter, but not without the consent of the creditor. Payment
by the new debtor gives him rights mentioned in articles 1236 and 1237.
3. Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that Land Bank is still liable for the return of the
750,000.00 pesos based on the principle of unjust enrichment. While Land Bank is not bound to
accept the substitution of debtors in the subject real estate mortgage, it is estoppel by its action
of accepting Alfredo’s payment from arguing that it does not have to recognize Alfredo as the
new debtor. By accepting Alfredo’s payment and keeping silent on the status of Alfredo’s
application, Land Bank misled Alfredo to believe that he had for all intents and purposes
stepped into the shoes of the Spouses Sy. Unjust enrichment exists when a person unjustly
retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of another
against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience.
There is unjust enrichment under Article 22 of the Civil Code when a person is unjustly
benefited, and such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another. Unjust
enrichment has been applied to actions called accion in rem verso. In order that the accion in
rem verso may prosper, the defendant must have been enriched; the plaintiff has suffered a
loss; the enrichment of the defendant is without just or legal ground; and the plaintiff has no
other action based on contract, quasi-contract, crime, or quasi-delict. The principle of unjust
enrichment essentially contemplates payment when there is no duty to pay, and the person who
receives the payment has no right to receive it. The principle applies to the parties in the instant
case, as, Alfredo, having been deemed disqualified from assuming the loan, had no duty to pay
petitioner bank and the latter had no right to receive it. Alfredo had no other remedy to recover
from Land Bank and the lower court properly exercised its equity jurisdiction in resolving the
collection suit.
FALLO:
Wherefore, the appeal is denied. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR-CV No. 84445 is
affirmed with modification in that the amount of PhP 750,000 will earn interest at 6% per annum
reckoned from December 12, 1997, and the total aggregate monetary awards will in turn earn
12% per annum from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.
85
Respect for Personality and Dignity of Others
Concepcion v. CA
RODRIGO CONCEPCION, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and
SPOUSES NESTOR NICOLAS and ALLEM NICOLAS, respondents.
G.R. No. 120706 January 31, 2000
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Petitioner Rodrigo Concepcion assails in this petition for review on certiorari the Decision
of the Court of Appeals dated 12 December 1994 which affirmed the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City ordering him to pay respondent spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem
Nicolas the sums of P50,000.00 for moral damages, P25,000.00 for exemplary damages and
P10,000.00 for attorney's fees, plus the costs of suit. Petitioner claims absence of factual and
legal basis for the award of damages.
FACTS:
Spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas, herein respondents, were residing in an
apartment leased to them by the owner Florence “Bing” Concepcion at Pasig City. Nestor
Nicolas was engaged in the business of supplying government agencies and private entities
with office equipment, appliances and other fixtures. Florence Concepcion joined after
contributing capital with the condition that she will receive half of the profit earned. Rodrigo
Concepcion, the petitioner and brother of the deceased husband of Florence, went to Nestor’s
apartment and accused him of committing adulterous relationship with Florence. Nestor felt
extreme embarrassment and shame. Florence even ceased to do business with the spouses.
The spouses started to quarrel as Allem became doubtful of her husband’s fidelity. Nestor
forced then Rodrigo demanding public apology and payment of damages. The latter ignored the
demand which triggered the spouses to file a civil suit against Rodrigo for damages. He
reasoned out that he did such to protect the name and reputation of the Concepcion family. The
trial court rendered decision in favor of the respondents, which was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. Hence, this petition.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a legal basis for the award of damages to private respondents,
spouses Nicolas.
RULING:
Yes. The petitioner's posture that there is no legal provision that supports such award of
damages has been rejected. Article 26 of the new Civil Code stressed the sacredness of human
personality, which is a concomitant consideration of every plan for human amelioration. The
rights of persons are amply protected, and damages are provided for violations of a person’s
dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind. There is no question that private respondent,
Nestor Nicolas suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social
humiliation as a proximate result of petitioner's abusive, scandalous and insulting language.
Thus, the petitioner is liable to the spouses for 50,000.00 pesos as moral damages, 25,000.00
pesos for exemplary damages, 10,000.00 pesos for attorney’s fees, plus costs of suit on the
order of the Supreme Court affirming the judgment of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals.
FALLO:
Wherefore, in light of the foregoing premises, the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167, holding
Rodrigo Concepcion liable to the spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas for P50,000.00 as
moral damages, P25,000.00 for exemplary damages, P10,000.00 for attorney's fees, plus costs
of suit, is affirmed.
87
Neglect or Refusal of Public Servant
Amonoy v. Spouses Gutierrez
SERGIO AMONOY, petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES JOSE GUTIERREZ AND ANGELA FORNILDA GUTIERREZ, respondents.
G.R. No. 140420 February 15, 2001
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Damnum absque injuria. Under this principle, the legitimate exercise of a person’s rights,
even if it causes loss to another, does not automatically result in an actionable injury. The law
does not prescribe a remedy for the loss. This principle does not, however, apply when there is
an abuse of a person’s right, or when the exercise of this right is suspended or extinguished
pursuant to a court order. Indeed, in the availment of one’s rights, one must act with justice, give
their due, and observe honesty and good faith.
FACTS:
Sergio Amonoy, the petitioner, was the counsel of Francisca Catolos, Agnes Catolos,
Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Formilda, for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Julio
Cantolos. Such estate involves six (6) parcels of land situated in Tanay, Rizal. The Project of
Partition was approved and two of the said lots were adjudicated to Asuncion Pasamba and
Alfonso Formilda. With regard to the attorney’s fees, Amonoy charged 27, 600.00 pesos. To
secure the payment of such, Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Formilda executed a deed of real
estate mortgage on the said two lots adjudicated to them. Both of them passed away and
among the heirs of Alfonso was his daughter, therein plaintiff-appellant Angela Gutierrez.
Amonoy filed for their foreclosure before in the Court of First Instance of Pasig, Rizal, since his
attorney’s fees secured by the two lots were not paid. The heirs opposed.
The court’s judgement was rendered in favor of Amonoy requiring the heirs to pay the
27,600.00 pesos attorney’s fees by the mortgage, 11,880.00 pesos as a value of the harvests,
and 9,654.00 pesos as another round of attorney’s fees within 90 days. Failing in that, the two
(2) lots would be sold at public auction. The Court of First Instance issued a Writ of Possession
and a pursuant to which a notice to vacate was made. The land, where the house of Gutierrez
88
spouses was situated, was part of the said parcel of land to be possessed by Amonoy. A
petition was then filed by therein petitioners, including Angela Gutierrez, before the Supreme
Court. A decision was rendered setting aside the Writ of Possession and the Temporary
Restraining Order was made permanent, and ordering that the six (6) parcels of land are
returned to petitioners. However, the said dwelling had already been destroyed. Thus, a
Complaint for damages for such was filed before the Regional Trial Court, but it was dismissed.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals set aside the lower court’s decision, rather ordered petitioner
Amonoy to pay 250,000.00 pesos as actual damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the liability of the petitioner for damages in favor of the respondents was
with merit.
RULING:
Yes. Petitioner cannot invoke damnum absque injuria, a principle premised on the valid
exercise of a right. Though the petitioner’s acts may have been justified at the outset, under the
Writ of Demolition issued by the Regional Trial Court, there was a continuation of the
commencement of the same after the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, enjoining the
demolition of respondents’ house, it amounted to an insidious abuse of his right and an invalid
exercise of a right that had been suspended when he received the Temporary Restraining Order
from the Court. That his actions were tainted with bad faith is unquestionable. If he did not insist
on completing the demolition, respondents would not have suffered the loss that led the suit
before the trial court.
The Latin phrase damnum absque injuria, that damage resulting from the legitimate
exercise of a person’s rights is a loss without injury, finds no application to this case. Anything
less or beyond such exercise will not give rise to the legal protection that the principle accords.
When damage or prejudice to another is occasioned thereby, liability cannot be obscured, much
less abated. The petitioner’s liability is premised on the obligation to repair or to make whole the
damage caused to another by reason of one’s act or omission, whether done intentionally or
negligently and whether or not punishable by law. Thus, the petition was denied for lack of merit
and the appealed decision was affirmed with costs against the petitioner.
89
FALLO:
In the ultimate analysis, petitioner’s liability is premised on the obligation to repair or to
make whole the damage caused to another by reason of one’s act or omission, whether done
intentionally or negligently and whether or not punishable by law.
Wherefore, the Petition is denied and the appealed Decision is affirmed.
90
Action for Damages based on Crime / Delict
Guaring v. CA
HEIRS OF THE LATE TEODORO GUARING, JR., petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC.,
and ANGELES CUEVAS, respondents.
G.R. No. 108395 March 7, 1997
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, reversing the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 20, which ordered respondent Philippine
Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and its driver, Angeles Cuevas, to pay various amounts in damages to
petitioners, the heirs of the late Teodoro Guaring, Jr.
FACTS:
This case arose from an unfortunate vehicular accident which happened on November
7, 1987, along the North Expressway in San Rafael, Mexico, Pampanga. Involved in the
accident were a Mitsubishi Lancer car driven by Teodoro Guaring, Jr., who died as a result of
the mishap, Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 415, driven by Angeles Cuevas, and a Toyota Cressida
car, driven by Eligio Enriquez. The Mitsubishi Lancer was heading north, at the speed of 80 to
90 kilometers per hour following behind it was the Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 415. On the other
hand, the Toyota Cressida was cruising on the opposite lane, bound for Manila.
Petitioners, heirs of Teodoro Guaring, Jr., brought this action for damages, based on
quasi delict, in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Their evidence tended to show that the
Rabbit bus tried to overtake Guaring’s car by passing on the right shoulder of the road and that
in so doing it hit the right rear portion of Guaring’s Mitsubishi Lancer. The impact caused the
Lancer to swerve to the south-bound lane, as a result of which it collided with the Toyota
Cressida car coming from the opposite direction. The Regional Trial Court awarded the heirs
with moral and exemplary damages. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision upon review.
The appellate court held that since the basis of petitioners’ action was the alleged negligence of
the bus driver, the latter’s acquittal in the criminal case rendered the civil case based on quasi
delict untenable.
91
ISSUE:
Whether or not the judgment in the criminal case extinguished the liability of private
respondent Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and its driver, Angeles Cuevas, for damages for
the death of Teodoro Guaring, Jr.
RULING:
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the
case back to the Court of Appeals for a decision in accordance with law. The judgment of
acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a
declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is
not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases.
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides that whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions. It is now settled that acquittal of the
accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of
the civil liability based on quasi delict. Therefore, the Supreme Court ruled that the proceedings
for the civil case of the said incident must continue for the recovery of damages of the victim’s
heirs.
FALLO:
Because the Court of Appeals did not consider the evidence in the civil case, this case
should be remanded to it so that it may render another decision in accordance with the law and
the evidence. The issues raised by the petitioners are essentially factual and require the
evaluation of evidence, which is the function of the Court of Appeals in the exercise of its
exclusive appellate jurisdiction. They cannot be decided in this Court.
Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and this case is remanded
to the Court of Appeals with instruction to render judgment with reasonable dispatch in
accordance with law and the evidence presented in Civil Case No. 88-43860.
92
Manantan v. CA
GEORGE MANANTAN, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS,
SPOUSES MARCELINO NICOLAS and MARIA NICOLAS, respondents.
G.R. No. 107125 January 29, 2001
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision dated January 31, 1992 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240, modifying the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Santiago, Isabela, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 066. Petitioner George Manantan was
acquitted by the trial court of homicide through reckless imprudence without a ruling on his civil
liability. On appeal from the civil aspect of the judgment in Criminal Case No. 066, the appellate
court found petitioner Manantan civilly liable and ordered him to indemnify private respondents
Marcelino Nicolas and Maria Nicolas P104,400.00 representing loss of support, P50,000.00 as
death indemnity, and moral damages of P20,000.00 or a total of P174,400.00 for the death of
their son, Ruben Nicolas.
FACTS:
The said accused, George Manantan, being then the driver and person-in-charge of an
automobile, drove and operated the same while along the Daang Maharlika at Barangay Malvar,
in said municipality, in a negligent, careless and imprudent manner, without due regard to traffic
laws, regulations and ordinances and without taking the necessary precaution to prevent
accident to person and damage to property, causing by such negligence, carelessness and
imprudence said automobile driven and operated by him to sideswipe a passenger jeep driven
by Charles Codamon, thereby causing the said automobile to turn down resulting to the death of
Ruben Nicolas a passenger of said automobile. Manantan was acquitted by the trial court of
homicide through reckless imprudence without a ruling on his civil liability. On appeal from the
civil aspect of the judgment in criminal case, the appellate court found Manantan civilly liable
and ordered him to indemnify private respondents Marcelino Nicolas and Maria Nicolas
104,400.00 pesos representing loss of support, 50,000.00 pesos as death indemnity, and moral
damages of 20,000.00 pesos or a total of 174,400.00 pesos for the death of their son, Ruben
Nicolas. Manantan, herein petitioner then proceeded to the Supreme Court and held that he
would be subject to double jeopardy if the trial on his civil liability would ensue.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner’s acquittal extinguished his civil liability.
RULING:
No. Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of
the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or
omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability. The second instance is
an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. Article 29 of the Civil Code
provides that a civil liability is not extinguished in criminal cases. Therefore, the accused cannot
be exempted from paying civil damages which may only be proven by preponderance
of evidence. Scrutiny of the lower court’s decision in the criminal case supports the conclusion
of the appellate court that the acquittal was based on reasonable doubt; hence, petitioner’s civil
liability was not extinguished by his discharge.
It should be noted that what was elevated to the Court of Appeals by private
respondents was the civil aspect of the criminal case. Petitioner was not charged anew with a
second criminal offense identical to the first offense. The records clearly show that no second
criminal offense was being imputed to petitioner on appeal. In modifying the lower court’s
judgment, the appellate court did not modify the judgment of acquittal nor did it order the filing of
a second criminal case against petitioner for the same offense. Therefore, there was no second
jeopardy to speak of. Petitioner’s claim of having been placed in double jeopardy is incorrect.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit
FALLO:
Wherefore, the instant petition is dismissed for lack of merit. The assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 promulgated on January 31, 1992, as well as its
resolution dated August 24, 1992, denying herein petitioner's motion for reconsideration,
are affirmed. Costs against petitioner.
94
Independent Civil Actions
Bonite v. Zosa
FRANCISCO BONITE, et. al., petitioners,

vs.
HON. MARIANO ZOSA Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental,
16th Judicial District, Branch III
and ELIGIO ABAMONGA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-33772 June 20, 1988
PADILLA, J.:
Petition for review on certiorari of the order of the Court of First Instance of Misamis
Occidental, Branch III, dated 25 February 1971, in Civil Case No. 2806 filed by herein
petitioners against private respondent, dismissing the complaint for damages, and the order
dated 27 March 1971 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration of aforesaid order.
FACTS:
While Florencio Bonite was working as caminero of the Bureau of Public Highways in
Barrio Vicente Alto, Oroquieta City, he was hit by a truck driven by private respondent, Eligio
Abamonga as a result of which, Bonite died on that same day. Consequently, a criminal
complaint for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was filed by the surviving heirs of the
deceased, herein petitioners against the respondent with the City Court of Oroquieta City.
Petitioners through their counsel Atty. Alberto Dulalas, as private prosecutor, actively
participated in the prosecution of the criminal case against the accused. After trial on the merits,
a decision was rendered by Hon. Mariano Zosa, the presiding judge, acquitting the accused
Abamonga for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Petitioners did not appeal; instead they filed a civil case for damages against the same accused
on account of the death of Florencio Bonite, with the Court of First Instance of Misamis
Occidental, 16th Judicial District, Branch III. The same judge rendered a decision dismissing the
complaint for damages stating that the Bonite heirs reserve the right to file a case. The
petitioners then moved for reconsideration of the said order.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an independent civil action for damages, under Article 29 of the Civil
95
Code deemed barred by petitioners' failure in the criminal action to make a reservation to file a
separate civil action and by their active participation in the prosecution of such criminal action.
RULING:
Yes. When the accused in a criminal case is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has
not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or
omission may still be instituted against him, and only a preponderance of evidence is required to
hold the accused liable. The civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal of the accused, where
the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt. In the instant case, the criminal complaint for
homicide through reckless imprudence was dismissed on the ground that the guilt of the
accused, herein private respondent was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Clearly, herein petitioners have the right to file an independent civil action for damages,
the acquittal of the accused in the criminal case notwithstanding. That petitioners actively
participated in the prosecution of the criminal case does not bar them from filing an independent
and separate civil action for damages under Article 29 of the Civil Code. The civil action based
on criminal liability and a civil action under Article 29 are two separate and independent actions.
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the rulings of the lower courts. It allowed the
reinstatement of the case for retrial.
FALLO:
Wherefore, the Orders dated 25 February 1971 and 27 March 1971 of the respondent
court are hereby reversed and set aside, and a new one is entered reinstating the complaint in
Civil Case No. 2806 and directing said court to proceed with the trial of the case. Costs against
private respondent.
96
People v. Bayotas

vs.
ROGELIO BAYOTAS, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994
ROMERO, J.:
In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y
Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a
decision penned by Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died
at the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic
encephalopathy secondary to hepato-carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the
Supreme Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal.
However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability
arising from his commission of the offense charged.
FACTS:
Rogelio Bayotas was charged with rape and eventually convicted thereof. Pending
appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the criminal
aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to
Bayotas’ civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged. In his comment, the
Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his
civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. The counsel of Bayotas,
however, opposed the view of the Solicitor General arguing that the death of the accused while
judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes
his civil liability.
RULING:
Yes. Under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is totally extinguished
by the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to the pecuniary penalties
97
liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment; Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. The death of the accused pending
appeal of his conviction extinguishes his civil liability because tire liability is based solely on the
criminal act committed.
The claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same
may also be predicated from another source of obligation other than delict, such as law,
contract, quasi-contract or quasi-delict. Where civil liability survives, an action for recovery may
be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1 Rule 11 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either
against the executor or administrator or the estate of the accused depending on the source of
obligation upon which the same is based.
The private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil
action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to
its extinction, the private offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such
case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of
the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code that should
thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.
The Supreme Court held that the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal
liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, rape. Consequently, the
appeal is dismissed without qualification.
FALLO:
Wherefore, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is dismissed with costs de oficio.
98
Mansion Biscuits v. CA
MANSION BISCUITS CORPORATION, represented by its president, ANG CHO HONG,

petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, TY TECK SUAN, substituted by his heirs,
ROSENDA TY, ELIZABETH TY KOH, EDWARD TY, EDMUND TY, EDGAR TY, EVELYN T.
LIM, EDWIN TY and EDISON TY, and SY GUI, respondents.
G.R. No. 94713 November 23, 1995
KAPUNAN, J.:
The instant petition for review seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals
dated May 8, 1990 dismissing petitioner's appeal of the civil aspect of Criminal Cases Nos.
5598-V-83 entitled People of the Philippines v. Ty Teck Suan" and 5599-V-83 entitled "People
of the Philippines v. Ty Teck Suan and Siy Gui, both for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22,
otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.
FACTS:
Ty Teck Suan, president of Edward Ty Brothers Corporation, violated Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law for allegedly failing his obligation to pay or make good the
value of the postdated checks he issued with the total amount of P300,000.00, which was
dishonored by the bank due to insufficiency of funds, in payment of the Nutri-wafer biscuits
purchased from the Mansion Biscuits Corporation. Despite repeated demands to make good
said checks or redeem the same within five banking days from demands, said accused failed
and refused to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the said Mansion Biscuits Corporation. Ty
Teck Suan was found not guilty of the two information filed against him and of the said criminal
charge by the trial court. Petitioner then filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals assailing
the trial court’s ruling absolving defendant from civil liability in the criminal cases and contending
that the acquittal of the accused in the criminal cases did not necessarily extinguished their civil
liability. While the appeal from civil liability was pending with the Court of Appeals, Ty Teck
Suan died.
ISSUE:
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Whether or not the petitioner can enforce civil liability for non-payment of the Nutri-wafer
biscuits in question against private respondents notwithstanding the fact that the latter
contracted the agreement in behalf of Edward Ty Brothers Corporation.
RULING:
No. The civil liability for non-payment of the Nutri-wafer biscuits delivered by petitioner to
the Edward Ty Brothers Corporation cannot be enforced against the private respondent
because the said civil liability was not the personal liability of Ty Teck Suan to Mansion Biscuits
Corporation, rather, it was the contractual liability of Edward Ty Brothers Corporation, of which
Ty Teck Suan was president, to the Mansion Biscuits Corporation. The issue of the civil liability
of Edward Ty Brothers Corporation to Mansion Biscuits Corporation arising from the contract of
purchase and sale between them could not have been and was not litigated and resolved in the
criminal case inasmuch as they were not parties therein. A separate civil action must be
instituted by Mansion Biscuits Corporation against Edward Ty Brothers Corporation to enforce
the contract between them. With respect to the issue of tortuous liability, the respondent court
state that any claim for tortuous liability must be ventilated in a separate action against the
proper party. The acquittal of Ty Teck Suan and Siy Gui extinguished both their criminal and
civil liability.
FALLO:
In the case at bench, the acquittal of Ty Teck Suan and Siy Gui extinguished both their
criminal and civil liability as it is clear from the order acquitting them that the issuance of the
checks in question did not constitute a violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Consequently,
no civil liability arising from the alleged delict may be awarded.
Wherefore, premises considered, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto.
100
Cojuangco v. CA
EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, THE PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE
and FERNANDO O. CARRASCOSO, JR., respondents.
G.R. No. 119398 July 2, 1999
PANGANIBAN, J.:
To hold public officers personally liable for moral and exemplary damages and for
attorney's fees for acts done in the performance of official functions, the plaintiff must prove that
these officers exhibited acts characterized by evident bad faith, malice, or gross negligence. But
even if their acts had not been so tainted, public officers may still be held liable for nominal
damages if they had violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Before us is a Petition for
Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 39252 promulgated on September 9, 1994. The assailed Decision
reversed the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 2, in Civil Case No. 91-55873, which
disposed of the controversy in favor of herein petitioner.
FACTS:
Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., herein petitioner, a known businessman-sportsman, won a total
of P1,020,700.00 on various horse-racing. He then sent a letter demanding to the defendants
the collection of the prizes due to him. However, the demanded prizes were being withheld on
advice of Commissioner Ramon Diaz of the Presidential Commission on Good Governance
heeding to then President Corazon Aquino’s Executive Order No. 2 freezing all properties of
former President Marcos, his immediate families, close associates and cronies, in which
Cojuangco is a friend of the former President Marcos. A case was filed regarding the said
matter before the RTC of Manila. The PCGG advised the defendants that it should pose no
more objections to the remittance of the prize winnings and this was immediately communicated
to the petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Mendoza by Carrascoso, Jr., herein respondent but was
refused since the matter was already brought to the court. The RTC ruled in this case in favor of
the petitioner. However, the awarding of moral damages, exemplary and attorney’s fees in favor
of the petitioner and that they acted in bad faith was questioned by the respondents, and was
appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed and set aside the rulings of the RTC. Hence,
the petitioner appealed it to the Supreme Court.
101
ISSUE:
Whether or not the constitutional rights of the petitioner were violated thereby amounting
to civil liability.
RULING:
Yes. Article 32 of the Civil Code which states that: Any public officer or employee, or any
private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates, impedes or impairs any
of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages.
When the respondents withheld the prize winnings of the petitioner, the latter’s right to the use
of his property was unduly impeded. There was no writ of sequestration on neither the
racehorse winnings of petitioner, nor the racehorses for that matter. The issuance of a
sequestration order requires the showing of a prima facie and due regard for the requirements
of due process. The withholding of the prize winnings of petitioner without a properly issued
sequestration order clearly spoke of a violation of his property rights without due process of
law. The respondents as public officers are liable not necessarily because they have acted in
bad faith or with malice, but because there was a violation of the constitutional rights
of petitioner particularly the rights against deprivation of property without due process of law,
even on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of their duties. Thus,
respondents were ordered by the court to pay the petitioner nominal damages.
FALLO:
Art. 2221 of the Civil Code authorizes the award of nominal damages to a plaintiff whose
right has been violated or invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or
recognizing that right, not for indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered. The court may also
award nominal damages in every case where a property right has been invaded. The amount of
such damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, with the relevant
circumstances taken into account.
Wherefore, the petition is hereby partially granted. The assailed Decision, as herein
clarified, is affirmed with the modification that private respondent Fernando O. Carrascoso Jr. is
ordered to pay petitioner nominal damages in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000).
102
Alcuaz v. PSBA
SOPHIA ALCUAZ, et al., petitioners

vs.
PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION Quezon City Branch,
DR. JUAN D. LIM, in his capacity as President and Chairman of Board of Trustees of
PSBA, ATTY. P. PAULINO, et al, respondents.
G.R. No. L-76353 May 2, 1988
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari and prohibition with motion for preliminary
mandatory injunction seeking to nullify the action taken by herein respondent Philippine School
of Business Administration, Quezon City Branch, in violation of petitioners' constitutional rights.
FACTS:
Petitioners are all bonafide students of the Philippine School of Business Administration,
Quezon City, while respondents are: Philippine Scholl of Business Administration Quezon City
Branch, a non-stock institution of higher learning organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines, Juan D. Lim, President and Chairman of the Board of PSBA; Benjamin P. Paulino,
Vice-president for admission and registration of PSBA; Ruben Estrella, Officer-in-charge; and
Ramon Agapay, director of the Office of Student Affairs and Romeo Rafer, chief security of
PSBA.
The students of the respondent school and the respondent PSBA had already agreed on
certain matters which would govern their activities within the school. In spite of the agreement,
petitioners felt the need to hold dialogues. Among others they demanded the negotiation of a
new agreement, which demand was turned down by the school, resulting in mass assemblies
and barricades of school entrances. During the regular enrollment period, petitioners and other
students similarly situated were allegedly blacklisted and denied admission for the school year
1986-1987. On Oct. 28, 1986, the president of the student council filed a complaint against
PSBA. Meanwhile, a motion for intervention was filed on Nov. 10, 1986, by the PSBA Faculty
Union representing the faculty members hereinafter referred to as intervenors on the ground of
similarity of issues and cause with that of the petitioners. Thereafter, an investigating committee
was established. The committee submits the following recommendation: that Renato Palma,
103
Bernadette Ang, Rogelio Taganas are to be exonerated of all charges; that Sophia Alcuaz be
honorably dismissed; that Florante Bagsic and Atenogenes Bondoc, both faculty-intervenors, be
reprimanded with a warning; that Severinon Cortes, also a faculty-intervenor, be granted non-
renewal of his semester appointment and that Asser Tamayo and Rene Encarnacion, also
faculty-intervenors, be terminated. Respondents adopted the aforestated recommendations and
prayed that the case be dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there has been a deprivation of constitutional rights of expression and
assembly and of due process of law of the petitioners-students who have been barred from re-
enrollment of intervenors-faculty whose services have been terminated.
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court held that due process in disciplinary cases such as the case at
bar does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and
proceedings in the courts of justice. The Court has already recognized the right of the school to
refuse re-enrollment of students for academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary
regulations. In the school’s administrative process, both students and professors were given
three (3) days from receipt of letter to explain in writing why the school should not take
administrative sanction against them. With respect to the academic activities of the students and
the teaching loads of the teachers, the respondent school has created new class for the
petitioners and the intervening professors during and when the investigation was going on. The
Court then upheld that there is no denial of due process where all requirements
of administrative due process were met by the school and the students were given the
opportunity to be heard and that the right of expression and assembly are not absolute
especially when parties are bound to certain rules under a contract
It is beyond dispute that a student once admitted by the school is considered enrolled for
one semester. It is provided in Par 137 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, that when a
college student registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire semester.
Likewise, it is provided in the manual that the written contracts required for college teachers are
for one semester. It is thus evident that after the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no
longer has any existing contract either with the student or with the intervening teachers. Such
being the case, the charge of denial of due process is untenable. It is a time-honored principle
104
that contracts are respected as the law between the contracting parties. Furthermore, the court
found out that petitioners were academically deficient while the intervening teachers apart from
participating in acts of illegality against the school committed various acts of misconduct. The
right of the school to refuse re-enrollment of students for academic delinquency and violation of
disciplinary regulation has always been recognized by the court. Hence, the petition was
dismissed.
FALLO:
Premised considered, the petition is hereby dismissed, but in the light of compassionate
equity, students Who were, in view of the absence of academic deficiencies, scheduled to
graduate during the school year when this petition was filed, should be allowed to re-enroll and
to graduate in due time. No pronouncement as to costs.
105
Non v. Dames
ARIEL NON, et al, petitioners,

vs.
HON. SANCHO DAMES II, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the 5th Regional Trail
Court, Branch 38, MABINI COLLEGES, INC., et al, respondents.
G.R. No. 89317 May 20, 1990
CORTES, J.:
Petitioners urge the Court en banc to review and reverse the doctrine laid down
in Alcuaz, et al. v. Philippine School of Business Administration, et al., G.R. No. 76353, May 2,
1988, 161 SCRA 7, to the effect that a college student, once admitted by the school, is
considered enrolled only for one semester and, hence, may be refused readmission after the
semester is over, as the contract between the student and the school is deemed terminated.
FACTS:
Petitioners, students in private respondent, Mabini Colleges Inc., in Daet were not
allowed to re-enroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in
student mass actions against the school in the preceding semester. Petitioners filed a petition in
the court seeking their re-admission to the school, but the trial court dismissed the petition using
the ruling in the Alcuaz vs. PSBA as the basis. Hence, petitioners filed the instant petition for
certiorari. The case was assigned to the 3rd division of the court, which then transferred it to the
Court en banc on Aug. 21, 1989 considering that the issues raised are jurisdictional.
Respondent school justified their action of non-readmission due to the fact that the petitioners
incurred academic deficiency. Petitioners used the following as defense: that three of them were
graduating; that their academic deficiencies do not warrant re-admission; that their breach of
discipline was not serious; that the improper conduct attributed to them was during the exercise
of the cognate rights of free speech and peaceable assembly; that there was no due
investigation; that respondent school is their choice institution near their places of residence
which they can afford to pay for tertiary education, of which they have already lost one-and-a-
half school-years-in itself is enough punishment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ruling in the Alcuaz vs. PSBA be binding in this case and that the
school has the right not to re-admit the petitioners.
106
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court cannot anchor the “Termination of
Contract” theory, which was applied in the case of Alcuaz vs. PSBA. However, the contract
between the school and the student is not an ordinary contract. It is imbued with public interest,
considering the high priority given by the Constitution to education and the grant to the State of
supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational institutions. It is intended merely to
protect schools wherein tuition fees are collected and paid on installment basis. It cannot be
construed to mean that a student shall be enrolled for only one semester.
The right of an institution of higher learning to set academic standards cannot be utilized
to discriminate against students who exercise their constitutional rights to speech and assembly,
for otherwise there will be a violation of their right to equal protection. It provides that every
student has the right to enroll in any school college or university upon meeting its specific
requirements and reasonable regulations; and that the student is presumed to be qualified for
enrollment or the entire period he is expected to complete the course, without prejudice to his
right to transfer. Respondent school cannot justify its actions by relying on Paragraph 137 of the
Manual of Regulations for Private Schools. On the other hand, the manual recognizes the right
of the student to be enrolled in his course for the entire period he is expected to complete it. It is
not denied that what incurred the ire of the school authorities were the student mass actions
conducted and which led and or participated by the petitioners.
Petitioners, who have been refused readmission and who have been effectively
excluded from respondent school for 4 semesters, have already been more than sufficiently
penalized for any breach of discipline they might have committed when they led and participated
in the mass actions that, according to respondents, resulted in the disruption of classes. To still
subject them to disciplinary proceedings would serve no useful purpose and would only further
aggravate the strained relations between petitioners and the officials of the respondent school.
Thus, respondent Mabini Colleges is ordered by the court to re-admit and to allow the re-
enrollment of petitioners.
FALLO:
Wherefore, the petition is granted. The orders of respondent judge dated August 8, 1988
and February 24, 1989 are hereby annulled. Respondent Mabini College is ordered to readmit
and to allow the re- enrollment of petitioners, if they are still so minded, without prejudice to its
107
taking the appropriate action as to petitioners Ariel Non, Joselito Villalon, George Jorge Dayaon
and Daniel Torres, if it is shown by their records (Form 137) that they have failed to satisfy the
school's prescribed academic standards.
108
Arafiles v. Philippine Journalists
CATALINO P. ARAFILES, petitioner,

vs.
PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC.,
ROMY MORALES, MAX BUAN, JR., and MANUEL C. VILLAREAL JR., respondents.
G.R No. 150256 March 25, 2004
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Petitioner Catalino Arafiles, seeks a review of the July 31, 2001 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals dismissing his complaint for damages against respondents Philippine Journalists, Inc.,
Romy Morales, Max Buan, Jr., and Manuel C. Villareal, Jr.
FACTS:
Respondent, Romy Morales, a reporter of People’s Journal Tonight, was at the Western
Police District Headquarters where Emelita Despuig, an employee of the National Institute at
Atmospheric Sciences (NIAS), lodged a complaint against petitioner, a NIAS director, for
forcible abduction with rape and forcible abduction with attempted rape. In the presence of
Morales, Despuig executed a sworn statement narrating the events surrounding the reported
offenses. She stated that the first incident was on March 14, 1987 where she was abducted and
raped by the petitioner at Flamingo Hotel. The second incident was an attempted rape on the
night of April 14, 1987. Morales thereupon personally interviewed Despuig. After the interview,
Morales tried to contact Arafiles at the NIAS office to verify Despuig’s story but failed, the office
having already closed. That same day, Morales’ report appeared as headline on People’s
Journal Tonight reading: “GOV’T EXEC RAPES COED GIRL by Romy Morales”.
The petitioner instituted a complaint before the RTC of Quezon City. Petitioner alleged
that on account of the grossly malicious and overly sensationalized reporting in the news item
prepared by respondent Morales, edited by respondent Buan Jr., allowed for publication by
respondent Villareal Jr., as president of the Philippine Journalists Inc., aspersions were cat on
his character; his reputation as a director of the NIAS at the PAGASA was injured; he became
the object of public contempt and ridicule as he was depicted as a sex-crazed stalker and serial
rapist. Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the complaint alleging that the news item,
having been sourced out of the Police Blotter which is an official public document and bolstered
by a personal interview is therefore privileged and falls within the protective constitutional
109
freedom of the press. RTC decided in favor of the petitioner. The Court of Appeals however
found that petitioner was not able to prove by that respondents were motivated to cause harm or
injury.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the publication of the news item was not attended with malice, thus
freeing the respondents from liability for damages.
RULING:
Yes. Article 33 contemplates a civil action for the recovery of damages that is entirely
unrelated to the purely criminal aspect of the case. A civil action for libel under this article shall
be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment and proved preponderance of evidence
separately from and entirely independent of the institution, pendency or result of the criminal
action because it is governed by the provisions of the New Civil Code and not by the Revised
Penal Code governing the criminal offense charged and the civil liability arising therefrom.
The presentation of the news item subject of petitioner’s complaint may have been in a
sensational manner, but it is not per se illegal. Respondents could of course have been more
circumspect in their choice of words as the headline and first 7 paragraphs of the news item
give the impression that a certain director of the NIAS actually committed the crimes complained
by Despuig. The succeeding paragraphs sufficiently conveyed to the readers, however, that the
narration of events was only an account of what Despuig had reported at the police
headquarters. In determining the manner in which a given event should be presented as a news
item and the importance to be attached thereto, newspapers must enjoy a certain degree of
discretion. In actions for damages for libel, it is axiomatic that public work alleged to contain
libelous material must be examined and viewed as a whole. The newspapers should be given
such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their
important role in our democracy. In the preparation of stories, press reporters and editors
usually have to race with their deadlines; and consistently with good faith and reasonable care,
they should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or
imperfection in choice of words.
110
FALLO:
The Court found that the case against respondents has not been sufficiently established
by preponderance of evidence. Wherefore, the petition is hereby denied.
111
International Flavors v. Argo
INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS AND FRAGRANCES (PHIL) INC., petitioner,

vs.
MERLIN J. ARGOS and JAJA C. PINEDA, respondents.
G.R. No. 130362 September 10, 2001
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition assails the decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 7, 1997,
dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by herein petitioner as a consequence
of the orders by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 166, in Civil Case No. 65026 for
damages.
FACTS:
International Flavors and Fragrances, Inc. or IFFI is a corporation organized and existing
under Philippine laws. Argos and Pineda, herein respondents are the general manager and
commercial director respectively of the Fragrance Division of IFFI. The office of Managing
Director was created to head the corporation’s operations in the Philippines where Costa was
appointed as the Managing Director, and Argos and Pineda as general managers have to report
directly to Costa. Because of serious differences between the Managing Director and the
General Manager, the latter agreed to terminate their services. They signed a Release Waiver
and Quit Claim and Costa issued a Personnel Announcement which described respondents as
‘persona non grata’ and urged employees not to have further dealings with them. The
respondents filed a libel case in Metropolitan Trial Court of Taguig, Metro Manila. The
respondents also filed a civil case for damages at the Regional Trial Court of Pasig against
Costa and IFFI in its subsidiary capacity as employer. IFFI moved to dismiss the complaint. The
RTC granted the motion to dismiss for the respondents failure to reserve right to institute a
separate civil case. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the respondents and was granted
by the same court. IFFI on the other hand filed a motion to reconsider the said order but was
denied by the court. The case was elevated by the IFFI to the Court of Appeals reiterating the
same ground for dismissal. However, the Court of Appeals dismissed the case.
112
ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondents can sue IFFI for a civil case for damages in its
subsidiary capacity as employer.
RULING:
No. Article 33 of the New Civil Code contemplates an action against the employee in his
primary civil liability. It does not apply against the employer to enforce its subsidiary liability,
because such liability arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal case or when
the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act in a criminal action and found to have
committed the offense in the discharge of his duties. Any action brought against the employer
based on its subsidiary liability before conviction of its employee is premature.
FALLO:
Having established that respondents did not base their civil action on petitioner IFFI's
primary liability under Art. 33 but claimed damages from IFFI based on its subsidiary liability as
employer of Costa is premature. Plainly both the trial and the appellate courts erred in failing to
dismiss the complaint against herein petitioner by respondents claiming subsidiary liability while
the criminal libel cases against IFFI's employee, Costa, were pending before the Metropolitan
Trial Court. Nothing herein said, however, ought to prejudice the reliefs that respondents might
seek at the appropriate time.
Wherefore, the petition is granted. The decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals
dated February 7, 1997 and August 28, 1997, respectively, are hereby reversed and set aside.
The civil complaint for damages filed and docketed as Civil Case No. 65026 before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 166, against herein petitioner is ordered dismissed.
113
Marcia v. CA
MAXIMO MARCIA, AMALIA MOJICA, TIRSO YAP, DAMIANA MARCIA, EDGAR MARCIA,
and RENATO YAP, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPREALS, FELARDO PAJE and VICTORY LINER, INC., respondents.
G.R. No. L-34529 January 27, 1983
RELOVA, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, which dismissed the complaint filed by tile
petitioners against private respondents in the concept of an independent civil action for
damages for physical injuries resulting from reckless imprudence.
FACTS:
A bus operated by Victory Liner, Inc. and driven by Felardo Paje, collided with a jeep
driven by Clemente Marcia, resulting in the latter’s death and in physical injuries to petitioner
Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap. Thereupon, an information for homicide and serious physical
injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed against Paje before the Regional Trial Court of
Pampanga. Subsequently, the petitioner filed an action for damages against Victory Liner Inc.
and Paje before the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, alleging that the mishap was due to the
reckless imprudence and negligence of the latter in driving the passenger bus. While the civil
case was in progress in Rizal, the criminal case proceeded and the Regional Trial Court of
Pampanga rendered its decision and convicted the accused Paje of the offense charged.
However, on appeal to the Court of Appeals, he was acquitted and the conclusion is that
criminal negligence is wanting in the case and that Paje was not even guilty of civil negligence
because it was a case of pure accident. Private respondents moved for the dismissal of the civil
complaint filed against them invoking the decision of the Court of Appeals for his acquittal in the
criminal case. The Rizal Regional Trial Court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for
damages against Victory Liner Inc. and Paje. The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals
invoking Article 33 of the New Civil Code and Sec. 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court and not
Sec. 3, that the civil action they filed was an independent civil action. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the Regional Trial Court decision and held that private respondent cannot be held civilly
liable after it had ruled in the criminal action that negligence was wanting and that the collision
was pure accident. Hence, this recourse.
114
ISSUE:
Whether or not the acquittal of the respondents in the criminal case on the ground that
the incident was a pure accident extinguished by implication the civil liability for damages.
RULING:
Yes. It was held by the Supreme Court that Article 33 speaks only of defamation, fraud
and physical injuries. The injuries suffered by the petitioners were alleged to be the result of
criminal negligence; they were not inflicted with malice. Hence, no independent civil action for
damages maybe instituted in connection therewith. Under Section 3 (c), Rule 111 of the Rules
of Court, extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the
extinction proceeds from which the civil might arise did not exist. Otherwise stated, unless the
act from which the civil liability arises is declared to be non-existent in the final judgment, the
extinction of the criminal liability will not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability. Since the
Court of Appeals found that this case was of pure accident, it is as good as saying that Paje did
not commit the crime charged. There being no crime committed, no civil liability arises.
FALLO:
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto. With costs against the
petitioners.
115
Ruiz v. Ucol
JESUS B. RUIZ, petitioner,

vs.
ENCARNACION UCOL and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. L- 45404 August 7, 1987
GUTIERREZ, JR., J:
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte dismissing
the Atty. Jesus Ruiz’s complaint for damages against Encarnacion Ucol on the ground of res
judicata. The issue involved being a pure question of law, the appellate court certified the
appeal to us for decision on the merits.
FACTS:
Agustina Tagaca, laundry woman for petitioner Atty. Jesus Ruiz filed an administrative
charge against respondent Encarnacion Ucol. In the answer of the respondent to the charge
filed against her, she alleged that Tagaca was merely used as a tool by Ruiz who wanted to get
back at the Ucol’s because of a case filed by the respondent’s husband against Ruiz. She also
alleged to have made remarks that the petitioner instigated the complaint and fabricated the
charge. The administrative case was dismissed and the petitioner decided to file his own
criminal complaint for libel against the respondent based on the alleged libelous portion of the
latter’s answer. The trial court acquitted the respondent from the criminal case on the ground
that her guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt. No pronouncement was made by
the trial court as to the civil liability of the respondent. The petitioner filed a separate complaint
for damages based on the same facts upon which the libel case was founded. The respondent
filed a motion to dismiss stating that the action had prescribed and that the cause of action was
barred by the decision in the criminal case of libel. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss
on the ground of res judicata. On appeal, the appellate court certified the case to the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the civil action for damages was already barred by the decision in the
criminal case of libel.
116
RULING:
Yes. The trial court dismissed the case filed by petitioner against respondent because
her guilt beyond reasonable doubt was not established and that the disputed answer of
respondent in the administrative case contains no libel. The court found the charges against
respondent, if not malicious, at least reckless in the face of proven facts and circumstances. The
contentions of the petitioner have no merit. The Supreme Court did not find any defamatory
imputation, which causes dishonor, or discredit to the petitioner caused by the respondent. The
Court held that the final judgment rendered therein constitutes a bar to the present civil action
for damages based upon the same cause.
FALLO:
Encarnacion Ucol had absolutely no motive to libel Atty. Jesus Ruiz who, by the way, cast
the first stone.
Wherefore, the appeal filed by appellant Jesus B. Ruiz is dismissed for lack of merit. The
petition filed by petitioner Encarnacion Ucol is likewise dismissed for patent lack of merit.
117
Barredo v. Garcia
FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner,

vs.
SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-48006 July 8, 1942
BOCOBO, J.:
This case comes up from the Court of Appeals which held the petitioner herein, Fausto
Barredo, liable in damages for the death of Faustino Garcia caused by the negligence of Pedro
Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by said Fausto Barredo.
FACTS:
A head-on collision between a taxicab owned by Barredo and a carretela occurred.
The carretela was overturned and one of its passengers, a 16-year old boy, the son of Garcia
and Almario, died as a result of the injuries which he received. The driver of the taxicab, Pedro
Fontanilla, an employee of Barredo, was prosecuted for the crime and was convicted by the trial
court. The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence given by the lower court in the criminal case.
On the other hand, there arose two liabilities of Fausto Barredo: first, the subsidiary one
because of the civil liability of the taxi driver arising from his criminal liability; and second,
Barredo’s primary liability as an employer under Article 1903 of the Civil Code.
The parents of the deceased, plaintiffs Garcia and Almario were free to choose which
course to take and they preferred the second. They instituted a civil action for damages before
the Court of First Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo, as the employer of the taxicab
driver, Pedro Fontanilla. The court awarded damages in favor of the plaintiffs. The Court of
Appeals modified the court’s decision by reducing the amount of damages. The Court of
Appeals found that Barredo was careless in employing Fontanilla who had been caught violating
the Automobile Law several times as shown in his records with the Bureau of Public Works.
Defendant must therefore indemnify the plaintiffs under the provisions of Article 1903 of the Civil
Code. Barredo maintained that Fontanilla's negligence is punishable by the Revised Penal
Code; hence, according to said code his liability as an employer is only subsidiary. However,
Fontanilla has not been sued in a civil action and his property has not been exhausted.
118
ISSUE:
Whether or not Barredo, as employer is civilly liable for the acts of Fontanilla, his
employee.
RULING:
Yes. The plaintiffs may bring a separate civil action against Fausto Barredo because of
the separate individuality of quasi delict or culpa aquiliana. The court held that this will make for
the better safeguarding of private rights and is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious
redress. Quasi-delict or culpa acquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code of
the Philippines and is entirely distinct and independent from a delict or crime under the
Revised Penal Code. In this jurisdiction, the same negligent act causing damage may produce
civil liability that is subsidiary arising from a crime under Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code of the Philippines; or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana under Articles
2179 and 2180 of the Civil Code and the parties are free to choose which course to take.
In the instant case, the negligent act of Fontanilla produces two (2) liabilities of Barredo:
First, a subsidiary one because of the civil liability of Fontanilla arising from the latter’s
criminal negligence under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, and second, Barredo’s
primary and direct responsibility arising from his presumed negligence as an employer under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Since the plaintiffs are free to choose what remedy to take, they
preferred the second, which is within their rights. This is the more expedious and effective
method of relief because Fontanilla was either in prison or just been released or had no
property. It is shown that Barredo was careless in employing Fontanilla who had been caught
several times for violation of the Automobile Law and speeding – violations which appeared in
the Records of the Bureau of Public Works available to the public and to himself. Therefore, he
must indemnify plaintiffs under the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code.
FALLO:
In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be and is hereby
affirmed, with costs against the defendant-petitioner. Petitioner Fausto Barredo is hereby liable
for damages.
119
Prejudicial Questions
Beltran v. People
MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HON. JUDGE FLORENTINO TUAZON, JR.,
being the Judge of the RTC, Branch 139, Makati City, respondents.
G.R. No. 137567 June 20, 2000
BUENA, J.:
This petition for review, filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeks
to review and set aside the Order dated January 28, 1999 issued by Judge Florentino A.
Tuazon, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 139 in Special Civil Case No. 98-
3056, entitled "Meynardo Beltran vs. People of the Philippines and Hon. Judge Alden Cervantes
of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61." The said Order denied petitioner's
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Judge Cervantes from
proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case No. 236176, a concubinage case against petitioner on
the ground that the pending petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by petitioner
against his wife constitutes a prejudicial question.
FACTS:
Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine Felix were married for twenty-four
years of marriage and had four children. Petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner’s wife answered by alleging that it was petitioner
who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named Milagros Salting.
Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal complaint for concubinage against petitioner and his
paramour before the City Prosecutor’s office in Makati, who found probable cause and ordered
the filing of an Information against the accused. Petitioner filed a motion to Defer Proceedings
Including the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case issued by the Metropolitan
Trial Court. Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his
marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case. Such motion
and the motion for reconsideration were denied.
120
ISSUE:
Whether or not the pendency of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of the
petitioner’s marriage is a prejudicial question to the criminal case of concubinage.
RULING:
No. The Court averred that petitioner’s contention is untenable. The rationale behind the
principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. The pendency of the case
for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage
case because the facts in the latter case are not based on the former for the guilt of the
petitioner-accused to be determined.
FALLO:
Thus, in the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of
the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as
void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists for
all intents and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the
judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
concubinage. The lower court therefore, has not erred in affirming the Orders of the judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court ruling that pendency of a civil action for nullity of marriage does not
pose a prejudicial question in a criminal case for concubinage.
Wherefore, for lack of merit, the instant petition is dismissed.
121
City of Pasig v. COMELEC
CITY OF PASIG, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA,
PROVINCE OF RIZAL, respondents.
G.R. No. 125646 September 10, 1999
MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, petitioner,

vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CITY OF PASIG, respondent.
G.R. No. 128663 September 10, 1999
Before us are two (2) petitions which both question the propriety of the suspension of
plebiscite proceedings pending the resolution of the issue of boundary disputes between the
Municipality of Cainta and the City of Pasig. G.R. No. 125646 involves the proposed Barangay
Karangalan while G.R. No. 128663 involves the proposed Barangay Napico. The City of Pasig
claims these areas as part of its jurisdiction/territory while the Municipality of Cainta claims that
these proposed barangays encroached upon areas within its own jurisdiction or territory.
FACTS:
Upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village that they be segregated from its
mother Barangays Manggahan and Dela Paz, City of Pasig, and to be converted and separated
into a distinct barangay to be known as Barangay Karangalan, the City Council of Pasig passed
an ordinance creating Barangay Karangalan in Pasig City. Plebiscite on the creation of said
barangay was thereafter set. The City of Pasig similarly issued an ordinance creating Barangay
Napico in Pasig City and a plebiscite for this purpose was also set. Immediately upon learning of
such ordinances, the Municipality of Cainta filed two petitions with the Commission on Elections
calling its attention to a pending case before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal for the
settlement of boundary disputes. The Municipality of Cainta claimed that the proposed
barangays involve areas included in the boundary dispute subject of said pending case; hence,
the scheduled plebiscite should be suspended or cancelled until after the said case shall have
been finally decided by the court. The COMELEC accepted the position of the Municipality of
Cainta and ordered the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan to be held in
122
abeyance until after the court has settled with finality the boundary dispute involving the two
municipalities. However, the COMELEC ruled differently in the other petition, dismissing the
same for being moot since the creation of Barangay Napico was already ratified and approved
by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite. Hence, these two petitions by the City of
Pasig and the Municipality of Cainta which question the propriety of the suspension of plebiscite
proceedings pending the resolution of the issue of boundary disputes between the Municipality
of Cainta and the City of Pasig.
ISSUE:
Wether or not there is a prejudicial question and that the City of Pasig should await for
the decision in the boundary dispute case before it should allow for a plebiscite segregating
Karangalan and Napico as independent barangays.
RULING:
Yes. The exception to the general rule that a prejudicial question contemplates a civil
and criminal action and does not come into play when both cases are civil, applies to this case.
In the interest of good order, the Supreme Court can suspend action on one case pending the
final outcome of another closely interrelated to the first even if the two are both civil cases. A
requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be properly identified by
more or less permanent natural boundaries. Precisely because territorial jurisdiction is an issue
raised in the pending civil case, until and unless such issue is resolved with finality, to define the
territorial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays would only be an exercise in futility. The Court
did not agree that merely because a plebiscite had already been held in the case of the
proposed Barangay Napico, the petition of the Municipality of Cainta has already been rendered
moot and academic. The Supreme Court, therefore, ruled that the plebiscite on the creation of
Barangay Karangalan should be held in abeyance pending final resolution of the boundary
dispute between the City of Pasig and Municipality of Cainta by the RTC of Antipolo City. In the
same vein, the plebiscite held to ratify the creation of Barangay Napico, Pasig City, should be
annulled and set aside. The COMELEC declared that the plebiscite held to ratify the creation of
the Barangays were null and void until after the courts settle with finality the boundary dispute
between the City of Pasig and the Municipality of Cainta.
FALLO:
Therefore, the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan should be held in
abeyance pending final resolution of the boundary dispute between the City of Pasig and the
Municipality of Cainta by the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City. In the same vein, the
123
plebiscite held on March 15, 1997 to ratify the creation of Barangay Napico, Pasig City, should
be annulled and set aside.
Wherefore, premises considered, the Petition of the City of Pasig in G.R. No. 125646 is
dismissed for lack of merit; while the Petition of the Municipality of Cainta in G.R. No. 128663 is
granted. The COMELEC Order in UND No. 97-002, dated March 21, 1997, is set aside and the
plebiscite held on March 15, 1997 to ratify the creation of Barangay Napico in the City of Pasig
is declared null and void. Plebiscite on the same is ordered held in abeyance until after the
courts settle with finality the boundary dispute between the City of Pasig and the Municipality of
Cainta, in Civil Case No. 94-3006.
124
Merced v. Diez
ABUNDIO MERCED, petitioner,

vs.
HON. CLEMENTINO V. DIEZ, et al., respondents
G.R. No. L-15315 August 26, 1960
LABRADOR, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari with prohibition to prohibit the judge presiding the
Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, Hon. Clementino V. Diez, from proceeding further in
the Criminal Case No. V-6520, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Abundio Merced until after
final termination of Civil Case No. R-5387, for the annulment of the marriage of petitioner
Abundio Merced with Elizabeth Ceasar, also pending in same court.
FACTS:
Abundio Merced was married to Eufriciana Tan and without such marriage having been
legally dissolved; he contracted a second marriage with Elizabeth Ceasar. Facing bigamy
charges filed by Elizabeth, petitioner alleged that the relatives of Elizabeth forced, threatened
and intimidated him into signing an affidavit to the effect that he and Elizabeth had been living
together as husband and wife for over five years and that the said affidavit was used to secure
their marriage of exceptional character, without the need for marriage license. Merced prays for
annulment of the marriage and for moral damages. He also raised the issue of prejudicial
question. Elizabeth filed her answer to the complaint and denied the material allegations of the
complaint and avers as affirmative defenses that neither she nor her relatives know of plaintiff's
previous marriage to Eufrocina Tan. As a counterclaim Elizabeth asks moral damages for the
deceit, fraud and insidious machinations committed upon her by Merced. Merced filed a motion
to hold to trial of said criminal case in abeyance until final termination of civil case for the reason
that the civil action involves facts which if proved will determine the innocence of the accused,
which was granted. However, a motion to reconsider the second order of the court was denied
and petition herein was filed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the action to annul the second marriage is a prejudicial question to the
prosecution for bigamy.
125
RULING:
Yes. Where the husband files a civil case for annulment of the second marriage on the
ground of lack of consent, and the second wife subsequently files a criminal case for bigamy
against him, the civil case for annulment is a prejudicial question to be determined before the
criminal case can proceed. Consent is an essential element of a valid marriage. Without
consent, the marriage is void. But the question of invalidity cannot ordinarily be decided in the
criminal action for bigamy but in a civil action for annulment. Since the validity of the second
marriage, subject of the action for bigamy, cannot be determined in the criminal case, and since
prosecution for bigamy does not lie unless the elements of the second marriage appear to exist,
it is necessary that a decision in a civil action to the effect that the second marriage contains all
the essentials of a marriage must first be secured. Before the Family Code took effect, the civil
action must be decided first before the prosecution for bigamy can proceed. The Supreme Court
adds that the principle of prejudicial question is to be applied even if there is only one court
before which the civil action and the criminal action are to be litigated. The petition was granted.
FALLO:
In the case at bar, in order that the petitioner be held guilty of the crime of bigamy, the
marriage which she contracted for the second time with Elizabeth Ceasar, must first be declared
valid. But its validity has been questioned in the civil action. This civil action must be decided
before the prosecution for bigamy can proceed. For the foregoing considerations, the petition for
the issuance of a writ of certiorari and prohibition is hereby granted. The order of the court
denying the petition of the herein petitioner to prohibit the Fiscal from prosecuting the case for
bigamy, criminal case no. V-6520, entitled People vs. Abundio Merced, is hereby set aside and
the preliminary injunction issued by this court to that effect is hereby made permanent.
126
Donato v. Luna
LEONILO C. DONATO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANIIA,
BRANCH XXXII; HON. JOSE FLAMINIANO, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA;
and PAZ B. ABAYAN, respondents.
G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988
GANCAYCO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, the question for
the resolution of the Court is whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the Court
of First Itance of Manila should be suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of marriage
pending before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court on the ground that the latter
constitutes a prejudicial question. The respondent judge ruled in the negative.
FACTS:
An information for bigamy against petitioner Leonilo Donato was filed by private
respondent Paz Abayan with the lower court in Manila. Before the petitioner’s arraignment, Paz
filed with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, a civil action for declaration of
nullity of her marriage with petitioner. Said civil case was based on the ground that Paz
consented to entering into the marriage which was Donato’s second since she had no previous
knowledge that Donato was already married to a certain Rosalinda Maluping. Donato defensed
that his second marriage was void since it was solemnized without a marriage license and that
force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were employed by private respondent to obtain
petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior to the solemnization of the second marriage, Paz and
Donato had lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for five years
proven by a joint affidavit executed by them for which reason, the requisite marriage license was
dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the Civil Code. Donato continued to live with Paz until
the latter left their home upon learning that he was already previously married. Prior to the date
set for the trial of the criminal case, petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of the
case because the civil action raises a prejudicial question which must first be determined before
the criminal case can proceed.
127
ISSUE:
Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the lower court be suspended
in view of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending before the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court on the ground that latter constitutes a prejudicial question.
RULING:
No. The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. It must be
noted that the issue before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court touching upon the nullity
of the second marriage is not determinative of petitioner Donato's guilt or innocence in the crime
of bigamy. Petitioner cannot apply the rule on prejudicial questions since a case for annulment
of marriage can be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused
only if it is proved that the petitioner's consent to such marriage was obtained by means of
duress, violence and intimidation in order to establish that his act in the subsequent marriage
was an involuntary one and as such the same cannot be the basis for conviction. The preceding
elements do not exist in the case at bar. In the case at bar, petitioner has not even sufficiently
shown that his consent to the second marriage has been obtained by the use of threats, force
and intimidation. Furthermore, it was petitioner's second wife, Paz Abayan who filed the
complaint for annulment of the second marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained
through deceit. He who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of
first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. Petitioner merely raised the
issue of prejudicial question to evade the prosecution of the criminal case. Hence, the petition
was dismissed and the order of denial issued by the respondent judge was sustained.
FALLO:
Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit the order of denial issued
by the respondent judge dated April 14, 1980 should be sustained.
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby dismissed for lack of
merit. We make no pronouncement as to costs.
128
PERSONS AND PERSONALITY
Natural Persons
Geluz v. CA
ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961
REYES, J.B.L., J.:

This petition for certiorari brings up for review question whether the husband of a
woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages from physician who
caused the same.
FACTS:
Nita Villanueva, the wife of private respondent Oscar Lazo, came to know petitoner
Antonio Geluz, a physician, through her aunt. Nita became pregnant some time before she and
Oscar were legally married. As advised by her aunt and to conceal it from her parents, she
decided to have it aborted by the petitioner. She had her second pregnancy aborted again by
the petitioner since she found it inconvenient as she was then employed in the Commission on
Elections. On her third pregnancy, she again repaired to the petitoner’s clinic accompanied by
her sister and the latter’s daughter. Her husband, private respondent Oscar Lazo at this time
was in the province of Cagayan campaigning for his election to the provincial board; he did not
know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion. It is the third and last abortion that constitutes
private respondent’s basis in filing this action and award of damages. The Court of Appeals and
the trial court predicated the award of damages upon the provision of the initial paragraph of
Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there can be recovery for damages resulting to the death or abortion of
an unborn child that is not endowed with personality.
129
RULING:
No. Personality begins at conception, called presumptive personality. It is essential that
birth should occur later, otherwise the fetus will be considered as never having possessed legal
personality. Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of injury or death pertains
primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for damages could be instituted on
behalf of the unborn child on account of injuries it received, no such right of action could
derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf
of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to
anyone can take place from one that lacked juridical personality. It is no answer to invoke the
presumptive personality of a conceived child under Article 40 of the Civil Code because that
same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child
should be subsequently born alive. In the present case, the child was dead when separated
from its mother’s womb. This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to damages.
However, such damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from injury
or violation of the rights of the deceased child.
FALLO:
The Supreme Court ruled that both the lower court and Court of Appeals erred in giving
minimum award of damages to the respondent. The two said courts have not found any basis
for an award of moral damages, evidently because the private respondent’s indifference to the
previous abortion of his wife, also caused by the petitioner herein, clearly indicates that he was
unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections. Despite the suspicious
repetition of the event, he appeared to have taken no steps to investigate and secure the
punishment of the practitioner. His only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining
from the physician a large money payment.
It is unquestionable that the petitioner’s act in provoking the abortion of private

respondent’s wife, without medical necessity to warrant it, was a criminal and morally
reprehensible act, that cannot be too severely condemned; and the consent of woman or that of
her husband does not excuse it. But the immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an
award of damage that under the circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis. Thus,
the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the complaint is ordered dismissed.
130
Catalan v. Basa
HEIRS OF THE LATE FELICIANO CATALAN, petitioners,

vs.
HEIRS OF THE LATE MERCEDES CATALAN-BASA, respondents.
G. R. No. 159567 July 31, 2007
PUNO, C.J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of
the Court of Appeals decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 66073, which affirmed the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 69, Lingayen, Pangasinan, in Civil Case No. 17666, dismissing the
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Possession and Ownership, and
damages.
FACTS:
The Board of Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs found petitioner
Feliciano Catalan unfit to render military service due to his mental disorder, schizophrenia, and
so he was discharged from active military service. A year after, Feliciano married Corazon
Cerezo. The petitioner allegedly donated to his sister, Mercedes Catalan, one-half of the real
property through the execution of a document, titled, “Absolute Deed of Donation”. People’s
Bank and Trust Company filed special proceedings to declare Feliciano incompetent. The trial
court issued its Order of Adjudication of Incompetency for Appointing Guardian for the Estate
and Fixing Allowance of Feliciano.
Thus, the trial court appointed the Bank of the Philippine Islands, which is formerly the
People’s Bank and Trust Company, to be his guardian. Mercedes sold the property donated by
Feliciano to her, in issue in favor of her children Delia and Jesus Basa. Bank of the Philippine
Islands acting as Feliciano’s guardian filed a case for Declaration of Nullity of Documents,
Recovery of Possession and Ownership, as well as damages against herein respondents. BPI
alleged that the Deed of Absolute Donation of Mercedes was void ab initio, as Feliciano never
donated the property to Mercedes. In addition, BPI averred that even if Feliciano had truly
intended to give the property to her, the donation would still be void, as he was not of sound
mind and was therefore incapable of giving a valid consent. Feliciano passed away and both the
lower court and Court of Appeals dismissed the case because of insufficient evidence presented
131
by the complainants to overcome the presumption that Feliciano was sane and competent at the
time he executed the deed of donation in favor of Mercedes Catalan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Feliciano has the capacity to execute the donation, thus the property
donated to Mercedes and later on sold to her children is legally in possession of the latter.
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the lower court and the Court of
Appeals and denied the petition. A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes
gratuitously a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it. Like any other contract, an
agreement of the parties is essential. Consent in contracts presupposes the following requisites:
(1) it should be intelligent or with an exact notion of the matter to which it refers; (2) it should be
free; and (3) it should be spontaneous. The parties’ intention must be clear and the attendance
of a vice of consent, like any contract, renders the donation voidable. A person suffering from
schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his competence to intelligently dispose his property. By
merely alleging the existence of schizophrenia, petitioners failed to show substantial proof that
at the date of the donation Feliciano Catalan had lost total control of his mental facilities. Thus,
the lower court correctly held that Feliciano was of sound mind at that time and this condition
continued to exist until proof to the contrary was adduced. Since the donation was valid,
Mercedes has the right to sell the property to whomever she chooses. Not a shred of evidence
has been presented to prove the claim that Mercedes’ sale of property to her children was
tainted with fraud or falsehood. Thus, the property in question belongs to Delia and Jesus Basa.
FALLO:
The Supreme Court notes the issue of prescription and laches for the first time on
appeal before the court. It is sufficient for the Supreme Court to note that even if it prospered,
the deed of donation was still a voidable, not a void, contract. As such, it remained binding as it
was not annulled in a proper action in court within four years.
In view whereof, there being no merit in the arguments of the petitioners, the petition is
denied. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66073 is affirmed in toto.
132
Domingo v. CA
EUGENIO DOMINGO, plaintiff,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, defendant.
G. R. No. 127540 October 17, 2001
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition seeks to annul the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 29, 1996,
which set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte, Branch 17, in
Civil Case No. 582-17 for reinvidicacion consolidated with Cadastral Case No. 1. The petition
likewise seeks to annul the resolution dated December 11, 1996, denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
FACTS:
Paulina Rigonan owned three parcels of land located at Batac and Espiritu, Ilocos Norte.
She allegedly sold them to private respondents, the spouses Felipe and Concepcion Rigonan
amounting to eight hundred fifty pesos (Php 850.00) through a Deed of Sale executed by former
on January 28, 1965. The petitioners Eugenio Domingo, Crispin Mangabat and Samuel
Capalungan, who claim to be the closest surviving relatives of Paulina, allegedly took
possession of the properties by means of stealth, force and intimidation, and refused to vacate
the same. The respondents filed a reinvindicacion of said parcels of land against the petitioners.
They shown a carbon copy of the deed of sale with an alleged thumb mark of Paulina and not
bearing a signature of the latter and the deed was tainted with alterations, defects
and irregularities. Petitioners contested respondents’ claim of the properties and alleged that the
deed of sale is null and void for lacking of considerations.
The trial court found the deed as fake and rendered a judgment in favor of the
petitioners. On appeal, the petitioners asserted that there was abundant evidence at the time of
the execution of the sale, the deceased was already senile. She could have not consented to
the sale by merely imprinting her thumb mark on the deed. The Court of Appeals, however,
reversed the decision of the trial court and declared the respondents the owner of the
properties.
133
ISSUE:
Whether or not the vendor has the capacity to act on the sale of the subject property in
dispute.
RULING:
No. At the time of the execution of the alleged Deed of Sale, Paulina Rigonan was
already of advanced age and senile. She died on March 20, 1966, barely over a year when the
deed was allegedly executed on January 28, 1965. The General Rule is that, a person is not
incompetent to contract merely because of advanced years or by reason of physical infirmities.
However, when such age or infirmities have impaired the mental faculties so as to prevent the
person from properly, intelligently, and firmly protecting her property rights, then she is
undeniably incapacitated. The unrebutted testimony of Eugenio Domingo’s wife, Zosima, shows
that at the time of the alleged execution of deed, Paulina was already incapacitated physically
and mentally. Given these circumstances, there is sufficient reason to seriously doubt that she
consented to the sale of her parcels of land. Thus, the Deed of Sale executed by Paulina
Rigonan on January 28, 1965 was rendered null and void ab initio. The Supreme Court
reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the decision rendered by the
Regional Trial Court.
FALLO:
Wherefore, the petition is granted. The decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals
dated August 29, 1996 and December 11, 1996, respectively, are reversed and set aside. The
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte, Branch 17, dated March 23, 1994, is
reinstated. Costs against private respondents.
134
Mendezona v. Ozamiz
MARIO MENDEZONA, TERESITA MENDEZONA, LUIS MENDEZONA, MARICAR

MENDEZONA, and TERESITA ADAD VDA. DE MENDEZONA, petitioners,
vs.
JULIO OZAMIZ, ROBERTO MONTALVAN, JOSE MA. OZAMIZ, CARMEN OZAMIZ, PAZ
MONTALVAN, MA. TERESA ZARRAGA, CARLOS FORTICH, JOSE LUIS ROS,
PAULITA RODRIGUEZ, and LOURDES LON, respondents.
G.R. No. 143370 February 6, 2002
DE LEON, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision and the Resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated July 27, 1998 and May 19, 2000, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 39752 which
reversed and set aside the Decision dated September 23, 1992 rendered in favor of the
petitioners by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 6 in Civil Case No. CEB-10766.
FACTS:
The respondents instituted the petition for guardianship with the Regional Trial Court
of Oroquieta City, alleging therein that Carmen Ozamiz, then 86 years old, after an illness in
July 1987, had become disoriented and could not recognize most of her friends; that she could
no longer take care of herself nor manage her properties by reason of her failing health, weak
mind and absent-mindedness. Mario Mendezona and Luis Mendezona, herein petitioners who
are nephews of Carmen Ozamiz, and Pilar Mendezona, a sister of Carmen Ozamiz, filed an
opposition to the guardianship petition. In the course of the guardianship proceeding, the
petitioners and the oppositors thereto agreed that Carmen Ozamiz needed a guardian over her
person and her properties, and thus respondent Paz Montalvan was designated as guardian
over the person of Carmen Ozamiz while petitioner Mario Mendezona, respondents Roberto
Montalvan and Julio Ozamiz were designated as joint guardians over the properties of the said
ward.
As guardians, they filed with the guardianship court their Inventories and Accounts listing
therein Carmen Ozamiz’s properties, cash, shares of stock, vehicles and fixed assets, including
a 10,396 square meter property known as the Lahug property. Said Lahug property is the same
property covered by the Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 28, 1989 executed by
Carmen Ozamiz in favor of the petitioners. Respondents caused the inscription on the titles of
135
petitioners a notice of lis pendens thus giving rise to the suit for quieting of title, Civil Case No.
CEB-10766, filed by herein petitioners.
The respondents opposed the petitioners’ claim of ownership of the Lahug property and
alleged that the titles issued in the petitioners names are defective and illegal, and the
ownership of the said property was acquired in bad faith and without value inasmuch as the
consideration for the sale is grossly inadequate and unconscionable. Respondents further
alleged that at the time of the sale Carmen Ozamiz was already ailing and not in full possession
of her mental faculties; and that her properties having been placed in administration, she was in
effect incapacitated to contract with petitioners.
The trial court found the sale valid. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court’s decision. The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration and subsequently, a motion
for a new trial or for reception of evidence, contending that the appellate court totally ignored the
testimony of Judge Tenorio Durias regarding the mental condition of Carmen Ozamiz a month
before the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale in question. They alleged that Judge Durias’
testimony is a newly-discovered evidence which could not have been discovered prior to the
trial by the exercise of due diligence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the vendor’s mental faculties were seriously impaired when she executed
the Deed of Absolute Sale.
RULING:
No. The appellate court placed too much reliance upon the testimonies of the respondents’
witnesses and erred in ruling that the mental faculties of Carmen Ozamiz at the time of the
execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale were already seriously impaired. That after a thorough
scrutiny of the transcripts of the testimonies of the witnesses, the Supreme Court found that the
respondents’ core witnesses all made sweeping statements which failed to show the true state
of mind of Carmen Ozamiz at the time of the execution of the disputed document. The
testimonies of the respondents’ witnesses on the mental capacity of Carmen Ozamiz are far
from being clear, consistent and convincing.
136
The revelation of Dr. Faith Go did not also shed light on the mental capacity of
Carmen Ozamiz on the relevant day when the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed and
notarized. At best, she merely revealed that Carmen Ozamiz was suffering from certain
infirmities in her body and at times, she was forgetful, but there was no categorical statement
that she succumbed to what the respondents suggest as her alleged “second childhood” as
early as 1987. The petitioners’ rebuttal witness, Dr. William Buot, a doctor of neurology, testified
that no conclusion of mental incapacity at the time the said deed was executed can be inferred
from Dr. Faith Go’s clinical notes nor can such fact be deduced from the mere prescription of a
medication for episodic memory loss.
It has been held that a person is not incapacitated to contract merely because of advanced
years or by reason of physical infirmities. Only when such age or infirmities impair her mental
faculties to such extent as to prevent her from properly, intelligently, and fairly protecting her
property rights, is she considered incapacitated. The respondents utterly failed to show
adequate proof that at the time of the sale Carmen Ozamiz had allegedly lost control of her
mental faculties.
FALLO:
Wherefore, the instant petition is hereby granted and the assailed Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals are hereby reversed and set aside. The Decision dated September 23,
1992 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 6, in Civil Case No. CEB-10766 is
reinstated. No pronouncement as to costs.
137
People v. Bayotas

vs.
ROGELIO BAYOTAS, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994
ROMERO, J.:
In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y
Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a
decision penned by Judge Manuel E. Autajay.
FACTS:
Rogelio Bayotas was charged with rape and eventually convicted by the Regional Trial
Court of Roxas City. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died at the National Bilibid
Hospital due to cardiorespiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy secondary to
hepato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the criminal
aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to
Bayotas’ civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged. In his comment, the
Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his
civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor General relying
on the case of People vs. Sendaydiego insists that the appeal should still be resolved for the
purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability is based. The
counsel of Bayotas, however, opposed the view of the Solicitor General arguing that the death
of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal
and civil penalties invoking the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People vs. Castillo and Ocfemia
which held that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and
therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is rendered.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes
his civil liability.
138
RULING:
Yes. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It provides that
criminal liability is totally extinguished: by the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties;
and as to the pecuniary penalties liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment; Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by
Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his
criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense
committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the
same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil
Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a
result of the same act or omission: a) Law; b) Contracts; c) Quasi-contracts; d) Quasi-delicts.
Where the civil liability survives, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only
by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon
which the same is based.
Thus, The Supreme Court held that the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his
criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape.
Consequently, the appeal is dismissed without qualification.
FALLO:
Wherefore, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DISMISSED with costs de oficio.
139
DOMICILE
Marcos v. COMELEC
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.
G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995
KAPUNAN, J.:
A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and
suppress the mischief at which it is aimed. The 1987 Constitution mandates that an aspirant for
election to the House of Representatives be "a registered voter in the district in which he shall
be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding
the election." The mischief which this provision — reproduced verbatim from the 1973
Constitution — seeks to prevent is the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with
the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective
office to serve that community."
FACTS:
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte, indicating that she was a resident of said
constituency for seven months. Faced with petition for cancellation and disqualification filed with
the Commission on Elections by the incumbent representative Cirilo Roy Montejo, alleging that
petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. Marcos filed an amended
certificate changing the entry “seven months” to “since childhood” and that she has always
maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven months
residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said
months. The Commission on Elections ordered the disqualification of Marcos from running for
the congressional seat of the First District of Leyte. It appears however, that Marcos garnered
the most votes in the election. The Commission on Elections, thus, suspended her
proclamation.
140
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in
running as representative of the First District of Leyte.
RULING:
Yes. It is the fact of residence, not a statement-in a certificate of candidacy which ought
to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitution’s
residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or
appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise
render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and
knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her
disqualification. A close look at said certificate would reveal the possible source of the
confusion: the entry for residence is followed immediately by the entry for residence in the
constituency where a candidate seeks election. Marcos merely committed an honest mistake in
jotting down the word “seven,” obviously resulting from the confusion which prompted Marcos to
write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of residence in
the First district, which was “since childhood” in the space provided. It must be noted again that
“residence” is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary, while
“domicile” denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of
returning. Residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.
FALLO:
Wherefore, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence
qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the
COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are
hereby set aside. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of
Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of
Leyte.
141
MARRIAGE
Aruego Jr. v. CA
JOSE E. ARUEGO, JR., SIMEONA SAN JUAN ARUEGO, MA. IMMACULADA T. ALANON,
ROBERTO A. TORRES, CRISTINA A. TORRES, JUSTO JOSE TORRES and AGUSTIN
TORRES, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THIRTEENTH DIVISION and ANTONIA ARUEGO,
respondents.
G.R. No. 112193 March 13, 1996
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

On March 7, 1983, a Complaint for Compulsory Recognition and Enforcement of
Successional Rights was filed before Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila by the
minors, private respondent Antonia F. Aruego and her alleged sister Evelyn F. Aruego,
represented by their mother and natural guardian, Luz M. Fabian. Named defendants therein
were Jose E. Aruego, Jr. and the five (5) minor children of the deceased Gloria A. Torres,
represented by their father and natural guardian, Justo P. Torres, Jr., now the petitioners herein.
FACTS:
The complaint filed by the petitioners for Compulsory Recognition and Enforcement of
Successional Rights avers that the late Jose M. Aruego, Sr., a married man, had an amorous
relationship with Luz M. Fabian sometime in 1959 until his death on March 30, 1982. Out of this
relationship were born Antonia F. Aruego and Evelyn F. Aruego on October 5, 1962 and
September 3, 1963, respectively. The complaint prayed for an Order praying that herein private
respondent and Evelyn be declared the illegitimate children of the deceased Jose M. Aruego,
Sr.; that herein petitioners be compelled to recognize and acknowledge them as the compulsory
heirs of the deceased Jose M. Aruego; that their share and participation in the estate of their
deceased father be determined and ordered delivered to them. The main basis of the action for
compulsory recognition is their alleged open and continuous possession of the status of
illegitimate children.
142
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provisions of the Family Code should be applied retroactively in the
instant case.
RULING:
No. The action brought by private respondent Antonia Aruego for compulsory recognition
and enforcement of successional rights which was filed prior to the advent of the Family Code,
must be governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code and not by Article 175, paragraph 2 of the
Family Code. The present law cannot be given retroactive effect insofar as the instant case is
concerned, as its application will prejudice the vested right of private respondent to have her
case decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. The right was vested to her by the fact that
she filed her action under the regime of the Civil Code. The conclusion then ought to be that the
action was not yet barred, notwithstanding the fact that it was brought when the putative father
was already deceased, since private respondent was then still a minor when it was filed, an
exception to the general rule provided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. Hence, the trial court,
which acquired jurisdiction over the case by the filing of the complaint, never lost jurisdiction
over the same despite the passage of E.O. No. 209, also known as the Family Code of the
Philippines.
FALLO:
The ruling of the Supreme Court reinforces the principle that the jurisdiction of a court,
whether in criminal or civil cases, once attached cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or
events, although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the
first instance, and it retains jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the case.
Wherefore, the petition is denied and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 31,
1993 and its Resolution dated October 13, 1993 are hereby affirmed.
143
Bernabe v. Alejo
ERNESTINA BERNABE, petitioner,

vs.
CAROLINA ALEJO as guardian ad litem for the minor ADRIAN BERNABE, respondent.
G.R. No. 140500 January 21, 2002
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The right to seek recognition granted by the Civil Code to illegitimate children who were still
minors at the time the Family Code took effect cannot be impaired or taken away. The minors
have up to four years from attaining majority age within which to file an action for recognition.
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying
for (1) the nullification of the July 7, 1999 Court of Appeals Decision in CA-GR CV No. 51919
and the October 14, 1999 CA Resolution denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, as
well as (2) the reinstatement of the two Orders issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Pasay City (Branch 109) concerning the same case.
FACTS:
The late Fiscal Ernesto A. Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary of twenty-
three (23) years, herein plaintiff-appellant Carolina Alejo. The son was born on September 18,
1981 and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died on August 13, 1993, while his wife
Rosalina died on December 3 of the same year, leaving Ernestina, as the sole surviving heir,
who filed the complaint praying that Adrian be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son of
Fiscal Bernabe and as such he (Adrian) be given his share in Fiscal Bernabe’s estate, which is
now being held by Ernestina as the sole surviving heir. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the
complaint. The Court of Appeals ruled that in the interest of justice, Adrian should be allowed to
prove that he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent has a cause of action to file a case against petitioner, the
legitimate daughter of the putative father, for recognition and partition with accounting after the
putative father’s death in the absence of any written acknowledgment of paternity by the latter.
144
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court hold that Article 285 of the Civil Code is a substantive law as it
gives Adrian the right to file his petition for recognition within 4 years from attaining majority age.
To emphasize, illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect
and whose putative parent died during their minority are thus given the right to seek recognition
under Article 285 of the Civil Code for a period of up to four years from attaining majority age.
This vested right was not impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family Code. The
overriding consideration is to protect the vested rights of minors who could not have filed suit,
on their own, during the lifetime of their putative parents. As respondent aptly points out in his
Memorandum, the State as parens patriae should protect a minor’s right. Born in 1981, Adrian
was only seven years old when the Family Code took effect and only twelve when his alleged
father died in 1993. The minor must be given his day in court. Therefore, the Family Code
cannot impair or take Adrian’s right to file an action for recognition because that right had
already vested prior to its enactment.
FALLO:
Wherefore, the Petition is hereby denied and the assailed Decision and Resolution
affirmed. Costs against petitioner.
145
Espinosa v. Atty. Omaña
RODOLFO A. ESPINOSA and MAXIMO A. GLINDO, complainants,

vs.
ATTY. JULIETA A. OMAÑA, respondent.
A.C. No. 9081 October 12, 2011
CARPIO, J.:
Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by Rodolfo A. Espinosa and Maximo
A. Glindo against Atty. Julieta A. Omaña.
FACTS:
Complainants Espinosa and Glindo charged Omaña with violation of her oath as a
lawyer, malpractice, and gross misconduct in office. They alleged that Espinosa and his wife
Elena Marantal sought respondent’s legal advice on whether they could legally live separately
and dissolve their marriage. Respondent then prepared a document entitled "Kasunduan Ng
Paghihiwalay", a contract dissolving their marriage. The spouses were fully convinced regarding
its validity and they started implementing its terms and conditions. However, Marantal eventually
took custody of all their children and took possession of most of the property they acquired
during their union. Espinosa sought the advice of his fellow employee, complainant Glindo, a
law graduate, who informed him that the contract executed by respondent was not valid.
Espinosa and Glindo then hired the services of a lawyer to file a complaint against respondent
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline. Respondent denied
that she prepared the contract. She presented Marantal’s affidavit to support her allegations and
to show that the complaint was instigated by Glindo. Respondent further presented a letter of
apology from her staff, Arlene Dela Peña, acknowledging that she notarized the document
without respondent’s knowledge, consent, and authority.
The IBP-CBD found that Omaña violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and that the respondent truly signed the questioned document, yet
she still disclaimed its authorship, thereby revealing much more her propensity to lie and make
deceit, which she is deserving of disciplinary sanction or disbarment. The IBP-CBD
recommended that respondent be suspended for one year from the practice of law and for two
146
years as a notary public and the same was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of
Governors. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contract prepared by the respondent is valid, thus dissolving the
marriage of petitioner and his wife.
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal
partnership without judicial approval is void. The Court has also ruled that a notary public should
not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the
spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership, which is exactly what
respondent did in this case. The Court agree with the IBP-CBD that respondent herself
notarized the contract. Even if it were true that it was her part-time staff who notarized the
contract, it only showed respondent’s negligence in doing her notarial duties. A notary public is
personally responsible for the entries in his notarial register and he could not relieve himself of
this responsibility by passing the blame on his secretaries or any member of his staff.That in
preparing and notarizing a void document, respondent violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Respondent knew fully well that the "Kasunduan Ng
Paghihiwalay" has no legal effect and is against public policy. Therefore, Omaña may be
suspended from office as an attorney for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
FALLO:
Wherefore Atty. Julieta A. Omaña is suspended from the practice of law for one year.
Atty. Omaña’s notarial commission is revoked, if still existing, and is suspended as a notary
public for two years.
147
Estrada v. Escritor
ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, complainant,

vs.
SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR, respondent.
A.M. No. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003
PUNO, J.:
The case at bar takes us to a most difficult area of constitutional law where man stands
accountable to an authority higher than the state. To be held on balance are the state’s interest
and the respondent’s religious freedom. In this highly sensitive area of law, the task of balancing
between authority and liberty is most delicate because to the person invoking religious freedom,
the consequences of the case are not only temporal.
FACTS:
Complainant Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., presiding judge of
Branch 253, Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, requesting for an investigation of rumors
that respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter in said court, is living with a man not her
husband. They allegedly have a child of eighteen to twenty years old. Estrada is not personally
related either to Escritor or her partner and is a resident not of Las Piñas City but of Bacoor,
Cavite. Nevertheless, he filed the charge against Escritor as he believes that she is committing
an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to remain
employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act.
Deputy Court Administrator lock stressed that although Escritor had become capacitated
to marry by the time she joined the judiciary as her husband had died a year before, it is due to
her relationship with a married man, voluntarily carried on, that respondent may still be subject
to disciplinary action. Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her
religion, the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They
allegedly have a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness under the approval of their congregation.
Such a declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to
legalize their union.
148
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of gross
and immoral conduct and be penalized by the State for such conjugal arrangement.
RULING:
No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of
religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights
in our Constitution. The State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or
symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at
bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy
charges against respondent or her partner. Thus the State’s interest only amounts to the
symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition.
A distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in
mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality. The Court further
states that our Constitution adheres to the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for
accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent
neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not
offend compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling
state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means
possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the
legitimate goal of the state. Thus, the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it
constitutes an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion.
FALLO:
In view whereof, the case is remanded to the Office of the Court Administrator. The
Solicitor General is ordered to intervene in the case where it will be given the opportunity (a) to
examine the sincerity and centrality of respondent’s claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to
present evidence on the state’s compelling interest to override respondent’s religious belief and
practice; and (c) to show that the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least
restrictive to respondent’s religious freedom. The rehearing should be concluded thirty (30)
days from the Office of the Court Administrator’s receipt of the Decision.
149
Ancheta v. Ancheta
MARIETTA B. ANCHETA, petitioner,

vs.
RODOLFO S. ANCHETA, respondent.
G.R. No. 145370 March 4, 2004
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 59550 which dismissed the petitioner’s petition under Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure to annul the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, Branch 15 in
Special Proceedings No. NC-662 nullifying the marriage of the petitioner and the respondent
Rodolfo S. Ancheta, and of the resolution of the appellate court denying the motion for
reconsideration of the said resolution.
FACTS:
Petitioner Marietta Ancheta and respondent Rodolfo Ancheta were married on March 5,
1959 and had eight children. After 33 years of marriage the petitioner left the respondent and
their children. Their conjugal properties were later separated through a court-sanctioned
compromise agreement where the petitioner got among others a resort in Cavite. When the
husband wanted to marry again, he filed before the Regional Trial Court a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with the petitioner on the ground of psychological incapacity
on June 5, 1995. Although he knew that the petitioner was already residing at the resort in
Cavite, he alleged in his petition that the petitioner was residing at Las Piñas, Metro Manila,
such that summons never reached her. Nevertheless substituted service was rendered to their
son at his residence in Cavite. Petitioner was then declared in default for failing to answer the
said petition. Just over a month after it was filed, the trial court granted the petition and declared
the marriage of the parties void ab initio.
Five years later, petitioner challenged the trial court’s order declaring as void ab initio her
marriage with respondent Rodolfo, citing extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction over her person,
among others. She alleged that the respondent lied on her real address in his petition so she
never received summons on the case, hence depriving her of her right to be heard. The Court of
Appeals dismissed her petition. Hence, this review on certiorari.
150
ISSUE:
Whether or not the declaration of nullity of marriage was valid.
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Appeals acted arbitrarily in dismissing the
original petition of the petitioner and the amended petition for annulment of the assailed order
grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. The original petition and the
amended petition in the Court of Appeals, in light of the material averments therein, were based
not only on extrinsic fraud, but also on lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over the person of the
petitioner because of the failure of the sheriff to serve on her the summons and a copy of the
complaint. She claimed that the summons and complaint were served on her son, Venancio
Mariano B. Ancheta III, who, however, failed to give her the said summons and complaint.
FALLO:
In light of all the foregoing, the petition is granted. The Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals dated July 13, 2000 and September 27, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59550 are hereby set
aside and reversed. Let the records of CA-G.R. SP No. 59550 be remanded to the Court of
Appeals for further proceedings conformably with the Decision of this Court and Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court, as amended.
151
People v. Borromeo
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ELIAS BORROMEO, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-61873 October 31, 1984
RELOVA, J.:
Appeal from the decision of the then Circuit Criminal Court, Fourteenth Judicial District,
Cebu-Bohol, finding accused Elias Borromeo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
parricide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory
penalties of the law; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Susana Taborada-Borromeo, in the
sum of P12,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs.
FACTS:
The four year old niece of Elias and Susana Borromeo reported to Matilde Taborada,
mother of Susana, that Susana was shouting frantically for help because Elias was killing her.
Matilde, upon reaching to her the information, told the child to report the same to Geronimo
Taborada, Susana’s brother who was then working at their mango plantation. The latter, upon
hearing the information, went to inform his father. The two went to Susana’s hut but the door
was closed. Geronimo could only peep through the bamboo slats at the wall and saw her sister
lying down, and motionless. Susana’s father called for the police. Thereafter, police officer
Fernando C. Abella and three policemen arrived. They shouted and ordered Elias to open the
door. The latter opened the door after he consumed one stick of cigarette. When questioned, he
could only mumble incoherent words. The Regional Trial Court of Cebu held Elias Borromeo
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide. Hence, this appeal to the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime committed by defendant-appellant is homicide and not
parricide because he and the deceased, Susana were not legally married.
152
RULING:
No. The defendant-appellant testified that he was indeed, married to Susana Borromeo.
There is no better of marriage than the admission of the accused of the existence of such
marriage. Person living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. And, the mere fact
that no record of the marriage exist in the registry of marriage does not invalidate said marriage,
as long as in the celebration thereof, all requisites for its validity are present. Thus, the
defendant-appellant is guilty of the crime of parricide.
FALLO:
Wherefore, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed, with the modification that the
indemnity of PHP 12,000.00 is increased to PHP 30,000.00.
153
Corpus v. Corpus
TOMAS CORPUS, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
ADMINISTRATOR and/or EXECUTOR of the Estate of Teodoro R. Yangco, RAFAEL
CORPUS, AMALIA CORPUS, JOSE A. V. CORPUS, RAMON L. CORPUS, ENRIQUE J.
CORPUS, S. W. STAGG, SOLEDAD ASPRER and CIPRIANO NAVARRO, defendants-
appellees.
G.R. No. L-22469 October 23, 1978
AQUINO, J.:
Teodoro R. Yangco died in Manila on April 20, 1939 at the age of seventy-seven years.
His will dated August 29, 1934 was probated in the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special
Proceeding No. 54863. The decree of probate was affirmed in this Court's 1941 decision
in Corpus vs. Yangco, 73 Phil. 527. The complete text of the will is quoted in that decision.
FACTS:
Teodoro R. Yangco died at the age of seventy-seven years and his will was probated in
the Court of First Instance of Manila. Yangco had no forced heirs. At the time of his death, his
nearest relatives were (1) his half brother, Luis Yangco, (2) his half sister, Paz Yangco, the wife
of Miguel Ossorio (3) Amalia Corpus, Jose Corpus, and Ramon Corpus, the children of his half
brother, Pablo Corpus, and (4) Juanita Corpus, the daughter of his half brother Jose Corpus.
Pursuant to the order of the probate court, a project of partition dated November 26,
1945 was submitted by the administrator and the legatees named in the will. The Probate court
approved the project of partition. From that order, Pedro Martinez, Juliana de Castro, Juanita
Corpus (deceased) and the estate of Luis R. Yangco aped to this Court. Appellant Tomas
Corpus signed that compromise settlement as the sole heir of Juanita Corpus. The estate of
Luis Yangco entered into a similar compromise agreement. A the resolution dismissing the
appeal became, final and executory on October 14 and November 4, 1947, entries of judgment
were made on those dates. On October 5, 1951, Tomas Corpus, as the sole heir of Juanita
corpus, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover her supposed share in
Yangco intestate estate. He alleged in his complaint that the dispositions in his Yangcos will
sing perpetual prohibitions upon alienation rendered it void under article 785 of the old Civil
154
Code and that the 1949 partition is invalid and, therefore, the decedent's estate should be
distributed according to the rules on intestacy.
The trial court dismissed the action on the grounds of res judicata and laches. It held that
the intrinsic validity of Yangco's will was passed upon in its order approving the project of
partition for the testator's estate. The Court of Appeals, however, certified the appeal to this
Court because it involves real property valued at more than fifty thousand pesos.
ISSUE:
Whether or not plaintiff has a cause of action to recover his mother's supposed intestate
share in Yangco's estate.
RULING:
No. Articles 944 and 945 of the Spanish Civil Code provides, if an acknowledged natural
or legitimated child should die without issue, either legitimate or acknowledged, the father or
mother who acknowledged such child shall succeed to its entire estate; and if both
acknowledged it and are alive, they shall inherit from it share and share alike. In default of
natural ascendants, natural and legitimated children shall be succeeded by their natural
brothers and sisters in accordance with the rules established for legitimate brothers and sisters.
Hence, Teodoro Yangco's half brothers on the Corpus side, who were legitimate, had no right to
succeed to his estate under the rules of intestacy. Following the rule in article 992, formerly
article 943, it was held that the legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate
child.
Since Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child or was illegitimate and
since Juanita Corpus was the legitimate child of Jose Corpus, himself a legitimate child, we hold
that appellant Tomas Corpus has no cause of action for the recovery of the supposed hereditary
share of his mother, Juanita Corpus, as a legal heir, in Yangco's estate. Juanita Corpus was not
a legal heir of Yangco because there is no reciprocal succession between legitimate and
illegitimate relatives. The trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint of Tomas Corpus.
FALLO:
Wherefore, the lower court's judgment is affirmed.
155
Rivera v. IAC
JOSE RIVERA petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and

ADELAIDO J. RIVERA, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 75005-06 February 15, 1990
CRUZ, J.:
Was there only one Venancio Rivera in Mabalacat, Pampanga, or were there two?
On May 30, 1975, a prominent and wealthy resident of that town named Venancio Rivera died.
On July 28, 1975, Jose Rivera, claiming to be the only surviving legitimate son of the deceased,
filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over Venancio's estate. Docketed as
SP No. 1076, this petition was opposed by Adelaido J. Rivera, who denied that Jose was the
son of the decedent. Adelaido averred that Venancio was his father and did not die intestate but
in fact left two holographic wills.
Facts:
On May 30, 1975, a prominent and wealthy resident of Mabalacat, Pampanga named Venancio
Rivera died. On July 28, 1975, Jose Rivera, claiming to be the only surviving legitimate son of
the deceased filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over Venancio’s state.
This was, apparently, opposed by one Adelaido Rivera who denied Jose was the son of the
decedent. He avers that the decedent left 2 holographic wills. The latter then filed for the
probation of the said 2 holographic wills. The two cases were then consolidated. Judge Eliodoro
B. Guinto found that Jose Rivera was not the son of the decedent but of a different Venancio
Rivera who was married to Maria Vital. The Venancio Rivera whose estate was in question was
married to Maria Jocson, by whom he had seven children, including Adelaido. Therefore, Jose
had no right to claim to this estate because the decedent was not his father. The Intermediate
Appellate Court affirmed this decision of the trial court. Hence, Jose Rivera appealed to the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Jose Rivera was the only surviving legitimate son of Venancio Rivera, whose
estate was in question in this case
156
Held:
It is true that Adelaido could not present his parents’ marriage certificate because, as he
explained it, the marriage records for 1942 in the Mabalacat Civil Registry were burned during
the war. Even so, he could still rely on the presumption of marriage, since it is not denied that
Venancio Rivera and Maria Jocson lived together as husband and wife and for many years,
begetting seven children in all during that time.
Jose Rivera, on the other hand, although presented necessary documents, his father’s parents
were different of that Venancio Rivera’s whose estate is in question. Moreover, if it was true, the
court said that Jose and her mother did not file any appropriate proceedings to prosecute
Venancio Rivera as they were abandoned and neglected, considering also that they lived in the
same town.
When the authenticity of a will is not being questioned, there is no necessity of presenting the
three witnesses required under Article 811; an opposition by a mere stranger did not have the
legal effect of requiring the three witnesses.
Thus, the petition was denied by the Supreme Court.
Fallo:
The petition is DENIED and the challenged decision is AFFIRMED, with costs against the
petitioner.
157
Abadilla v. Tabiliran
MA. BLYTH B. ABADILLA, complainant, vs.
JUDGE JOSE C. TABILIRAN, JR.,respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-92-716 October 25, 1995
The herein administrative case arose from a complaint, dated September 8, 1992, filed by Ma.
Blyth B. Abadilla, a Clerk of Court assigned at the sala of respondent, Judge Jose C. Tabiliran,
Jr., of the 8th Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Manukan, Zamboanga del Norte. Respondent stands
charged with "gross immorality, deceitful conduct, and corruption unbecoming of a judge."
Facts:
Ma. Blyth B. Abadilla, a clerk of Court assigned to the sala of the respondent, Judge Jose C.
Tabiliran, Jr. of the 8th Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Manukan, Zamboanga Del Norte.
Respondent stands charged with gross immorality for contracting a second marriage to certain
Priscilla Q. Baybayan as his legitimate child; and corruption unbecoming of a judge for
notarizing documents, collected fees thereof, and used it for personal purposes.
The respondent judge denied all the allegations against him. In the case of gross immorality,
respondent claimed that his marriage to Priscilla Q. Baybayan was valid because his first wife
Teresita Banzuela abandoned the conjugal home for seven years, citing Article 310 of the Civil
Code; on deceitful conduct, he claimed that since there were only three words to choose from,
Single, Widow, or Divorced, he chose the word single as the most appropriate since he had no
knowledge of his first wife whereabouts; on corruption, he claimed that there was no Notary
Public in Manukan, as attested by the Mayor of the place, and as such, he may be allowed to
notarize documents as ex-officio notary. The fees collected were for the used to subsidize office
expenses since the funds he had been receiving from the municipal government were not
enough to cover expenses in maintaining his office.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent’s cohabitation with Priscilla Baybayan is not and was neither
bigamous nor immoral because, as his contention, he started living with Priscilla Baybayan only
after his first wife had already left and abandoned the family home in 1966 and until the present
her whereabouts is not known and respondent has had no news of her being alive
158
Held:
The Supreme Court held that the respondent’s actuation of cohabiting with another when his
marriage was valid and subsisting – his wife having been allegedly absent for four years only –
constitutes grossly immoral conduct.
Children born prior to marriage can not be legitimated nor in any way considered legitimate if at
the time they were born there was an existing valid marriage between the father and his first
wife.
The respondent’s failure to properly account and turn over the fees collected by him as ex-
officio notary to the municipal government as required by law raises the presumption that he
had put such fund to his personal use.
Thus, the Supreme Court held that the respondent, Judge C. Tabiliran, guilty of the three
charges against him and was dismissed from service, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement
benefits, and disqualification from re-employment in the government service, all without
prejudice to criminal or civil liability.
Fallo:
The Court finds respondent Judge Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr. guilty of gross immorality, deceitful
conduct and corruption and, consequently, orders his dismissal from the service. Such dismissal
shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and
disqualification from re-employment in the government-service, all without prejudice to criminal
or civil liability.
159
Dela Rosa v. Heirs of Delgado
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE DECEASED JOSEFA DELGADO

AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE LA ROSA and other HEIRS OF
LUIS DELGADO, petitioners, v. HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN,
respondents.
G.R. No. 155733. January 27, 2006.
CORONA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 55, in SP Case No. 97668, which was
reversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals in its decision dated October 24, 2002.
Facts:
The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado may be divided into two
groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings,
nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces. Petitioners allege that Ramon
Osorio and Felisa Delgado were never married. In support thereof, they assert that no evidence
was ever presented to establish it, not even so much as an allegation of the date or place of the
alleged marriage. (2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters, his nephews
and nieces, his illegitimate child,9 and the de facto adopted child (ampun-ampunan) of the
decedents. Respondents aver that like Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died without a will. He
was survived by his sisters Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz, and by
the children of his predeceased brother Roman Rustia Sr., namely, Josefina Rustia Albano,
Virginia Rustia Paraiso, Roman Rustia, Jr., Sergio Rustia, Francisco Rustia and Leticia Rustia
Miranda. Guillerma Rustia has no interest in the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia as she was
never duly acknowledged as an illegitimate child. They contend that her right to compulsory
acknowledgement prescribed when Guillermo died in 1974 and that she cannot claim voluntary
acknowledgement since the documents she presented were not the authentic writings
prescribed by the new Civil Code.
The decision of the trial court states “petitioner and her co-claimants to the estate of the late
Josefa Delgado listed in the Petitions, and enumerated elsewhere in this Decision, are hereby
declared as the only legal heirs of the said Josefa Delgado who died intestate in the City of
160
Manila on September 8, 1972, and entitled to partition the same among themselves in
accordance with the proportions referred to in this Decision. Oppositors filed an appeal which
was denied on the ground that the record on appeal was not filed on time. They then filed a
petition for certiorari and mandamus, which was dismissed by the Court of Appeals. However,
the Court of Appeals reversed itself and gave due course to oppositors’ appeal in the interest of
substantial justice. Acting on the appeal, the Court of Appeals partially set aside the trial court’s
decision. Upon motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals amended its earlier decision.
The decision was reconsidered and vacated. Consequently, the decision of the trial court was
reversed and set-aside. Hence, the case to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether there was a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
Held:
In this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage existed
between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot
be doubted. Their family and friends knew them to be married. Their reputed status as husband
and wife was such that even the original petition for letters of administration filed by Luisa
Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975 referred to them as "spouses." Every intendment of the law
leans toward legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage are
presumed to be in fact married. This is the usual order of things in society and, if the parties are
not what they hold themselves out to be, they would be living in constant violation of the
common rules of law and propriety. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume
marriage.
Thus, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the RTC Manila,
Branch 55) was denied. The assailed October 24, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals was
affirmed with modifications.
161
Fallo:
The petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the RTC Manila, Branch 55)
is herebyDENIED. The assailed October 24, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED with the following modifications:
1. Guillermo Rustia's June 15, 1973 affidavit of self-adjudication is hereby ANNULLED.
2. the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the intestate estate of Josefa
Delgado. The remaining half shall pertain to (a) the full and half-siblings of Josefa Delgado who
survived her and (b) the children of any of Josefa Delgado's full- or half-siblings who may have
predeceased her, also surviving at the time of her death. Josefa Delgado's grandnephews and
grandnieces are excluded from her estate. In this connection, the trial court is hereby ordered to
determine the identities of the relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to share in her
estate.
3. Guillermo Rustia's estate (including its one-half share of Josefa Delgado's estate) shall be
inherited by Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz (whose respective
shares shall be per capita) and the children of the late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who survived
Guillermo Rustia and whose respective shares shall be per stirpes). Considering that Marciana
Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz are now deceased, their respective shares
shall pertain to their estates.
4. Letters of administration over the still unsettled intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and
Josefa Delgado shall issue to Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and to a nominee from
among the heirs of Guillermo Rustia, as joint administrators, upon their qualification and filing of
the requisite bond in such amount as may be determined by the trial court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
162
Eugenio v. Velez
TOMAS EUGENIO, SR., petitioner, vs. HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, respondent.

G.R. No. 85140 May 17, 1990.
PADILLA, J.:
On 5 October 1988, petitioner came to this Court with a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
application for restraining order and/or injunction (docketed as G.R. No. 85140) seeking to
enjoin respondent Judge from proceeding with the Habeas Corpus case (Sp. Proc. No. 88- 55,
RTC, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City), * the respondent Sheriff from enforcing and
implementing the writ and orders of the respondent Judge dated 28, 29, and 30 September
1988, and to declare said writ and orders as null and void. In a resolution issued on 11 October
1988, this Court required comment from the respondents on the petition but denied the
application for a temporary restraining order.
Facts:
Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of (Vitaliana Vargas, Vitaliana for brevity), her full
blood brothers and sisters, herein private respondents (Vargases', for brevity) filed on 27
September 1988, a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of Misamis Oriental (Branch 20,
Cagayan de Oro City) alleging that Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her residence sometime in
1987 and confined by herein petitioner in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental.
Despite her desire to escape, Vitaliana was allegedly deprived of her liberty without any legal
authority. At the time the petition was filed, it was alleged that Vitaliana was 25 years of age,
single, and living with petitioner Tomas Eugenio.
Petitioner refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana (who had died on 28 August 1988) to the
respondent sheriff, reasoning that a corpse cannot be the subject of habeas corpus proceedings
and that he alleged that he had already a burial permit from the Undersecretary of the
Department of Health, authorizing the burial at the palace quadrangle of the Philippine
Benevolent Christian Missionary, Inc. (PBCM), a registered religious sect, of which he
(petitioner) is the Supreme President and Founder.
The court a quo denied the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner on the ground that there was no
surviving spouse, ascendants or descendants, the brothers and sisters were preferred over
petitioner who was merely a common law spouse, the latter being himself legally married to
another woman. Hence, the appeal.
163
Issue:
Whether or not Tomas Eugenio is the rightful custodian of Vitaliana's body as his common-law
husband
Held:
Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally
married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the
public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community
where they live may be considered legally mauled in common law jurisdictions but not in the
Philippines. While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships
are present in our society, and that they produce a community of properties and interests which
is governed by law, authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of co-ownership
requires that the man and woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to
contract marriage. In any case, herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman,
a legal impediment which disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana. The provisions
of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to
a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a
lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her
lifetime.
Hence, the decision appealed from was affirmed. Both petitions were dismissed.
Fallo:
The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Both petitions are hereby DISMISSED. No Costs.
164
Garcia vda. De Chua v. CA
ANTONIETTA GARCIA VDA. DE CHUA, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 116835 March 5, 1998
KAPUNAN, J.:
Assailed before us in this Appeal by Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR Sp. No. 33101, promulgated on 19 April 1994
affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, of Cotabato City in Special
Procedure Case No. 331.
Facts:
During his lifetime, Roberto Lim Chua lived out of wedlock with private respondent Florita A.
Vallejo from 1970 up to 1981. The union begot two illegitimate children, namely, Roberto Rafson
Alonso and Rudyard Pride Alonzo.
When Roberto Chua died intestate in Davao City, Vallejo filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Cotabato City a petition for Guardianship and Administration. The trial court issued an order
setting the hearing and directed the notice thereof be published in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province of Maguindanao and Cotabato City and or Davao City.
Sometime in July 1992, Antonietta Garcia Vda. de Chua, representing to be the surviving
spouse of Roberto Chua, filed a motion to dismiss, on the ground of improper venue. She
alleged that the decedent’s death was in Davao City, thus, the Regional Trial Court of Davo City
is the proper forum.
Vallejo filed a motion to dismiss mainly on the ground that Antonietta de Chua has no
personality to intervene in the petition for guardianship and administration of Robert Chua; a
pretender because the deceased never contracted marriage with any woman until he died.
The trial court, indeed, dismissed the petition of de Chua for lack of merit. She was able only to
present a Xerox copy of the alleged marriage certificate. She was unable to produce the original
copy or authenticated copy. The alleged marriage was not even registered to local civil
registration. Moreover, the alleged judge who solemnized the marriage denied that he
solemnized such marriage (Judge Augusto Banzali). The trial court issued an order appointing
165
Romulo Lim Uy, first cousin of the deceased, and Florita Vallejo as guardian to the estate of
Roberto and Rudyard Alonzo.
Antonietta filed a motion to recall the letters of administration of Vallejo and she also filed a
petition to declare the proceedings as mistrial but was denied.
She filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to the Court of Appeals alleging the trial court
acted with grave abuse of discretion but it was denied, hence, the petition was elevated to the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Antonietta has a personality to file a motion to dismiss the petition for
guardianship and administration of Robert and Rudyard Alonzo, filed by Vallejo
Held:
Petitioner was not able to prove her status as the surviving spouse of the decedent. The best
proof of marriage between man and wife is marriage contract which Antonietta failed to produce.
The lower court correctly disregarded the Photostat copy of the marriage certificate which she
presented, this being a violation of the best evidence rule, together with other worthless pieces
of evidence.
Fallo:
The petition of petitioner Antonietta Chua is hereby denied.
166
Requisites of a Valid Marriage
RP v. Silverio
ROMMEL JACINTO and DANTES SILVERIO, petitioners v.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent
G.R. 174689. October 22, 1997
CORONA, J.:
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the
change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of
Manila as respondent.
Facts:
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the
change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in RTC Manila. His name was registered
as “Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio” in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was
registered as “male.” He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, “anatomically male
but feels, thinks and acts as a female” and that he had always identified himself with girls since
childhood. His attempts to transform himself to a “woman” culminated on January 27, 2001
when he underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. From then on, petitioner
lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in
his birth certificate changed from “Rommel Jacinto” to “Mely,” and his sex from “male” to
“female.”
Judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the Civil Registrar to change
the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of petitioner, specifically for petitioner’s first name
from “Rommel Jacinto” to MELY and petitioner’s gender from “Male” to FEMALE.The Court of
Appeals rendered a decision in favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial court’s decision
lacked legal basis.
Issue:
Whether or not the entries on the Birth Certificate of the petitioner can be changed.
167
Ruling:
The petition lacks merit. Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment. The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for
purposes of identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of
name are controlled by statutes. In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that
“No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.”
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment. The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal
issue and the court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code
provides that “No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial
order.” For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and
appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry
as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the
correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground
of Equity. The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the
principles of justice and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury
or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.
The Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly
into the commonly recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is
indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to
be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.
Fallo:
The petition is hereby DENIED.
168
RP v. Cagandahan
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JENNIFER CAGANDAHAN

GR No. 166676, September 12, 2008
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising purely questions of law
and seeking a reversal of the Decision dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, which granted the Petition for Correction of Entries in
Birth Certificate filed by Jennifer B. Cagandahan and ordered the following changes of entries in
Cagandahan’s birth certificate: (1) the name "Jennifer Cagandahan" changed to "Jeff
Cagandahan" and (2) gender from "female" to "male."
FACTS:
Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna a
Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to
Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from female to male. It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is
suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare medical condition where afflicted
persons possess both male and female characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with
secondary male characteristics. To further her petition, Cagandahan presented in court the
medical certificate evidencing that she is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which
certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the
Philippines-Philippine General Hospital, who, in addition, explained that "Cagandahan
genetically is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not
develop normally, thus has organs of both male and female." The lower court decided in her
favor but the Office of the Solicitor General appealed before the Supreme Court invoking that
the same was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said petition
did not implead the local civil registrar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Cagandahan’s sex as appearing in her birth certificate be changed.
RULING:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. It held that, in deciding the case,
the Supreme Court considered “the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees
169
of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial.” The Supreme Court
made use of the availale evidence presented in court including the fact that private respondent
thinks of himself as a male and as to the statement made by the doctor that Cagandahan's body
produces high levels of male hormones (androgen), which is preponderant biological support for
considering him as being male.”
The Supreme Court further held that they give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how
an individual deals with what nature has handed out. That is, the Supreme Court respects the
respondent’s congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult
for the ordinary person. The Court added that a change of name is not a matter of right but of
judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons and the consequences that will
follow.
Fallo:
The Republic’s petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
170
Donato v. Luna
LEONILO C. DONATO, petitioners, vs. HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988
Facts:
Paz Abayan filed an information for Bigamy against petitioner Leonilo Donato. She also filed
with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court a civil action for declaration of nullity of
marriage to petitioner because of a prior marriage of petitioner. In his answer petitioner claimed
that his 2nd marriage was void because is was solemnized without a valid marriage license and
that violence, intimation and undue influence were employed by Paz to obtain his consent.
Prior to the date set for the trial of the criminal case, petitioner filed a motion to suspend the
proceedings of the case because the civil action raises a prejudicial question which must first be
determined before the criminal case can proceed.
Issue:
Does a criminal case for bigamy suspend the civil case of annulment of marriage on the ground
that the latter constitutes a prejudicial question?
Held:
The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. I must be noted that the
issue before the JDRC touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is not determinative of
petitioner Donato's guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy. Furthermore, it was petitioner's
2nd wife, the herein private respondent Paz Abayan who filed the complaint for annulment of
the 2nd marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit.
He who contracts a 2nd marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
Fallo:
The instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. We make no pronouncement as to
costs.
171
Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy
LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY and KARL
HEINZ WIEGEL, respondents.
G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986
PARAS, J.:
In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the erstwhile Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Caloocan City, herein respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff therein) asked for the
declaration of Nullity of his marriage (celebrated on July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic
Christian Church Branch in Makati, Metro Manila) with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel (Lilia,
for short, and defendant therein) on the ground of Lilia's previous existing marriage to one
Eduardo A. Maxion, the ceremony having been performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of
Lourdes Church in Quezon City. Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting
marriage claimed that said marriage was null and void, she and the first husband Eduardo A.
Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter said marital union. In the pre-trial that ensued, the
issue agreed upon by both parties was the status of the first marriage (assuming the presence
of force exerted against both parties): was said prior marriage void or was it merely voidable?
Contesting the validity of the pre-trial order, Lilia asked the respondent court for an opportunity
to present evidence.
Facts:
Karl Heinz Wiegel filed a petition for the declaration of his marriage to the petitioner Lilia Oliva
Wiegel before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City. Their marriage was
celebrated in June 1978. The basis for such petition was that Lilia’s previous marriage to
Eduardo A. Maxion was still existing. Lilia admitted the existence of her previous marriage, but
as a defense, he avers that it was initiated by force, therefore, the previous marriage was null
and void. So, a pre-trial ensued. respondent judge ruled against Lilia.
Issue:
Whether or not the Lilia’s previous marriage was void or merely voidable.
172
Held:
There is no need to prove that Lilia’s previous marriage was vitiated by force, because
assuming that indeed it is vitiated by force, it is not void but merely voidable (Article 85, Civil
Code). Therefore, since there is no annulment made, her marriage to the respondent is void
because the previous marriage is not yet dissolved.
Fallo:
The petition is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit, and the Orders complained of are hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
173
Atienza v. Brillantes
LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant, vs.

JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995
QUIASON, J.:
This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety
against Judge Francisco Brillantes, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch
20, Manila.
Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living together at
No. 34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. He stays in said house, which
he purchased in 1987, whenever he is in Manila.
Facts:
Lupo Almodiel Atienza filed an administrative case against Judge Brillantes for Gross Immorality
and Appearance of Impropriety. Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De
Castro, who are living together at a subdivision in Makati, which he purchased in 1987. One
day, he caught the respondent asleep in his bedroom. He asked the houseboy about him and
the latter said that the judge had been cohabiting with De Castro. Atienza did not bother to wake
up the respondent instead asked the houseboy to take care of his two children.
After that, the respondent prevented him from visiting his child and has alienated the affection of
his children. The Complainant also claims that the respondent is married to Zenaida Ongkiko.
The judge denies having been married to Ongkiko because their marriage was celebrated twice
without marriage license, therefore, his marriage to De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles,
California was because he believed in good faith and for all legal purposes, that his first
marriage was solemnized without marriage license.
He further argues that Article 40 of the Family Code is not applicable in his case because his
first marriage in 1965 was governed by the Civil Code and the 2nd relationship was 1991 under
the Family Code. No retroactive Effect.
Issue:
Whether or not the absence of marriage license of his previous marriage justifi3es his act to
cohabit with De Castro
174
Held:
Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice of law in
1963. At the time he went through the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was already a
lawyer. Yet, he never secured any marriage license. Any law student would know that a
marriage license is necessary before one can get married. Respondent was given an
opportunity to correct the flaw in his first marriage when he and Ongkiko were married for the
second time. His failure to secure a marriage license on these two occasions betrays his sinister
motives and bad faith.
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the
Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly
true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right
that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.
Fallo:
The respondent is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all leave and retirement
benefits and with prejudice to reappointment in any branch, instrumentality, or agency of the
government, including government-owned and controlled corporations. This decision is
immediately executory.
175
Beso v. Judge Daguman
ZENAIDA S. BESO, complainant, vs. Judge JUAN DAGUMAN, respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211. January 28, 2000
In this administrative complaint, respondent Judge stands charged with Neglect of Duty and
Abuse of Authority. In a Complaint-Affidavit dated December 12, 1997, Zenaida S. Beso
charged Judge Juan J. Daguman, Jr. with solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdiction and of
negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering the marriage contract with the office of the
Local Registrar.
Facts:
Zenaida S. Beso charged Judge Juan J. Daguman, Jr. with solemnizing marriage outside of his
jurisdiction and not registering the marriage contract with the office of the Local Civil Registrar.
On the other hand, the respondent claimed that he solemnized their marriage (Zenaida S. Beso
and Bernardito Yman) due to the urgency of the situation, that Beso, on August 28, 1997, the
day of the marriage, said that he will be leaving the country for job purposes and considering
her to be an Overseas Filipino Worker and that if not solemnized that day, their marriage license
would lapse because she will be working abroad for a long period. Thus, this would necessitate
spouses for a new marriage license. The necessary documents that was supposedly to be
forwarded by him to the Local Civil Registrar was missing and claimed to be taken by someone.
The Office of the Court administration held that the respondent Judge committed non-feasance
in office and was fined PHP 5,000 with stern warning.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Daguman really committed non-feasance in office
Held:
The Supreme Court finds evaluation of the Office of the Court Administration will taken.
Marriage may only be solemnized in a public place except in marriage in articulo mortis, remote
place, or upon request by both parties in writing a sworn statement.
The Supreme Court also held that judges who are appointed to specific jurisdiction may officiate
176
in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Moreover, a judge is charged with
exercising extra care in ensuing that the records of the cases and official documents in his
custody are intact.
Fallo:
The respondent Judge is hereby FINED Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar infractions will be dealt with more severely.
177
Alcantara v. Alcantara
RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA, petitioner, v.
ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 167746. August 28, 2007
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Restituto Alcantara
assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No.
66724 denying petitioner’s appeal and affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Makati City, Branch 143, in Civil Case No. 97-1325 dated 14 February 2000, dismissing his
petition for annulment of marriage.
Facts:
A petition for annulment of marriage was filed by petitioner against respondent Rosita A.
Alcantara alleging that he and respondent celebrated their marriage twice without securing the
required marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite,
appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and
they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar of the said place.
On 14 October 1985, respondent gave birth to their child Rose Ann Alcantara. In 1988, they
parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be
issued declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding
marriage contract and its entry on file.
Answering petitioner’s petition for annulment of marriage, respondent asserts the validity of their
marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification
from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. She had actually gave birth to two
children, one as stated by the petitioner and the other was Rachel Ann Alcantara on October 27,
1992. Moreover, petitioner filed the said case in order to evade prosecution for concubinage for
he had a mistress with whom he had three children. The case for concubinage was actually filed
and that petitioner prays that the annulment case be dismissed for lack of merit.
The Regional Trial Court of Makati City dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The Court of
Appeals dismissed also the petitioner’s appeal. Hence, the appeal to the Supreme Court.
178
Issue:
Whether or not The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it ruled that
the Petition for Annulment has no legal and factual basis despite the evidence on record that
there was no marriage license at the precise moment of the solemnization of the marriage
Held:
The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz of Carmona, Cavite enjoys the
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage
license was done in the regular conduct of official business. The presumption of regularity of
official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty.
However, the presumption prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive.
Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption and, in case of doubt
as to an officer’s act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness.
Significantly, apart from these, petitioner, by counsel, admitted that a marriage license was,
indeed, issued in Carmona, Cavite.
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of the
marriage. Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds.
The Courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the
contrary, the presumption is of great weight.
Fallo:
The instant Petition is Denied for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30
September 2004 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143 of Makati City,
dated 14 February 2000, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
179
Sevilla v. Cardenas
JAIME O. SEVILLA, petitioner, vs. CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, respondent.

G.R. No. 167684. July 31, 2006.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 74416 dated 20 December 2004 which set aside the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, in Civil Case No. 94-1285 dated 25 January 2002.
Facts:
Jaime O. Sevilla, herein petitioner, filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Carmelita N. Cardenas, herein respondent, for their marriage was vitiated by machination,
duress, and intimidation employed by the respondents Carmelita and her father. He was forced
to sign a marriage contract with Carmelita Cardenas before a minister of the Gospel, Rev. Cirilo
D Gonzales. Moreover, he alleged that there was no marriage license presented before the
solemnizing officer as certified by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Manila.
Actually, it was certified 3 times on the following dates: March 11, September 20, 1994 and July
25, 2000 that marriage license no. 2770792 was nowhere to be found.
On the other hand, the respondent, Carmelita N. Cardenas refuted these allegations of Jaime
and claims that they were first civilly married on May 19, 1969 and thereafter married at a
church on May 31, 1969 at Most Holy Redeemer Parish in Quezon City. Both were alleged to be
recorded in Local Civil Registrar and NSO. He is estopped from invoking the lack of marriage
license after having been married to her for 25 years.
The Regional Trial Court of Makati City declared the nullity of marriage of the parties based on
the petitioner’s allegations that no marriage license was presented before a solemnizing officer.
And that without the said marriage license, being one of the formal requisites of marriage, the
marriage is void from the beginning. This was based on the 3 certifications issued by the Local
Civil Registrar Manila that marriage license number 220792 was fictitious.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the decision of the
trail court in favor of the marriage, because the Local Civil Registrar failed to locate the said
license with due effort as testified by certain Perlita Mercader because the former Local Civil
180
registrar had already retired. The petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration but it was
denied by the Court of Appeals. thus, this case was elevated to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the certification made by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan that Marriage
License No. 2770792, as appearing in the marriage contract of the parties, sufficient to declare
the marriage void from the beginning
Held:
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of

irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The absence of logbook is not conclusive proof of non-
issuance of Marriage License No. 2770792. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to
search for the said logbook, we can not easily accept that absence of the same also means
non-existence or falsity of entries therein.
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and lived together for several
years producing two offsprings, now adult themselves. Thus, the instant petition was denied.
Fallo:
The instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20 December 2004
and the Resolution dated 6 April 2005 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
181
Aranes v. Occiano
MERCEDITA MATA ARANES, petitioner, vs.

JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO, respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390. April 11, 2002.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
RESPONDENT PATRICIA S.J. DE LEON, Clerk III, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial
Court, Naga City, borrowed P20,000.00 from complainant Monica A. Villaseñor on 1 November
1996 at five percent (5%) interest per month which she agreed to pay in full once she received
her year-end bonus for that year as a court employee. On the agreed date of payment, she
failed to settle her indebtedness, and continues to do so despite several demands and years
passing; hence, the instant complaint.
Facts:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Aranes charges respondent Judge, the presiding judge of the
Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, with Gross Ignorance of the law for
solemnizing her marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia (a retired Commodore of the
Philippine Navy) on February 17, 2000, without the requisite of marriage license and at Navua,
Camarines Sur which outside the respondent’s territorial jurisdiction.
They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her husband
passed away. However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioner’s right to inherit the “vast
properties” left by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving pensions
from her late husband’s job.
On the respondent judge’s comment dated July 5, 2001, he solemnized the marriage because
he was requested by a certain Juan Arroyo; Orobia had a difficulty walking because he had a
physical condition that if aggravated could lead to a fatal end; due to influx of visitors, he
proceeded to solemnize the marriage; assuming that all marriage requirements were present;
petitioner and Orobia assured respondent judge that they would give the license to him in the
afternoon on that same day, February 12, 2000.
However, after reading the Comment filed by respondent judge, she realized her own
shortcomings and is now bothered by her conscience.
182
Reviewing from the records of the case, it appears that petitioner filed application for marriage
license on January 5, 2000. It was issued on January 17, 2000 but neither petitioner nor Orobia
claimed it.
On September 12, 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of desistance dated August 28 2001 with
the Office of the Court of a marriage license.
The Office of the Court Administrator rendered a decision penalizing respondent judge of a fine
of PHP 5,000 in November 15, 2000.
Issue:
Whether or not the affidavit of desistance shall excuse the judge from being penalized
Held:
No, because the Supreme Court has the authority to discipline its members.
The act of the judge in solemnizing the marriage at Nabua, outside the territorial jurisdiction of
the respondent judge is contrary to the law of marriage. The marriage may still be considered
valid but the respondent judge in administratively liable. However, this is not a gross ignorance
of law (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P. 129).
The grounds that make the act grossly ignorance of the law is the solemnization of the marriage
without the marriage license, which makes the marriage void under paragraph 2 Article 3 of the
Family Code, and the late issuance of such license did not prove the validity of the marriage.
Thus, the Supreme Court rendered a decision requiring the respondent judge to pay the fine of
PHP 5,000.
Fallo:
The respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of
Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.
183
Vda. De Jacob v. CA
TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB, as Special Administratrix of the Estate of the Deceased

ALFREDO E. JACOB, petitioner, vs.HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 88602 April 6, 1990.
GANCAYCO J.:
The question of whether or not an extrajudicial foreclosure of a mortgage may proceed even
after the death of the mortgagor and whether or not a petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession may be barred by estoppel, are the issues presented in this petition.
Facts:
Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob was the registered owner of a parcel of land described under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 1433 of the Register of Deeds of Naga City. Because of the problem of
paying realty taxes, internal revenue taxes and unpaid wages of farm laborers of the hacienda,
Dr. Jacob asked Centenera to negotiate for a loan. For this purpose, a special power of attorney
was executed and acknowledged by Dr. Jacob before notary public Lorenzo Rosales.
The mortgage was annotated on the title and when the loan was twice re-structured, the
proceeds of the same were not actually given by the bank to Centera since the transaction was
actually nothing but a renewal of the first or original loan and the supposed proceeds were
applied as payment for the loan. The accrued interest for sixty (60) days was, however, paid by
Centenera.
On November 15, 1982 a definite deed of sale of the property was executed in favor of the
respondent bank as the sole and highest bidder.
Tomasa Vda. de Jacob who was subsequently named administratrix of the estate of Dr. Jacob
and who claimed to be an heir of the latter, conducted her own investigation and therefore she
filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Sur alleging that the special power of
attorney and the documents therein indicated are forged and therefore the loan and/or real
estate mortgages and promissory notes are null and void. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s
complaint for lack of a cause of action and/or her failure to prove the causes of action alleged in
the complaint; and judgment was rendered against the Estate of the late Dr. Alfredo Jacob in
favor of the defendants. The plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals but the latter affirmed in
184
toto the decision of the lower court and dismissing the appeal for lack of merit. Thus, the
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not an extrajudicial foreclosure of a mortgage may proceed even after the death of
the mortgagor
Held:
A mortgagee has three remedies that may be alternately availed of in case the mortgagor dies
under Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court:
a. to waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor as an
ordinary claim;
b. to foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove the deficiency as an ordinary claim; and;
c. to rely on the mortgage exclusively, or other security and foreclose the same at anytime,
before it is barred by prescription, without the right to file a claim for any deficiency.
From this rule, it is clear that the mortgagee does not lose its light to extrajudicially foreclose the
mortgage even after the death of the mortgagor as a third alternative under Section 7, Rule 86
of the Rules of Court. The power to foreclose a mortgage is not an ordinary agency that
contemplated exclusively the representation of the principal by the agent but is primarily an
authority conferred upon the mortgagee for the latter's own protection. That power survives the
death of the mortgagor. The rights of the mortgage bank to extra judicially foreclose the
mortgage after the death of the mortgagor, acting through his attorney-in-fact, did not depend on
the authority in the deed of mortgage executed by the latter. That right existed independently of
said stipulation and is clearly recognized in Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court aforecited.
Other issues were questions of facts and can not be reviewed at the Supreme Court as only
questions of law are reviewed in the latter.
Thus, the case was dismissed for lack of merit.
Fallo:
The petitions in G.R. Nos. 88602 and 89544 are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, with costs
against petitioner.
185
Trinidad v. Trinidad
ARTURIO TRINIDAD, petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, FELIX TRINIDAD (DECEASED)
AND LOURDES TRINIDAD, respondents.
G.R. No. 118904. April 20, 1998
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In the absence of a marriage contract and a birth certificate, how may marriage and filiation be
proven?
This is the main question raised in this petition for review on certiorari challenging the Court of
Appeals Decision promulgated December 1, 1994 and Resolution promulgated on February 8,
1995 in CA-GR CV No. 23275, which reversed the decision of the trial court and dismissed
petitioner's action for partition and damages.
Facts:
On August 10, 1978, petitioner Arturio Trinidad filed with the Court of First Instance of Aklan,
Kalibo, Aklan, an action for partition of four parcels of land, described therein, claiming that he
was the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, one of three children of Patricio Trinidad, who was
the original owner of the parcels of land. Patricio Trinidad died in 1940, leaving the four parcels
of land to his three children, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix.
In 1970, petitoner demanded from the defendants to partition the land into three equal shares
and to give him the one-third individual share of his late father, but the defendants refused.
Defendants denied that plaintiff was the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad. They contended that
Inocentes was single when he died in 1941, before plaintiff’s birth.
Arturio Trinidad, born on July 21, 1943, claimed to be the legitimate son of the late Inocentes
Trinidad. Arturio got married in 1966 to Candelaria Gaspar, at the age of twenty three.
The trial court rendered decision in favor of the petitioner that he is entitled to inherit the
property left by his deceased father which is 1/3 of the 4 parcels of land subject matter of this
case.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court on the ground that petitioner failed to adduce
sufficient evidence to prove that his parents were legally married to each other and that
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acquisitive prescription against him had set in.
Issue:
Did petitioner present sufficient evidence of his parents’ marriage and of his filiation?
Ruling:
Petitioner’s first burden is to prove that Inocentes and his mother (Felicidad) were validly
married, and that he was born during the subsistence of their marriage. Petitioner secured a
certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Aklan that all records of births, deaths and
marriages were lost, burned or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of said municipality.
This fact, however, is not fatal to petitioner’s case. Although the marriage contract is considered
the primary evidence of the marital union, petitioner’s failure to present it is not proof that no
marriage took place, as other forms of relevant evidence may take its place. In place of a
marriage contract, two witnesses were presented by petitioner: Isabel Meren, who testified that
she was present during the nuptial of Felicidad and Inocentes on May 5, 1942 in New
Washington, Aklan; and Jovita Gerardo, who testified that the couple deported themselves as
husband and wife after the marriage. It is undisputed then, that, prior to the action for partition,
petitioner, in the concept of a co-owner, was receiving from private respondents his share of the
produce of the land in dispute. Further, the titles of these pieces of land were still in their father’s
name. The petition is granted and the assailed decision and resolution are reversed and set
aside. The trial court’s decision dated July 4, 1989 is reinstated.
Fallo:
The petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The trial court's decision dated July 4, 1989 is REINSTATED. No cost.
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Republic v. CA
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, v.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 159614. December 9, 2005.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
On March 29, 2001, Alan B. Alegro filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 27, for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Rosalia
(Lea) A. Julaton.
Facts:
On March 29, 2001, Alan B. Alegro filed a petition in the Regional Trial Courtbfor the declaration
of presumptive death of his wife, Rosalia “Lea” A. Julaton.
At the hearing, Alan adduced evidence that he and Lea were married on January 20, 1995 in
Catbalogan, Samar. He testified that, on February 6, 1995, Lea arrived home late in the evening
and he berated her for being always out of their house. He told her that if she enjoyed the life of
a single person, it would be better for her to go back to her parents. Lea did not reply. Alan
narrated that, when he reported for work the following day, Lea was still in the house, but when
he arrived home later in the day, Lea was nowhere to be found. Alan thought that Lea merely
went to her parents’ house in Bliss, Sto. Niño, Catbalogan, Samar. However, Lea did not return
to their house anymore.
Alan further testified that, he inquired Lea’s whereabouts but to no avail.

Sometime in June 1995, he decided to go to Manila to look for Lea, but his mother asked him to
leave after the town fiesta of Catbalogan, hoping that Lea may come home for the fiesta. Alan
agreed. However, Lea did not show up. Alan then left for Manila on August 27, 1995. He went to
a house in Navotas where Janeth, Lea’s friend, was staying. When asked where Lea was,
Janeth told him that she had not seen her. He failed to find out Lea’s whereabouts despite his
repeated talks with Janeth. Alan decided to work as a part-time taxi driver. On his free time, he
would look for Lea in the malls but still to no avail. He returned to Catbalogan in 1997 and again
looked for his wife but failed.
On June 20, 2001, Alan reported Lea’s disappearance to the local police station. The police
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authorities issued an Alarm Notice on July 4, 2001. Alan also reported Lea’s disappearance to
the National Bureau of Investigation on July 9, 2001.
On January 8, 2002, the court rendered judgment granting the petition.

The OSG appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which rendered judgment on August 4,
2003, affirming the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the declaration of presumptive death of the wife is valid
Ruling:
No. In view of the summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of the Family Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of one’s spouse, the degree of due diligence set by the Court
in locating the whereabouts of a missing spouse must be strictly complied with. It is the policy of
the State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic social institution. Marriage is the
foundation of the family. Since marriage is an inviolable social institution that the 1987
Constitution seeks to protect from dissolution at the whim of the parties. For respondent’s failure
to prove that he had a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead and that he exerted the
required amount of diligence in searching for his missing wife, the petition for declaration of
presumptive death should have been denied by the trial court and the Honorable Court of
Appeals. For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage, the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he
has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse
may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a well-
grounded belief. Cuello Callon writes that “es menester que su creencia sea firme se funde en
motivos racionales.” The Court finds and so holds that the respondent failed to prove that he
had a well-founded belief, before he filed his petition in the trial court, that his spouse Rosalia
“Lea” Julaton was already dead. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set
aside.
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Fallo:
The petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73749 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Samar,
Branch 27, is ORDERED to DISMISS the respondent’s petition.
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Sy v. CA
FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
G.R. No. 127263 April 12, 2000
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review is the decision dated May 21, 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
44144, which affirmedthe decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga,
denying the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of the spouses Filipina Sy and
Fernando Sy.
Facts:
Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy were married on November 15, 1973 at the church of Our Lady of
Lourdes, Quezon City. Both were 22 years old. the union was blessed with two children,
Frederick and Farrah Sheryl. They first resided at Singalong, Manila, then in Apalit, Pampanga,
and later I Sto. Tomas, Pampanga were they operated their business, lumber and hardware.
Later, Fernando left their Conjugal dwelling. Their two children were under the custody of
Filipina. But later, Frederick transferred to his father in Tondo.
As a result, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation in Regional Trial Court San Fernando,
Pampanga. The case later upgraded to separation of property on the ground that her husband
left her without cause for more than one year. Moreover, they have entered into a Memorandum
of Agreement. The trial court granted the petition. She also sued her husband for attempted
parricide. One afternoon, she went to a dental clinic owned by her husband and operated by her
mistress. She went there to fetch her son Frederick and to take him to San Fernando,
Pampanga. But the boy ignored her and continued playing the family computer. So she spanked
her, unfortunately Fernando pulled her and started beating her like hell. Unfortunately, the
Regional Trial Court of Manila held Fernando liable only for slight physical injuries and
sentenced to 20 days of imprisonment.
She filed another legal separation on that ground and the Regional trial Court of Pampanga
granted the petition and giving Sheryll in her custody, Frederick to the respondent.
She filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage to Fernando. But the Regional Trial
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Court denied for lack of merit. She appealed to the Court of Appeals but denied the same. It fell
short of quantum of evidence. Thus, the petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage is void ab initio because of the absence of marriage license at the
time of the celebration of marriage
Held:
The findings of the Supreme Court were:

a. The marriage was celebrated on November 15, 1973, but the marriage license was issued on
September 17, 1974. Almost one year after the celebration of the marriage (120 days from the
date of issue).
b. The marriage license was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet neither the wife nor the husband
ever resided the place.
Thus, the petition was granted.
Fallo:
The petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando,
Pampanga, dated December 9, 1993 as well as the Decision promulgated on May 21, 1996 by
the Court of Appeals and its Resolution dated November 21, 1996 in CA-G.R. No. 44144 are set
aside. The marriage celebrated on November 15, 1973 between petitioner Filipina Yap and
private respondent Fernando Sy is hereby declared void ab initio for lack of a marriage license
at the time of celebration. No pronouncement as to costs.
192
Carino v. Carino
SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO, petitioner, v. SUSAN YEE CARIÑO, respondent.

G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001.
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263, which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632.
Facts:
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted two marriages, the first
was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño with whom he had two offsprings,
namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cariño; and the second was on November 10, 1992, with
respondent Susan Yee Cariño with whom he had no children in their almost ten year
cohabitation starting way back in 1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by
pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee,
who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for
monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government
agencies.
On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of
money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying that petitioner be ordered to return to her at
least one-half of the money collectively denominated as “death benefits” which she received.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the
subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage
between petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the
previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where
she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her action for
collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required marriage
license.
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On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent.On appeal by petitioner to the
Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
a. Whether or not the marriage of the deceased and petitioner is null and void ab initio because
it was solemnized without marriage license
b. Whether or not the second marriage is valid
Ruling:
a. Yes. Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan
Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of
marriage, and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab
initio. There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fall within
the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was
indispensable to the validity of their marriage. The marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao
and the deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not
being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void
ab initio.
b. No. The declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and
petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with
respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first
obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased
void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab
initio. Hence, the petition is granted, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and
set aside.
Fallo:
The petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263
which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ordering petitioner to pay
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respondent the sum of P73,000.00 plus attorney’s fees in the amount of P5,000.00, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632, is hereby
DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
195
Morigo v. People
LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

G.R. No. 145226. February 06, 2004.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision dated October 21, 1999 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the judgment dated August 5, 1996
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch 4, in Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial court
found herein petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy and
sentenced him to a prison term of seven (7) months of prision correccional as minimum to six
(6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. Also assailed in this petition is the
resolution of the appellate court, dated September 25, 2000, denying Morigo’s motion for
reconsideration.
Facts:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of one Catalina Tortor at
Tagbilaran City, Bohol for four years. Their communication was broken after school year 1977-
1978. In 1984, Lucio received a letter from Lucia from Singapore. After an exchange of letters,
the two became sweethearts. Lucia later returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to
work there. Nonetheless, the sweethearts maintained a constant communication. Lucia, later
came back to the Philippines. The two agreed to get married, thus, they were married at Iglesia
de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol. Lucia reported back to her work in Canada
leaving Lucio behind. Barely a year, August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with Ontario Court a petition
for divorce which was granted and took effect in February of 1992. On October that year Lucia
married Maria Lumbago also in Tagbilaran City. September 21, 1993, Lucio filed a complaint for
nullity of marriage in Regional Trial Court of Bohol on the ground that there was no marriage
ceremony actually took place. He was later charge with Bigamy filed by City Prosecutor of the
Regional Trial Court of Bohol.
The petitioner moved for the suspension of the criminal case invoking prejudicial question. The
civil case is a prejudicial question to bigamy. The Court granted unfortunately denied by the
motion for reconsideration of the prosecution.
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The Regional Trial Court of Bohol held Lucio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.
He filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. While the case was pending in Court of Appeals, the
trial court granted the petition for nullty of marriage since no marriage ceremony took place. No
appeal was taken from this decision, thus, became final and executory. But the Court of Appeals
denied the petition for lack of merit. Hence, the petition was elevated to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether his defense of good faith is valid
Held:
The first element of Bigamy as laid down in Bobis v. Bobis was not present.
No marriage ceremony. What transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the
two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The mere signing of the same bears no
semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity.
The Supreme Court need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack
of criminal intent, which is moot and academic.
Fallo:
The instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of the appellate court dated
September 25, 2000, denying herein petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY
on the ground that his guilt has not been proven with moral certainty.
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Moreno v. Bernabe
MARILOU NAMA MORENO, complainant, v. JUDGE JOSE C. BERNABE, respondent.

A.M. No. MTJ-94-963. July 14, 1995.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Marilou Nama Moreno filed this complaint against Judge Jose C. Bernabe of the Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch 72, Pasig, Metro Manila for grave misconduct and gross ignorance of the
law.
Facts:
Marilou Nama Moreno filed this complainant against Judge C. Bernabe for grave misconduct
and gross ignorance of the law.
On October 4, 1993, complainant alleges that she and Marcelo Moreno were married before
respondent Judge Bernabe. She visited the office of the Respondent Judge on October 15,
1993 only to find out that she could not get the marriage contract because the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar failed to issue a marriage license. She claims that respondent Judge
connived with the relatives of Marcelo Moreno to deceive her.
Respondent denied that he conspired with the relatives of Marcelo Moreno to solemnize the
marriage for the purpose of deceiving the complainant.
Judge Villarama, Jr. recommended the dismissal of the complaint against respondent for failure
of complainant to appear on any of the scheduled hearings. He, however, also recommended
that the respondent be issued a stern warning for the latter solemnized a marriage without the
requisites marriage license.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage is void due to the lack of marriage license
Ruling:
Respondent Judge displayed his ignorance of the law when he solemnized the marriage without
a marriage license. As a judge, he is presumed to be aware of the existence of Article 3(2) of
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the Family Code of the Philippines, which provides of a marriage is a valid marriage license.
Absence of said requisite will make the marriage void from the beginning. Family Code declares
that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage
void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of
the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable. Thus, respondent be held liable for misconduct for solemnizing a
marriage without a marriage license and that the appropriate administrative sanctions be
imposed against him.
Fallo:
The respondent is hereby ordered to pay a fine of P10,000.00 and is STERNLY WARNED that
a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
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Navarro v. Dumagtoy
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, v.

JUDGE HERNANDO DOMAGTOY, respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088. July 19, 1996.
ROMERO, J.:
The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte,
Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by
respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends,
exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.
Facts:
On September 27, 1994, Judge Hernando Domagtoy solemnized the wedding between Gaspar
A. Tagadan and Arlyn Borga despite the fact that the groom is merely separated from his first
wife.
Respondent judge, likewise, performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo
and Gemma del Rosario outside his jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Thus he faced an
administrative for gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law
filed by Rodolfo Navarro, the complainant.
Respondent seeks exculpation from his act by stating that he merely relied on the affidavit
issued by the municipal trial court confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have
not seen each other for almost seven years. The certified true copy of the marriage contract
between Tagadan and Borga states that the former’s civil status is “separated.” Tagadan was
civilly married to Ida Peñaranda; that after 13 years of cohabitation and having borne five
children, she left the conjugal dwelling and did not return for almost seven years thereby giving
rise to the presumption that she is already dead.
In the marriage of Sumaylo and del Rosario, he maintained that he did not violate Article 7,
paragraph 1 of the Family Code.
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Issue:
Whether or not the respondent judge erred in solemnizing the marriages
Ruling:
Yes. Should Tagadan institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wife’s
presumptive death otherwise he remains married to Peñaranda. Such negligence or ignorance
of the law has resulted is a bigamous, and therefore, void marriage. The marriage between
Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void, there being a subsisting
marriage between him and Ida Peñaranda.
A marriage can be held outside of the judge’s chambers or courtroom only in the following
instances: (1) at the point of death; (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29; (3) upon
request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that
either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in a remote area. The written request
was made by only one party. Under Article 3 of the Family Code, one of the formal requisite is
the authority of the solemnizing officer. Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among
others, any incumbent member of the judiciary within his or her court’s jurisdiction. Article 8 of
the same Code refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify
the authority of the solemnizing officer. Non compliance of such will not invalidate the marriage.
Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said
areas otherwise there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite and may subject the
solemnizing officer to administrative liability.
Fallo:
The respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6)
months and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt
with more severely.
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Foreign Divorce
Tanchavez v. Escano
PASTOR TANCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant, vs. VICENTA ESCANO, defendant-appellee

No. L-19671. November 29, 1965
REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, in its Civil Case No. R-4177, denying the claim of the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B.
Tenchavez, for legal separation and one million pesos in damages against his wife and parents-
in-law, the defendants-appellees, Vicente, Mamerto and Mena, all surnamed "Escaño,"
respectively.
Facts:
On February 24, 1948, Vicenta Escano and Pastor Tanchavez got married and the marriage
was unknown to the parents of Vicenta. The said marriage was solemnized by Lt. Lavares, an
Army Catholic Chaplain. Their marriage was the culmination of a previous love affair and was
duly registered with the local civil registrar.
Upon the knowledge of the parents of Vicenta, they took her to their house. Consequently, she
admitted her marriage with Tanchavez. Her parents were surprised because Tanchavez never
asked for the hand of Vicenta and were disgusted because of the great scandal because of the
clandestine marriage would provoke.
Thereafter, Vicenta continued to live with her parents, while tanchavez returned to Manila to his
job. As of June 1948, the newlyweds were already estranged. Vicenta filed a petition to annul
her marriage; however, she did not sign the said document. Thus, the case was dismissed
because of her non- appearance at the hearing.
In 1950, Vicenta left for United States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for
divorce. And on October 21, 1950, a decree of divorce, final and absolute was issued. In 1954,
Vicenta married an American and she lived with him and begotten children.
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Issue:
Whether or not Vicenta failed to perform her wifely duties.
Ruling:
It was held that the refusal to perform her wifely duties and her denial of consortium and her
desertion of her husband constitute in law a wrong caused through he fault. Thus, the husband
is entitled for indemnity.
Fallo:
The decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from
defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the
amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the
estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.
Neither party to recover costs.
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RP v. Iyoy
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner v. CRASUS L. IYOY, respondent.

G.R. No. 152577. September 21, 2005
CHICO-NAZARIO, J:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Republic
of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, prays for the reversal of
the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, affirming
the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-
20077, dated 30 October 1998, declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and
Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines.
FACTS:
Crasus Iyoy married Fely on December 16, 1961 in Cebu City. They begot five children. After
the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was “hot-tempered, a
nagger and extravagant.” In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America
(U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children to the care of respondent Crasus. Sometime in 1985,
respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got
married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. Fely had five visits in Cebu City
but never met Crasus. Also, she had been openly using the surname of her American husband
in the Philippines and in the USA. Crasus filed a declaration of nullity of marriage on March 25,
1997.
On her Answer, Fely alleged that while she did file for divorce from respondent Crasus, she
denied having herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus requesting him to sign the enclosed
divorce papers. After securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married her American
husband and acquired American citizenship. She argued that her marriage to her American
husband was legal because now being an American citizen, her status shall be governed by the
law of her present nationality. Fely also prayed that the RTC declare her marriage to respondent
Crasus null and void; and that respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely the P90,000.00 she
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advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and
litigation expenses.
The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage of Crasus and Fely null and void ab ignition on
the ground of psychological incapacity. One factor considered by the RTC is that Fely obtained
a divorce decree in the United States of America and married another man and has established
another family of her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation, wherein he is married to a wife
who is already married to another man in another country. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court’s decision.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not abandonment and sexual infidelity constitute psychological incapacity.

2. Whether or not the divorce instituted by Fely abroad was valid.
RULING:
1st issue:
The totality of evidence presented during the trial is insufficient to support the finding of
psychological incapacity of Fely. Using the guidelines established by the cases of Santos,
Molina and Marcos, this Court found that the totality of evidence presented by respondent
Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife Fely;
therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code of the Philippines. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or
perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological
incapacity under the said Article.
2nd issue:
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple
getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was
celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case
of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was
still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her
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Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime
after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in
1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At
the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by
Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she
was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize
divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from
respondent Crasus.
The Supreme Court held that the marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-
Iyoy remains valid and subsisting.
Fallo:
The Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
62539, dated 30 July 2001, affirming the Judgment of the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil
Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
206
Van Dorn v. Romillo
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, v. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR. AND RICHARD
UPTON, respondents.
No. L-68470. October 8, 1985.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside
the Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by
respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for
Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.
Facts:
Petitioner Alicia Reyes Van is citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton
is a citizen of the United States, were married on 1972 at Hongkong. On 1982, they got divorced
in Nevada, United States; and the petitioner remarried to Theodore Van Dorn.
On July 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner, asking that the petitioner be
ordered to render an accounting of her business in Ermita, Manila, and be declared with right to
manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the
cause of action is barred by previous judgement in the divorce proceeding before Nevada Court
where respondent acknowledged that they had no community property. The lower court denied
the motion to dismiss on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines, that
the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. Respondent avers that Divorce Decree abroad
cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not the divorce obtained the spouse valid to each of them.
(2) Whether or not Richard Upton may assert his right on conjugal properties.
207
Held:
As to Richard Upton the divorce is binding on him as an American Citizen. As he is bound by

the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court
from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. Only Philippine Nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorce the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. Alicia Reyes under our National law is still considered
married to private respondent. However, petitioner should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
Fallo:
The Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint filed
in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.
208
Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner, v. HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, HON LUIS

C. VICTOR AND ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.
G.R. No. 80116. June 30, 1989.
REGALADO, J.:
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private
respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of
Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The
marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate,
Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980.
Facts:
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil (Filipino citizen) and respondent
and respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, German national, were married at Federal Republic of
Germany. They lived together in Malate, Manila and had a child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling.
The private respondent initiated divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany. The local
court in Germany promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the
spouse.
On the other hand, petitioner filed an action for legal separation before a trial court in Manila.
After the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed the complaint for adultery
before the prosecutor of Manila alleging that the petitioner had an affair William Chia and Jesus
Chua while they were still married.
Petitioner filed a petition with the Justice Secretary asking to set aside the cases filed against
her and be dismissed. Thereafter, petitioner moved to defer her arraignment and to suspend
further proceedings. Justice Secretary Ordoñez issued a resolution directing to move for the
dismissal of the complaints against petitioner.
Issue:
Is the action tenable?
209
Ruling:
Yes. The crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted
except upon sworn written filed by the offended spouse. Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code
presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the
criminal action for adultery. This is logical consequence since the raison d’etre of said provision
of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the
alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case. It is indispensable that the status
and capacity of the complainant to commence the action be definitely established and, such
status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. Thus, the divorce
decree is valid not only in his country, may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private
respondent is concerned – in view of the nationality principle under the Civil Code on the matter
of civil status of persons. Private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no
legal standing to commence the adultery case. The criminal case filed against petitioner is
dismissed.
Fallo:
The questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another one
enteredDISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The
temporary restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent.
210
Quita v. CA
FE D. QUITA, petitioner, VS. COURT OF APPEALS

and BLANDINA DANDAN, respondents
December 22, 1998
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18 May
1941. They were not however blessed with children. Somewhere along the way their
relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
She submitted in the divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19 July 1950 evidencing their
agreement to live separately from each other and a settlement of their conjugal properties. On
23 July 1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a
certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the
U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a certain Wernimont.
Facts:
Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on May 18,
1941. No children were born out of their marriage. On July 23, 1954, petitioner obtained a final
judgment of divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. On April 16, 1972, Arturo died leaving
no will. On August 31, 1972, Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the RTC for issuance of
letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust
Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan, claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Dandan
and the surviving children, all surnamed Padlan, opposed the petition. The RTC expressed that
the marriage between Antonio and petitioner subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972, that the
marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo was clearly void since it was
celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner. The Court of Appeals
remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
Issues:
1. Should the case be remanded to the lower court?

2. Who between the petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the decedent?
211
Held:
If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person
or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy
shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No dispute exists as to the right of the six Padlan children to inherit from the decedent because
there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even
recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan, nor as to their respective hereditary shares.
Private respondent is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status
presupposes a legitimate relationship. Her marriage to Arturo being a bigamous marriage
considered void ab inito under Articles 80 and 83 of the Civil Code renders her not a surviving
spouse.
The decision of the Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the case is affirmed.
Fallo:
The petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May
15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga
del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.
212
San Luis v. San Luis
EDGAR SAN LUIS, petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, respondent.

G.R. No. 133743. February 6, 2007.
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who
was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted
three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were
born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963,
Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Facts:
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who
was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted
three marriages. The first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were
born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963,
Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. The second was Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son,
Tobias; and Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, with whom he had no children with
respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death.
Respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of
Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 146.
Thereater, the heirs of Virginia Sulit filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue
and failure to state a cause of action. But the trial court issued an order denying the two motions
to dismiss. On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of
administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor
and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta.
Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to
file the petition for letters of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous,
thus, void ab initio. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court,
and, hence, the case before the Supreme Court.
213
Issue:
Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration
Held:
Respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of
Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If
she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that
her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be
considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the
property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by
either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property
be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the
union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the
portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven.
Morover, the Supreme Court founnd that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition
for letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his
co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
The order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its
October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is affirmed. It
was also REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
Fallo:
the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating and affirming the
February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss
and its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is
AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
214
Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas
CORPUZ, petitioner, vs. STO. TOMAS, respondent.

G.R. No. 186571. August 11, 2010
BRION, J.:
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship
through naturalization on November 29, 2000. On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married
respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. Due to work and other professional
commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines
sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was
having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed
a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted
Gerbert’s petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month
later, on January 8, 2006.
Facts:
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship
through naturalization on November 29, 2000. On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married
respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. Due to work and other professional
commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines
sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was
having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed
a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted
Gerbert’s petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month
later, on January 8, 2006.
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love.
Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City
Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage
certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics
Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under
Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized
by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.
215
ISSUE:
Whether or not the divorce obtained is valid.
Held:
No, Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected, without judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code
by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry
may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the
jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment,
authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry.
Fallo:
he petition for review on certiorari was grant, and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We
order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with our
ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.
216
Recio v. Recio
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, v. REDERICK A. RECIO,

respondent.
G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the
January 7, 1999 Decision and the March 24, 1999 Order of the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026-AF. The assailed Decision disposed as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A.
Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can
now remarry under existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties."
FACTS:
Respondent Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in
Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On
May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an
Australian family court. On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen and was
married again to petitioner Grace Garcia-Recio, a Filipina on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan
City. In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as “single” and
“Filipino.”
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage.
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the
ground of bigamy. Respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married
her. On his Answer, Rederick contended that his first marriage was validly dissolved; thus, he
was legally capacitated to marry Grace.
217
On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couple’s wedding and while the suit for the
declaration of nullity was pending , respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a
family court in Sydney, Australia because the “marriage had irretrievably broken down.”
The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage of Rederick and Grace Recio dissolved on the
ground that the Australian divorce had ended the marriage of the couple thus there was no
more marital union to nullify or annul.
ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven.
2.) Whether or not respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner.
RULING:
1st issue: The Supreme Court ruled that the mere presentation of the divorce decree of
respondent’s marriage to Samson is insufficient. Before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate
its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Furthermore, the divorce decree between
respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family
court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on
evidence must be demonstrated.
2nd issue:
Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
“1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the
other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy.”
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorrecce obtained by respondent may have
been restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his
national law. Hence, the Court find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously
assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent’s capacity to remarry
despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.
218
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving
evidence. The Court mentioned that they cannot grant petitioner’s prayer to declare her
marriage to respondent null and void because of the question on latter’s legal capacity to marry.
Fallo:
The case is remand to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively
show respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties'
marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.
219
RP v. Orbecido III
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III

G.R. No.154881, October 5, 2005
NACHURA, J.:
This petition had its origins in 1984 when numerous claimants led by Bienvenido M. Cadalin,
Rolando M. Amul and Donato B. Evangelista instituted a class suit with the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) for money claims, among which are the benefits provided
by Amiri Decree No. 23 of Bahrain, Retirement and Savings Plan benefits, etc., arising from
their recruitment by respondent Asia International Builders Corp. (AIBC) and employment by
Brown & Root International, Inc. (BRII).Several other complaints were filed by other groups of
claimants with the same money claims. The said POEA cases, L-84-06-555, L-85-10-777, L-85-
10-779 and L-86-05-460, were consequently consolidated. On January 30, 1989, the POEA
Administrator rendered his decision awarding US$824,652.44 in favor of only 324 claimants.
Facts:
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church
of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and
a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son, Kristoffer. A few years
later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree
and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. The respondent thereafter filed with the trial court
a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.
220
Ruling:
The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner
at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction
absurdity and injustice. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
The Court ruled that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code should be interpreted to allow
a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and
remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present petition there is no
sufficient evidence submitted and on record, the Court is unable to declare, based on
respondent’s bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had
obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated
to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondent’s submission of the
aforecited evidence in his favor.
Fallo:
The case is REMANDED to the trial court for its proper disposition. No costs.
221
Void Ab Initio Marriages
Moreno v. Moreno
Marilou Nama Moreno, complainant vs. Judge Jose C. Bernabe, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 72, Pasig, Metro Manila, respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-94-963 July 14, 1995
KAPUNAN, J.:
Trial Court, Branch 72, Pasig, Metro Manila for grave misconduct and gross ignorance of the
law.
Facts:
Trial Court, Branch 72, Pasig, Metro Manila for grave misconduct and gross ignorance of law.
Complainant alleges that on October 4, 1993, she and Marcelo Moreno were married before
respondent Judge Bernabe. She avers that respondent Judge assured her that the marriage
contract will be released ten days after October 4, 1993. When she visited the office of the
Judge, she found out that she could not get the marriage contract because the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar failed to issue a marriage license. She claims that respondent Judge
connived with the relatives of Marcelo Moreno to deceive her.
Respondent denies that he conspired with the relatives of Marcelo Moreno to solemnize the
marriage for the purpose of deceiving the complainant. Respondent contends that: 1) the Local
Civil Registrar of Pasig actually prepared the marriage license but it was not released due to the
subsequent objection of the father of Marcelo Moreno; 2) he, in good faith, solemnized the
marriage as he was moved only by a desire to help a begging and pleading complainant who
wanted some kind of assurance or security due to her pregnant condition; 3) in order to pacify
complainant, Marcelo Moreno requested him to perform the marriage ceremony with the
express assurance that the marriage license was definitely forthcoming; 4) that the contracting
parties were not known to him; and 5) that both parties, were fully appraised of the effects of a
marriage performed without the required marriage license.
222
Issue:
Whether or not respondent be held liable for misconduct for solemnizing a marriage without a
marriage license.
Held:
Respondent, by his own admission that he solemnized the marriage between complainant and
Marcelo Moreno without the required marriage license, has dismally failed to live up to his
commitment to be the “embodiment of competence, integrity and independence” and to his
promise to be “faithful to the law.”
Respondent cannot hide behind his claim of good faith and Christian motives which, at most,
would serve only to mitigate his liability but not exonerate him completely. Good intentions could
never justify violation of the law.
Fallo:
Respondent is hereby ordered to pay a fine of P10,000.00 and is STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
223
Navarro v. Domagtoy
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, v. JUDGE HERNANDO DOMAGTOY, respondent.

A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088. July 19, 1996.
ROMERO, J.:
The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte,
Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by
respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends,
exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.
Facts:
On September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the marriage between Gaspar A.
Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his
first wife. It is also alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador
Sumaylo and Gemma D. del Rosario outside his courts jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. in
relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having
solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife ,
and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied in the affidavit issued by the Municipal trial
Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his wife have not seen each
other for almost seven years. With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in
solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7,
paragraph I of the Family code which states that: “Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any
incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction”; and that Article 8 thereof
applies to the case in question.
Issue:
Whether or not the acts of Judge Domagtoy exhibits gross misconduct, inefficiency in office and
ignorance of the law.
224
Held:
In the first allegation, Gaspar Tagdan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration
of his first wife’s presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida
Penaranda. Whether wittingly, or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent
judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of
the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage.
Inasmuch as respondent judge’s jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and
Burgos, he was also not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in Dapa, Surigao del
Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced
authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles
of civil law.
Because of the respondent’s failure to apply the legal principles applicable in these cases, the
Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law because of this he is
suspended for a period of six months.
Fallo:
The respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6)
months and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt
with more severely.
225
Alcantara v. Alcantara
RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA, petitioner, v.

ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 167746. August 28, 2007
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Restituto Alcantara
assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No.
66724 denying petitioner’s appeal and affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Makati City, Branch 143, in Civil Case No. 97-1325 dated 14 February 2000, dismissing his
petition for annulment of marriage.
Facts:
A petition for annulment of marriage was filed by petitioner against respondent Rosita A.
Alcantara alleging that he and respondent celebrated their marriage twice without securing the
required marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite,
appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and
they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar of the said place.
On 14 October 1985, respondent gave birth to their child Rose Ann Alcantara. In 1988, they
parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be
issued declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding
marriage contract and its entry on file.
Answering petitioner’s petition for annulment of marriage, respondent asserts the validity of their
marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification
from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. She had actually gave birth to two
children, one as stated by the petitioner and the other was Rachel Ann Alcantara on October 27,
1992. Moreover, petitioner filed the said case in order to evade prosecution for concubinage for
he had a mistress with whom he had three children. The case for concubinage was actually filed
and that petitioner prays that the annulment case be dismissed for lack of merit.
The Regional Trial Court of Makati City dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The Court of
Appeals dismissed also the petitioner’s appeal. Hence, the appeal to the Supreme Court.
226
Issue:
Whether or not The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it ruled that
the Petition for Annulment has no legal and factual basis despite the evidence on record that
there was no marriage license at the precise moment of the solemnization of the marriage.
Held:
The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz of Carmona, Cavite enjoys the
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage
license was done in the regular conduct of official business. The presumption of regularity of
official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty.
However, the presumption prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive.
Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption and, in case of doubt
as to an officer’s act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness.
Significantly, apart from these, petitioner, by counsel, admitted that a marriage license was,
indeed, issued in Carmona, Cavite.
Fallo:
The instant Petition is Denied for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30
September 2004 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143 of Makati City,
dated 14 February 2000, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
227
Sevilla v. Cardenas
JAIME O. SEVILLA, petitioner, vs. CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, respondent.

G.R. No. 167684. July 31, 2006.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 74416 dated 20 December 2004 which set aside the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, in Civil Case No. 94-1285 dated 25 January 2002.
Facts:
Jaime O. Sevilla, herein petitioner, filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Carmelita N. Cardenas, herein respondent, for their marriage was vitiated by machination,
duress, and intimidation employed by the respondents Carmelita and her father. He was forced
to sign a marriage contract with Carmelita Cardenas before a minister of the Gospel, Rev. Cirilo
D Gonzales. Moreover, he alleged that there was no marriage license presented before the
solemnizing officer as certified by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Manila.
Actually, it was certified 3 times on the following dates: March 11, September 20, 1994 and July
25, 2000 that marriage license no. 2770792 was nowhere to be found.
On the other hand, the respondent, Carmelita N. Cardenas refuted these allegations of Jaime
and claims that they were first civilly married on May 19, 1969 and thereafter married at a
church on May 31, 1969 at Most Holy Redeemer Parish in Quezon City. Both were alleged to be
recorded in Local Civil Registrar and NSO. He is estopped from invoking the lack of marriage
license after having been married to her for 25 years.
The Regional Trial Court of Makati City declared the nullity of marriage of the parties based on
the petitioner’s allegations that no marriage license was presented before a solemnizing officer.
And that without the said marriage license, being one of the formal requisites of marriage, the
marriage is void from the beginning. This was based on the 3 certifications issued by the Local
Civil Registrar Manila that marriage license number 220792 was fictitious.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the decision of the
trail court in favor of the marriage, because the Local Civil Registrar failed to locate the said
228
license with due effort as testified by certain Perlita Mercader because the former Local Civil
registrar had already retired. The petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration but it was
denied by the Court of Appeals. thus, this case was elevated to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the certification made by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan that Marriage
License No. 2770792, as appearing in the marriage contract of the parties, sufficient to declare
the marriage void from the beginning.
Held:
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of

irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The absence of logbook is not conclusive proof of non-
issuance of Marriage License No. 2770792. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to
search for the said logbook, we can not easily accept that absence of the same also means
non-existence or falsity of entries therein.
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and lived together for several
years producing two offsprings, now adult themselves. Thus, the instant petition was denied.
Fallo:
The instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20 December 2004
and the Resolution dated 6 April 2005 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
229
Mallion v. Alcantara
OSCAR P. MALLION, petitioner, v. EDITHA ALCANTARA, respondent.

G.R. No. 141528. October 31, 2006.
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising a question
of law: Does a previous final judgment denying a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground
of psychological incapacity bar a subsequent petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of
lack of marriage license?
Facts:
On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar Mallion filed with the regional trial court seeking a
declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
The trial court denied the petition. Likewise, it was dismissed in the Court of Appeals.
After such decision, petitioner filed another petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with the
regional trial court alleging that his marriage with respondent was null and void due to the fact
that it was celebrated without a valid marriage license.
Respondent filed an answer with motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata and forum
shopping. The trial court grated her petition.
Issue:
Is the action of the husband tenable?
Ruling:
No. Section 47(b) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court pertains as “bar by prior judgment” or
“estoppels by verdict,” which is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of the
second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. In Section 47(c) of the same
rule, it pertains to res judicata in its concept as “conclusiveness of judgment” or the rule of auter
230
action pendant which ordains that issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot
again be raised in any future case between the same parties involving a different cause of
action. Therefore, having expressly and impliedly concealed the validity of their marriage
celebration, petitioner is now deemed to have waived any defects therein. The Court finds then
that the present action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of marriage
license is barred. The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Fallo:
The petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
231
Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma
EDUARDO M. COJUANCO, JR., complainant, v. ATTY. LEO J. PALMA, respondent.

Adm. Case No. 2474. September 15, 2004.
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
“The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain rigid
standards of mental and moral fitness. For the admission of a candidate to the bar, the Rules of
Court not only prescribe a test of academic preparation but require satisfactory testimonials of
good moral character. These standards are neither dispensed with nor lowered after admission:
the lawyer must continue to adhere to them or else incur the risk of suspension or removal.”
FACTS:
Complainant Eduardo Conjuanco, Jr. and Atty. Leo Palma, respondent, met when the
latter was assigned to handle the case of the former. In other words, the respondent was hired
by the complainant has his personal counsel. Consequently, the respondent got acquainted with
the complainant’s family, most especially with the latter’s daughter, Maria Luisa Cojuanco.
Later on, she, 22 years of age, and respondent got married in Hong Kong without the
former’s family knowledge. It was only after the marriage that respondent informed the
complainant of the said marriage and assured him that it is all legal. Complainant knew that
respondent is married to Elizabeth Hermosisima and has two children; the former then sent his
two sons to Hong Kong to convince Luisa to go home to Manila. She was persuaded.
Thus, the complainant filed with the Court of First Instance a petition for declaration of
nullity of the marriage between the respondent and Luisa. The lower court declared the same
null and void ab initio.
Thereafter, complainant filed the instant complaint for disbarment of the respondent.
It was found out that the first marriage with Elizabeth Hermosisima was subsisting at the
time the respondent contracted second marriage.
232
ISSUE:
Is the second marriage null and void ab initio?
RULING:
As to the validity of the second marriage, it has not yet been determined by the Court
with finality for the same poses a prejudicial question to the present disbarment proceeding. If
the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not determinative of an administrative case
against him or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect its course, then
the judgment of annulment of respondent’s marriage does not also exonerate him from a
wrongdoing actually committed. Definitely, the second marriage is null and void ab initio since
respondent is married to Elizabeth. First marriage is not yet annulled, thus second marriage
bigamous.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, respondent Leo J. Palma is found GUILTY of grossly immoral conduct

and violation of his oath as a lawyer, and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.
233
Carino v. Carino
SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO, petitioner, v. SUSAN YEE CARIÑO, respondent.

G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001.
The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two marriages
contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, whose “death benefits” is now the
subject of the controversy between the two Susans whom he married.
FACTS:
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted two marriages,
the first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño with whom he had two
offspring, namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cariño; and the second was on November 10, 1992, with
respondent Susan Yee Cariño with whom he had no children in their almost ten year
cohabitation starting way back in 1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño became ill and bedridden due to diabetes
complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23, 1992, under the
care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and
respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the
deceased from various government agencies.
On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of
sum of money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying that petitioner be ordered to return to her
at least one-half of the money collectively denominated as “death benefits” which she received.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during
the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage
license.
On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent.
234
On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto the decision of
the trial court.
ISSUES:
a. Whether or not the marriage of the deceased and petitioner is null and void ab
initio because it was solemnized without marriage license
b. Whether or not the second marriage is valid
RULING:
a. Yes. Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is
a requisite of marriage, and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the
marriage void ab initio. There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased
does not fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license,
therefore, was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. The marriage between petitioner
Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage
license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is
undoubtedly void ab initio.
b. No. The declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the
deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased
with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first
obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased
void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab
initio. Hence, the petition is granted, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and
set aside.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 51263 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
ordering petitioner to pay respondent the sum of P73,000.00 plus attorney’s fees in the amount
of P5,000.00, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632, is
hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
235
Trinidad v. Trinidad
ARTURIO TRINIDAD, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

G.R. No. 118904 April 20, 1998
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In the absence of a marriage contract and a birth certificate, how may marriage and filiation
be proven?
FACTS:
On August 10, 1978, petitioner filed with the Court of First Instance of Aklan, Kalibo,
Aklan, an action for partition of four (4) parcels of land, described therein, claiming that he was
the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, one of three (3) children of Patricio Trinidad, who was the
original owner of the parcels of land. Patricio Trinidad died in 1940, leaving the four (4) parcels
of land to his three (3) children, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. In 1970, plaintiff demanded from
the defendants to partition the land into three (3) equal shares and to give him the one-third
(1/3) individual share of his late father, but the defendants refused and alleged in their answer
filed on September 07, 1978 that plaintiff was not the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad.
Defendants contended that Inocentes was single when he died in 1941 , before plaintiff's birth.
Defendants also denied that plaintiff had lived with them, and claimed that the parcels of land
described in the complaint had been in their possession since the death of their father in 1940
and that they had not given plaintiff a share in the produce of the land.
The trial court rendered in favor of the petitioner. However, Respondent Court reversed
the trial court on the ground that petitioner failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that his
parents were legally married to each other and that acquisitive prescription against him had set
in. Respondent Court denied reconsideration, thus, the appeal.
ISSUE:
In the absence of a marriage contract and a birth certificate, how may marriage and
filiation be proven?
236
RULING:
According to Respondent Court, petitioner failed to accomplish to prove that Inocentes

and his mother (Felicidad) were validly married, and that he was born during the subsistence of
their marriage. The Supreme Court disagrees citing the case of Pugeda v. Trias when the
question of whether a marriage has been contracted arises in litigation, said marriage may be
proven by relevant evidence. To prove the fact of marriage, the following would constitute
competent evidence: the testimony of a witness to the matrimony, the couple's public and open
cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock, the birth and the baptismal
certificates of children born during such union, and the mention of such nuptial in subsequent
documents.
In the case at bar, petitioner secured a certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar
of Aklan that all records of births, deaths and marriages were either lost, burned or destroyed
during the Japanese occupation of said municipality. This fact, however, is not fatal to
petitioner's case. Although the marriage contract is considered the primary evidence of the
marital union, petitioner's failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place, as other
forms of relevant evidence may take its place. In place of a marriage contract, two witnesses
were presented by petitioner, Isabel Meren, who testified that she was present during the nuptial
of Felicidad and Inocentes on May 5, 1942 in New Washington, Aklan; and Jovita Gerardo, who
testified that the couple deported themselves as husband and wife after the marriage. Gerardo,
the 77-year old barangay captain of Tigayon and former board member of the local parent-
teachers' association, used to visit Inocentes and Felicidad's house twice or thrice a week, as
she lived only thirty meters away.
Private respondents' thesis is that Inocentes died unwed and without issue in March
1941. Private respondents' witness, Pedro Briones, testified that Inocentes died in 1940 and
was buried in the estate of the Trinidads, because nobody was willing to carry the coffin to the
cemetery in Kalibo, which was then occupied by the Japanese forces. Taking judicial notice that
World War II did not start until December 7, 1941 with the bombing of Pearl Harbor in Hawaii,
the trial court was not convinced that Inocentes dies in March 1941. 35 The Japanese forces
occupied Manila only on January 2, 1942; thus, it stands to reason that Aklan was not occupied
until then. It was only then that local residents were unwilling to bury their dead in the cemetery
In Kalibo, because of the Japanese soldiers who were roaming around the area. Furthermore,
petitioner consistently used Inocentes' surname (Trinidad) without objection from private
respondents a presumptive proof of his status as Inocentes' legitimate child.
237
The petition was granted and the assailed Decision and Resolution were reversed and
set aside. The trial court's decision dated July 4, 1989 was reinstated.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial court’s decision dated July 4, 1989 is
REINSTATED. No costs.
238
LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant, v.

JUDGE FRANCISCO BRILLANTES, JR., respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706. March 29, 1995.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of
Impropriety against Judge Francisco Brillantes, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 20, Manila.
FACTS:
Petitioner Lupo Atienza alleged that he was living Yolanda De Castro and that they had
two children.
In December 1991, he saw Judge Franciso Brillantes, Jr., the respondent, sleeping on
his bed. He was informed by the houseboy that he cohabited with De Castro. He did not bother
on what he saw; he simply left the house and told the houseboy to take good care of his
children.
Thereafter, respondent prevented him to visit his children. The former likewise alienated
the affection of his children for him.
While cohabiting with De Castro, the respondent was actually married to Zenaida
Ongkiko with whom he has five children. He alleged that while he and Ongkiko went through a
marriage ceremony before the mayor of a town in Nueva Ecija on April 25, 1965, it was not valid
for there was no marriage license. Even when they had their second marriage ceremony,
neither party applied for marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned respondent leaving their children
to his care and custody.
Respondent then claimed that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles,
California, he believed in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was single
because his first marriage was solemnized without a license.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage of Judge Brillantes and Zenaida Ongkiko is valid.
239
RULING:
No. However, there should be judicial declaration of the nullity of the previous marriage
before a party can enter into a second marriage as provided in Article 40 of the Family Code.
The fact that he is already a lawyer, he then knew marriage license is necessary or a formal
requisite before one can get married. He was given an opportunity to correct the flaw when he
married Ongkiko for the second time but he failed to secure motives and bad faith.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all leave
and retirement benefits and with prejudice to reappointment in any branch, instrumentality, or
agency of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations. This
decision is immediately executory.
240
Manzano v. Sanchez
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner, v.

JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were both bound
by a prior existing marriage is the bone of contention of the instant complaint against
respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act,
complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the
law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on 12 May
1999.
FACTS:
Complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano avers that she was the lawful wife of the late
David Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish,
Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. Four children were born out of that marriage. On 22 March
1993, however, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before
respondent Judge. When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to
know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both
contracting parties were "separated."
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated
the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married.
What he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years
already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit. According to him,
had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not to marry
again; otherwise, Manzano could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be
dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed merely to harass him.
The Court Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross
ignorance of the law.
Respondent Judge alleges that he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in
accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.
241
ISSUE:
Is the reason of the respondent Judge in solemnizing the marriage valid?
RULING:
No. In Article 34 of the Family Code provides “No license shall be necessary for the
marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. Respondent Judge cannot take
refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had
been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary
cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting
previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who
are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage
license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent
marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.
FALLO:
ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby

ADOPTED, with the MODIFICATION that the amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent
Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to P20,000.
242
Ninal v. Bayadog
ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL,
INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petitioners, v. NORMA BAYADOG,
respondent.
G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000
YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage after his death?
FACTS:
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. She was shot by
Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter, Pepito and
respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito
and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage
license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident.
After their father’s death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage
license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second
marriage would affect petitioner’s successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action
since they are not among the persons who could file an action for annulment of marriage under
Article 47 of the Family Code.
ISSUES:
(a) Whether or not Pepito and Norma’ living together as husband and wife for at
least five years exempts them from obtaining a marriage license under Article 34 of the Family
Code of the Philippines.
(b) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for
the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her
243
specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is
already dead
RULING:
(a) On the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and
wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on
the basis of cohabitation as “husband and wife” where the only missing factor is the special
contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common law
cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a
period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. The five-year period
should be the years immediately before the day the marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity—meaning no third party was involved at any time
within the five years, and continuity—that is, unbroken. Otherwise, if that five-year cohabitation
period is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry
each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and
encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing
with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.
(b) The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage.
Voidable and void marriages are not identical. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned
even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the
lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring
will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial
Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.
244
Sy v. CA
FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

G.R. No. 127263. April 12, 2000.
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review is the decision dated May 21, 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 44144, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando,
Pampanga, denying the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of the spouses
Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy.
FACTS:
On November 15, 1973 Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy got married at the Church of Our
Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. After some time, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Two
children were born out of the marriage. Frederick, their son went to his father’s residence.
Filipina filed for legal separation.
The Trial Court dissolved their conjugal partnership of gains and granted the custody of
their children to her.
Later on, Filipina was punched at the different parts of her body and was even choked
by him when she started spanking their son when the latter ignored her while she was talking to
him.
The Trial Court convicted him for slight physical injuries only. A new action for legal
separation was granted by repeated physical violence and sexual infidelity. Filipina then filed
for the declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage citing psychological incapacity.
The Trial Court and Appellate Court denied her petition. On her petition to this Court, she
assailed for the first time that there was no marriage license during their marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between the parties is void from the beginning for lack of a
marriage license at the time of the ceremony?
245
RULING:
Their marriage license was issued on September 17, 1974. However, the celebration of
their marriage was on Nov. 15, 1973. It is obvious from the dates that the marriage was
contracted by the partners without a marriage license. They were not among the exceptions
that could avail of a valid marriage without marriage license, thus, their marriage is void from the
beginning for an absence of a formal requisite of a marriage. Thus, the marriage celebrated on
November 15, 1973 between petitioner Filipina Yap and private respondent Fernando Sy is
hereby declared void ab initio for lack of marriage license at the time of celebration.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
San Fernando, Pampanga, dated December 9,1993 as well as the Decision promulgated on
May 21, 1996 by the Court of Appeals and its Resolution dated November 21, 1996, in CA-G.R.
No. 44144 are set aside. The marriage celebrated on November 15, 1973 between petitioner
Filipina Yap and private respondent Fernando Sy is hereby declared void ab initio for lack of
marriage license at the time of celebration. No pronouncement as to costs.
246
Cosca v. Palaypayon
JUVY N. COSCA, EDMUNDO B. PERALTA, RAMON C. SAMBO, and APOLLO A.

VILLAMORA, complainants, v. HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR., Presiding Judge, and
NELIA B. ESMERALDA-BAROY, Clerk of Court II, respondents.
A.M. No. MTJ-92-721. September 30, 1994.
PER CURIAM, J.:

Complainants Juvy N. Cosca, Edmundo B. Peralta, Ramon C. Sambo, and Apollo
Villamora, are Stenographer I, Interpreter I, Clerk II, and Process Server, respectively, of the
Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Respondents Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon,
Jr. and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy are respectively the Presiding Judge and Clerk of Court II of
the same court.
FACTS:
Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the
requisite marriage license. Thus, the following couples were able to get married by the simple
expedient of paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy, despite the absence of a marriage
license. In addition, respondent judge did not sign their marriage contracts and did not indicate
the date of solemnization, the reason being that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license
to be submitted by the parties which was usually several days after the ceremony. Indubitably,
the marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil registrar. Complainant Ramon Sambo,
who prepares the marriage contracts, called the attention of respondents to the lack of marriage
licenses and its effect on the marriages involved, but the latter opted to proceed with the
celebration of said marriages.
It is alleged that respondent judge made it appear that he solemnized seven marriages
in the month of July, 1992, when in truth he did not do so or at most those marriages were null
and void.
In view of the findings that the evidence presented by the complainants sufficiently show
that respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. had solemnized marriages, particularly that of
Sammy Bocaya and Gina Besmonte, without a marriage license.
247
Issue:
Whether or not the marriages the respondent Judge solemnized were valid?
RULING:
It declares that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall generally
render the marriage void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not
affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be
civilly, criminally and administratively liable. The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting
parties and those affected by the illegal marriages, and what we are providing for herein
pertains to the administrative liability of respondents, all without prejudice to their criminal
responsibility.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby imposes a FINE of P20, 000.00 on respondent Judge
Lucio P. Palaypayon. Jr., with a stern warning that any repetition of the same or similar offenses
in the future will definitely be severely dealt with. Respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy is hereby
DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to
employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the Government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations.
248
Jarillo v. People
VICTORIA S. JARILLO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
PERALTA, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
praying that the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated July 21, 2003, and its
Resolution[2] dated July 8, 2004, be reversed and set aside.
FACTS:
On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged with Bigamy before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 117 under the following Information in Criminal Case No. 00-08-11.
The allege was that on or about the 26th day of November 1979, in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
Victoria S. Jarillo, being previously united in lawful marriage with Rafael M. Alocillo, and without
the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy which marriage was
only discovered on January 12, 1999.
In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the appellant Civil Case No. 99-93582 for
annulment of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.Thereafter, appellant Jarillo
was charged with bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subsequent marriage was valid?
249
RULING:
No. The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to [private
complainant] had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in
the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to
prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is
contracted.
FALLO:
Petition is DENIED.
250
Macarrubo v. Macarrubo
FLORENCE TEVES MACARRUBO, the Minors JURIS ALEXIS T. MACARRUBO and

GABRIEL ENRICO T. MACARRUBO as represented by their Mother/Guardian, FLORENCE
TEVES MACARRUBO, complainant, v. ATTY. EDMUNDO L. MACARRUBO, respondent.
A.C. No. 6148. February 27, 2004.
PER CURIAM:
Florence Teves Macarrubo (complainant), by herself and on behalf of her two children, filed
on June 6, 2000 a verified complaint[1] for disbarment against Atty. Edmundo L. Macarubbo
(respondent) with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), docketed as CBD Case No. 00-
734-A, alleging that respondent deceived her into marrying him despite his prior subsisting
marriage with a certain Helen Esparza.
FACTS:
Florence Teves Macarrubo, complainant, filed on June 6, 2000 a verified complaint for
disbarment against Atty. Edmundo L. Macarubbo,respondent, with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines alleging that respondent deceived her into marrying him despite his prior subsisting
marriage with a certain Helen Esparza. The complainant averred that he started courting her in
April 1991, he representing himself as a bachelor; that they eventually contracted marriage
which was celebrated on two occasions administered by Rev. Rogelio J. Bolivar, the first on
December 18, 1991 in the latter’s Manila office, and the second on December 28, 1991 at the
Asian Institute of Tourism Hotel in Quezon City; and that although respondent admitted that he
was married to Helen Esparza on June 16, 1982, he succeeded in convincing complainant, her
family and friends that his previous marriage was void.
Complainant further averred that respondent entered into a third marriage with one
Josephine T. Constantino; and that he abandoned complainant and their children without
providing them any regular support up to the present time, leaving them in precarious living
conditions.
Respondent denied employing deception in his marriage to complainant, insisting
instead that complainant was fully aware of his prior subsisting marriage to Helen Esparza, but
that she dragged him against his will to a “sham wedding” to protect her and her family’s
reputation since she was then three-months pregnant. He submitted in evidence that in the civil
case “Edmundo L. Macarubbo v. Florence J. Teves,” it declared his marriage to complainant
251
void ab initio. He drew attention to the trial court’s findings on the basis of his evidence which
was not controverted, that the marriage was indeed “a sham and make believe” one, “vitiated by
fraud, deceit, force and intimidation, and further exacerbated by the existence of a legal
impediment” and want of a valid marriage license. Respondent raised the additional defenses
that the judicial decree of annulment of his marriage to complainant is res judicata upon the
present administrative case; that complainant is in estoppel for admitting her status as mere
live-in partner to respondent in her letter to Josephine T. Constantino. Stressing that he had
always been the victim in his marital relations, respondent invoked the final and executory
August 21, 1998 in the case “Edmundo L. Macarubbo v. Helen C. Esparza,” declaring his first
marriage void on the ground of his wife’s psychological incapacity.
It is recommended that respondent Atty. Edmundo L. Macarrubo be suspended for three
months for gross misconduct reflecting unfavorably on the moral norms of the profession. The
IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent should be suspended for gross misconduct?
RULING:
While the marriage between complainant and respondent has been annulled by final
judgment, this does not cleanse his conduct of every tinge of impropriety. He and complainant
started living as husband and wife in December 1991 when his first marriage was still
subsisting, as it was only on August 21, 1998 that such first marriage was annulled, rendering
him liable for concubinage. Such conduct is inconsistent with the good moral character that is
required for the continued right to practice law as a member of the Philippine bar. Even
assuming that respondent was coerced by complainant to marry her, the duress, by his own
admission as the following transcript of his testimony reflects, ceased after their wedding day,
respondent having freely cohabited with her and even begot a second child by her. Thus,
respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo is found guilty of gross immorality and is hereby disbarred
from the practice of law.
252
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo is found guilty of gross immorality

and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law. He is likewise ORDERED to show
satisfactory evidence to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline and to this Court that he is
supporting or has made provisions for the regular support of his two children by complain
253
Tenebro v. Tenebro
VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner, v.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
G.R. No. 150758. February 18, 2004.
We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of the judicial
declaration of the nullity of a second or subsequent marriage, on the ground of psychological
incapacity, on an individual’s criminal liability for bigamy. We hold that the subsequent judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not retroact to
the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines’ penal laws are concerned.
As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence
of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration
that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
FACTS:
Petitioner Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia

Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial
Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without
interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been
previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed
Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous
marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating
that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain
Nilda Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch
15. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter
was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter, Villareyes confirmed that petitioner,
Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner.
The trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of bigamy. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
254
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused for the crime of bigamy despite
clear proof that the marriage between the accused and private complainant had been declared
null and void ab initio and without legal force and effect
RULING:
As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent
declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s
valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio
completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage
contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this
second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990,
during the subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been
consummated. Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the
essential requisites for validity. In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity
of marriage were satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of age, and
they voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the required license before Judge Alfredo
B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two witnesses.
The decision of the Court of Appeals convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the crime of
Bigamy is AFFIRMED.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21636, convicting petitioner
Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.
255
Quita v. CA
FE D. QUITA, petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and

BLANDINA DANDAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 124862. December 22, 1998.
BELLOSILLO, J .:
FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18
May 1941. They were not however blessed with children. Somewhere along the way their
relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California,
U.S.A. She submitted in the divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19 July 1950
evidencing their agreement to live separately from each other and a settlement of their conjugal
properties. On 23 July 1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks
thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but their relationship also
ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a certain Wernimont.
FACTS:
Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18
May 1941. Somewhere along the way their relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for
divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. She submitted in the divorce proceedings a private
writing dated 19 July 1950 evidencing their agreement to live separately from each other and a
settlement of their conjugal properties. On 23 July 1954 she obtained a final judgment of
divorce. Three weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but their
relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a
certain Wernimont.
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong
filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of
administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company.
Respondent Blandina Dandan, claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, opposed
the petition and prayed for the appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Cabasal, which was
resolved in favor of the latter. Upon motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was
later replaced by Higino Castillon.
The trial court disregarded the divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Consequently, it
expressed the view that their marriage subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972.
256
In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, it declared null and void the decision and order of
the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage of Arturo and Fe still subsists
RULING:
The Court noted that Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally married to her
in spite of the divorce they obtained. However, petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the
time of her divorce from Arturo. Significantly, the decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo was
obtained in the same year. Petitioner however did not bother to file a reply memorandum to
erase the uncertainty about her citizenship at the time of their divorce, a factual issue requiring
hearings to be conducted by the trial court. Consequently, respondent appellate court did not
err in ordering the case returned to the trial court for further proceedings. The Court emphasizes
however that the question to be determined by the trial court should be limited only to the right
of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private respondent's claim to
heirship was already resolved by the trial court. She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947
while the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous
marriage considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code.
Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status
presupposes a legitimate relationship. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals ordering the
remand of the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and declaring null and void its
decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is affirmed.
The order of the appellate court modifying its previous decision by granting one-half of the net
hereditary estate to the Padlan children, namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and
Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's brother Ruperto
Padlan, is likewise affirmed. The Court however emphasizes that the reception of evidence by
the trial court should be limited to the hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse of
Arturo Padlan.
257
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals

ordering the remand of the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and declaring null
and void its decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs
is AFFIRMED. The order of the appellate court modifying its previous decision by granting
one-half (1/2) of the net hereditary estate to the Padlan children, namely, Claro, Ricardo,
Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of
Arturo's brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED. The Court however emphasizes that
the reception of evidence by the trial court should be limited to the hereditary rights of petitioner
as the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan
258
Vda. de Mijares v. Villaluz
PRISCILLA CASTILLO VDA. DE MIJARES, complainant, v.

JUSTICE ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ (RETIRED), respondent.
Adm. Case No. 4431. June 19, 1997.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Through a verified letter-complaint dated 12 September 1995, retired Justice of the
Court of Appeals Onofre A. Villaluz charged Judge Priscilla C. Mijares, incumbent Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 108, with dishonesty, corrupt practices, grave
misconduct and immorality,
FACTS:
Complainant Judge Priscilla Castillo Vda. De Mijares is the presiding judge in Pasay City
while respondent Onofre A. Villaluz, a retired Justice of the Court of Appeals, is a consult at the
Presidential Anti-Crime Commission.
Judge Mijares is actually widowed by the death of her first husband, Primitivo Mijares.
She obtained a decree declaring her husband presumptively dead, after an absence of 16
years. Thus, she got married to respondent in a civil wedding on January 7, 1994 before Judge
Myrna Lim Verano.
They (complainant and respondent) knew each other when the latter, who was at that
time the Presiding Judge of the Criminal Circuit Court in Pasig, was trying a murder case
involving the death of the son of Mijares.
During their marriage, complainant judge discovered that respondent was having an illicit
affair with another woman. Respondent denied such rather he uttered harsh words to the
complainant judge. As a result, they lived separately and did not get in touch with one another
and the respondent did not bother to apologize for what happened.
Through Judge Ramon Makasiar, complainant knew that respondent married Lydia
Geraldez. Complainant then filed a complaint against respondent for disbarment for the latter
immorally and bigamously entered into a second marriage while having a subsisting marriage
and distorted the truth by stating his civil status as single.
In his defense, he contended that his marriage to the complainant judge was a “sham
marriage”; that he voluntarily signed the marriage contract to help her in the administrative case
for immorality filed against her by her legal researcher. Likewise, he maintained that when he
259
contracted his marriage with complainant, he had a subsisting marriage with his first wife
because the decision declaring the annulment of such marriage had not yet become final and
executory or published.
Judge Purisima the found respondent guilty of deceit and grossly immoral conduct and
later on affirmed by the Court.
ISSUES:
a. Whether or not marriage of complainant and respondent valid

b. Whether or not the marriage of complainant and respondent was a sham marriage
RULING:
a. Yes. It was a valid marriage. All the essential and formal requisites of a valid
marriage under Articles 2 and 3 of the Family Code were satisfied and complied. Given the
circumstance that he was facing criminal case for bigamy and assuming for the sake of
argument that the judgment in civil case declaring the annulment of marriage between
respondent and the first wife had not attained complete finality, the marriage between
complainant and respondent is not void but only voidable.
b. As to the issue that it was a “sham” marriage is too incredible to deserve serious
consideration. Thus, former Justice Onofre Villaluz is found guilty of immoral conduct in violation
of the Code of Professional Responsibility; he is hereby suspended from practice of law for two
years with the specific warning.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds respondent guilty of grave
misconduct and resolves that:
(1) Under the first charge, respondent Judge Priscilla C. Mijares is hereby FINED in the amount
of P20,000.00.
(2) Under the second charge, respondent Judge Mijares is hereby FINED P10,000.00 for
violating Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court.
260
(3) Respondent Judge is further WARNED that the commission of the same or a similar offense
shall be dealt with more severely.
261
Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy
LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO- DIY AND KARL
HEINZ WIEGEL, respondents.
No. L-53703. August 19, 1986.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Through a verified letter-complaint dated 12 September 1995, retired Justice of the
Court of Appeals Onofre A. Villaluz charged Judge Priscilla C. Mijares, incumbent Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 108, with dishonesty, corrupt practices, grave
misconduct and immorality.
FACTS:
Karl Heinz Wiegel asked for the declaration of nullity of his marriage, celebrated on July
1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church in Makati, with Lilia Oliva Wiegel on the
ground that she had a previous existing marriage to Eduardo Maxion solemnized on June 25,
1972, at Our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City.
Lilia admitted she had prior subsisting marriage but it was null and void that she and
Eduardo have been allegedly forced to enter said marital union and that he, at the time of the
marriage in 1972, was already married to someone else.
The trial court ruled against Lilia because the existence of force exerted in both parties
of the first marriage had already been agreed upon
ISSUE:
Was said prior marriage void or merely voidable?
RULING:
The prior marriage was voidable. A marriage vitiated by force on both parties is not void
but merely voidable and therefore valid until annulled. Since there is no annulment yet, it is clear
that when she married respondent, she was validly married to her first husband, consequently,
her marriage to respondent is void.
262
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that JUDGE PRISCILLA C.

MIJARES be found guilty of grave misconduct under Charges No. 1 and No. 2, and that she be
DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all leave credits and retirement benefits and
privileges, and with prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of the Government service,
whether pertaining to the national or local Government, including government-owned and/or
controlled corporations, instrumentalities and agencies.
263
Balogbog and Balogbog v. CA
LEONCIA BALOGBOG and GAUDIOSO BALOGBOG, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE

COURT OF APPEALS, respondents
G.R. No. 83598. March 7, 1997
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, affirming the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu City (Branch IX), declaring private respondents
heirs of the deceased Basilio and Genoveva Balogbog entitled to inherit from them.
FACTS:
Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva
Arnibal who died intestate. Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog brought an action for partition
and accounting against petitioners, claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino and
that they were entitled to the one-third share of Gavino in the estate of their grandparents.
Petitioners denied knowing private respondents. Petitioners presented two witnesses to fortify
their claims. Catalina Ubas testified concerning her marriage to Gavino. She testified that after
the wedding, she was handed a “receipt,” presumably the marriage certificate but it was burned
during the war. She said that she and Gavino lived together in Obogon and begot three
children. Private respondents produced a certificate from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar
that the Register of Marriages did not have a record of the marriage of Gavino and Catalina;
another certificate from the Office of the Treasurer that there was no record of the birth of
Ramonito in that office and, for this reason, the record must be presumed to have been lost or
destroyed during the war, and a certificate by the Parish Priest of Asturias that there was
likewise no record of birth of Ramonito in the church, the records of which were either lost or
destroyed during the war. Petitioner Leoncia Balogbog testified that Gavino died single at the
family residence in Asturias. She obtained a certificate from the Local Civil Registrar of Asturias
to the effect that that office did not have a record of the names of Gavino and Catalina. The
Court of First Instance of Cebu City rendered judgment for private respondents, ordering
petitioners to render an accounting from 1960 until the finality of its judgment, to partition the
estate and deliver to private respondents one-third of the estate of Basilio and Genoveva.
264
ISSUE:
Should the marriage of Gavino and Catalina be proven under Articles 53 and 54 of the
Civil Code of 1889 and that the existence of their marriage cannot be presumed because there
was no evidence showing in particular that they declared that they take each other as husband
and wife during their marriage?
RULING:
Articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 1889 of Spain did not take effect, therefore,
articles. 53 and 54 never came into force. Since this case was brought in the lower court in
1968, the existence of the marriage was to be determined in accordance with the present Civil
Code, except as they related to vested rights, and the rules on evidence. Under the Rules of
Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as husband and wife
are legally married. This presumption may be rebutted only by cogent proof to the contrary.
Evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the marriage.
Indeed, although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, the failure to
present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence may be presented to prove
marriage. The argument that the existence of the marriage cannot be presumed because there
was no evidence showing in particular that Gavino and Catalina, in the presence of two
witnesses, declared that they were taking each other as husband and wife is without merit. An
exchange of vows can be presumed to have been made from the testimonies of the witnesses
who state that a wedding took place, since the very purpose for having a wedding is to
exchange vows of marital commitment. It would indeed be unusual to have a wedding without
an exchange of vows and quite unnatural for people not to notice its absence.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
265
Tamano v. Ortiz
ESTRELLITA TAMANO, petitioner, vs. HON. RODOLFO ORTIZ, respondent

G.R. No. 126603. June 29, 1998
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the decision of the
Court of Appeals of 30 September 1996 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 39656 which affirmed the decision
of the Regional Trial Court-Br. 89, Quezon City, denying the motion to dismiss as well as the
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Estrellita J. Tamano.
FACTS:
Senator Mamintal Tamano married Zorayda A. Tamano in civil rites. Their marriage
supposedly remained valid and subsisting until his death in 1994. Prior to his death, Tamano
also married petitioner Estrellita J. Tamano in civil rites. In 1994, Zorayda joined by her son Adib
A. Tamano filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage of Tamano and Estrellita on
the ground that it was bigamous. They contended that Tamano and Estrellita misrepresented
themselves as divorced and single, respectively, thus making the entries in the marriage
contract false and fraudulent.
Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the RTC was without jurisdiction over the
subject and nature of the action. She alleged that "only a party to the marriage" could file an
action for annulment of marriage against the other spouse, hence, it was only Tamano who
could file an action for annulment of their marriage. Petitioner likewise contended that since
Tamano and Zorayda were both Muslims and married in Muslim rites the jurisdiction to hear and
try the instant case was vested in the shari’a courts pursuant to Art. 155 of the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws.
ISSUE:
Is the marriage between Tamano and Zorayda under the jurisdiction of shari’a courts
and not the civil courts?
266
RULING:
No. Under The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, Regional Trial Courts have
jurisdiction over all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations. In the
complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by private respondents herein, it was alleged
that Estrellita and Tamano were married in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code.
Hence, contrary to the position of petitioner, the Civil Code is applicable in the instant case.
Assuming that indeed petitioner and Tamano were likewise married under Muslim laws, the
same would still fall under the general original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts.
Article 13 of PD No. 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were
married both in civil and Muslim rites. Consequently, the shari’a courts are not vested with
original and exclusive jurisdiction when it comes to marriages celebrated under both civil and
Muslim laws. Consequently, the Regional Trial Courts are not divested of their general original
jurisdiction under Sec. 19, par. (6) of BP Blg. 129 which provides – Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil
Cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: (6) In all cases not
within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
sustaining the 18 July 1995 and 22 August 1995 orders of the Regional Trial Court - Br. 89,
Quezon City, denying the motion to dismiss and reconsideration thereof, is AFFIRMED. Let the
records of this case be immediately remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings until
terminated.
267
Republic v. CA
REPUBLIC, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, defendant

GR No. 108763. February 13, 1997
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals reversing the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIX,[2]Cauayan, Isabela declaring Free Patent No.
V-79740 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-88 17 in the name of Irene Bullungan null and
void so far as the portion of Lot No. 1, Psu- 150801 involved in this case is concerned.
FACTS:
Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985. After a year of marriage,
Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility as a husband and a father. He
depended on his parents for aid and assistance, was never honest with her, was habitually
quarrelsome. He abandoned his family in the course of their marriage. Roridel filed a case in the
courts and Reynaldo's claims were that she was inefficient in the discharge of her marital duties.
The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage as void ab initio. The decision was affirmed in
toto by the Court of Appeals. The Office of the Solicitor General challenged the decision, citing
that opposing personalities as was evinced is not equivalent to psychological incapacity. The
ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and
duties, but a defect in their psychological nature."
ISSUE:
How must psychological incapacity be interpreted?
RULING:
The Supreme Court granted the petition and reversed and set aside the rulings of the
lower courts. What was shown was more of a difficulty rather than psychological incapacity.
Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem, neither its
268
juridical antecedence nor its incurability.
The Supreme Court also laid down the Molina guidelines for future reference in
interpreting psychological incapacity:
"(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them,
could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994), nevertheless such root cause must
be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's."
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not
be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
269
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less in will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the

Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also
be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x
x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for
his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor-General
shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095."
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and the decision

dated September 25, 1989 of the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch XIX is
REINSTATED.
270
Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, v.

GLORIA BERMUDEZ-LORINO, respondent.
G.R. No. 160258. January 19, 2005
GARCIA, J.:
Via this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), seeks the
reversal and setting aside of the decision dated September 23, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 73884, which affirmed on appeal an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) at San Mateo, Rizal in a summary judicial proceeding thereat commenced by the herein
respondent Gloria Bermudez-Lorino for the declaration of the presumptive death of her absent
spouse, Francisco Lorino, Jr., based on the provisions of Article 41 of the Family Code, for
purposes of remarriage.
FACTS:
Respondent Gloria Bermudez-Lorino, and her husband were married on June 12,
1987. Out of this marriage, she begot three children, namely: Francis Jeno, Fria Lou and
Fatima. Before they got married in 1987, Gloria was unaware that her husband was a habitual
drinker, possessed with violent character/attitude, and had the propensity to go out with friends
to the extent of being unable to engage in any gainful work.
Because of her husband’s violent character, Gloria found it safer to leave him behind
and decided to go back to her parents together with her three children. In order to support the
children, Gloria was compelled to work abroad. From the time of her physical separation from
her husband in 1991, Gloria has not heard of him at all. She had absolutely no communications
with him, or with any of his relatives.
On August 14, 2000, nine years after she left her husband, Gloria filed a verified petition
with the Regional Trial Court. The same issued an order directing, the publication of the petition
in a newspaper of general circulation, on August 28, 2000; that after nine years, there was
absolutely no news about him and she believes that he is already dead and is now seeking
through this petition for a Court declaration that her husband is judicially presumed dead for the
purpose of remarriage.
271
ISSUE:
Whether or not the factual and legal bases for a judicial declaration of presumptive death
under Article 41 of the Family Code were duly established in this case
RULING:
The Court rules against petitioner Republic. The Court, therefore, finds in this case grave
error on the part of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals. To stress, the Court of Appeals
should have dismissed the appeal on ground of lack of jurisdiction, and reiterated the fact that
the trial court decision was immediately final and executory. As it were, the Court of Appeals
committed grave reversible error when it failed to dismiss the erroneous appeal of the Republic
on ground of lack of jurisdiction because, by express provision of law, the judgment was not
appealable. Thus, the instant petition is hereby denied for lack of merit.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. No

pronouncement as to costs.
272
Republic v. Nolasco
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, v. GREGORIO NOLASCO, respondent.

G.R. No. 94053. March 17, 1993.
FELICIANO, J.:
On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Antique, Branch 10, a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica
Parker, invoking Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition prayed that respondent's wife be
declared presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that the marriage be declared null and void.
FACTS:
On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court a
petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, involving
Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition prayed that respondent's wife be declared
presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that the marriage be declared null and void.
The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through the Provincial Prosecutor of
Antique who had been deputized to assist the Solicitor-General in the instant case. The
Republic argued, first, that Nolasco did not possess a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead; and second, Nolasco's attempt to have his marriage annulled in the
same proceeding was a cunning attempt to circumvent the law on marriage.
Respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he had first met Janet
Monica Parker, a British subject, in a bar in England during one of his ship's port calls. From that
chance meeting onwards, Janet Monica Parker lived with respondent Nolasco on his ship for six
months until they returned to respondent's hometown of San Jose, Antique on 19 November
1980 after his seaman's contract expired. On 15 January 1982, respondent married Janet
Monica Parker in San Jose, Antique, in Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the
Cathedral of San Jose.
He obtained another employment contract as a seaman and left his wife with his parents
in San Jose, Antique. Sometime in January 1983, while working overseas, respondent received
a letter from his mother informing him that Janet Monica had given birth to his son. The same
letter informed him that Janet Monica had left Antique.
Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself whenever his ship
docked in England proved fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he had sent to his missing
273
spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of the bar where he
and Janet Monica first met, were all returned to him. He also claimed that he inquired from
among friends but they too had no news of Janet Monica.
The trial court granted Nolasco's petition hereby declaring the presumptively death of
Janet Monica Parker Nolasco, without prejudice to her reappearance.
The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the trial court erred in
declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead because respondent Nolasco had failed to
show that there existed a well-founded belief for such declaration. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that respondent had sufficiently established a basis to
form a belief that his absent spouse had already died.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.
RULING:
No. The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his
missing wife with such diligence as to give rise to a "well-founded belief" that she is dead.
Pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code, a marriage contracted by any person during the
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In fine,
respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief required by law that his absent
wife was already dead that would sustain the issuance of a court order declaring Janet Monica
Parker presumptively dead. Thus, the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's
decision declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead is hereby reversed and both
Decisions are hereby nullified and set aside.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 February 1990, affirming
the trial court's decision declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead is hereby
274
REVERSED and both Decisions are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Costs against
respondent.
275
Valdez v. Republic
ANGELITA VALDEZ, petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent

GR No. 180863, September 8, 2009
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Camiling, Tarlac dated
November 12, 2007 dismissing petitioner Angelita Valdez’s petition for the declaration of
presumptive death of her husband, Sofio Polborosa.
FACTS:
Angelita Valdez was married with Sofio in January 1971. She gave birth to a baby girl
named Nancy. They argued constantly because Sofio was unemployed and did not bring home
any money. In March 1972, the latter left their house. Angelita and her child waited until in May
1972, they decided to go back to her parent’s home. 3 years have passed without any word
from Sofio until in October 1975 when he showed up and they agreed to separate and executed
a document to that effect. It was the last time they saw each other and had never heard of ever
since. Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes in June 1985.
Virgilio’s application for naturalization in US was denied because petitioner’s marriage with Sofio
was subsisting. Hence, in March 2007, petitioner filed a petition seeking declaration of
presumptive death of Sofio.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s marriage with Virgilio is valid despite lack of declaration of
presumptive death of Sofio.
RULING:
The court ruled that no decree on the presumption of Sofio’s death is necessary
because Civil Code governs during 1971 and not Family Code where at least 7 consecutive
276
years of absence is only needed. Thus, petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio and their
marriage is legal and valid.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition is DENIED.
277
Bienvenido v. CA
NENITA BIENVENIDO, petitioner, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

G.R. No. 111717. October 24, 1994.
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but her motion was denied in a resolution of
the Court of Appeals promulgated on August 19, 1993.
FACTS:
Aurelio P. Camacho married Consejo Velasco in Manila on October 3, 1942. On

February 6, 1962, without his marriage to Consejo Velasco being dissolved, Aurelio P.
Camacho contracted another marriage with respondent Luisita C. Camacho with whom he had
been living since 1953 and by whom he begot a child, respondent Aurelio Luis “Chito” Faustino
C. Camacho, born on May 22, 1961. The marriage was solemnized in Tokyo, Japan where
Aurelio and Luisita had been living since 1958.
Because of their quarrels, one or the other left the dwelling place for long periods of
time. In her case Luisita stayed on those occasions at various times in Davao City, Hongkong or
Japan.
In 1967 Aurelio met petitioner Nenita T. Bienvenido, who had been estranged from her
husband, Luis Rivera. Aurelio courted her and apparently won her heart because from June
1968 until Aurelio's death on May 28, 1988, he lived with her, the last time in a duplex
apartment in Quezon City. Petitioner's daughter, Nanette, stayed with them as did Aurelio's son,
Chito, who lived with them for about a year in 1976.
On May 28, 1988, Aurelio died. Petitioner, using her Loyola Life Plan and Aurelio's
account in the PCI Bank, took care of the funeral arrangements. Respondent Luisita was then in
the United States with respondent Chito, having gone there, according to her, at the instance of
Aurelio in order to look for a house in San Francisco so that Aurelio could follow and rejoin
them. Upon learning of the death of Aurelio she and her son Chito came home on May 31,
1988.
278
Respondent Luisita was granted death benefits by the Armed Forces of the Philippines
as the surviving spouse of Aurelio. Soon she also claimed ownership of the house and lot on
Scout Delgado Street in which Nenita had been living.
On September 7, 1988, Luisita and her son Chito brought this case in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, seeking the annulment of the sale of the property to petitioner and the
payment to them of damages. Luisita alleged that the deed of sale was a forgery and that in any
event it was executed in fraud of her as the legitimate wife of Aurelio.
On August 29,1989, the trial court rendered a decision upholding the sale of the property
to petitioner and dismissing the complaint of Luisita. It found the deed of sale in favor of
petitioner to be genuine and respondents Luisita and Chito to be in estoppel in not claiming the
property until 1988 despite knowledge of the sale by the late Aurelio who had represented
himself to be single.
On appeal the respondents prevailed. On June 4, 1993, the Court of Appeals reversed
the decision of the trial court and declared respondents to be the owners of the house and lot in
dispute.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in presuming the validity of the marriage between Aurelio
and Luisita
RULING:
On the question of validity of Luisita's marriage to Aurelio, there is no dispute on the fact
of appellant Luisita's marriage in 1962 to Aurelio. The Court finds that the presumption of the
validity of the marriage Aurelio and Luisita has not been successfully assailed by appellee. The
Court of Appeals thus presumed the validity of Aurelio's second marriage from the failure of
petitioner to prove that at the time of such marriage Aurelio's first wife, Consejo, had not been
absent for at least seven years and that Aurelio did not have news that his first wife we still
alive.
It was the burden of herein respondents to prove that, at the time of his second marriage to
respondent Luisita, Aurelio's first wife, Consejo Velasco, had been absent for at least seven
years and that Aurelio had no news that she was alive. To assume these facts because
petitioner has not disproved them would be to stand the principle on its head. Since Aurelio had
279
a valid, subsisting marriage to Consejo Velasco, his subsequent marriage to respondent Luisita
was void for being bigamous.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and another one is entered,
DISMISSING the complaint against petitioner and DECLARING the deed of sale executed in
her favor and Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 326681 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City issued in her name to be VALID.
280
Manuel v. People
EDUARDO MANUEL, plaintiff vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendants

G.R. No. 165842. November 29, 2005
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR No. 26877, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio
City, Branch 3, convicting Eduardo P. Manuel of bigamy in Criminal Case No. 19562-R.
FACTS:
Petitioner Eduardo Manuel was married to Rubylus Gaña on July 28, 1975. Rubylus was
charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned. He visited her in jail after three months
and never saw her again. On or about the 22nd day of April, 1996, Eduardo contracted a
second marriage with Tina Gandalera-Manuel. He assured her that he was single and was able
to marry. They had lived together fruitfully for three years until Eduardo became distant and
came home only twice a year. One day he packed up his things and left her. Aggrieved and
curious, Tina learned from the NSO that Eduardo was previously married; she then filed a
bigamy case against Eduardo. The Regional Trial Court found him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of bigamy. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Eduardo then filed a
motion to the Supreme Court claiming that he had contracted the second marriage in good faith
since he had not been able to see his first wife for over twenty years. He alleged that under the
Civil Code, no judicial decree of presumptive death is necessary for remarriage.
ISSUE:
What constitutes a valid bigamous marriage?
RULING:
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals. Under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage may
exceptionally be considered valid, the following conditions must concur, viz.: (a) The prior
281
spouse of the contracting party must have been absent for four consecutive years, or two years
where there is danger of death under the circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at
the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee for which purpose the spouse present can institute a summary
proceeding in court to ask for that declaration. The last condition is consistent and in
consonance with the requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent marriages as so
provided in Article 41, in relation to Article 40, of the Family Code.
It should be noted that petitioner got married on 1996, way past the time when the
Family Code came into effect. The second marriage is therefore governed by the provisions of
the family code.
FALLO:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
282
Calisterio v. Calisterio
ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO, petitioner, vs. MARIETTA CALISTERIO, respondent.

GR No. 136467, April 6, 2000
VITUG, J.:
On 24 April 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving several parcels of land with
an estimated value of P604,750.00. Teodorico was survived by his wife, herein respondent
Marietta Calisterio.
FACTS:
Teodorico Calisterio, husband of Marietta Calisterio, the respondent, died intestate in
April 1992 leaving several parcel of land estimated value of P604,750.00. He was the second
husband of Marietta who was previously married with William Bounds in January 1946. The
latter disappeared without a trace in February 1947. 11 years later from the disappearance of
Bounds, Marietta and Teodorico were married in May 1958 without Marietta securing a court
declaration of Bounds’ presumptive death.
Antonia Armas y Calisterio, surviving sister of Teodorico filed a petition claiming to be the sole
surviving heir of the latter and that marriage between Marietta and his brother being allegedly
bigamous is thereby null and void. She prayed that her son Sinfroniano be appointed as
administrator, without bond, of the estate of the deceased and inheritance be adjudicated to her
after all the obligations of the estate would have been settled.
ISSUE:
Whether Marrieta and Teodorico’s marriage was void due to the absence of the
declaration of presumptive death.
RULING:
The marriage between the respondent and the deceased was solemnized in May 1958
where the law in force at that time was the Civil Code and not the Family Code which only took
effect in August 1988. Article 256 of the Family Code itself limits its retroactive governance only
to cases where it thereby would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance
283
with the Civil Code or other laws. Since Civil Code provides that declaration of presumptive
death is not essential before contracting marriage where at least 7 consecutive years of
absence of the spouse is enough to remarry then Marrieta’s marriage with Teodorico is valid
and therefore she has a right can claim portion of the estate.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the Coin of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 51574 is
AFFIRMED except insofar only as it decreed in paragraph (c) of the dispositive portion thereof
that the children of petitioner are likewise entitled, along with her, to the other half of the
inheritance, in lieu of which, it is hereby DECLARED that said one-half share of the decedent's
estate pertains solely to petitioner to the exclusion of her own children. No costs.
284
Carino v. Carino
SANTIAGO CARINO, petitioner vs. SUSAN CARINO, defendant

G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001
subject of the controversy between the two Susans whom he married.
FACTS:
the first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño (hereafter referred to as
Susan Nicdao), with whom he had two offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cariño; and the
second was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cariño (hereafter referred to
as Susan Yee), with whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way
back in 1982.
Upon his death, Susan Nicdao inherited petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of
P146,000.00 from “MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig, while respondent
Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00 from “GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS). On
December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of money
against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to her at
least one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively
denominated as “death benefits” which she (petitioner) received from “MBAI, PCCUI,
Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig.” Despite service of summons, petitioner failed to file
her answer, prompting the trial court to declare her in default.
Susan Nicdao's marriage was celebrated without the requisite marriage license while the
marriage of Susan Carino was celebrated without having obtained the necessary judicial
declaration of nullity of the first void marriage. Both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals favored granting the peitition thus leaving Susan Nicdao to file a motion to the Supreme
Court.
285
ISSUES:
a. How essential is the judicial decree of nullity of a void marriage?

b. How must presumptive legitimes be delivered in this instance?
RULING:
The Supreme Court granted the petition and the initial decision of the Regional Trial
Court was dismissed. Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial
action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but
not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass
upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an
absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court
declaring such previous marriage void.
The Court of Appeals relied on the decision of Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service
Insurance System, which is unfortunately premised on the requisite of having a judicial decree
of nullity of marriage and is therefore inapplicable to the case at hand.
FALLO:
286
Mercado v. Tan
VINCENT MERCADO, petitioner vs. MA.CONSUELO TAN, defendant

G.R. No. 137110. August 1, 2000
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent
one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first
obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier
union is characterized by statute as “void.”
FACTS:
The accused, Vincent Mercado was in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a
marriage ceremony solemnized on April 10, 1976. Despite the prior marriage he got married to
complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991. On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for
bigamy was filed by complainant through counsel with the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City,
which eventually resulted [in] the institution of the present case before this Court against said
accused, Dr. Vincent G. Mercado, on March 1, 1993 in an Information dated January 22, 1993.
On November 13, 1992, or more than a month after the bigamy case was lodged in the
Prosecutor’s Office, accused filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Ma.
Thelma V. Oliva in RTC-Br. 22, Cebu City, and in a Decision dated May 6, 1993 the marriage
between Vincent G. Mercado and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was declared null and void. Despite this,
the Trial Court charged Vincent with bigamy since his prior marriage was still subsisting at the
time he had contracted his second marriage. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial
court. The petitioner then filed a case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Is the judicial declaration of nullity of a prior marriage necessary for remarriage?
RULING:
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the assailed decision. Under Article
40 of the Family Code, ‘the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes
287
of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.’ But
here, the final judgment declaring null and void accused’s previous marriage came not before
the celebration of the second marriage, but after, when the case for bigamy against accused
was already tried in court. And what constitutes the crime of bigamy is the act of any person
who shall contract a second subsequent marriage ‘before’ the former marriage has been legally
dissolved.
It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in
a bigamy charge. As with a voidable marriage, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity
of a marriage before contracting the second marriage.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
288
LUPO ATIENZA, plaintiff vs HON. FRANCISCO BRILLANTES, defendant

A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995
QUIASON, J.:
This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of
Impropriety against Judge Francisco Brillantes, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 20, Manila.
FACTS:
Respondent Judge Francisco Brillantes was married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom
he has five children on April 25, 1965. The marriage was contracted without a marriage license.
He remarried Ongkiko again without the requisite marriage license on June 5, 1965. Ongkiko
abandoned respondent 17 years ago, leaving their children to his care and custody as a single
parent. Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles,
California on December 4, 1991, he believed, in all good faith and for all legal intents and
purposes, that he was single because his first marriage was solemnized without a license.
The petitioner on the other hand alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro. In
December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on his
(complainant's) bed. Upon inquiry, he was told by the houseboy that respondent had been
cohabiting with De Castro. Complainant did not bother to wake up respondent and instead left
the house after giving instructions to his houseboy to take care of his children. Lupo A. Atienza
then filed a complaint for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety against Judge
Francisco Brillantes.
ISSUE:
Is the second marriage valid when celebrated without the judicial decree of nullity of the
prior marriage?
289
RULING:
The Supreme Court dismissed the respondent from government service. Under the
Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage before a
party thereto can enter into a second marriage. Article 40 of said Code provides: The absolute
nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes of remarriage on the basis solely
of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him
considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the
Philippines; while the second marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the
Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly
true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right
that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all leave
and retirement benefits and with prejudice to reappointment in any branch, instrumentality, or
agency of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations. This
decision is immediately executory.
290
Domingo v. CA
ROBERT DOMINGO, petitioner vs COURT OF APPEALS, defendant

GR No. 104818. September 17, 1993
ROMERO, J.:
The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent court's ruling finding no grave
abuse of discretion in the lower court's order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property.
FACTS:
The petitioner Roberto Domingo married Emerlinda Paz on April 25, 1969. Roberto had
remarried again with the respondent Delia Soledad on November 29, 1976. She worked
primarily in Saudi Arabia and filed for a case of bigamy against Roberto. Her husband had been
solely dependent on her earnings and had been cohabiting with another woman. She filed a
petition for declaration of nullity and separation of property. Delia appointed her brother Moises
as her attorney-in-fact and for assigned him to take care of the properties managed by Roberto.
Roberto filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the petition stated no cause of action. The
marriage being void ab initio, the petition for the declaration of its nullity is therefore superfluous
and unneccessary. Roberto also claimed that private respondent had no property in his
possession. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Trial Court to deny the motion.
ISSUE:
When does a void marriage require a judicial declaration of nullity?
RULING:
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the ruling of the lower courts. A marriage
though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact under the Family Code even for
purposes other than remarriage. The necessity of final judgment however applies when the
purpose of nullity is for remarriage. The declaration of nullity of marriage carries ipso facto a
judgment for the liquidation of property/custody, and support of children, etc. There is no need
of filing a separate civil action for such purpose. It should also be noted that the husband
291
admitted to possessing his properties based on the respondent wife's earnings.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of respondent Court
dated February 7, 1992 and the Resolution dated March 20, 1992 are AFFIRMED.
292
Beltran v. People
MEYNARDO BELTRAN, petitioner vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G.R. No. 137567. June 20, 2000
BUENA, J.:
of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati city, Branch 61." The said Order denied petitioner’s
FACTS:
Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix were married on June 16,
1973. On February 7, 1997, after twenty-four years of marriage and four children, petitioner filed
a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code. In her Answer to the said petition, petitioner's wife Charmaine Felix alleged that it
was petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named
Milagros Salting. Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal complaint for concubinage against
petitioner and his paramour before the City Prosecutor's Office of Makati who, in a Resolution
dated September 16, 1997, found probable cause and ordered the filing of an Information
against them. On March 20, 1998, petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant for
his arrest, filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in
the criminal case. Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity
of his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case. The Trial
dismissed his petition. Undaunted, the petitioner filed a motion to the higher courts.
293
ISSUES:
a. Is there a prejudicial question involved in the case above?

b. Can a party judge for himself the nullity of his own marriage?
RULING:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. In the case at bar it must be
held that parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for
the same must be submitted to judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of
the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration
the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he who
cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage. The lower court therefore, has not erred
in affirming the Orders of the judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court ruling that pendency of a civil
action for nullity of marriage does not pose a prejudicial question in a criminal case for
concubinage.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
294
Chi Ming Tsoi v. CA and Lao
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner vs COURT OF APPEALS, defendant

GR No. 119190. January 16, 1997
TORRES, JR., J.:

Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey over
troubled waters. Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in
the works of the unseen hand of Him who created all things.
FACTS:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, Gina and Chi Ming Tsoi were married as evidence by their
marriage contract. From May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no
sexual contact between them. Gina made attempts for sexual activity to no avails. Medical
examinations showed that both Gina and Chi Ming Tsoi were capaple of sexual conduct. Gina
was still a virgin at the time of the medical examination. Gina filed a motion for declaration of
nullity and the Trial Court declared their marriage as void. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court's decision. Petitioner Chi Ming Tsoi subsequently filed a motion to the Supreme Court
citing that it was she and not he that had the problem regarding sexual intimacy.
ISSUES:
a. What is psychological incapacity?

b. Can non-desire of sexual consumation be an indicator of psychological incapacity?
RULING:
The Supreme Court found the petition to be bereft of merit. Since the action to declare
the marriage void may be filed by either party, the question of who refuses to have sex with the
other becomes immaterial. If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to
perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant,
Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn
refusal. Aligned with this is the essential marital obligation, "the procreate children based on the
universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of
295
marriage." Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness
of the marriage.
After ten months of marriage, the reluctance to perform the sexual act was indicative of a
hopeless situation, and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological
incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants within the contemplation of the Family Code.
FALLO:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court of

Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
296
Santos v. CA
LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner vs COURT OF APPEALS, defendant

GR No. 112019. January 4, 1995
VITUG, J.:
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision introduced by
the Family Code is Article 36 (as amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which
declares:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization.
The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of Leouel Santos ("Leouel"),
brings into fore the above provision which is now invoked by him. Undaunted by the
decisions of the court a quo 1 and the Court of Appeal, 2 Leouel persists in beseeching its
application in his attempt to have his marriage with herein private respondent, Julia
Rosario Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), declared a nullity.
FACTS:
Leouel and Julia exchanged vows on September 20, 1986. A year after the marriage, the couple
when quarreling over a number of things including the interference of Julia's parents into their
marital affairs. On May 18, 1998, Julia finally left for the United States. Leouel was then unable
to communicate with her for a period of five years and she had then virtually abandoned their
family. Leouel filed a case for nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity. The Regional
Trial Court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of the trial court.
ISSUE:
What is psychological incapacity?
297
RULING:
The Supreme Court denied the petition. Psychological incapacity should refer to no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. The
psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated and must be incurable.
Mere abandonment cannot therefore qualify as psychological incapacity on the part of Julia.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
298
Republic v. CA and Olaviano
REPUBLIC, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, defendant

GR No. 108763. February 13, 1997
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those
enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological
incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been swamped with various petitions to
declare marriages void based on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the meaning
of psychological incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges
and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific cases. In the present case
and in the context of the herein assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General
has labelled — exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his frustration — Article
36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving
the present case, finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
FACTS:
Roridel and Reynaldo were married on APril 14, 1985. After a year of marriage,
Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility as a husband and a father. He
depended on his parents for aid and assistance, was never honest with her, was habitually
quarrelsome. He abandoned his family in the course of their marriage. Roridel filed a case in the
courts and Reynaldo's claims were that she was inefficient in the discharge of her marital duties.
The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage as void ab initio. The decision was affirmed in
toto by the Court of Appeals. The Office of the Solicitor General challenged the decision, citing
that opposing personalities as was evinced is not equivalent to psychological incapacity. The
ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and
duties, but a defect in their psychological nature."
ISSUE:
How must psychological incapacity be interpreted?
299
RULING:
The Supreme Court granted the petition and reversed and set aside the rulings of the lower
courts. What was shown was more of a difficulty rather than psychological incapacity. Mere
showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem, neither its
juridical antecedence nor its incurability.
The Supreme Court also laid down the Molina guidelines for future reference in interpreting
psychological incapacity:
"(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them,
could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994), nevertheless such root cause must
be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's."
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
300
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not
be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less in will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the

Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also
be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x
x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for
his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor-General
shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095."
301
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and

SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
302
Barcelona v. CA
DIANA BARCELONA, plaintiff vs. COURT OF APPEALS, defendant

G.R. No. 130087. September 24, 2003
CARPIO, J.:
The Petition for Review before us assails the 30 May 1997 Decision[1] as well as the 7
August 1997 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43393. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the Order[2] dated 21 January 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 106, in Civil Case No. Q-95-24471. The Regional Trial Court refused to dismiss private
respondent’s Petition for Annulment of Marriage for failure to state a cause of action and for
violation of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The assailed Resolution denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
FACTS:
On 29 March 1995, private respondent Tadeo R. Bengzon (“respondent Tadeo”) filed a

Petition for Annulment of Marriage against petitioner Diana M. Barcelona (“petitioner Diana”).
On 9 May 1995, respondent Tadeo filed a Motion to Withdraw Petition which the trial court
granted in its Order dated 7 June 1995. On 21 July 1995, respondent Tadeo filed anew a
Petition for Annulment of Marriage against petitioner Diana.Petitioner Diana filed a Motion to
Dismiss the second petition on two grounds. First, the second petition fails to state a cause of
action. The root cause of psychological incapacity was not properly alleged. Second, it violates
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94 (“Circular No. 04-94”) on forum shopping.
Respondent Tadeo opposed the Motion to which petitioner Diana filed Additional Arguments in
Support of the Motion. The lower courts rejected the petition, after which it was sent to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
a. Is a statement of a cause for action required in the declaration of nullity of marriage?

b. Is there forum shopping constituted by respondent Tadeo?
303
RULING:
The Supreme Court denied the petition. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code
shall specifically allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were
psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage
at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
celebration. Section 2, paragraph (d) of the new Rules also provides that expert testimony need
not be alleged. Since the new Rules do not require the petition to allege expert opinion on the
psychological incapacity, it follows that there is also no need to allege in the petition the root
cause of the psychological incapacity.
In determining whether the allegations of a complaint are sufficient to support a cause of action,
it must be borne in mind that the complaint does not have to establish or allege the facts proving
the existence of a cause of action at the outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the
merits of the case.
The first petition was dismissed without prejudice at the instance of respondent Tadeo to keep
the peace between him and his grown up children. The dismissal happened before service of
answer or any responsive pleading. Clearly, there is no litis pendentia since respondent Tadeo
had already withdrawn and caused the dismissal of the first petition when he subsequently filed
the second petition. Neither is there res judicata because the dismissal order was not a
decision on the merits but a dismissal “without prejudice.” Thusly, forum shopping could not be
applicable in this case.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The assailed Decision dated 30 May 1997 as
well as the Resolution dated 7 August 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43393 is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
304
Tongol v. Tongol
ORLANDO G. TONGOL, PETITIONER, VS. FILIPINAS M. TONGOL, RESPONDENT.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Assailed in the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated September 25, 2002 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 66245, and its Resolution of March 19, 2003, denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration. The CA Decision affirmed, in toto, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati City, Branch 149, which dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage filed by herein petitioner Orlando Tongol.
FACTS:
On August 19, 1996, Orlando filed before the RTC of Makati City a verified petition for
the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Filipinas on the ground that the latter is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations. Orlando
Tongol alleged that Filipinas was unable to perform her duty as a wife because of Filipinas
unbearable attitude that will lead to their constant quarrel. Inhere Answer with Counter-Petition,
Filipinas admitted that efforts at reconciliation have been fruitless and that their marriage is a
failure. However, she claims that their marriage failed because it is Orlando s insufficiency
to fulfil his obligation as married man. Both parties underwent a psychological exam which
proved that the respondent Filipinas Tongol has a psychological insufficiency.
ISSUE:
Does the psychological problem of of Mrs Filipina Tongol enough to compel the court to
nullify their marriage?
305
RULING:
No, as elucidated in Molina the psychological incapacity must exist during the ceremony
of the marriage, the psychological incapacity must be apparent as to the extent that the other
party is incapable the significance of their marriage and lastly, the malady must be incurable.
The definition or manifestation of marriage must within the scope of article 36of the Family
Code. As in the present case, the psychological sufficiency of Mrs Tongol is not severe that
would render her incapable of recognize the sanctity of her marital contract with her husband,
second, Dr. Vellegas failed to prove the that the ailment is incurable. As to the facts of the
psychological examination report say: the emotional malady discussed merely by rejection of
Mrs. Tongol by her mother when she was young. Further, the facts of the case did not show that
Mrs. Tongol did not care about the welfare of their children. And the financial issue as being
cited in the facts, the court deemed that such phenomena is natural in every marriage and can
be settled easily. Hence the court dismissed the petition of the nullity of marriage.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 25, 2002 Decision and March
19, 2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66245 are AFFIRMED.
306
Ochosa v. Ochosa
JOSE REYNALDO B. OCHOSA, PETITIONER, VS. BONA J. ALANO AND REPUBLIC OF

THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
set aside the Decision[1] dated October 11, 2004 as well as the Resolution[2] dated March 10,
2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 65120, which reversed and set aside the
Decision[3] dated January 11, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 140 in Civil
Case No. 97-2903. In the said January 11, 1999 Decision, the trial court granted petitioner Jose
Reynaldo Ochosa's (Jose) petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage between him and
private respondent Bona J. Alano (Bona).
FACTS:
It appears that Jose met Bona in August 1973. They had a whirlwind romance
that culminated into sexual intimacy and eventual marriage on 27 October 1973 before
the Honorable Judge Cesar S. Principe in Basilan. It appears that Bona was an
unfaithful spouse. Even at the onset of their marriage when Jose was assigned in
various parts of the country, she had illicit relations with other men. On one occasion,
Bona was caught by Demetrio Bajet y Lita, a security aide, having sex with Jose’s driver,
Corporal Gagarin. Rumors of Bona’s sexual infidelity circulated in the military
community. When Jose could no longer bear these rumours, he got a military pass from
his jail warden and confronted Bona.
During their confrontation, Bona admitted her relationship with Corporal Gagarin who
also made a similar admission to Jose. Jose drove Bona away from their living quarters.
Bona left with Ramona and went to Basilan. In 1994, Ramona left Bona and came to live
with Jose. It is Jose who is currently supporting the needs of Ramona.
Jose filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 97-
2903 with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, seeking to nullify his marriage to Bona on
the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity to fulfil the essential obligations of
marriage.
307
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage can be declared null and void on the ground of
RULING:
No. The psychiatrist’s findings on Bona’s personality profile did not emanate from a
personal interview with the subject herself as admitted by Dr. Rondain in court. Dr. Rondain
merely relied on her interview with Jose and his witness, Mrs. Padernal, as well as the court
record of the testimonies of other witnesses,
Based on the testimonies, Bona had no manifest desire to abandon Jose at the beginning of
their marriage and was, in fact, living with him for the most part of their relationship from 1973
up to the time when Jose drove her away from their conjugal home in 1988. On the contrary,
the record shows that it was Jose who was constantly away from Bona by reason of his military
duties and his later incarceration. A reasonable explanation for Bona’s refusal to accompany
Jose in his military assignments in other parts of Mindanao may be simply that those locations
were known conflict areas in the seventies. Any doubt as to Bona’s desire to live with Jose
would later be erased by the fact that Bona lived with Jose in their conjugal home in Fort
Bonifacio during the following decade.
In view of the foregoing, the badges of Bona’s alleged psychological incapacity, i.e., her
sexual infidelity and abandonment, can only be convincingly traced to the period of time after
her marriage to Jose and not to the inception of the said marriage
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
is hereby AFFIRMED.
308
Yambao v. Republic
CYNTHIA E. YAMBAO, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND PATRICIO E.

YAMBAO,Respondents.
NACHURA, J.:
Petitioner Cynthia E. Yambao (petitioner) is assailing the DecisioN dated April 16, 2008 and the
Resolution dated August 4, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 89262. The
CA affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, which denied
petitioner's Petition for the annulment of her marriage to respondent Patricio E. Yambao
(respondent) on the ground of psychological incapacity.
FACTS: Petitioner and respondent were married on December 21, 1968 at

the Philamlife Church in Quezon City. On July 11, 2003, after 35 years of marriage, petitioner
filed a Petition before the RTC, Makati City, praying that the marriage be declared null and void
by reason of respondent’s psychological incapacity, pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
FACTS:
In her petition before the RTC, petitioner narrated that, since the beginning, her and
respondent’s married life had been marred by bickering, quarrels, and recrimination due to the
latter’s inability to comply with the essential obligations of married life.[8]
Petitioner averred that through all the years of their married life, she was the only one
who earned a living and took care of the children. Respondent, she alleged, did nothing but eat
and sleep all day, and spend time with friends. When respondent would find a job, he would not
be able to stay in it for long. Likewise, respondent went into several business ventures, which all
failed. In addition, respondent loved to gamble and would gamble away whatever money would
come his way.
Petitioner also claimed that, when their children were babies, respondent did not even help to
change their diapers or feed them, even while petitioner was recovering from her caesarean
operation, proffering the excuse that he knew nothing about children.[9] Later, respondent
became insecure and jealous and would get mad every time he would see petitioner talking to
other people, even to her relatives. When respondent started threatening to kill petitioner, she
309
decided to leave the conjugal abode and live separately from him.[10] She then consulted a
psychiatrist who concluded that respondent was indeed psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations
ISSUE:
Does the totality of petitioner’s evidence establish respondent’s psychological incapacity

to perform the essential obligations of marriage
RULING:
The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage.[48] Thus, for a marriage to be annulled under
Article 36 of the Family Code, the psychologically incapacitated spouse must be shown to suffer
no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes him or her to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants.[49] It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.[50]
In this case, there is no showing that respondent was suffering from a psychological
condition so severe that he was unaware of his obligations to his wife and family. On the
contrary, respondent’s efforts, though few and far between they may be, showed an
understanding of his duty to provide for his family, albeit he did not meet with much success.
Whether his failure was brought about by his own indolence or irresponsibility, or by some other
external factors, is not relevant. What is clear is that respondent, in showing an awareness to
provide for his family, even with his many failings, does not suffer from psychological incapacity.
Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic

marital obligations and not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital
obligations or ill will.[51] This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit
oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the
essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering
of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be
tantamount to a psychological abnormality.[52] It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to
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meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be
incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness.[53]
That respondent, according to petitioner, “lack[ed] effective sense of rational judgment

and responsibility”[54] does not mean he is incapable to meet his marital obligations. His refusal
to help care for the children, his neglect for his business ventures, and his alleged unbearable
jealousy may indicate some emotional turmoil or mental difficulty, but none have been shown to
amount to a psychological abnormality.
Moreover, even assuming that respondent’s faults amount to psychological incapacity, it has not
been established that the same existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
In his psychological report,[55] Dr. Tolentino merely said, “[b]ecause one’s personality or
character is formed early in life, it has a clear ANTECEDENT and it has an enduring pattern of
inner experience that deviates from the expectations of the individual’s culture,” [56] without
explaining this antecedent. Even petitioner, in her allegations, never explained how the alleged
psychological incapacity manifested itself prior to or at the time of the celebration of their
marriage.
Likewise militating against petitioner’s cause is the finding of the trial court, and the same was
affirmed by the CA, that respondent never committed infidelity or physically abused petitioner or
their children. In fact, considering that the children lived with both parents, it is safe to assume
that both made an impact in the children’s upbringing. And still, as found by the RTC and the
CA, the parties were able to raise three children into adulthood “without any major parenting
problems.”[57] Such fact could hardly support a proposition that the parties’ marriage is a nullity.
Respondent may not have turned out to be the ideal husband, or may have failed to meet
petitioner’s exacting standards. Yet this Court finds it impossible to believe that, as petitioner
alleges, there was nothing but heartache and strife in their over 35 years (prior to filing the
petition for declaration of nullity) of marriage.
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FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision dated April 16, 2008 and the Resolution dated August 4, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 89262 are AFFIRMED.
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Marable v. Marable
ROSALINO L. MARABLE, petitioner, VS. MYRNA F. MARABLE, respondent.

G.R. No. 178741, January 17, 2011
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
On appeal is the Decision dated February 12, 2007 and Resolution dated July 4, 2007 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 86111 which reversed and set aside the
Decisiondated January 4, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 72, Antipolo City, in
Civil Case No. 01-6302. The RTC had granted petitioner's prayer that his marriage to
respondent be declared null and void on the ground that he is psychologically incapacitated to
perform the essential obligations of marriage.
FACTS:
On December 19, 1970, petitioner and respondent eloped and were married in civil rites at
Tanay, Rizal before Mayor Antonio C. Esguerra. A church wedding followed on December 30,
1970 at the Chapel of the Muntinlupa Bilibid Prison and their marriage was blessed with five
children.
As the years went by, however, their marriage turned sour. Verbal and physical quarrels
became common occurrences. They fought incessantly and petitioner became unhappy
because of it. The frequency of their quarrels increased when their eldest daughter transferred
from one school to another due to juvenile misconduct. It became worse still when their
daughter had an unwanted teenage pregnancy. The exceedingly serious attention petitioner
gave to his children also made things worse for them as it not only spoiled some of them, but it
also became another cause for the incessant quarrelling between him and respondent.
Longing for peace, love and affection, petitioner developed a relationship with another woman.
Respondent learned about the affair, and petitioner promptly terminated it. But despite the end
of the short-lived affair, their quarrels aggravated. Also, their business ventures failed. Any
amount of respect remaining between them was further eroded by their frequent arguments and
verbal abuses in front of their friends. Petitioner felt that he was unloved, unwanted and
unappreciated and this made him indifferent towards respondent. When he could not bear his
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lot any longer, petitioner left the family home and stayed with his sister in Antipolo City. He gave
up all the properties which he and respondent had accumulated during their marriage in favor of
respondent and their children. Later, he converted to Islam after dating several women.
On October 8, 2001, petitioner decided to sever his marital bonds. On said date, he filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent on the ground of his psychological
incapacity to perform the essential responsibilities of marital life.
ISSUE:
Whether or not psychological incapacity to perform his (respondent’s) essential marital

obligations was clearly proven and correctly appreciated by the trial court.
RULING:
The Supreme Court found that the CA did not err in declaring the marriage of petitioner
and respondent as valid and subsisting. The totality of the evidence presented is insufficient to
establish petitioner's psychological incapacity to fulfill his essential marital obligations.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The February 12, 2007 Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86111 and its Resolution dated July 4, 2007 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
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Agraviador v. Agraviador
Enrique Agraviador v. Erlinda Amparo-Agraviador

G.R. No. 170729, December 8, 2010
BRION, J.:
Facts:
PETITIONER (Enrique) met RESPONDENT (Erlinda) in 1971 at a beerhouse where
RESPONDENT worked. PETITIONER, at that time, was a 24-year old security guard of the
Bureau of Customs, while RESPONDENT was a 17-year old waitress. PETITIONER and
RESPONDENT eventually became sweethearts. They soon entered into a common-law
relationship.
In 1973, PETITIONER and RESPONDENT married in a ceremony officiated by Reverend
Reyes at a church in Tondo. PETITIONER’s family was apprehensive because of the nature of
RESPONDENT’s work and because she comes from a broken family.
Out of their union, they begot four children: Erisque, Emmanuel, Evelyn, and Eymarey. In 2001,
PETITIONER filed with RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code. PETITIONER alleged that RESPONDENT was psychologically
incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage as she was carefree and
irresponsible, and refused to do household chores like cleaning and cooking; stayed away from
their house for long periods of time; had an affair with a lesbian; didn’t take care of their sick
child; consulted a witch doctor in order to bring him bad fate; and refused to use the family
name Agraviador in her activities.
PETITIONER further claimed RESPONDENT refused to have sex with him since 1993 because
she became very close to a male tenant in their house (Enrique also discovered their love notes
to each other, and caught them inside his room several times).
RESPONDENT moved to dismiss petition on the ground that the root cause of her
psychological incapacity was not medically identified. RTC denied motion.
In her answer, RESPONDENT denied engaging in extramarital affairs and maintained that
PETITIONER refused to have sex with her. PETITIONER allegedly wanted to have their
marriage annulled because he wanted to marry their former household helper, Gilda Camarin.
Lastly, PETITIONER maintained she took care of her sick son (who eventually died).
RTC ordered city prosecutor and Solgen to investigate if collusion existed between the parties.
Aside from his testimony, PETITIONER presented Certificate of True Copy of their Marriage
Contract and the psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Juan Cirilo L. Patac. Dr. Patac: (1)
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PETITIONER psychologically capable to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage; (2)
RESPONDENT failed to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage, manifesting inflexible
maladaptive behavior even at the time before their marriage; and (3) RESPONDENT suffers
from a Personality Disorder.
Issue:
Whether there is basis to nullify the petitioner’s marriage to the respondent on the ground of
psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations?
Held:
No. Petition denied.
1. TOTALITY OF EVIDENCE presented failed to establish RESPONDENT’s psychological
incapacity. Psychological incapacity under Art. 36 is not vitiation of consent; it does not affect
the consent to the marriage.
2. Summary of Jurisprudential Guidelines:
a. Santos v. Court of Appeals: psychological incapacity is a mental incapacity (not physical
capacity) that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. Thus, it is must
be confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. It is characterized by:
i. Gravity;
ii. Juridical antecedence; and
iii. Incurability.
b. Molina Doctrine (Republic v. Court of Appeals): Guidelines in interpreting Art. 36 of the
Family Code:
i. Burden of Proof belongs to the Plaintiff. Doubt should be resolved in favor of existence
and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
ii. Root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified;
(b) alleged in the complaint; (c) sufficiently proven by the experts; and (d) clearly explained in
the decision.
iii. Incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage
(exchanged I do’s).
iv. Incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Incurability may be absolute or relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolute against everyone of the same sex.
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v. Illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of the marriage; it should not be merely a refusal, neglect, difficulty, or ill
will. Ergo, the natal/supervening disability effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to the marriage.
vi. Essential marital obligations = Arts. 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife & Arts. 220, 221, and 225 of the Family Code w/ respect to the children
vii. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church of the Philippines, while not controlling, should be given great respect by the courts.
viii. The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the SolGen to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the SolGen issues a certification
stating his reasons for agreeing or opposing the petition. SolGen shall discharge the equivalent
function of defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
c. Marcos v. Marcos: clarified that there is no requirement that defendant/respondent

should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for
the declaration of marriage based on psychologically incapacity. Introduction of expert opinion in
a petition under Art. 36 of the Family Code no longer necessary if the totality of evidence shows
psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be
duly established.
d. Ngo Te v. Yu-Te: rigid rules are in appropriate in resolving all cases of psychological
incapacity (PI) such as those set out it Molina. This case put into question the applicability of
time-tested guidelines set forth in Manila.
e. Ting v. Velez-Ting & Suazo v. Suazo: clarified that Ngo Te did not abandon Molina, it
simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements. Ngo Te merely stands for a more
flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on PI.
3. Summary of Evidence
a. Petitioner’s testimony: Petitioner’s theory that the respondent’s psychological incapacity
is premised on her refusal or unwillingness to perform certain marital obligations, and a number
of unpleasant personality traits such as immaturity, irresponsibility, and unfaithfulness. These
acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of psychological incapacity that the law requires, and
317
should be distinguished from the “difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect,” in the
performance of some marital obligations that characterize some marriages.
Petitioner’s testimony failed to establish that the respondent’s condition is a manifestation of a

disordered personality rooted on some incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition that
makes her completely unable to discharge the essential marital obligations. If at all, the
petitioner merely showed that the respondent had some personality defects that showed their
manifestation during the marriage; his testimony sorely lacked details necessary to establish
that the respondent’s defects existed at the inception of the marriage. In addition, the petitioner
failed to discuss the gravity of the respondent’s condition; neither did he mention that the
respondent’s malady was incurable, or if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
respondent’s means to undertake. The petitioner’s declarations that the respondent “does not
accept her fault,” “does not want to change,” and “refused to reform” are insufficient to establish
a psychological or mental defect that is serious, grave, or incurable as contemplated by Article
36 of the Family Code.
b. Psychiatric Evaluation Report: fell short in proving that the respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital duties. Dr. Patac did not
personally evaluate and examine the respondent; he, in fact, recommended at the end of his
Report for the respondent to “undergo the same examination [that the petitioner] underwent.”
We do not suggest that a personal examination of the party alleged to be psychologically

incapacitated is mandatory. If a psychological disorder can be proven by independent means,
no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted and given credit. No such
independent evidence appears on record, however, to have been gathered in this case.
In his Report, Dr. Patac attempted to establish the juridical antecedence of the respondent’s
condition by stating that the respondent manifested “inflexible maladaptive behavior” before
marriage, pointing out how the respondent behaved before the marriage – the respondent
defied her parents and lived alone; rented a room for herself; and allowed the petitioner to sleep
with her. These perceived behavioral flaws, to our mind, are insufficient to establish that the
incapacity was rooted in the history of the respondent antedating the marriage. This is an area
where independent evidence, such as information from a person intimately related to the
respondent, could prove useful. In the absence of such evidence, it is not surprising why the
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Psychiatric Report Evaluation failed to explain how and why the respondent’s so-called inflexible
maladaptive behavior was already present at the time of the marriage.
Dr. Patac’s Psychiatric Evaluation Report likewise failed to prove the gravity or seriousness of
the respondent’s condition. He simply made an enumeration of the respondent’s purported
behavioral defects (as related to him by third persons), and on this basis characterized the
respondent to be suffering from mixed personality disorder. At best, the personality flaws
mentioned in the Report, even if true, could only amount to insensitivity, sexual infidelity,
emotional immaturity, and irresponsibility, which do not by themselves warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Psychiatric Evaluation Report likewise failed to adequately explain how Dr. Patac came to
the conclusion that the respondent’s personality disorder had “no definite treatment.” It did not
discuss the concept of mixed personality disorder and failed to show how and to what extent the
respondent exhibited this disorder in order to create a necessary inference that the respondent’s
condition had no definite treatment or is incurable. A glaring deficiency, to our mind, is the
Psychiatric Evaluation Report’s failure to support its findings and conclusions with any factual
basis.
The standards used in Court to assess the sufficiency of psychological reports may be deemed
very strict, but these are proper, in view of the principle that any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the validity of the marriage.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the
Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated May 31, 2005 and December 6,
2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 75207. Costs against the petitioner.
319
Ligeralde v. Patalinghug
SILVINO A. LIGERALDE, Petitioner,

vs.
MAY ASCENSION A. PATALINGHUG and the REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
G.R. NO. 168796 April 15, 2010
MENDOZA, J.:
This petition seeks to set aside the November 30, 2004 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) which reversed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City (RTC)
declaring the marriage between petitioner Silvino A. Ligeralde (Silvino) and private respondent
May Ascension A. Patalinghug (May) null and void.
Facts:
Silvino and May got married on October 3, 1984. They were blessed with four children.
Silvino claimed that, during their marriage, he observed that May had several manifestations of
a negative marital behavior. He described her as immature, irresponsible and carefree. Her
infidelity, negligence and nocturnal activities, he claimed, characterized their marital relations.
Sometime in September 1995, May arrived home at 4:00 o’clock in the morning. Her excuse
was that she had watched a video program in a neighboring town, but admitted later to have
slept with her Palestinian boyfriend in a hotel. Silvino tried to persuade her to be conscientious
of her duties as wife and mother. His pleas were ignored. His persuasions would often lead to
altercations or physical violence.
In the midst of these, Silvino’s deep love for her, the thought of saving their marriage for
the sake of their children, and the commitment of May to reform dissuaded him from separating
from her. He still wanted to reconcile with her.
The couple started a new life. A few months after, however, he realized that their marriage was
hopeless. May was back again to her old ways. This was demonstrated when Silvino arrived
home one day and learned that she was nowhere to be found. He searched for her and found
her in a nearby apartment drinking beer with a male lover.
Later, May confessed that she had no more love for him. They then lived separately.
With May’s irresponsible, immature and immoral behavior, Silvino came to believe that she is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
320
Prior to the filing of the complaint, Silvino referred the matter to Dr. Tina Nicdao-Basilio for
psychological evaluation. The psychologist certified that May was psychologically incapacitated
to perform her essential marital obligations; that the incapacity started when she was still young
and became manifest after marriage; and that the same was serious and incurable.3
On October 22, 1999, the RTC declared the marriage of Silvino and May null and void.
Its findings were based on the Psychological Evaluation Report of Dr. Tina Nicdao-Basilio.
The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision. It ruled that private respondent’s alleged
sexual infidelity, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility do not constitute psychological
incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code and that the psychologist failed to
identify and prove the root cause thereof or that the incapacity was medically or clinically
permanent or incurable.
Issue:
Whether or not the assailed order of the CA is based on conjecture and, therefore,
issued without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Ruling:
The Court required the private respondent to comment but she failed to do so. Efforts
were exerted to locate her but to no avail.
Nevertheless, the petition is technically and substantially flawed. On procedural grounds, the
Court agrees with the public respondent that the petitioner should have filed a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 instead of this petition for certiorari under Rule 65. For having
availed of the wrong remedy, this petition deserves outright dismissal. Substantially, the petition
has no merit. In order to avail of the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court, the petitioner must clearly show that the public respondent acted
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess in jurisdiction.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at
all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion and hostility. In sum, for the extraordinary writ of certiorari to lie, there
must be capricious, arbitrary or whimsical exercise of power. In this case at bench, the Court
finds no commission of a grave abuse of discretion in the rendition of the assailed CA decision
dismissing petitioner’s complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
321
Family Code. Upon close scrutiny of the records, we find nothing whimsical, arbitrary or
capricious in its findings.
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code
which provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party
would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. It must be rooted in
the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge
only after the marriage. It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
beyond the means of the party involved. The Court likewise laid down the guidelines in resolving
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, in
Republic v. Court of Appeals. Relevant to this petition are the following:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root
cause of the psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the
complaint, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision; (3) the incapacity
must be proven to be existing at the "time of the celebration" of the marriage; (4) such
incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable; and (5) such
illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.
Fallo:
The Petition Is Denied.
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Reyes v. Reyes
MA. SOCORRO CAMACHO-REYES, Petitioner,

- versus -
RAMON REYES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 185286 August 18, 2010
NACHURA, J.:
Facts:
Petitioner and respondent were campus sweethearts. The former’s love to the latter did
not change even when she discovered that respondent was cutting classes and taking up
marijuana. He did not even finish college. By the time they married each other, all living
expenses were shouldered by respondent’s parents, and they were living with the respondent’s
parents. When their first child was born, financial difficulties started to come in. To prod
respondent into assuming more responsibility, petitioner suggested that they live separately
from her in-laws. However, the new living arrangement engendered further financial difficulty.
Petitioner was a single-income earner, and the business ventures of the respondent all
floundered. The couple became so estranged from each other that the respondent remained
unconcerned and inattentive, not only to the petitioner but also to their children. To make things
worse, petitioner was able to confirm that respondent was having an extra-marital affair.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the essential
marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
Yes, there existed psychological incapacity. The marriage between the petitioner and the
respondent was nullified.
Psychological incapacity was shown by respondent’s 1.) sporadic financial support; 2.) extra-
marital affairs; 3.) substance abuse; and 4.) failed business attempts. The high court found that
the marriage between the parties from its inception had this “congenital infirmity” which “pertains
to the inability of the parties to effectively function emotionally, intellectually and socially towards
each other in relation to their essential duties to mutually observe love, fidelity and respect as
well as to mutually render help and support” as mandated by Article 68 of the Family Code.
Such finding was anchored by the unanimous findings of three psychology experts: petitioner
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manifested inadequacies along her affective sphere that made her less responsive to the
emotional needs of her husband, while the respondent manifested “strong sense of Inadequacy
along masculine strivings and narcissistic features that renders him psychologically
incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage.” The Supreme Court further
ruled that such psychological incapacity, as stated by psychology experts, is permanent,
incurable, and stable over time, and mere recommendation of one psychology expert that the
incapacity is curable does not automatically imply curability. Therefore, the case has the gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability – the three requirements of nullifying marriage based on
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Toring v. Toring
Ricardo P. Toring
versus
Teresita M. Toring and Republic of the Philippines
G.R. No. 165321
BRION, J.
Facts:
September 4, 1978 when Ricardo P. Toring and Teresita M. Toring got married at the
City court of Quezon City. They were blessed with three children. Twenty years after their
wedding, Ricardo filed a petition for annulment before the RTC. He claimed that Teresita was
psychological incapacitated to comply with the essential obligation of marriage prior to and at
the time of their marriage. With the testimonies of Ricardo that his wife failed to manage the
fund for their family while Ricardo worked as seaman, the unpaid tuition fees, unpaid bills and
also failure to remit the amounts she collected as sales agent. He also accused his wife of
infidelity and suspected that she was pegnant with another man’s child.
Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran also testified that Terisita was suffering from Narcissistic
Personality Disorder; the evaluation was based from Dr. Cecilia’s interview to Ricardo and
Richardson (Ricardo and Teresita’s son). Because of the evidences presented before the court.
The RTC agreed with Ricardo and annulled his marriage to Teresita. However Court of Appeals
reversed the RTC decision and held that the trial court’s finding did not satisfy the rule and
guidelines set by the court in Republic v CA and Molina. RTC failed to specifically point out the
root of illness or defect that caused Teresita’s psychological incapacity already existed at the
time of celebration of marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not the evidence presented is enough for the CA to reverse the decision of
RTC.
Ruling:
Yes. The evidence presented was not sufficient. And the petition unmeritorious, as the
CA committed no reversible when it set aside the RTC’s decision for lack of legal and factual
basis. Dr. Albaran’s testimony was supported only by what Ricardo and Richardson told. And in
Ricardo’s testimony was merely established Teresita’s irresponsible in managing the family
finances by not paying their rent, utility bill and other financial obligations. Root Cause of the
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psychological incapacity needs to be alleged is a petition for annulment under Article 36 of the
Family Code must be proven, and it was characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedent and
(c) incurability.
Fallo:
The decision of CA affirmed.
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Suazo v. Suazo
Suazo v. Suazo
G.R. No. 164493 : March 10, 2010
BRION, J.
Facts:
Jocelyn M. Suazo and Angelito Suazo were married when they were 16 years old. They
lived with Angelito’s parent. Jocelyn M. Suazo took odd jobs while Angelito refused to work and
was most of the time drunk. Jocelyn urged him to find work but this often resulted to violent
quarrels. Jocelyn year after their marriage, Jocelyn left Angelito 10 years later, she filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Art. 36. Jocelyn testified on the alleged
physical beating she received. The expert witness corroborated parts of Jocelyn’s testimony.
Both her psychological report and testimony concluded that Angelito was psychologically
incapacited. However, Angelito was not personally examined by the expert witness. The RTC
annulled the marriage but the CA reversed it.
Issue:
Whether or not there is basis to nullify Jocelyn’s marriage with Angelito under Art. 36.
Ruling:
Jocelyn’s evidence is insufficient to establish Angelito’s psychological incapacity. The
psychologist evaluated Angelito’s psychological condition only in an indirect manner – she
derived all her conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause
cannot of course be doubted. The psychlologist, using meager information coming from a
directly interested party, could not have secured a complete personality profile and could not
have conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelito’s psychological
condition. While the report or evaluation may be conclusive with respect to Jocelyn’s
psychological condition, this is not true for Angelito’s. The methodology employed simply cannot
satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party
alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder. Both the psychologist’s report and
testimony simply provided a general description of Angelito’s purported anti-social personality
disorder, supported by the characterization of this disorder as chronic, grave and incurable. The
psychologist was conspicuously silent, however, on the bases for her conclusion or the
particulars that gave rise to the characterization she gave. Jurisprudence holds that there must
be evidence showing a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
327
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. Jocelyn’s testimony regarding the habitual
drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of psychological incapacity, do
not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity. All these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or
mere refusal to perform marital obligations.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of

merit. We AFFIRM the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
62443. Costs against the petitioner.
328
Azcueta vs. Republic
Azcueta vs. Republic,

G.R. No. 180668; 26 May 2009
Ponente: J. Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro

Facts:
Marietta Azcueta (Marietta) filed a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of her
marriage to Rodolfo Azcueta (Rodolfo) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Marietta averred
that Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. Marietta complained that despite her encouragement, Rodolfo never bothered to look
for a job and always depended on his mother for financial assistance and for his decisions. It
was Rodolfo’s mother who found them a room near the Azcueta home and paid the monthly
rental. Rodolfo also pretended to have found work and gave Marietta money which actually
came from Rodolfo’s mother. When Marietta confronted him, Rodolfo cried like a child and told
her his parents could support their needs. They had sex only once a month which Marietta
never enjoyed. When they discussed this, Rodolfo told Marietta that sex was sacred and should
not be enjoyed or abused. Rodolfo also told her he was not ready for a child. When Marietta
asked Rodolfo if they could move to another place, he did not agree and she was forced to
leave and see if he would follow her. He did not. Rodolfo’s first cousin, who at one time lived
with Rodolfo’s family, corroborated Marietta’s testimony that Rodolfo was not gainfully employed
and relied on the allowance given by his mother who also paid the rentals for the room the
couple lived in. The psychiatrist who examined Marietta testified that she found the latter to be
mature, independent, focused, and responsible, had a direction and ambition in life, and was not
psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. Based on
information gathered from Marietta, the same psychiatrist found Rodolfo to be suffering from
Dependent Personality Disorder characterized by loss of self-confidence, constant self-doubt,
and inability to make his own decisions and dependency on other people. The psychiatrist
explained that the root cause of the disorder was a cross-identification with Rodolfo’s mother
who was the dominant figure in the family considering that Rodolfo’s father, a seaman, was
always out of the house. She added that the problem began during the early stages of Rodolfo’s
life but manifested only after his marriage. She stated that the problem was severe, because he
would not be able take on the responsibilities of a spouse, and incurable, because it began in
early development and had been deeply ingrained in his personality. She, thus, concluded that
Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital duties and responsibilities.
329
Rodolfo failed to appear and file an answer despite service of summons on him. The City
Prosecutor found no collusion between the parties. Based on the evidence presented by
Marietta, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) declared the marriage void ab initio. The Solicitor
General appealed the RTC’s decision, arguing that the psychiatric report was based solely on
the information given by Marietta, and there was no showing that the alleged psychological
disorder was present at the start of the marriage or that it was grave, permanent and incurable.
The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC’s decision. Marietta, thus, brought the case to the
Supreme Court on a petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated to justify a declaration that his
marriage to Marrieta is void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital duties because of is
Dependent Personality Disorder. His marriage to Marietta was declared void ab initio. Marietta
sufficiently discharged her burden to prove her husband’s psychological incapacity. As held in
Marcos vs. Marcos [397 Phil. 840 (2000)], there is no requirement that the respondent spouse
should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for
the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. What matters is
whether the totality of evidence presented is adequate to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity. Marietta’s testimony was corroborated in material points by Rodolfo’s close relative,
and supported by the psychiatrist’s testimony linking the manifestations of Rodolfo’s
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. It is a settled principle of civil
procedure that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled
to great respect from the appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to observe
the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate their candor or lack
thereof. Since the trial court itself accepted the veracity of Marietta’s factual premises, there is
no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn there from by her expert
witness.
The root cause of Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity was alleged in the petition,
medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by testimony of an expert witness with more
than 40 years experience in the field of psychology and psychological incapacity, and clearly
explained in the trial court’s decision. As held in Te vs. Te (G.R. No. 161793, 13 February
330
2009), “(b)y the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of
decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert
opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.” Rodolfo’s psychological
incapacity was also established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before the
celebration of marriage. Witnesses were united in testifying that from the start of the marriage,
Rodolfo’s irresponsibility, overdependence on his mother and abnormal sexual reticence were
already evident. These manifestations of Rodolfo’s Dependent Personality Disorder must have
existed even prior to the marriage being rooted in his early development and a by-product of his
upbringing and family life. Furthermore, Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity had been shown to
be grave so as to render him unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The
Court of Appeals’ opinion that Rodolfo’s requests for financial assistance from his mother might
have been due to embarrassment for failing to contribute to the family coffers and that his
motive for not wanting a child was a “responsible” realization since he was unemployed, were
dismissed by the High Court for being speculative and unsupported by evidence. The Supreme
Court likewise disagreed with the Court of Appeals’ finding that Rodolfo’s irresponsibility and
overdependence on his mother could be attributed to immaturity, noting that at the time of his
marriage, Rodolfo was almost 29 years old. Also, the expert testimony identified a grave clinical
or medical cause for Rodolfo’s abnormal behavior – Dependent Personality Disorder. A person
afflicted with Dependent Personality Disorder cannot assume the essential marital obligations
of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is
unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to make most of
his important decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people even when he
believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do things that are
demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when
alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. (Te vs. Te, supra)One who is
unable to support himself, much less a wife; one who cannot independently make decisions
regarding even the most basic matters that spouses face every day; and one who cannot
contribute to the material, physical and emotional well-being of his spouse, is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the marital obligations within the meaning of Article 36 of the
Family Code. This is not to say, however, that anyone diagnosed with Dependent Personality
Disorder is automatically deemed psychologically incapacitated to perform his/her marital
obligations. The court must evaluate the facts, as guided by expert opinion, and carefully
examine the type of disorder and the gravity thereof before declaring the nullity of a marriage
331
under Article 36. Finally, it has been established that Rodolfo’s condition is incurable, having
been deeply ingrained in his system since his early years.
332
Alcazar v. Alcazar
VERONICA CABACUNGAN ALCAZAR, Petitioner,

vs.
REY C. ALCAZAR, Respondent.
G.R. No. 174451 October 13, 2009
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Facts:
Petitioner alleged in her Complaint that she was married to respondent on 11 October
2000 by Rev. Augusto G. Pabustan (Pabustan), at the latter’s residence. After their wedding,
petitioner and respondent lived for five days in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, the hometown of
respondent’s parents. Thereafter, the newlyweds went back to Manila, but respondent did not
live with petitioner at the latter’s abode at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue,
Tondo, Manila. On 23 October 2000, respondent left for Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
where he worked as an upholsterer in a furniture shop. While working in Riyadh, respondent
did not communicate with petitioner by phone or by letter. Petitioner tried to call respondent for
five times but respondent never answered. About a year and a half after respondent left
for Riyadh, a co-teacher informed petitioner that respondent was about to come home to
the Philippines. Petitioner was surprised why she was not advised by respondent of his arrival.
Petitioner further averred in her Complaint that when respondent arrived in

the Philippines, the latter did not go home to petitioner at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue,
Tondo, Manila. Instead, respondent proceeded to his parents’ house in San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro. Upon learning that respondent was in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, petitioner went
to see her brother-in-law in Velasquez St., Tondo, Manila, who claimed that he was not aware of
respondent’s whereabouts. Petitioner traveled to San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, where she
was informed that respondent had been living with his parents since his arrival in March 2002.
Petitioner asserted that from the time respondent arrived in the Philippines, he never
contacted her. Thus, petitioner concluded that respondent was physically incapable of
consummating his marriage with her, providing sufficient cause for annulment of their marriage
pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code). There
was also no more possibility of reconciliation between petitioner and respondent.
333
Issue:
Whether or not the evidences presented is sufficient to nullify their marriage.
Ruling:
The Court laid down the guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriage, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, in Republic v. Court of Appeals,[24] to wit:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation
of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact
that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it “as the foundation of the nation.” It decrees marriage as legally
“inviolable,” thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both
the family and marriage are to be “protected” by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be a) medically or

clinically identified, b) alleged in the complaint, c) sufficiently proven by experts
and d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires
that the incapacity must be psychological – not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, were mentally or psychically ill to such
an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless
such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
334
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the “time of the
celebration” of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their “I do’s.” The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically

permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only
in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure
them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts”
cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential
to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles

68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
335
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The 24 May 2006 Decision and 28
August 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84471, which affirmed the 9
June 2004 Decision of the Regional TrialCourt of Malolos City, Branch 85, dismissing petitioner
Veronica Cabacungan Alcazar’s Complaint in Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, are AFFIRMED. No
costs.
336
Aspillaga v. Aspillaga
ASPILLAGA v. ASPILLAGA
G.R. No. 170925 October 26, 2009
Quisumbing, J.:
Facts:
Rodolfo Aspillaga filed a petition for annulment of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of Aurora Aspillaga. Aurora alleged upon her return to
Manila, she discovered that while she was in Japan, Rodolfo brought into their conjugal home
her cousin, Lecita Rose A. Besina, as his concubine. Aurora alleged that Rodolfo’s cohabitation
with her cousin led to the disintegration of their marriage and their eventual separation.
During trial, expert witness Dr. Eduardo Maaba explained that both parties are
psychologically incapacitated. The RTC found the parties psychologically incapacitated to enter
into marriage.
The CA reversed the RTC decision and declared the marriage of Rodolfo and Aurora
Aspillaga valid. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was also denied.
Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of the parties’ psychological
incapacity.
Held:
No. As early as 1995, in Santos v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995),
it has been categorically ruled that:
Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the
party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be
rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved.
In the instant case, Dr. Maaba failed to reveal that the psychological conditions were
grave or serious enough to bring about incapacity to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Indeed, Dr. Maaba was able to establish the parties’ personality disorder; however, he
337
failed to link the parties’ psychological disorders to his conclusion that they are psychologically
incapacitated to perform their obligations as husband and wife. The fact that these
psychological conditions will hamper their performance of their marital obligations does not
mean that they suffer from psychological incapacity as contemplated under Article 36 of the
Family Code. Mere difficulty is not synonymous to incapacity.
It must be stressed that psychological incapacity must be more than just a “difficulty,”
“refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations (Republic v. CA). The
intention of the law is to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage (Tongol v. Tongol, G.R. No. 157610, October 19,
2007).
Psychological disorders do not manifest that both parties are truly incapacitated to
perform the basic marital covenants. Moreover, there is nothing that shows incurability of these
disorders. Incompatibility and irreconcilable differences cannot be equated with psychological
incapacity as understood juristically.
As to Rodolfo’s allegation that Aurora was a spendthrift, the same likewise fails to
convince. While disagreements on money matters would, no doubt, affect the other aspects of
one’s marriage as to make the wedlock unsatisfactory, this is not a ground to declare a marriage
null and void. In fact, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that disagreements regarding
money matters are a common, and even normal, occurrence between husbands and wives.
338
Najera v. Najera
DIGNA A. NAJERA, Petitioner,

vs.
EDUARDO J. NAJERA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 164817 July 3, 2009
PERALTA, J.:
Facts:
Digna Najera, Petitioner, sought annulment or in the alternative, legal separation with
her husband Eduardo Najera, Respondent. For the ground of Borderline Personality Disorder,
jobless, failed to give financial support, abandoned family home and jumped ship in Los Angeles
Petitioner prayed that upon filing of the petition, an Order be issued appointing her as
the sole administrator of their conjugal properties; and that after trial on the merits, judgment be
rendered declaring their marriage void ab initio in accordance with Article 36 of the Family
Code; in the alternative, decreeing legal separation of petitioner and respondent pursuant to
Title II of the Family Code; and declaring the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of petitioner
and respondent and the forfeiture in favor of petitioner of respondent’s share in the said
properties pursuant to Articles 42 (2) and 63 (2) of the Family Code; and granting petitioner
other just and equitable reliefs.
The Regional Trial Court declared legal separation, not annulment and the court of
appeals affirmed decision of RTC.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied petition, marriage valid and subsisting –because totality of
evidence insufficient ,conclusion of psychologist based on stories Digna relayed, conclusions
are unscientific and unreliable – only grounds for legal separation and not annulment – finding
of psychologist not supported by decision of National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 68053, dated February 23, 2004, and its Resolution dated August 5, 2004, are hereby
AFFIRMED.
339
Te v. Te
Te vs. Te
GR No. 161793, February 13, 2009
NACHURA, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Edward Te first met respondent Rowena Te in a gathering organized by the

Filipino-Chinese association in their college. Initially, he was attracted to Rowena’s close friend
but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to court Rowena, which
happened in January 1996. It was Rowena who asked that they elope but Edward refused
bickering that he was young and jobless. Her persistence, however, made him relent. They left
Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing their travel money of P80,000 and she,
purchasing the boat ticket.
They decided to go back to Manila in April 1996. Rowena proceeded to her uncle’s
house and Edward to his parents’ home. Eventually they got married but without a marriage
license. Edward was prohibited from getting out of the house unaccompanied and was
threatened by Rowena and her uncle. After a month, Edward escaped from the house, and
stayed with his parents. Edward’s parents wanted them to stay at their house but Rowena
refused and demanded that they have a separate abode. In June 1996, she said that it was
better for them to live separate lives and they then parted ways.
After four years in January 2000, Edward filed a petition for the annulment of his
marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latter’s psychological incapacity.
ISSUE:
Whether the marriage contracted is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
RULUNG:
The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six months. They met in January
1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The
psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated.
Petitioner’s behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder,
and respondent’s, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder
340
There is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be
personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
The presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of
the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and
incurable presence of psychological incapacity.
Indeed, petitioner, afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the
essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering
help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, and
allows others to make most of his important decisions (such as where to live). As clearly shown
in this case, petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is
insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to
speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.
As for the respondent, her being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes her
unable to assume the essential marital obligations on account for her disregard in the rights of
others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse, and her tendency to
blame others. Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she
had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity,
the precipitous marriage that they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review
on certiorari is GRANTED. The August 5, 2003 Decision and the January 19, 2004 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
Decision, dated July 30, 2001, REINSTATED.
341
Paras v. Paras
ROSA YAP PARAS, petitioner,

vs.
JUSTO J. PARAS, Respondent
G.R. No. 147824 August 2, 2007
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Facts:
On May 21, 1964, petitioner Rosa Yap married respondent Justo J. Paras in
Bindoy,Negros Oriental. They begot four (4) children. May 27, 1993, Rosafiled with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31, Dumaguete City, a complaint for annulment of her
marriage with Justo. She alleged that Justo is psychologically incapacitated to exercise the
essential obligations of marriage as shown by the following circumstances: (a) he dissipated her
business assets and forged her signature in one mortgage transaction; (b) he lived with
concubine and sired a child with her; (c) he did not give financial support to his children; and (d)
he has been remiss in his duties both as a husband and as a father. Sometime in 1975, their
daughter Cindy Rose was afflicted with leukemia. It was her family who paid for her medication.
Also, in 1984, their son Raoul was electrocuted while Justo was in their rest house with his
"barkadas." He did not heed her earlier advice to bring Raoul in the rest house as the latter has
the habit of climbing the rooftop. To cope with the death of the children, the entire family went to
the United States. However, after three months, Justo abandoned them and left for the
Philippines. Upon her return to the Philippines, she was shocked to find her "Botica" and other
businesses heavy in debt and he disposed without her consent a conjugal piece of land. After
trial or on February 28, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision upholding the validity of the
marriage. It found that: (a) Justo did not abandon the conjugal home as he was forced to leave
after Rosa posted guards at the gates of their house; (b) the conjugal assets were sufficient to
support the family needs, thus, there was no need for Justo to shell out his limited salary; and
(c) the charge of infidelity is unsubstantiated. The RTC observed that the relationship between
the parties started well, negating the existence of psychological incapacity on either party at the
time of the celebration of their marriage. And lastly, it ruled that there appeared to be collusion
between them as both sought the declaration of nullity of their marriage. On December 8, 2000,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision in the present case, holding that "the evidence
of the plaintiff (Rosa) falls short of the standards required by law to decree a nullity of marriage."
It ruled that Justo’s alleged defects or idiosyncrasies "were sufficiently explained by the
342
evidence," Rosa contends that this Court’s factual findings in A.C. No. 5333 for disbarment are
conclusive on the present case. Consequently, the Court of Appeals erred in rendering contrary
factual findings. Also, she argues that she filed the instant complaint sometime in May, 1993
Issues:
Whether a remand of this case to the RTC for reception of expert testimony on the root
cause of
Justo’s alleged psychological incapacity is necessary; and
Whether the totality of evidence in the case shows psychological incapacity on the part
of Justo
Ruling:
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified,(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts, and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological --not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, were mentally or psychically
ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the
principle of ejusdemgeneris, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologist
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by a party who, at the time of celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c)
incurability
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 49915 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
343
Zamora v. CA
BERNARDINO S. ZAMORA
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and NORMA MERCADO ZAMORA
G.R. No. 141917 February 7, 2007
AZCUNA, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent were married on June 4, 1970 in Cebu City. After their
marriage, they lived together at No. 50-AGorordo Avenue, Cebu City. The union did not produce
any child. In 1972, private respondent left for the United States to work as nurse. She returned
to the Philippines for a few months, and then left again in 1974. Thereafter, she made periodic
visits to Cebu City until 1989, when she was already a U.S. citizen. Petitioner filed a complaint
for declaration of nullity of marriage anchored on the alleged "psychological incapacity" of
private respondent, as provided for under Article 36 of the Family Code. To support his position,
he alleged that his wife was "horrified" by the mere thought of having children as evidenced by
the fact that she had not borne petitioner a child. Furthermore, he also alleged that private
respondent abandoned him by living in the United States and had in fact become an American
citizen; and that throughout their marriage they lived together for not more than three years.
Respondent denied that she refused to have a child. She portrayed herself as one who loves
children as she is a nurse by profession and that she would from time to time borrow her
husband’s niece and nephews to care for them. She also faulted her husband for the breakup of
their marriage, alleging that he had been unfaithful to her. He allegedly had two affairs with
different women, and he begot at least three children with them. On June 22, 1995, the trial
court rendered its decision. The plaintiff consented to defendant’s trip to the United States in
1974. She [defendant] wanted to earn money there because she wanted to help her husband
build a big house at the Beverly Hills, Cebu City. The plaintiff himself admitted that he has a
child, and the court is also convinced that he has two children. However, nothing in the evidence
of plaintiff shows that the defendant suffered from any psychological incapacity or that she failed
to comply with her essential marital obligations. There is no evidence of psychological
incapacity on the part of defendant so that she could not carry out the ordinary duties required in
married life. Neither has it been shown that there was an incurable defect on the part of
defendant.
344
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals misapplied facts of weight and substance affecting
the result of the present case.
Ruling:
The Courts merely said in that case that "the well-considered opinions of psychiatrists,
psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even
desirable." However, no expert opinion is helpful or even desirable to determine whether private
respondent has been living abroad and away from her husband for many years; whether she
has a child; and whether she has made her residence abroad permanent by acquiring U.S.
citizenship2) Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.3) A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall
specifically allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically
incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the
celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated August 5, 1999 and January 24, 2000, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 53525
are AFFIRMED. No costs.
345
Ferraris v. Ferraris
MA. ARMIDA-FERRARIS, petitioner vs BRIX FERRARIS, defendant

G.R. No. 162368, July 17, 2006
Facts:
The Regiona Trial Court denied the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage between
petitioner Ma. Armida-Ferraris with Brix Ferraris. It found that his "violence" during episodes of
epilepsy did not constitute psychological incapacity. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
and cited that the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that respondent was
suffering from psychological incapacity or that his "defects" were incurable and already presen t
at the inception of the marriage. Dr Dayan's testimony of the respondent's mixed-personality
was unsufficiently arrived at. It was alleged that he had Schizoid characteristics in his persona.
The testimony however failed to establish how this was arrived at or that there was a natal or
supervening disabling factor or an adverse integral element in respondent's character that
effectively incapacitated him from accepting and complying with the essential marital
obligations. The petitioner then filed a motion to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Can epilepsy constitute psychological incapacity?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition with finality. The Supreme Court found
respondent's alleged mixed personality disorder, the "leaving-the-house" attitude whenever they
quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment
and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family,
are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness
to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Article 36 of the Family Code should not be
confused with Divorce or with Legal Separation
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration of the
Resolution dated June 9, 2004 denying the petition for review on certiorari for failure of the
346
petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error,
is DENIED WITH FINALITY.
347
Antonio v. Reyes
ANTONIO, petitioner vs REYES, respondent

G.R. No. 155800. March 10, 2006
TINGA, J:
Facts:
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and
respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married on 6
December 1990. On 8 March 1993, petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent
declared null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code
alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondent’s incapacity existed at the time their
marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the present. As manifestations of respondent’s
alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied about
herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other
events or things. The Trial Court declared the marriage as null and void since it found that
respondent's propensity to lie rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her
marriage. The Church also annuled the Catholic marriage of the parties. The Court of Appeals
nevertheless held that the totality of the evidence presented was insufficient to establish
respondent’s psychological incapacity and thus reversed the decision of the trial court. The
petitioner then filed a motion to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Can pathological lying constitute psychological incapacity?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court granted the petition and reinstated the decision of the Trial Court.
The Molina guidelines did not foreclose the grant of a decree of nullity under Article 36, even as
it raised the bar for its allowance. The guidelines are in fact used to interpret incapacity in the
present case. The decision of the Church to nullify the marriage was given great weight in the
consideration of the case. The other guidelines were also satisfied in affirming the psychological
condition. The pathological lying of the respondent shows a dangerous if not unhealthy inability
to distinguish reality from the fantasy world which makes the fulfillment of marital obligations and
duties impossible.
348
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10 August
1995, declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article
36 of the Family Code, is REINSTATED. No costs.
349
RP v. Iyoy
REPUBLIC, plaintiff vs. CRASUS IYOY, defendant

G.R. No. 152577. September 21, 2005
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Facts:
Respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial Church,
Jones Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their union, they had five children – Crasus, Jr.,
Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos – who are now all of legal ages. After the celebration of
their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was “hot-tempered, a nagger and
extravagant.” In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.),
leaving all of their five children. In 1984, she filed for divorce while in the United States. In 1985
respondent Fely married an American citizen and became an American citizen herself sometime
in 1988. Respondent eventually filed a petition to the courts alleging in his Complaint that Fely’s
acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological
incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable
and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in
relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.
The Regional Trial rendered its decision in favor of the respondent and declared the
marriage as null and void ab initio. The Court of Appeals upheld the decision also citing that
under Art. 26 of the Family Code, divorce was permissible since Fely was already an American
citizen. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) then intervened claiming that mere
abandonment and sexual infidelity does not constitute psychological incapacity and that there
was error in applying Art. 26 of the Family Code. The respondent questions the participation of
the OSG.
Issues:
a. How is psychological incapacity properly alleged?
b. Is the divorce of Fely valid?
c. Can the OSG rightly intervene in the case cited above?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court granted the petition and reversed and set aside the decisions of the
lower courts. The root cause of psychological incapacity was not proven. According to the
Molina guidelines, psychological incapacity must be medically proven to be existent. There was
also improper application of Art. 26 of the Family Code. Since Fely only acquired American
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citizenship in 1988, she was still a Filipino citizen when she acquired her divorce in 1984.
Filipinos cannot be granted divorce unless they are within the context of a mixed marriage which
was not the case back then in 1984.
While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal who actively participates, on behalf of the
State, in a proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC, the
Office of the Solicitor General takes over when the case is elevated to the Court of Appeals or
this Court. Since it shall be eventually responsible for taking the case to the appellate courts
when circumstances demand, then it is only reasonable and practical that even while the
proceeding is still being held before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General can already
exercise supervision and control over the conduct of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal therein to
better guarantee the protection of the interests of the State.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, affirming the Judgment of the RTC of
Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998, is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.
The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and
subsisting
351
Siayngco v. Siayngco
CARATING-SIAYNGCO vs SIAYNGCO
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Juanita
Carating Siayngco was married to Manuel Siayngco. Their marriage did not produce children
however, the adopted a boy. Manuel, after being married for 24 years filed a petition to the court
seeking the nullification of their marriage by reason of psychological incapacity exhibited
through over domineering attitude and causing him embarrassment and humiliation. The lower
court denied his petition. The CA on the other hand reversed the decision relying on the doctor’s
findings that both parties are psychologically incapacitated.
ISSUE:
Whether or not one or both of the parties were proven psychologically incapacitated
sufficient to warrant the nullification of their marriage.
RULING:
The court ruled in the negative. Manuel’s relationship with another was caused merely
by his sexual infidelity which does not fall within the purview of psychological incapacity. This
act is caused by his desire to have children which he himself admitted. The testimonies of the
doctor failed to show that this infidelity is caused by a psychological illness or disorder. It is
necessary that it his by reason of a psychological disorder that he will be completely unable to
perform his marital obligations. With regard to Juanita, Manuel failed to show that her actions
constitute psychological incapacity that would render her unable to perform her marital
obligations and that a doctor has in fact stated otherwise. The evidence adduced failed to show
sufficiently that the couple or either of the spouse were psychologically incapacitated, rather it
showed that they were merely having the marital trouble of becoming strangers to each other
and wanting to get out of it. The marriage thus cannot be declared null and void.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated 01 July
2003 of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated 31
January 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102 is reinstated and given full
force and effect. No costs.
352
Villalon v. Villalon
JAIME VILLALON, petitioner vs. MA. CORAZON VILLALON, respondent

G.R. No. 167206
Facts:
On July 12, 1996, petitioner Jaime F. Villalon filed a petition for the annulment of his
marriage to respondent Ma. Corazon N. Villalon. As ground therefor, petitioner cited his
psychological incapacity which he claimed existed even prior to his marriage. According to
petitioner, the manifestations of his psychological incapacity were: (a) his chronic refusal to
maintain harmonious family relations and his lack of interest in having a normal married life; (b)
his immaturity and irresponsibility in refusing to accept the essential obligations of marriage as
husband to his wife; (c) his desire for other women and a life unchained from any spousal
obligation; and (d) his false assumption of the fundamental obligations of companionship and
consortium towards respondent.
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad Dayan, a clinical psychologist, to testify on his alleged
psychological disorder of “Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder” with “Casanova
Complex”. A person afflicted with this disorder believes that he is entitled to gratify his emotional
and sexual feelings and thus engages in serial infidelities. Likewise, a person with “Casanova
Complex” exhibits habitual adulterous behavior and goes from one relationship to another.
Respondent claimed that her husband was a dutiful husband and father during their marriage
and alleged that his sexual infidelity was exhibited only on 2 occasions which were 13 years
apart which was not consistent with his supposed psychological disorder. The Regional Trial
Court decided in favor the petitioner while the Court of Appeals reversed the earlier decision
and held the marriage as valid.
Issue:
What quantum of evidence must be present to properly psychological incapacity?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition for annulment of the marriage. Sexual infidelity,
by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity. It must
be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which
make petitioner completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage. The
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evidence at record did not show the alleged gravity and incurability of the husband's
psychological incapacity. In fact the evidence shows that the husband was a responsible
husband and father. It appears that petitioner has simply lost his love for respondent and has
consequently refused to stay married to her. Also, at the time of respondent’s testimony,
petitioner’s illicit relationship has been going on for six years. This is not consistent with the
symptoms of a person suffering from “Casanova Complex” who, according to Dr. Dayan, is one
who jumps from one relationship to another. Dr. Dayan also failed to provide vital links and the
basis for her findings. Hence the grounds for psychological incapacity were betrayed by a lack
of sufficient evidence indicating the same.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The March 23, 2004 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74354 and its October 28, 2004 Resolution, are AFFIRMED.
354
Buenaventura v. CA
NOEL BUENAVENTURA, plaintiff vs COURT OF APPEALS, defendant

GR No. 127358. March 31, 2005
AZCUNA, J.
Facts:
On July 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court, declared the marriage between Noel A.
Buenaventura and defendant Isabel Lucia Singh Buenaventura (on July 4, 1979) null and void
ab initio. Noel was revealed to have been psychologically incapacitated; that he had married out
of parental pressure and not out of love; that he had abandoned his family; that this caused
defendant to suffer moral damages. The Regional Trial Court awarded the defendant with
damages based on Art. 2217 and Art. 21 of the New Civil Code. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the ruling. The plaintiff-appellee therefore filed for a petition of certiorari alleging that the Court
of Appeals erred in awarding damages.
Issue:
Can award for damages be provided when the alleged offender is psychologically
incapacitated?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court deleted the award for moral and exemplary damages. It is
contradictory to characterize acts as a product of psychological incapacity and hence beyond
the control of the party because of an innate inability while at the same time considering the
same set of acts as willful. Psychological incapacity therefore removes the basis for the
contention that the petitioner purposely deceived the private respondent. Therefore, the award
of moral damages damages was without basis in law and in fact. Since the award of moral and
exemplary damages was no longer justified, the award of attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation is left without basis.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 8, 1996 and its
Resolution dated December 10, 1996 which are contested in the Petition for Review (G.R. No.
127449), are hereby MODIFIED, in that the award of moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s
fees, expenses of litigation and costs are deleted. The order giving respondent one-half of the
retirement benefits of petitioner from Far East Bank and Trust Co. and one-half of petitioner’s
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shares of stock in Manila Memorial Park and in the Provident Group of Companies is sustained
but on the basis of the liquidation, partition and distribution of the co-ownership and not of the
regime of conjugal partnership of gains. The rest of said Decision and Resolution are
AFFIRMED.
356
RP v. Hamano
REPUBLIC, petitioner vs. TOSHIO HAMANO, defendant

G.R. No. 149498. May 20, 2004
CORONA, J.
Facts:
On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for declaration
of nullity of her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of
Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio started a common-law
relationship in Japan. They later lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went
back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987, she gave birth to their
child.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M. Balderia of the
Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio was psychologically
incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest only
after the marriage. Her husband had sent them financial support for two months and had
abandoned ever since. He did not even visit them when he returned to the Philippines. The wife
filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of the marriage citing the the husband did not fulfill
any of his marital obligations. The Regional Trial Court granted the petition which was affirmed
by the Appellate Court.The Court of Appeals also added that this case could not be equated
with Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina and Santos vs. Court of Appeals. In those cases,
the spouses were Filipinos while this case involved a “mixed marriage,” the husband being a
Japanese national.The petitioner Republic however forwarded the case to the Supreme Court
for review.
Issue:
Are the Molina Guildelines inapplicable in the instance of mixed marriages?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court granted the petition. In proving psychological incapacity, there is no
distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. There cannot be leniency in the
application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated
happens to be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological
incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the
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norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of
nationality.
In the case above, the Molina guildelines were not strictly followed in that there was no
medical illness that was properly identified. As it is, mere abandonment by itself is insuffient to
prove psychological incapacity.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated August
28, 1997 of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
358
FLORENCE TEVES MACARUBBO, plaintiff vs. EDMUNDO MACARUBBO, defendant

A.C. No. 6148. February 27, 2004
Facts:
Atty. Edmundo L. Macarrubo was married to Helen Esparza on June 16, 1982. Despite
this existing marriage, he contracted a second one with Florence Teves Macarrubo, with whom
he had borne two children, on December 28, 1991. On August 21, 1998 a decision was
rendered by the courts declaring his first marriage void on the basis of his wife's psychological
incapacity. Florence Teves Macarrubo (complainant), by herself and on behalf of her two
children, filed on June 6, 2000 a verified complaint for disbarment against Atty. Edmundo L.
Macarubbo (respondent) with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The respondent had
left his second wife and was married to another woman, Josephine Constantino, with whom he
had another pending case of annulment. The respondent provided all relevant documents
showing that he had no mark of criminality or wrong and that he had provided support for his
family though sometimes intermittent. The investigating body hence recommended that he be
suspended for a period of three months.
Issue:
Can the respondent validly contract a second marriage when the prior marriage was
annulled on the basis of psychological incapacity years after the second marriage was
solemnized?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court disbarred the respondent from legal practice. The respondent's
actions show his disrespect for the institution of marriage and the family. While a first shotgun
marriage may be excusable on the part of a lawyer respondent, two consecutive claims of being
the victim in marriage raises some questions. The fact that another petition for annulment is
lodged against the respondent's third wife shows his non commitment to the social institution.
His intermittent support to his children also does not compensate for the monthly support that is
needed in their sustenance. The respondent exhibited gross immoral conduct in the instances
mentioned above.
The decision, rendered in default of complainant, cannot serve as res judicata on the
final resolution of the present case. As this Court held in In re Almacen, a disbarment case is
sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an investigation by the
359
Court into the conduct of its officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not
determinative of an administrative case against him, or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a
disbarment case does not affect its course, then the judgment of annulment of respondent’s
marriage does not also exonerate him from a wrongdoing actually committed. So long as the
quantum of proof – clear preponderance of evidence – in disciplinary proceedings against
members of the bar is met, then liability attaches.
Fallo:
supporting or has made provisions for the regular support of his two children by complainant.
360
Dedel v. CA
DAVID DEDEL, petitioner vs COURT OF APPEALS, respondent

G.R. No. 151867. January 29, 2004
Facts:
Petitioner David B. Dedel married respondent Sharon L. Corpuz Dedel on May 20, 1967.
Petitioner avers that during the marriage, Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible and
immature wife and mother. She had extra-marital affairs with several men: a dentist in the
Armed Forces of the Philippines; a Lieutenant in the Presidential Security Command and later a
Jordanian national.
Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila Medical City for treatment by Dr. Lourdes
Lapuz, a clinical psychiatrist. Petitioner alleged that despite the treatment, Sharon did not stop
her illicit relationship with the Jordanian national named Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she married
and with whom she had two children. However, when Mustafa Ibrahim left the country, Sharon
returned to petitioner bringing along her two children by Ibrahim. Petitioner accepted her back
and even considered the two illegitimate children as his own. Thereafter, on December 9, 1995,
Sharon abandoned petitioner to join Ibrahim in Jordan with their two children. Since then,
Sharon would only return to the country on special occasions. Finally the petitioner then filed a
motion for the declaration of nullity of the marriage based on psychological incapacity. The
petitioner presented Dr. Dayan Natividad who alleged that Sharon suffered from Anti-Social
disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity and abandonment. These characteristics
render her unable to perform essential marital obligations.
The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage as null and void. The Office of the
Solicitor General appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed the earlier ruling. The petitioner
then filed a motion to the Supreme Court alleging that there was error in the judgment of the
Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Does the aberrant sexual behavior of respondent adverted to by petitioner fall within the
term “psychological incapacity?”
Ruling:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the ruling the ruling of the Court
of Appeals. In this case, respondent’s sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or
361
psychically ill to such an extent that she could not have known the obligations she was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given a valid assumption thereof. It appears that
respondent’s promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception of the marriage. What is, in
fact, disclosed by the records is a blissful marital union at its celebration, later affirmed in church
rites, and which produced four children. Respondent’s sexual infidelity or perversion and
abandonment do not by themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation
of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60406, which ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 97-
467 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
362
RP v. Dagdag
REPUBLIC, petitioner vs. AVELINO DAGDAG, respondent

GR. No. 109975. February 9,2001
QUISUMBING, J.:
Facts:
On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matis married Avelino Parangan Dagdag. A week after
the wedding signs of the husband's immaturity began to manifest. He indulged in drinking
sprees and would return home drunk. He would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse
and if she refused, he would inflict physical injuries on her. On October 1993, he left his family
again and that was the last they heard from him. It was learned that Avelino became an
escaped convict and remained at-large to date. On July 3, 1990, Erlinda filed a petition for
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article
36 of the Family Code. Erlinda testified and presented her sis-in-law, Virginia Dagdag, as her
only witness. The trial court rendered a decision declaring the marriage of Erlinda and Averlino
void under Article 36 of the Family Code. The Office of the Solicitor General filed a motion for
reconsideration on the ground that the decision was not in accordance with the evidence and
the law.
Issue:
What properly constitutes psychological incapacity?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court granted the petition of the OSG and reversed and set aside the
assailed decision. Since the Molina guildelines were laid down, the courts were expected to
better understand how to facilitate cases of psychological incapacity. Erlina failed to comply with
guideline No. 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically
or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts. Expert testimony should have also
been presented to establish the precise cause of private respondent's psychological incapacity.
The investigating prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to present controverting
evidence since the trial court's decision was prematurely rendered.
363
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated April 22, 1993, in CA-G.R. CY No. 34378 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No
364
Pesca v. Pesca
LORNA PESCA, petitioner vs ZOSIMO PESCA, respondent

GR No. 136921. April 17, 2001
VITUG, J.
Facts:
Petitioner Lorna G pesca and respondent Zosimo A . Pesca were married on March
1975. In 1988, the petitioner started noticing signs of respondent's "psychological incapacity"
through his habitual drinking and physical abuse. Eventually, petitioner forwarded a case to the
courts for the annulment of the said marriage. On Nevember 15, 1995, the Regional Trial Court
rendered its decision, declaring the marriage between the petitioner and respondent to be null
and void ab initio on the basis of psychologicl incapacity. The respondent appealed to the Court
of Appeals which rendered its decision in his favor. Based on Article 68 of the Family Code,
incapacity must be grave, psychological no physical, etc. The Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court and declared the marriage as valid. The petitioner filed a
motion to the Supreme Court stating that :
1) The doctrine laid down in Santos vs CA and Republic vs CA and Molina should bear no
retoractive effect.
2) The application of the Santos and Moiline dicta should warrant only a remand of the case to
the Trial Courts for further proceedings and not dismissal.
Issues:
a. What constitutes psychological incapacity?
b. How should previous judicial decisions affect future cases?
Ruling:
The petition was dismissed for lack of merit. It was held that the clause "psychological
incapacity" under Article 35 of the Family Code has not been meant to encompass all possible
psychoses, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility involved. The decisions from Santos and
Molina has the force of law under the doctrine of Stare Decisis, ordained in Article 8 of the New
Civil Code. Jurisprudence would constitute part of that law as of the date the statute is enacted.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the herein petition is DENIED. No costs.
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Marcos v. Marcos
BRENDA MARCOS, petitioner vs. WILSON MARCOS, respondent

GR No. 136490. October 19, 2000
PANGANIBAN, J.
Facts:
The marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent Wilson G. Marcos
was solemnized on September 6, 1982. Wilson was a military man but left the service after the
downfall of Marcos in 1987. Thereafter, the couple began experiencing marital problems. Wilson
was unable to find gainful employment over which they would quarrel. He would beat his wife
and children and force her to have sex with him. He would also leave several times during their
cohabitation. In 1992, they were already living separately. The petitioner filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. The petitioner
submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D for psychologcal evaluation. The
Regional Trial Court found the marriage null and void. The Court of Appeals reversed this and
held that psychological incapacity had not been established by the the totality of the evidence
presented. The appellant was not subjected to any psychological or psychiatric evaluation
either.
Issue:
Is psychological examination of the respondent required for the declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition and upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Personal medical or psychological examination of respondent was not a requirement for a
declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she presented
did not show such incapacity. There was absolutely no showing that respondent's "defects"
were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they were incurable. The behavior
of the respondent could be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully
employed for a period of not more than six years. At best, the evidence presented by petitioner
refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision AFFIRMED, except that
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portion requiring personal medical examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding of
psychological incapacity. No costs
367
Hernandez v. CA
LUCITA HERNANDEZ, petitioner vs COURT OF APPEALS, respondent

GR No. 126010. December 8, 1999
MENDOZA, J.:
Facts:
Petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez and private respondent Mario C. Hernandez were
married on January 1, 1981. On July 10, 1992 filed a petition seeking the annulment of her
marriage to private respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity of the latter. It was
alleged that he failed to support the family and contribute to the management of the household.
He was a habitual drinker, cohabited with another woman with whom he had an illegitemate
child, and had transmitted to her a sexually transmitted disease (STD) because of his
promiscuity. He was irresponsible, immature, unprepared for the duties of married life. Ester
Alfaro, petitioner's childhood friend testified during the hearing on the petition for annulment.
Ester testified that Lucita was once hospitalized because she was beaten up by Mario. The Trial
Court dismissed the petition. It found the grounds alleged as grounds for legal separation and
not for a declaration of nullity of marriages. The STD was also transmitted five years after
marriage and thusly could not constitute fraud. The Court of Appeals upheld the decision which
left petitioner to forward a motion to the Supreme Court.
Isssue:
What constitutes psychological incapacity?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The petitioner failed to
establish the fact that private respondent was suffering from a psychological defect at the start
of their marriage. Private respondent's alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or
peversion, and abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for finding that he was
suffering from a psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must
be shown that the acts are manifestations of a disrdered personality which make private
respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, and not
merely due to private respondent's youth and self-conscious feeling of being handsome.
Morever, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of private
respondent's psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the incaption of
the marriage.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
368
Enrico v. Heirs
Lolita Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Eulogio B. Medinaceli

GR No. 173614
Facts:
Spouses Eulogio B. Medinaceli and Trinidad Catli-Madinaceli were married on June 14,
1962. They had seven children, herein respondents. Trinidad died on May 1, 2004. On August
26, 2004, Eulogio married petitioner, Lolita Enrico and on February 10, 2005 or six months later,
Eulogio passed away.
Respondents, as heirs of Eulogio Medinaceli, filedan action for declaration of nullity of
marriage of Eulogio and Lolita on two grounds: that marriage was entered into without the
requisite of marriage license and the lack of marriage ceremony due to Eulogio’s serious illness
which made its performance imposible.
Enrico contended that she has been living with Eulogio for 21 years hence exempt from
getting a marriage license under Article 34 of the Family Code. Their heirs invoked the ruling in
the case of Ninal v. Bayadog holding that their heirs of a deceased spouse have the standing to
assail a void marriage even after the death of the Latter.
Issues:
1) Whether or not the marriage between Eulogio and Enrico is exempt from securing a
marriage license.
2) Whether or not the respondent heirs can assail the validity of said marriage after death
of Eulogio.
Ruling:
Under Article 34 of the Family Code, a man and woman who have been living together
for at least five years without any legal impediment to marry are exempt from securing a
marriage license. The said exemption cannot possibly apply because the second marriage
contracted by Eulogio with Enrico took place barely three months after his first wife, Trinidad,
died. Moreover, the respondent heirs have NO standing to assail the validity of the second
marriage even after the death of their father, Eulogio.
369
While it is true that Niñal vs. Bayadog allowed the heirs therein to file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of their father’s second marriage after the death of their father, the Court
held that the same rule cannot be applied for the reason that the impugned marriage therein
was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. As can be gleaned from the facts of
this case, Enrico’s marriage to Eulogio was celebrated in 2004. Sec. 1 states that “this Rule
shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of
voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines. The Rules of Court shall apply
suppletorily.” Sec. 2, par. (a) Categorically states that a petition for Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of a Void Marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
Nonetheless, the heirs are not left without remedy. They can still protect their
successional rights as compulsory or intestate heirs if Eulogio by questioning the validity of his
second marriage with Enrico, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but in a proceeding
for the settlement of the estate of their deceased father filed in the regular courts.
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Catalan v. CA
FELICIANO CATALAN, petitioners, vs. JESUS BASA, respondents

G. R. No. 159567. July 31, 2007.
PUNO, C.J.
Facts:
On October 20, 1948, Feliciano Catalan was discharged from active military service.
The Board of Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs found that he was unfit to
render military service due to his mental disorder (schizophrenia). On September 28, 1949,
Feliciano married Corazon Cerezo. On June 16, 1951, Feliciano allegedly donated to his sister
Mercedes one-half of the real property through the execution of a document, titled, “Absolute
deed of Donation”. On December 11, 1953, People’s Bank and Trust Company filed Special
Proceedings to declare Feliciano incompetent. On December 22, 1953, the trial court issued its
Order of Adjudication of Incompetency for Appointing Guardian for the Estate and Fixing
Allowance of Feliciano. Thus, Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), which is formerly the
People’s Bank and Trust Company, was appointed to be his guardian by the trial court. On
March 26, 1979, Mercedes sold the property donated by Feliciano to her in issue in her children
Delia and Jesus Basa. On April 1, 1997, BPI, acting as Feliciano’s guardian filed a case for
Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Possession and Ownership, as well as
damages against herein respondents. BPI alleged that the Deed of Absolute Donation of
Mercedes was void ab initio, as Feliciano never donated the property to Mercedes. In addition,
BPI averred that even if Feliciano had truly intended to give the property to her, the donation
would still be void, as he was not of sound mind and was therefore incapable of giving valid
consent. On August 14, 1997, Feliciano passed away. Both the lower court and Court of
Appeals dismissed the case because of insufficient evidence presented by the complainants to
overcome the presumption that Feliciano was sane and competent at the time he executed the
deed of donation in favor of Mercedes Catalan.
Issue:
Whether or not Feliciano has the capacity to execute the donation
Whether or not the property donated to Mercedes and later on sold to her children is
legally in possession of the latter
Are laches and prescription should be considered in the case?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the lower court and the Court of Appeals
and denied the petition. A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously
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a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it. Like any other contract, an agreement of the
parties is essential. Consent in contracts presupposes the following requisites: (1) it should be
intelligent or with an exact notion of the matter to which it refers; (2) it should be free; and (3) it
should be spontaneous. The parties’ intention must be clear and the attendance of a vice of
consent, like any contract, renders the donation voidable. A person suffering from schizophrenia
does not necessarily lose his competence to intelligently dispose his property. By merely
alleging the existing of schizophrenia, petitioners failed to show substantial proof that at the date
of the donation, June 16, 1951, Feliciano Catalan had lost total control of his mental facilities.
Thus, the lower court correctly held that Feliciano was of sound mind at that time and this
condition continued to exist until proof to the contrary was adduced. Since the donation was
valid. Mercedes has the right to sell the property to whomever she chose. Not a shred of
evidence has been presented to prove the claim that Mercedes’ sale of property to her children
was tainted with fraud or falsehood. Thus, the property in question belongs to Delia and Jesus
Basa. The Supreme Court notes the issue of prescription and laches for the first time on appeal
before the court. It is sufficient for the Supreme Court to note that even if it prospered, the deed
of donation was still a voidable, not a void, contract. As such, it remained binding as it was not
annulled in a proper action in court within four years.
Fallo:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, there being no merit in the arguments of the petitioners, the
petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66073 is
affirmed in toto.
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Ninal v. Bayadog
ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL,
INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petitioners, v. NORMA BAYADOG,
respondent.
G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Facts:
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. She was shot by
Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter, Pepito and
respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito
and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage
license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident.
After their father’s death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage
license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second
marriage would affect petitioner’s successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action
since they are not among the persons who could file an action for annulment of marriage under
Issues:
(c) Whether or not Pepito and Norma’ living together as husband and wife for at
least five years exempts them from obtaining a marriage license under Article 34 of the Family
Code of the Philippines.
(d) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for
the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her
specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is
already dead
Ruling:
(c) On the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and
wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on
the basis of cohabitation as “husband and wife” where the only missing factor is the special
contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common law
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cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a
period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. The five-year period
should be the years immediately before the day the marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity—meaning no third party was involved at any time
within the five years, and continuity—that is, unbroken. Otherwise, if that five-year cohabitation
period is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry
each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and
encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing
with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.
(d) The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage.
Voidable and void marriages are not identical. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned
even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the
lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring
will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial
Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.
374
Ablaza v. Republic
Ablaza v. Republic
G. R. 158298, August 11, 2010
BERSAMIN, J.
FACTS:
On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the RTC Masbate a petition for the
declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between
his late brother A and B.
The petitioner alleged that the marriage between A and B had been celebrated without a
marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering
the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage license.
ISSUE:
Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the
marriage of his deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the OLD Civil Code?
RULING:
YES. Before anything more, the Court has to clarify the impact to the issue posed
herein of Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages), which took effect on March 15, 2003.
Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages covered by the Family
Code and those solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988,
but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings
commenced after March 15, 2003.
Based on Carlos v. Sandoval, the following actions for declaration of absolute nullity of a
marriage are exempted from the limitation, to wit:
Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and
Those filed vis-à-vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code and,
those celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15, 2003.
Considering that the marriage between A and B was contracted on December 26, 1949,
the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to
375
initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had
absolutely no application to the petitioner.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is granted. We reverse and set aside the
decision dated January 30, 2003 rendered by the Court of Appeals.
376
Carlos v. Sandoval
JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS

v.
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL and TEOFILO CARLOS II
Facts:
Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels of land to
their compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlosand petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. During the lifetime of
Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. The agreement was made in order to
avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn, undertook to deliver and turn over the
share of the other legal heir, petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. Eventually, the first three (3)
parcels of land were transferred and registered in the name of Trefoil. On May 13, 1992, Teofilo
died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and their son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo
II).Upon Teofilo's death; the parcels of land were registered in the name of respondent Felicidad
and co-respondent, Teofilo II. In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before the
RTC in Muntinlupa City. In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late
brother Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required
marriagelicense. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor
the adoptive father of respondent Teofilo CarlosII.RTC declared the marriage between
defendant Felicidad Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos solemnized at Silang, Cavite on May 14,1962,
evidenced by the Marriage Certificate submitted in this case, null and void ab initio for lack of
the requisite marriage license. CAreversed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the marriage between Felicidad and Teofilo should be rendered null and void
2) Whether or not the filing of petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage of herein petitioner
was valid.
RULING:
The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither
judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment
disallowed. While it may be readily conceded that a valid marriage license is among the formal
requisites of marriage, the absence of which renders the marriage void
ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58 of the Civil Code the failure to reflect
the serial number of the marriage license on the marriage contract evidencing the marriage
between Teofilo Carlos and appellant Felicidad Sandoval, although irregular, is not as fatal as
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appellee represents it to be. Aside from the dearth of evidence to the contrary, appellant
Felicidad Sandoval's affirmation of the existence of said marriage license is corroborated by the
following statement in the affidavit executed by Godofredo Fojas, then Justice of the Peace who
officiated the impugned marriage. If the non-presentation of the marriage contract - the primary
evidence of marriage - is not proof that a marriage did not take place, neither should appellants'
non-presentation of the subject marriage license be taken as proof that the same was not
procured. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage, it must be emphasized, rests
upon the plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
378
Mallion v. Alcatara
OSCAR P. MALLION, petitioner, v. EDITHA ALCANTARA, respondent.

G.R. No. 141528. October 31, 2006.
AZCUNA, J.:
Facts:
On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar Mallion filed with the regional trial court seeking a
declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara on the ground of
The trial court denied the petition. Likewise, it was dismissed in the Court of Appeals.
After such decision, petitioner filed another petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
with the regional trial court alleging that his marriage with respondent was null and void due to
the fact that it was celebrated without a valid marriage license.
Respondent filed an answer with motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata and
forum shopping.
The trial court grated her petition.
Issue:
Is the action of the husband tenable?
Ruling:
No. Section 47(b) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court pertains as “bar by prior judgment” or
“estoppels by verdict,” which is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of the
second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. In Section 47(c) of the same
rule, it pertains to res judicata in its concept as “conclusiveness of judgment” or the rule of auter
action pendant which ordains that issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot
again be raised in any future case between the same parties involving a different cause of
action. Therefore, having expressly and impliedly concealed the validity of their marriage
celebration, petitioner is now deemed to have waived any defects therein. The Court finds then
that the present action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of marriage
license is barred. The petition is denied for lack of merit.
379
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
380
Maquilan v. Maquilan
VIRGILIO MAQUILAN, petitioner vs DITA MAQUILAN, respondent

GR No. 155409. June 8, 2007
Facts:
Virgilio Maquilan and Dita Maquilan lived a blissful married life and out of which were
blessed to have a son. However, the romance ended when the wife was found out to have an
extra-marital affair. She and her paramour were convicted of adultery and were sentenced to
suffer imprisonment. On June 15, 2001, private respondent, through counsel, filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage, dissolution and liquidation of conjugal partnership of gains and
damages. During pre-trial of the said case, petitioner and private respondent entered into a
compromise agreement. The compromise agreement was given judical imprimatur, which was
erroneously dated January 2, 2002. However, petitioner filed an Omnibus motion dated January
15, 2002 praying for the repudiation of the said agreement. With the lower courts continuously
denying repudiation, petitioner eventually came to the Supreme Court with the same motion
citing among his reasons that the agreement is void for having failed to secure the presence of
the State through the Office of the Solicitor General duing its enactment.
Issue:
When is State presence required in Marital Cases (as defined under Art. 48 of the
Family Code)?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition and validated the compromise agreement. The
purpose of the active participation of the public prosecutor or the OSG is to ensure that the
interest of the state is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration
of nullity of marriage by preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication, or
suppression of evidence. Nothing in the subject compromise agreement touched into the very
merits of the case of nullity of marriage. It merely pertains to an agreement between petitioner
and private respondent to separate their conjugal properties partially.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the subject Compromise Agreement
is VALIDwithout prejudice to the rights of all creditors and other persons with
pecuniary interest in the properties of the conjugal partnership of gains.
381
RP v. Cuison-Melgar
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CUISON-MELGAR, respondent

G.R. No. 139676. March 31, 2006
Facts:
In 1965, Norma and Eulogio were married and their union begot five children. In 1996,
Norma filed for declaration of nullity of her marriage on the ground of Eulogio’s psychological
incapacity to comply with his essential marital obligations. Summons were served to Eulogio,
however, he failed to file an answer within the reglementary period. The RTC ordered the Public
Prosecutor to conduct an investigation on the case to determine whether or not there exists
collusion between the contending parties and with this, found none. Upon motion of Norma’s
counsel, the RTC allowed the presentation of evidence. She testified that Eulogio was suffering
from psychological incapacity manifested by the latter’s immaturity, habitual alcoholism,
unbearable jealousy, maltreatment, constitutional laziness, and abandonment of his family since
1985.On January 20, 1997 or twelve days after the reception of evidence, the RTC rendered its
decision nullifying the marriage of Norma and Eulogio which the CA affirmed. Petitioner,
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed an appeal with the CA,
contending that the evidence presented are not sufficient to declare the marriage void under
Issue:
a. Whether the alleged psychological incapacity of respondent of respondent is in the
nature contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code.
b. Whether defaults in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation are
accepted in courts.
Ruling:
a. The OSG submits that Norma’s comments are irrelevant and not responsive to the
arguments in the petition. Nonetheless, the OSG reiterates that Norma’s evidence
fell short of the requirements of the law since no competent evidence was presented
during the trial to prove that Eulogio’s inability to look for a job, his resulting
drunkenness, jealousy and other disagreeable behavior are manifestations of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
b. Section 6 of Rule 18 of the 1985 Rules of Court,[23] the rule then applicable,
provides:
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Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation. - If
the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to
answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not
acollusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the
State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.
The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court.
In this case, the State did not actively participate in the prosecution of the case at
the trial level. Other than the Public Prosecutor’s Manifestation that no collusion existed
between the contending parties and the brief cross-examination which had barely
scratched the surface, no pleading, motion, or position paper was filed by the Public
Prosecutor or the OSG. The State should have been given the opportunity to present
controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered.
Fallo:
The decision of RTC and CA is reversed and set aside.
383
Corpus v. Ochotorena
MARGIE CORPUS, petitioner, vs. OCHOTORENA, respondent

A.M. No. RTJ-04-1861. July 30, 2004
TINGA, J.
Facts:
In 2001, a verified complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage was filed against Mrs.
Margie Corpus-Macias by Mariano Joaquin S. Macias, her husband and incumbent presiding
judge of RTC, Branch 11, Liloy, Zamboanga Del Norte. The case was raffled to the judge
Ochotorena’s court. On the same day the complaint was filed, the respondent immediately
issued summons to Mrs. Macias. However, the summons was not served on Mrs. Macias
because her whereabouts were allegedly unknown. Consequently, Mr. Macias filed a motion to
serve summons by publication. The respondent granted the motion in his order dated March 7,
2001, with the directive that Mrs. Macias should file her answer within 30 days after
notice. Thereafter, Mr. Macias caused the publication of the summons in the local weekly
newspaper. Within the 30-day period to file an answer, she filed a motion to dismiss, which she
set for hearing on April 20, 2001. However, instead of first acting upon the motion, the
respondent judge set the hearing on the merits of the subject on April 19, 2001 or one day
before. On April 19, 2001, respondent judge denied the Motion to Dismiss and re-set the
hearing on the merits to April 30, May 2 and 3, 2001. After the scheduled hearings and while
various motions by the petitioner were still pending, the respondent judge terminated the
proceedings and declared the case submitted for decision. Thus, Mrs. Macias filed a complaint
against respondent before the Office of the Court Administrator.
Issue:
Whether Judge Ochotorena acted with gross ignorance of the law and procedure which
deprived of the petitioner her fundamental right to due process with utmost bias and partiality for
Mr. Macias.
Ruling:
The respondent judge disregarded the provisions of Section 1, Rule 18 of the 1997
Rules on Civil Procedure, which states that: After the last pleading has been served and filed, it
shall be the duty of the plaintiff to promptly move ex-parte that the case be set for pre-trial.
Considering that the last pleading was Mrs. Macias’ Motion to Dismiss, the respondent judge
should have first resolved the motion and then waited for Mr. Macias’ motion to set the case for
384
pre-trial.
What happened in the case is a classic example of “railroading” or “procedural short-cut.”
It is also worth mentioning that even if Mrs. Macias failed to file her answer to the
complaint after the period therefor had elapsed, the respondent judge was not authorized to
conduct a hearing of the case on its merits. The Rules of Court prohibits default proceedings in
cases involving declaration of nullity of marriage.
Section 3, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure makes the report of the Public
Prosecutor a condition sine qua non for further proceedings to go on in the case. This was
ignored by respondent judge. While the record shows that the public prosecutor had filed a
Certification stating that he appeared in behalf of the Solicitor General during the ex-parte
presentation of plaintiff’s evidence and had no objection to the granting of the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage, such Certification does not suffice to comply with the
mandatory requirement that the court should order the investigating public prosecutor whether a
collusion exists between the parties. Such directive must be made by the court before trial
could proceed, not after the trial on the merits of the case had already been had. Notably, said
Certification was filed after the respondent judge had ordered the termination of the case.
Respondent compulsorily retired from the service on June 04, 2001, thus, dismissal or
suspension from the service is no longer possible. Nonetheless, a penalty of fine worth
P20,000.00 was imposed pursuant to Section 3 in relation to Section 10 of Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court which grants that gross ignorance of the law is considered a serious offense, for
which a penalty of either dismissal from the service with forfeiture of benefits, suspension from
office for more than three (3) months but not exceeding six (6) months or a fine of more than
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) but not exceeding Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00)
may be imposed.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, Judge Wilfredo G. Ochotorena is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of
the law and incompetence and is hereby FINED the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) to be taken from the amount earlier withheld from his retirement benefits. The
Fiscal Management Office of the OCA is DIRECTED to immediately release to the respondent
judge the remaining balance of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) from the aforesaid
retained amount, unless there are other valid reasons for its further retention.
385
Macias v. Macias
MARIANO MACIAS, petitioner, vs. MARGIE MACIAS, respondent

G.R. No. 149617. September 3, 2003
Facts:
Judge Mariano Joaquin S. Macias (herein petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 11, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
against Margie Corpus Macias (herein respondent) on February 6, 2001. Summons was not
served on Mrs. Macias because her whereabouts were allegedly unknown. Consequently, Mr.
Macias filed a motion to serve summons by publication. The latter was granted and in an order
dated March 7, 2001 was a directive that Mrs. Macias should file her answer within 30 days
after notice. Thereafter, Mr. Macias caused the publication of the summons in the local weekly
newspaper. Instead of filing an answer, respondent, through counsel, on April 10, 2001, filed a
motion to dismiss the petition. On April 19, 2001, the trial court issued an Order denying
respondent’s motion to dismiss. Incidentally, in the same Order, the trial court granted
respondent’s request (via long distance telephone call) to set the hearing on April 30, 2001. The
hearing set on April 30, 2001 was cancelled for failure of respondent and counsel as well as the
expert witness to appear. On the same day, the trial court issued an Order setting the hearing
anew on May 2 and 3, 2001. Respondent received a copy of this Order only on May 8, 2001.
Thus, when the case was called for hearing as scheduled, respondent and counsel, not being
duly notified, did not appear. Surprisingly, the trial court allowed the petitioner to present his
evidence ex parte.
On May 5, 2001, respondent still unaware that the case had been submitted for decision,
filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated April 19, 2001 denying her motion to
dismiss. The trial court merely noted the motion for reconsideration in his Order dated May 16,
2001. Consequently, on May 18, 2001, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary
injunction challenging the trial court’s Order dated April 19, 2001 which denied her motion to
dismiss. Acting thereon, the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution dated May 23, 2001, enjoined the
trial court from conducting further proceedings.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner was deprived, by the Respondent Court, of her right to due
process enshrined in Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution.
386
Ruling:
The hearings of the complaint of the private respondent, on its merits, were a blatant
transgression by the respondent of the fundamental right of the petitioner to due
process. Petitioner learned of the complaint and summons about the first week of April, 2001 on
the basis of the March 11-17, 2001 issue of the ‘Tingog Peninsula.’ Even if the thirty-day period
fixed by the Respondent Court was reckoned from the March 11-17, 2001 issue of the ‘Tingog
Peninsula,’ the Petitioner had until April 16, 2001 within which to file a ‘Motion to Dismiss’ under
Section 1, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure or file an Answer to the complaint.
However, she opted to file, on April 10, 2001, a ‘Motion to Dismiss,’ instead of filing an Answer
to the complaint. The filing of said motion suspended the period for her to file her Answer to the
complaint. Until said motion is resolved by the Respondent Court with finality, it behooved the
Respondent Court to suspend the hearings of the case on the merits.
The Petitioner may file a ‘Motion for Reconsideration’ of said Order conformably with
Section 5, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court. Until then, a hearing of the case on its merits is
impermissible and a travesty. However, even before the Petitioner could be served with a copy
of the order of the Respondent Court denying her ‘Motion to Dismiss,’ the Respondent Court
proceeded with the hearing of the case on its merits. In the case at bar, the trial court did not
observe the rudimentary principle of due process enshrined in our Constitution. Neither did it
comply with pertinent procedural rules.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated July 13, 2001 and
Resolution dated August 30, 2001 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.
387
Sin v. Sin
Sin vs. Sin

GR No. 137590, March 26, 2001
PARDO, J.:
FACTS:
Florence, the petitioner, was married with Philipp, a Portuguese citizen in January 1987.
Florence filed in September 1994, a complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage.
Trial ensued and the parties presented their respective documentary and testimonial evidence.
In June 1995, trial court dismissed Florence’s petition and throughout its trial, the State did not
participate in the proceedings. While Fiscal Jabson filed with the trial court a manifestation
dated November 1994 stating that he found no collusion between the parties, he did not actively
participated therein. Other than having appearance at certain hearings, nothing more was
heard of him.
ISSUE:
Whether the declaration of nullity may be declared even with the absence of the
participation of the State in the proceedings.
RULING:
Article 48 of the Family Code states that “in all cases of annulment or declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it
to appear on behalf of the state to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to
take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. The trial court should have ordered the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification briefly stating
his reasons for his agreement or opposition as the case may be, to the petition. The records
are bereft of an evidence that the State participated in the prosecution of the case thus, the
case is remanded for proper trial.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the appealed decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. CV No. 51304, promulgated on April 30, 1998 and the decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig City in Civil Case No. 3190, dated June 16, 1995.
Let the case be REMANDED to the trial court for proper trial. No costs.
388
Ancheta v. Ancheta
MARIETTA B. ANCHETA, petitioner v.

RODOLFO S. ANCHETA, respondent
G.R. No. 145370. March 4, 2004
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 59550 which dismissed the petitioner’s petition under Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure to annul the Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, Branch 15 in Special
Proceedings No. NC-662 nullifying the marriage of the petitioner and the respondent Rodolfo S.
Ancheta, and of the resolution of the appellate court denying the motion for reconsideration of
the said resolution.
Facts:
After their marriage on March 5, 1959, the petitioner and the respondent resided in
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. They had eight children during their coverture. The respondent left
the conjugal home and abandoned the petitioner and their children. Petitioner Marietta Ancheta
filed a petition with the RTC against the respondent for the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership and judicial separation of property with a plea for support and support pendente lite.
The parties executed a Compromise Agreement where some of the conjugal properties
were adjudicated to the petitioner and her eight children. The respondent intended to marry
again and filed a petition with the RTC for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the
petitioner on the ground of psychological incapacity and subsequently granted by the court. The
Court of Appeals granted the decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of trial court.
Ruling:
The original petition and the amended petition in the Court of Appeals, in light of the
material averments therein, were based not only on extrinsic fraud, but also on lack of
jurisdiction of the trial court over the person of the petitioner because of the failure of the sheriff
to serve on her the summons and a copy of the complaint. She claimed that the summons and
complaint were served on her son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, who, however, failed to
give her the said summons and complaint.
389
The Supreme Court, thus, rule that the Court of Appeals acted arbitrarily in dismissing
the original petition of the petitioner and the amended petition for annulment of the assailed
order grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the
Court of Appeals dated July 13, 2000 and September 27, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59550 are
hereby SET ASIDE and REVERSED. Let the records of CA-G.R. SP No. 59550 be remanded to
the Court of Appeals for further proceedings conformably with the Decision of this Court and
Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
FALLO:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the
Court of Appeals dated July 13, 2000 and September 27, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59550 are
hereby SET ASIDE and REVERSED. Let the records of CA-G.R. SP No. 59550 be remanded to
the Court of Appeals for further proceedings conformably with the Decision of this Court and
Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
390
Tuason v. CA and Tuason
EMILIO TUASON, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and
MARIA VICTORIA L. TUASON, respondent
G.R. No. 116607. April 10, 1996
PUNO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the decision dated July 29,
1994 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37925 denying petitioner’s appeal from an
order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 149, Makati in Civil Case No. 3769.
Facts:
Maria Victoria Tuason filed a petition for annulment or declaration of nullity of her
marriage to petitioner Emilio R. Tuason. She alleged that they were married in 1972 and from
this union, begot two children; that at the time of the marriage, petitioner was already
psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations which became
manifest afterward and resulted in violent fights; that petitioner used prohibited drugs, was a
womanizer, left the conjugal home and cohabited with three women in succession, gave
minimal support to the family, a spendthrift; that attempts at reconciliation were made but they
all failed because of petitioner’s refusal to reform. Petitioner denied the imputations against
him. The trial was reset due to Emilio’s counsel’s petition for suspension of trial which the court
granted. However, during the agreed date of trial, petitioner failed to appear thereby garnering a
decision in default which is in favor of private respondent. Petitioner, through new counsel, filed
with the trial court a petition for relief from judgment. Petitioner also insisted that he has a valid
and meritorious defense. He cited the Family Code which provides that in actions for annulment
of marriage or legal separation, the prosecuting officer should intervene for the state because
the law “looks with disfavor upon the haphazard declaration of annulment of marriages by
default.”
Issue:
Is the petitioner’s contention tenable?
Ruling:
No. The facts in the case at bar do not call for the strict application of Articles 48 and 60
of the Family Code. For one, petitioner was not declared in default by the trial court for failure to
answer. Petitioner filed his answer to the complaint and contested the cause of action alleged
by private respondent. He actively participated in the proceedings below by filing several
391
pleadings and cross-examining the witnesses of private respondent. It is crystal clear that every
stage of the litigation was characterized by a no-holds barred contest and not by collusion.
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal
separation proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between the parties and to take
care that the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner’s vehement opposition to the
annulment proceedings negates the conclusion that collusion existed between the parties.
There is no allegation by the petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the
parties. Under these circumstances, the Court is convinced that the non-intervention of a
prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to
the validity of the proceedings in the trial court.
FALLO:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied and the decision dated July 29, 1994 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37925 is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
Pacete v. Carriaga, Jr.
CONCEPCION PACETE, petitioner, vs.

HON. CARRIAGA, JR., respondent
G.R. No. 53880. March 17, 1994
VITUG, J.:
The issue in this petition for certiorari is whether or not the Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court) of Cotabato, Branch I, in Cotabato City, gravely abused its discretion in denying
petitioners' motion for extension of time to file their answer in Civil Case No. 2518, in declaring
petitioners in default and in rendering its decision of 17 March 1980 which, among other things,
decreed the legal separation of petitioner Enrico L. Pacete and private respondent Concepcion
Alanis and held to be null and void ab initio the marriage of Enrico L. Pacete to Clarita de la
Concepcion.
Facts:
Concepcion Alanis-Pacete filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage
between her husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion whom he married when
his marriage with Concepcion Alanis was still subsisting, as well as for legal separation,
accounting and separation of properties. Alanis averred that Pacete also ignored overtures for
an amicable settlement and that reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since
392
the latter evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita. The defendants were each served
summons and as response, they filed for several motions for extension which the court granted
except for the last motion. The plaintiff thereupon filed a motion to declare the defendants in
default, which the court granted and consequently directed her to present evidence. As a result
thereof, a decree of legal separation of their marriage was issued.
Issue:
Is the court’s denial for the petitioners’ motion for extension of time to file their answer
and in declaring them in default valid?
Ruling:
No. Under Article 60 of the Family Code, no decree of legal separation shall be based
upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. In any case, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to take steps to prevent collusion between the
parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppresses. Also, in Article 58 of
the same Code, an action for legal separation shall in case be tried before six months shall have
elapsed since the filing of the petition. The significance of these substantive provisions of the
law is underscored in Section 6, Rule 18 of Rules of Court: “No defaults in action for annulment
of marriage or for legal separation.” If the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or
legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned
to it to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is
not fabricated.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED and the proceedings
below, including the Decision of 17 March 1980 appealed from, are NULLIFIED and SET
ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
393
Silva v. CA
CARLITOS E. SILVA, petitioner, vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
SUZANNE T. GONZALES, respondents
G.R. No. 114742. July 17, 1997
VITUG, J.:
Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and legal duty, to care for their children, see
to their proper upbringing and safeguard their best interest and welfare. This authority and
responsibility may not be unduly denied the parents; neither may it be renounced by them.
Even when the parents are estranged and their affection for each other is lost, the attachment
and feeling for their offsprings invariably remain unchanged. Neither the law nor the courts
allow this affinity to suffer absent, of course, any real, grave and imminent threat to the well-
being of the child.
Facts:
Carlitos E. Silva, a married businessman, and Suzanne T. Gonzales, an unmarried local
actress, cohabited without the benefit of marriage and their union begat two children. However,
not long enough, the two eventually parted ways. The instant petition started with the refusal of
Gonzales to allow Silva, in apparent contravention of a previous understanding, to have the
children in his company on weekends. Silva filed a petition for custodial rights over the children
but the petition was opposed by Gonzales who averred that Silva often engaged in "gambling
and womanizing" which she feared could affect the moral and social values of the children. An
order ordering herein respondent to allow petitioner visitorial rights to her children during
weekends. However, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City reversed the former decision
thereby denying petitioner his visitorial rights.
Issue:
Should petitioner be denied of his visitorial rights over his children?
Ruling:
The answer is in the negative. The Constitution itself speaks in terms of the "natural and
primary rights” of parents in the rearing of the youth. Article 209, in relation to Article 220, of the
Family Code states that it is the natural right and duty of parents and those exercising parental
authority to, among other things, keep children in their company and to give them love and
affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding. The allegations of
respondent against the character of petitioner, even assuming as true, cannot be taken as
sufficient basis to render petitioner an unfit father. The fears expressed by respondent to the
394
effect that petitioner shall be able to corrupt and degrade their children once allowed to even
temporarily associate with petitioner is but the product of respondent's unfounded imagination,
for no man, bereft of all moral persuasions and goodness, would ever take the trouble and
expense in instituting a legal action for the purpose of seeing his illegitimate children. It can just
be imagined the deep sorrows of a father who is deprived of his children of tender ages. The
Court appreciates the apprehensions of private respondent and their well-meant concern for the
children; nevertheless, it seems unlikely that petitioner would have ulterior motives or undue
designs more than a parent’s natural desire to be able to call on, even if it were only on brief
visits, his own children.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is REINSTATED, reversing thereby the
judgment of the appellate court which is hereby SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
395
Jarillo v. People
VICTORIA S. JARILLO, Petitioner, VS.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 164435 June 29, 2010
PERALTA, J.:
This resolves petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration dated November 11, 2009 and
respondent's Comment thereto dated March 5, 2010.
In the Decision dated September 29, 2009, the Court affirmed petitioner's conviction for
bigamy. Petitioner is moving for reconsideration of the Decision, arguing that since petitioner's
marriages were entered into before the effectivity of the Family Code, then the applicable law is
Section 29 of the Marriage Law (Act 3613), instead of Article 40 of the Family Code, which
requires a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void before a person may contract a
subsequent marriage.
Facts:
Petitioner is moving for reconsideration of the Decision, arguing that since petitioner's
marriages were entered into before the effectivity of the Family Code, then the applicable law is
Section 29 of the Marriage Law (Act 3613), instead of Article 40 of the Family Code, which
requires a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void before a person may contract a
subsequent marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not the nullity of a previous marriage required before a subsequent marriage
is proper.
Ruling:
Yes. Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a
second marriage and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect.
In the case at bar, respondent's clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of
his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution
for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist
has to do is disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and
escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the
396
subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A
party may even enter into a marriage aware of the absence of a requisite – usually the marriage
license – and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity
of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void. Such scenario would render
nugatory the provision on bigamy.
FALLO:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Motion for Reconsideration dated November 11,
2009 is DENIED with FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
397
Carino v. Carino
SUSAN CARIÑO, petitioner, vs.

SUSAN YEE CARIÑO, respondent
G.R. No. 132529. March 4, 2004
subject of the controversy between the two Susans whom he married. 1âwphi1.nêt
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision 1
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263, which affirmed in toto the decision 2 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632.
Facts:
the first was with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño (referred to as Susan Nicdao) and the second
was with respondent Susan Yee Cariño (referred to as Susan Yee), with whom cohabited with
almost ten years. In 1988, SPO4 Cariño became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated
by pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23, 1992 under the care of Susan
Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed
claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various
government agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 while
respondent Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00. Respondent Susan Yee filed the instant
case for collection of sum of money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying that petitioner be
ordered to return to her at least one-half of the P146,000.00 collectively denominated as “death
benefits”. Susan Yee admitted that they contracted the marriage while SPO4 Cariño’s marriage
with Susan Nicdao was still subsisting. However, she claimed that the latter’s marriage was void
ab initio for lack of marriage license supported by her presenting their marriage contract bearing
no marriage license number and a certification from the LCR that their marriage license was not
on record. RTC favored the petition, granting her half of the P146,000.00.
Issue:
Whether Susan Yee is entitled to the collection of one-half of the P146,000.00.
Ruling:
Susan Yee is not entitled to the said share. Considering that the marriage of respondent
Susan Yee and the deceased is a bigamous marriage, the application of Article 148—the
properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-
398
ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively is
therefore in order. The disputed P146,000 are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits
from governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police officer. Unless respondent
Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she contributed money,
property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in
common by respondent and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and respondent
has no right whatsoever to claim the same.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of
the Family Code governs. This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated
and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void
for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage license. Under the foregoing article, wages
and salaries earned by either party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in
equal shares and will be divided equally between them, even if only one party earned the wages
and the other did not contribute thereto. Conformably, even if the disputed “death benefits” were
earned by the deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership
in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of
bad faith in the present case, both parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith.
Thus, one-half of the subject “death benefits” under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her
share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by,
intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.
FALLO:
SO ORDERED.
399
Leonor v. CA and Beldia
VIRGINIA A. LEONOR, petitioner, vs.

BELDIA, JR. and LEONOR, JR., respondent
G.R. No. 112597. April 2, 1996
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Is a judgment voiding a marriage and rendered by the regional trial court under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court valid and proper? May its validity be challenged by the wife in a petition for
certiorari against the husband who abandoned her and who is now living abroad with a foreign
woman?
These are the two main issues that were posed before this Court in this petition for review
seeking a partial reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 promulgated September 30,
1993 in CA-G.R. SP No. 30606 and its Resolution3 promulgated November 11, 1993, which
denied petitioner’s motion for partial reconsideration of the Decision.
Facts:
Virginia A. Leonor, herein petitioner, was married to the private respondent, Mauricio D.
Leonor, Jr., in San Carlos City. They had been separated for a substantial part of their married
life for, while Mauricio resided in Switzerland studying and working, Virginia stayed in the
Philippines working as a nurse in Laguna. Mauricio became unfaithful and lived with a certain
Lynda Pond abroad. This induced petitioner to institute a civil action in Geneva, Switzerland for
separation and alimony. Private respondent counter-sued for divorce. Cantonal Civil Court of
Switzerland pronounced the divorce of the spouses Leonor but reserved the liquidation of the
matrimonial partnership. The said Swiss Court denied alimony to petitioner. On appeal to the
higher Cantonal Civil Court, Mauricio asked for the cancellation of his marriage in the
Philippines. In 1992, the higher Cantonal Civil Court granted petitioner alimony, prompting
Mauricio to elevate the matter on appeal to the Federal Court of Switzerland. In its decision, the
Federal Court affirmed the decision of the higher Cantonal Civil Court. Mauricio, represented by
his brother Teodoro Leonor, filed a petition for the cancellation of the late registration of
marriage in the civil registry; given as grounds for the cancellation were the tardiness of the
400
registration and the nullity of his marriage with Virginia “due to the non-observance of the legal
requirements for a valid marriage.” After several hearings, the trial court rendered judgment
declaring said marriage null and void for being sham and fictitious.
Issue:
Is the judgment rendered by the regional trial court voiding a marriage under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court valid and proper?
Ruling:
No. The summary procedure under Rule 108, and for that matter under Art. 412 of the
Civil Code, cannot be used by Mauricio to change his and Virginia’s civil status from married to
single and of their three children from legitimate to illegitimate. Neither does the trial court,
under said Rule, have any jurisdiction to declare their marriage null and void and as a result
thereof, to order the local civil registrar to cancel the marriage entry in the civil registry. The only
errors that can be cancelled or corrected under this Rule are typographical or clerical errors, not
material or substantial ones like the validity or nullity of a marriage. Where the effect of a
correction in a civil registry will change the civil status of petitioner and her children from
legitimate to illegitimate, the same cannot be granted except only in an adversarial proceeding
Clearly and unequivocally, the summary procedure under Rule 108, and for that matter under.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Judgment is hereby rendered DECLARING
NULL and VOID the decision of the respondent judge dated February 14,1992 in Special
Proceedings No. RTC-144 and MODIFYING accordingly the Decision dated September 30,
1993 of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-30606. Let a copy of this Decision
be spread in the records of respondent Judge in the Office of the Court Administrator. Costs
against private respondent Mauricio D. Leonor, Jr.
SO ORDERED.
401
Balogbog and Balogbog v. CA
LEONCIA BALOGBOG and GAUDIOSO BALOGBOG, petitioners, vs.

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents
G.R. No. 83598. March 7, 1997
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu City (Branch IX), declaring private respondents heirs of the
deceased Basilio and Genoveva Balogbog entitled to inherit from them.
Facts:
Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva
Arnibal who died intestate. Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog brought an action for partition
and accounting against petitioners, claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino and
that they were entitled to the one-third share of Gavino in the estate of their grandparents.
Petitioners denied knowing private respondents. Petitioners presented two witnesses to fortify
their claims. Catalina Ubas testified concerning her marriage to Gavino. She testified that after
the wedding, she was handed a “receipt,” presumably the marriage certificate but it was burned
during the war. She said that she and Gavino lived together in Obogon and begot three
children. Private respondents produced a certificate from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar
that the Register of Marriages did not have a record of the marriage of Gavino and Catalina;
another certificate from the Office of the Treasurer that there was no record of the birth of
Ramonito in that office and, for this reason, the record must be presumed to have been lost or
destroyed during the war, and a certificate by the Parish Priest of Asturias that there was
likewise no record of birth of Ramonito in the church, the records of which were either lost or
destroyed during the war. Petitioner Leoncia Balogbog testified that Gavino died single at the
family residence in Asturias. She obtained a certificate from the Local Civil Registrar of Asturias
to the effect that that office did not have a record of the names of Gavino and Catalina. The
Court of First Instance of Cebu City rendered judgment for private respondents, ordering
petitioners to render an accounting from 1960 until the finality of its judgment, to partition the
estate and deliver to private respondents one-third of the estate of Basilio and Genoveva.
402
Issue:
Should the marriage of Gavino and Catalina be proven under Articles 53 and 54 of the
Civil Code of 1889 and that the existence of their marriage cannot be presumed because there
was no evidence showing in particular that they declared that they take each other as husband
and wife during their marriage?
Ruling:
Articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 1889 of Spain did not take effect, therefore,
articles. 53 and 54 never came into force. Since this case was brought in the lower court in
1968, the existence of the marriage was to be determined in accordance with the present Civil
Code, except as they related to vested rights, and the rules on evidence. Under the Rules of
Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as husband and wife
are legally married. This presumption may be rebutted only by cogent proof to the contrary.
Evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the marriage.
Indeed, although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, the failure to
present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence may be presented to prove
marriage. The argument that the existence of the marriage cannot be presumed because there
was no evidence showing in particular that Gavino and Catalina, in the presence of two
witnesses, declared that they were taking each other as husband and wife is without merit. An
exchange of vows can be presumed to have been made from the testimonies of the witnesses
who state that a wedding took place, since the very purpose for having a wedding is to
exchange vows of marital commitment. It would indeed be unusual to have a wedding without
an exchange of vows and quite unnatural for people not to notice its absence.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
403
Tamano v. Ortiz
ESTRELLITA TAMANO, petitioner, vs.

HON. RODOLFO ORTIZ, respondent
G.R. No. 126603. June 29, 1998
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the decision of the Court of
Appeals of 30 September 1996 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 39656 which affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court-Br. 89, Quezon City, denying the motion to dismiss as well as the motion
for reconsideration filed by petitioner Estrellita J. Tamano.
Facts:
Senator Mamintal Tamano married Zorayda A. Tamano in civil rites. Their marriage
supposedly remained valid and subsisting until his death in 1994. Prior to his death, Tamano
also married petitioner Estrellita J. Tamano in civil rites. In 1994, Zorayda joined by her son Adib
A. Tamano filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage of Tamano and Estrellita on
the ground that it was bigamous. They contended that Tamano and Estrellita misrepresented
themselves as divorced and single, respectively, thus making the entries in the marriage
contract false and fraudulent.
Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the RTC was without jurisdiction over the
subject and nature of the action. She alleged that "only a party to the marriage" could file an
action for annulment of marriage against the other spouse, hence, it was only Tamano who
could file an action for annulment of their marriage. Petitioner likewise contended that since
Tamano and Zorayda were both Muslims and married in Muslim rites the jurisdiction to hear and
try the instant case was vested in the shari’a courts pursuant to Art. 155 of the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws.
Issue:
Is the marriage between Tamano and Zorayda under the jurisdiction of shari’a courts
and not the civil courts?
404
Ruling:
No. Under The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, Regional Trial Courts have
jurisdiction over all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations. In the
complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by private respondents herein, it was alleged
that Estrellita and Tamano were married in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code.
Hence, contrary to the position of petitioner, the Civil Code is applicable in the instant case.
Assuming that indeed petitioner and Tamano were likewise married under Muslim laws, the
same would still fall under the general original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts.
Article 13 of PD No. 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were
married both in civil and Muslim rites. Consequently, the shari’a courts are not vested with
original and exclusive jurisdiction when it comes to marriages celebrated under both civil and
Muslim laws. Consequently, the Regional Trial Courts are not divested of their general original
jurisdiction under Sec. 19, par. (6) of BP Blg. 129 which provides – Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil
Cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: x x x (6) In all cases
not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions x x x x
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
sustaining the 18 July 1995 and 22 August 1995 orders of the Regional Trial Court - Br. 89,
Quezon City, denying the motion to dismiss and reconsideration thereof, is AFFIRMED. Let the
records of this case be immediately remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings until
terminated.
SO ORDERED.
405
Domingo v. CA
DELIA DOMINGO, petitioner, vs.

G. R. No. 104818. September 17, 1993
ROMERO, J.:
The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent court's ruling finding no grave abuse of
discretion in the lower court's order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property.
Facts:
Delia Soledad A Domingo filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and
separation of property against petitioner Roberto Domingo. She alleged that Roberto Domingo
has a previous marriage when their marriage was solemnized and came to know of the prior
marriage when petitioner’s wife, Emerlina sued them for bigamy. Furthermore, petitioner who
was unemployed and completely dependent upon her has been allegedly disposing some of her
properties without the latter’s consent. Delia thus prayed for their marriage to be declared null
and void and for all of her properties to be declared in favor of her as the sole and exclusive
owner. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, with the contention that the marriage being void ab
initio, the petition for the declaration of its nullity is irrelevant.
Issue:
Whether a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary
Ruling:
A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is explicitly required either as a cause
of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to
be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for
said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void.
406
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of respondent Court
dated February 7, 1992 and the Resolution dated March 20, 1992 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Beltran v. People
MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner, vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HON. JUDGE FLORENTINO TUAZON, JR.,
respondents
G.R. No. 137567. June 20, 2000
BUENA, J.:
of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati city, Branch 61." The said Order denied petitioner’s
Facts:
Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix were marriedafter twenty-four
years of marriage and four children, petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Cod petitioner's wife
Charmaine Felix alleged that it was petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with
a certain woman named Milagros Salting. Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal complaint for
concubinage under Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner and his paramour
Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage
posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case. Petitioner contends that
the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage based on psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code is a prejudicial question that should merit the
suspension of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him by his wife.
Issue:
407
Is the contention of the petitioner tenable?
Ruling:
Petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his
marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement
that his marriage is void from the beginning is not tenable. The pendency of the case for
declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage
case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the
suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only
that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action,
the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. It must also be held that
parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same
must be submitted to judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits
with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the
risk of being prosecuted for concubinage.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
408
Bobis v. Bobis
IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS, petitioner, vs.

ISAGANI D. BOBIS, respondent
G. R. No. 138509. July 31, 2000
On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce B.
Javier. Without said marriage having been annulled, nullified or terminated, the same
respondent contracted a second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis on January 25,
1996 and allegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. Based on petitioner’s
complaint-affidavit, an information for bigamy was filed against respondent on February 25,
1998, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q98-75611 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
226, Quezon City. Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial
declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a
marriage license. Respondent then filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal
case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial
question to the criminal case. The trial judge granted the motion to suspend the criminal case in
an Order dated December 29, 1998. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same
was denied.
Facts:
Isagani Bobis, herein respondent contracted a first marriage with Maria Dulce Javier.
Without said marriage having been annulled, nullified or terminated, respondent contracted a
second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis and allegedly a third marriage with a
certain Julia Sally Hernandez. Based on petitioner’s complaint-affidavit, an information for
bigamy was filed against respondent. Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for
the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was
celebrated without a marriage license. Respondent then filed a motion to suspend the
proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the first
marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal case. The trial judge granted the motion to
409
suspend the criminal case. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was
denied.
Issue:
Whether the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous
marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy.
Ruling:
The civil action for declaration of nullity of marriage does not constitute a prejudicial
question to a criminal case for bigamy. Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the
time of celebration of the second marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a
previous marriage before a party may remarry. The clear implication of this is that it is not for the
parties, particularly the accused, to determine the validity or invalidity of the marriage. Whether
or not the first marriage was void for lack of a license is a matter of defense because there is
still no judicial declaration of its nullity at the time the second marriage was contracted. It should
be remembered that bigamy can successfully be prosecuted provided all its elements concur –
two of which are a previous marriage and a subsequent marriage which would have been valid
had it not been for the existence at the material time of the first marriage.
In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, can not be said to have validly entered into the
second marriage. Per current jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a judicial
declaration of such fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the second marriage will
also be void. The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is
presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes
regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner.
Against this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact
that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus,
a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is,
therefore, not a prejudicial question. As stated above, respondent cannot be permitted to use
his own malfeasance to defeat the criminal action against him.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The order dated December 29, 1998 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 226 of Quezon City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the trial
court is ordered to IMMEDIATELY proceed with Criminal Case No. Q98-75611.
SO ORDERED.
410
Ty v. CA
OFELIA P. TY, petitioner, vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS, and EDGARDO M. REYES, respondents.
G. R. No. 127406. November 27, 2000
QUISUMBING, J.:
This appeal seeks the reversal of the decision dated July 24, 1996, of the Court of Appeals in
C.A. – G.R. CV 37897, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch
160, declaring the marriage contract between private respondent Edgardo M. Reyes and
petitioner Ofelia P. Ty null and void ab initio. It also ordered private respondent to pay
P15,000.00 as monthly support for their children Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes.
Facts:
Edgardo Reyes, herein private respondent, married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva on
August 4, 1980. The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court declared their marriage null and
void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license. The church wedding on was also declared null
and void ab initio for lack of consent of the parties. Even before the decree was issued nullifying
his marriage to Anna Maria, private respondent wed Ofelia P. Ty, herein petitioner. Private
respondent filed a civil case praying that his marriage to petitioner be declared null and void.
He alleged that they had no marriage license when they got married. He also averred that at
the time he married petitioner, he was still married to Anna Maria. He stated that at the time he
married petitioner the decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria had not been
issued. Petitioner, in defending her marriage to private respondent, pointed out that his claim
that their marriage was contracted without a valid license is untrue. Petitioner also submitted the
decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. These documents were submitted as
evidence during trial and, according to petitioner, are therefore deemed sufficient proof of the
facts therein. In 1996, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision. It ruled that a
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage (to Anna Maria) must first be secured before a
subsequent marriage could be validly contracted.
411
Issue:
Whether the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before a subsequent
marriage can be entered into validly?
Ruling:
Private respondent’s first and second marriages contracted in 1977 and 1979,
respectively, are governed by the provisions of the Civil Code. Pertinent to the present
controversy, Article 83 of the Civil Code provides that:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the
first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void
from its performance.
A declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause
of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to
be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for
said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void. In the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered into
in 1979, before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and
Aragon. The first marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license and consent,
there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second
marriage. In this case, therefore, the Court concluded that private respondent’s second
marriage to petitioner is valid. Moreover, the provisions of the Family Code cannot be
retroactively applied to the present case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of
petitioner and of her children.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated July 24, 1996 and its Resolution dated November 7, 1996, are reversed partially, so that
the marriage of petitioner Ofelia P. Ty and private respondent Edgardo M. Reyes is hereby
DECLARED VALID AND SUBSISTING; and the award of the amount of P15,000.00 is
RATIFIED and MAINTAINED as monthly support to their two children, Faye Eloise Reyes and
Rachel Anne Reyes, for as long as they are of minor age or otherwise legally entitled thereto.
Costs against private respondent.
412
SO ORDERED.
Valdes v. Valdes
ANTONIO A. S. VALDES, petitioner, vs.

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT and
CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-VALDES, respondents.
G.R. No. 122749. July 31, 1996
VITUG, J.:
The petition for review bewails, purely on a question of law, an alleged error committed by the
Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. Q-92-12539. Petitioner avers that the court a quo has
failed to apply the correct law that should govern the disposition of a family dwelling in a
situation where a marriage is declared void ab initio because of psychological incapacity on the
part of either or both of the parties to the contract.
Facts:
Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971. Valdes sought
the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. After hearing
the parties following the joinder of issues, the trial court, in its decision of 29 July 1994, granted
the petition. The petitioner and respondent are directed to start proceedings on the liquidation of
their common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the
provisions of Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code, within thirty (30) days from notice.
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing compliance with
Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no
provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage."
Parenthetically, during the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing
their desire to remain with their father, Antonio Valdes, herein petitioner.
Issue:
What property regime should govern in unions without marriage?
Ruling:
413
Considering that this Court has already declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent as null and void ab initio, pursuant to Art. 147, the property regime of petitioner and
respondent shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a void marriage, regardless of
the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is
governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family
Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in
previous cases; it provides:
"ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void
marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property
acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30 October 1995, of the
trial court are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
414
Voidable / Annullable Marriages
Villanueva v. CA
ORLANDO VILLANUEVA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent

G.R. No. 132955. October 27, 2006
This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the January 26, 1998
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51832, affirming with modification the
Decision2 dated January 12, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
Branch 172 in Civil Case No. 3997-V-92 (a) dismissing petitioner's petition for the annulment of
his marriage to private respondent and (b) ordering him to pay moral and exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees and costs. Also assailed is the March 5, 1998 Resolution3 denying petitioner’s
415
Facts:
Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia Canalita-Villanueva got
married on April 13, 1988 in Puerto Princesa, Palawan. On November 17, 1992, Orlando filed
with the trial court a petition for annulment of his marriage alleging that threats of violence and
duress forced him into marrying Lilia, who was already pregnant; that he did not get her
pregnant prior to the marriage; that he never cohabited with her after the marriage; and that he
later learned that private respondent's child died during delivery on August 29, 1988. In her
counterclaim, Lilia prayed for the dismissal of the petition, arguing that petitioner freely and
voluntarily married her; that petitioner stayed with her in Palawan for almost a month after their
marriage; that petitioner wrote letters to her after he returned to Manila, during which private
respondent visited him personally; and that petitioner knew about the progress of her
pregnancy, which ended in their son being born prematurely.
Issue:
Whether the marriage be annulled on the ground that the consent of the petitioner, as he
alleged, has been obtained by fraud, intimidation and undue and improper pressure and
influence.
Ruling:
The Court is not convinced that appellant’s apprehension of danger to his person is so
overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. Given
that at the time their marriage took place, his employment as a security guard in a bank would at
least enable him to know the rudiments of self-defense. Neither did he inform the judge about
his predicament prior to solemnizing their marriage. Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his
marriage, as he was made to believe by appellee that the latter was pregnant with his child
when they were married. Appellant’s excuse that he could not have impregnated the appellee
because he did not have an erection during their tryst is flimsy at best, and an outright lie at
worst. The complaint is bereft of any reference to his inability to copulate with the appellee.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The January 26, 1998 Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51832 affirming with modification the January 12, 1996
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172 in Civil Case No.
416
3997-V-92 dismissing petitioner’s petition for the annulment of his marriage with private
respondent, is AFFIRMED. However, the award of moral and exemplary damages is DELETED
for lack of basis.
SO ORDERED.
Anaya v. Palaroan
AURORA ANAYA, petitioner, vs. FERNANDO PALAROAN, respondent

G.R. No. 27930. November 26, 1973
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from an order of dismissal, issued motu proprio by the Juvenile & Domestic Relations
Court, Manila, of a complaint for annulment of marriage, docketed therein as Civil Case No. E-
00431, entitled "Aurora A. Anaya, plaintiff vs. Fernando O. Palaroan, defendant."
Facts:
Before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, a complaint was brought by Aurora
Anaya against her husband Fernando Palaroan, praying for the annulment of their marriage.
Plaintiff contends that the marriage that was solemnized between them constituted fraud in
obtaining her consent. This contention was premised in the allegation that her husband divulged
to her that several months prior to their marriage, he had pre-marital relationship with a close
relative of his and that the non-divulgement wrecked their marriage.
417
Defendant in his answer denied the allegations and filed a counterclaim for damages for
the malicious filing of the suit. In her reply, Anaya alleged, among others, that her husband
secretly intended from the very beginning not to perform his marital duties and allegations
appurtenance thereto and furthermore, he covertly made up his mind not to live with her.
The court a quo dismissed the complaint for non-disclosure of a husband’s pre-marital
relationship with another woman is not one of the enumerated circumstances that would
constitute a ground for annulment. Anaya appealed the case contending that the lower court
erred in ignoring as cause of action her allegations in her reply.
Issue:
Whether the allegation in the reply will constitute a cause of action, which the court must
adjudicate.
Ruling:
No. The averment made in the reply is an entirely new and additional cause of action.
According to the plaintiff herself, the allegation “is apart, distinct and separate from that earlier
averred in the complaint. . .” Said allegation were, therefore, improperly alleged in the reply,
because if in a reply a party plaintiff is not permitted to amend or charge the cause of action as
set forth in his complaint, there is more reason not to allow such party to allege a new and
additional cause of action in the reply. Otherwise, the series of pleadings of the parties could
become interminable.
FALLO:
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the appealed order is hereby affirmed. No costs.
418
Buccat v. Buccat
BUCCAT, plaintiff v
BUCCAT, defendant
G.R. No 47101 April 25, 1941
JORILLENO, J.:
This issue has been raised to this superiority by the Court of First Instance of Baguio,
which only raises a purely question of law.
Facts:
The 20 of March of 1939 the inico plaintiff present/display cause, in which not
comparecio the demanded one, despite properly to be located. By that, allowed the plaintiff to
present/display its tests, the inferior Court failure the subject in favor of the demanded one. The
plaintiff requests the cancellation of his marriage are been with the demanded Luida Mangonon
de Buccat the 26 of November of 1938, in the City of Baguio, being based in which, when
allowing in this marriage, she did because demanded habia assured to him that she was
419
virgin.The plaintiff conocio to demanded the month of March of 1938. After several interviews,
both were it jeopardize the 19 of September of he himself year. The 26 of November of equal
year, the plaintiff contracted marriage with the demanded one in catedrla catholic of the City of
Baguio. Desoues to coexist maritally by space of eighty and nine days, the demanded one gave
to light a boy of nine months, the 23 of February of 1939. From you are from this event, the
plaintiff abandonment to demanded and volvio not to make marital life with her.
Issue:
Whether or not the was attended by fraud.
Ruling:
Yes. The court does not see reason some to revoke the appealed sentence. In effect,
the allegation of the plaintiff and appellant is improbable that nor followed habia suspected the
grave state the demanded one, being this, as it is proven, in pregnant condition very outpost.
Reason why there is place no to consider the fraud of which the appellant speaks. The alleged
thing by this in the sense that ses rare not to find people of developed abdomen, seems to us
pueril to deserve our consideration, as much but whatever that the plaintiff was student of first
year of right. The marriage is an institution sacratisima: it is the foundation in which the society
rests. In order to annul it, they are necessary clear and fehacientes tests. In this subject such
tests do not exist.
FALLO:
Finding the original ruling in accordance with law, it must be affirmed, as this is
confirmed, in its entirety, with the cost against the appellant. So ordered.
420
Villanueva v. CA
ORLANDO VILLANUEVA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent

G.R. No. 132955. October 27, 2006
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51832, affirming with modification the
Decision2 dated January 12, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
attorney’s fees and costs. Also assailed is the March 5, 1998 Resolution3 denying petitioner’s
Facts:
421
Issue:
influence.
Ruling:
FALLO:
for lack of basis.
422
SO ORDERED.
FLORENCE TEVES MACARRUBO, the Minors JURIS ALEXIS T. MACARRUBO and

GABRIEL ENRICO T. MACARRUBO as represented by their Mother/Guardian, FLORENCE
TEVES MACARRUBO, complainant, v.
ATTY. EDMUNDO L. MACARRUBO, respondent.
A.C. No. 6148. February 27, 2004.
PER CURIAM:
Florence Teves Macarrubo (complainant), by herself and on behalf of her two children, filed on
June 6, 2000 a verified complaint1 for disbarment against Atty. Edmundo L. Macarubbo
(respondent) with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), docketed as CBD Case No. 00-
734-A, alleging that respondent deceived her into marrying him despite his prior subsisting
marriage with a certain Helen Esparza.
Facts:
423
Florence Teves Macarrubo, complainant, filed on June 6, 2000 a verified complaint for
disbarment against Atty. Edmundo L. Macarubbo,respondent, with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines alleging that respondent deceived her into marrying him despite his prior subsisting
marriage with a certain Helen Esparza. The complainant averred that he started courting her in
April 1991, he representing himself as a bachelor; that they eventually contracted marriage
which was celebrated on two occasions administered by Rev. Rogelio J. Bolivar, the first on
December 18, 1991 in the latter’s Manila office, and the second on December 28, 1991 at the
Asian Institute of Tourism Hotel in Quezon City; and that although respondent admitted that he
was married to Helen Esparza on June 16, 1982, he succeeded in convincing complainant, her
family and friends that his previous marriage was void.
Complainant further averred that respondent entered into a third marriage with one
Josephine T. Constantino; and that he abandoned complainant and their children without
providing them any regular support up to the present time, leaving them in precarious living
conditions.
Respondent denied employing deception in his marriage to complainant, insisting
instead that complainant was fully aware of his prior subsisting marriage to Helen Esparza, but
that she dragged him against his will to a “sham wedding” to protect her and her family’s
reputation since she was then three-months pregnant. He submitted in evidence that in the civil
case “Edmundo L. Macarubbo v. Florence J. Teves,” it declared his marriage to complainant
void ab initio. He drew attention to the trial court’s findings on the basis of his evidence which
was not controverted, that the marriage was indeed “a sham and make believe” one, “vitiated by
fraud, deceit, force and intimidation, and further exacerbated by the existence of a legal
impediment” and want of a valid marriage license. Respondent raised the additional defenses
that the judicial decree of annulment of his marriage to complainant is res judicata upon the
present administrative case; that complainant is in estoppel for admitting her status as mere
live-in partner to respondent in her letter to Josephine T. Constantino. Stressing that he had
always been the victim in his marital relations, respondent invoked the final and executory
August 21, 1998 in the case “Edmundo L. Macarubbo v. Helen C. Esparza,” declaring his first
marriage void on the ground of his wife’s psychological incapacity.
It is recommended that respondent Atty. Edmundo L. Macarrubo be suspended for three
months for gross misconduct reflecting unfavorably on the moral norms of the profession. The
IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner.
424
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent should be suspended for gross misconduct
Ruling:
While the marriage between complainant and respondent has been annulled by final
judgment, this does not cleanse his conduct of every tinge of impropriety. He and complainant
started living as husband and wife in December 1991 when his first marriage was still
subsisting, as it was only on August 21, 1998 that such first marriage was annulled, rendering
him liable for concubinage. Such conduct is inconsistent with the good moral character that is
required for the continued right to practice law as a member of the Philippine bar. Even
assuming that respondent was coerced by complainant to marry her, the duress, by his own
admission as the following transcript of his testimony reflects, ceased after their wedding day,
respondent having freely cohabited with her and even begot a second child by her. Thus,
respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo is found guilty of gross immorality and is hereby disbarred
from the practice of law.
FALLO:
supporting or has made provisions for the regular support of his two children by complainant.53
Let respondent's name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
425
People v. Santiago
PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. FELIPE SANTIAGO, respondent

G.R. No. L-46132 May 28, 1991
MEDIALDEA, J.:
The accused, Felipe Santiago, was charged with the crime of rape in Criminal Case No. 1048
before the Court of First Instance, Branch I, Nueva Ecija.
Facts:
426
Felipe Santiago, herein appellant, asked Felicita Masilang, his niece, to accompany him
across the river on some errand. The girl agreed and after crossing the river, Santiago
manifested a desire to have sexual intercourse with the former, but notwithstanding her
resistance, accomplished his purposes by force and against her will. After that deed, Santiago
conducted Felicita to his uncle’s house that brought in a protestant minister who solemnized a
marriage between the two. After the ceremony, Santiago gave the girl a few pesos and sent her
home. The father of Felicita, having known of what transpired, filed a criminal case of rape
against the appellant, resulting to his conviction. The latter now forwarded the defense of his
marriage to Felicita.
Issue:
Is the appellant’s defense tenable?
Ruling:
No. the ceremony cannot be considered binding on her because of duress. It is therefore
void for lack of essential consent, and it posed no impediment to the wrongdoer’s prosecution.
The marriage ceremony was a mere ruse to escape from the consequences of his act. The
manner in which appellant dealt with the girl before and after the marriage shows that he had no
bona fide intention of making her his wife.
FALLO:
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision of the trial court dated February 23, 1977 is
AFFIRMED. The accused, Felipe Santiago is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua as well as to indemnify the victim in the
amount of P40,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
427
Reyes v. Zaballero
CESAR REYES, PETITIONER VS. AGRIPINO ZABALLERO, RESPONDENT

89 PHIL 39 G.R. NO. L-3561 MAY 23, 1951
BENGZON, J.:
During the Japanese occupation the creditor of a prewar debt reluctantly received Japanese
military notes tendered in full payment of his credit. After liberation he sued for recovery of the
debt, contending that his acceptance of the money was invalidated by duress. This is that suit,
coming from the Court of Appeals wherein the payment was held valid and the debt fully
discharged.
Facts:
This case originated from a loan of P6,500 with interest at 10 per cent per annum
payable in advance, made by Dr. Ceasar Reyes to Agripino Zaballero on October 1, 1942.
Zaballero secured the payment with a first mortgage on ten parcels of land.
428
The installments due for 1942 and 1943 totaling the sum of P1,300 plus interest were
paid in Japanese Military Script and the Payments were unreservedly accepted. On November
30, 1944, Zaballero offered to pay the third installments and its interests which fell due on
October of the same year, but Reyes refused to accept on the ground that it was immoral and
unjust that the payment be made in Japanese Military notes which had considerably devaluated,
and that he had an option according to the contract to have the payment in Philippine or United
States currency. Zaballero announced that the next day he would tender the whole balance.
Reyes, acting upon advice given by his attorneys to whom he had meanwhile resorted for
guidance, received the money and executed the notarial deed of release of the real estate
mortgage. On the same day, he received payment, the mortgagee (Reyes), executed an
affidavit in secret, without defendants’ knowledge, before a Notary Public stating that he had
accepted under protest the payment of P5,200 plus interest in the sum of P612, and that he had
deposited the whole amount paid by the debtors.
ISSUE:
What constitutes Duress or Intimidation?
RULING:
According to the Civil Code, there is Duress or intimidation when one of the contracting
parties is inspired by a rational and well-grounded fear or suffering an imminent and serious
injury to his person or property, of his spouse, descendants and ascendants.
Mere reluctance does not detract from the voluntariness of one’s acts. There is a
distinction between a case where a person gives his consent reluctantly and even against his
good sense and judgment, and where he, in reality, gives no consent at all, as where he
executed a contract or performs an act against a pressure which he cannot resist. It is clear that
one acts as voluntarily and independently in the eye of the law when he acts reluctantly and with
hesitation as when he acts spontaneously and joyously. Legally speaking he acts as voluntarily
429
and freely when he acts wholly against his better sense and judgment as when he acts in
conformity with them. Between the two acts there is no difference in law.
FALLO:
THE APPEALED DECISION IS AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS.
Alcazar v. Alcazar
VERONICA CABACUNGAN ALCAZAR, Petitioner, V.

REY C. ALCAZAR, Respondent.
G.R. No. 174451 October 13, 2009
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse the Decision dated 24 May 2006
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84471, affirming the Decision dated 9 June 2004 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos City, Branch 85, in Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, which
dismissed petitioner Veronica Cabacungan Alcazar’s Complaint for the annulment of her
marriage to respondent Rey C. Alcazar.
FACTS:
430
Petitioner alleged in her Complaint that she was married to respondent on 11 October
2000 by Rev. Augusto G. Pabustan (Pabustan), at the latter’s residence. After their wedding,
petitioner and respondent lived for five days in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, the hometown of
respondent’s parents. Thereafter, the newlyweds went back to Manila, but respondent did not
live with petitioner at the latter’s abode at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue,
Tondo, Manila. On 23 October 2000, respondent left for Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
where he worked as an upholsterer in a furniture shop. While working in Riyadh, respondent
did not communicate with petitioner by phone or by letter. Petitioner tried to call respondent for
five times but respondent never answered. About a year and a half after respondent left
for Riyadh, a co-teacher informed petitioner that respondent was about to come home to
the Philippines. Petitioner was surprised why she was not advised by respondent of his arrival.
Petitioner further averred in her Complaint that when respondent arrived in

the Philippines, the latter did not go home to petitioner at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue,
Tondo, Manila. Instead, respondent proceeded to his parents’ house in San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro. Upon learning that respondent was in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, petitioner went
to see her brother-in-law in Velasquez St., Tondo, Manila, who claimed that he was not aware of
respondent’s whereabouts. Petitioner traveled to San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, where she
was informed that respondent had been living with his parents since his arrival in March 2002.
Petitioner asserted that from the time respondent arrived in the Philippines, he never
contacted her. Thus, petitioner concluded that respondent was physically incapable of
consummating his marriage with her, providing sufficient cause for annulment of their marriage
pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code of the Philippines. There was also no
more possibility of reconciliation between petitioner and respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage should be nullified under the provision of Article 45
paragraph 5 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
RULING:
No. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
431
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it “as the foundation of the nation.” It decrees marriage as
legally “inviolable,” thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be “protected” by the state. ART. 45. A marriage may be annulled
for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage that either party was
physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such incapacity
continues and appears to be incurable. Here, the mere none communication, the husband living
with his parents and not the wife and absence of sexual intercourse cannot be a valid ground to
annul the marriage.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The 24 May 2006 Decision and 28
August 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84471, which affirmed the 9
June 2004 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos City, Branch 85, dismissing petitioner
Veronica Cabacungan Alcazar’s Complaint in Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, are AFFIRMED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Villanueva v. CA
ORLANDO VILLANUEVA, petitioner, vs.

G.R. No. 132955. October 27, 2006
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J:
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51832, affirming with modification the
Decision dated January 12, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
432
attorney’s fees and costs. Also assailed is the March 5, 1998 Resolution denying petitioner’s
Facts:
Issue:
influence.
Ruling:
FALLO:
433
for lack of basis.
SO ORDERED.
Jimenez v. Canizares
Jimenez, petitioner
vs.
Canizares, respondent
L-12790, August 31, 1960
PADILLA, J.:
In a complaint filed on 7 June 1955 in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga the
plaintiff Joel Jimenez prays for a decree annulling his marriage to the defendant Remedios
Cañizares contracted on 3 August 1950 before a judge of the municipal court of Zamboanga
City, upon the ground that the office of her genitals or vagina was to small to allow the
434
penetration of a male organ or penis for copulation; that the condition of her genitals as
described above existed at the time of marriage and continues to exist; and that for that reason
he left the conjugal home two nights and one day after they had been married. On 14 June 1955
the wife was summoned and served a copy of the complaint. She did not file an answer. On 29
September 1956, pursuant to the provisions of article 88 of the Civil Code, the Court directed
the city attorney of Zamboanga to inquire whether there was a collusion, to intervene for the
State to see that the evidence for the plaintiff is not a frame-up, concocted or fabricated. On 17
December 1956 the Court entered an order requiring the defendant to submit to a physical
examination by a competent lady physician to determine her physical capacity for copulation
and to submit, within ten days from receipt of the order, a medical certificate on the result
thereof. On 14 March 1957 the defendant was granted additional five days from notice to
comply with the order of 17 December 1956 with warning that her failure to undergo medical
examination and submit the required doctor's certificate would be deemed lack of interest on her
part in the case and that judgment upon the evidence presented by her husband would be
rendered.
FACTS:
Joel Jimenez, the petitioner, filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage with
Remedios Canizares on the ground that the orifice of her genitals or vagina was too small to
allow the penetration of a male organ for copulation. It has existed at the time of the marriage
and continues to exist that led him to leave the conjugal home two nights and one day after the
marriage. The court summoned and gave a copy to the wife but the latter did not file any
answer. The wife was ordered to submit herself to physical examination and to file a medical
certificate within 10 days. She was given another 5 days to comply or else it will be deemed
lack of interest on her part and therefore rendering judgment in favor of the petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage can be annulled with only the testimony of the husband.
RULING:
The wife who was claimed to be impotent by her husband did not avail of the opportunity
to defend herself and as such, claim cannot be convincingly be concluded. It is a well-known
435
fact that women in this country are shy and bashful and would not readily and unhesitatingly
submit to a physical examination unless compelled by competent authority. Such physical
examination in this case is not self-incriminating. She is not charged with any offense and
likewise is not compelled to be a witness against herself. Impotence being an abnormal
condition should not be presumed. The case was remanded to trial court.
The decree appealed from is set aside and the case remanded to the lower court for
further proceedings in accordance with this decision, without pronouncement as to costs.
FALLO:
Jimenez v. Republic
Jimenez, petitioner
Vs.
Republic, respondent
G.R. No. L-12790, August 31, 1960
PADILLA, J.:
In a complaint filed on 7 June 1955 in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga the plaintiff Joel
Jimenez prays for a decree annulling his marriage to the defendant Remedios Cañizares
contracted on 3 August 1950 before a judge of the municipal court of Zamboanga City, upon the
ground that the office of her genitals or vagina was to small to allow the penetration of a male
436
organ or penis for copulation; that the condition of her genitals as described above existed at
the time of marriage and continues to exist; and that for that reason he left the conjugal home
two nights and one day after they had been married. On 14 June 1955 the wife was summoned
and served a copy of the complaint. She did not file an answer. On 29 September 1956,
pursuant to the provisions of article 88 of the Civil Code, the Court directed the city attorney of
Zamboanga to inquire whether there was a collusion, to intervene for the State to see that the
evidence for the plaintiff is not a frame-up, concocted or fabricated. On 17 December 1956 the
Court entered an order requiring the defendant to submit to a physical examination by a
competent lady physician to determine her physical capacity for copulation and to submit, within
ten days from receipt of the order, a medical certificate on the result thereof. On 14 March 1957
the defendant was granted additional five days from notice to comply with the order of 17
December 1956 with warning that her failure to undergo medical examination and submit the
required doctor's certificate would be deemed lack of interest on her part in the case and that
judgment upon the evidence presented by her husband would be rendered.
FACTS:
Joel and Remedios are husband and wife. Joel later filed for annulment on grounds that
Remedios is impotent because her genitals were too small for copulation and such was already
existing at the time of the marriage. Remedios was summoned to answer the complaint of Joel
but she refused to do so. It was found that there was no collusion between the parties
notwithstanding the non-cooperation of Remedios in the case. Remedios was ordered to have
herself be submitted to an expert to determine if her genitals are indeed too small for copulation.
Remedios again refused to do as ordered. The trial was heard solely on Joel’s complaint. The
marriage was later annulled.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Remedios’ impotency has been established.
HELD:
In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question was decreed upon the sole
testimony of Joel who was expected to give testimony tending or aiming at securing the
annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether Remedios is really impotent cannot
be deemed to have been satisfactorily established, because from the commencement of the
proceedings until the entry of the decree she had abstained from taking part therein. Although
her refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court show indifference on her part, yet from
such attitude the presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence could not arise or be
inferred, because women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not
437
submit to a physical examination unless compelled to by competent authority. Impotency being
an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency. The
lone testimony of Joel that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to
tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife.
FALLO:
Pacete v. Carriaga, Jr.
CONCEPCION PACETE, petitioner,

vs. HON. CARRIAGA, JR., respondent
G.R. No. 53880. March 17, 1994
Facts:
Concepcion Alanis-Pacete filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage

between her husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion whom he married when
438
his marriage with Concepcion Alanis was still subsisting, as well as for legal separation,
accounting and separation of properties. Alanis averred that Pacete also ignored overtures for
an amicable settlement and that reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since
the latter evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita. The defendants were each served
summons and as response, they filed for several motions for extension which the court granted
except for the last motion. The plaintiff thereupon filed a motion to declare the defendants in
default, which the court granted and consequently directed her to present evidence. As a result
thereof, a decree of legal separation of their marriage was issued.
Issue:
Is the court’s denial for the petitioners’ motion for extension of time to file their answer
and in declaring them in default valid?
Ruling:
No. Under Article 60 of the Family Code, no decree of legal separation shall be based
upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. In any case, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to take steps to prevent collusion between the
parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppresses. Also, in Article 58 of
the same Code, an action for legal separation shall in case be tried before six months shall have
elapsed since the filing of the petition. The significance of these substantive provisions of the
law is underscored in Section 6, Rule 18 of Rules of Court: “No defaults in action for annulment
of marriage or for legal separation.” If the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or
legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned
to it to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is
not fabricated.
439
Tuason v. CA
EMILIO TUASON, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, respondents
G.R. No. 116607. April 10, 1996
PUNO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the decision dated July 29,
1994 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37925 denying petitioner’s appeal from an
order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 149, Makati in Civil Case No. 3769.
440
Facts:
In 1989, private respondent Maria Victoria Lopez Tuason filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Makati a petition for annulment or declaration of nullity of her marriage to petitioner Emilio
R. Tuason. In her complaint, private respondent alleged that she and petitioner were married on
June 3, 1972 and from this union, begot two children; that at the time of the marriage, petitioner
was already psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations which
became manifest afterward and resulted in violent fights between husband and wife; that
petitioner used prohibited drugs, was apprehended by the authorities and sentenced to a one-
year suspended penalty and has not been rehabilitated; that petitioner was a womanizer; that
after he left the conjugal dwelling, petitioner gave minimal support to the family and even
refused to pay for the tuition fees of their children compelling private respondent to accept
donations and dole-outs from her family and friends; that attempts at reconciliation were made
but they all failed because of petitioner’s refusal to reform. In addition to her prayer for
annulment, private respondent prayed for powers of administration to save the conjugal
properties from further dissipation.
After the issues were joined, trial commenced on March 30, 1990. Private respondent
presented her evidences. On the scheduled reception of the petitioner’s evidences on May 11,
1990, petitioner’s counsel filed for postponement on the ground that the principal counsel was
out of the country. The court granted the motion and reset the hearing on June 8, 1990. On the
said date, petitioner failed to appear. On oral motion of private respondent, the court declared
petitioner to have waived his right to present evidence and deemed the case submitted for
decision on the basis of the evidence presented. On June 29, 1990, the trial court rendered
judgment declaring the nullity of private respondent’s marriage to petitioner and awarding
custody of the children to private respondent.
The petitioner appealed but was again denied by the CA. at the Supreme Court,
petitioner alleges that the proper process for annulment of marriage or legal separation was not
properly followed by the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in the process of rendering the marriage null and
void?
Ruling:
A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger
441
of collusion. Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal
separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the state for the
purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is
not fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court
cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to
determine if collusion exists between the parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose
the application for legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his own evidence,
if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated. Our Constitution is committed to
the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. Our family law is based on the
policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the state is vitally
interested.
The facts in the case at bar do not call for the strict application of Articles 48 and 60 of
the Family Code. For one, petitioner was not declared in default by the trial court for failure to
answer. Petitioner actively participated in the proceedings below by filing several pleadings and
cross-examining the witnesses of private respondent. It is crystal clear that every stage of the
litigation was characterized by a no-holds barred contest and not by collusion. The role of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal separation proceedings is to
determine whether collusion exists between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not
suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner’s vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings
negates the conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. There is no allegation by the
petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties. Under these
circumstances, we are convinced that the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure
lack of collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings in
the trial court.
FALLO:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied and the decision dated July 29, 1994 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37925 is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
442
Legal Separation
Ong v. Ong
ONG ENG KIAM, petitioner vs.

LUCITA ONG, respondent
G.R No. 153206. October 23, 2006
443
Before this Court is a Petition for Review seeking the reversal of the Decision2[1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. CV No. 59400 which affirmed in toto the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 41, Dagupan City granting the petition for legal separation
filed by herein respondent, as well as the Resolution3[2] of the CA dated April 26, 2002 which
denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Facts:
Ong Eng Kiam, also known as William Ong and Lucita G. Ong were married on July 13,
1975 at the San Agustin Church, Manila. They have three children. On March 21, 1996, Lucita
filed a complaint for legal separation under Art. 55 (1) of the family Code before the RTC-
Dagupan alleging that her life with William was marked by physical violence, threats,
intimidation and grossly abusive conduct. The said abuses were repeated almost everyday.
William would also scold and beat the children at different parts of their bodies using the buckle
of his belt; whenever she tried to stop William from hitting the children, he would turn his ire on
her and box her. There was even one time when William pointed a gun at her and asked her to
leave the house. Both the RTC and CA granted the petition for Legal Separation. William claim
that the only parties who will benefit from a decree of legal separation are Lucita’s parents and
siblings while such decree would condemn him as a violent and cruel person, a wife-beater and
a child-abuser and will taint his reputation especially among the Filipino-Chinese community. He
further allege that what took place were mere disagreements. He also argues that a decree for
legal separation should not be granted because Lucita abandoned the conjugal dwelling. Hence
the appeal to this court.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in disregarding clear evidence repudiating respondent’s
claim of repeated physical violence and grossly abusive conduct on the part of petitioner?
Ruling:
444
As correctly observed by the RTC, William admitted that there was no day that he did
not quarrel with his wife, which made his life miserable and he blames her for being negligent of
her wifely duties. Lucita and her sister also gave numerous accounts of the instances when
William displayed violent temper against Lucita and their children. William claims that the
witnesses of Lucita are not credible because of their relationship with her. We do not agree.
Relationship alone is not enough reason to discredit and label a witness’ testimony as biased
and unworthy of credence. William also posits that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case is
in order for her side of the family to gain control of the conjugal properties. The court finds such
reasoning hard to believe. What is more probable is that there truly exists a ground for legal
separation, a cause so strong that Lucita had to seek redress from the courts. Also without merit
is the argument of William that no decree should be granted because of the abandonment done
by Lucita. The abandonment referred to is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than
1 year. As it was established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does not
constitute abandonment contemplated by the said provision.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Banez v. Banez
AIDA BANEZ, petitioner vs.

GABRIEL BANEZ, respondent
G.R No. 133628. January 23, 2002
445
QUISUMBING, J.:
These two petitions stem from the decision dated September 23, 1996 of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu, Branch 20, in Civil Case No. CEB-16765. The first seeks the reversal of the
Court of Appeals’ decision dated March 21, 1997, setting aside the orders dated October 1 and
November 22, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court. The second prays for the reversal of the
resolution dated February 10, 1998, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV-56265, denying
the motion to dismiss.
Facts:
On September 23, 1996, the RTC-Cebu decreed the legal separation between petitioner
Aida Banez and respondent Gabrial Banez on the ground of the latter’s sexual infidelity; the
dissolution of their conjugal property relations and the division of the conjugal net assets; the
forfeiture of respondent’s ½ share in the net conjugal assets in favor of the common children
and an order to respondent to leave the conjugal dwelling. In another motion, petitioner sought
moral and exemplary damages. The RTC this time denied her petition. In turn, in a petition for
certiorari, Gabrial Banez elevated the case to the CA which decided that the grant of execution
by the RTC be set aside. The CA also denied Aida’s motion for reconsideration. Hence this
appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in setting aside the decision of the RTC ordering
respondent to vacate their residential house?
Ruling:
In this case, considering the reasons cited by petitioner that she and her children be
allowed to occupy and enjoy the house considering that during the entire proceedings before
the RTC, she did not have the chance to occupy it, we are in view that there is no superior or
urgent circumstances that outweighs the damage which respondent would suffer if he were
ordered to vacate the house since even he was not given the chance to occupy the said house.
Further, petitioner alleges that an action for legal separation is one where multiple
appeals are allowed. We do not think so. The issues involved in the case will necessarily relate
to the same marital relationship between the parties. The effects of legal separation such as
entitlement to live separately, dissolution and liquidation of the absolute community, and
custody of the minor children, follow from the decree of legal separation. They are not separate
or distinct matters that may be resolved by the court and become final prior to or apart from the
446
decree of legal separation. Rather, they are mere incidents of legal separation. Thus, they may
not be subject to multiple appeals.
FALLO:
Wherefore, the petitions are denied. The decision of the CA is affirmed.
Gaudionco v. Penaranda
FROILAN GAUDIONCO, petitioner, vs.

HON. SENEN PENARANDA, respondent
447
G.R No. 79284. November 27, 1987
PADILLA, J.:
A special civil action for certiorari, with application for injunction, to annul (1) the Order of the
respondent Judge, dated 10 December 1986, ordering petitioner to pay support pendente lite to
private respondent (his wife) and their child, and (2) the Order of the same respondent Judge,
dated 5 August 1987, denying petitioner's motion to suspend hearings in the action for legal
separation filed against him by private respondent as well as his motion to inhibit respondent
Judge from further hearing and trying the case.
Facts:
On 29 May 1986, Teresita Gaudionco, the legal wife of the petitioner, Froilan Gaudionco,
filed with the RTC-Misamis Oriental, presided over by respondent Judge, Hon. Senen
Penaranda, a complaint against petitioner for legal separation, on the ground of concubinage,
with a petition for support and payment of damages. On 13 October 1986, Teresita Gaudionco
also filed with the MTC-General Santos City, a complaint against petitioner for concubinage. On
14 November 1986, an application for the provisional remedy of support pendente lite, pending
a decision in the action for legal separation, was filed by Teresita Gaudionco in the civil case for
legal separation. The respondent judge then ordered the payment of support pendente lite.
The petitioner believes that the civil action for legal separation is grounded on
concubinage, so that all proceedings related to legal separation will have to be suspended to
await conviction or acquittal for concubinage in the criminal case. Petitioner also argues that his
conviction for concubinage will have to be first secured before the action for legal separation
can prosper or succeed, as the basis of the action for legal separation is his alleged offense of
concubinage. He also alleges that the judge acted in abuse of discretion in ordering him for
payment of support.
Issue:
Whether or not the ground is sufficient in this case?
Ruling:
In view of the amendment under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, a civil action for
legal separation, based on concubinage, may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a
criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is not one "to enforce the civil liability
arising from the offense" even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to
the same offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live separately, with the
448
legal consequences thereof, such as, the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains,
custody of offspring’s support, and disqualification from inheriting from the innocent spouse,
among others. A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon
proof by preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation. No criminal proceeding or
conviction is necessary.
Petitioner's attempt to resist payment of support pendente lite to his wife must also fail,
as we find no proof of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent Judge in ordering
the same. Support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an action for legal
separation, and granted at the discretion of the judge. If petitioner finds the amount of support
pendente lite ordered as too onerous, he can always file a motion to modify or reduce the same.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Prima Partosa-Jo v. CA
PRIMA PARTOSA-JO, petitioner vs.
449
G.R. No. 82606. December 18, 1992
CRUZ, J.:
The herein private respondent, Jose Jo, admits to having cohabited with three women and
fathered fifteen children. The first of these women, the herein petitioner, claims to be his legal
wife whom he begot a daughter, Monina Jo. The other women and their respective offspring are
not parties of these case.
Facts:
Jo having cohabited with three women and fathered fifteen children. The first of those
women is Partosa- Jo, his legal wife whom he fathered one daughter.
Partosa-Jo filed a complaint for legal separation of property and an action for support
against his husband Jo. Thus, based on the facts presented, the RTC rendered its decision in
favor of Partosa-Jo ordering Jo to support her and the child. However, the trial court failed to
provide in its depositive portion as to its decision concerning the legal separation of conjugal
properties.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals denied the appeal contending that the said complaint
lacks merit because such claim was based on their mutual agreement and thus there is no
abandonment.
Issue:
Whether of not legal separation of conjugal properties be declared.
Ruling:
The Court held that, abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the avowed
intent never to return, followed by prolonged absence without just cause and without in the
meantime providing in the least for one’s family although able to do so. There must be absolute
cessation of marital relations, duties and rights with the intent of perpetual separation.
As shown by evidences presented, Jo refused to accept Pertosa-Jo in their conjugal
dwelling without just cause and even denied that they were married. Thus, such act is
tantamount to abandonment.
FALLO:
450
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision of the respondent
court is MODIFIED. Civil Case No. 51 is hereby decided in favor the plaintiff, the petitioner
herein, and the conjugal property of the petitioner and the private respondent is hereby ordered
divided between them, share and share alike. This division shall be implemented by the trial
court after determination of all the properties pertaining to the said conjugal partnership,
including those that may have been illegally registered in the name of the persons.
SO ORDERED.
Arroyo v. CA
451
Arroyo vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 96602. Nov. 19, 1991
FELICIANO, J.:
In G.R. No. 96602, the Court summarized the facts of the case in this manner:
Dr. Jorge B. Neri filed a criminal complaint for adultery before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 4, of Benguet against his wife, Ruby Vera Neri, and
Eduardo Arroyo committed on 2 November 1982 in the City of Baguio.
Both defendants pleaded not guilty and after trial, the RTC convicted petitioner
and Mrs. Ruby Vera Neri of adultery as defined under Article 333 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Facts:
On November 2, 1982, accused, Mrs. Ruby Vera Neri in the company of Mrs. Linda Sare
and witness Jabunan, took the morning plane to Baguio. Arriving at around 11:00 a.m., they
dropped first at the house of Mrs. Vera, mother of Ruby Vera at Crystal Cave, Baguio City then
proceeded to the Mines View Park Condominium owned by the Neri spouses. At around 7 pm,
accused Eduardo Arroyo arrived at the Neris' condominium. Jabunan opened the door for
Arroyo who immediately went knocked at the master's bedroom where accused Ruby Neri and
her companion Linda Sare were. On accused Ruby Neri's request, Linda Sare left the master's
bedroom and went upstairs to the sala leaving the two accused alone in the master’s bedroom.
About forty-five minutes later, accused Arroyo Jr. came up and told Linda Sare that she could
already come down. The event was made known to Dr. Jorge Neri, husband of Ruby Neri, who
thereafter, filed a criminal complaint for adultery before the RTC-Benguet against his wife, Ruby
Vera Neri, and Eduardo Arroyo. Both the RTC and the CA found the two accused guilty of
adultery.
Ruby Vera Neri and Eduardo Arroyo filed for a Motion for Reconsideration which was
denied by the CA. On appeal, both accused alleges the following: that they were into an illicit
affair, however, they denied that they had sexual intercourse on November 2, 1982 which Dr.
Neri claims; and finally, that a pardon had been extended by Dr. Neri, and that he had later
contracted marriage with another woman with whom he is presently co-habiting.
Issue:
Whether or not the pardon of Dr. Neri is tenable to free the two accused of their criminal
liability?
452
Ruling:
The rule on pardon is found in Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
"Art.344-The crime of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a
complaint filed by the offended spouse. The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution
without including both parties, if they are both alive, or in any case, if he shall have consented or
pardoned the offenders.
While there is a conceptual difference between consent and pardon in the sense that
consent is granted prior to the adulterous act while pardon is given after the illicit affair,
nevertheless, for either consent or pardon to benefit the accused, it must be given prior to the
filing of a criminal complaint. In the present case, the compromise agreement stating the
pardon given by Dr. Neri, was executed only on February 16, 1989, after the trial court had
already rendered its decision dated December 17, 1987 finding petitioners guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. Because of this, the said pardon is not sufficient to free the two accused
namely Ruby Vera Neri and Eduardo Arroyo of the crime adultery.
FALLO:
ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 96602 is hereby DENIED
for lack of merit and this denial is FINAL. The Petition for Review in G.R. No. 96715 is hereby
similarly DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.
Let a copy of this Resolution and of Dr. Neri's Manifestation and Motion subscribed on 23
August 1991 be forwarded to the Department of Justice for inquiry into the possible liability of
Dr. Neri for perjury.
453
Bugayong v. Ginez
BENJAMIN BUGAYONG, plaintiff-appellant, vs.

LEONILA GINEZ, defendant-appellee.
G.R No. L-10033. December 28, 1956
FELIX, J.:
This is a case for legal separation filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan wherein on
motion of the defendant, the case was dismissed. The order of dismissal was appealed to the
Court of Appeals, but said Tribunal certified the case to the Court on the ground that there is
absolutely no question of fact involved, the motion being predicated on the assumption as true
of the very facts testified to by plaintiff-husband.
Facts:
Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the United States Navy, was married to defendant
Leonila Ginez on August 27, 1949, at Asingan, Pangasinan. Immediately after their marriage,
the couple lived with their sisters who later moved to Sampaloc, Manila. At about July, 1951,
Leonila Ginez left the dwelling of her sister-in-law and informed her husband by letter that she
had gone to reside with her mother in Asingan, Pangasinan. As early as July, 1951,
Benjamin Bugayong began receiving letters from his sister-in-law and some from anonymous
writers informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife. On cross-examination, Benjamin
admitted that his wife also informed him by letter, that a certain "Eliong" kissed her. All these
communications prompted him in to seek the advice of the navy legal department. In August,
1952, Benjamin went to Asingan, Pangasinan, and sought for his wife whom he met in the
house of Leonila’s godmother. She came along with him and both proceeded to the house of a
cousin ofBenjamin, where they stayed and lived for 2 nights and 1 day as husband and wife. On
the second day, Benjamin tried to verify from his wife the truth of the information he received
that she had committed adultery but Leonila, instead of answering his query, merely packed up
and left. After that and despite such belief, Benjamin still exerted efforts to locate her and failing
to find her, he went to Bacarra, Ilocos Norte, "to soothe his wounded feelings". On November
18, 1952, Benjamin filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan a complaint for legal
separation against his wife, Leonila who filed an answer vehemently denying the averments of
the complaint and setting up affirmative defenses. After the issues were joined and convinced
that reconciliation was not possible, the court set the case for hearing on June 9, 1953.
Benjamin presented his evidences, but the counsel of Leonila moved for the dismissal of the
complaint due to the fact that there was “condonation.” Both the RTC and CA believed that
there was indeed condonation.
454
Issue:
Whether or not there has been condonation?
Ruling:
Condonation is the “forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal
separation” or, condonation is the "conditional forgiveness or remission, by a husband or wife of
a matrimonial offense which the latter has committed". It is to be noted, however, that in
defendant's answer she vehemently and vigorously denies having committed any act of infidelity
against her husband, and even if we were to give full weight to the testimony of the plaintiff, who
was the only one that had the chance of testifying in Court and link such evidence with the
averments of the complaint, we would have to conclude that the facts appearing on the record
are far from sufficient to establish the charge of adultery preferred against the defendant.
Certainly, the letter that plaintiff claims to have received from his sister-in-law, must have been
too vague and indefinite as to defendant's infidelity to deserve its production in evidence; nor
the anonymous letters which plaintiff also failed to present; nor the alleged letter that, according
to plaintiff, his wife addressed to him admitting that she had been kissed by one Eliong, whose
identity was not established, do not amount to anything that can be relied upon.
The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has
been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are
offenders, legal separation cannot be claimed by either of them. Collusion between the parties
to obtain legal separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition.
A detailed examination of the testimony of the plaintiff-husband clearly shows that there
was a condonation on the part of the husband for the supposed "acts of rank infidelity
amounting to adultery" committed by defendant-wife. Admitting for the sake of argument that the
infidelities amounting to adultery were committed by the defendant-wife, reconciliation was
effected between her and the plaintiff. The act of the latter in persuading her to come along with
him, and the fact that she went with him and consented to be brought to the house of his cousin
and together they slept there as husband and wife for one day and one night, and the further
fact that in the second night they again slept together in their house likewise as husband and
wife- all these facts have no other meaning in the opinion of this court than that a reconciliation
between them was effected and that there was a condonation of the wife by the husband. The
reconciliation occurred almost ten months after he came to know of the acts of infidelity
455
amounting to adultery. Although he believed that her wife committed adultery, he still persuaded
her wife.
It is important to note that a divorce suit will not be granted for adultery where the parties
continue to live together after it was known, or there is sexual intercourse after knowledge of
adultery, or sleeping together for a single night, and many others. The resumption of marital
cohabitation as a basis of condonation will generally be inferred, nothing appearing to the
contrary, from the fact of the living together as husband and wife, especially as against the
husband.
Because of this, the Supreme Court agreed with the RTC and CA’s findings that there
was indeed condonation on the part of Benjamin Bugayong, therefore, the foregoing case is
hereby dismissed.
FALLO:
Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing, the order appealed from is hereby
affirmed, with costs against appellant. It is so ordered.
456
People v. Zapata and Bondoc
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs.

GUADALUPE ZAPATA and DALMACIO BONDOC, defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-3047. May 161951
PADILLA, J.:
In the Court of First Instance of Pampanga a complaint for adultery was filed by Andres Bondoc
against Guadalupe Zapata, his wife, and Dalmacio Bondoc, her paramour, for cohabiting and
having repeated sexual intercourse during the period from the year 1946 14 March 1947, the
date of the filing of the complaint, Dalmacio Bondoc knowing his codefendant to be a married
woman (criminal case No. 426). The defendant wife entered the plea of guilty and was
sentenced to suffer four months of arresto mayor which penalty she served. In the same court,
on 17 September 1948, the offended husband filed another complaint for adulterous acts
committed by his wife and her paramour from 15 March 1947 to 17 September 1948, the date of
the filing of the second complaint (criminal case No. 735). On 21 February 1949, each of the
defendants filed a motion to quash the complaint of the ground that they would be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The trial court upheld the contention of the
defendants and quashed the second complaint. From the other sustaining the motions to quash
the prosecution has appealed.
Facts:
In the Court of First Instance of Pampanga a complaint for adultery was filed by Andres
Bondoc against Guadalupe Zapata, his wife, and Dalmacio Bondoc, her paramour, for
cohabiting and having repeated sexual intercourse during the period from the year 1946 to
March 14, 1947. The defendant-wife entered a plea of guilty and was sentenced to suffer four
months of arresto mayor which penalty she served. In the same court, on September 17, 1948,
the offended husband filed another complaint for adulterous acts committed by his wife and her
paramour from March 15, 1947 to September 17, 1948. On February 21, 1949, each of the
defendants filed a motion to quash the complaint on the ground that they would be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The trial court upheld the contention of the
defendants and quashed the second complaint.
The trial court held that the adulterous acts charged in the first and second complaints
must be deemed one continuous offense, the defendants in both complaints being the same
and identical persons and the two sets of unlawful acts having taken place continuously during
457
the years 1946, 1947 and part of 1948 is within the scope and meaning of the constitutional
provision that “No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.”
Issue:
Whether or not consent attended the case?
Ruling:
Adultery is a crime of result and not of tendency; it is an instantaneous crime which is
consummated and exhausted or completed at the moment of the carnal union. Each sexual
intercourse constitutes a crime of adultery. True, two or more adulterous acts committed by the
same defendants are against the same person- the offended husband; the same status- the
union of the husband and wife by their marriage; and the same community represented by the
State for its interest in maintaining and preserving such status. But this identity of the offended
party, status and society does not argue against the commission of the crime of adultery as
many times as there were carnal acts consummated, for as long as the status remain
unchanged, the nexus undissolved and unbroken, an encroachment or trespass upon that
status constitutes a crime. There is no constitutional or legal provision which bars the filing of as
many complaints for adultery as there were adulterous acts committed, each constituting one
crime.
In the instant case the last unity does not exist, because as already stated the culprits
perpetrate the crime in every sexual intercourse and they need not do another or other
adulterous acts to consummate it. After the last act of adultery had been committed as charged
in the first complaint, the defendants again committed adulterous acts not included in the first
complaint and for which the second complaint was filed.
Another reason why a second complaint charging the commission of adulterous acts
does not constitute a violation of the double jeopardy clause of the constitution is that, at the
time of the commission of the crime charged in the second complaint, the paramour already
knew that his codefendant was a married woman and yet he continued to have carnal
knowledge of her. Even if the husband should pardon his adulterous wife, such pardon would
not exempt the wife and her paramour from criminal liability for adulterous acts committed after
the pardon was granted, because the pardon refers to previous and not to subsequent
adulterous acts
458
FALLO:
The order appealed from, which quashed the second complaint for adultery, is hereby
reversed and set aside, and trial court directed to proceed with the trial of the defendants in
accordance with law, with costs against the appellees.
459
Ocampo v. Florenciano
JOSE DE OCAMPO, petitioner, vs.

SERAFINA FLORENCIANO, respondent.
G.R. No. L-13553. February 23, 1960
BENGZON, J.:
Action for legal separation by Jose de Ocampo against his wife Serafina, on the ground of
adultery. The court of first instance of Nueva Ecija dismissed it. The Court of Appeals affirmed,
holding there was confession of judgment, plus condonation or consent to the adultery and
prescription.
Facts:
Plaintiff and defendant were married in April 5, 1938 by a religious ceremony in Guimba,
Nueva Ecija, and had lived thereafter as husband and wife. They begot several children. In
March 1951, plaintiff discovered on several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by
maintaining illicit relations with one Jose Arcalas. Having found the defendant carrying marital
relations with another man, plaintiff sent her to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture,
where she stayed for one year. Again, plaintiff discovered that while in the said city, defendant
was going out with several other men, aside from Jose Arcalas. Towards the end of June 1952,
when defendant had finished studying her course, she left plaintiff and since then they had lived
separately. On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with
another man by the name of Nelson Orzame. Plaintiff signified his intention of filing a petition for
legal separation; to which defendant manifested her conformity provided she is not charged with
adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, plaintiff filed on July 5, 1955, a petition for legal
separation.
The RTC and CA held that a legal separation could not be decreed due to the
confession of judgment by the defendant.
Issue:
Whether or not pardon attended the case at bar?
Ruling:
The mere circumstance that defendant told the Fiscal that she "like also" to be legally
separated from her husband, is no obstacle to the successful prosecution of the action. When
she refused to answer the complaint, she indicated her willingness to be separated. Yet, the law
does not order the dismissal. Allowing the proceeding to continue, it takes precautions against
460
collusion, which implies more than consent or lack of opposition to the agreement. In this
connection, it has been held that collusion may not be inferred from the mere fact that the guilty
party confesses to the offense and thus enables the other party to procure evidence necessary
to prove it; and proof that the defendant desires the divorce and makes no defense, is not by
itself collusion. Here, the offense of adultery had really taking place without collusion by the
parties, according to the evidence. The Supreme Court does not think plaintiff's failure actively
to search for defendant and take her home constituted condonation or consent to her adulterous
relations with Orzame. It will be remembered that she "left" him after having sinned with Arcalas
and after he had discovered her dates with other men. Consequently, it was not his duty to
search for her to bring her home. Hers was the obligation to return.
Wherefore, finding no obstacles to the aggrieved husband's petition we hereby reverse
the appealed decision and decree a legal separation between this spouse. Costs of all
instances against Serafina Florenciano.
FALLO:
the appealed decision and decree a legal separation between these spouse, all the consequent
effects. Costs of all instances against Serafina Florenciano. So ordered.
461
Matubis v. Praxedes
SOCORRO MATUBIS, plaintiff-appellant, vs.

ZOILO PRAXEDES, defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. L-11766. October 25, 1960
PAREDES, J.:
Alleging abandonment and concubinage, plaintiff Socorro Matubis, filed with the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur, on April 24, 1956, a complaint for legal Separation and changed of
surname against her husband defendant Zoilo Praxedes.
Facts:
Plaintiff and defendant were legally married on January 10, 1943 at Iriga, Camarines
Sur. For failure to agree on how they should live as husband and wife, the couple, on May 30,
1944, agreed to live separately from each other, which status remained unchanged until the
present. On April 3, 1948, plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement,the significant
portions of which are hereunder reproduced: (a) That both of us relinquish our right over the
other as legal husband and wife; (b) That both without any interference by any of us, nor either
of us can prosecute the other for adultery or concubinage or any other crime or suit arising from
our separation; (c) That I, the, wife, is no longer entitled for any support from my husband or any
benefits he may received thereafter, nor I the husband is not entitled for anything from my wife;
(d) That neither of us can claim anything from the other from the time we verbally separated,
that is from May 30, 1944 to the present when we made our verbal separation into writing.
In January, 1955, defendant began cohabiting and deporting themselves as husband
and wife who were generally reputed as such in the community with Asuncion Rebulado and on
September 1, 1955, said Asuncion gave birth to their child. On April 24, 1956, plaintiff Socorro
Matubis filed a complaint for legal separation Alleging abandonment and concubinage on the
part of defendant. The RTC and CA dismissed the case due to the presence of condonation on
the part of the plaintiff.
Issue:
Whether or not condonation attended the case?
462
Ruling:
The very wording of the agreement gives no room for interpretation other than that given
by the trial judge. Counsel in his brief submits that the agreement is divided in two parts. The
first part having to do with the act of living separately which he claims to be legal, and the
second part, that which becomes a license to commit the ground for legal separation which is
admittedly illegal. We do not agree in appellant’s defense. Condonation and consent on the part
of plaintiff are the most vital part in the said agreement. The condonation and consent here are
not only implied but expressed. The law (Art. 100 Civil Code) specifically provides that legal
separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no
condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Having condoned and or consented
in writing, the plaintiff is now undeserving of the court's sympathy. Plaintiff's counsel even
agrees that the complaint should be dismissed. He claims however, that the grounds for the
dismissal should not be those stated in the decision of the lower court, "but on the ground that
plaintiff and defendant have already been legally separated from each other, but without the
marital bond having been affected, long before the effectivity of the new Civil Code." Again, we
cannot subscribe to counsel's contention, because it is contrary to the evidence.
FALLO:
Conformably with the foregoing, we find that the decision appealed from is in
accordance with the evidence and the law on the matter. The same is hereby affirmed, with
costs.
463
People v. Schnckenberger
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee vs.

RODOLFO SCHNCKENBERGER, defendant-appellant
G.R. No. 48183. November 10, 1941
Facts:
On Mach 16, 1926, the accused, Rodolfo Schneckenberger married the complainant
Elena Cartegena and after 7 years of marital life, they agreed, for reason of alleged
incompatibility of character, to live separately from each other. On May 25, 1935, they executed
a document in which they agreed to live separately and to choose who they want to live with. On
June 15, 1935, the accused, without leaving the Philippines, secured a divorce from the civil
court of Juarez, Mexico. On May 11, 1936, he contracted another marriage with his co-accused,
Julia Medel. Complainant herein instituted 2 actions for Bigamy in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal and the other for concubinage in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The first culminated
in the conviction of the accused. On the trial of concubinage, accused interposed the plea of
double jeopardy, and the case was dismissed. But upon appeal by the fiscal, accused was
convicted of concubinage through reckless imprudence. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in convicting accused in the offense of concubinage?
Ruling:
As to appellant’s plea for double jeopardy, it need only be observed that the offense of
bigamy for which he was convicted and that of concubinage for which he stood trial are two
distinct offenses in law and in fact as well as the mode of their prosecution. The celebration of
the second marriage, with the first still existing, characterizes bigamy; in the present case, mere
cohabitation by the husband with a woman who is not his wife characterizes concubinage.
Upon the other hand, we believe and so hold that the accused should be acquitted of the
crime of concubinage. The document executed by and between the accused clearly shows that
each party intended to forego the illicit acts of the other. As the term “pardon” unquestionably
refers to the offense after its commission, “consent” must have been intended, agreeably with its
ordinary usage, to refer to the offense prior its commission. No logical difference can indeed be
464
perceived between prior and subsequent consent, for in both instances as the offended party
has chosen to compromise with his/her dishonor, he/she becomes unworthy to come to court
and invoke its aid in the vindication of the wrong. In arriving at this conclusion, we do not wish to
be misconstrued as legalizing an agreement to do an illicit act, in violation of law. Our view must
be taken only to mean that an agreement of the tenor entered into between the parties herein,
operates, within the plain language and manifest policy of the law, to bar the offended party
from prosecuting the offense.
FALLO:
Wherefore, judgment is reversed and the accused is hereby acquitted in the crime of
concubinage.
465
People v. Sensano
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
URSULA SENSANO and MARCELO RAMOS, defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. L-37720 March 27, 1933
BUTTE, J.:
The appellants were sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte for the
crime of adultery to three years, six months and twenty-one days of prision correccional and
appealed to this court, assigning the following error: "The court below erred in not holding that
the offended husband contested to the adultery committed by his wife Ursula Sensano in that he
refused to live with her after she extinguished her previous sentence for the same offense, and
by telling her then that she could go where she wanted to and do what she pleased, and by his
silence for seven years notwithstanding that he was informed of said adultery.
Facts:
Mariano Ventura and Ursula Sensano are married couples and were blessed with a
child, sometime in their marriage; Mariano Ventura went to Cagayan and abandoned his family.
Mariano Ventura left Ursula Sensano for 3 years without writing to her or sending support,
Ursula Sensano did not have any means of survival so she resorted to cohabiting with Marcelo
Ramos who took her and her child. When Mariano Ventura returned, he filed adultery charges
against Ursula Sensano and Marcelo Ramos. Both were convicted with adultery and were
sentenced to four months and one day of arresto mayor. After completing her sentence, Ursula
Sensano asked Ventura to forgive her but the latter denied. Mariano Ventura told her to go
anywhere she wished and do whatever she wants to do. She again lived with Ramos while
Mariano Ventura knowing that Ursula Sensano cohabitated again with Marcelo Ramos did
nothing to interfere and went to Hawaii for 7 years. When Mariano Ventura returned to the
Philippines, he filed a second charge of adultery and filed a case for legal separation under the
provisions of Act No. 2710.
Issue:
Whether or not Ursula Sensano is guilty of adultery.
466
Ruling:
No, under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, Prosecution of the crimes of adultery,
concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness cannot be criminally
prosecuted without including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he
shall have consented or pardoned the offenders thus Mariano Ventura consented to the
adulterous relations of his wife Ursula Sensano and therefore Mariano Ventura is barred from
instituting a case for adultery.
FALLO:
Wherefore, the judgment is reversed.
467
Benedicto De La Rama v. De La Rama
AGUEDA BENEDICTO DE LA RAMA, appellee,

vs.
ESTEBAN DE LA RAMA, appellant.
G.R. No. 1056 March 13, 1907
WILLARD, J.:
On July 5, 1902, the Court of First Instance of the Province of Iloilo entered a final
judgment in this case, decreeing a divorce to the plaintiff on the ground of the husband's
adultery, as well as the payment of 81,042.76 pesos due her as her unpaid share of the
property belonging to the conjugal partnership, as well as the sum of 3,200 pesos as an
allowance for their support since the date on which the action was instituted.
Facts:
Agueda Benedicto and Esteban De la rama was Married in July 1891 to august 1892
and lived happily together, one day wife’s maid gave husband a letter in the handwriting of his
wife and saw that wife is cohabitating with another man, the man was a Spanish corporal of the
civil guard, named Zabal, when he confronted her she admitted the genuineness of the letter,
fell upon her knees and implored him to pardon her. That same day he took her to the home of
her parents, told what had occurred and left her there and never lived with her afterwards. One
day, wife was told by her friends that husband was cohabitating with one
GREGORIA BERMEJO. DELA RAMA. Wife charged BENEDICTO with adultery, BENEDICTO
denied the adultery imputed to DELA RAMA, and asked for divorce. CFI: granted the divorce to
plaintiff and 81, 042. 76 pesos as her share of the conjugal property- court assumed that the
provisions of the civil code relating to divorce contained in title 4 of book1 are still in force. DE
LA RAMA then filed an appeal before the Supreme Court praying for the reversal of the case.
Issue:
Whether or not either Esteban Dela Rama or Benedicto are guilty of adultery
Ruling:
468
No, Supreme Court holds that neither party is entitled to judgment of divorce against the
other; that judgment be entered that the plaintiff take nothing by her action or the defendant by
his cross demand, and that neither party recover of the other any costs either in this court or the
Court of First Instance. either spouse has been guilty of adultery, so is the fact that he has
pardoned her when she first committed an adulterous act.
FALLO:
After the expiration of twenty days let judgment be entered in accordance herewith, and
ten days thereafter the record be remanded to the court from whence it came for execution. So
ordered.
469
Brown v. Yambao
WILLIAM H. BROWN, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
JUANITA YAMBAO, defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. L-10699 October 18, 1957
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
On July 14, 1955, William H. Brown filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila to
obtain legal separation from his lawful wife Juanita Yambao. He alleged under oath that while
interned by the Japanese invaders, from 1942 to 1945, at the University of Sto. Tomas
internment camp, his wife engaged in adulterous relations with one Carlos Field of whom she
begot a baby girl that Brown learned of his wifes misconduct only in 1945, upon his release from
internment; that thereafter the spouse lived separately and later executed a document (Annex A
) liquidating their conjugal partnership and assigning certain properties to the erring wife as her
share. The complaint prayed for confirmation of the liquidation agreement; for custody of the
children issued of the marriage; that the defendant be declared disqualified to succeed the
plaintiff; and for their remedy as might be just and equitable.
Facts:
Brown alleges that while he was interned by the Japanese from 1942 to1945, his wife
had engaged in an adulterous relationship from which she begot a child. He learned of it after
his release. From then on they decided to live separately from each other and executed, to this
effect, an agreement liquidating conjugal partnership, even giving the erring wife a share. On
July, he filed a suit for legal separation praying for confirmation of said agreement, custodial
rights and disqualification of wife from succession of plaintiff. Her wife was declared in default
for not having answered on time. When cross-examined by the assistant city fiscal, it was
revealed however that Brown, after the liberation from the internment, had also lived with
another woman with whom he has begotten children. The court refused to grant the petition on
the basis of prescription, commission of similar offense by petitioner, and involvement of
consent and connivance.
470
Issue:
Whether or not proceedings for legal separation can still be instituted when both
spouses are offenders.
Ruling:
No. His petition cannot prosper for two reasons: (1) prescriptive period is over since he
learned of his wife’s relations in 1945 and only filed a complaint after ten years; and (2) His
cohabitation with another woman bars him from claiming legal separation. Failure of the wife to
set up a defense may be considered circumstantial evidence of collusion between them.
Consent and connivance no longer need to be proven there being two established statutory
grounds to grant the decree of legal separation
FALLO:
The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered.
471
De Ocampo v. Florenciano
JOSE DE OCAMPO, petitioner,

vs.
SERAFINA FLORENCIANO, respondent.
G.R. No. L-13553 February 23, 1960
BENGZON, J.:
Action for legal separation by Jose de Ocampo against his wife Serafina, on the ground
of adultery. The court of first instance of Nueva Ecija dismissed it. The Court of Appeals
affirmed, holding there was confession of judgment, plus condonation or consent to the adultery
and prescription.
FACTS:
Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married in 1938. They begot several
children who are not living with the plaintiff. In March 1951, the latter discovered on several
occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with Jose Arcalas.
Having found out, he sent the wife to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture where she
stayed for one year. Again plaintiff discovered that the wife was going out with several other
man other than Arcalas. In 1952, when the wife finished her studies, she left plaintiff and since
then they had lived separately. In June 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit
relations with Nelson Orzame. He signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation to
which defendant manifested conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal
action. Accordingly, Ocampo filed a petition for legal separation in 1955.
ISSUE:
Whether the confession made by Florenciano constitutes the confession of judgment

disallowed by the Family Code.
Ruling:
No, Florenciano’s admission to the investigating fiscal that she committed adultery, in
the existence of evidence of adultery other than such confession, is not the confession of
472
judgment disallowed by Article 48 of the Family Code. What is prohibited is a confession of
judgment, a confession done in court or through a pleading. Where there is evidence of the
adultery independent of the defendant’s statement agreeing to the legal separation, the decree
of separation should be granted since it would not be based on the confession but upon the
evidence presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively on
defendant’s confession. The petition should be granted based on the second adultery, which
has not yet prescribed.
FALLO:

the appealed decision and decree a legal separation between these spouse, all the consequent
effects. Costs of all instances against Serafina Florenciano. So ordered.
473
Contreras v. Macaraig
ELENA CONTRERAS, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
CESAR J. MACARAIG, defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. L-29138 May 29, 1970
DIZON, J.:
Appeal taken by Elena Contreras from a decision of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 00138 dismissing her complaint upon the ground
that the same was filed more than one year from and after the date on which she had become
cognizant of the cause for legal separation.
Facts:
Elena Contreras appealed the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations court
of Manila which dismissed her complaint of adultery against Cesar J. Macaraig on the ground
that the time for filing an action has prescribed. In 1961, defendant met Lily Ann Alacala and
had started to come home late and be away often. In September 1962, Avelino Lubos, the
family driver, told Elena that her husband was living with Alcala. When defendant came home in
October, plaintiff did not verify the report so that defendant will not get angry. In April 1963,
plaintiff once again heard rumors of the alleged misconduct of her husband. It was only upon
hearing reports that Lily Ann Alcala had given birth did plaintiff sent Mrs. Felicisima Antioquo to
investigate. The latter confirmed on October 1963 that a child had been born by Alcala, bearing
the surname of defendant. Plaintiff, through her father and sister-in-law, tried to convince the
defendant to come back but defendant told her that he can no longer leave Lily Ann. The lower
court held that the word “cognizant” does not connote the date when proof was sufficient
because the time indicated by the code would have been rendered meaningless as all one
would need to do is fix the date.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition should be barred by prescription.
Ruling:
474
Yes, December 1963 was the only time when she became truly cognizant of her
husband’s infidelity. Hearsay information would not have been legally sufficient as a basis for
legal separation thus she raised her complaint later than the prescribed date under the law.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is set aside and another is hereby rendered
holding that appellant is entitled to legal separation as prayed for in her complaint; and the case
is hereby remanded to the lower court for appropriate proceedings in accordance with law.
475
Araneta v. Concepcion
LUIS MA. ARANETA, Petitioner, vs. HONORABLE HERMOGENES CONCEPCION, as

judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VI and EMMA BENITEZ
ARANETA, Respondents.
[G.R. No. L-9667. July 31, 1956.]
LABRADOR, J.:
The main action was brought by Petitioner against his wife, one of
the Respondent herein, for legal separation on the ground of adultery.
Facts:
A civil action was filed by LUIS MA. ARANETA against his wife for legal separation on
the ground of adultery. Meanwhile After the issues were joined his wife filed an omnibus petition
to secure custody of their three minor children, a monthly support for herself and said children,
and the return of her passport. LUIS MA. ARANETA opposed the petition, denying the
misconduct imputed to him and alleged and prayed that as the petition for custody and support
cannot be determined without evidence, the parties be required to submit their respective
evidence. He also contended that Defendant is not entitled to the custody of the children as she
had abandoned them and had committed adultery, that by her conduct she had become unfit to
educate her children, being unstable in her emotions and unable to give the children the love,
respect and care of a true mother and without means to educate them. As to the claim for
support, Plaintiff claims that there are no conjugal assets and she is not entitled to support
because of her infidelity and that she was able to support herself. Affidavits and documents
were submitted both in support and against the omnibus petition.The HONORABLE
HERMOGENES CONCEPCION, as judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila resolved the
omnibus petition, in favor of petitioner LUIS MA. ARANETA wife granting the custody of the
children to wife and a monthly allowance for support for her and the children, P300 for a house
and P2,000 as attorney’s fees. Upon refusal of the judge to reconsider the order, LUIS MA.
ARANETA filed a petition for certiorari against said order of HONORABLE HERMOGENES
CONCEPCION and prayed that HONORABLE HERMOGENES CONCEPCION require both
parties to submit evidence before deciding the case
476
Issue:
Whether or not an evidence for custody be required before a decision of the court
Ruling:
Yes, It is conceded that the period of six months fixed therein Article 103 (Civil Code) is
evidently intended as a cooling off period to make possible reconciliation between the spouses.
The recital of their grievances against each other in court may only fan their already inflamed
passions against one another, and the lawmaker has imposed the period to give them
opportunity for dispassionate reflection. But this practical expedient, necessary to carry out
legislative policy, does not have the effect of overriding other provisions such as the
determination of the custody of the children and alimony and support pendente lite according to
the circumstances. (Article 105, Civil Code.) The law expressly enjoins that these should be
determined by the court according to the circumstances. If these are ignored or the courts close
their eyes to actual facts, rank in justice may be caused. Thus the determination of the custody
and alimony should be given effect and force provided it does not go to the extent of violating
the policy of the cooling off period. That is, evidence not affecting the cause of the separation,
like the actual custody of the children, the means conducive to their welfare and convenience
during the pendency of the case, these should be allowed that the court may determine which is
best for their custody.
FALLO:
The writ prayed for is hereby issued and the Respondent judge or whosoever takes his
place is ordered to proceed on the question of custody and support pendente lite in accordance
with this opinion. The court’s order fixing the alimony and requiring payment is reversed.
Without costs.
477
Pacete v. Carriaga
ENRICO L. PACETE, CLARITA DE LA CONCEPCION, EMELDA C. PACETE, EVELINA C.

PACETE and EDUARDO C. PACETE, petitioners,
vs.
HON. GLICERIO V. CARRIAGA, JR. and CONCEPCION (CONCHITA) ALANIS
PACETE, respondents.
G.R. No. L-53880 March 17, 1994
VITUG, J.:
The issue in this petition for certiorari is whether or not the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of Cotabato, Branch I, in Cotabato City, gravely abused its discretion
in denying petitioners' motion for extension of time to file their answer in Civil Case No. 2518,
in declaring petitioners in default and in rendering its decision of 17 March 1980 which, among
other things, decreed the legal separation of petitioner Enrico L. Pacete and private respondent
Concepcion Alanis and held to be null and void ab initio the marriage of Enrico L. Pacete to
Clarita de la Concepcion.
Facts:
Concepcion Alanis filed with the court below a complaint for the declaration of
nullity of the marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la
Concepcion, as well as for legal separation (between Alanis and Pacete), accounting and
separation of property. In her complaint, she averred that she was married to Pacete before the
Justice of the Peace of Cotabato; that they had a child named Consuelo; that Pacete
subsequently contracted in 1948 a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion in
North Cotabato; that she learned of such marriage only on1979; that during her marriage to
Pacete, the latter acquired vast property consisting of large tracts of land, fishponds and
several motor vehicles; that he fraudulently placed the several pieces of property
either in his name and Clarita or in the names of his children with Clarita and other
"dummies;" that Pacete ignored overtures for an amicable settlement;
andt h a t r e c o n c i l i a t i o n b e t w e e n h e r a n d P a c e t e w a s i m p o s s i b l e s i n c e h e evid
ently preferred to continue living with Clarita.
Issue:
478
Whether or not RTC of Cotabato City gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioners'
motion for extension of time to file their answer on the decree of legal separation.
Ruling:
Yes, special prescriptions on actions that can put the integrity of marriage to
possible jeopardy are impelled by no less than the State's interest in the marriage relation and
its avowed intention not to leave the matter within the exclusive domain and the
vagaries of the parties to alone dictate. It is clear that the petitioner did, in fact, specifically
pray for legal separation. That other remedy, whether principal or incidental, have
likewise been sought in the same action cannot dispense, nor excuse compliance,
with any of the statutory requirements a fore quoted. An action for legal separation must "in no
case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition,"
obviously in order to provide the parties a "cooling-off" period. In this interim, the court should
take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED and the proceedings
below, including the Decision of 17 March 1980 appealed from, are NULLIFIED and SET
ASIDE. No costs.
479
Somosa-Ramos v. CA
LUCY SOMOSA-RAMOS, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE CIPRIANO VAMENTA, JR., Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Oriental and CLEMEN G. RAMOS, respondents.
G.R. No. L-34132 July 29, 1972
FERNANDO, J.:
The question raised in this petition for certiorari is whether or not Article 103 of the Civil
Code prohibiting the hearing of an action for legal separation before the lapse of six months
from the filing of the petition, would likewise preclude the court from acting on a motion for
preliminary mandatory injunction applied for as an ancillary remedy to such a suit. Respondent
Cipriano Vamenta, Jr., of the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, answered the question
in the affirmative, in view of the absolute tenor of such Civil Code provision, which reads thus:
"An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed
since the filing of the petition." He therefore ordered the suspension, upon the plea of the other
respondent the husband Clemente G. Ramos, of the hearing on a motion for a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction filed by petitioner at the same time the suit for legal separation
was instituted. Petitioner, Lucy Somosa-Ramos, the wife who brought the action for legal
separation would dispute such a ruling. Hence, this certiorari proceeding. As will be shown later
there is justification for such a move on the part of petitioner. The respondent Judge ought to
have acted differently. The plea for a writ of certiorari must be granted.
Facts:
On June 18, 1971, petitioner filed Civil Case No. 5274 in the sala of respondent Judge
against respondent Clemente Ramos for legal separation, on concubinage on the respondent's
part and an attempt by him against her life being alleged. She likewise sought the issuance of a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for the return to her of what she claimed to be her
paraphernal and exclusive property, then under the administration and management of
respondent Clemente Ramos. There was an opposition to the hearing of such a motion, dated
July 3, 1971, based on Article 103 of the Civil Code. It was further manifested by him in a
pleading dated July 16, 1971, that if the motion asking for preliminary mandatory injunction were
480
heard, the prospect of the reconciliation of the spouses would become even more dim.
Respondent Judge ordered the parties to submit their respective memoranda on the matter.
Then on September 3, 1971, petitioner received an order dated August 4, 1971 of respondent
Judge granting the motion of respondent Ramos to suspend the hearing of the petition for a writ
of mandatory preliminary injunction. That is the order complained of in this petition for certiorari.
Respondents were required to answer according to our resolution of October 5, 1971. The
answer was filed December 2 of that year. Then on January 12, 1972 came a manifestation
from parties in the case submitting the matter without further arguments.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 103 of the Civil Code prohibits the hearing of an action for legal
separation before the lapse of six months from the filing of the petition
Ruling:
No, It is conceded that the period of six months fixed therein Article 103 (Civil Code) is
evidently intended as a cooling off period to make possible reconciliation between the spouses.
Article 103 the Civil Code is not an absolute bar to the hearing motion for preliminary injunction
prior to the expiration of the six-month period.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the plea of petitioner for a writ of certiorari is granted, and the order of
respondent Court of August 4, 1971, suspending the hearing on the petition for a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction is set aside. Respondent Judge is directed to proceed without
delay to hear the motion for preliminary mandatory injunction. Costs against respondent
Clemente G. Ramos.
481
Sabalones v. CA
SAMSON T. SABALONES, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and REMEDIOS GAVIOLA-SABALONES, respondents.
G.R. No. 106169 February 14, 1994
RUZ, J.:
The subject of this petition is the preliminary injunction issued by the respondent court
pending resolution of a case on appeal. We deal only with this matter and not the merits of the
case.
FACTS:
As an ambassador petitioner Samson Sabalones was assigned to different countries

and as such, he left the administration of their conjugal properties to his wife Remedios Gaviola-
Sabalones, 1985 – Sabalones retired as ambassador to live in the Philippines but did not return
to his family. In 1989, he filed judicial authorization to sell their Greenhills property. He alleged
that he was 68 yrs. old, very sick and living alone with no income. Remedies
opposed the authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal separation. She alleged that the
Greenhills property was occupied by her and their 6 children and they were dependent on the
rentals of their other properties. She also informed the court that despite Sabalones’ retirement,
he did not return to his legitimate family and instead maintained a separate residence with
Thelma Cumareng and their 3children. Remedios prayed for a decree of legal separation and
liquidation of their conjugal properties, with forfeiture of her husband’s share, Also prayed for
preventing the Sabalones from disturbing the tenants in the Forbes Park property and disposing
any of the conjugal properties.
After trial, Judge Mariano Umali found that the petitioner had indeed contracted a
bigamous marriage on October 5, 1981 with Thelma Cumareng. The court, then, decreed the
legal separation of Sabalones and Remedios,
forfeiture of his share in the conjugal properties and non-entitlement to support, Pendente lite,
Remedios filed a motion for issuance of a write of preliminary injunction
preventing Sabalones from interfering in the administration of their
properties. Petitioner opposed motion, April 7, 1992 – CA granted the preliminary injunction,
482
Petitioner argued that the law provides of a joint administration of the conjugal
properties by the husband and wife, citing Art. 124 FC. Also the court failed to appoint an
administrator pursuant to Art. 61 FC
ISSUE:
Whether or not the wife can enter into a contract of lease of a conjugal property without
the consent of both spouses
Ruling:
Yes, while the law does indeed grant the spouses joint administration over conjugal
properties under Art. 124 FC, Art. 61 of the same code is to be applied in the instant case since
the legal separation case filed by the wife is still
pending.Pending the appointment of an administrator over the conjugal assets, CA was justified
in allowing the wife to continue with her administration pursuant to Art. 61FC, This provision
states that after a petition for legal separation has been filed, the trial court shall, in the absence
of a written agreement between the couple, appoint either one of the spouses or a third person
to act as the administrator
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. It is so ordered.
483
Espiritu and Layug v. CA
REYNALDO ESPIRITU and GUILLERMA LAYUG, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TERESITA MASAUDING, respondents.
G.R. No. 115640 March 15, 1995
MELO, J.:
This case concerns a seemingly void marriage and a relationship which went sour. The
innocent victims are two children horn out of the same union. Upon this Court now falls the not
too welcome task of deciding the issue of who, between the father and mother, is more suitable
and better qualified in helping the children to grow into responsible, well-adjusted, and happy
young adulthood.
Facts:
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met sometime in
1976 in Iligan City where Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel Corporation and
Teresita was employed as a nurse in a local hospital. In 1977, Teresita left for Los Angeles,
California to work as a nurse. She was able to acquire immigrant status sometime later. In 1984,
Reynaldo was sent by his employer, the National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
as its liaison officer and Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a common law
relationship of husband and wife. On August 16, 1986, their daughter, Rosalind Therese, was
born. On October 7, 1987, while they were on a brief vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and
Teresita got married, and upon their return to the United States, their second child, a son, this
time, and given the name Reginald Vince, was born on January 12, 1988.
Their relationship deteriorated as Teresita stating that he was always nagging her about money
matters. Reynaldo, on the other hand, contended that Teresita was a spendthrift, buying
expensive jewelry and antique furniture instead of attending to household expenses.
Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California. She claims,
however, that she spent a lot of money on long distance telephone calls to keep in constant
touch with her children.
484
Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but because his assignment in
Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent back by his company to Pittsburgh. He had to
leave his children with his sister, co-petitioner Guillerma Layug and her family.
upon arrival of Teresita to the Philippines, she filed the petition for a writ of habeas
corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody over the children, thus starting the whole
proceedings now reaching this Court. On June 30, 1993, the trial court dismissed the petition
for habeas corpus.
It suspended Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind and Reginald and declared
Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over them but with rights of visitation to be agreed
upon by the parties and to be approved by the Court.
On February 16, 1994, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision. It gave custody
to Teresita and visitation rights on weekends to Reynaldo.
Hence, an appeal before the Supreme Court in a petition for review.
Issue:
Whether or not Teresita should have custody over their children.
Ruling:
No, The law is more than satisfied by the judgment of the trial court. The children are
now both over seven years old. Their choice of the parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear
from the record. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person, thus meeting the two
requirements found in the first paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code. The presumption
under the second paragraph of said article no longer applies as the children are over seven
years. Assuming that the presumption should have persuasive value for children only one or two
years beyond the age of seven years mentioned in the statute, there are compelling reasons
and relevant considerations not to grant custody to the mother. The children understand the
unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and have been affected in their emotional growth by
her behavior.
FALLO:
485
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is
reversed and set aside, and the decision of Branch 96 of the Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Quezon City and presided over by the Honorable
Lucas P. Bersamin in its Civil Case No. Q-92-14206 awarding custody of the minors Rosalind
and Reginald Espiritu to their father, Reynaldo Espiritu, is reinstated. No special pronouncement
is made as to costs.
486
Lapuz Sy v. Eufemio
CARMEN LAPUZ SY, represented by her substitute MACARIO LAPUZ, petitioner-

appellant,
vs.
EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO alias EUFEMIO SY UY, respondent-appellee.
G.R. No. L-30977 January 31, 1972
REYES J.B.L., J.:
Petition, filed after the effectivity of Republic Act 5440, for review by certiorari of an
order, dated 29 July 1969, of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, in its Civil
Case No. 20387, dismissing said case for legal separation on the ground that the death of the
therein plaintiff, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, which occurred during the pendency of the case, abated
the cause of action as well as the action itself. The dismissal order was issued over the
objection of Macario Lapuz, the heir of the deceased plaintiff (and petitioner herein) who sought
to substitute the deceased and to have the case prosecuted to final judgment.
FACTS:
Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio Eufemio on August 1953.
They were married civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically after nine days. They had
lived together as husband and wife continuously without any children until 1943 when her
husband abandoned her. They acquired properties during their marriage. Petitioner then
discovered that her husband cohabited with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about
1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which among others, would
order that the defendant Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership
profits.
Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lapuz-Sy on the
ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Trial proceeded and the parties
adduced their respective evidence. However, before the trial could be completed, respondent
already scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a vehicular accident on
May 1969. Her counsel duly notified the court of her death. Eufemio moved to dismiss the
petition for legal separation on June 1969 on the grounds that the said petition was filed beyond
487
the one-year period provided in Article 102 of the Civil Code and that the death of Carmen
abated the action for legal separation. Petitioner’s counsel moved to substitute the deceased
Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz.
ISSUE:
Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for legal separation, abate the
action and will it also apply if the action involved property rights.
Ruling:
Yes, An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights
are involved. These rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the
decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the
finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the
pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and
definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily
remain unborn.
The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic and there could be no
further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the
questioned union. Any property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition
by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.
FALLO:
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgment of the Manila Court of Juvenile and Domestic
Relations is hereby affirmed. No special pronouncement as to costs.
488
Laperal v. Republic
ELISEA LAPERAL, petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor.
G.R. No. L-18008 October 30, 1962
BARRERA, J.:
FACTS:
The petitioner, a bona fide resident of Baguio City, was married with Mr. Enrique R.
Santamaria on March 1939. However, a decree of legal separation was later on issued to the
spouses. Aside from that, she ceased to live with Enrique. During their marriage, she naturally
uses Elisea L. Santamaria. She filed this petition to be permitted to resume in using her maiden
name Elisea Laperal. This was opposed by the City Attorney of Baguio on the ground that it
violates Art. 372 of the Civil Code. She was claiming that continuing to use her married name
would give rise to confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.
ISSUE:
Whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general will prevail over the
specific provision of Art. 372 of the Civil Code with regard to married woman legally separated
from his husband.
RULING:
In legal separation, the married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no
severance of the vinculum. The finding that petitioner’s continued use of her husband surname
may cause undue confusion in her finances was without basis. It must be considered that the
issuance of the decree of legal separation in 1958, necessitate that the conjugal partnership
between her and Enrique had automatically been dissolved and liquidated. Hence, there could
be no more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.
489
Furthermore, applying Rule 103 is not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name
of Elisea for to hold otherwise would be to provide for an easy circumvention of the mandatory
provision of Art. 372.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court of December 1, 1960, granting the petition, is
hereby set aside and the petition dismissed.
490
Siochi v. Gozon
MARIO SIOCHI, Petitioner,

vs.
ALFREDO GOZON, WINIFRED GOZON, GIL TABIJE, INTER-DIMENSIONAL REALTY, INC.,
and ELVIRA GOZON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 169900 March 18, 2010
CARPIO, J.:
This is a consolidation of two separate petitions for review,1 assailing the 7 July 2005
Decision2 and the 30 September 2005 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
74447.
Facts:
This case involves a 30,000 sq.m. parcel of land (property) covered by TCT No.
5357 The property is situated in Malabon, Metro Manila and is registered in the name of "Alfredo
Gozon (Alfredo), married to Elvira Gozon (Elvira)."
On 23 December 1991, Elvira filed with the Cavite City Regional Trial Court (Cavite
RTC) a petition for legal separation against her husband Alfredo. On 2 January 1992, Elvira filed
a notice of lis pendens, which was then annotated on TCT No. 5357.
While the legal separation case was still pending, Alfredo and Mario Siochi (Mario)
entered into an Agreement to Buy and Sell (Agreement) involving the property for the price
of P18 million. Among the stipulations in the Agreement were that Alfredo would: (1) secure an
Affidavit from Elvira that the property is Alfredo’s exclusive property and to annotate the
Agreement at the back of TCT No. 5357; (2) secure the approval of the Cavite RTC to exclude
the property from the legal separation case; and (3) secure the removal of the notice of lis
pendenspertaining to the said case and annotated on TCT No. 5357. However, despite
repeated demands from Mario, Alfredo failed to comply with these stipulations. After paying
the P5 million earnest money as partial payment of the purchase price, Mario took possession
of the property in September 1993. On 6 September 1993, the Agreement was annotated on
TCT No. 5357.
Meanwhile, on 29 June 1994, the Cavite RTC rendered a decision decreeing the legal
separation between petitioner and respondent.
491
On 22 August 1994, Alfredo executed a Deed of Donation over the property in favor of their
daughter, Winifred Gozon (Winifred). The Register of Deeds of Malabon, Gil Tabije, cancelled
TCT No. 5357 and issued TCT No. M-1050 in the name of Winifred, without annotating the
Agreement and the notice of lis pendens on TCT No. M-10508.
On 26 October 1994, Alfredo, by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney executed in his favor by
Winifred, sold the property to Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. (IDRI) for P18 million. IDRI paid
Alfredo P18 million, representing full payment for the property. Subsequently, the Register of
Deeds of Malabon cancelled TCT No. M-10508 and issued TCT No. M-10976 to IDRI.
Mario then filed with the Malabon Regional Trial Court (Malabon RTC) a complaint for
Specific Performance and Damages, Annulment of Donation and Sale, with Preliminary
Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order.
On 3 April 2001, the Malabon RTC rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
1.1.1 Enjoining defendants Alfredo Gozon, Winifred Gozon, Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. and
Gil Tabije, their agents, representatives and all persons acting in their behalf from any attempt
of commission or continuance of their wrongful acts of further alienating or disposing of the
subject property;
02. The Agreement to Buy and Sell dated 31 August 1993, between plaintiff and defendant
Alfredo Gozon is hereby approved, excluding the property and rights of defendant Elvira
Robles-Gozon to the undivided one-half share in the conjugal property subject of this case.
03. The Deed of Donation dated 22 August 1994, entered into by and between defendants
Alfredo Gozon and Winifred Gozon is hereby nullified and voided.
04. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated 26 October 1994, executed by defendant Winifred Gozon,
through defendant Alfredo Gozon, in favor of defendant Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. is hereby
nullified and voided.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Malabon RTC’s decision with modification.
The sale of the subject land by defendant Alfredo Gozon to plaintiff-appellant Siochi is declared
null and void for the following reasons:
An appeal was filed by Mario and IDRI.
Issue:
Whether or not the transactions of Alfred Gozon in selling their conjugal property are
valid without the consent for her spouse.
Ruling:
492
No, Alfredo was the sole administrator of the property because Elvira, with whom Alfredo
was separated in fact, was unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal property.
However, as sole administrator of the property, Alfredo still cannot sell the property without the
written consent of Elvira or the authority of the court. Without such consent or authority, the sale
is void. The absence of the consent of one of the spouse renders the entire sale void, including
the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale. Even if the
other spouse actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the property, that other spouse’s
written consent to the sale is still required by law for its validity. The Agreement entered into by
Alfredo and Mario was without the written consent of Elvira. Thus, the Agreement is entirely
void. As regards Mario’s contention that the Agreement is a continuing offer which may be
perfected by Elvira’s acceptance before the offer is withdrawn, the fact that the property was
subsequently donated by Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to IDRI clearly indicates that the
offer was already withdrawn.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petitions.
493
Rights and Obligations of Spouses
Ilusorio v. Ilusorio
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA K.

ILUSORIO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, respondents.
G.R. No. 139808 July 19, 2001
PARDO, J.:
Once again we see the sad tale of a prominent family shattered by conflicts on
expectancy in fabled fortune.
On March 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio, the matriarch who was so lovingly inseparable
from her husband some years ago, filed a petition with the Court of Appeals 1 for habeas
corpus to have custody of her husband in consortium.
Facts:
On July 11, 1942, Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony and lived
together for a period of thirty (30) years. In 1972, they separated from bed and board for
undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived at Urdaneta Condominium, Ayala Ave., Makati City when
he was in Manila and at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City.
On the other hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo City.out of their marriage they had 6 childrens.
On February 25, 1998, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court, Antipolo City a
petition. for guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano Ilusorio due to the latter’s
advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment.
On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for habeas corpus to have
the custody of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. She alleged that respondents refused petitioner’s
demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo
City.
Court of Appeals rendered decision, Ordering, for humanitarian consideration and upon
petitioner’s manifestation, respondents Erlinda K. Ilusorio Bildner and Sylvia Ilusorio-Yap, the
494
administrator of Cleveland Condominium or anywhere in its place, his guards and Potenciano
Ilusorio’s staff especially Ms. Aurora Montemayor to allow visitation rights to Potenciano
Ilusorio’s wife, Erlinda Ilusorio and all her children, notwithstanding any list limiting visitors
thereof, under penalty of contempt in case of violation of refusal thereof and ORDERING that
the writ of habeas corpus previously issued be recalled and the herein petition for habeas
corpus be DENIED DUE COURSE, as it is hereby DISMISSED for lack of unlawful restraint or
detention of the subject of the petition.
Hence, the two petitions, which were consolidated and are herein jointly decided.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly decided to allow visitation rights to
Potenciano Ilusorio’s wife, Erlinda Ilusorio and all her children, notwithstanding any list limiting
visitors thereof.
2. Whether or not a petition writ of habeas corpus of Erlinda Illusorio to her husband
should be given merit in court.
Ruling:
1. No, With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano Ilusorio
may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him
of his right to privacy. Needless to say, this will run against his fundamental constitutional right.
The Court of Appeals exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights in a
petition for habeas corpus where Erlinda never even prayed for such right. The ruling is not
consistent with the finding of subject’s sanity.
When the court ordered the grant of visitation rights, it also emphasized that the same shall be
enforced under penalty of contempt in case of violation or refusal to comply. Such assertion of
raw, naked power is unnecessary.
The Court of Appeals missed the fact that the case did not involve the right of a parent to
visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In case the husband refuses to see
his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat of any penalty attached to the
exercise of his right.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife.
Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs
495
or by any other mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the
man and woman’s free choice.
2. No, a writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention,
or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is
available where a person continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional
freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary
but are unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become
arbitrary. It is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint, as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom.
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all
manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.
To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and
involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and
effective, not merely nominal or moral.
The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of
lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio’s liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that
lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or under medication does not necessarily
render him mentally incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical
condition but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions.
FALLO:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we DENY Erlinda's motion for reconsideration. At any rate, the
case has been rendered moot by the death of subject.
496
Arroyo v. Vasquez de Arroyo
MARIANO B. ARROYO, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
DOLORES C. VASQUEZ DE ARROYO, defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. L-17014 August 11, 1921
STREET, J.:
Mariano B. Arroyo and Dolores C. Vasquez de Arroyo were united in the bonds of
wedlock by marriage in the year 1910, and since that date, with a few short intervals of
separation, they have lived together as man and wife in the city of Iloilo until July 4, 1920, when
the wife went away from their common home with the intention of living thenceforth separate
from her husband. After efforts had been made by the husband without avail to induce her to
resume marital relations, this action was initiated by him to compel her to return to the
matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful wife. The defendant answered, admitting the
fact of marriage, and that she had left her husband's home without his consent; but she averred
by way of defense and cross-complaint that she had been compelled to leave by cruel treatment
on the part of her husband. Accordingly she in turn prayed for affirmative relief, to consist of (1)
a decree of separation; (2) a liquidation of the conjugal partnership; (3) and an allowance for
counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance. Upon hearing the cause the lower court
gave judgment in favor of the defendant, authorizing her to live apart from her husband, granting
her alimony at the rate of P400 per month, and directing that the plaintiff should pay to the
defendant's attorney the sum of P1,000 for his services to defendant in the trial of the case. The
plaintiff thereupon removed the case with the usual formalities by appeal to this court.
Facts:
Mariano Arroyo and Dolores Vazquez de Arroyo were united in the bonds of wedlock by
marriage in 1910 and since that date, with a few short intervals of separation, they lived together
as husband and wife until July 4, 1920, when the wife went away from their common home with
the intention to live separately from her husband. After efforts had been made by the husband
without avail to induce her to resume marital relations, an action was initiated by him to compel
her to return to the matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful wife. The wife answered that
she had left her husband’s home without his consent because of the cruel treatment on the part
of her husband. Upon hearing the cause, the lower court gave judgment in favor of the wife,
497
authorizing her to live apart from her husband. They concluded that the husband was more to
blame than the wife and that his continued ill-treatment was a sufficient justification for her
abandonment of the conjugal home.
Issue:
Whether or not an action of the husband compelling the wife to return home is valid
Ruling:
Yes, In a decision of January 2, 1909, the supreme court of Spain appears to have
affirmed an order of the Audencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to return to the marital
domicile, and in the alternative, upon her failure to do so, to make a particular disposition of
certain money and effects then in her possession and to deliver to her husband, as
administrator of the ganancial property, all income, rents, and interest which might accrue to her
from the property which she had brought to the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11.) but it does
not appear that this order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile was sanctioned by any
other penalty than the consequences that would be visited upon her in respect to the use and
control of her property; and it does not appear that her disobedience to that order would
necessarily have been followed by imprisonment for contempt.
We are therefore unable to hold that Mariano B. Arroyo in this case is entitled to the
unconditional and absolute order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile, which is
sought in the petitory part of the complaint; though he is, without doubt, entitled to a judicial
declaration that his wife has presented herself without sufficient cause and that it is her duty to
return.
FALLO:
Therefore, reversing the judgment appealed from, in respect both to the original
complaint and the cross-bill, it is declared that Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo has absented herself
from the marital home without sufficient cause; and she is admonished that it is her duty to
return. The plaintiff is absolved from the cross-complaint, without special pronouncement as to
costs of either instance. So ordered.
498
Goitia v. Campos Rueda
ELOISA GOITIA DE LA CAMARA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA, defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. 11263 November 2, 1916
TRENT, J.:
This is an action by the wife against her husband for support outside of the conjugal
domicile. From a judgment sustaining the defendant's demurrer upon the ground that the facts
alleged in the complaint do not state a cause of action, followed by an order dismissing the case
after the plaintiff declined to amend, the latter appealed.
Facts:
This is an action by the wife against the husband for support outside of the conjugal
domicile. Eloitia Goitia and Jose Campos Rueda were legally married on January 7, 1915 and
established residence at San Marcelino where they lived together for one month because the
wife returned to the home of her parents due to the following reasons: that the husband demand
wife to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs; that whenever wife rejected
husband’s indecorous demands, husband would maltreat wife by words and inflict injuries on
wife’s lips, face and different parts of her body; and that because wife was unable to desist
husband’s repugnant desires and maltreatment, she was obliged to leave the conjugal home.
The wife also seeks for support from his husband even if she lives separately. The husband on
the other hand, seeks the relief of the courts in compelling his wife to return back to their
conjugal home.
Issue:
Whether or not the wife is still entitled for support outside of the conjugal domicile
Ruling:
Yes, Marriage is an institution and its maintenance is in its purity which the public is
deeply interested. In the case at bar, when the continuance of the marriage becomes intolerable
to one or both parties and gives no possible good to the community, relief from the court should
be attainable. The Supreme Court made the observation that implied approval by the court of a
499
wife’s separate residence from her husband doe not necessarily violate the sacredness and
inviolability of the marriage. Since separation de-facto is allowed in this case, it is only due to
the fact that public peace and wife’s purity must be preserved.
The husband cannot, by his own wrongful acts, relieve himself from the duty to support
his wife imposed by law; and where a husband, by wrongful, illegal and unbearable conduct,
drives his wife from the domicile fixed by him, he cannot take the advantage of her departure to
abrogate his duty to still support his wife. In law, the wife is legally still within the conjugal
domicile, even if living separately, thus he is entitled to support and maintenance by the
husband.
FALLO:
The foregoing are the grounds upon which our short opinion and order for judgment,
heretofore filed in this case, rest.
500
Tenchavez v. Escano
PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-19671 November 29, 1965
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, in its Civil Case No. R-4177, denying the claim of the plaintiff-appellant,
Pastor B. Tenchavez, for legal separation and one million pesos in damages against his wife
and parents-in-law, the defendants-appellees, Vicente, Mamerto and Mena, all surnamed
"Escaño," respectively.
Facts:
On February 24, 1948, Vicenta Escano and Pastor Tanchavez got married and the
marriage was unknown to the parents of Vicenta. The said marriage was solemnized by Lt.
Lavares, an Army Catholic Chaplain. Their marriage was the culmination of a previous love
affair and was duly registered with the local civil registrar.
Upon the knowledge of the parents of Vicenta, they took her to their house.
Consequently, she admitted her marriage with Tanchavez. Her parents were surprised because
Tanchavez never asked for the hand of Vicenta and were disgusted because of the great
scandal because of the clandestine marriage would provoke.
Thereafter, Vicenta continued to live with her parents, while tanchavez returned to
Manila to his job. As of June 1948, the newlyweds were already estranged. Vicenta filed a
petition to annul her marriage; however, she did not sign the said document. Thus, the case was
dismissed because of her non- appearance at the hearing.
In 1950, Vicenta left for United States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified complaint
for divorce. And on October 21, 1950, a decree of divorce, final and absolute was issued. In
1954, Vicenta married an American and she lived with him and begotten children.
Issue:
501
Whether or not the claim of the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B. Tenchavez, for legal
separation on the ground that his wife failed to do wifely duties be accepted
Ruling:
Yes, Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts cannot give
recognition on foreign decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens because it would be
a violation of the Civil Code. Such grant would arise to discrimination in favor of rich citizens
who can afford divorce in foreign countries. The adulterous relationship of Escano with her
American husband is enough grounds for the legal separation prayed by Tenchavez. In the
eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still married. A foreign divorce between
Filipinos sought and decreed is not entitled to recognition neither is the marriage of the divorcee
entitled to validity in the Philippines. Thus, the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce
decree by one spouse entitled the other for damages.
FALLO
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;

(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from
defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the
amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the
estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.
Neither party to recover costs.
502
Cuenca v. Cuenca
DIOSDIDIT, BALDOMERO, FILOMENO, ELPIDIO, AIDA, all surnamed

CUENCA, petitioners,
vs.
RESTITUTO CUENCA, MELADORA CUENCA and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 72321 December 8, 1988
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks the reversal of the resolutions of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, denying the petitioners' motion for new trial
on the ground of newly discovered evidence.
Facts:
Agripino Cuenca and Maria Bangahon- Cuenca were legally married, begotten two
children, Restituto and Meladora as their heirs. Maria Bangahon brought properties into her
marriage. Said property was inherited by her from her parents.
However, Agrapi had a second family who claimed to be the legitimate family of
Agrapino. Thus, they claimed that the said properties are the conjugal property of Agrapino and
Engracia, second wife.
The trial court decided in favor of the second family. However, the Court of Appeals
decided otherwise and thus favored the first family.
Issue:
Whether or not the said property of Maria is the conjugal property of Agripino and
Engracia.
Ruling:
No, The petitioners also alleged the finding of newly discovered evidence to prove that
the subject parcels of land were conjugal properties of Agripino Cuenca and petitioner Engracia
Basadre. These consist of eight (8) sketch maps obtained on December 27, 1984 from the
Regional Office of the Bureau of Lands in Cagayan de Oro City "after extensive research." The
petitioners alleged that these parcels were surveyed for Agripino Cuenca and approved when
503
Agripino Cuenca was already married to Engracia as indicated in the documents, hence, there
is the presumption that these are conjugal properties and therefore petitioners have hereditary
rights over these properties.
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "All property of the marriage is presumed
to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife," In the cases of Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, (153
SCRA 435 [August 31, 1987); Magallon v. Montejo (146 SCRA 282 [December 16, 1986])
and Maramba v. Lozano (20 SCRA 474 [June 29, 1967]) this Court ruled that the presumption
refers only to the property acquired during marriage and does not operate when there is no
showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal was acquired.
In the case at bar, the documents sought to be presented as newly discovered evidence
do not show that the claims to the subject parcels consisting of homestead lands were perfected
during the marriage of Agripino Cuenca and petitioner Engracia Basadre. The perfection of the
homestead claims is considered the time of acquisition of the properties. (See Magallon v.
Montejo, supra) The fact that these parcels were surveyed for Agripino Cuenca and approved
during the marriage of Agripino Cuenca and petitioner Engracia Basadre is not determinative of
the issue as to whether or not the parcels were the conjugal properties of Agripino and
Engracia. Moreover, the documents show that 5 of the 8 parcels covered by the documents are
titled in the name of either respondent Meladora Cuenca or respondent Restituto Cuenca. The
presumption cannot prevail "when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of
innocent third parties are involved. (Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, supra citing
Nable Jose v. Nable Jose, 41 Phil. 713) Under the circumstances of this case, the non-
applicablility of the presumption should also be upheld.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The questioned resolutions of the

appellate court are AFFIRMED. For non-compliance with this Court's Resolution dated March 2,
1988, ordering him to show cause for his failure to file a memorandum within the period given to
him, Atty. Cipriano C. Alvizo, Sr. is fined Five Hundred (P500.00) Pesos. If he fails to pay the
fine within ten (10) days from notice of this decision, he shall be imprisoned for five (5) days.
504
Go v. CA
NANCY GO AND ALEX GO, Petitioners, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,

HERMOGENES ONG and JANE C. ONG, Respondents.
[G.R. No. 114791. May 29, 1997]
ROMERO, J.:
No less than the Constitution commands us to protect marriage as an inviolable social

institution and the foundation of the family. In our society, the importance of a wedding
ceremony cannot be underestimated as it is the matrix of the family and, therefore, an occasion
worth reliving in the succeeding years.
Facts:
Hermogenes and Jane Ong were married on June 7, 1987. The video coverage of the
wedding was provided by the petitioner spouses Nancy and Alex Go. Spouses Ong claimed the
video of their wedding three times but they failed to have it. Because the newlywed couple will
be having their honeymoon in US, they agreed to have the video tape upon their return.
When the couple came home, they found out that the said tape had been erased by
spouses Go.
Furious at the lost of the tape which suppose to be the only record of their wedding.
Thus, they filed a complaint. The RTC rendered its decision making spouses Go liable to the
said erased tape. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, a
petition before the Supreme Court praying that the Court of Appeals erred in not appreciating
the evidence they presented to prove that they acted only as agents of a certain Pablo Lim and,
as such, should not have been held liable. In addition, they aver that there is no evidence to
show that the erasure of the tape was done in bad faith so as to justify the award of damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the court of appeals erred in rewarding HERMOGENES ONG and JANE C.
ONG moral damages in their decision
Ruling:
505
No, Generally, moral damages cannot be recovered in an action for breach of contract
because this case is not among those enumerated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. However, it
is also accepted in this jurisdiction that liability for a quasi-delict may still exist despite the
presence of contractual relations, that is, the act which violates the contract may also constitute
a quasi-delict. Consequently, moral damages are recoverable for the breach of contract which
was palpably wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith, oppresive or abusive.
Petitioners’ act or omission in recklessly erasing the video coverage of private respondents’
wedding was precisely the cause of the suffering private respondents had to undergo.
As the appellate court aptly observed:
“Considering the sentimental value of the tapes and the fact that the event therein recorded — a
wedding which in our culture is a significant milestone to be cherished and remembered —
could no longer be reenacted and was lost forever, the trial court was correct in awarding the
appellees moral damages albeit in the amount of P75,000.00, which was a great reduction from
plaintiffs’ demand in the complaint, in compensation for the mental anguish, tortured feelings,
sleepless nights and humiliation that the appellees suffered and which under the circumstances
could be awarded as allowed under Articles 2217 and 2218 of the Civil Code.”
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated September 14, 1993 is hereby AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that petitioner Alex Go is absolved from any liability to private
respondents and that petitioner Nancy Go is solely liable to said private respondents for the
judgment award. Costs against petitioners.
506
Property Relations Between Spouses
Arcaba v. De Batocael
CIRILA ARCABA, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA TABANCURA VDA. DE BATOCAEL, SEIGFREDO C.

TABANCURA, DORIS C. TABANCURA, LUZELLI C. TABANCURA, BELEN C.
TABANCURA, RAUL A. COMILLE, BERNADETTE A. COMILLE, and ABNER A.
COMILLE, respondents.
[G.R. No. 146683. November 22, 2001]
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Cirila Arcaba seeks review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Dipolog
City, Zamboanga del Norte in Civil Case No. 4593, declaring as void a deed of donation inter
vivos executed by the late Francisco T. Comille in her favor and its subsequent
resolution[ denying reconsideration.
Facts:
On January 16, 1956, Francisco Comille and his wife Zozima Montallana are owners of
several pieces of land. However, when Zosima died Francisco and his mother-in-law executed a
deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights. On June 27, 1961, Francisco registered
those said lots in his name.
Having no children to take care of him after his retirement, Francisco asked his niece
Leticia and His cousin Luzveminda and Cirila Abarca to take care of his house and the store as
well.
There are however conflicting testimonies as to the relationship of Francisco and Cirila.
Niece of Francisco, Leticia said that her uncle and Cirila were lovers and they slept in the same
room. Another niece of Fernando said that Francisco himself told her that Cirila is her mistress.
Cirila on the other hand claimed that they are not lovers nor she is a mistress of Francisco. She
is just a mere helper of Francisco.
Few months before the death of Francisco, he executed an instrument dominated “Deed
of Donation Inter Vivos” in favor of Cirila. Cirila on the other hand accepted the said donation.
A complaint was filed by the heirs of Francisco for the declaration of nullity of the deed of
donation inter vivos basing it on Article 87 of the Family Code.
507
Thus, the said donation was nullified by the RTC and was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly applied Art. 87 of the Family Code to the
circumstances of this case.
Ruling:
Yes, It was held by the Court that, Francisco and Cirila as proved by evidences and
testimonies, they actually lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage. Thus, the
said donation is invalid or void basing it on Article 87 of the Family Code which provides: “ Every
donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect between the spouses during the
marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the
occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as
husband and wife without a valid marriage.
Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco
lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that
the donation made by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the trial
court is hereby AFFIRMED.
508
Matabuena v. Cervantes
CORNELIA MATABUENA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. PETRONILA CERVANTES,

DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
[G.R. No. L-28771, March 31, 1971]
FERNANDO, J.:
A question of first impression is before this Court in this litigation. We are called upon to
decide whether the ban on a donation between the spouses during a marriage applies to a
common-law relationship.
FACTS:
In 1956, herein appellant’s brother Felix Matabuena donated a piece of lot to his
common-law spouse, herein appellee Petronila Cervantes. Felix and Petronila got married only
in 1962 or six years after the deed of donation was executed. Five months later, or September
13, 1962, Felix died. Thereafter, appellant Cornelia Matabuena, by reason of being the only
sister and nearest collateral relative of the deceased, filed a claim over the property, by virtue of
a an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962, had the land declared in her name
and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon. The lower court of Sorsogon declared that
the donation was valid inasmuch as it was made at the time when Felix and Petronila were not
yet spouses, rendering Article 133 of the Civil Code inapplicable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a
common-law relationship.
RULING:
While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the spouses
during marriage, policy consideration of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of
morality requires that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship.
509
As stated in Buenaventura vs. Bautista (50 OG 3679, 1954), if the policy of the law is
to prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue
and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, then there is every reason to apply the
same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without the benefit of
nuptials.
The lack of validity of the donation by the deceased to appellee does not necessarily
result in appellant having exclusive right to the disputed property. As a widow, Cervantes is
entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the surviving sister to the other half.
Article 1001, Civil Code: Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the
widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and
sisters or their children to the other half.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of November 23, 1965 dismissing the complaint
with costs is reversed. The questioned donation is declared void, with the rights of plain-tiff and
defendant as pro indiviso heirs to the property in question recognized. The case is remanded to
the lower court for its appropriate disposition in accordance with the above opinion. Without
pronouncement as to costs. Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro,
Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
510
Grecio v. Sun Life
HILARIO GERCIO, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SUN LIFE ASSURANCE OF CANADA, ET AL., defendants.
SUN LIFE ASSURANCE OF CANADA, appellant.
G.R. No. 23703 September 28, 1925
MALCOLM, J.:
The question of first impression in the law of life insurance to be here decided is whether
the insured — the husband — has the power to change the beneficiary — the former wife —
and to name instead his actual wife, where the insured and the beneficiary have been divorced
and where the policy of insurance does not expressly reserve to the insured the right to change
the beneficiary. Although the authorities have been exhausted, no legal situation exactly like the
one before us has been encountered.
Facts:
Andrea Zialcita was the lawful wife of Hilario Gercio. Towards the end of the year 1919,
she was convicted of the crime of adultery. On September 4, 1920, a decree of divorce was
issued which had the effect of completely dissolving the bonds of matrimony contracted by
Hilario Gercio and Andrea Zialcita.
On march 4, 1922, Gercio notified the Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada that he had
revoked his donation in favor of Zialcita, and he had designated in her stead his present wife, as
the beneficiary of the policy. Gercio requested the company to eliminate Zialcita as beneficiary,
however, the company refused.
Issue:
Whether or not Gercio can change the beneficiary of the policy.
Ruling:
It was held by the Court that, the insured-the husband- has no power to change the
beneficiary- the former wife- and to name the stead his actual wife, where the policy of the
insurance does not expressly reserve to the insured the right to change the beneficiary.
511
FALLO:
The judgment appealed from will be reversed and the complaint ordered dismissed as to
the appellant, without special pronouncement as to the costs in either instance. So ordered.
512
Harding v. Commercial Union
HARDING, plaintiff-appellees vs.

COMMERCIAL UNION ASSURANCE COMPANY, defendant-appellant
G.R. No. 12707. August 10, 1918
FISHER, J.:
This was an action by plaintiffs to recover from defendant the sum of P3,000 and
interest, alleged to be due under the terms of a policy of insurance. The trial court gave plaintiffs
judgment for the amount demanded, with interest and costs, and from that decision the
defendant appeals.
Facts:
A husband donated an automobile to his wife, who subsequently insured it for P 3,000.
When the car was later completely destroyed, the wife sought to recover the insurance
indemnity, but the insurance pleaded in defense that the wife had no insurable interest in the
car, the donation by the husband being void.
Issue:
Whether or not the insurance can raise the validity of the donation as a defense.
Ruling:
It was held by the Court that, the insurance company failed to show that the gift was not
a moderate one, considering the circumstances of the parties. Furthermore, even if the gift had
not been a moderate one, the company cannot assail the validity of the donation, because at
the time of the transfer, it was not a creditor.
FALLO:
We are, therefore, of the opinion and hold that plaintiff was the owner of the automobile
in question and had an insurable interest therein; that there was no fraud on her part in
procuring the insurance; that the valuation of the automobile, for the purposes of the insurance,
is binding upon the defendant corporation, and that the judgment of the court below is,
therefore, correct and must be affirmed, with interest, the costs of this appeal to be paid by the
appellant. So ordered.
513
Imani v. Metrobank
EVANGELINE D. IMANI,* Petitioner,

vs.
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, Respondent.
G.R. No. 187023 November 17, 2010
NACHURA, J.:
On appeal is the July 3, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
93061, setting aside the November 22, 2005 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
City, Branch 64, as well as its subsequent Resolution dated March 3, 2009, denying petitioner’s
Facts:
On August 28, 1981, Evangeline D. Imani (petitioner) et. al. signed a Continuing
Suretyship Agreement in favor of respondent Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company (Metrobank).
As sureties, they bound themselves to pay Metrobank whatever indebtedness C.P. Dazo
Tannery, Inc. (CPDTI) incurs, but not exceeding Six Million Pesos (P6,000,000.00).
Later, CPDTI obtained loans as evidenced by promissory notes signed by Cesar and
Nieves Dazo. CPDTI defaulted in the payment of its loans. Metrobank made several demands
for payment upon CPDTI, but to no avail. This prompted Metrobank to file a collection suit
against CPDTI and its sureties, including herein petitioner.
After due proceedings, the court ordered the petitioners to pay their indebtedness but to
no avail, hence, Metrobank then filed with the RTC a motion for execution, which was granted
on a property of petitioner. Upon subsequent motion for reconsiderations of both parties, the
court of appeals cancelled the motion for execution on the ground that the subject property was
a conjugal property of petitioner, hence, an appeal was made by respondent before the court.
Issue:
Whether or not the conjugal property of petitioner could be a subject of execution
Ruling:
Indeed, all property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal. However, for this
presumption to apply, the party who invokes it must first prove that the property was acquired
during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non to the
operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. Thus, the time when the
property was acquired is material.
514
Indubitably, petitioner utterly failed to substantiate her claim that the property belongs to
the conjugal partnership. Thus, it cannot be rightfully said that the CA reversed the RTC ruling
without valid basis.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and the Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 93061 sustaining the validity of the writ of execution, the auction
sale, and the certificate of sale are AFFIRMED.
515
Navarro v. Judge Escobido
ROGER V. NAVARRO, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. JOSE L. ESCOBIDO, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 37, Cagayan de Oro City, and
KAREN T. GO, doing business under the name KARGO ENTERPRISES, Respondents.
G.R. No. 153788 November 27, 2009
BRION, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 that seeks to set aside the Court of Appeals
(CA) Decision dated October 16, 2001 and Resolution dated May 29, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP. No.
64701. These CA rulings affirmed the July 26, 2000 and March 7, 2001 orders of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City, denying petitioner Roger V.
Navarro’s (Navarro) motion to dismiss.
Facts:
Private respondent (Karen Go) files a complaint with a prayer for the issuance of a writ
of replevin against petitioner (Navarro) for the seizure of 2 motor vehicles under lease
agreement. Petitioner maintains among others in the case at bar that the complaints were
premature because no prior demand was made on him to comply with the provisions of the
lease agreements before the complaints for replevin were filed.
Issue:
Whether or not prior demand is a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin.
Ruling:
No. Petitioner erred in arguing that prior demand is required before an action for a writ of
replevin is filed since we cannot liken a replevin action to an unlawful detainer.
For a writ of replevin to issue, all that the applicant must do is to file an affidavit and bond,
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules, which states:
Sec. 2. Affidavit and bond.
516
The applicant must show by his own affidavit or that of some other person who
personally knows the facts:
(a) That the applicant is the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or is
entitled to the possession thereof;
(b) That the property is wrongfully detained by the adverse party, alleging the cause of
detention thereof according to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief;
(c) That the property has not been distrained or taken for a tax assessment or a fine
pursuant to law, or seized under a writ of execution or preliminary attachment, or otherwise
placed under custodialegis, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure or custody; and
(d) The actual market value of the property.
The applicant must also give a bond, executed to the adverse party in double the value
of the property as stated in the affidavit aforementioned, for the return of the property to the
adverse party if such return be adjudged, and for the payment to the adverse party of such sum
as he may recover from the applicant in the action.
The SC held that there is nothing in the afore-quoted provision which requires the
applicant to make a prior demand on the possessor of the property before he can file an action
for a writ of replevin. Thus, prior demand is not a condition precedent to an action for a writ of
replevin.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for review for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioner Roger V. Navarro.
517
Villanueva v. CA
GAMALIEL C. VILLANUEVA and IRENE C. VILLANUEVA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS, SPOUSES JOSE and LEONILA DELA CRUZ, and SPOUSES GUIDO and
FELICITAS PILE, respondents.
[G.R. No. 107624. January 28, 1997]
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The main issue here is whether a contract of sale has been perfected under the attendant
facts and circumstances.
Facts:
Eusebia Napisa and Nicolas Retuya were married on October 7, 1926. out of the
marriage, they begotten five children. During their marriage, they acquired real properties.
In 1936, Nicolas started to cohabit with Pacita Villanueva and out of wedlock they had an
illegitimate child, Procopio Villanueva.
Eusebia sought the reconveyance from Nicolas and Pacita of several properties,
claiming the subject properties are her conjugal properties with Nicolas. On November 23, 1996,
Eusebia died.
The RTC ruled in favor of Eusebia represented by her son. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the said decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not Eusebia has the right for the reconveyance of the said properties.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that in the affirmative. Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly
mandates that the Code shall apply to conjugal partnerships established before the Family
Code to vest rights already acquired under the Civil Code. Thus, under the Family Code, if the
properties are acquired during the marriage, the presumption is that they are conjugal. This is
counter balanced by the requirement that properties must first be proven to have been acquired
during the marriage before it is presumed to be conjugal.
Eusebia was able to prove that those properties were acquired during their marriage.
Though Nicolas and Pacita cohabited, Nicolas and Eusebia were still married. Thus, any
518
property acquired during the period is considered conjugal, unless it is proven that Pacita
contributed in the acquisition of said property. However, Pacita failed to prove the exception.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.
519
Ching v. CA
ALFREDO CHING, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ZOSIMO Z. ANGELES,
RTC - BR. 58, MAKATI, METRO MANILA, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ALLIED
BANKING CORPORATION, respondents.
[G.R. No. 110844. April 27, 2000]
BUENA, J.:
Confronting the Court in this instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the
task of resolving the issue of whether the pendency of a civil action for damages and declaration
of nullity of documents, specifically trust receipts, warrants the suspension of criminal
proceedings instituted for violation of Article 315 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to
P.D. 115, otherwise known as the "Trust Receipts Law".xl-aw
Facts:
On September 26, 1978, PBMCI obtained a loan of P9,000,000 from Allied Banking
Corporation. On December 28, 1978, ABC extended another loan to the PBMCI through its
Executive Vice President Alfredo Ching. However, PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all its
loans.
PBMCI and Alfredo Ching jointly filed a petition for suspension of payments with the
Securities and Exchange Commission and at the same time seeking the PBMCI’s rehabilitation.
On July 9, 1982, the SEC issued an order placing PBMCI’s business, including its assets
and liabilities under rehabilitation. In the mean time, on July 21, 1983, the deputy sheriff of the
trial court levied on attachment the 100,000 common shares of stocks in the name of Ching.
On November 16, 1993, Encarnacion Ching, wife of Alfredo Ching filed a motion to set
aside the levy on attachment. She alleged that the 100,000 shares of stock levied on by the
sheriff were acquired by her and her husband during their marriage out of conjugal funds.
Encarnacion showed to the court copy of her marriage contract with Alfredo as an evidence.
The RTC ruled in her favor but the Court of Appeals reversed the said decision of the
RTC.
520
Issue:
Whether or not the said 100,000 shares of stock be excluded from the case.
Ruling:
It was held by the court that, for conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability, that
should appertain to the husband alone, there must be showing that some advantages accrued
to the spouses. Certainly, to make conjugal partnership responsible for a liability that should
appertain alone to one of the spouses is to frustrate the objective of the New Civil Code to show
the utmost concern for solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit. The husband, therefore,
is denied the power to assume unnecessary and unwarranted risks to the financial stability of
the conjugal partnership. ABC failed to prove that the conjugal partnership of Encarnacion and
Alfredo was benefited by Alfredo’s act of executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship
agreement with the respondents for and in behalf of PBMCI.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision and resolution of the Court
of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Accordingly, the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 58, is hereby directed to proceed with
the hearing and trial on the merits of Criminal Case Nos. 92-0934 to 92-0937, inclusive, and to
expedite proceedings therein, without prejudice to the right of the accused to due process.
521
Tan v. CA
ALFONSO TAN and ETERIA TEVES TAN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES
CELESTINO U. TAN and ROSARIO DY KUSHIN and SPOUSES MAXIMO U. TAN
and TERESITA SY TAN, respondents.
[G.R. No. 120594. June 10, 1997]
KAPUNAN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 37224 dated June 20, 1994 which reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 10, the decretal portion of which reads:
Facts:
On April 17,1989, a case for partition and accounting was instituted by the spouses
Alfonso and Eteria Tan against Alfonso’s brothers, Celestino and Maximo Tan.
Spouses claimed that 1/3 of the 906 square meter residential lot was brought to their
conjugal property during their marriage. However, brothers of Alfonso objected the claim. They
claimed that the subject property was inherited by them from their mother and was divided
among them, Alfonso, Celestino and Maximo.
Eteria, admitted that she is legally married to Alfonso but they were now living separately
by virtue of a decree of legal separation.
The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of Alfonso and Eteria, however, the Court of
Appeals decided otherwise.
Issue:
Whether or not the said 1/3 of the subject property is a conjugal property of Eteria and
Alfonso.
Ruling:
It was held by the Court that, the Husband’s acquisition by succession of a parcel of land
during his marriage to his wife simply means that the lot is his exclusive property because it was
acquired by him during the marriage by lucrative title.
522
FALLO:
the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 20,
1994 is AFFIRMED.
523
Ros and Aguete v. PNB Laoag
JOE A. ROS and ESTRELLA AGUETE, Petitioners,

vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK - LAOAG BRANCH, Respondent.
G.R. No. 170166 April 6, 2011
CARPIO, J.:
This is a petition for review assailing the Decision promulgated on 17 October 2005 by
the Court of Appeals (appellate court) in CA-G.R. CV No. 76845. The appellate court granted
the appeal filed by the Philippine National Bank – Laoag Branch (PNB). The appellate court
reversed the 29 June 2001 Decision of Branch 15 of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City (trial
court) in Civil Case No. 7803.
Facts:
Plaintiff-appellee Joe A. Ros obtained a loan of P115,000.00 from PNB Laoag Branch on
October 14, 1974 and as security for the loan, plaintiff-appellee Ros executed a real estate
mortgage involving a parcel of land.
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, PNB instituted extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property.
Claiming that she (plaintiff-appellee Estrella Aguete) has no knowledge of the loan
obtained by her husband nor she consented to the mortgage instituted on the conjugal property
– a complaint was filed to annul the proceedings pertaining to the mortgage, sale and
consolidation of the property – interposing the defense that her signatures affixed on the
documents were forged and that the loan did not redound to the benefit of the family.
Issue:
Whether or not the real estate mortgage valid
524
Ruling:
The husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the
consent, express or implied, of the wife. Should the husband do so, then the contract is
voidable. Article 173 of the Civil Code allows Aguete to question Ros’ encumbrance of the
subject property. However, the same article does not guarantee that the courts will declare the
annulment of the contract. Annulment will be declared only upon a finding that the wife did not
give her consent. In the present case, we follow the conclusion of the appellate court and rule
that Aguete gave her consent to Ros’ encumbrance of the subject property.
The documents disavowed by Aguete are acknowledged before a notary public, hence
they are public documents. Every instrument duly acknowledged and certified as provided by
law may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment
being prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved. The
execution of a document that has been ratified before a notary public cannot be disproved by
the mere denial of the alleged signer. PNB was correct when it stated that petitioners’ omission
to present other positive evidence to substantiate their claim of forgery was fatal to petitioners’
cause. Petitioners did not present any corroborating witness, such as a handwriting expert, who
could authoritatively declare that Aguete’s signatures were really forged.
For this reason, we rule that Ros’ loan from PNB redounded to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership. Hence, the debt is chargeable to the conjugal partnership.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 76845 promulgated on 17 October 2005 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
525
Go v. CA
JANE GO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent

G.R. No. 114791. May 29, 1997
Facts:
Hermogenes and Jane Ong were married on June 7, 1987. The video coverage of the
wedding was provided by the petitioner spouses Nancy and Alex Go. Spouses Ong claimed the
video of their wedding three times but they failed to have it. Because the newlywed couple will
be having their honeymoon in US, they agreed to have the video tape upon their return.
When the couple came home, they found out that the said tape had been erased by
spouses Go.
Furious at the lost of the tape which suppose to be the only record of their wedding.
Thus, they filed a complaint. The RTC rendered its decision making spouses Go liable to the
said erased tape. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not spouses Go be jointly held liable.
Ruling:
The Court held that, since the wife may exercise any profession, occupation or engage
in business without the consent of the husband, the husband may not be held jointly and
severally liable with his wife for breach of a contract that the latter had entered into.
526
Siochi v. Gozon
MARIO SIOCHI, Petitioner,

vs.
ALFREDO GOZON, WINIFRED GOZON, GIL TABIJE, INTER-DIMENSIONAL REALTY, INC.,
and ELVIRA GOZON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 169900 March 18, 2010
CARPIO, J.:
This is a consolidation of two separate petitions for review, assailing the 7 July 2005
Decision and the 30 September 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
74447.
Facts:
This case involves a 30,000 sq.m. parcel of land (property) covered by TCT No. 5357.
The property is situated in Malabon, Metro Manila and is registered in the name of "Alfredo
Gozon (Alfredo), married to Elvira Gozon (Elvira)."
On 23 December 1991, Elvira filed with the Cavite City Regional Trial Court (Cavite
RTC) a petition for legal separation against her husband Alfredo. On 2 January 1992, Elvira filed
a notice of lis pendens, which was then annotated on TCT No. 5357.
While the legal separation case was still pending, Alfredo and Mario Siochi (Mario)
entered into an Agreement to Buy and Sell (Agreement) involving the property for the price
of P18 million. Among the stipulations in the Agreement were that Alfredo would: (1) secure an
Affidavit from Elvira that the property is Alfredo’s exclusive property and to annotate the
Agreement at the back of TCT No. 5357; (2) secure the approval of the Cavite RTC to exclude
the property from the legal separation case; and (3) secure the removal of the notice of lis
pendenspertaining to the said case and annotated on TCT No. 5357. However, despite
repeated demands from Mario, Alfredo failed to comply with these stipulations. After paying
the P5 million earnest money as partial payment of the purchase price, Mario took possession
of the property in September 1993. On 6 September 1993, the Agreement was annotated on
TCT No. 5357.
Meanwhile, on 29 June 1994, the Cavite RTC rendered a decision decreeing the legal
separation between petitioner and respondent.
527
On 22 August 1994, Alfredo executed a Deed of Donation over the property in favor of their
daughter, Winifred Gozon (Winifred). The Register of Deeds of Malabon, Gil Tabije, cancelled
TCT No. 5357 and issued TCT No. M-10508 in the name of Winifred, without annotating the
Agreement and the notice of lis pendens on TCT No. M-10508.
On 26 October 1994, Alfredo, by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney executed in his favor by
Winifred, sold the property to Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. (IDRI) for P18 million. IDRI paid
Alfredo P18 million, representing full payment for the property. Subsequently, the Register of
Deeds of Malabon cancelled TCT No. M-10508 and issued TCT No. M-10976 to IDRI.
Mario then filed with the Malabon Regional Trial Court (Malabon RTC) a complaint for
Specific Performance and Damages, Annulment of Donation and Sale, with Preliminary
Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order.
On 3 April 2001, the Malabon RTC rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
1.1.1 Enjoining defendants Alfredo Gozon, Winifred Gozon, Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. and
Gil Tabije, their agents, representatives and all persons acting in their behalf from any attempt
of commission or continuance of their wrongful acts of further alienating or disposing of the
subject property;
02. The Agreement to Buy and Sell dated 31 August 1993, between plaintiff and defendant
Alfredo Gozon is hereby approved, excluding the property and rights of defendant Elvira
Robles-Gozon to the undivided one-half share in the conjugal property subject of this case.
03. The Deed of Donation dated 22 August 1994, entered into by and between defendants
Alfredo Gozon and Winifred Gozon is hereby nullified and voided.
04. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated 26 October 1994, executed by defendant Winifred Gozon,
through defendant Alfredo Gozon, in favor of defendant Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. is hereby
nullified and voided.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Malabon RTC’s decision with modification.
The sale of the subject land by defendant Alfredo Gozon to plaintiff-appellant Siochi is declared
null and void for the following reasons:
An appeal was filed by Mario and IDRI
Issue:
Whether or not the transactions of Alfred Gozon in selling their conjugal property are
valid without the consent for her spouse
528
Ruling:
No, Alfredo was the sole administrator of the property because Elvira, with whom Alfredo
was separated in fact, was unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal property.
However, as sole administrator of the property, Alfredo still cannot sell the property without the
written consent of Elvira or the authority of the court. Without such consent or authority, the sale
is void. The absence of the consent of one of the spouse renders the entire sale void, including
the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale. Even if the
other spouse actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the property, that other spouse’s
written consent to the sale is still required by law for its validity. The Agreement entered into by
Alfredo and Mario was without the written consent of Elvira. Thus, the Agreement is entirely
void. As regards Mario’s contention that the Agreement is a continuing offer which may be
perfected by Elvira’s acceptance before the offer is withdrawn, the fact that the property was
subsequently donated by Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to IDRI clearly indicates that the
offer was already withdrawn.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petitions.
529
Aggabao v. Parulan
SPOUSES REX AND CONCEPCION AGGABAO, petitioners, vs.

DIONISIO Z. PARULAN, JR. and MA. ELENA PARULAN, Respondents.BERSAMIN, J.:
G.R. No. 165803 September 1, 2010
BERSAMIN, J.:
On July 26, 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 136, in Makati City annulled
the deed of absolute sale executed in favor of the petitioners covering two parcels of registered
land the respondents owned for want of the written consent of respondent husband Dionisio
Parulan, Jr. On July 2, 2004, in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 69044,[1] the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed
the RTC decision.
FACTS:
Real estate broker Marta K. Atanacio offered two properties, which are owned by Ma.
Elena but authorize the latter to sell the same, to the petitioners. Petitioners then bought the
properties.
On March 18, 1991, the petitioners delivered the final amount of P700,000.00 to Ma.
Elena, who executed a deed of absolute sale in their favor. However, Ma. Elena did not turn
over the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 63376, claiming that said copy was in the
possession of a relative who was then in Hongkong. She assured them that the owner’s
duplicate copy of TCT No. 63376 would be turned over after a week. On March 19, 1991, TCT
No. 63377 was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of the petitioners.
Ma. Elena did not turn over the duplicate owner’s copy of TCT No. 63376 as promised.
In due time, the petitioners learned that the duplicate owner’s copy of TCT No. 63376 had been
all along in the custody of Atty. Jeremy Z. Parulan, who appeared to hold an SPA executed by
his brother Dionisio authorizing him to sell both lots.
At Atanacio’s instance, the petitioners met on March 25, 1991 with Atty. Parulan, they
were also accompanied by one Atty. Olandesca. They recalled that Atty. Parulan “smugly
demanded P800,000.00” in exchange for the duplicate owner’s copy of TCT No. 63376,
because Atty. Parulan represented the current value of the property to be P1.5 million. As a
counter-offer, however, they tendered P250,000.00, which Atty. Parulan declined, giving them
only until April 5, 1991 to decide.
530
Hearing nothing more from the petitioners, Atty. Parulan decided to call them on April 5,
1991, but they informed him that they had already fully paid to Ma. Elena. Thus, on April 15,
1991, Dionisio, through Atty. Parulan, commenced an action praying for the declaration of the
nullity of the deed of absolute sale executed by Ma. Elena, and the cancellation of the title
issued to the petitioners by virtue thereof. In turn, the petitioners filed on July 12, 1991 their own
action for specific performance with damages against the respondents.Both cases were
consolidated for trial and judgment in the RTC.
RTC ruled in favour of Plaintiff Parulan and declared the sale covered by TCT 63376
and 63377 as null and void.
Issues:
Whether or not the encumbrance was valid
Ruling:
We stress that the power of administration does not include acts of disposition or
encumbrance, which are acts of strict ownership. As such, an authority to dispose cannot
proceed from an authority to administer, and vice versa, for the two powers may only be
exercised by an agent by following the provisions on agency of the Civil Code (from Article 1876
to Article 1878). Specifically, the apparent authority of Atty. Parulan, being a special agency,
was limited to the sale of the property in question, and did not include or extend to the power to
administer the property.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, we deny the petition for review on certiorari, and affirm the decision
dated July 2, 2004 rendered by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 69044 entitled
“Dionisio Z. Parulan, Jr. vs. Ma. Elena Parulan and Sps. Rex and Concepcion
Aggabao” and“Sps. Rex and Concepcion Aggabao vs. Dionisio Z. Parulan, Jr. and Ma. Elena
Parulan.”
531
Fuentes v. Roca
MANUEL O. FUENTES and LETICIA L. FUENTES

Petitioners
- versus –
CONRADO G. ROCA, ANNABELLE R. JOSON, ROSE MARIE R. CRISTOBAL and PILAR
MALCAMPO
Respondents
April 21, 2010
ABAD, J.:
This case is about a husband’s sale of conjugal real property, employing a challenged
affidavit of consent from an estranged wife. The buyers claim valid consent, loss of right to
declare nullity of sale, and prescription.
Facts:
Sabina Tarroza owned a titled 358-square meter lot in

Canelar, Zamboanga City. On October 11, 1982 she sold it to her son, Tarciano T. Roca
(Tarciano) under a deed of absolute sale.[1] But Tarciano did not for the meantime have the
registered title transferred to his name.
Six years later in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to petitioners Manuel and Leticia
Fuentes (the Fuentes spouses). They arranged to meet at the office of Atty. Romulo D. Plagata
whom they asked to prepare the documents of sale. They later signed an agreement to sell that
Atty. Plagata prepared[2]dated April 29, 1988.
Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario, namely, respondents
Conrado G. Roca, Annabelle R. Joson, and Rose Marie R. Cristobal, together with Tarciano’s
sister, Pilar R. Malcampo, represented by her son, John Paul M. Trinidad (collectively, the
Rocas), filed an action for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the land against the Fuentes
spouses before the Regional Trial Court. The Rocas claimed that the sale to the spouses was
void since Tarciano’s wife, Rosario, did not give her consent to it. Her signature on the affidavit
of consent had been forged. They thus prayed that the property be reconveyed to them upon
reimbursement of the price that the Fuentes spouses paid Tarciano.[6]
532
On February 1, 2005 the RTC rendered judgment, dismissing the case. It ruled that the
action had already prescribed since the ground cited by the Rocas for annulling the sale, forgery
or fraud, already prescribed and the Rocas failed to present clear and convincing evidence of
the fraud.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC decision. The CA found
sufficient evidence of forgery and did not give credence to Atty. Plagata’s testimony that he
saw Rosario sign the document in Quezon City. Its jurat said differently. Also, upon comparing
the questioned signature with the specimen signatures, the CA noted significant variance
between them. That Tarciano and Rosario had been living separately for 30 years since 1958
also reinforced the conclusion that her signature had been forged.
Issue:
Whether or not the sale of property was valid
Ruling:
The key issue in this case is whether or not Rosario’s signature on the document of
consent had been forged. For, if the signature were genuine, the fact that she gave her consent
to her husband’s sale of the conjugal land would render the other issues merely academic.
The CA found that Rosario’s signature had been forged. The CA observed a marked
difference between her signature on the affidavit of consent[15] and her specimen
signatures.[16] The CA gave no weight to Atty. Plagata’s testimony that he saw Rosario sign
the document in Manila on September 15, 1988 since this clashed with his declaration in
the jurat that Rosario signed the affidavit in Zamboanga City on January 11, 1989.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS WITH MODIFICATION the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 00531 dated February 27, 2007 as follows:
1. The deed of sale dated January 11, 1989 that Tarciano T. Roca executed in favor
of Manuel O. Fuentes, married to Leticia L. Fuentes, as well as the Transfer Certificate of Title
T-90,981 that the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga City issued in the names of the latter
spouses pursuant to that deed of sale are DECLARED void;
533
2. The Register of Deeds of Zamboanga City is DIRECTED to reinstate Transfer
Certificate of Title 3533 in the name of Tarciano T. Roca, married to Rosario Gabriel;
3. Respondents Gonzalo G. Roca, Annabelle R. Joson, Rose Marie R. Cristobal, and
Pilar Malcampo are ORDERED to pay petitioner spouses Manuel and Leticia Fuentes
the P200,000.00 that the latter paid Tarciano T. Roca, with legal interest from January 11, 1989
until fully paid, chargeable against his estate;
4. Respondents Gonzalo G. Roca, Annabelle R. Joson, Rose Marie R. Cristobal, and
Pilar Malcampo are further ORDERED, at their option, to indemnify petitioner spouses Manuel
and Leticia Fuentes with their expenses for introducing useful improvements on the subject land
or pay the increase in value which it may have acquired by reason of those improvements, with
the spouses entitled to the right of retention of the land until the indemnity is made; and
5. The RTC of Zamboanga City from which this case originated is DIRECTED to
receive evidence and determine the amount of indemnity to which petitioner spouses Manuel
and Leticia Fuentes are entitled.
SO ORDERED.
534
Sps. De Leon v. De Leon
SPS. LITA DE LEON and FELIX RIO TARROSA, Petitioners,

vs.
ANITA B. DE LEON, DANILO B. DE LEON, and VILMA B. DE LEON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 185063 July 23, 2009
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 assailing and seeking to
set aside the Decision and Resolution dated August 27, 2008 and October 20, 2008,
respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 88571. The CA affirmed with
modification the October 4, 2006 Decision in Civil Case No. Q04-51595 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 22 in Quezon City.
Facts:
On July 20, 1965, Bonifacio O. De Leon, then single, and the People’s Homesite and
Housing Corporation (PHHC) entered into a Conditional Contract to Sell for the purchase on
installment of a 191.30 square-meter lot situated in Fairview, Quezon City. Subsequently, on
April 24, 1968, Bonifacio married Anita de Leon in a civil rite officiated by the Municipal Mayor of
Zaragosa, Nueva Ecija. To this union were born Danilo and Vilma. Following the full payment of
the cost price for the lot thus purchased, PHHC executed a Final Deed of Sale in favor of
Bonifacio.
Subsequently, Bonifacio, for PhP 19,000, sold the subject lot to her sister, Lita, and
husband Felix Rio Tarrosa (Tarrosas), petitioners herein. The conveying Deed of Sale dated
January 12, 1974 (Deed of Sale) did not bear the written consent and signature of Anita.
On February 29, 1996, Bonifacio died. Three months later, the Tarrosas registered the
Deed of Sale and had TCT No. 173677 canceled. They secured the issuance in their names of
TCT No. N-173911 from the Quezon City Register of Deeds.
Getting wind of the cancellation of their father’s title and the issuance of TCT No. N-173911,
Danilo and Vilma filed on May 19, 2003 a Notice of Adverse Claim before the Register of Deeds
of Quezon City to protect their rights over the subject property and that fraud attended the
execution of the Deed of Sale and that subsequent acts of Bonifacio would show that he was
535
still the owner of the parcel of land. In support of their case, they presented, inter alia, the
following documents:
On October 4, 2006, the RTC, on the finding that the lot in question was the conjugal
property of Bonifacio and Anita, rendered judgment in favor of Anita and her children.
Aggrieved, the Tarrosas appealed to the CA. Nonetheless, the CA affirmed the order of the
RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject land was the conjugal property of Bonifacio and his spouse
Ruling:
The Subject Property is the Conjugal Property of Bonifacio and Anita. In the case at bar,
ownership over what was once a PHHC lot and covered by the PHHC-Bonifacio Conditional
Contract to Sell was only transferred during the marriage of Bonifacio and Anita. It is well settled
that a conditional sale is akin, if not equivalent, to a contract to sell. In both types of contract, the
efficacy or obligatory force of the vendor’s obligation to transfer title is subordinated to the
happening of a future and uncertain event, usually the full payment of the purchase price, so
that if the suspensive condition does not take place, the parties would stand as if the conditional
obligation had never existed. In other words, in a contract to sell ownership is retained by the
seller and is not passed to the buyer until full payment of the price, unlike in a contract of sale
where title passes upon delivery of the thing sold.
Even on the supposition that Bonifacio only sold his portion of the conjugal partnership,
the sale is still theoretically void, for, as previously stated, the right of the husband or the wife to
one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 88571 is

AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
536
Sps. Bautista v. Silva
SPOUSES CLARO and NIDA BAUTISTA, petitioners,

vs.
BERLINDA F. SILVA, Represented by HERMES J. DORADO, in his capacity as Attorney-
In-Fact, respondent.
G.R. No. 157434 September 19, 2006
To establish his status as a buyer for value in good faith, a person dealing with land
registered in the name of and occupied by the seller need only show that he relied on the face
of the seller's certificate of title. But for a person dealing with land registered in the name of and
occupied by the seller whose capacity to sell is restricted, such as by Articles 166and 173 of the
Civil Code or Article 124 of the Family Code, he must show that he inquired into the latter's
capacity to sell in order to establish himself as a buyer for value in good faith. The extent of his
inquiry depends on the proof of capacity of the seller. If the proof of capacity consists of a
special power of attorney duly notarized, mere inspection of the face of such public document
already constitutes sufficient inquiry. If no such special power of attorney is provided or there is
one but there appear flaws in its notarial acknowledgment mere inspection of the document will
not do; the buyer must show that his investigation went beyond the document and into the
circumstances of its execution.
Facts:
On August 14, 1980, a Transfer Certificate of Title No. B- 37189 over a parcel of land
was registered in the names of Spouses Berlinda F. Silva and Pedro M. Silva.
On March 3, 1988, Pedro M. Silva, for himself and as attorney-in-fact of his wife,
Berlinda, thru a Special Power of Attorney purportedly executed on November 18, 1987 by
Berlinda in his favor, signed and executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the said parcel of land
covered by TCT No. B-37189 in favor of spouses Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista.
As a consequence, TCT No. B-37189 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. V-2765
of the Registry of Deeds for the Valenzuela Branch was issued in the names of spouses Claro
Bautista and Nida Bautista on March 4, 1988.
537
Evidence shows that the signature appearing on the Special Power of Attorney as that of
Berlinda is a forged, and that consequently, the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Pedro in
favor of spouses Bautista is not authorized by Berlinda.
Issue:
Whether or not the sale made by Pedro is null and void.
Ruling:
Yes.The sale of conjugal property by the husband without marital consent of the wife
affects the entire property, not just the share of the wife and it is considered a nullity.
Petitioners are not buyers of good faith since they were dealing with a seller (Pedro) who
had title to and possession of the land but whose capacity to sell was restricted, in that marital
consent of respondent is required before he could convey the property.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated November 21, 2001
and Resolution dated February 27, 2003 of the Court of Appeal are AFFIRMED.
538
Homeowner Savings and Loan Bank v. Dailo
HOMEOWNER SAVINGS LOAN BANK, petitioner v.

MARCELINO DAILO, respondent
G.R. No. 153802. March 11, 2005
TINGA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,
assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59986 rendered on June 3,
2002, which affirmed with modification the October 18, 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 29, San Pablo City, Laguna in Civil Case No. SP-4748 (97).
Facts:
Miguela Dailo and Marcelino Dailo Jr. are husband and wife who bought a house and lot.
The absolute deed of sale was executed only in favor of Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee thereof
to the exclusion of the wife.
In 1993, Marcelino obtained a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank
to be secured by the spouse house and lot. An amount of P300,000.00 was obtained as a loam
and a Real Estate Mortgage was executed on the subject property in favor of the petitioner.
That said transaction entered into took place without the knowledge and consent of the wife.
Upon maturity the loan remained outstanding. As a result, petitioner instituted
extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale
thereof, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of the petitioner as the highest bidder. In 1995,
Marcelino died.
Miguela calimed that she had no knowledge of the mortgaged constituted on the subject
property which was conjugal in nature. The trial court rendered its decision favoring Miguela,
and it ordered the reconveyance of the subject property. On Appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial Courts decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the husband may sale the conjugal property even without the consent of
the wife.
Ruling:
No. The court ruled that, the sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the
husband and wife. In the absence of the consent of one renders the entire sale null and void,
including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
539
Abalos v. Macatangay
ESTHER ABALOS, plaintiff v. MACATANGAY J.R., defendant

G.R. No.155043, September 30, 2004
TINGA, J.:
The instant petition seeks a reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 48355 entitled “Dr. Galicano S. Macatangay, Jr. v. Arturo R. Abalos and Esther Palisoc-
Abalos,” promulgated on March 14, 2002. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision
which dismissed the action for specific performance filed by respondent, and ordered petitioner
and his wife to execute in favor of herein respondent a deed of sale over the subject property.
Facts:
Spouses Arturo and Esther Abalos are the registered owner of a parcel of land with
improvements. Armed with Special Power of Attorney, purportedly issued by his wife, Arturo
executed a Receipt and Memorandum of Agreement in Favor of respondent Macatangay,
binding himself to sell to respondent the subject property ad not to offer the same to any other
party with in thirty days (30) from date.
Subsequently, Arturo’s wife, Esther, executed a Special Power of Attorney appointing
her sister Ramos, to act for and in her behalf relative to the transfer of the property to
respondent.
Issue:
Whether or not spouses can dispose their own share in the conjugal property even
without the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Ruling:
No. The court held that, even on the supposition that the parties only disposed of their
respective shares in the property the sale. Assuming that it exists, it is still void because the
right of the husband and wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not rest until the liquidation
of the conjugal partnership. Nemo dat quod non habet. No one can give what he has not.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
complaint in Civil Case No. 90-106 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati is ordered
DISMISSED.
540
Roxas v. CA
MELANIA ROXAS, plaintiff v. COURT OF APPEALS, defendant

G.R. No. 92245. June 26, 1991
PARAS, J.:
The only issue before us is whether or not a husband, as the administrator of the
conjugal partnership, may legally enter into a contract of lease involving conjugal real property
without the knowledge and consent of the wife.
Facts:
Melania Roxas and Antonio Roxas are husband and wife; however, they were living
separately. Plaintiff Petitioner Melania discovered that her estranged husband entered into a
contract of lead covering a portion of their conjugal lot.
Melania filed a complaint; however, the Trial Court dismissed the same because the
complaint fails to satisfy the test of sufficiency of action. On appeal, the Court of Appeals,
affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.
Issue:
Whether or not the husband may enter into a contract of lease involving conjugal real
property without the knowledge and consent of his wife.
Ruling:
No. The court held that, in the contract of lease, the leesor transfers his rights of use in
favor of the lessee. The lessors right is impaired, therein. Therefore, lease is a burden of the
land. Thus, under Art.176 of the Civil Code, in care the wife’s consent is not secured by the
husband as required by law, there was the remedy of filing an action for the annulment of the
contract.
Fallo:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE
and this case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial court for further proceedings.
541
Nicolas v. CA
NICOLAS, plaintiff v. COURT OF APPEALS, defendant

No. L-37631. October 1987
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 assailing and seeking to
set aside the Decision1 and Resolution dated August 27, 2008 and October 20, 2008,
respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 88571. The CA affirmed with
modification the October 4, 2006 Decision in Civil Case No. Q04-51595 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 22 in Quezon City.
Facts:
Anastacio Madlangsakay married to Lourdes Manuel Brought parcels of land. At the time
of purchase, petitioners were occupying one of the land’s as tenants. Anastacio sold that said
parcel of the land occupied by the tenants to them.
The controversy arose when criminal case of robbery was filed by Anastacio against the
petitioners when they allegedly cut bamboos from the said land. On the other hand, petitioners
filed a criminal case of perjury against Anastacio in encroaching on their rights by gathering the
fruits on the subject land.
Anastacio claimed that the Deed of Absolute Sale that was executed is a forgery, there
being no marital consent from his wife as required by law. Thus, the said sale is null and void.
The RTC rendered judgment favoring Anastacio was the court of Appeals when the case
was about for appeal by the petitioners.
Issue:
Whether or not the sale of property being conjugal in nature without marital consent from
one is valid.
Ruling:
No. The court held that, the very conspicuous absence of the wife conform to such
ganancial property, there being no showing that Lourdes Manuel- wife of Anastacio is legally
incapacitated-renders the scale void ab initio.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 88571 is
542
Muller v. Muller
ELENA MULLER, petitioner v. HELMUT MULLER, respondent

G.R. No. 149615. August 29, 2006
This petition for review on certiorari assails the February 26, 2001 Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59321 affirming with modification the August 12, 1996
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 86 in Civil Case No. Q-94-21862,
which terminated the regime of absolute community of property between petitioner and
respondent, as well as the Resolution dated August 13, 2001 denying the motion for
reconsideration.
Facts:
Elena Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in Germany in 1989. They
resided at the house owned by the respondent’s parents but decided to move and reside in the
Philippines permanently in 1992. Helmut inherited the house in Germany from his parents and
sold it. He used the money to purchase a parcel of land and to construct a house in the
Philippines.
Elena filed a petition from legal separation due to incompatibilities. In 1996, the Regional
Trial Court rendered its judgment and terminated the regime of absolute community of property
of the spouses. It also decreed a legal separation of properties located in the country but
excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage. However, respondent cannot
recover the funds because the property was purchased in violation of Sec.7, Art. XII of the
Constitution.
Respondent appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the regional
Trial Court. It ruled that respondent may claim reimbursement of the amount of the said
property.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent can claim reimbursement of the property in dispute.
Ruling:
No. The court ruled that, the respondent was aware of the Constitutional Prohibition. He
declared that he had the property titled in the name of the Filipino wife because of the
Constitutional prohibition against aliens.
His claim to a right in the said property cannot be sustained. In cases of hereditary
succession, respondent’s disqualification in owning lands in the Philippine is absolute. Not even
an ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where the purchase is made in isolation of an existing
543
statute and in evasion of its express provision, not trust can result in favor of the party who is
guilty of fraud.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision
dated February 26, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59321 ordering petitioner
Elena Buenaventura Muller to reimburse respondent Helmut Muller the amount of P528, 000 for
the acquisition of the land and the amount of P2,300,000 for the construction of the house in
Antipolo City, and the Resolution dated August 13, 2001 denying reconsideration thereof, are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The August 12, 1996 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 86 in Civil Case No. Q-94-21862 terminating the regime of absolute
community between the petitioner and respondent, decreeing a separation of property between
them and ordering the partition of the personal properties located in the Philippines equally, is
REINSTATED.
544
Cruz v. Cristobal
MERCEDES CRISTOBAL CRUZ, et.al., petitioners v.

EUFROSINA CRISTOBAL, respondent
G.R. No. 140422, August 7, 2006
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 22 July 1999 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 56402, affirming in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City,
Branch 156, in Civil Case No. 65035 entitled, “Mercedes Cristobal, Anselmo A. Cristobal and
Elisa Cristobal Sikat vs. EufrosinaCristobal, Florencio Cristobal, Jose Cristobal, Heirs of
Norberto Cristobal and The Register of Deeds, San Juan, M.M.”
Facts:
Petitioners (Mercedes Cristobal, Anselmo Cristobal, the heirs of the deceased Socorro
Cristobal, and Elisa Cristobal-Sikat) claim that they are the legitimate children of Buenaventura
Cristobal during his first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal. On the other hand, private respondents
(Norberto, Florencio, Eufrosina and Jose, all surnamed Cristobal) are also the children of
Buenaventura Cristobal resulting from his second marriage to Donata Enriquez. Sometime in
the year 1930, Buenaventura Cristobal died intestate. More than six decades later, petitioners
learned that private respondents had executed an extrajudicial partition of the subject property
and transferred its title to their names.
To prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal, the baptismal
certificates of Elisa, [3] Anselmo, [4] and the late Socorro [5] were presented. After trial on the
merits, the trial court rendered a judgment [8] on 11 July 1997, dismissing the case, ruling that
petitioners failed to prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal as the
baptismal and birth certificates presented have scant evidentiary value and that petitioners’
inaction for a long period of time amounts to laches.
Not satisfied, petitioners sought recourse in the Court of Appeals which, in its Decision
[9] dated 22 July 1999, ruled that they were able to prove their filiation with the deceased
Buenaventura Cristobal thru “other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws,” but
affirmed the ruling of the trial court barring their right to recover their share of the subject
property because of laches.
545
Issue:
Whether or not filiation was properly proven by the respondents with the deceased
Buenaventura Cristobal
Ruling:
Yes. The foregoing evidence thus suffices to convince this Court that petitioners are,
indeed, children of the late Buenaventura Cristobal during the first marriage.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court rules as follows:
(1) The Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE;
(2) Petitioners are RECOGNIZED and DECLARED as children of the late Buenaventura
Cristobal from his first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal;
(3) The Deed of Partition executed by private respondents is DECLARED not binding upon
petitioners who were not notified or did not participate in the execution thereof;
(4) The subject property, covered by TCTs No. 165132, No. 165133, 165134, and No. 165135,
in the name of private respondents consisting of 535 square meters is ORDERED to be
partitioned and distributed in accordance with this Decision and appropriate certificates of title
be issued in favor of each of the recognized heirs of the late Cristobal Buenaventura, and
(5) Petitioners are AWARDED the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00)
PESOS as damages, to be paid by private respondents.
546
Go v. Yamane
Spouses JOSEPHINE MENDOZA GO & HENRY GO, Petitioners,

vs. LEONARDO YAMANE, Respondent.
G.R. No. 160762 May 3, 2006
PANGANIBAN, CJ.:
Property purchased by spouses during the existence of their marriage is presumed to be
conjugal in nature. This presumption stands, absent any clear, categorical, and convincing
evidence that the property is paraphernal. Conjugal property cannot be held liable for the
personal obligation contracted by one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is shown to
have accrued to the conjugal partnership.
Facts:
Involved in the suit is a 750 square meters parcel of lot located at Baguio City, registered
in the name of Muriel Pucay Yamane, wife of Leonardo Yamane, [respondent] herein.
A motion for execution of a charging lien was filed by Atty. Guillermo De Guzman in a
Civil Case, entitled 'Florence Pucay De Gomez, Elsie Pucay Kiwas and Muriel Pucay Yamane v.
Cypress Corporation,' which said counsel handled for the plaintiffs therein, hereinafter
collectively referred to as the Pucay sisters, to satisfy the lien for attorney's fees in the amount
of P10,000. The said property was scheduled to be sold at public auction on August 11, 1981.
Four days prior to the auction sale, [respondent] filed a Third-Party Claim with the Office
of the Provincial Sheriff to stop the public auction on the ground that the subject property is
conjugal property and, therefore, should not be held answerable for the personal obligation of
the Pucay sisters. However, the Sheriff proceeded with the auction sale despite [respondent's]
protest. The subject property was sold to spouses Josephine [and] Henry Go (or [petitioners]) as
highest bidder. A Final Sheriff's Certificate of Sale was eventually issued conveying and
transferring the said property to [petitioners]. Leonardo filed a complaint on the regional trial
court but the motion was denied. He then elevated the matter to the CA and the CA reversed
the RTC's decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject property is conjugal or paraphernal.
Ruling:
Yes, the property is conjugal. The purchase of the property had been concluded in 1967,
before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. Accordingly, the transaction was aptly
covered by the then governing provisions of the New Civil Code. Article 160 of the New Civil
Code provides that "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
547
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." As
a conditio sine qua non for the operation of this article in favor of the conjugal partnership, the
party who invokes the presumption must first prove that the property was acquired during the
marriage.
In other words, the presumption in favor of conjugality does not operate if there is no
showing of when the property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. Moreover, the presumption
may be rebutted only with strong, clear, categorical and convincing evidence. There must be
strict proof of the exclusive ownership of one of the spouses, and the burden of proof rests upon
the party asserting it.
The CA committed no error in declaring that the parcel of land belonged to the conjugal
partnership of Spouses Muriel and Leonardo Yamane. They acquired it from Eugene Pucay on
February 27, 1967, or specifically during the marriage. The rule that proof of the acquisition of
the subject property during a marriage suffices to render the statutory presumption operative. It
is clear enough that the presently disputed piece of land pertains to the conjugal partnership.
The petition was denied.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution
548
Oligario v. CA
OPAZ OLIGARIO, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent

G.R. No. 104892. November 14, 1994
PUNO, J.:
Spouses Marciliano Olegario and Aurelia Rivera-Olegario owned a parcel of land
measuring 91 square meters at 198 J.P. Rizal corner Antipolo Streets, Caloocan City as
evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 124222 of the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City.
The Olegario couples were childless but reared and educated private respondents
Manuel Rivera, Paz Olegario, and Socorro Olegario-Teves. Petitioner Bonifacio Olegario is the
brother of Marciliano while petitioner Adelaida Victorino is the niece of Aurelia.
Facts:
Aurelia and Marciliano Go owned a parcel of land. The spouses were child less but
reared and educated Rivera, Paz Oligario and Socorro Teves- respondents. On the other hand,
Bonifacio Oligario is the brother of Marciliano and Adelaida is the niece of Aurelia.
Aurelia died on March 19, 1986. To preclude the heirs of his wife and to avoid the
payment of tax, Marciliano sold the property to the respondents. On 1988, Marciliano died
intestate.
Issue:
1) Whether or not Bonifacio and Adeliada have the legal right to inherit.
2) What is the proper liquidation of the said property?
Ruling:
1) The Court held that, the petitioners being the sole heir of the deceased, have the
legal right to inherit. The unlawful motive of Marciliano in selling the property
rendered the sale null and void.
2) The lot is presumed to be conjugal property. The death of Aurelia dissolved the
conjugal partnership. By virtue of such dissolution, ½ of the said property should
appertain to Marciliano as his share from the conjugal partnership and ¼
representing his share as surviving spouse. Adelaida as the surviving niece of
Aurelia is entitled to ¼ of the lot.
549
Fallo:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of respondent court dated January 7, 1992 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Complaint in Civil Case
No. C-13973 is ordered DISMISSED. No costs.
550
Nable-Jose v. Nable-Jose
NABLE-JOSE, plaintiff-appellant vs. NABLE-JOSE, respondent-appellee

41 P 713
Facts:
Couples were legally married, however, the marital bond was dissolved when the wife
died.
Issue:
Whether or not the surviving husband has the power to sell or mortgage the community
property after the death of his wife.
Ruling:
Yes. It was held by the court that, when a conjugal partnership is dissolved by the death
of the wife, the surviving husband and not the judicial administrator appointed in the
proceedings for the settlement of the wife’s estate, is entitled to the possession of the property
of the conjugal partnership until he has liquidated its affairs; the husband is the administrator of
the affairs of the conjugal partnership until they are finally settled and liquidated; and that the
liquidation is to be conducted by him as administrator. Thus, the husband has the power to
dispose properties for settlements of debts but not for his own interest if the said sale is prior
liquidation.
551
Luna v. Linatoc
AGUSTIN DE LUNA, ET AL., petitioners-appellants,

vs
JOSE LINATOC, respondent-appellee
G.R. No. L-48403, October 28, 1942
BOCOBO, J.:
Appeal and error; inquiry by Supreme Court into conclusion of fact made by court of
appeals.
Facts:
The wife of Agustin de Luna sold a parcel of land together with those lands under
her husband's name. After the sale, they bring an action to ask for annulment of the sales since
according to article 1432, the wife could not sell her portions of those lands in the name of
her husband because the partition is illegal and void as it was made during the marriage
and there was no juducial order authorizing separation of property between husband and wife.
Consequently, the character of these portions of lands is conjugal and the wife may bind the
conjugal partnership with the consent of the husband, according to article 1614 of the Civil
Code. The Court of Appeals upheld the validity of the three sales made since the instant case is
one of recognition because the husband was not trying to cleanse the sales of all taint, such
as fraud, violence or mistake, nor was it his purpose to confer authority to his wife, because he
stated in Exhibit I: "when my wife sold said lands to J. L. she did so with my knowledge
and consent.” Thus, the requirement in the statute of frauds that in a sale of real property the
authority of the agent should be in writing has been complied with. Therefore, she was only
acting as his agent.
Issue:
Whether or not they can ask for the annulment of the sales of the aforementioned
parcels of lands.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that they cannot examine the question whether or not the Court
of Appeals is right when it concluded that there had been deceit. Thus, the decision made
by the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed.
552
Fallo:
PETITION for review on certiorari.
553
Cuenca v. Cuenca
DIOSDIDIT CUENCA, et al, petitioner, vs RESTITUTO CUENCA, et al

No. L-72321. December 8, 1988
CRUZ, J.:
The respondent Court of Appeals is faulted in this petition for review for sustaining the
orders of the trial court dated February 22, 1988, and May 20, 1988.
Facts:
Agripino Cuenca and Maria Bangahon- Cuenca were legally married, begotten two
children, Restituto and Meladora as their heirs. Maria Bangahon brought properties into her
marriage. Said property was inherited by her from her parents.
However, Agrapi had a second family who claimed to be the legitimate family of
Agrapino. Thus, they claimed that the said properties are the conjugal property of Agrapino and
Engracia, second wife.
The trial court decided in favor of the second family. However, the Court of Appeals
decided otherwise and thus favored the first family.
Issue:
Whether or not the conjugal property be affected by the de facto separation.
Ruling:
No. The Court held that, properties in the conjugal partnership will still remain. There
being no judicial declaration of legal separation nor legal separation of conjugal properties.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with
costs against the petitioner.
554
Wong v. CA
WONG, petitioner vs. COURT OFAPPEALS, respondent

G.R. No. 70082, August 19, 1991
FERNAN, C.J.:
Submitted for adjudication in the instant petition for review on certiorari is the issue of
whether or not the execution of a decision in an action for collection of a sum of money may be
nullified on the ground that the real properties levied upon and sold at public auction are the
alleged exclusive properties of a husband who did not participate in his wife's business
transaction from which said action stemmed.
Facts:
Romarico Henson and Katrina Pineda got married in 1964, out of their marriage they
have three children, but during the early age of their marriage, they had been living separately.
Romarico bought a parcel of land for PhP 11, 492 from his father and the money he used was
barrowed by him from his officemate.
Year later, a complaint was filed against Katrina holding her civilly liable because of her
debt from the jewelries she purchased from Wong and for the issuance of check which was
dishonored for lack of fund.
The RTC rendered its decision and held Katrina liable for those offenses incurred
against Wong. Hence, said liability was charged against the property bought by Henson.
Henson on the other hand objected the said decision contending that, the said property
is his exclusive property because he bought it using his own fund and did not know anything
about the transactions entered into by her wife.
RTC favored him, so as the Court of Appeals who affirmed the decision of the RTC in
toto in his favor.
Issue:
Whether or not the said property be held liable for the offense incurred by the wife.
Ruling:
No. The Court held that, on the matter of ownership of the property involved, the Court
disagrees with the appellate court that the said property is exclusively owned by Henson.
Having been acquired during the marriage, they are still presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership even though Henson and Katrina had been living separately.
The presumption of the conjugal nature of the property subsists in the absence of clear
satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption or to prove that the property
is exclusively owned by Henson. While there is proof that Henson acquired the property with the
555
money he loaned from his officemate, if he paid out of his salaries, then the money is part of the
conjugal assets and not exclusively his.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the decisions of the appellate court and the lower court in Civil Case No.
28-09 are hereby AFFIRMED subject to the modifications above stated. No costs.
556
Prima Partosa Jo v. CA
PRIMA PARTOSA-JO, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent

G.R. No. 82606. December 18, 1992
CRUZ, J.:
The herein private respondent, Jose Jo, admits to having cohabited with three women
and fathered fifteen children. The first of these women, the herein petitioner, claims to be his
legal wife whom he begot a daughter, Monina Jo. The other women and their respective
offspring are not parties of these case.
Facts:
Jo having cohabited with three women and fathered fifteen children. The first of those
women is Partosa- Jo, his legal wife whom he fathered one daughter.
Partosa-Jo filed a complaint for legal separation of property and an action for support
against his husband Jo. Thus, based on the facts presented, the RTC rendered its decision in
favor of Partosa-Jo ordering Jo to support her and the child. However, the trial court failed to
provide in its depositive portion as to its decision concerning the legal separation of conjugal
properties.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals denied the appeal contending that the said complaint
lacks merit because such claim was based on their mutual agreement and thus there is no
abandonment.
Issue:
Whether of not legal separation of conjugal properties be declared.
Ruling:
The Court held that, abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the avowed
intent never to return, followed by prolonged absence without just cause and without in the
meantime providing in the least for one’s family although able to do so. There must be absolute
cessation of marital relations, duties and rights with the intent of perpetual separation.
As shown by evidences presented, Jo refused to accept Pertosa-Jo in their conjugal
dwelling without just cause and even denied that they were married. Thus, such act is
tantamount to abandonment.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision of the respondent
court is MODIFIED. Civil Case No. 51 is hereby decided in favor the plaintiff, the petitioner
557
herein, and the conjugal property of the petitioner and the private respondent is hereby ordered
divided between them, share and share alike. This division shall be implemented by the trial
court after determination of all the properties pertaining to the said conjugal partnership,
including those that may have been illegally registered in the name of the persons.
558
De Ocampo v. Delizo
DOROTEA DE OCAMPO, petitioner-appellant vs.

NICOLAS DELIZO, respondent-appellee
Nos. L-32820-21. January 30, 1976
ANTONIO, J.:
These two cases involve the partition of the conjugal partnership properties of two
marriages contracted by Nicolas Delizo.
Facts:
Nicolas Delizo contracted two marriages, first was in 1891 with Rosa Villasfer and their
marriage ended in 1909 when Villasfer died. In his first marriage, he had three children. His
second marriage was in 1911 with Dorotea de Ocampo and it ended when Delizo died on May
3, 1957. Out of the second marriage, he had nine children.
On April 15, 1957 before the death of Delizo, an action for partition was instituted by his
son and daughter in his first marriage, all against him and de Ocampo. de Ocampo opposed the
said partition, claiming that the properties described in the complaint were those of the second
marriage.
Those subject properties were alleged to be acquired by Nicolas as homestead during
the first marriage, however, the requirements for the patent were perfected on the second
marriage. Thus, improvements of the said property were introduced during the second marriage
through the joint effort of Nicolas and de Ocampo.
Issue:
How should the subject properties be liquidated?
Ruling:
The Court held that, the decisive factor in the determination of whether a parcel of land
acquired by way of homestead is conjugal property of the first or second marriage is not
necessary the time of the issuance of the homestead patent but the time of the fulfillment of the
requirements of the public land law for the acquisition of such right to the patent.
There are the established facts that the produce of the lands acquired homestead
contributed considerably to the acquisition of the properties acquired during the existence of the
second marriage. Also the children of the first marriage as a matter of equity should share in the
properties acquired by homestead.
559
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby modified as
herein indicated. The records of these cases should be, as they are hereby, remanded to the
trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this judgment.
560
Vda. de Consegrua v. GSIS
VDA. DE CONSEGRUA, petitioner-appellant vs.

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, respondent-appellee
No. L-28093. January 30, 1971
ZALDIVAR, J.:
Appeal on purely questions of law from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Surigao del Norte, dated March 7, 1967, in its Special Proceeding No. 1720.
Facts:
At the time of death of Jose Consuegra, he was an employee of the Office of the District
Engineer of Surigao del Norte. In his life time, he contracted two marriages, the first with Diaz
whom he fathered two children but predeceased him; and the second marriage in which he
contracted in good faith, seven children were born.
Being a member of GSIS, when he died the proceeds of his life insurance were paid by
GSIS to Berdin his second wife and to seven children who were the beneficiaries of the said
policy. Having been in the government service for twenty years, he was entitled to retirement
insurance benefits in the sum of PhP 6, 304. 47. However, he did not designate any beneficiary
who would receive the retirement benefits due to him.
First wife Diaz filed a cliam with GSIS asking that the retirement insurance benefits be
paid to her as the only legal heir of Jose. Berdin on the other hand claimed that the benefits be
paid to her and to their children being the designated beneficiaries of the life insurance.
To solve the conflict, GSIS divided the said amount of benefits equally to both parties.
Dissatisfied with the apportionment made by GSIS, petitioner filed a petition in the Court of First
Instance. The said court upheld the division made by GSIS.
Issue:
Whether or not the liquidation is proper.
Ruling:
The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance. Thus, the court held that,
in construing the rights of two women who were married to the same man since the deceased
first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void, the conjugal partnership established by
that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her status as putative
heir of her husband under the New Civil Code, entitled to share in the estate upon his death
should she survive him. Consequently, whether as conjugal partnership in a still subsisting
marriage or as such putative heir has an interest in the husband’s share in the property in
dispute. And with respect to the second wife, the Court observed that although the second
561
marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was
still subsisting, still there is a need for judicial declaration of nullity. And in as much as the
conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of
its nullity, “the only just and equitable solution is to recognize the right of the second wife to her
share of one-half in the property acquired by her husband, and consider the other half as
pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage.”
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against petitioners-
appellants.
562
Salvador v. CA
REMEDIOS G. SALVADOR and MA. GRACIA G. SALVADOR, petitioners, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS, ALBERTO and ELPIA YABO, FRANCISCA YABO, et al., respondents.
G.R. No. 109910. April 5, 1995.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Assailed in this petition is the legal determination made by the Court of Appeals on the
issues of which portion of Lot No. 6080 and Lot No. 6180 formed part of the conjugal assets of
the spouses Pastor Makibalo and Maria Yabo, and of whether or not the rights of Pastor's co-
heirs in the estate of Maria Yabo were extinguished through prescription or laches.
Facts:
Alipio Yabo was the owner of Lot No. 6080 and Lot No. 6180. Title thereto devolved
upon his nine children, namely, Victoriano, Procopio, Lope, Jose, Pelagia, Baseliza, Francisca,
Maria, and Gaudencia, upon his death sometime before or during the second world war.
On April 28, 1976, Pastor Makibalo, husband of Maria Yabo, child of Alipio filed with the
Court of First Instance a complaint against the spouses Alberto and Elpia Yabo. In such
complaint, Pastor alleged that he owned a total of 8 shares of the said lots having purchased
the share of seven of Alipio’s children and inherited the share of his wife Maria, and that except
for the portion corresponding to Gaudencia’s share which he did not buy, he occupied,
cultivated and possessed continuously, openly, peacefully and exclusively the two parcels of
land. He therefore prayed that he be declared the absolute owner of 8/9 of the lots questioned.
The trial court rendered judgment, finding Pastor, now Eugelio Salvador and Remedios
Salvador owners of eight shares on Lot No.6080 and some shares on Lot No.6180.
On October 8, 1976, the grandchildren and great grandchildren of the late Alipio Yabo
lodged within the same court a complaint for partition and quieting of title with damages against
Pastor, Enecia, Cristal, and the spouses Eulogio and Remedios Salvador. They alleged that the
aforesaid lots are common properties of the heirs of Alipio and that the defendants after Alipio’s
death became the de facto administrators of the lots and to their surprise discovered that the
Salvadors have been harvesting coconuts from the lots.
The plaintiffs prayed that they and the defendant be declared as the owners of the lots
and that the Salvador spouses be declared as having no rights thereto. The two cases thereby
were consolidated and jointly heard. The trial court however ruled against the plaintiffs.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that Maria did not sell her share to Alberto and
Elpia Yabo; that prescription and laches have not ran against the private respondents with
respect to the 1/9 share of Maria Yabo in the estate of her father and to her conjugal share in
563
the portions acquired from her brother and sisters and Procopio never sold his share in Lot. No.
6080 to Pastor Makibalo.
Issue:
Whether or not, the shares of Jose, Victoriano, Lope, Baseliza, Procopio and Francisca
in Lot No.6180 and in Lot No. 6080 which had been purchased by Pastor during his marriage
with Maria is the husband’s exclusive property.
Ruling:
No.
The Court ruled that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to either of them. In the instant case,
the shares of Jose, Victoriano, Lope, Baseliza, Procopio and Francisca in Lot No.6180 and in
Lot No. 6080 had been purchased by Pastor during his marriage with Maria. Such shares would
have been the exclusive property of Pastor had there been proof that the properties were
acquired or purchased by him with his exclusive money. Thus, absent such proof the same was
deemed by the Court to belong to the conjugal partnership of Pastor and Maria.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals of 8 February 1993 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 12839 is AFFIRMED, subject to the modifications indicated above. Upon the
finality of this decision, let this case be forthwith remanded to the court a quo for further
proceedings on the partition of Lots Nos. 6180 and 6080 in conformity with this decision.
564
Sarmiento v. Ordonez
CESAR SARMIENTO, petitioner, vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON.

REGINA G. ORDOÑEZ-BENITEZ, as the Presiding Judge of Branch XLVII of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, NORMA SARMIENTO, LORNA
SARMIENTO and LERMA SARMIENTO, respondents.
G.R. No. 75409. August 17, 1987.
PARAS., J.:
This is a petition to review and reverse the decision dated June 13, 1986 of respondent
Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) in AC-G.R. SP Nos. 09159 and 09160
denying the petition for certiorari and prohibition for lack of merit and correspondingly dismissing
these cases.
Facts:
Petitioner Cesar Sarmiento was married to private respondent Norma Sarmiento. On
May 10, 1977, private respondent Norma sued her husband, Cesar, for support. The case was
filed with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and later assigned to Regional Trial Court,
Branch XLVII, presided over by Judge Regina Ordoñez-Benitez. On March 1, 1984, Judge
Ordoñez-Benitez rendered a decision ordering the defendant, Cesar, to pay his wife, Norma, the
sum of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) monthly as support.
On August 1, 1984, the private respondent brought another action against the petitioner
for a declaration that the retirement benefits due the petitioner from the Philippine National Bank
(PNB) were conjugal and that 50% thereof belonged to the private respondent as her share.
Branch XXVII of the RTC of Manila rendered a decision ordering the PNB to desist and
refrain from releasing to defendant Cesar all monetary benefits and emoluments which may be
due him by reason of his retirement from service, but instead, to deliver one-half (1/2) thereof to
his wife.
Issue:
Whether or not the order of RTC Branch XXVII is proper when it ordered the freeze of
one-half (1/2) of the retirement benefits of Cesar, as allegedly a conjugal property of the
spouses.
Ruling:
No.
The default judgment dated February 20, 1986 which ordered the PNB to desist and
refrain from releasing to petitioner all monetary benefits and emoluments due him as retirement
benefits and to deliver one-half thereof to private respondent comes within the prohibition
565
imposed by Sec. 26, as amended, of the GSIS Charter which states: "Sec. 26. Exemption from
legal process and liens. No policy of life insurance issued under this Act, or the proceeds
thereof, when paid to any member thereunder, nor any other benefit granted under this Act,
shall be liable to attachment, garnishment, or other process, or to be seized, taken,
appropriated, or applied by any legal or equitable process or operation of law to pay any debt or
liability of such member, or his beneficiary, or any other person who may have a right
thereunder, either before or after payment; nor shall the proceeds thereof; when not made
payable to a named beneficiary, constitute a part of the estate of the member for payment of his
debt: Provided, however, That this section shall not apply when obligations or indebtedness to
the System and the employer are concerned, nor when the retirement annuity is assigned to
any person, corporation, association or bank or other financial institution, which is hereby
authorized." This, in effect, is a freeze order which is illegal and improper.
The directive to deliver one-half (1/2) of the retirement benefits to private respondent
makes the default judgment doubly illegal because retirement benefits have been adjudged as
gratuities or reward for lengthy and faithful service of the recipient and should be treated as
separate property of the retiree-spouse. Thus, if the monetary benefits are given gratis by the
government because of previous work, this is a gratuity and should be considered separate
property.
Fallo:
In view of the foregoing, the petitions are hereby GRANTED.
566
Villanueva v. IAC
CONSOLACION VILLANUEVA, petitioner, vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,

JESUS BERNAS and REMEDIOS Q. BERNAS, respondents.
G.R. No. 74577. December 4, 1990.
NARVASA, J.:
The spouses Graciano Aranas and Nicolasa Bunsa were the owners in fee simple of a
parcel of land identified as Lot 13, their ownership being evidenced by Original Certificate of
Title No. 0-3239 issued by the Register of Deeds of Capiz on June 19, 1924. After they died,
their surviving children, Modesto Aranas and Federico Aranas, adjudicated the land to
themselves under a deed of extrajudicial partition executed on May 2, 1952. The southern
portion, described as Lot 13-C, was thereby assigned to Modesto; the northern, to Federico.
Facts:
Spouses Graciano Aranas and Nicolasa Bunsa were the owners of a parcel of land
identified as Lot 13. After they died, their surviving children, Modesto Aranas and Federico
Aranas, adjudicated the land to themselves under a deed of extrajudicial partition executed on
May 2, 1952. The southern portion, described as Lot 13-C, was thereby assigned to Modesto;
the northern, to Federico.
On March 21, 1953, Modesto Aranas obtained a Torrens title in his name. He died on
April 20, 1973 while his wife, Victoria Comorro, predeceased him dying on July 16, 1971. They
had no children but Modesto was survived by two (2) illegitimate children named Dorothea
Aranas Ado and Teodoro C. Aranas. These two borrowed P18,000.00 from Jesus Bernas. As
security therefor they mortgaged to Bernas their father's property, Lot 13-C.
Dorothea and Teodoro failed to pay their loan. As a result, Bernas caused the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage over Lot 13-C on June 29, 1977 and acquired the land.
On November 24, 1978, Consolacion Villanueva and Raymundo Aranas filed a
complaint against Jesus Bernas and his spouse, Remedios Bernas. They alleged that they be
declared as co-owners of the land as stated in the will they have discovered that was executed
by Victoria Comorro.
The trial court declared the defendants spouses Jesus Bernas and Remedios O. Bernas
as legal owners of Lot No. 13-C and including all the improvements thereon;
The plaintiffs appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court, where they succeeded only
in having the award of actual and moral damages deleted, the judgment of the trial court having
been otherwise affirmed in toto.
567
From this judgment of the Appellate Court, Consolacion Villanueva appealed to the
Supreme Court. Her co-plaintiff, Raymundo Aranas, did not.
Issue:
Whether or not Lot 13-C is a conjugal property of spouses Modesto Aranas and Victoria
Comorro which gives Consolacion Villanueva all of said Victoria's interests, rights and
properties, real and personal as her net share from the conjugal partnership property with her
husband, Modesto Aranas.
Ruling:
No.
Lot 13-C was not a conjugal partnership property of Victoria Comorro and her husband,
Modesto Aranas. It was the latter's exclusive, private property, which he had inherited from his
parents Graciano Aranas and Nicolasa Bunsa as provided in Article 148 of the Civil Code that
to be considered as the exclusive property of each spouse is inter alia, that which is brought to
the marriage as his or her own, or that which each acquires, during the marriage, by lucrative
title. Thus, even if it be assumed that Modesto's acquisition by succession of Lot 13-C took
place during his marriage to Victoria Comorro, the lot would nonetheless be his exclusive
property because acquired by him, during the marriage, by lucrative title.
Moreover, Victoria Comorro died on July 16, 1971, about two years ahead of her
husband, Modesto Aranas, exclusive owner of Lot 13-C, who passed away on April 20, 1973.
Victoria never therefore inherited any part of Lot 13-C and hence, had nothing of Lot 13-C to
bequeath by will or otherwise to Consolacion Villanueva.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court subject of this appeal,
being in accord with the evidence and applicable law and jurisprudence, is AFFIRMED.
568
Tan v. CA
ALFONSO TAN and ETERIA TEVES TAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
SPOUSES CELESTINO U. TAN and ROSARIO DY KUSHIN and SPOUSES MAXIMO U. TAN
and TERESITA SY TAN, respondents.
G. R. No. 120594. June 10, 1997.
KAPUNAN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 37224 dated June 20, 1994 which reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 10, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
defendants-spouses Celestino U. Tan and Rosario Dy, and Maximo U. Tan and Teresita Sy to
partition the house and lot covered by TCT No. 46249, deliver to plaintiff Eteria Teves Tan the
one-third share of plaintiffs-spouses Alfonso U. Tan and Eteria Teves Tan; to pay Eteria Teves
Tan P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees; P5,000.00 as litigation expenses; and to pay the costs.
Facts:
Eteria Teves Tan was married to Alfonso U. Tan but they were now living separately by
virtue of a decree of legal separation rendered by the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court on August 31, 1977.
On April 17, 1989, a case for partition and accounting was instituted by the spouses
Alfonso and Eteria Tan against herein private respondents who are Alfonso's brothers,
Celestino and Maximo, and their respective wives, Rosario and Teresita. It was alleged in the
complaint that the parties are co-owners of a 906-square meter residential lot with
improvements thereon situated at Banaue, Cebu City acquired sometime in 1970. Pursuant to
the provisions of Article 494 of the New Civil Code, the spouses Alfonso and Eteria Tan, being
co-owners to the extent of one-third (1/3) portion of the aforesaid lot, sought partition of the
same.
On January 16, 1990, Alfonso U. Tan filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss
contending that the case was filed only at the instance of his estranged wife, Eteria, and that he
had no claim whatsoever against his brothers insofar as the family business is concerned.
On July 12, 1991, a decision was rendered after trial finding that the 906-square meter
lot with improvements was acquired by the three (3) brothers by sale through installments and
so it should be partitioned equally among them and their respective wives. Consequently, since
569
the lot was acquired during the marriage of petitioner and Alfonso, the former could not be
deprived of her share of the one-third portion which is the conjugal property of the spouses.
Spouses Celestino and Rosario Tan and the spouses Maximo and Teresita Tan,
interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals which, in turn, reversed and set aside the said
judgment. Respondent court ruled that although the subject property was acquired during the
marriage of the spouses Eteria and Alfonso, it was established by the Tan brothers that the
same was inherited from their mother, hence, their exclusive property.
Issue:
Whether or not the property in dispute was inherited by Alfonso, Celestino and Maximo
from their late mother, Trinidad Uy Tan, making one-third of the said portion an exclusive
property of Alfonso.
Ruling:
Yes.
Conclusive evidence points to the fact that the undivided one-third (1/3) of the parcel of
land in question is not the conjugal partnership property of the spouses Alfonso Tan and Eteria
Teves Tan. It is the former's exclusive property which he had inherited from his mother, Trinidad
Uy, the original owner of the property.
Although acquired during Alfonso's marriage to Eteria, the said property should be
regarded as Alfonso's own exclusively, as a matter of law pursuant to Article 148 of the Civil
Code which provides that: Article 148. The following shall be the exclusive property of each
spouse: xxx that which each acquires, during the marriage, by lucrative title.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is then affirmed.
Fallo:
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated June 20, 1994 is AFFIRMED.
570
Manotok Realty v. CA
MANOTOK REALTY, INC., petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FELIPE
MADLANGAWA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-45038. April 30, 1987.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari by way of appeal seeking to set aside the decision of the
Court of Appeals which upheld the dismissal of the petitioner's complaint for reinvidicatory
action with damages against the private respondent and ordered the petitioner to accept the
payment of the balance of P2,551.85 from said respondent, and thereafter, to execute the
corresponding deed of sale of Lot 227, Block I in favor of the latter.
Facts:
Private respondent Felipe Madlangawa claims that he has been occupying a parcel of
land in the Clara de Tambunting de Legarda Subdivision since 1949 upon permission being
obtained from Andres Ladores, then an overseer of the subdivision.
On April 2, 1950, the owner of the lot, Clara Tambunting, died and her entire estate,
including her paraphernal properties which covered the lot occupied by the private respondent
were placed under custodia legis.
On April 22, 1950, the private respondent made a deposit for the said lot in the sum of
P1,500.00 which was received by Vicente Legarda, husband of the late owner, which was
appointed as a special administrator of the estate on April 28, 1950.
Subsequently, petitioner Manotok Realty Inc., became the successful bidder and vendee
of the Tambunting-Legarda Subdivision consisting of 44 parcels of land pursuant to the deeds of
sale executed in its favor by the Philippine Trust Company on March 13 and 20, 1959, as
administrator of the Testate Estate of Clara Tambunting de Legarda. The lot in dispute was one
of those covered by the sale and private respondent was one of the many occupants who
refused to vacate the lots they were occupying, so that on April 26, 1968, the petitioner filed an
action to recover the said lot.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the only right remaining to the petitioner is to enforce the
collection of the balance of payment from private respondent.
Issue:
Whether or not the property sold by Vicente Legarda to private respondent is conjugal
making the sale valid, binding, and enforceable against the petitioner.
Ruling:
No.
571
Article 136 of the Civil Code provides that The wife retains the ownership of the
paraphernal property while Article 137 states that The wife shall have the administration of the
paraphernal property, unless she delivers the same to the husband by means of a public
instrument empowering him to administer it.
It is not proved that Vicente Legarda was the administrator of the paraphernal properties
of Clara Tambunting during the lifetime of the latter. Vicente Legarda, therefore, could not have
validly disposed of the lot in dispute as a continuing administrator of the paraphernal properties
of Clara Tambunting. It is also undisputed that the probate court appointed Vicente Legarda as
administrator of the estate only on August 28, 1950, more than three months after the
questioned sale had taken place.
Therefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside. Private
respondent is ordered to surrender the material and physical possession of the lot to the
petitioner because the sale between Don Vicente Legarda and the private respondent is void ab
initio, the former being neither an owner nor administrator of the subject property.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The private respondent is ordered to SURRENDER the material
and physical possession of Lot No. 277, Block I to the petitioner and to pay the latter the rentals
as stated above from May, 1950 until he surrenders the said lot. The petitioner shall reimburse
the private respondent the amount of P1, 500.00 with legal interest from May, 1950 or offset
said amount from the rentals due to it.
572
Ong v. CA
RAMON C. ONG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, FRANCISCO BOIX and ARSENIO
CAMINO AS DEPUTY SHERIFF OF CAMARINES NORTE, respondents.
G.R. No. 63025, November 29, 1991.
PARAS, J.:
The instant petitioner for certiorari seeks are reversal of the decision ** of herein public
respondent Court of Appeals dated October 24, 1977 in CA-G.R. No. 47063-R and its resolution
dated January 14, 1983 denying herein petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
Facts:
Teodora B. Ong conducted her own logging business in Camarines Sur. In furtherance
of her business operation, on August 18, 1955, she secured from Francisco Boix a loan in the
amount of P2,827.83. Unfortunately, because of mismanagement, Teodora defaulted in her
obligation. This prompted Boix to file a complaint against Teodora and Ramon Ong, the latter
being joined as husband of the former. Defendant-spouses were declared in default and
judgment was rendered, in favor of Boix. After the decision became final and executory, Boix
moved to execute the judgment. The motion was granted and a corresponding writ of execution
was issued.
Accordingly, the Sheriff of Camarines Norte levied and attached a parcel of land in the
sole name of Teodora B. Ong. In a notice of levy or Execution and notice of Public Auction sale,
auction sales was held on October 10, 1958 with defendant Boix having adjudged as highest
bidder.
On November 16, 1961, Ramon C. Ong filed a complaint against defendants Arsenio
Camino as Deputy Sheriff of Camarines Norte and Francisco Boix, to annul the auction sale of a
parcel of land, allegedly owned conjugally by plaintiff and his former wife Teodora B. Ong,
awarded in favor of Boix, as highest bidder, in an auction sale conducted by Deputy Sheriff
Camino.
Petitioner contends that the auction sale of the property in dispute is null and void; that
the subject property is really conjugal which the wife in the case at bar could not legally bind,
and considering that the indebtedness was contracted by the wife only, the levy of the subject
property not owned exclusively by the wife but owned jointly with the husband is improper.
The subject property is paraphernal property, in view of the fact that it was declared,
under Tax No. 05378, in the name of Teodora B. Ong while the house erected thereon was
declared under Tax No. 06022 in the name of Ramon C. Ong and Teodora B. Ong is petitioner's
claim that the subject property is conjugal. Petitioner stresses heavily on the fact that since the
573
surname "Ong" (which is the surname of the husband Ramon C. Ong) was carried by Teodora
in the tax declaration that indicates that the subject property was acquired during the marriage.
By reason thereof, the property in dispute is presumed to be owned jointly by both spouses.
Issue:
Whether or not the property in dispute was a conjugal ownership of spouses Ramon and
Teodora Ong.
Ruling:
No.
The mere use of the surname of the husband in the tax declaration of the subject
property is not sufficient proof that said property was acquired during the marriage and is
therefore conjugal. It is undisputed that the subject parcel was declared solely in the wife's
name, but the house built thereon was declared in the name of the spouses. Under such
circumstances, coupled with a careful scrutiny of the records of the present case, the Supreme
Court held that the lot in question is paraphernal, and is therefore, liable for the personal debts
of the wife.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit without
574
Ravina v. Abrille
PATROCINIA AND WILFREDO RAVINA, petitioners, vs MARY ANN PASAOL VILLA-

ABRILLE, respondent.
G.R. NO 160708, OCTOBER 16, 2009
QUISUMBING, Acting C.J.:
For review are the Decision dated February 21, 2002 and the resolution dated October
&, 2003 of the Court of Appeala in CA-G.R. CV No. 54560. The appellate court modified the
Decision dated September 26, 1995 of the Regioanl Trial Court of Davao city, Branch 15.
FACTS:
Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille and Pedro Villa Abrille are husband and wife. In1982, the
spouses acquired lot 7 in Davao City with TCT T-88674 in their names. Said lot was adjacent to
lot 8 which Pedro acquired when he was still single and was registered solely under his name
(TCT T-26471)
Spouses used their conjugal funds and loan from Development Bank Philippines to build
a house on lot 7and Pedro’s lot. Consequently, they made improvements, including a poultry
house and an annex. However, in 1991, the husband got a mistress and started to neglect his
family. The wife was forced to sell or mortgage their movables to support the family. On his own,
the husband wanted to dispose of the house and two lots to the petitioners Patrocinia and
Wilfredo Ravina. The wife opposed but the husband still sold the property without the wife’s
consent and signature.
July 5, 1991, while the wife and children were out, the husband and some CAFGU
members transferred all the belongings from the hose to an apartment. When they got home,
they were prevented from entering the house. Thus, the wife filed a complaint for the annulment
of sale with damages against the husband and the petitioners. During the trial, the husband
alleged that the house was built from his exclusive funds. The RTC ruled in favor of the wife,
declaring that the sale of lot 8 was void, being a conjugal property while the sale of lot 7 was
valid since it was the husband’s exclusive property. The CA declared that the sale of lot 7 to
petitioners is valid but the sale of lot 8 is null and void and that the husband is ordered to return
the value of the consideration for lot 8 to petitioners and also those petitioners are ordered to re-
convey the house and lot to the wife.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the husband can sell a property which is part exclusive and part conjugal
RULING:
575
Art. 160 of the New Civil Code provide that “all property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership; unless it is proven that it pertains exclusively to the husband
or to the wife.”
Lot 7 is an exclusive property of the husband since it
was acquired prior to his marriage with the respondent. However lot 8 was acquired in 1983
during the marriage of the spouses. There is no evidence proving
that the subject property was acquired through exchange or barter. The presumption of the
conjugal nature of the property subsists in the absence of and convincing evidence to overcome
the presumption. A sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the effectivity of
the Family Code on August 3, 1988 is governed by Art. 124 of the Family Code which states
that a disposition or encumbrance is void if done: a. without the consent of both the husband
and wife, or; b. in case of one spouse’s inability, the authority of the court.
Under article 124, the administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership of
property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case
of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the
wife for proper remedy which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable
to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole
powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or
encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other
spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon
the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn
by either or both offerors. Unlike in the New Civil Code which gives the wife 10 years to annul
alienation or encumbrance, any alienation or encumbrance under the Family Code without the
consent of both spouses is NULL AND VOID. Just like in ACP, if the husband, without the
knowledge and consent of the wife, sells conjugal property, the sale is void. If the sale was with
the knowledge but not the consent of the wife, the wife has 5 years from the date of the contract
to annul the sale. In the present case, the wife filed within the prescribed period. However, her
action to annul the sale pertains only to the conjugal house and lot which does not include lot 7
which is an exclusive property of the husband. The petitioners cannot argue that they were
buyers of good faith since they knew that at the time of the sale, Pedro was married to Mary
Ann and her signature did not appear in the deed. Even if they were to argue that the property is
576
an exclusive property of the husband, that they proceeded with the sale regardless of the wife’s
contention and that the she was in actual and public possession of the house at the time of the
sale, clearly indicates that they are not purchasers in good faith. The decision of the CA was
affirmed.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, we deny the instant petition for lack of merit. The Decision dated
February 21, 2001 and the Resolution dated October 7, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R
No. 54560 are affirmed.
577
Titan Construction Corporation v. David
TITAN CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, petitioner, V. MANUEL A. DAVID, SR. AND

MARTHA S. DAVID, respondents.
G.R. No. 169548, March 15, 2010
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The review of factual matters is not the province of this Court. The Supreme Court is not
a trier of facts, and is not the proper forum for the ventilation and substantiation of factual
issues.
This Petition for Review assails the July 20, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 67090 which affirmed with modification the March 7, 2000 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 80. Also assailed is the August 31, 2005
Resolution of the CA denying the motion for reconsideration.
FACTS:
Manuel A. David, Sr. (Manuel) and Martha S. David (Martha) were married on March 25,
1957. In 1970, the spouses acquired a 602 square meter lot located at White Plains, Quezon
City, which was registered in the name of "MARTHA S. DAVID, of legal age, Filipino, married to
Manuel A. David" and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 156043 issued by the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City. In 1976, the spouses separated de facto, and no longer
communicated with each other.
Sometime in March 1995, Manuel discovered that Martha had previously sold the
property to Titan Construction Corporation (Titan) for P1, 500,000.00 through a Deed of Sale
dated April 24, 1995, and that TCT No. 156043 had been cancelled and replaced by TCT No.
130129 in the name of Titan.
Thus, on March 13, 1996, Manuel filed a Complaint for Annulment of Contract and
Recovenyance against Titan before the RTC of Quezon City. Manuel alleged that the sale
executed by Martha in favor of Titan was without his knowledge and consent, and therefore
void. He prayed that the Deed of Sale and TCT No. 130129 be invalidated, that the property be
578
reconveyed to the spouses, and that a new title be issued in their names.
The RTC issued a Decision which invalidated both the Deed of Sale and TCT No. 130129; (ii)
ordered Titan to reconvey the property to Martha and Manuel; (iii) directed the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City to issue a new title in the names of Manuel and Martha; and (iv) ordered
Titan to pay P200, 000.00 plus P1, 000.00 per appearance as attorney's fees, and P50, 000.00
as costs of suit. The CA affirmed the Decision of the trial court but deleted the award of
attorney's fees and the amount of P50, 000.00 as costs. Hence, the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court of appeals patently erred in declaring the subject deed of sale
null and void and failed to apply to this case the pertinent law and jurisprudence on the torrens
system of land registration.
Ruling:
No. The petition is without merit. The property is part of the spouses' conjugal partnership.
The Civil Code of the Philippines, the law in force at the time of the celebration of the
marriage between Martha and Manuel in 1957, provides: Article 160. All property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Article 153 of the Civil Code also provides:
Article 153. The following are conjugal partnership property:
(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common
fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
These provisions were carried over to the Family Code. In particular, Article 117 thereof
provides:
Art. 117. The following are conjugal partnership properties:
(1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund,
whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
Article 116 of the Family Code is even more unequivocal in that "[a]ll property acquired during
the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in
579
the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved."
We are not persuaded by Titan's arguments that the property was Martha's exclusive
property because Manuel failed to present before the RTC any proof of his income in 1970,
hence he could not have had the financial capacity to contribute to the purchase of the property
in 1970; and that Manuel admitted that it was Martha who concluded the original purchase of
the property. In consonance with our ruling in Spouses Castro v. Miat, Manuel was not required
to prove that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership. Rather, the presumption
applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear. Here, we
find that Titan failed to overturn the presumption that the property, purchased during the
spouses' marriage, was part of the conjugal partnership. In the absence of Manuel's consent,
the Deed of Sale is null and void.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The July 20, 2004 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67090 which affirmed with modifications the March 7, 2000
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80, and its August 31, 2005
Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED, without prejudice to the
recovery by petitioner Titan Construction Corporation of the amounts it paid to Martha S. David
in the appropriate action before the proper court.
580
Ching v. CA
ALFREDO CHING and ENCARNACION CHING, petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 124642. February 23, 2004.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This petition for review, under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, assails the Decision
of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated November 27, 1995 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33585, as well as
the Resolution on April 2, 1996 denying the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. The
impugned decision granted the private respondent’s petition for certiorari and set aside the
Orders of the trial court dated December 15, 1993 and February 17, 1994nullifying the
attachment of 100,000 shares of stocks of the Citycorp Investment Philippines under the name
of petitioner Alfredo Ching.
Facts:
On September 26, 1978, the Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained
a loan of P9,000,000.00 from the Allied Banking Corporation (ABC). By virtue of this loan, the
PBMCI, through its Executive Vice-President Alfredo Ching, executed a promissory note for the
said amount promising to pay on December 22, 1978 at an interest rate of 14% per annum. As
added security for the said loan, on September 28, 1978, Alfredo Ching, together with Emilio
Tañedo and Chung Kiat Hua, executed a continuing guaranty with the ABC binding themselves
to jointly and severally guarantee the payment of all the PBMCI obligations owing the ABC to
the extent of P38,000,000.00. The loan was subsequently renewed on various dates, the last
renewal having been made on December 4, 1980.
Earlier, on December 28, 1979, the ABC extended another loan to the PBMCI in the
amount of P13,000,000.00 payable in eighteen months at 16% interest per annum. As in the
previous loan, the PBMCI, through Alfredo Ching, executed a promissory note to evidence the
loan maturing on June 29, 1981. This was renewed once for a period of one month.
The PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all its loans. Hence, on August 21, 1981, the
ABC filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment against
the PBMCI to collect the P12,612,972.88 exclusive of interests, penalties and other bank
charges.
In the meantime, on July 26, 1983, the deputy sheriff of the trial court levied on
attachment the 100,000 common shares of Citycorp stocks in the name of Alfredo Ching.
On November 16, 1993, Encarnacion T. Ching, assisted by her husband Alfredo Ching,
filed a Motion to set aside the levy on attachment. She alleged inter alia that the 100,000
581
shares of stocks levied on by the sheriff were acquired by her and her husband during their
marriage out of conjugal funds after the Citycorp Investment Philippines. Furthermore, the
indebtedness covered by the continuing guaranty/comprehensive suretyship contract executed
by petitioner Alfredo Ching for the account of PBMCI did not redound to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.
Issue:
Whether or not the levy on attachment of the 100,000 shares of stocks in the name of
petitioner-husband should be set aside for the said shares of stocks were conjugal in nature;
hence, not liable for the account of her husband under his continuing guaranty and suretyship
agreement with the PBMCI.
Ruling:
Yes.
Article 161 (1) of the New Civil Code now Article 121 (2 and 3) of the Family Code of the
Philippines provides: “The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (1) All debts and obligations
contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by
the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership.
The Supreme Court held in this case that the private respondent failed to prove that the
conjugal partnership of the petitioners was benefited by the petitioner-husband’s act of
executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the private respondent for and
in behalf of PBMCI. The contract of loan was between the private respondent and the PBMCI,
solely for the benefit of the latter. No presumption can be inferred from the fact that when the
petitioner-husband entered into an accommodation agreement or a contract of surety, the
conjugal partnership would thereby be benefited.
Fallo:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE AND REVERSED. The assailed orders of
the RTC are AFFIRMED.
582
Castro v.Miat
SPOUSES VIRGILIO and MICHELLE CASTRO, MOISES B. MIAT and ALEXANDER V.

MIAT, petitioners, vs. ROMEO V. MIAT, respondent.
G.R. No. 143297. February 11, 2003.
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 43053, entitled “Romeo V. Miat vs. Spouses Virgilio and Michelle Castro,
Moises B. Miat and Alexander V. Miat,” dated November 29, 1999.
Facts:
Spouses Moises and Concordia Miat bought two parcels of land during their coverture.
The first is located in Parañaque, Metro Manila and the second is located in Paco, Manila.
Concordia died on April 30, 1978. They had two children: Romeo and Alexander.
While at Dubai, United Arab Emirates, Moises agreed that the Parañaque and Paco
properties would be given to Romeo and Alexander. However, when Moises returned in 1984,
he renegotiated the agreement with Romeo and Alexander. He wanted the Parañaque property
for himself but would leave the Paco property to his two sons. They agreed.
It appears that Moises and Concordia bought the Paco property on installment basis on
May 17, 1977. However, it was only on December 14, 1984 that Moises was able to pay its
balance. He secured the title over the property in his name as a widower. According to Romeo,
Moises violated the agreement that their (Romeo’s and Alexander’s) names would be registered
in the title once the balance was paid.
Romeo and Alexander lived on the Paco property but in April 1988, Alexander agreed to
sell to Romeo his share in the Paco property.
In February 1988, Romeo learned that Rosalina Castro, mother of petitioner Virgilio
Castro, had given Moises P30, 000.00 as down payment for the sale by Moises of the Paco
property to her son. Romeo was informed that the Paco property had been sold to Castro by
Moises by virtue of a deed of sale dated December 5, 1988 for P95, 000.00. Alexander testified
that after the sale, his father got one-third of the proceeds while he received two-thirds. Romeo
did not get a single centavo.
Romeo then filed an action to nullify the sale between Moises and the Castro spouses
and to compel Moises and Alexander to execute a deed of conveyance of the Paco property to
him upon payment of the balance of its agreed price.
The petitioners contend that the Paco property is the capital property of Moises. They
allege that the spouses Moises and Concordia purchased the property on installment basis in
583
1977 but stress that it was Moises who paid the balance of P12, 000.00 pesos in 1984. At that
time, Concordia had long been dead.
Issue:
Whether or not the Paco property is the capital property of Moises.
Ruling:
No.
The Paco property is a conjugal property of Moises and Concordia. Since Moises and
Concordia were married before the effectivity of the Family Code, the provisions of the New Civil
Code apply. Article 153(1) of the New Civil Code provides that “The following are conjugal
partnership property: (1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of
the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
x x x.” Moises and Concordia bought the Paco property during their marriage — Moises did not
bring it into their marriage, hence it has to be considered as conjugal.
Petitioners also overlook Article 160 of the New Civil Code. It provides that “all property
of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.”
Petitioners-spouses Castro were not buyers in good faith. A purchaser in good faith must
be wary and should investigate the rights of those in possession. It was proven that Romeo told
Virgilio in a meeting that Romeo has a right over the Paco property by virtue of an oral partition
and assignment. Virgilio even admitted that he knew Romeo was in possession of the title and
Romeo then insisted that he is the owner of the property. Petitioners-spouses therefore have no
right in the property.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. CV No. 43053 is
affirmed. Costs against petitioners.
584
Francisco v. CA
TERESITA C. FRANCISCO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS; and CONCHITA

EVANGELISTA and Her Husband SIMEON EVANGELISTA; ARACELI F. MARILLA and Her
Husband FREDDY MARILLA; ANTONIO V. FRANCISCO; and EUSEBIO FRANCISCO,
respondents.
G.R. No. 102330. November 25, 1998.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse respondent appellate court’s decision
promulgated on October 7, 1991, affirming in toto the judgment of the Regional Trial Court
which ruled, thus:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court renders judgment in favor of the
defendants and against the plaintiff, as follows:
1) Ordering the dismissal of the Complaint with costs against the plaintiff;
2) Declaring the defendant Eusebio Francisco the administrator of the properties described in
paragraph eight (8) of the Complaint; and
3) Sentencing the plaintiff to pay the defendants the sum of P10,000.00 as and for attorney’s
fees.
Facts:
Petitioner is the legal wife of private respondent Eusebio Francisco by his second
marriage. Private respondents Conchita Evangelista, Araceli F. Marilla and Antonio Francisco
are children of Eusebio by his first marriage.
Petitioner alleges that since their marriage on February 10, 1962, she and Eusebio have
acquired the following: (1) a sari-sari store, a residential house and lot, and an apartment house
and; (2) a house and lot located at Rodriguez, Rizal. Petitioner further avers that these
properties were administered by Eusebio until he was invalidated on account of tuberculosis,
heart disease and cancer, thereby, rendering him unfit to administer them. Petitioner also claims
that private respondents succeeded in convincing their father to sign a general power of
attorney which authorized Conchita Evangelista to administer the house and lot together with
the apartments situated in Rodriguez, Rizal.
On August 31, 1988, petitioner filed a suit for damages and for annulment of said
general power of attorney. Petitioner also sought to be declared as the administratrix of the
properties in dispute. In due course, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of private
585
respondents. It held that the petitioner failed to adduce proof that said properties were acquired
during the existence of the second conjugal partnership, or that they pertained exclusively to the
petitioner. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject properties are conjugal properties of the spouses.
Ruling:
No.
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "all property of the marriage is presumed
to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife". However, proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine
qua non for the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership but petitioner failed to adduce
ample evidence to show that the properties which she claimed to be conjugal were acquired
during her marriage with Eusebio.
Property already owned by a spouse prior to the marriage, and brought to the marriage,
is considered his or her separate property. As regards the house, apartment and sari-sari store,
petitioner relied on the building permits for the house and the apartment, with her as the
applicant although in the name of Eusebio. She also invoked the business license for the sari-
sari store issued in her name alone. It must be emphasized that the aforementioned documents
in no way prove that the improvements were acquired during the second marriage. And the fact
that one is the applicant or licensee is not determinative of the issue as to whether or not the
property is conjugal or not.
Regarding the property at San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal, private respondents assert that
their father purchased it during the lifetime of their mother. In contrast, petitioner claims
ownership over said property inasmuch as the title thereto is registered in the name of "Eusebio
Francisco, married to Teresita Francisco." It must be stressed that the certificate of title upon
which petitioner anchors her claim is inadequate. The fact that the land was registered in the
name of "Eusebio Francisco, married to Teresita Francisco", is no proof that the property was
acquired during the spouses coverture.
Therefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.
586
Diaz v. CA
CONCESO DIAZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TOMAS DE GUZMAN,

respondents.
G.R. No. L-42180. November 10, 1986.
PARAS, J.:
Petition for certiorari to nullify the Resolution of respondent Court of Appeals dated
October 10, 1975 in CA-G.R. No. 51356-R affirming in toto the Order of the Court of First
Instance of Isabela granting private respondent Tomas de Guzman's petition for the surrender
of owner's duplicate certificate of title.
Facts:
The late Teodulo Diaz, who died intestate before the last World War, was the registered
owner of a tract of land located in Ilagan, Isabela. He was survived by his wife Maria Espejo
(now also deceased) and five children, one of whom is the herein petitioner Conceso Diaz.
On June 9, 1947, the widow, Maria Espejo sold a portion of the land to herein private
respondent Tomas de Guzman. The transaction was evidenced by a Deed of Sale.
Tomas de Guzman declared the land he purchased for taxation purposes, and he has
been paying the taxes thereon. In a letter dated September 22, 1971 private respondent
requested the Register of Deeds of Isabela to issue the corresponding transfer certificate of title
of the land conveyed. The Register of Deeds in turn wrote a letter to petitioner Conceso Diaz to
surrender the owner's duplicate certificate of title in order that the deed of sale could be properly
annotated. Due to the refusal of petitioner to surrender the owner's duplicate certificate of title,
de Guzman had to file on April 5, 1972, in the Court of First Instance of Isabela, a petition for the
surrender of the owner's duplicate of Original Certificate of Title in the name of the late Teodulo
Diaz.
Among his contention, Diaz argued that the property sold is part of the intestate estate of
his late father, thus, Maria Espejo did not have any judicial authority to sell the portion of the lot
in question.
Issue:
Whether or not the property of Teodulo Diaz and Maria Espejo is conjugal giving her the
authority to sell the lot in question to Tomas De Guzman.
587
Ruling:
Yes.
Upon a consideration of the established facts, it was shown that the property was
acquired during the existence of the conjugal partnership. It is a settled rule that adjudication of
real property to one of the spouses only, does not necessarily mean that it is his or her
exclusive property, if said land was acquired during the marriage.
Upon the death of Teodulo Diaz, the land was divided into two, one-half became the
conjugal share of Maria Espejo and the other half became the hereditary share of the heirs of
Teodulo Diaz by operation of law.
When Maria Espejo Vda. de Diaz sold the lot to respondent in 1947, she did not sell the
same as an administratrix; she sold it as owner of the other half. There was, therefore, no need
for any judicial authority for her to sell her own property or share in the conjugal partnership.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioner.
588
Ayala Investments v. CA
AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. and ABELARDO MAGSAJO, petitioners,

vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES ALFREDO & ENCARNACION CHING,
respondents.
G.R. No. 118305. 12 February 1998.
MARTINEZ, J.:
Under Article 161 of the Civil Code, what debts and obligations contracted by the husband
alone are considered “for the benefit of the conjugal partnership” which are chargeable against
the conjugal partnership? Is a surety agreement or an accommodation contract entered into by
the husband in favor of his employer within the contemplation of the said provision?
Facts:
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a P50, 300,000 loan from petitioner Ayala
Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). As added security for the credit line
extended to PBM, respondents Alfredo Ching, Executive Vice President of PBM, executes
security agreements making himself jointly and severally answerable with BM’s indebtedness to
AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, AIDC filed a case for sum of money against PBM and
respondent-husband Alfredo Ching with the Court of First Instance (CFI).
The CFI rendered judgment ordering PBM and respondent-husband Alfredo Ching to
jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount of P 50,300,000 with interests.
Pending appeal of judgment in the civil case, upon motion of AIDC, the lower court
issued a writ of execution pending appeal. Upon AIDC’s putting up of an P8,000,000 bond, a
writ of execution was issued. Thereafter, petitioner Abelardo Magsajo, Sr. appointed sheriff in
the civil case caused the issuance and service upon respondents-spouses of a notice of a
sheriff sale on three of their conjugal properties. Petitioner Magsajo then scheduled the auction
sale of the properties levied.
Upon application of private respondents, the lower court issued a temporary restraining
order to prevent petitioner Magsajo from proceeding with the enforcement of the writ of
execution and with the sale of the said properties at public auction.
However, after filing of a petition for certiorari by AIDC, the CA issued a Temporary
Restraining Order enjoining the lower court from enforcing its order, thus paving the way for the
scheduled auction sale of respondents-spouses conjugal properties.
The auction sale took place, AIDC being the only bidder, was issued a Certificate of Sale
by petitioner Magsajo which was registered.
589
Eventually, the trial court promulgated its decision declaring the sale on execution null
and void. The CA promulgated the assailed decision, affirming the decision of the RTC which
held that “the loan procured from respondent-appellant AIDC was for the advancement and
benefit of the PBM and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of petitioner-appellees.
Issue:
Whether or not the debts and obligations contracted by respondent husband alone in
this case are considered for the benefit of the conjugal partnership which is chargeable against
the conjugal partnership.
Ruling:
No.
Where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law
presumes and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e. he directly
received money and services to be used in and for his own business or his own profession, that
contract falls within the term “obligation for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.” Here, no
actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit of the family in apparent at the time
of the signing of the contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family
stands to benefit from the loan or services to be rendered to the business or profession of the
husband.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the petition for review should be, as it is hereby, DENIED for lack of
merit.
590
Salvador v. CA
REMEDIOS G. SALVADOR and MA. GRACIA G. SALVADOR, petitioners, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS, ALBERTO and ELPIA YABO, FRANCISCA YABO, et al., respondents.
G.R. No. 109910. April 5, 1995.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Assailed in this petition is the legal determination made by the Court of Appeals on the
issues of which portion of Lot No. 6080 and Lot No. 6180 formed part of the conjugal assets of
the spouses Pastor Makibalo and Maria Yabo, and of whether or not the rights of Pastor's co-
heirs in the estate of Maria Yabo were extinguished through prescription or laches.
Facts:
Alipio Yabo was the owner of Lot No. 6080 and Lot No. 6180. Title thereto devolved
upon his nine children, namely, Victoriano, Procopio, Lope, Jose, Pelagia, Baseliza, Francisca,
Maria, and Gaudencia, upon his death sometime before or during the second world war.
On April 28, 1976, Pastor Makibalo, husband of Maria Yabo, child of Alipio filed with the
Court of First Instance a complaint against the spouses Alberto and Elpia Yabo. In such
complaint, Pastor alleged that he owned a total of 8 shares of the said lots having purchased
the share of seven of Alipio’s children and inherited the share of his wife Maria, and that except
for the portion corresponding to Gaudencia’s share which he did not buy, he occupied,
cultivated and possessed continuously, openly, peacefully and exclusively the two parcels of
land. He therefore prayed that he be declared the absolute owner of 8/9 of the lots questioned.
The trial court rendered judgment, finding Pastor, now Eugelio Salvador and Remedios
Salvador owners of eight shares on Lot No.6080 and some shares on Lot No.6180.
On October 8, 1976, the grandchildren and great grandchildren of the late Alipio Yabo
lodged within the same court a complaint for partition and quieting of title with damages against
Pastor, Enecia, Cristal, and the spouses Eulogio and Remedios Salvador. They alleged that the
aforesaid lots are common properties of the heirs of Alipio and that the defendants after Alipio’s
death became the de facto administrators of the lots and to their surprise discovered that the
Salvadors have been harvesting coconuts from the lots.
The plaintiffs prayed that they and the defendant be declared as the owners of the lots
and that the Salvador spouses be declared as having no rights thereto. The two cases thereby
were consolidated and jointly heard. The trial court however ruled against the plaintiffs.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that Maria did not sell her share to Alberto and
Elpia Yabo; that prescription and laches have not ran against the private respondents with
respect to the 1/9 share of Maria Yabo in the estate of her father and to her conjugal share in
591
the portions acquired from her brother and sisters and Procopio never sold his share in Lot. No.
6080 to Pastor Makibalo.
Issue:
Whether or not, the shares of Jose, Victoriano, Lope, Baseliza, Procopio and Francisca
in Lot No.6180 and in Lot No. 6080 which had been purchased by Pastor during his marriage
with Maria belong to their conjugal partnership.
Ruling:
Yes.
The Court ruled that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to either of them. In the instant case,
the shares of Jose, Victoriano, Lope, Baseliza, Procopio and Francisca in Lot No.6180 and in
Lot No. 6080 had been purchased by Pastor during his marriage with Maria. Such shares would
have been the exclusive property of Pastor had there been proof that the properties were
acquired or purchased by him with his exclusive money. Thus, absent such proof the same was
deemed by the Court to belong to the conjugal partnership of Pastor and Maria.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals of 8 February 1993 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 12839 is AFFIRMED, subject to the modifications indicated above. Upon the
finality of this decision, let this case be forthwith remanded to the court a quo for further
proceedings on the partition of Lots Nos. 6180 and 6080 in conformity with this decision.
592
Ros and Aguete v. PNB Laoag
JOE A. ROS AND ESTRELLA AGUETE, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL

BANK - LAOAG BRANCH, respondent
G.R. No. 170166, April 06, 2011
CARPIO, J.:
G.R. No. 170166 is a petition for review assailing the Decision promulgated on 17
October 2005 by the Court of Appeals (appellate court) in CA-G.R. CV No. 76845. The
appellate court granted the appeal filed by the Philippine National Bank - Laoag Branch (PNB).
The appellate court reversed the 29 June 2001 Decision of Branch 15 of the Regional Trial
Court of Laoag City (trial court) in Civil Case No. 7803.
The trial court declared the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage executed by spouses Jose A. Ros
(Ros) and Estrella Aguete (Aguete) (collectively, petitioners), as well as the subsequent
foreclosure proceedings, void. Aside from payment of attorney's fees, the trial court also
ordered PNB to vacate the subject property to give way to petitioners' possession.
Facts:
On January 13, 1983, spouses Jose A. Ros and Estrella Aguete filed a complaint for the
annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage and all legal proceedings taken thereunder against
PNB, Laoag Branch before the Court of First Instance, Ilocos Norte. docketed as Civil Case No.
7803.The complaint was later amended and was raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15,
Laoag City.
The averments in the complaint disclosed that plaintiff-appellee Joe A. Ros obtained a
loan of P115,000.00 from PNB Laoag Branch on October 14, 1974 and as security for the loan,
plaintiff-appellee Ros executed a real estate mortgage involving a parcel of land - Lot No. 9161
of the Cadastral Survey of Laoag, with all the improvements thereon described under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-9646.
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, PNB instituted extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a
Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of PNB, Laoag as the highest bidder. After the lapse of
one (1) year without the property being redeemed, the property was consolidated and registered
in the name of PNB, Laoag Branch on August 10, 1978.
Claiming that she (plaintiff-appellee Estrella Aguete) has no knowledge of the loan
obtained by her husband nor she consented to the mortgage instituted on the conjugal property,
593
a complaint was filed to annul the proceedings pertaining to the mortgage, sale and
consolidation of the property interposing the defense that her signatures affixed on the
documents were forged and that the loan did not redound to the benefit of the family.
In its answer, PNB prays for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action,
and insists that it was plaintiffs-appellees' own acts of omission/connivance that bar them from
recovering the subject property on the ground of estoppel, laches, abandonment and
prescription.
The trial court rendered its Decision in favor of petitioners. PNB filed its Notice of Appeal
and the appellate court rendered its Decision granting the PNB's appeal. The appellate court
reversed the trial court's decision, and dismissed petitioners' complaint. Hence, the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the mortgage should be annulled on the ground that the plaintiff-appellee
has no knowledge and given no consent to such execution
Held:
No. The petition has no merit. The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the appellate
court.
The civil code was the applicable law at the time of the mortgage. And under Article 173
of the civil code, the wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction
questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without
her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends
to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to
exercise this right, she or her heirs after the dissolution of the marriage may demand the value
of the property fraudulently alienated by the husband.
The husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the consent,
express or implied, of the wife. Should the husband do so, then the contract is voidable. Article
173 of the Civil Code allows Aguete to question Ros' encumbrance of the subject property.
However, the same article does not guarantee that the courts will declare the annulment of the
contract. Annulment will be declared only upon a finding that the wife did not give her consent.
In the present case, we follow the conclusion of the appellate court and rule that Aguete gave
her consent to Ros' encumbrance of the subject property.
594
The documents disavowed by Aguete are acknowledged before a notary public, hence
they are public documents. Every instrument duly acknowledged and certified as provided by
law may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment
being prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved. The
execution of a document that has been ratified before a notary public cannot be disproved by
the mere denial of the alleged signer. PNB was correct when it stated that petitioners' omission
to present other positive evidence to substantiate their claim of forgery was fatal to petitioners'
cause. Petitioners did not present any corroborating witness, such as a handwriting expert, who
could authoritatively declare that Aguete's signatures were really forged.
Ros himself cannot bring action against PNB, for no one can come before the courts
with unclean hands.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
76845 promulgated on 17 October 2005 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
595
Domingo v. Reed
Spouses DANILO and ALBERTA DOMINGO, and EDUARDO QUITEVES, Petitioners, vs.
GUILLERMO REED, Respondent.
G.R. No. 157701. December 9, 2005.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When dealing with registered land, prospective buyers are normally not required by law
to inquire further than what appears on the face of the Torrens certificate of title on file with the
Register of Deeds. Equally settled is the principle, however, that purchasers cannot close their
eyes to known facts that should put a reasonable person on guard; they cannot subsequently
claim to have acted in good faith, in the belief that there was no defect in the vendor’s certificate
of title. Their mere refusal to face up to that possibility will not make them innocent purchasers
for value, if it later becomes apparent that the title was indeed defective, and that they would
have discovered the fact, had they acted with the measure of precaution required of a prudent
person in a like situation.
Facts:
Respondent Guillermo Reed was an overseas contract worker from 1978 to 1986 and
came home only for short vacations. He purchased from the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) on installment basis a 166 square meter property. Because he was working
abroad, it was his wife, Lolita Reed, who paid the consideration to the GSIS. The title covering
said property was issued by the Registry of Deeds in the name of Lolita Reed, married to
Guillermo Reed.
Guillermo had allowed his brother, Dominador, and the latter’s wife, Luz, to stay in the
house constructed on his property.
In December, 1991, Dominador and Luz Reed were summoned to the barangay in
connection with the complaint for ejectment filed against them by Eduardo Quiteves and Alberta
Domingo, who claimed to be the owners of the lot where their house stands. Guillermo denied
having sold his property.
On March 8, 1994, Guillermo filed a complaint for reconveyance of property against
Lolita, spouses Ardaniel and Natividad Villanera, spouses Danilo and Alberta Domingo, and
Eduardo Quiteves, alleging that his wife, Lolita Reed, from whom he had been estranged,
conspiring with the other petitioners, caused the preparation of a special power of attorney
wherein it was made to appear that he authorized his wife to sell the subject property; that he
596
did not sign the special power of attorney nor appear before the notary public because he was
working abroad.
The trial court rendered judgment against Guillermo. However, the Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not Lolita is justified in effecting a sale of the subject property without her
husband’s consent for the maintenance and support of the family.
Ruling:
No.
Lolita’s rights over the property were merely inchoate prior to the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership. There was also absolutely no proof to her allegations that she used the
proceeds of the sale to purchase necessities for the maintenance and support of the family.
Having failed to establish any of these circumstances, she may not unilaterally bind the conjugal
assets.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the Petition and the Petition-in-Intervention are hereby DENIED. Costs
against petitioners.
597
Embrado v. CA
LUCIA EMBRADO and ORESTE TORREGIANI, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

PACIFICO CIMAFRANCA, MARCOS SALIMBAGAT, EDA JIMENEZ and SANTIAGO
JIMENEZ, respondents.
G.R. No. 51457. June 27, 1994.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
LUCIA EMBRADO and ORESTE TORREGIANI, spouses, filed this petition for review
on certiorari from the decision of respondent Court of Appeals upholding the validity of the
Deed of Sale over Lot No. 564 executed by petitioner Lucia Embrado in favor of private
respondent Eda Jimenez.
Facts:
Lucia Embrado was married to Oreste Torregiani in 1943. Prior to the marriage, there
was a sale of Lot 564, a 366-square meter lot to Lucia when she was still single. However, only
on 2 July 1946 when a Venta Definitiva, a notarized document written entirely in Spanish, was
executed by the Carpitanos to Lucia.
The couples, after the marriage made their conjugal abode on the lot and in 1958
constructed a residential commercial building thereon.
On May 1, 1971 an absolute deed of sale was executed by Lucia Embrado Torregiani of
the said lot described as her own paraphernal property to her adopted daughter, Eda Jimenez,
for the sum of P 1,000.00.
On March 6, 1972, Eda Jimenez sold 65 square meters of the said lot to Marcos
Salimbagat for P 6,500.00. On August 1972, the Torregianis spouses instituted an action for
declaration of nullity of contract, annulment of sales, reconveyance and damages against the
spouses Santiago and Eda Jimenez alleging that the sail of said lot to Eda Jimenez was void
not only for lack of consideration but also because the husband of Lucia did not consent to the
sale, which consent is necessary because the lot was a conjugal property.
The trial court held in favor of Lucia. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court’s decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the lot in question is paraphernal property of Lucia.
Ruling:
No.
While the Supreme Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the property in question
was originally a paraphernal property of Lucia, the Supreme Court cannot adopt its conclusion
598
that because Lucia and the original owners agreed for its purchase and sale, ownership was
already acquired by Lucia at that moment. Under Art. 1496 of the Civil Code, "ownership of the
thing sold is acquired by the vendee from the moment it is delivered to him in any of the ways
specified in articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other manner signifying an agreement that the
possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee," and under Art. 1498, "when the sale
is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of
the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or
cannot clearly be inferred."
The Venta Definitiva over the lot in favor of Lucia Embrado was executed by the
Carpitanoses on 2 July 1946 when her marriage to petitioner Oreste Torregiani was already
subsisting.
Another thing more, the second paragraph of Art. 158 of the Civil Code (now Article 120,
Family Code) provides that "buildings constructed, at the expense of the partnership, during the
marriage on land belonging to one of the spouses, also pertain to the partnership, but the value
of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same." Under this article, the land
becomes conjugal upon the construction of the building without awaiting reimbursement before
or at the liquidation of the partnership upon the concurrence of two conditions, to wit: (a) the
construction of the building at the expense of the partnership; and, (b) the ownership of the land
by one of the spouses. 18 The conditions have been fully met in the case at bench. Thus, even
if Lot 564 was originally the paraphernal property of Lucia as evident from the "Venta Definitiva",
the same became conjugal upon the construction of the residential/commercial building in 1958.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals dated 26 April 1979 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision of the then Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court) of Zamboanga del Norte dated 14 June 1976 is REINSTATED and ADOPTED
herein as the decision in this case.
599
Carlos v. Abelardo
HONORIO L. CARLOS, petitioner, vs. MANUEL T. ABELARDO, respondent.

G.R. No. 146504. April 9, 2002.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 10, 2000 in CA-G.R. CV No. 54464 which
reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 172, and
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence the complaint for a sum of money and damages filed by
herein petitioner Honorio Carlos against respondent Manuel Abelardo, his son-in-law, and the
latter’s wife, Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo.
Facts:
Petitioner averred in his complaint filed on October 13, 1994 that in October 1989,
respondent Manuel T Abelardo, his son-in-law, and the latter’s wife, Maria Theresa Carlos-
Abelardo approached him and requested him to advance the amount of US$25,000.00 for the
purchase of a house and lot located at #19952 Chestnut Street, Executive Heights Village,
Paranaque, Metro Manila. To enable and assist the spouses conduct their married life
independently and on their own, petitioner, in October 31, 1989, issued a check in the name of a
certain Pura Vallejo, seller of the property, who acknowledged receipt thereof.
When petitioner inquired from the spouses in July 1991 as to the status of the amount he
loaned to them, the latter acknowledged their obligation but pleaded that they were not yet in a
position to make a definite settlement of the same. Thereafter, respondent expressed violent
resistance to petitioner’s inquiries on the amount to the extent of making various death threats
against petitioner.
On August 24, 1994, petitioner made a formal demand for the payment of the amount of
US$25,000.00 but the spouses failed to comply with their obligation. Thus, petitioner filed a
complaint for collection of a sum of money and damages against respondent and his wife.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. The Court of Appeals reversed
the decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the loan by the husband and wife is the liability of the conjugal property.
Ruling:
Yes.
600
The loan is the liability of the conjugal partnership pursuant to Article 121 of the Family
Code. Notwithstanding the alleged lack of consent of respondent husband, he shall be solidarily
liable for such loan together with his wife.
The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during
the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded
to the benefit of the family. The defendants never denied that the check of US$25,000.00 was
used to purchase the subject house and lot. They do not deny that the same served as their
conjugal home, thus benefiting the family. On the same principle, acknowledgment of the loan
made by the defendant-wife binds the conjugal partnership since its proceeds redounded to the
benefit of the family. Hence, defendant-husband and defendant-wife are jointly and severally
liable in the payment of the loan.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA GR-CV No. 54464 is MODIFIED in that respondent is ordered to pay petitioner
the amounts of (1) US$25,000 or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the time of payment,
plus legal interest from August 4, 1994, until fully paid; (2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(3) P20,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (4) P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
601
BA Finance v. CA
BA FINANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,

AUGUSTO YULO, LILY YULO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-61464. May 28, 1988.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review seeking to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Manila, dismissing the
complaint instituted by the petitioner and ordering it to pay damages on the basis of the private
respondent's counterclaim.
Facts:
On July 1, 1975, private respondent Augusto Yulo secured a loan from the petitioner in
the amount of P591,003.59 as evidenced by a promissory note he signed in his own behalf and
as representative of the A & L Industries. Respondent Yulo presented an alleged special power
of attorney executed by his wife, respondent Lily Yulo, who manages A & L Industries and under
whose name the said business is registered, purportedly authorizing Augusto to procure the
loan and sign the promissory note. About two months prior to the loan, however, Augusto had
already left Lily and their children and had abandoned their conjugal home. When the obligation
became due and demandable, Augusto failed to pay the same.
Private respondent Lily filed her answer with counterclaim, alleging that although
Augusto and she are husband and wife, the former had abandoned her and their children five
months before the filing of the complaint; that they were already separated when the promissory
note was executed; that her signature in the special power of attorney was forged because she
had never authorized Augusto in any capacity to transact any business for and in behalf of A &
L Industries, which is owned by her as a single proprietor, that she never got a single centavo
from the proceeds of the loan mentioned in the promissory note; and that as a result of the
illegal attachment of her properties, which constituted the assets of the A & L Industries, the
latter closed its business and was taken over by the new owner.
The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the petitioner's complaint against the
private respondent Lily Yulo and A & L Industries. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the loan incurred by respondent Augusto is a liability of the conjugal
partnership.
602
Ruling:
No.
There is no dispute that A & L Industries was established during the marriage of Augusto
and Lily Yulo and therefore the same is presumed conjugal and the fact that it was registered in
the name of only one of the spouses does not destroy its conjugal nature. However, for the said
property to be held liable, the obligation contracted by the husband must have redounded to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership. In the present case, the obligation which the petitioner is
seeking to enforce against the conjugal property managed by the private respondent Lily was
undoubtedly contracted by Augusto for his own benefit because at the time he incurred the
obligation he had already abandoned his family and had left their conjugal home. Worse, he
made it appear that he was duly authorized by his wife in behalf of A & L Industries, to procure
such loan from the petitioner.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE and the
petitioner is ordered to pay the private respondent Lily Yulo the amount of SIX HUNDRED
SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS (P660,000.00) as actual damages. The remaining properties
subject of the attachment are ordered released in favor of the petitioner.
603
Johnson and Johnson v. CA
JOHNSON & JOHNSON (PHILS.), INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALEJO M.
VINLUAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 102692. September 23, 1996.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
May a husband be held liable for the debts of his wife which were incurred without his
consent and which did not benefit the conjugal partnership? May a judgment declaring a wife
solely liable, be executed upon conjugal property, over the objection of the husband?
These are the main questions raised in the instant petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks nullification of the Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 19178
of the Court of Appeals, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED, and the
orders dated July 24, 1989 and October 4, 1989 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
137, in Civil Case No. 4186, as well as the notices of levy issued by the Provincial Sheriff of
Rizal dated February 8, 1989, are hereby declared null and void and set aside. No costs."
Facts:
Johnson & Johnson (Phils.), Incorporated is engaged in the manufacturing and selling of
various cosmetics, health, and body care products, as well as medical drugs. On several
occasions in the year 1982, the defendant, Delilah Vinluan, purchased products of the said
corporation, as she was also engaged in the business of retailing Johnson products. The
defendants, under the name and style of "Vinluan Enterprises," thus incurred an obligation of
Two Hundred Thirty-Five Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty Pesos and Eighty-Nine (P235,880.89)
Centavos, for which she issued seven (7) Philippine Banking Corporation checks of varying
amounts and due dates. When presented on their respective due dates, however, the checks
given in payment of the obligation bounced and were dishonored for having been drawn against
insufficient funds.
Several demands thereafter for payment were to no avail, despite the several extensions
given to the defendant spouses to settle the obligation. It was only on January 5, 1983 that the
defendants made a partial payment of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos, thereby reducing their
principal obligation to P230,880.89. When no further payments were made to settle the
obligation despite repeated demands, Johnson & Johnson was constrained to file a complaint
on June 8, 1983 against defendant spouses Vinluan, for collection of the principal obligation
plus interest, with damages.
Issue:
604
Whether or not Alejo Vinluan, as well as their conjugal property, can be held liable for his
wife’s obligation to plaintiff corporation.
Ruling:
No.
The Supreme Court ruled that the decision of the trial court is final and executory. Thus,
it affirmed the lower court’s decision when it charged defendant Delilah Vinluan alone to pay the
plaintiff corporation, having already declared that the defendant-husband cannot be held legally
liable for his wife’s obligation. Perhaps, when it was later discovered that the defendant Delilah
Vinluan did not have sufficient property of her own to settle their obligation, the conjugal
properties of the defendant spouses became the object of levy. But in order to bind the conjugal
partnership and its properties, the New Civil Code provides that the debts and obligations
contracted by the husband or the wife must be for the benefit of the conjugal partnership and
that the husband must consent to his wife’s engaging in business. However, in this case, the
husband did not give his consent neither did the obligation redounded to the benefit of the
family. Hence, the conjugal partnership as well as the defendant cannot be held liable.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the herein petition is
hereby DENIED, and the Decision of the respondent Court is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
605
Fuentes v. Roca
MANUEL O. FUENTES and LETICIA L. FUENTES, petitioners, vs.

CONRADO G. ROCA, ANNABELLE R. JOSON, ROSE MARIE R. CRISTOBAL and PILAR
MALCAMPO, respondents. G.R. No. 178902, April 21, 2010
ABAD, J.:
This case is about a husband’s sale of conjugal real property, employing a challenged affidavit
of consent from an estranged wife. The buyers claim valid consent, loss of right to declare nullity
of sale, and prescription.
Facts:
Sabina Tarroza owned a titled lot in Canelar, Zamboanga City. On October 11, 1982 she
sold it to her son, Tarciano T. Roca (Tarciano) under a deed of absolute sale.
Six years later, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to petitioners Manuel and Leticia Fuentes
(the Fuentes spouses). They arranged to meet at the office of Atty. Romulo D. Plagata whom
they asked to prepare the documents of sale. They later signed an agreement to sell that Atty.
Plagata prepared.
The parties left their signed agreement with Atty. Plagata who then worked on the other
requirements of the sale. According to the lawyer, he went to see Rosario in one of his trips to
Manila and had her sign an affidavit of consent. As soon as Tarciano met the other conditions,
Atty. Plagata notarized Rosario’s affidavit in Zamboanga City. In 1989, Tarciano executed a
deed of absolute sale in favor of the Fuentes spouses. A new title was issued in the name of the
spouses who immediately constructed a building on the lot. On January 28, 1990 Tarciano
passed away, followed by his wife Rosario who died nine months afterwards.
Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario, namely, respondents
Conrado G. Roca, Annabelle R. Joson, and Rose Marie R. Cristobal, together with Tarciano’s
sister, Pilar R. Malcampo, represented by her son, John Paul M. Trinidad (collectively, the
Rocas), filed an action for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the land against the Fuentes
spouses before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City. The Rocas claimed that the
sale to the spouses was void since Tarciano’s wife, Rosario, did not give her consent to it. Her
signature on the affidavit of consent had been forged. They thus prayed that the property be
reconveyed to them upon reimbursement of the price that the Fuentes spouses paid Tarciano.
At the trial, both the Rocas and the Fuentes spouses presented handwriting experts. The
Rocas’ expert testified that the signatures were not written by the same person. Making the
same comparison, the spouses’ expert concluded that they were.
606
The RTC rendered judgment, dismissing the case. On appeal, the CA found sufficient
evidence of forgery and did not give credence to Atty. Plagata’s testimony that he saw Rosario
sign the document in Quezon City. Hence, the petition for review.
Issues:
Whether or not Rosario’s signature on the document of consent to her husband
Tarciano’s sale of their conjugal land to the Fuentes spouses was forged;
Whether or not only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could bring the action
to annul that sale.
Held:
1. Yes. The Court agrees with the CA. The CA found that Rosario’s signature had been
forged. It observed a marked difference between her signature on the affidavit of consent and
her specimen signatures. The CA gave no weight to Atty. Plagata’s testimony that he saw
Rosario sign the document in Manila on September 15, 1988 since this clashed with his
declaration in the jurat that Rosario signed the affidavit in Zamboanga City on January 11, 1989.
Moreover, the Court agrees with the CA’s observation that Rosario’s signature strokes
on the affidavit appears heavy, deliberate, and forced. Her specimen signatures, on the other
hand, are consistently of a lighter stroke and more fluid. The way the letters "R" and "s" were
written is also remarkably different. The variance is obvious even to the untrained eye.
Significantly, Rosario’s specimen signatures were made at about the time that she
signed the supposed affidavit of consent. They were, therefore, reliable standards for
comparison. The Fuentes spouses presented no evidence that Rosario suffered from any illness
or disease that accounted for the variance in her signature when she signed the affidavit of
consent. Notably, Rosario had been living separately from Tarciano for 30 years since 1958.
And she resided so far away in Manila. It would have been quite tempting for Tarciano to just
forge her signature and avoid the risk that she would not give her consent to the sale or demand
a stiff price for it.
The Fuentes spouses honestly relied on the notarized affidavit as proof of Rosario’s
consent does not matter. The sale is still void without an authentic consent.
2. No. The Fuentes spouses point out that it was to Rosario, whose consent was not
obtained, that the law gave the right to bring an action to declare void her husband’s sale of
conjugal land. But here, Rosario died in 1990, the year after the sale. Does this mean that the
right to have the sale declared void is forever lost?
As stated above, that sale was void from the beginning. Consequently, the land
remained the property of Tarciano and Rosario despite that sale. When the two died, they
607
passed on the ownership of the property to their heirs, namely, the Rocas. As lawful owners, the
Rocas had the right, under Article 429 of the Civil Code, to exclude any person from its
enjoyment and disposal.
In fairness to the Fuentes spouses, however, they should be entitled, among other
things, to recover from Tarciano’s heirs, the Rocas, the P200, 000.00 that they paid him, with
legal interest until fully paid, chargeable against his estate.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS WITH MODIFICATION the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 00531 dated February 27, 2007.
608
Bautista v. Silva
SPS. BAUTISTA, plaintiff

vs.
SILVA, defendant
G.R. No.157434. September 19,2006
FACTS:
A parcel of land was registered in the names of spouses Berlina Silva and Pedro Silva.
In 1988, Pedro Silva, for himself and as attorney-in-fact of his wife Berlina, thru a Special Power
of Attorney executed by Berlina in his favor, signed and executed a Deed of absolute sale over
the said parcel of land in favor of defendants-spouses Carlo and Nida Bautista.
The RTC found out that the said Special Power of Attorney as signed by Berlina is a
forgery. It appears that the SPA was executed, when she was in Germany and has no
knowledge to the said execution with is tantamount to not consent. The defendants prayed that
the share of Berlina in the parcel of land sold to them be excluded and the share of Pedro be
retained. Thus, the RTC did not entertain the defendant’s prayer and ruled in favor of Berlina.
On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the decision rendered by the RTC in toto.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the share of Berlina in the parcel of land to the defendants be excluded
and the share of Pedro be retained.
RULING:
The court ruled that, the nullity of the sale of conjugal property contracted by the
husband without the marital consent of the wife affects the entire property not just the share of
the wife.
609
Alfredo v. Borras
SPOUSES GODOFREDO ALFREDO and CARMEN LIMON ALFREDO, et al., petitioners,

vs. SPOUSES ARMANDO BORRAS and ADELIA LOBATON BORRAS, respondents.
G.R. No. 144225. June 17, 2003.
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
The registered owners of the Subject Land, which is the subject of controversy in this
case, were petitioner spouses, Godofredo and Carmen Alfredo. The Subject Land is covered
by Original Certificate of Title No. 284 issued to Godofredo and Carmen.
On 7 March 1994, the private respondents, spouses Armando Borras and Adelia
Lobaton Borras, filed a complaint for specific performance against Godofredo and Carmen
before the trial court. Armando and Adelia alleged in their complaint that Godofredo and
Carmen mortgaged the Subject Land for P7,000.00 with the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP). To pay the debt, Carmen and Godofredo sold the Subject Land to Armando
and Adelia for P15,000.00, the buyers to pay the DBP loan and its accumulated interest, and
the balance to be paid in cash to the sellers.
Armando and Adelia gave Godofredo and Carmen the money to pay the loan to DBP.
Godofredo and Carmen introduced Armando and Adelia, as the new owners of the Subject
Land, to the old tenants of the same. Armando and Adelia then took possession of the Subject
Land.
Armando and Adelia discovered that Godofredo and Carmen had re-sold portions of the
Subject Land to several persons. Thus, Armando and Adelia filed a complaint for specific
performance.
The trial court ruled in favor of Armando and Adelia. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contract of sale made by Carmen is void because she did not obtain
the consent and authority of her husband, Godofredo.
610
RULING:
No.
The Supreme Court ruled that the contract of sale was voidable subject to annulment by
the husband. Following petitioners’ argument that Carmen sold the land to Armando and
Adelia without the consent of Carmen’s husband, the sale would only be voidable and not void.
The Family Code provides that any alienation or encumbrance made by the husband of
the conjugal partnership property without the consent of the wife is void. However, when the
sale is made before the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code.
Article 173 of the Civil Code provides that the disposition of conjugal property without the wife’s
consent is not void but merely voidable. Article 173 reads: “The wife may, during the marriage,
and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any
contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any
act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal
partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the
dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the
husband.”
Godofredo can no longer question the sale either. Voidable contracts are susceptible of
ratification. Godofredo ratified the sale when he introduced Armando and Adelia to his tenants
as the new owners of the Subject Land. If the sale was truly unauthorized, then Godofredo
should have filed an action to annul the sale. He did not. The prescriptive period to annul the
sale has long lapsed. Godofredo’s conduct belies his claim that his wife sold the Subject Land
without his consent.
Moreover, Godofredo and Carmen used most of the proceeds of the sale to pay their
debt with the DBP. This shows that the sale redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. Hence, even if Carmen sold the land without the consent of her husband, the sale
still binds the conjugal partnership.
611
Jardeleza v. Jardeleza
TEODORO L. JARDELEZA, petitioner,

vs.
GILDA L. JARDELEZA, ERNESTO L. JARDELEZA, JR., MELECIO GIL L. JARDELEZA, and
GLENDA L. JARDELEZA, respondents.
G.R. No. 112014. December 5, 2000.
PARDO, J.:
FACTS:
Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. and Gilda L. Jardeleza were married long before 03 August
1988, when the Family Code took effect. The union produced five children, namely: petitioner,
Ernesto, Jr., Melecio, Glenda and Rolando.
On 25 March 1991, Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. then 73 years old, suffered a stroke and
lapsed into comatose condition.
On 3 July 1991, petitioner filed with the trial court a motion for the issuance of letters of
guardianship to him, rather than to his mother, on the ground that she considered the property
acquired by Dr. Jardeleza as her own and did not want to be appointed guardian.
On 09 August 1991, respondents filed with the trial court an opposition to the petition for
guardianship and the motion for issuance of letters of guardianship to petitioner.
On 20 August 1993, the trial court issued an order dismissing the petition for
guardianship. The trial court concluded, without explanation, that the petition is superfluous and
would only serve to duplicate the powers of the wife under the explicit provisions of Article 124,
second paragraph, of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 124 of the Family Code renders superfluous the appointment of a
judicial guardian over the person and estate of an incompetent married person.
612
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that Article 124 of the Family Code is not applicable to the
situation of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. and that the proper procedure was an application for
appointment of judicial guardian under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court.
The Supreme Court remands the case to the trial court for further proceedings
consistent with this decision.
613
Guiang v. CA
ANTONIO and LUZVIMINDA GUIANG, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GILDA CORPUZ, respondents.
G.R. No. 125172. June 26, 1998.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
Gilda Corpuz and Judie Corpuz are legally married spouses. They were married on
December 24, 1968. The couple has three children, namely: Junie, Harriet and Jodie.
On February 14, 1983, the couple Gilda and Judie, bought a 421 sq. meter lot located
from Manuel Callejo. Sometime on April 22, 1988, the couple sold one-half portion of the said lot
to Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang.
However, in the absence of his wife Gilda, Judie pushed through the sale of the
remaining one-half portion of their lot on March 1, 1990 to Luzviminda Guiang.
On May 28, 1990, Gilda filed an Amended Complaint against her husband Judie and
petitioners-spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang. The said Complaint sought the declaration
of a certain deed of sale, which involved the conjugal property of private respondent and her
husband, null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale of the remaining one-half portion of the conjugal lot made by the
husband is valid without the consent of his wife.
RULING:
No.
The Supreme Court held that any alienation or encumbrance made after August 3, 1988
when the Family Code took effect by the husband of the conjugal partnership property without
the consent of the wife is null and void.
614
The said contract properly falls within the ambit of Article 124 of the Family Code, which
states: "Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall
belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail,
subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within
five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which
must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence
of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the
transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and
the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.”
615
Nicolas v. CA
SANTIAGO NICOLAS, et al., petitioners,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, et al., respondents.
G.R. No. L-37631. October 12, 1987.
FERNAN, J.:
FACTS:
In 1951, respondent Anastacio Madlangsakay, a rice dealer, married to Lourdes Manuel,

bought from Felipe Garcia three parcels of land. The Transfer Certificate of Title was issued on
October 19, 1951 in the name of Madlangsakay. At the time of the purchase, petitioners were
occupying Lot No. 8 as tenants.
Negotiations begun for the sale of Lot No. 8 to petitioner tenants and in an affidavit dated
August 26, 1958, Madlangsakay promised to subdivide the land among them at P0.70 per
square meter. Nothing came out of the negotiations.
Soon thereafter, the relationship between the new owner and the occupants soured and
quickly deteriorated into a series of legal squabbles which culminated in the present
controversy.
On April 26, 1961, petitioners filed an amended complaint against Madlangsakay to quiet
title over Lot. No. 8.
In his answer, Madlangsakay averred that the deeds of sale and the affidavits which he
purportedly executed were all forgeries and that the land in question, being conjugal property
and mortgaged with the Philippine National Bank, could not be alienated without his wife's
consent.
The trial court upheld Madlangsakay. It dismissed the complaint, nullified the deeds of
sale and the affidavits.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale of the conjugal property made by Madlangsakay is valid.
616
RULING:
No.
The land is a conjugal property and, as such, it could not be alienated without the
conformity of his wife. Moreover, it was heavily mortgaged with the Philippine National Bank,
Malolos branch, and could not be transferred without the bank's consent. As a matter of fact, the
transfer certificate of title was then in the possession of said bank.
617
Uy v. CA
JOSE UY and GLENDA J. UY and GILDA L. JARDELEZA, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO L. JARDELEZA, respondents.
G.R. No. 109557. November 29, 2000.
PARDO, J.:
FACTS:
This case is a dispute between Teodoro L. Jardeleza, against his mother Gilda L.
Jardeleza, and sister and brother-in-law, the spouses Jose Uy and Glenda Jardeleza. The
controversy came about as a result of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.’s suffering of a stroke on
March 25, 1991, which left him comatose and bereft of any motor or mental faculties. Said
Ernesto, Sr. is the father of herein Teodoro Jardeleza and husband of herein private respondent
Gilda Jardeleza.
On June 13, 1991, respondent Gilda herself filed a petition regarding the declaration of
incapacity of Ernesto, Sr., assumption of sole powers of administration of conjugal properties,
and authorization to sell the same.
The trial court rendered its decision finding that it was convinced that Ernesto, Sr. was
truly incapacitated to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, and that the
sale of Lot No. 4291 and the improvements thereon was necessary to defray the mounting
expenses for treatment and hospitalization.
On June 24, 1991, Teodoro filed his Opposition to the proceedings being unaware and
not knowing that a decision has already been rendered on the case by public respondent.
On July 3, 1991, Teodoro filed a motion for reconsideration. He propounded the
argument that the petition for declaration of incapacity, assumption of sole powers of
administration, and authority to sell the conjugal properties was essentially a petition for
guardianship of the person and properties of Ernesto, Sr. As such, it cannot be prosecuted in
accordance with the provisions on summary proceedings set out in Article 253 of the Family
Code. It should follow the rules governing special proceedings in the Revised Rules of Court
which require procedural due process, particularly the need for notice and a hearing on the
merits
618
ISSUE:
Whether or not Gilda, as the wife of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. may assume sole powers of
administration of the conjugal property under Article 124 of the Family Code and dispose of a
parcel of land with its improvements, with the approval of the court in a summary proceedings,
to her co-petitioners, her own daughter and son-in-law, for the amount of eight million pesos.
RULING:
No.
In regular manner, the rules on summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code
govern the proceedings under Article 124 of the Family Code. The situation contemplated is
one where the spouse is absent, or separated in fact or has abandoned the other or consent is
withheld or cannot be obtained. Such rules do not apply to cases where the non-consenting
spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In this case, the trial court found that
the subject spouse "is an incompetent" who was in comatose or semi-comatose condition, a
victim of stroke, cerebrovascular accident, without motor and mental faculties, and with a
diagnosis of brain stem infarct. In such case, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship
proceedings under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court.
619
Sabalones v. CA
SAMSON T. SABALONES, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and

REMEDIOS GAVIOLA-SABALONES, respondents.
G.R. No. 106169. February 14, 1994.
CRUZ, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Samson T. Sabalones left to his wife, herein respondent Remedios Gaviola-
Sabalones, the administration of some of their conjugal, properties for fifteen years having been
assigned to different countries during his successive tours of duties as a member of the
diplomatic service.
Sabalones retired as ambassador in 1985 and came back to the Philippines but not to
his wife and their children. Four years later, he filed an action for judicial authorization to sell a
building and lot in Greenhills belonging to the conjugal partnership.
In her answer, the private respondent opposed the authorization and filed a counterclaim
for legal separation. She alleged that the house in Greenhills was being occupied by her and
their six children and that they were depending for their support on the rentals from another
conjugal property in Forbes Park. She also informed the court that despite her husband's
retirement, he had not returned to his legitimate family and was instead maintaining a separate
residence in Quezon City, with Thelma Cumareng and their three children.
Remedios also asked the court to grant the decree of legal separation and order the
liquidation of their conjugal properties, with forfeiture of her husband's share therein because of
his adultery.
The trial court found that the petitioner had indeed contracted a bigamous marriage with
Thelma Cumareng, to whom he had returned upon his retirement at a separate residence. The
court thus decreed the legal separation of the spouses and the forfeiture of the petitioner's
share in the conjugal properties, declaring as well that he was not entitled to support from his
respondent wife.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent should be the sole administrator of the conjugal
properties.
620
RULING:
Yes.
The Supreme Court notes that the wife has been administering the subject properties for
almost nineteen years, apparently without complaint on the part of the petitioner. He has not
alleged, much less shown, that her administration has caused prejudice to the conjugal
partnership.
Thus, it was held that pending the appointment of an administrator over the whole mass
of conjugal assets, private respondent is allowed to continue with her administration; and
petitioner should be enjoined from interfering with his wife's administration pending resolution of
the appeal.
The law does indeed grant to the spouses joint administration over the conjugal
properties as provided in Article 124 of the Family Code. However, Article 61 states that after a
petition for legal separation has been filed, the trial court shall, in the absence of a written
agreement between the couple, appoint either one of the spouses or a third person to act as the
administrator.
While it is true that no formal designation of the administrator has been made, such
designation was implicit in the decision of the trial court denying the petitioner any share in the
conjugal properties (and thus also disqualifying him as administrator thereof). That designation
was in effect approved by the Court of Appeals when it issued in favor of the respondent wife
the preliminary injunction.
621
Relucio v. Lopez
IMELDA RELUCIO, petitioner,

vs.
ANGELINA MEJIA LOPEZ, respondent.
G.R. No. 138497. January 16, 2002.
PARDO, J.:
FACTS:
On September 15, 1993, Angelina Mejia Lopez filed a petition for “APPOINTMENT AS
SOLE ADMINISTRATRIX OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF PROPERTIES, FORFEITURE,
ETC.,” against Alberto Lopez and petitioner Imelda Relucio. In the petition, Angelina alleged that
sometime in 1968, Alberto, who is legally married to the her, abandoned the latter and their four
legitimate children; that he arrogated unto himself full and exclusive control and administration
of the conjugal properties, spending and using the same for his sole gain and benefit to the total
exclusion of the private respondent and their four children; that defendant Lopez, after
abandoning his family, maintained an illicit relationship and cohabited with herein petitioner
since 1976.
It was further alleged that Alberto and petitioner Relucio, during their period of
cohabitation since 1976, have amassed a fortune consisting mainly of stockholdings in Lopez-
owned or controlled corporations, residential, agricultural, commercial lots, houses, apartments
and buildings, cars and other motor vehicles, bank accounts and jewelry. These properties,
which are in the names of Alberto and petitioner Relucio singly or jointly or their dummies and
proxies, have been acquired principally if not solely through the actual contribution of money,
property and industry of Alberto with minimal, if not nil, actual contribution from petitioner
Relucio.
ISSUE/S:
(a) Whether respondent’s petition for appointment as sole administratrix of the conjugal
property, accounting, etc. against her husband Alberto established a cause of action against
petitioner.
(b) Whether or not there is a basis in law to forfeit Alberto’s share in property co-owned
by him with petitioner, and a dissolution of the conjugal partnership with private respondent.
622
RULING:
(a) No. The first cause of action is for judicial appointment of respondent as
administratrix of the conjugal partnership or absolute community property arising from her
marriage to Alberto. Petitioner is a complete stranger to this cause of action. There is no right-
duty relation between petitioner and respondent that can possibly support a cause of action.
(b) Yes. The Supreme Court upheld that the trial court can issue a judgment ordering
Alberto to make an accounting of his conjugal partnership with respondent, and give support to
respondent and their children, and dissolve Alberto’s conjugal partnership with respondent, and
forfeit Alberto’s share in property co-owned by him and petitioner. Such judgment would be
perfectly valid and enforceable against Alberto J. Lopez.
623
Nable-Jose v. Nable-Jose
AMPARO NABLE-JOSE et al., STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF NEW YORK and CARMEN
CASTRO, plaintiffs and appellants,
vs.
MARIANO NABLE-JOSE et al., defendants and appellees.
No. 7397. December 11, 1916.
CARSON, J.:
FACTS:
Macario Nable-Jose was married to Paz Borja in Dagupan, Pangasinan. In the year 1897,
Paz Borja passed away. On 31 July 1907, Mariano entered into a contract with Standard Oil
Company of New York. He executed as a mortgage a conjugal property and a real estate, a
house and a camarin situated in Dagupan, Pangasinan measuring about 7,091 square meters.
On 24 October 1910, the Standard Oil Company of New York through its lawyers presented
its complaint to Mariano Nable Jose. Said action was known as No. 833 of the Court of First
Instance of Dagupan, Pangasinan. The purpose of the action was to recover from Mariano the
sum of 633,191.244 pesos and the foreclosure of the said mortgages given by Mariano to the
plaintiff upon certain property particularly described in the complaint to secure the payment if the
said sum of money.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mariano Nable-Jose after the death of Paz Borja has the power to sell or
mortgage the community property acquired during their coverture.
RULING:
The husband has the exclusive right as the surviving spouse to take the possession of
the common property, and to administer it, until the same is liquidated and he is entrusted to
make the liquidation upon the death of the wife. The interest of the wife in the community
property is an inchoate interest, a mere expectancy, and after her death, her interest constitutes
neither a legal nor equitable estate, and only ripens into title when upon liquidation and
settlement there appear to be assets in the community partnership.
624
The contract executed by a person, who, according to the registry has a right thereto,
cannot be invalidated with regard to third persons after it has been recorded. The mortgage is
perfectly valid and binding upon all parties.
625
ARTURO R. ABALOS, petitioner,

vs.
DR. GALICANO S. MACATANGAY, JR., respondent.
G.R. No. 155043. September 30, 2004.
TINGA, J.:
FACTS:
Spouses Arturo and Esther Abalos are the registered owners of a parcel of land with
improvements. On June 2, 1988, armed with a Special Power of Attorney, purportedly issued by
his wife, Arturo executed a Receipt and Memorandum of Agreement (RMOA) in favor of
respondent, binding himself to sell to respondent the subject property.
Subsequently, Arturo’s wife, Esther, executed a Special Power of Attorney dated October
25, 1989, appointing her sister, Bernadette Ramos, to act for and in her behalf relative to the
transfer of the property to respondent. Ostensibly, a marital squabble was brewing between
Arturo and Esther at the time and to protect his interest, respondent caused the annotation of
his adverse claim on the title of the spouses to the property on November 14, 1989.
On November 16, 1989, respondent sent a letter to Arturo and Esther informing them of
his readiness and willingness to pay the full amount of the purchase price. The letter contained
a demand upon the spouses to comply with their obligation to turn over possession of the
property to him. Arturo and Esther failed to deliver the property which prompted respondent to
file a complaint for specific performance with damages against petitioners.
The trial court dismissed the complaint for specific performance. The Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale of the conjugal property executed by Arturo and Esther on
separate documents is valid before the dissolution of their marriage.
626
RULING:
No.
Arturo and Esther appear to have been married before the effectivity of the Family Code.
There being no indication that they have adopted a different property regime, their property
relations would automatically be governed by the regime of conjugal partnership of gains. The
subject land which had been admittedly acquired during the marriage of the spouses forms part
of their conjugal partnership.
The husband, even if he is statutorily designated as administrator of the conjugal
partnership, cannot validly alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership
without the wife’s consent. Similarly, the wife cannot dispose of any property belonging to the
conjugal partnership without the conformity of the husband.
More significantly, it has been held that prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership,
the interest of each spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy, which
constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable estate, and does not ripen into title until it appears
that there are assets in the community as a result of the liquidation and settlement. The
interest of each spouse is limited to the net remainder or “remanente liquido” (haber ganancial)
resulting from the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its dissolution. Thus, the right
of the husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the dissolution and
liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of the marriage, when it is finally
determined that, after settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net assets left which can be
divided between the spouses or their respective heirs.
The sale by the husband of property belonging to the conjugal partnership without the
consent of the wife when there is no showing that the latter is incapacitated is void ab initio
because it is in contravention of the mandatory requirements of Article 166 of the Civil Code.
Since Article 166 of the Civil Code requires the consent of the wife before the husband may
alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership, it follows that acts or
transactions executed against this mandatory provision are void except when the law itself
authorizes their validity.
As an exception, the husband may dispose of conjugal property without the wife’s
consent if such sale is necessary to answer for conjugal liabilities mentioned in Articles 161 and
162 of the Civil Code This is one instance where the wife’s consent is not required and,
impliedly, no judicial intervention is necessary.
627
Inescapably, herein petitioner’s action for specific performance must fail. Even on the
supposition that the parties only disposed of their respective shares in the property, the sale,
assuming that it exists, is still void for the right of the husband or the wife to one-half of the
conjugal assets does not vest until the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. Nemo dat qui non
habet. No one can give what he has not.
628
Heirs of Reyes v. Mijares
HEIRS OF IGNACIA AGUILAR-REYES, petitioners,

vs.
SPOUSES CIPRIANO MIJARES and FLORENTINA MIJARES, respondents
G.R. No. 143826. August 28, 2003
FACTS:
Vicente and Ignacia were married in 1960, but had been separated since 1974.
Sometime in 1984, Ignacia learned that on March 1, 1983, Vicente sold a lot belonging to the
conjugal properties to spouses Cipriano and Florentina Mijares on March 1, 2983, without her
knowledge and consent. On August 9, 1984, Ignacia, through her counsel, sent a letter to
respondent spouses demanding the return of her ½ share in the lot. Failing to arrive at an
amicable settlement, she filed a complaint for annulment of sale against respondent spouses.
Respondent spouses claimed that they are purchasers in good faith and that the sale was valid
because it was duly approved by the court.
On February 15, 1990, the trial court declared the sale of the lot void with respect to the
share of Ignacia. On May 31, 1990, the trial court modified its decision by declaring the sale void
in its entirety and ordering Vicente Reyes to reimburse respondent spouses the purchase price
of P110,000.
Both Ignacia and respondent spouses appealed in the Court of Appeals. Pending the
appeal, Ignacia died and she was substituted by her compulsory heirs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale should be annulled in its entirety or only with respect to the
share of Ignacia
RULING:
The husband could not alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the
consent, express or implied, of the wife otherwise, the contract is voidable. In the case, the
629
contract is void and not merely voidable. The trial court correctly annulled the sale of the lot in
its entirety. In Bucoy v. Paulino, a case involving the annulment of sale with assumption of
mortgages executed by the husband without the consent of the wife, it was held that the
alienation or encumbrance must be annulled in its entirety and not only insofar as the share of
the wife in the conjugal property is concerned.
630
Castro v. Miat
SPOUSES VIRGILIO and MICHELLE CASTRO, MOISES B. MIAT and ALEXANDER V.

MIAT, petitioners,
vs.
ROMEO V. MIAT, respondent.
G.R. No. 143297. February 11, 2003.
PUNO, J.:
FACTS:
Spouses Moises and Concordia Miat bought two parcels of land during their coverture.
The first is located in Parañaque, Metro Manila and the second is located in Paco, Manila.
Concordia died on April 30, 1978. They had two children: Romeo and Alexander.
While at Dubai, United Arab Emirates, Moises agreed that the Parañaque and Paco
properties would be given to Romeo and Alexander. However, when Moises returned in 1984,
he renegotiated the agreement with Romeo and Alexander. He wanted the Parañaque property
for himself but would leave the Paco property to his two sons. They agreed.
It appears that Moises and Concordia bought the Paco property on installment basis on
May 17, 1977. However, it was only on December 14, 1984 that Moises was able to pay its
balance. He secured the title over the property in his name as a widower. According to Romeo,
Moises violated the agreement that their (Romeo’s and Alexander’s) names would be registered
in the title once the balance was paid.
Romeo and Alexander lived on the Paco property but in April 1988, Alexander agreed to
sell to Romeo his share in the Paco property.
In February 1988, Romeo learned that Rosalina Castro, mother of petitioner Virgilio
Castro, had given Moises P30, 000.00 as down payment for the sale by Moises of the Paco
property to her son. Romeo was informed that the Paco property had been sold to Castro by
Moises by virtue of a deed of sale dated December 5, 1988 for P95, 000.00. Alexander testified
that after the sale, his father got one-third of the proceeds while he received two-thirds. Romeo
did not get a single centavo.
Romeo then filed an action to nullify the sale between Moises and the Castro spouses
and to compel Moises and Alexander to execute a deed of conveyance of the Paco property to
him upon payment of the balance of its agreed price.
631
The petitioners contend that the Paco property is the capital property of Moises. They
allege that the spouses Moises and Concordia purchased the property on installment basis in
1977 but stress that it was Moises who paid the balance of P12, 000.00 pesos in 1984. At that
time, Concordia had long been dead.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Paco property is the capital property of Moises.
RULING:
No.
The Paco property is a conjugal property of Moises and Concordia. Since Moises and
Concordia were married before the effectivity of the Family Code, the provisions of the New Civil
Code apply. Article 153(1) of the New Civil Code provides that “The following are conjugal
partnership property: (1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of
the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
x x x.” Moises and Concordia bought the Paco property during their marriage — Moises did not
bring it into their marriage, hence it has to be considered as conjugal.
Petitioners also overlook Article 160 of the New Civil Code. It provides that “all property
of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.”
Petitioners-spouses Castro were not buyers in good faith. A purchaser in good faith must
be wary and should investigate the rights of those in possession. It was proven that Romeo told
Virgilio in a meeting that Romeo has a right over the Paco property by virtue of an oral partition
and assignment. Virgilio even admitted that he knew Romeo was in possession of the title and
Romeo then insisted that he is the owner of the property. Petitioners-spouses therefore have no
right in the property.
632
Perez v. CA
NERISSA PEREZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and
RAY PEREZ, respondents
G.R. No. 118870. March 29, 1996
ROMERO, J.:
FACTS:
Private respondent Ray Perez, a doctor of medicine, is married to petitioner, Nerissa

Perez, a registered nurse. Nerissa began working in the U.S. in October 1988 and she used a
part of her earning to build a modest house for her family in Mandaue City, Cebu. She became
a resident alien in February 1992. After 6 miscarriages and a high-risk pregnancy, Nerissa
finally gave birth to Ray Perez II in New York on July 20, 1992.
On January 17, 1993, the couple and their baby arrived in Cebu. After a few weeks, only
Nerissa returned to the U.S. She alleged that they came home only for a five week vacation and
they all had roundtrip tickets. However, her husband stayed behind to take care of his sick
mother and promised to follow her with their baby. According to Ray, they had agreed to stay
permanently in the Philippines but once Nerissa was in New York, she changed her mind and
continued working. She was supposed to come back immediately after winding her affairs.
When Nerissa arrived home a few days before Ray II’s first birthday, the couple was no
longer in good terms. The petitioner did not want to live near her in-laws. She only wanted to be
with her only child but he was being kept away from her by his husband. On the other hand, Ray
wanted to stay here in the Philippines and maintained that it would not be very difficult to live
here since they have their own home and car. Nerissa was forced to move to her parents.
On July 26, 1993, Nerissa filed a petition for habeas corpus asking respondent Ray to
surrender the custody of their child to her.
On August 27, 1993, the court issued an order awarding custody of the one-year old
child to his mother. Upon appeal by Ray, the Court of Appeals, on September 27,1993,
reversed the decision of the court and awarded the custody of the child to his father.
633
ISSUE:
Whether or not the custody of the child should be given to his father.
RULING:
The general rule that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his
mother finds its raison d'etre in the basic need of a child for his mother's loving care. Only the
most compelling of reasons shall justify the court's awarding the custody of such a child to
someone other than his mother, such as her unfitness to exercise sole parental authority. In the
past the following grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a mother of
custody and parental authority: neglect, abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual
drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity and being sick with a
communicable disease.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside. The custody of the child
belongs to the mother, Nerissa Perez.
634
VIRGILIO MAQUILAN, petitioner,

vs.
DITA MAQUILAN, respondent
G.R. No. 155409. June 8, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent are spouses, having a son. Respondent and her paramour
was convicted for adultery. After which, respondent filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage, dissolution and liquidation of conjugal partnership of gains, and damages, imputing
psychological incapacity on the part of the petitioner.
During the pre-trial of the case, the spouses entered into a compromise agreement. The
said agreement was given judicial imprimatur. However, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for
the repudiation of the compromise agreement and the reconsideration of the same on the
grounds that his previous lawyer did not intelligently and judiciously apprise him of the
consequential effects of the compromise agreement. Such was denied by the RTC.
On August 30, 2002, the CA dismissed the petition holding that the conviction of the
respondent of the crime of adultery does not ipso facto disqualify her from sharing in the
conjugal property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the partial voluntary separation of property by the spouses pending the
petition of nullity of marriage is valid
RULING:
Yes. The compromise agreement partially divided the properties of the conjugal
partnership of gains between the parties and does not deal with the validity of a marriage or
legal separation. Under Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property may be effected
voluntarily or for sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval. The questioned compromise
635
agreement which was judicially approved is exactly such a separation of property allowed under
the law. This holds true even if the proceedings for the declaration of nullity of marriage was still
pending.
636
In re Bermas
IN RE VOLUNTARY DISSOLUTION OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF JOSE

BERMAS, SR. AND PILAR MANUEL BERMAS, petitioners-appellants
No. L-20379. June 22, 1965
CONCEPCION, J.:
FACTS:
On May 31, 1962, the spouses Jose and Pilar Bermasn executed a deed entitled
"Agreement for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership and Separation of Property". Such contract
pertains to the voluntary dissolution of their conjugal partnership and the establishment between
them of the regime of separation of property grounded on Article 191 of the civil code.
The trial court denied the petition upon the ground that, under Article 191 of the Civil
Code, a conjugal partnership shall only be dissolved once a legal separation has been ordered.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a conjugal partnership may be dissolved upon agreement of the spouses
RULING:
Yes. The fourth paragraph of Article 191 of the Civil Code provides that the husband and
wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to
judicial approval. However, in the case, the liquidation cannot be effected without a liquidation of
the conjugal partnership between Jose Bermas, Sr. and his first wife, in which the children by
first marriage have an interest. The decision appealed from is set aside and the case was
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in conformity with this decision.
637
Lacson v. Lacson
ALFONSO LACSON, petitioner

vs.
CARMEN SAN JOSE-LACSON and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents
No. L-23482. August 30, 1968
CASTRO, J.:
FACTS:
On February 14, 1953, Alfonso Lacson and Carmen San Jose-Lacson were married. To
them were born four children.
On January 9, 1963 the respondent spouse left the conjugal home in Santa Clara
Subdivision, Bacolod City, and commenced to reside in Manila. She filed on March 12, 1963 a
complaint in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court (JDRC) of Manila for custody of all their
children as well as support for them and herself.
However, the spouses, thru the assistance of their respective attorneys, succeeded in
reaching an amicable settlement respecting custody of the children, support, and separation of
property. On April 27, 1963 they filed a joint petition dated April 21, 1963, to which the CFI
rendered judgment approving and incorporating in toto their compromise agreement
On May 7, 1963 the respondent spouse filed in the JDRC a motion wherein she alleged
that she "entered into and signed the Joint Petition as the only means by which she could have
immediate custody of the minor children who are all below the age of 7," and thereafter prayed
that she "be considered relieved of the agreement pertaining to the custody and visitation of her
minor children and that since all the children are now in her custody, the said custody in her
favor be confirmed pendente lite." On May 24, 1963 the petitioner spouse opposed the said
motion and moved to dismiss the complaint. The JDRC, on May 28, 1963, sustained the
petitioner spouse's plea of bar by prior judgment and lis pendens, and dismissed the case. After
the denial of her motion for reconsideration, the respondent spouse interposed an appeal to the
Court of Appeals wherein she raised, among others, the issue of validity or legality of the
compromise agreement in connection only with the custody of their minor children. On October
14, 1964 the Court of Appeals certified the said appeal to the Supreme Court, since "no hearing
on the facts was ever held in the court below no evidence, testimonial or documentary,
presented-only a question of law pending resolution in the appeal."
638
ISSUE:
Whether or not the compromise agreement entered into by the parties and the judgment
of CFI grounded on the said agreement, are conformable to law
RULING:
It is valid with respect to the separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership. It is not however, within the province of the court to attempt to compel
one of the spouses to cohabit, andrender conjugal rights to the other.
The order dated April 27, 1963 of the CFI, in so far as it awarded custody of the two
older children who were 6 and 5 years old, respectively, to the father, in effect sought to
separate them from their mother. To that extent therefore, it was null and void because it is
clearly violative of article 363 of the Civil Code.
639
Maxey v. CA
MARGARET, FLORENCE, AND LUCILLE MAXEY, petitioners

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES BEATO MACAYRA AND ALACOPUE MONDAY,
respondents
No. L-45870. May 11, 1984
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

FACTS:
Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales were united together in a marriage performed in
a military fashion in 1903. During their cohabitation, they had six children. The disputed property
involving a parcel of land was acquired in 1911 before the church wedding in 1919.
Regina Morales died sometime after their marriage in 1919. The husband remarried
Julia Pamatluan who sold the properties using a power of attorney to spouses, Mr. and Mrs.
Beato C. Macarya.
Plaintiffs instituted the present case on January 26, 1962, before the Court of First
Instance of Davao, praying for the annulment of the documents of sale covering the subject
parcels of land and to recover possession thereof with damages from the herein defendant
spouses, alleging that the realties were common properties of their parents, having been
acquired during their lifetime and through their joint effort and capital; and that the sales of the
said lands in favor of the defendant spouses in 1953, after the death of their mother, Regina
Morales, was executed by their father, Melbourne Maxey, without their knowledge and consent;
and that they came to know of the above-mentioned sales only in 1961.
On the other hand, defendant-spouses deny the material allegations of the complaint
and assert by way of affirmative defenses that they are the true and lawful owners and
possessors of the properties in question having purchased the same in good faith and that since
then, they have been in possession thereof openly, exclusively and continuously in concept of
owners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the properties in question are the exclusive properties of the late
Melbourne Maxey, to the exclusion of his wife Regina Morales.
640
RULING:
No. Where a man and woman lived as common-law partners in 1903, got married in
1919, and after the death of the woman in 1919, the surviving spouse sold a parcel of land
acquired before they got legally married, article 144 of the new civil code applies and their
children entitled to recover ½ from the vendee.
The disputed properties were owned in common by Melbourne Maxey and the estate of
his late wife, Regina Morales, when they were sold. Technically speaking, the petitioners should
return one-half of the P1, 300.00 purchase price of the land while the private respondents
should pay some form of rentals for their use of one-half of the properties. Equitable
considerations, however, lead us to rule out rentals on one hand and return of P650.00 on the
other.
641
Valdes v. RTC
ANTONIO A. S. VALDES, petitioner,

vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT and
CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-VALDES, respondents.
G.R. No. 122749. July 31, 1996
VITUG, J.:
FACTS:
Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971. Valdes sought
the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. After hearing
the parties following the joinder of issues, the trial court, in its decision of 29 July 1994, granted
the petition. The petitioner and respondent are directed to start proceedings on the liquidation of
their common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the
provisions of Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code, within thirty (30) days from notice.
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing compliance with
Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no
provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage."
Parenthetically, during the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing
their desire to remain with their father, Antonio Valdes, herein petitioner.
ISSUE:
What property regime should govern in unions without marriage?
RULING:
Considering that this Court has already declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent as null and void ab initio, pursuant to Art. 147, the property regime of petitioner and
respondent shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a void marriage, regardless of
the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is
governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family
Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in
previous cases; it provides:
642
"ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void
marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property
acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership.
643
Dino v. Dino
ALAIN DINO
VS.
MA. CARIDAD L. DINO
G.R. NO. 178044 JANUARY 19, 2011
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
On May 30, 2011, petitioner Alain M. Diño filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage against respondent Ma. Caridad L. Diño, citing Psychological Incpacity under Article
36 of the Family Code. The Office of Las Piñas prosecutor, upon finding no indicative facts of
collusion, set the case for trial.
The Trial Court declared on its October 18, 2006 decision on the dissolution of Absolute
Community Property and ruled that a DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall
only be issued upon compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
Petitioner filed for a motion for partial reconsideration questioning the Dissolution of the
Absolute Community Property and the ruling that a decree of annulment shall only be issued
upon compliance with Art. 50 and 51
The Trial Court partially granted the motion and modified its October 18, 2006 decision
stating that a DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued after the
liquidation, partition and distribution of properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Trial court erred when it ordered that a DECREE OF ABSOLUTE
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued after the liquidation, partition and distribution of
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
RULING:
YES
In a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during
the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.
The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spoused should be liquidated
in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the New
Civil Code, “partition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial
proceedings” xxx. It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same
proceeding of nullity of marriage.
644
Buenaventura v. CA
NOEL BUENAVENTURA, plaintiff

vs
COURT OF APPEALS, defendant
GR No. 127358. March 31, 2005
AZCUNA, J.:
FACTS:
On July 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court, declared the marriage between Noel A.
Buenaventura and defendant Isabel Lucia Singh Buenaventura (on July 4, 1979) null and void
ab initio. Noel was revealed to have been psychologically incapacitated; that he had married out
of parental pressure and not out of love; that he had abandoned his family; that this caused
defendant to suffer moral damanges. The Regional Trial Court awarded the defendant with
damages based on Art. 2217 and Art. 21 of the New Civil Code. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the ruling. The plaintiff-appelle therefore filed for a petition of certiorari alleging that the Court of
Appeals erred in awarding damages.
ISSUE:
Can award for damages be provided when the alleged offender is psychologically
incapacitated?
RULING:
The Supreme Court deleted the award for moral and exemplary damages. It is
contradictory to characterize acts as a product of psychological incapacity and hence beyond
the control of the party because of an innate inability while at the same time considering the
same set of acts as willful. Psychological incapacity therefore removes the basis for the
contention that the petitioner purposely deceived the private respondent. Therefore, the award
of moral damages damages was without basis in law and in fact. Since the award of moral and
exemplary damages was no longer justified, the award of attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation is left without basis.
645
VIRGILIO MAQUILAN, petitioner

vs
DITA MAQUILAN, respondent
GR No. 155409. June 8, 2007
AUSTRI A-M ARTINEZ, J.:
FACTS:
Virgilio Maquilan and Dita Maquilan lived a blissful married life and out of which were
blessed to have a son. However, the romance ended when the wife was found out to have an
extra-marital affair. She and her paramour were convicted of adultery and were sentenced to
suffer imprisonment. On June 15, 2001, private respondent, through counsel, filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage, dissolution and liquidation of conjugal partnership of gains and
damages. During pre-trial of the said case, petitioner and private respondent entered into a
compromise agreement. The compromise agreement was given judical imprimatur, which was
erroneously dated January 2, 2002. However, petitioner filed an Omnibus motion dated January
15, 2002 praying for the repudiation of the said agreement. With the lower courts continuously
denying repudiation, petitioner eventually came to the Supreme Court with the same motion
citing among his reasons that the agreement is void for having failed to secure the presence of
the State through the Office of the Solicitor General duing its enactment.
ISSUE:
When is State presence required in Marital Cases (as defined under Art. 48 of the
Family Code)?
RULING:
The Supreme Court denied the petition and validated the compromise agreement. The
purpose of the active participation of the public prosecutor or the OSG is to ensure that the
interest of the state is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration
of nullity of marriage by preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication, or
suppression of evidence. Nothing in the subject compromise agreement touched into the very
merits of the case of nullity of marriage. It merely pertains to an agreement between petitioner
646
and private respondent to separate their conjugal properties partially.
647
Gonzales v. Gonzales
FRANCISCO GONZALES, petitioner,

vs.
ERMINDA GONZALES, respondent
G.R. No. 159521. December 16, 2005
FACTS:
After two years of cohabitation, Francisco and Erminda got married on February 4, 1979.
They begot four children from the said union. On October 29, 1992, respondent filed a complaint
for annulment of their marriage on the ground that petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with his marital obligations. Moreover, she prays for the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains.
On February 12, 1997, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent. The petitioner
appealed to the Court of Appeals, not satisfied with the manner their properties were divided.
He did not contest the decision declaring his marriage to respondent void ab initio.
The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the properties should be divided equally
between the parties
RULING:
No. their property relations shall be governed by Article 147 of the Family Code which
creates a presumption that properties acquired during the cohabitation of the parties under a
void marriage, have been acquired through their joint efforts; work or industry shall be owned by
them in equal shares. It further provides that a party who did not participate in the acquisition by
the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition if
the former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
648
Flora v. Pardo
FLORDELIZA CALPATURA FLORA, DOMINADOR CALPATURA, and TOMAS

CALPATURA, JR., heirs of TOMAS CALPATURA, SR., petitioners,
vs.
ROBERTO, ERLINDA, DANIEL, GLORIA, PATRICIO, JR., EDNA, and NARCISA PRADO,
respondents
G.R. No. 156879. January 20, 2004
FACTS:
After the death of Patricio Prado, Sr., Narcisa subsequently married Bonifacio
Calapatura. In order to support her minor children with her first husband, Narcisa and her
brother-in-law, Tomas Calapatura, Sr., excuted on April 26, 1968 an Agreement of Purchase
and Sale whereby the former agreed to sell to the latter the northern half portion of the property.
Narcisa executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Tomas over the said property. In 1976,
Tomas’ daughter, Flordeliza Calpatura Flora, built a two-storey duplex on the northern part half
portion of the property. Likewise, Maximo Calpatura, son of Tomas’ cousin, built a small house
on the northern portion of theproperty.
On April 8, 1991, respondents filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of sale and
delivery of possession of the northern half portion of the subject property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject property conjugal or paraphernal
RULING:
Article 160 of the Civil Code, which was in effect at the time the sale was entered into,
provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership
unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. In the case, while
Narcisa testified that she bought the property with her own funds, she, however, admitted in the
contract that the property was her conjugal share with her first husband. A verbal assertion that
649
she bought the land with her own funds is inadmissible to qualify the terms of a written
agreement under the parole evidence rule.
650
Mercado-Fehr v. Fehr
ELENA MERCADO-FEHR, petitioner,

vs.
BRUNO FEHR, respondent
G.R. No. 152716. October 23, 2003
PUNO, J.:
FACTS:
The marriage between petitioner and respondent was declared null and void ab initio by
the trial court under Article 36 of the Family Code and ordered the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership of property.
On October 5, 2000, the trial court held that since the marriage between petitioner and
respondent was declared void ab initio, the rules on co-ownership should apply in the liquidation
and partition of the properties they own in common pursuant to Article 147 of the Family Code.
Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, petitioner’s motion was dismissed for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 147 of the Family Code applies in the dissolution of their
properties
RULING:
Yes. All the elements required in Article 147 are present in the case at bar. Considering,
however, the merits of the case, the Court believes that a blind adherence to the general rule
will result in miscarriage of justice as it will divest the petitioner of her just share in their common
property, and thus, deprive her of a significant source of income to support their children whom
the court had entrusted to her care. The Court held that where a rigid application of the rule that
certiorari cannot be substitute for appeal will result in a manifest failure of justice, the provisions
of the Rules of Court which are technical rules may be relaxed.
651
Carino v. Carino
SUSAN NICDAO CARINO, petitioner,

vs.
SUSAN YEE CARINO, respondent
G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001
FACTS:
the first was with petitioner Susan Nicdao Carino and the second was with respondent Susan
Yee Cariño.
complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away under the care of Susan Yee, who
spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for
agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 while respondent
Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00. On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed
the instant case for collection of sum of money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter
alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six
thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively denominated as “death benefits” which the petitioner
received.
license.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Susan Yee Carino should be entitled to one half of the benefits received
by Susan Nicdao Carino
652
RULING:
Since the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be
absolute or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of Article
147 and 148 of the Family Code on “Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.” In this
property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution
shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her
exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the home, children, and household, ar
excluded in this regime.
One-half of the subject “death benefits” under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her
share in the property regime, and the other half to the deceased legal heirs, his children with
Susan Nicdao.
653
Tumlos v. Fernandez
GUILLERMA TUMLOS, petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES MARIO FERNANDEZ and LOURDES FERNANDEZ, respondents
G.R. No. 137650. April 12, 2000
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
Herein respondents were the plaintiffs in a Civil Case, an action for ejectment filed
before the MTC of Valenzuela, Metro Manila against Guillerma Tumlos, Toto Tumlos, and Gina
Tumlos. In their complaint dated July 5, 1996.
Petitioner Guillerma Tumlos was the only one who filed an answer to the complaint. She
averred therein that the Fernandez spouses had no cause of action against her, since she is a
co-owner of the subject premises as evidenced by a Contract to Sell wherein it was stated that
she is a co-vendee of the property in question together with respondent Mario Fernandez. She
then asked for the dismissal of the complaint.
After an unfruitful preliminary conference on November 15, 1996, the MTC required the
parties to submit their affidavits and other evidence on the factual issues defined in their
pleadings within ten days from receipt of such order, pursuant to section 9 of the Revised Rule
on Summary Procedure. Guillerma Tumlos submitted her affidavit/position paper on November
29, 1996, while the respondents filed their position paper on December 5, 1996, attaching
thereto their marriage contract, letters of demand to the defendants, and the Contract to Sell
over the disputed property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the claim of co-ownership by Guillerma Tumlos valid.
RULING:
Petitioner's central theory and main defense against respondents' action for ejectment is
her claim of co-ownership over the property with respondent Mario Fernandez. At the first
654
instance before the MTC, she presented a Contract to Sell indicating that she was his spouse.
The MTC found this document insufficient to support her claim. The RTC, however, after
considering her allegation that she had been cohabiting with Mario Fernandez as shown by
evidence presented before it, ruled in her favor.
On the other hand, the CA held that the pieces of evidence adduced before the RTC
could no longer be considered because they had not been submitted before the MTC. Hence,
the appellate court concluded that the claim of co-ownership was not satisfactorily proven.
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, a man and woman who are not legally capacitated
to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together conjugally, may be deemed co-owners
of a property acquired during the cohabitation only upon proof that each made an actual
contribution to its acquisition. Hence, mere cohabitation without proof of contribution will not
result in a co-ownership.
655
Malang v. Moson
NENG MALANG, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COROCOY MOSON et. al., respondents
G.R. No. 119064. August 22, 2000
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
FACTS:
The applicability of the regular rules of procedure and case law in this jurisdiction. to civil
cases before the District Shari'a Courts is the issue in this petition.
On November 14, 1988, petitioner-spouses filed a complaint against private respondents
for "Quieting of Title to Property, Annulment of Original Certificates of Title Nos. P-122 and P-
138, and Damages, With Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction" with the Shari'a District
Court, 6th Shari's District at Cotabato City, Public respondent Register of Deeds of the same
city was impleaded as a nominal party. Private respondents filed their answer dated December
1, 1988.
The case was set for trial on the merits on May 22, 1989 but it was postponed at the
instance of private respondents. Other settings were postponed for one reason or another.
However, on July 4, 1989, private respondents filed a pleading designated as "Amplification of
Affirmative or Special Defenses with Prayer for Dismissal of Complaint on the Ground of Lack of
Jurisdiction." On the basis thereof, the trial court issued an order on November 7, 1989
dismissing the complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Civil Code shall govern the property relations of Muslim Marriages
celebrated before the Muslim Code
RULING:
Yes. Since it is the Civil Code which determines the validity of the marriages contracted
before P.D. 1083, it is the same code that determines and governs the property relations of the
marriages, for the reason that at the time of the celebration of the marriages in question, the
656
Civil Code was the only law on marriage relations, including property relations between
spouses, whether Muslim or non-Muslim.
657
Metrobank v. Pascual
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO., Petitioner,

vs.
NICHOLSON PASCUAL a.k.a. NELSON PASCUAL, Respondent.
G.R. No. 163744, February 29, 2008
VELASCO JR., J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga were married on January 19,
1985. During the union, Florencia bought from spouses Clarito and Belen Sering a 250-square
meter lot with a three-door apartment standing thereon located in Makati City. Subsequently,
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. S-101473/T-510 covering the purchased lot was canceled
and, in lieu thereof, TCT No. 156283 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City was issued in the
name of Florencia, “married to Nelson Pascual” a.k.a. Nicholson Pascual.
In 1994, Florencia filed a suit for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-23533. After trial, the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 94 in Quezon City rendered, on July 31, 1995, a Decision, declaring the marriage
of Nicholson and Florencia null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of
Nicholson. In the same decision, the RTC, inter alia, ordered the dissolution and liquidation of
the ex-spouses’ conjugal partnership of gains. Subsequent events saw the couple going their
separate ways without liquidating their conjugal partnership.
On April 30, 1997, Florencia, together with spouses Norberto and Elvira Oliveros, obtained a
PhP 58 million loan from petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. (Metrobank). To secure the
obligation, Florencia and the spouses Oliveros executed several real estate mortgages (REMs)
on their properties, including one involving the lot covered by TCT No. 156283. Among the
documents Florencia submitted to procure the loan were a copy of TCT No. 156283, a
photocopy of the marriage-nullifying RTC decision, and a document denominated as “Waiver”
that Nicholson purportedly executed on April 9, 1995. The waiver, made in favor of Florencia,
covered the conjugal properties of the ex-spouses listed therein, but did not incidentally include
the lot in question.
658
ISSUE:
Whether or not the real estate mortgage on the property covered by [TCT] No. 156283 of
the Registry of Deeds for the City of Makati as well as all proceedings thereon are null and void.
RULING:
In the case at bar, Florencia constituted the mortgage on the disputed lot on April 30, 1997, or a
little less than two years after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership on July 31, 1995, but
before the liquidation of the partnership. Be that as it may, what governed the property relations
of the former spouses when the mortgage was given is the aforequoted Art. 493. Under it,
Florencia has the right to mortgage or even sell her one-half (1/2) undivided interest in the
disputed property even without the consent of Nicholson. However, the rights of Metrobank, as
mortgagee, are limited only to the 1/2 undivided portion that Florencia owned. Accordingly, the
mortgage contract insofar as it covered the remaining 1/2 undivided portion of the lot is null and
void, Nicholson not having consented to the mortgage of his undivided half.
The conclusion would have, however, been different if Nicholson indeed duly waived his share
in the conjugal partnership. But, as found by the courts a quo, the April 9, 1995 deed of waiver
allegedly executed by Nicholson three months prior to the dissolution of the marriage and the
conjugal partnership of gains on July 31, 1995 bore his forged signature, not to mention that of
the notarizing officer. A spurious deed of waiver does not transfer any right at all, albeit it may
become the root of a valid title in the hands of an innocent buyer for value.
Upon the foregoing perspective, Metrobank’s right, as mortgagee and as the successful bidder
at the auction of the lot, is confined only to the 1/2 undivided portion thereof heretofore
pertaining in ownership to Florencia. The other undivided half belongs to Nicholson. As
owner pro indiviso of a portion of the lot in question, Metrobank may ask for the partition of the
lot and its property rights “shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to [the bank] in
the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.”This disposition is in line with the well-
established principle that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally
possible to do so––quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest.
In view of our resolution on the validity of the auction of the lot in favor of Metrobank, there is
hardly a need to discuss at length whether or not Metrobank was a mortgagee in good faith.
Suffice it to state for the nonce that where the mortgagee is a banking institution, the general
rule that a purchaser or mortgagee of the land need not look beyond the four corners of the title
659
is inapplicable.Unlike private individuals, it behooves banks to exercise greater care and due
diligence before entering into a mortgage contract. The ascertainment of the status or condition
of the property offered as security and the validity of the mortgagor’s title must be standard and
indispensable part of the bank’s operation. A bank that failed to observe due diligence cannot
be accorded the status of a bona fide mortgagee,as here.
But as found by the CA, however, Metrobank’s failure to comply with the due diligence
requirement was not the result of a dishonest purpose, some moral obliquity or breach of a
known duty for some interest or ill-will that partakes of fraud that would justify damages.
660
Francisco v. Master Ironworks
JOSEFINA FRANCISCO, petitioner,

vs.
MASTER IRON WORKS AND CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION and ROBERTO
ALEJO, respondents
G.R. No. 151967. February 16, 2005
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
FACTS:
On August 31, 1984, the Imus Rural Bank, Inc. executed a deed of absolute sale in favor
of Josefina Castillo Francisco, married to Eduardo Francisco, covering two parcels of residential
land with a house thereon. On February 15, 1985, the Register of Deeds made a record entry of
an Affidavit of Waiver executed by Eduardo where he waived whatever claims he had over the
property. On June 11, 1990, Eduardo bought 7,500 bags of cement from Master Iron Works and
Construction Corporation (MIWCC) but failed to pay for the same. On November 27, 1990,
MIWCC filed a complaint against him and was rule by the trial court in favor of the respondent.
Sheriff Roberto Alejo included the parcels of land mentioned earlier at a public auction for the
recovery of the balance of the amount due.
On July 3, 1994, Josefina executed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim over the two parcels
of land in which she claimed that they were her paraphernal property, and that her husband had
no propriety right or interest over them as evidenced by his affidavit of waiver.
The trial court ruled in favor of Josefina. However, the CA reversed the decision of the
RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject property is the conjugal property of Josefina Castillo and
Eduardo Francisco
RULING:
No. The petitioner failed to prove that she acquired the property with her personal funds
before the cohabitation with Eduardo and that she is the sole owner of the property. The
661
petitioner failed to adduce preponderance of evidence that she contributed money, property, or
industry in the acquisition of the subject property and hence, is not a co-owner of the property.
Petiitioner admitted that when she and Eduardo cohabited, the latter was incapacitated to marry
her. Since the subject property was acquired during the subsistence of the marriage of Eduardo
and Carmelita, the same should be presumed to be the conjugal property of Eduardo and
Carmelita.
662
Joaquino v. Reyes
MILAGROS JOAQUINO a.k.a. MILAGROS REYES, petitioner,

vs.
LOURDES, MERCEDES, MANUEL, MIRIAM, AND RODOLFO, JR.-all surnamed REYES,
respondents
G.R. No. 154645. July 13, 2004
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Lourdes Reyes was legally married to Rodolfo Reyes on January 3, 1947 in
which they had four children. At the time of the death of Rodolfo, he was living with his common-
law wife with whom they begot three children. During the common-law relationship of Rodolfo
and Milagros, they decided to buy a house and lot in which a Deed of Absolute Sale was
executed in favor of Milagros.
Petitioner, in order to secure finances with which to pay the purchase price, executed a
Special Power of Attorney in favor of Rodolfo, as attorney-in-fact to secure a loan. The loan was
payable for ten years. After the death of Rodolfo, the balance was fully paid by the Philam Life
Insurance Co. as insurer of the deceased.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the salaries and earnings of Rodolfo, which were his and Lourdes’
conjugal funs, paid for the loan and, hence, the disputed property was conjugal
RULING:
Yes. Under Article 145 of the Civil Code, a conjugal partnership of gains is created upon
marriage and lasts until the legal union is dissolved by death, annulment, legal separation, or
judicial separation of property. On the other hand, Article 144 of the Civil Code mandates a co-
ownership between a man and a woman not legally married provided that the couple must not
be incapacitated to contract marriage.
663
Article 148 of the Family Code likewise finds application to the case at bar, thus, when a
common-law couple have legal impediment to marriage, only the property acquired by them—
through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry—shall be owned by them in
common and in proportion to their respective contributions.
Respondents have shown that the property was bought during the marriage of Rodolfo
and Lourdes, a fact that gives rise to the presumption that it is conjugal. Also, they have
established that the proceeds of the loan obtained by Rodolfo were used to pay for the property.
664
Mallilin Jr v. Castillo
EUSTAQUIO MALLILIN, JR., PETITIONER,

VS.
MA. ELVIRA CASTILLO, RESPONDENT
G.R. No. 136803. June 16, 2000
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner, Eustaquio Mallilin Jr. and respondent Ma. Elvira Castillo were both married
and with children but are separated from their respective spouses, they cohabited while their
respective marriages still subsisted. Petitioner and respondent acquired real and personal
properties which were registered solely in respondent’s name. But due to irreconcilable
differences the couple separated. Petitioner the demanded his share in the subject properties
but respondent refused.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the parties be considered as co-owners of the properties considering the
present status of the parties as both married and incapable of marrying each other even
assuming that they lived together as husband and wife.
RULING:
The Family Code Provides that a co-ownership exists between a man and a woman who live
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, likewise provides that if the
parties are incapacitated to marry each other, properties acquired by them through their joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their contributions which, in the absence of proof to contrary, is presumed to be equal. There is
thus co-ownership even if the parties are incapacitated to marry.
Saguid v. CA
665
JACINTO SAGUID, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MARINDUQUE, and GINA
REY, respondents
G.R. No. 150611. June 10, 2003
FACTS:
Seventeen-year old Gina Rey was married, but separated de facto from her husband,
when she met petitioner Jacinto Saguid sometime in July 1987. After a brief courtship, they
decided to cohabit as husband and wife. When her relationship with Jacinto’s relatives turned
sour, she decided to work as an entertainer in Japan. In 1996, the couple decided to separate
and end their 9-year cohabitation.
On January 9, 1997, respondent filed a complaint for partition and recovery of personal
property with receivership against petitioner, alleging that she was able to contribute P70,000.00
in the completion of their unfinished house from her salary as entertainer in Japan. Also, she
was able to acquire and accumulate appliances, pieces of furniture, and household effects. She
prayed that she be declared the sole owner of these personal properties and that the amount of
P70,000.00 be reimbursed to her.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 148 of the Family Code applies although the adulterous
cohabitation commenced prior to the effectivity of the same code
RULING:
Yes. In the issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by parties to a bigamous

marriage and adulterous relationship, a proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the
property is essential. In the case at bar, although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties
commenced in 1987, which is before the date of the effectivity of the Family Code on 1988,
Article 148 applies because this provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article
144 of the Civil Code. Respondent Gina Rey is declared co-owner of petitioner Jacinto in the
666
controverted house and personal properties. Petitioner is ordered to reimburse the required
amount as determined by the Court.
Carino v. Carino
667
SUSAN NICDAO CARINO, petitioner,
vs.
SUSAN YEE CARINO, respondent
G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001
FACTS:
the first was with petitioner Susan Nicdao Carino and the second was with respondent Susan
Yee Cariño.
complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away under the care of Susan Yee, who
spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for
agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 while respondent
Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00. On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed
the instant case for collection of sum of money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter
alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six
thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively denominated as “death benefits” which the petitioner
received.
license.
ISSUE:
668
Whether or not Susan Yee Carino should be entitled to one half of the benefits received
by Susan Nicdao Carino
RULING:
Since the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be
absolute or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of Article
147 and 148 of the Family Code on “Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.” In this
property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution
shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her
exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the home, children, and household, ar
excluded in this regime.
One-half of the subject “death benefits” under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her
share in the property regime, and the other half to the deceased legal heirs, his children with
Susan Nicdao.
Uy v. CA
669
TSHIATE UY and RAMON UY, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, NATIVIDAD CALAUNAN-UY, and THE ESTATE OF MENILO
UY, respondents
G.R. No. 102726. May 27, 1994
VITUG, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Natividad was the common-law wife of the late Menilo Uy, Sr. for about
thirty-six years. Their union bore four children. After the death of Menilo, Sr., petitioners initiated
a special proceeding entitled, “In the Matter of the Petition for Letters of Administration of the
Estate of Menilo Uy, Sr.” Respondent filed a civil case for “Partition of Properties Under Co-
ownership,” against the estate of Menilo, Sr.
The parties, upon the suggestion of the RTC, submittes a Compromise Agreement. On
April 24, 1991, a judgment was rendered based on such compromise. Petitioner Tshiate filed an
omnibus motion alleging that by virtue of Hong Kong marriage, she was the surviving legal
spouse of Menilo, Sr. Petitioners contended that the compromise was a patent nullity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the action for partition of property on alleged co-ownership in the case at
bar be governed by Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code
RULING:
Yes. The action for partition is predicated on an alleged co-ownership between private
respondent Natividad and deceased Menilo, Sr. of property evidently acquired during the period
of their common-law relationship. The governing provisions, applicable to their case, are now
found in Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code, considering that Menilo, Sr. died on
September 27, 1990, well after the effectivity of Executive Order No. 209 or the Family Code of
the Philippines on August 3, 1988.
670
Belcodera v. CA
JOSEPHINE BELCODERA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ET. AL., respondents
G.R. No. 89667. October 20, 1993
VITUG, J.:
FACTS:
Alayo D. Busing married Juliana Oday on 27 July 1927, with whom he had three
children, namely, Flora, Teresita, and Gaido. In 1946, he left the conjugal home, and he
forthwith started to live instead with Josefa Rivera with whom he later begot one child, named
Josephine Bosing, now Josephine Belcodero.
On 23 August 1949, Alayo purchased a parcel of land on installment basis from the
Magdalena Estate, Inc. In the deed, he indicated his civil status as "married to Josefa R.
Bosing," the common-law wife. In a letter, dated 06 Dctober 1959, which he addressed to
Magdalena Estate, Inc., he authorized the latter to transfer the lot in the name of his "wife
Josefa R. Bosing." The final deed of sale was executed by Magdalena Estate, Inc., on 24
October 1959. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 48790 was issued in the name of "Josefa R.
Rosing, married to Alayo Bosing, On 6 June 1958, Alayo married Josefa even while his prior
marriage with Juliana was still subsisting. Alayo died on 11 March 1967. About three years later,
or on 17 September 1970, Josefa and Josephine executed a document of extrajudicial partition
and sale of the lot in question, which was there described as "conjugal property" of Josefa and
the deceased Alayo. The notice of extrajudicial partition was published on 04, 05 and 06
November 1970 in the Evening Post; the inheritance and estate taxes were paid; and a new
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 198840 was issued on 06 June 1974 in the name of Josephine.
On 30 October 1980, Juliana and her three legitimate children filed with the court a quo
an action for reconveyance of the property. On the basis of the above facts, the trial court ruled
in favor of the plaintiffs, and it ordered that Josephine Bosing execute a deed of reconveyance
of the property in question to the legal heirs of the deceased Alayo D. Bosing, and that both
defendants pay, jointly and severally, actual damages by way of attorney's fees and expenses
in litigation.
671
ISSUE:
Whether the property in question was acquired by Alayo in 1949 when an agreement for
its purchase on installment basis was entered into between him and Magdalena Estate, Inc., or
in 1959 when a deed of sale was finally executed by Magdalena Estate, Inc., the legal results
would be the same.
RULING:
Yes. The property remained as belonging to the conjugal partnership of Alayo and his
legitimate wife Juliana. Under both the new Civil Code (Article 160) and the old Civil Code
(Article 1407), "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership
unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.”
The applicable prescriptive period for an action seeking a reconveyance of the
properties by the beneficiaries is ten years (Article 1144, civil code). The case has been initiated
seasonably.
672
Juaniza v. Jose
VICTOR JUANIZA, Heirs of Josefa Leus, etc., et al. plaintiffs and appellees,
vs.
EUGENIO JOSE, THE ECONOMIC INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., AND ROSALIA ARROYO,
defendants and appellants
DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS:
Eugenio was the registered owner and operator of a passenger jeepney involved in an
accident of collision with a freight train of the Philippine National Railways which resulted to the
death pf seven and physical injuries to five passengers.
Eugenio was legally married to Socorro Ramos but had been cohabiting with defendant-
appellant Rosalia Arroyo, for sixteen years. The ruling of the case for damages held Eugenio
and Rosalia to pay the damages. The lower court based her liability on the provision of Artcile
144 of the civil code.
Rosalia then appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the ruling of the lower
court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 144 of the Civil Code is applicable in a case where one of the
parties in a common-law relationship is incapacitated to marry
RULING:
No. the co-ownership contemplated in Article 144 of the Civil Code requires that the man
and the woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. Since
Eugenio is legally married to Socorro, there is an impediment for him to contract marriage with
Rosalia, thus, Rosalia cannot be a co-owner of the jeepney. The jeepney belongs to the
conjugal partnership of Eugenio and Socorro. There is therefore, no legal basis for the liability of
Rosalia for damages arising from the death of, and physical injuries suffered, by the passengers
of the jeepney. Only the registered owner of the public service vehicle is responsible for
damages.
673
Adriano v. CA
MARINO, RENATO, LETICIA, IMELDA, ALICIA, LIGAYA, and ZENAIDA, all surnamed
ADRIANO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CELESTINA, MANOLO and AIDA, all surnamed
ADRIANO, respondents.
G.R. No. 124118 March 27, 2000
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, Second
Division, affirming in toto the Joint Order of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, Branch
55, which dismissed Civil Case No. 88-115 for annulment of will and ordered the disposition of
the estate of Lucio Adriano in accordance with the provisions of his last will and testament in
Spec. Proc. No. 4442.
FACTS:
The testator, Lucio Adriano, also known as Ambrocio Adriano, married Gliceria Dorado
on October 29, 1933. Out of their lawful marriage, they had three children, namely, Celestina,
Manolo, and Aida, private respondents in this case. Sometime in 1942 or prior thereto, Lucio
and Gliceria separated, and Gliceria settled in Rizal, Laguna where she died on June 11, 1968.
Five months after the death of Gliceria, Lucio married Vicenta. But even before the said
marriage, Lucio and Vicenta had been cohabitating since Lucio and Glicera separated or even
before, with whom he had eight children: Marino, Renato, Leticia, Imelda, Maria Alicia, Ligaya,
Jose Vergel, and Zenaida, all surnamed Adriano. All his children by Vicenta Villa are the named
petitioners in the instant case, with the exception of Jose Vergel, who died before the inception
of the proceedings. Lucio and Vicenta and their children lived in Candelaria, Quezon until the
spouses separated in 1972.
On October 10, 1980, Lucio executed a last will and testament disposing of all his
properties, and assigning, among others, his second wife Vicenta and all his children by his first
and second marriages as devisees and legatees therein. Among the properties bequeathed in
the will were a 45,000 square meter lot and the residential house, rice mill, warehouse and
equipment situated thereon located in Candelaria, Quezon and registered under Transfer
674
Certificate of Title ("TCT") No. T-56553 in the Registry of Deeds of Quezon, which was disposed
of in the following manner: (1) to private respondents, Lucio's children by his first wife, 10,000
square meters of the disputed property, including the warehouse, rice mill, and equipment
situated thereon; (2) to Vicenta and petitioners, his children by his second marriage, the
remaining 35,000 square meters; and (3) to private respondents, the residential house also
within the same property.
On February 11, 1981, Lucio died and private respondent Celestina Adriano, who was
instituted in Lucio's will as its executrix, filed a petition for the probate of the will on February 18,
1981 before the RTC of Lucena City. The probate case was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 4442.
After due hearing and despite the Opposition filed by Vicenta, the RTC allowed the probate of
the will and directed the issuance of letters testamentary to petitioner-executrix Celestina
Adriano in an Order dated August 22, 1983. On November 10, 1983, Vicenta appealed said
Order to the then Intermediate Appellate Court, which in turn affirmed the probate of the will.
Vicenta died on July 2, 1985.
On August 17, 1988, and while the proceedings for settlement of estate were pending
before the RTC, petitioners instituted an action for annulment of Lucio Adriano's will which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 88-115. In the complaint, plaintiffs-petitioners alleged that before the
marriage of Lucio and their mother, Vicenta, on November 22, 1968, the two lived together as
husband and wife and as such, acquired properties which became the subject of inventory and
administration in Spec. Proc. No. 4442. Plaintiffs claimed that the properties bequeathed in
Lucio's will are undivided "civil partnership and/or conjugal properties of Lucio Adriano and
Vicenta Villa", and thus, the will sought to be probated should be declared void and ineffective
insofar as it disposes of the rightful share or properties of Vicenta.
Spec. Proc. No. 4442 and Civil Case No. 88-115 were consolidated and jointly heard by
the RTC. RTC dismissed the Civil Case No. 88-115 and order the continuation of the
settlement, liquidation and partitioning of the estate of the testator as hereby ordered in Spec.
Proc. No. 4442 which was subsequently affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will sought to be probated should be declared void and ineffective
insofar as it dispose of the rightful share of Vicenta?
675
RULING:
No. Petitioners' insistence that a co-ownership of properties existed between Lucio and
Vicenta during their period of cohabitation before their marriage in 1968 is without lawful basis
considering that Lucio's marriage with Gliceria was then subsisting. Petitioners alleged that it
was erroneous of respondent court not to have upheld the co-ownership of Vicenta to 1/2 of
said property, and to have declared the entire property as belonging to the conjugal partnership
of Lucio and Gliceria. The petition essentially relies on the following grounds: (1) TCT No. T-
56553, issued to "Spouses, LUCIO ADRIANO and VICENTA VILLA", constitutes conclusive and
indefeasible evidence of Vicenta's co-ownership in the property,and (2) the Deed of Sale dated
March 15, 1964, as annotated in OCT No. O-9198, the mother title of TCT No. T-56553,
designates Vicenta Villa as a co-vendee. Petitioners maintain that the Deed of Sale, being the
"best evidence" of the contents thereof, proves Vicenta's co-ownership in the land. The co-
ownership in Article 144 of the Civil Code requires that the man and woman living together as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage must not in any way be incapacitated to
marry. Considering that the property was acquired in 1964, or while Lucio's marriage with
Gliceria subsisted, such property is presumed to be conjugal unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife. It is clear that the petitioner’s claim of co-ownership is
a mistake which need to be rectified without any evidence on record that Vicenta actually
contributed to the acquisition of the property in question. According to Article 1456, “If property
is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a
trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes”. The
principle that a trustee who takes a Torrens title in his or her name cannot repudiate the trust by
relying on the registration, is a well-known exception to the principle of conclusiveness of a
certificate of title. The petitioner claim is hereby found lack of merit and accordingly dismissed.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 41509 is hereby AFFIRMED. SO
ORDERED.
676
THE FAMILY
Guerrero v. RTC
GAUDENCIO GUERRERO, petitioner,

vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ILOCOS NORTE, BR. XVI, JUDGE LUIS B. BELLO, JR.,
PRESIDING, and PEDRO G. HERNANDO, respondents.
G.R. No. 109068 January 10, 1994
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Filed by petitioner as an accion publicana 1 against private respondent, this case

assumed another dimension when it was dismissed by respondent Judge on the ground that the
parties being brother-in-law the complaint should have alleged that earnest efforts were first
exerted towards a compromise.
FACTS:
Filed by petitioner as an accion publicana against private respondent, this case

assumed another dimension when it was dismissed by respondent Judge on the ground that the
parties being brother-in-law the complaint should have alleged that earnest efforts were first
exerted towards a compromise.
The complaint does not allege that the parties exerted earnest towards a compromise
and that the same failed. However, private respondent Pedro G. Hernando apparently
overlooked this alleged defect since he did not file any motion to dismiss nor attack the
complaint on this ground in his answer. It was only on 7 December 1992, at the pre-trial
conference, that the relationship of petitioner Gaudencio Guerrero and respondent Hernando
was noted by respondent Judge Luis B. Bello, Jr., they being married to half-sisters hence are
brothers-in-law, and on the basis thereof respondent Judge gave petitioner five (5) days "to file
his motion and amended complaint" to allege that the parties were very close relatives, their
respective wives being sisters, and that the complaint to be maintained should allege that
earnest efforts towards a compromise were exerted but failed. Apparently, respondent Judge
considered this deficiency a jurisdictional defect.
677
On 11 December 1992, Guerrero moved to reconsider the 7 December 1992 Order
claiming that since brothers by affinity are not members of the same family, he was not required
to exert efforts towards a compromise. Guerrero likewise argued that Hernando was precluded
from raising this issue since he did not file a motion to dismiss nor assert the same as an
affirmative defense in his answer.
On 22 December 1992, respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration holding
that "failure to allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise is jurisdictional such that for
failure to allege same the court would be deprived of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
case." He warned that unless the complaint was amended within five (5) days the case would
be dismissed.
On 29 January 1993, the 5-day period having expired without Guerrero amending his
complaint, respondent Judge dismissed the case, declaring the dismissal however to be without
prejudice.
ISSUE:
Whether or not brothers by affinity are considered members of the same family.
RULING:
No. It is true that according to Art. 151. “No suit between members of the same family
shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts
toward a compromise have been made, but that the same had failed. If it is shown that no such
efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed” but as already ruled in “Gayon
v. Gayon” that the enumeration of "brothers and sisters" as members of the same family does
not comprehend "sisters-in-law". Hence, the court ruled that it is also in the case of “brother-in-
law” and the case should proceed between the petitioner and the respondent Pedro G.
Hernando without the need to comply with Art. 151 provision.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the appealed Orders of 7 December 1992,
22 December 1992 and 29 January 1993 are SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Laoag
678
City, Branch 16, or whichever branch of the court the case may now be assigned, is directed to
continue with Civil Case No. 10084-16 with deliberate dispatch.SO ORDERED.
679
Esquivias v. CA
SALVADOR S. ESQUIVIAS and ALICIA DOMALAON-ESQUIVIAS, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE G. DOMALAON, ELENA G. DOMALAON and REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF SORSOGON, respondents.
G.R. No. 119714 May 29, 1997
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a petition pertaining to 6,270-SQUARE METER PARCEL OF LAND in the

poblacion of Gubat, Sorsogon, which is the subject of this action for reconveyance and
damages.
FACTS:
Julia Galpo de Domalaon was the owner of a piece of land with an area of 1,260 square
meters and the two-storey house standing thereon. In 1950 she extrajudicially constituted this
property into a family home. Alicia Domalaon-Esquivias, Elena G. Domalaon and Jose G.
Domalaon, among other children, were named beneficiaries thereof.[2]
On 11 March 1974 a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by Julia Galpo de Domalaon
in favor of her son-in-law, Atty. Salvador Esquivias, husband of Alicia Domalaon. Subject
matter of the deed was the property constituting the family home the two-storey house and the
residential lot on which it stood, more particularly described in the deed.
On 30 March 1977 the family home was dissolved by Julia Galpo de Domalaon with the
conformity of all her children. Afterwards, another deed of sale was executed by her dated 12
April 1977 transferring to Jose G. Domalaon the house and lot which once constituted the family
home. The deed indicated that the property being sold was the entire 1,260 square
meters. However, in the Affidavit of Confirmatory Waiver of Rights, the area was increased to
2,456 square meters.
Alleging that it was only in 1981 that she came to know that the document she signed in
favor of Atty. Salvador S. Esquivias in 1974 was actually a deed of sale, Julia Galpo de
Domalaon filed a disbarment case against Atty. Esquivias. According to her, being a son-in-law
and lawyer of the Domalaons, Atty. Esquivias took advantage of her trust and confidence and
poor eyesight by representing that the document was a sale of her land in favor of all her
680
children. But the Solicitor General, who investigated the case, recommended its dismissal for
lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellate court correct in holding that no earnest effort towards a
compromise between members of the same family was made, in contravention of Art. 222 of the
Civil Code.
RULING:
No. Petitioners contend that Atty. Esquivias is only a brother-in-law of Jose and Elena
Domalaon. Atty. Esquivias is not a member of the family of his wife and is outside the scope
and coverage of the law requiring that the same members of a family should exert efforts to
bring about a compromise before the commencement of a litigation.
Article 222 of the Civil Code provides that no suit shall be filed or maintained between
members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts towards a compromise
have been made but the same have failed. The reason for the law is that a lawsuit between
family members generates deeper bitterness than one between strangers. Hence, it is
necessary that every effort should be made towards a compromise before a litigation is allowed
to breed hate and passion in the family.
But this requirement in Art. 222 of the Civil Code applies only to suits between or among
members of the same family. The phrase "between members of the same family" should be
construed in the light of Art. 217 of the Civil Code under which "family relations" include only
those (a) between husband and wife, (b) between parent and child, (c) among other ascendants
and their descendants, and (d) among brothers and sisters. As correctly pointed out by
petitioners, Atty. Salvador S. Esquivias is not included in the enumeration of who are members
of the same family, as he is only a brother-in-law of respondents Jose and Elena by virtue of his
marriage to their sister Alicia. His relationship with respondents is based on affinity and not on
consanguinity.
681
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of respondent Court of Appeals reversing that of the

Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, Gubat, Sorsogon, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
Decision of the latter court in favor of petitioners as quoted in pages four (4) and five (5) hereof
is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. Costs against private respondents. SO ORDERED.
682
Hiyas Savings v. Acuna
HIYAS SAVINGS and LOAN BANK, INC. Petitioner,

vs.
HON. EDMUNDO T. ACUÑA, in his capacity as Pairing Judge of Regional Trial Court,
Branch 122, Caloocan City, and ALBERTO MORENO, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 154132 August 31, 2006
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify the
Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 122, dated November 8,
2001 and May 7, 2002 denying herein petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Partial
Reconsideration, respectively.
FACTS:
Private Alfredo Moreno filed a complaint against Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank Inc., his
wife Remedios, the spouses Owe and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City for cancellation of
mortgage. He said that he did not secure any loan from the petitioner bank or execute any
mortgage contract in its favor. He says that the petitioners were the only ones benefited by the
mortgage and it‘s not possible for him to have signed the contract because he was working
abroad at the time it was entered into.
Hiyas filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that no earnest efforts towards a
compromise had been made because the parties involved here are family members. On the
other hand, Moreno says that since three of the parties are not his family members, such
compromise need not be made before the action is instituted. He also said that the defendants
be declared in default for not filing an answer in time.
RTC ruled in favor of Moreno and denied the order to dismiss. It said that when one of
the parties to a case is not a family member, there is no need to show that earnest efforts
towards a compromise have been made.
683
ISSUE:
Whether or not when a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of the
same family, the law requiring earnest efforts be made towards a compromise is required.
RULING:
No. The RTC is correct in its ruling that it is not required in a suit involving members of
the same family when a stranger become party that an earnest efforts be made towards a
compromise. In Magbaleta v Gonong, the rule was already laid down that when a stranger
becomes party to a suit between family members, the law no longer requires that earnest efforts
towards a compromise have to be made before the action can prosper. Article 151 applies only
when the suit is exclusively among family members, and it may be invoked only be a party who
is the same member of that family. The petition did not even go through the CA so it ignored the
hierarchy of courts. On this note, the petition is already dismissed.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs
against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
684
Martinez v. Martinez
APRIL MARTINEZ, FRITZ DANIEL MARTINEZ and MARIA OLIVIA MARTINEZ, petitioners,
vs.
RODOLFO MARTINEZ, respondent
G.R. No. 162084 June 28, 2005
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 59420 setting aside and reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 30, in Civil Case No. 00-96962 affirming, on appeal, the decision of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Manila in Civil Case No. 164761 (CV) for ejectment.
FACTS:
On March 6, 1993, Daniel, Sr. executed a last will and testament directing the
subdivision of the property owned by him and his wife Natividad into three lots bequeathed to
each of his sons.
On May 1995, Daniel, Sr. suffered a stroke which resulted in the paralysis of the right
side of his body. On October 26, 1996, Natividad died. Daniel, Sr. passed away on October 6,
1997.
On September 16, 1998, Rodolfo found a deed of sale purportedly signed by his father
on September 15, 1996, where the latter appears to have sold the lot to Manolo and his wife
Lucila. Rodolfo filed a complaint for annulment of deed of sale against his brother Manolo and
his sister-in-law before the RTC. He also filed a criminal complaint for estafa through falsification
of public document against Manolo.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the spouses holding that the spouses
substantially complied with Article 151 of the Family Code based on the allegations of the
complaint and the appended certification to file action issued by the barangay captain.
On November 27, 2003, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 151 of the Family Code was duly complied with.
685
RULING:
Yes. The petitioners were able to comply with the requirements of Article 151 of the
Family Code because they alleged in their complaint that they had initiated a proceeding against
the respondent for unlawful detainer in the Katarungang Pambarangay, in compliance with P.D.
No. 1508; and that, after due proceedings, no amicable settlement was arrived at, resulting in
the barangay chairman’s issuance of certificate to file action.
FALLO:
The petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
59420 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila,
as affirmed on appeal by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 30, in Civil Case No.
164761(CV) is REINSTATED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
686
Hontiveros v. RTC of Iloilo City
SPOUSES AUGUSTO HONTIVEROS and MARIA HONTIVEROS, petitioners,

vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 25, Iloilo City and SPOUSES GREGORIO
HONTIVEROS and TEODORA AYSON, respondents.
G.R. No. 125465 June 29, 1999
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition docketed as Civil Case No. 19504 in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo
City, Branch 25 with regard to the real owners of a parcel of land in the town of Jamindan,
Province of Capiz.
FACTS:
On December 3, 1990, petitioners, the spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros, filed a
complaint for damages against private respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson
before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City. In said complaint, petitioners alleged that they are
the owners of a parcel of land, in the town of Jamindan, Province of Capiz, in a land registration
case filed by private respondent Gregorio Hontiveros, brother of Augusto; that petitioners were
deprived of income from the land as a result of the filing of the land registration case; that such
income consisted of rentals from tenants of the land in the amount of P66,000.00 per year from
1968 to 1987, and P595,000.00 per year thereafter; and that private respondents filed the land
registration case and withheld possession of the land from petitioners in bad faith. The
respondents filed an answer denying all allegations by the petitioner. Private respondents
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and for an order against petitioners to pay damages to
private respondents by way of counterclaim, as well as reconveyance of the subject land to
private respondents.On November 23, 1995, the trial court denied petitioners’ motion. At the
same time, however, it dismissed the case on the ground that the complaint was not verified as
required by Art. 151 of the Family Code and, therefore, it did not believe that earnest efforts had
been made to arrive at a compromise.
687
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 151 of the Family Code was attended in the case.
RULING:
Art. 151 provides, “No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it
should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise
have been made, but that the same have failed. It if is shown that no such efforts were in fact
made, the case must be dismissed.” This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the
subject of compromise under the Civil Code. Art. 151 of the Family Code do not apply in this
case since the suit is not exclusively among family members. The private respondent Ayson is
admittedly a stranger to the Hontiveros family, the case is not covered by the requirements of
Art. 151 of the Family Code. The absence of the verification required in Art. 151 do not affect
the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the complaint. The verification is merely a
formal requirement intended to secure an assurance that matters which are alleged are true and
correct. If the court doubted the veracity of the allegations regarding efforts made to settle the
case among members of the same family, it could simply have ordered petitioners to verify
them.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Order, dated November 23, 1995 of
the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 25 is SET ASIDE and the case is remanded to the
trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this decision.SO ORDERED.
688
Vda. De Manalo v. CA
PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO, ANTONIO S. MANALO, ORLANDO S. MANALO, and

ISABELITA MANALO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
G.R. No. 129242 January 16, 2001
DE LEON, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners Pilar S. Vda De Manalo, et.
Al., seeking to annul the Resolution 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 affirming the Orders 3 of the
Regional Trial Court and the Resolution 4 which denied petitioner' motion for reconsideration.
FACTS:
Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1966 died intestate on February 14, 1992. He was
survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven (11) children, namely: Purita M. Jayme,
Antonio Manalo, Milagros M. Terre, Belen M. Orillano, Isabelita Manalo, Rosalina M. Acuin,
Romeo Manalo, Roberto Manalo, Amalia Manalo, Orlando Manalo, and Imelda Manalo, who are
all of legal age. At the time of his death on February 14, 1992, Troadio Manalo left several real
properties located in Manila and in the province of Tarlac. On November 26, 1992, the eight (8)
of the surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo, namely: Purita, Milagros, Belen, Rosalina,
Romeo, Roberto, Amalia, and Imelda filed a petition with the respondent Regional Trial Court of
Manila for the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father, Troadio Manalo, and for the
appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof. The order of general
default was set aside by the trial court upon motion of herein petitioners namely: Pilar S. Vda.
De Manalo, Antonio, Isabelita and Orlando who were granted ten (10) days within which to file
their opposition to the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 222 of the Civil Code shall be applied.
689
RULING:
Under Article 222 of the Civil Code, No suit shall be filed or maintained between
members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise
have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035. This is
clear from the term “suit” that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or
others in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for
the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. A civil action is
thus an action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues another for the enforcement of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. Besides, an excerpt from the Report of the Code
Commission unmistakably reveals the intention of the Code Commission to make that legal
provision applicable only to civil actions which are essentially adversarial and involve members
of the same family.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the petition in the above-entitled case, is DENIED for lack of merit, Costs
against petitioners. SO ORDERED.
690
Uy v. Chua
JOANIE SURPOSA UY, Petitioner,

vs.
JOSE NGO CHUA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 183965 September 18, 2009
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the Resolution dated 25 June 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 24,
which granted the demurrer to evidence of respondent Jose Ngo Chua, resulting in the
dismissal of Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB.
FACTS:
Petitioner Joanie Surposa Uy filed on 27 October 2003 before the RTC of Cebu, Branch
24 a Petition for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate filiation against respondent docketed
as Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB. Petitioner alleged in her Complaint that respondent
Jose Ngo Chua, who was then married, had an illicit relationship with Irene
Surposa. Respondent and Irene had two children, namely, petitioner and her brother, Allan
Surposa. Respondent attended to Irene when the latter was giving birth to petitioner on 27
April 1959, and instructed that petitioner’s birth certificate be filled out with the following names:
“ALFREDO F. SURPOSA” as father and “IRENE DUCAY” as mother. Actually, Alfredo F.
Surposa was the name of Irene’s father, and Ducay was the maiden surname of Irene’s
mother. Respondent financially supported petitioner and Allan. The respondent even
introduces them in the Chinese community as his illegitimate children and provided the
petitioner employment.
It turned out that prior to instituting Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB on 27 October
2003, petitioner had already filed a similar Petition for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate
affiliation against respondent. It was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, assigned
to RTC-Branch 9. Petitioner and respondent eventually entered into a Compromise Agreement
in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, which was approved by RTC-Branch 9 in a
Decision dated 21 February 2000. In the compromise agreement they agreed that petitioner
acknowledge together with her brother that there is no blood filiation between then and the
691
respondent, the respondent will pay them two million each and that they have no claim on any
property of the respondent as inheritors. In pursuant to this Compromise Agreement adjudge by
the co-equal court, the court dismiss the case by virtue of demurrer of evidence rendering it res
judicata as the respondent urged.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the principle of res judicata is applicable to issues decided by Regional
Trial Court, Branch 9 of Cebu City.
RULING:
No. For res judicata, to serve as an absolute bar to a subsequent action, the
following requisites must concur: (1) there must be a final judgment or order; (2) the
court rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it
must be a judgment or order on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the two
cases, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. Article 2035 states
that no compromise upon the following questions shall be valid: the civil status of
persons, future support, the jurisdiction of courts and future legitime. The agreement
undeniably shows that it has a bearing with these selected situations rendering the
compromise void. If the compromise is void then the court has no jurisdiction to render it
valid which set up by the law as void and also rendering the other element to follow like
there is no final judgement rendered and the judgement has no merit.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution dated 25 June 2008 of
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 24, in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. This case is ordered REMANDED to the said trial court for
further proceedings in accordance with the ruling of the Court herein. No costs. SO ORDERED.
692
Santos v. CA
NICANOR T. SANTOS, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS CONSUELO T. SANTOS-GUERRERO and ANDRES GUERRERO,
respondents.
G.R. No. 134787 November 15, 2005
GARCIA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
petitioner Nicanor T. Santos assails and seeks to set aside the Decision dated March 24,
1998[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A. G.R. CV No. 50060 dismissing his appeal from the
amended decision dated July 27, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon-Navotas in Civil
Case No. 1784-MN, an action for revival of judgment.
FACTS:
Petitioner Nicanor T. Santos and private respondent Consuelo T. Santos-Guerrero are

brother and sister, born to spouses Urbano Santos and Candelaria Santos, now both deceased.
Sometime in 1956, Nicanor, Consuelo, and eight their siblings, executed a “Basic Agreement of
Partition” covering properties they inherited from their parents.Two years later, Consuelo, joined
by her husband, herein respondent Andres Guerrero, filed suit with the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal against petitioner and two other brothers, for recovery of inheritance. They
sought for the judicial declaration of validity in the 1956 Agreement of Partition. The Santos
heirs executed on May 5, 1959 another document, denominated “Deed of Partition.” Spouses
Guerreros filed another complaint against Nicanor for the recovery of her share under the 1959
Deed of Partition. The Judge, in his decision, ordered Nicanor and others to comply with his
part of the Deed of Partition and deliver to the Guerreros the amount of P26,650.00 without
prejudice to the right of reimbursement under the same deed.Subsequently, the Guerreros
instituted another complaint against Nicanor with the CFI at Pasig for recovery of sums of
money under the 1959 Deed of Partition. Thereat, Nicanor, as defendant a quo, filed a third
party complaint against brothers Ernesto et al. And albeit not touched upon in the basic
pleadings, the issue of whether Nicanor was obligated to pay Consuelo the amount stated in the
1959 partition. Nicanor was ordered by the Court to pay Consuelo the amount due her under the
693
May 5, 1959 deed of partition plus damages and attorney’s fees. Nicanor appealed in the
Intermediate Appellate Court to reverse the decision of the trial court but the appellate court
affirmed and modified the decision of the lower court.Approximately six years later, the
Guerreros filed a complaint for revival of the IAC’s decision in the RTC of Malabon- Navotas but
the said court dismissed the complaint. However, on motion for reconsideration and following a
new trial, the trial court reversed itself. Therefrom, Nicanor went on appeal to the Court of
Appeals and the court dismissed his appeal.
ISSUES:
(a) Whether or not Article 222 of the New Civil Code, now pursuant to 151 of the Family
Code shall be applied.
(b) Whether or not res judicata can barred the Court’s decision.
(c)
RULING:
(a) A lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers;
While a complaint in ordinary civil actions involving members of the same family must
contain an allegation that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made
pursuant to Article 222of the Civil Code, now pursuant to Article 151 of the Family Code,
a complaint otherwise defective on that score may be cured by introduction of evidence
effectively supplying the necessary averments of a defective complaint. The complaint
filed in this case contains no allegations. An action for revival of judgment of a dormant
decision rendered in an original action can hardly be the kind of suit contemplated in
Article 222 of the Code. It cannot be over-emphasized in this regard that the rationale of
said provision is to obviate hatred and passion in the family likely to be spawned by
litigation between and among the members thereof.
(b) Res Judicata refers to the rule that a final judgment rendered by the court of a
competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their
privies, and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the
same claim, demand or cause of action. Res judicata is not a nullifying factor, such that
the final judgment in the former action works to nullify the proceeding in a subsequent
action where the doctrine is invoked.
694
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the impugned decision of the Court of
Appeals AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
695
Mendoza v. CA
CECILION MENDOZA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and LUISA DE LA ROSA MENDOZA,
respondents.
GR No. L-23102 April 24, 1967
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This is a petition for a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in case CA-G.R. No.
30005-R, denying a writ of prohibition and injunction against the orders of the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija refusing dismissal of Civil Case No. 3436 of that Court.
FACTS:
Cecilio and Luisa were married on September 2, 1953 and lived together as husband
and wife until July 14, 1954, when the husband departed for the United States to further his
studies and practice his profession. Since then, the husband without justifiable cause or reason
deliberately abandoned and neglected the wife and despite repeated demands from her, the
husband failed and refused to provide for the maintenance and support of the wife who is
pregnant sickly and without source of revenue. Thus, she filed a complaint against her husband.
The husband filed two motions of dismissal consecutively but both were denied. Then he
petitioned the Court of Appeals for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction to stop to stop
the Court of First Instance from further proceeding with the case. After the CA heard and
considered the merits, it d3enied the writ of prohibition and dissolved the injunction.
ISSUES:
(a) Whether or not Article 222 of the Civil Code shall be applied.
(b) Whether or not Article 2053 of the Civil Code shall be applied to claim future support.
696
RULINGS:
(a) Article 222 of the Civil Code requires that before a suit between members of the family is
filed or maintained, it must appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been
made and the only way to make it so appear when the suit is filed is by proper averment
to that effect in the complaint. Since the law forbids a suit being initiated unless such
efforts at compromise appear, the showing that efforts in question were made is a
condition precedent to the existence of the cause of action. It follows that the failure of
the complaint to plead that plaintiff previously tried in earnest to reach a settlement out of
court renders it assailable for lack of cause of action and it may be so attacked at any
stage of the case even on appeal.
(b) A claim for future support that under Article 2053vof the Civil Code cannot be subject of
a valid compromise, therefore, outside the sphere of Article 222 of the Code upon which
petitioner relies. The validity of marriage is also a non-compromisable issue. Since no
valid compromise is valid on these issues, a showing of previous effects to compromise
them would be superfluous.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, sustaining that of the court of origin
denying dismissal of the complaint, is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
697
Versoza v. Versoza
MARGARET ANN WAINRIGHT VERSOZA, JOSE MARIA VERSOZA JR., CHARLES JOHN
VERSOZA, and VIRGINIA FELICE VERSOZA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
JOSE MARIA VRERSOZA, defendant-respondent
G.R. No. L-25609 November 27, 1968
SANCHEZ, J.:
The is a petition of the correctness of the lower court's order dismissing, without
prejudice, the complaint seeking, inter alia, future support upon the ground that there is no
allegation therein that earnest efforts toward a compromise were made but that the same have
failed, in infringement of Article 222 of the Civil Code.
FACTS:
On March 4, 1964, a verified complaint later amended, for monthly support in arrears
and damages and custody of the children with a petition for support pendiente lite was lodged
against Jose Maria Versoza by his wife and their three minor children. Reason gives are that
defendant has abandoned plaintiff without providing for their support and maintain illicit relation
with another woman.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 222 of the Civil Code is applicable in the case
RULING:
Article 222 of the Civil Code , construed in relation of Section 1 (j) Rule 16, Rules of
Court; Meaning of no suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family
unless it should appear that earnest effects toward a compromise have been made but that the
same have failed, subject to limitations in Article 2035. The right to support cannot be: (1)
removed; (2) transmitted to third persons; (3) nor compensated with what the receipients owes
the obligor (Article 301). The alleged defect is that the complaint does not state a cause of
698
action. The proposed amendment seeks to complete it. An amendment to the effect that the
requirements of Article 222 have been complied with does not confer jurisdiction upon the lower
Court. The defect is curable.
FALLO:
For the reasons given —
(1) the orders of the lower court of February 22, 1965, March 30, 1965, and June 22, 1965 are
hereby SET ASIDE; and
(2) the record of this case is hereby REMANDED to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon
City, Branch IX, with instructions to admit the second amended complaint and to conduct further
proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion herein. Costs against defendant. SO ORDERED.
699
Trinidad Ramos v. Pangilinan
JUANITA TRINIDAD RAMOS, ALMA RAMOS WORAK, MANUEL T. RAMOS, JOSEFINA R.

ROTHMAN, SONIA R. POST, ELVIRA P. MUNAR, and OFELIA R. LIM, Petitioners,
vs.
DANILO PANGILINAN, RODOLFO SUMANG, LUCRECIO BAUTISTA and ROLANDO
ANTENOR, Respondents.
G.R. No. 185920 July 20, 2010
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
This is a petition filed in 2003 a complaint for illegal dismissal against E.M. Ramos
Electric, Inc., a company owned by Ernesto M. Ramos (Ramos), the patriarch of herein
petitioners. By Decision of April 15, 2005, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of respondents and
ordered Ramos and the company to pay the aggregate amount ofP1,661,490.30 representing
their backwages, separation pay, 13th month pay & service incentive leave pay.
FACTS:
Respondents filed in 2003 a complaint for illegal dismissal against E.M. Ramos Electric,
Inc., a company owned by Ernesto M. Ramos (Ramos), the patriarch of herein petitioners. By
Decision of April 15, 2005, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of respondents and ordered Ramos
and the company to pay the aggregate amount ofP1,661,490.30 representing their backwages,
separation pay, 13th month pay & service incentive leave pay.
When the decision become final and executor, the writ of execution was passed. Sheriff
exhausted all means to execute the judgment but failed because Ramos’ bank accounts were
already closed while other properties in his or the company’s name had already been
transferred, and the only property left was the Pandacan property which is the subject matter of
this petition.
The petitioner herein alleged that the property is a family home of Ernesto therefore
cannot be subject to fulfil any debt pursuant to Article 153 of the Family code. The NLRC denied
the petition which was affirmed by the appellate court.
700
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Pandacan property of Ernesto M. Ramos is a Family Home pursuant
to Article 153 of the Family Code.
RULLING:
No. The Pandacan property is not a family home because the Family Code cannot be
retroactively applied, so the Civil Code is the one that should be followed in this case. A family
home constructed before the affectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988, must have
been constituted either judicially or extra-judicially as provided under Articles 225, 229-231 and
233 of the Civil Code. Judicial constitution of the family home requires the filing of a verified
petition before the courts and the registration of the court’s order with the Registry of Deeds of
the area where the property is located. Meanwhile, extrajudicial constitution is governed by
Articles 240 to 242 of the Civil Code and involves the execution of a public instrument which
must also be registered with the Registry of Property. Failure to comply with either one of these
two modes of constitution will bar a judgment debtor from availing of the privilege. Ernesto
Ramos did not comply with any of this requirement therefore the petition has no merit and the
foreclosure of the said property should continue.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED.
701
Modequillo v. Breva
JOSE MODEQUILLO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA FRANCISCO SALINAS, FLORIPER ABELLAN-SALINAS,
JUANITO CULAN-CULAN and DEPUTY SHERIFF FERNANDO PLATA, respondents.
G.R. No. 86355 May 31, 1990
GANCAYCO, J.:
The issue in this petition is whether or not a final judgment of the Court of Appeals in an
action for damages may be satisfied by way of execution of a family home constituted under the
Family Code.
FACTS:
The debt was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident and the money judgment
arising there from was rendered by the Appellate Court on January 27, 1988 which ordering the
petitioner to pay the Salinas spouses the due damages. The said judgment having become final
and executory, a writ of execution was issued by the Court to satisfy the said judgment on the
goods and chattels of the defendants including the petitioner. On July 7, 1988, the sheriff levied
on a parcel of residential land registered in the name of Jose Modequillo. A motion to quash or
set aside levy of execution was filed by the petitioner alleging that the residential land located is
where the family home is built since 1969 prior to the commencement of this case and as such
is exemt from execution, forced sale or attachment under Articles 152 and 153 of the Family
Code except for liabilities mentioned in article 155 thereof; and that the judgment debt sought to
be enforced against the family home of the defendant is not one of those enumerated under
article 155 of the Family Code. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
1988.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case fall under the exemption from the execution provided in the
Family Code.
702
RULING:
Case does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the Family Code.
Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from time it is
occupied as a family residence. Thus, the creditors should take necessary precautions to
protect their interest before extending credit to the spouses or head of the family owes the
home. Exemption is effective from the time of the Constitution of the Family home as such and
lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. The residential house and lot of
petitioner was not constituted as a family home whether judicial or extrajudicial under the Civil
Code. It became a family home by operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code of
the Philippines on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its publication in the Manila
Chronicles on August 4, 1987.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to

costs. SO ORDERED.
703
Trinidad Ramos v. Pangilinan
JUANITA TRINIDAD RAMOS, ALMA RAMOS WORAK, MANUEL T. RAMOS, JOSEFINA R.

ROTHMAN, SONIA R. POST, ELVIRA P. MUNAR, and OFELIA R. LIM, Petitioners,
vs.
DANILO PANGILINAN, RODOLFO SUMANG, LUCRECIO BAUTISTA and ROLANDO
ANTENOR, Respondents.
G.R. No. 185920 July 20, 2010
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
This is a petition filed in 2003 a complaint for illegal dismissal against E.M. Ramos
Electric, Inc., a company owned by Ernesto M. Ramos (Ramos), the patriarch of herein
petitioners. By Decision of April 15, 2005, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of respondents and
ordered Ramos and the company to pay the aggregate amount ofP1,661,490.30 representing
their backwages, separation pay, 13th month pay & service incentive leave pay.
FACTS:
Respondents filed in 2003 a complaint for illegal dismissal against E.M. Ramos Electric,
Inc., a company owned by Ernesto M. Ramos (Ramos), the patriarch of herein petitioners. By
Decision of April 15, 2005, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of respondents and ordered Ramos
and the company to pay the aggregate amount ofP1,661,490.30 representing their backwages,
separation pay, 13th month pay & service incentive leave pay.
When the decision become final and executor, the writ of execution was passed. Sheriff
exhausted all means to execute the judgment but failed because Ramos’ bank accounts were
already closed while other properties in his or the company’s name had already been
transferred, and the only property left was the Pandacan property which is the subject matter of
this petition.
The petitioner herein alleged that the property is a family home of Ernesto therefore
cannot be subject to fulfil any debt pursuant to Article 153 of the Family code. The NLRC denied
the petition which was affirmed by the appellate court.
ISSUE:
704
Whether or not the Pandacan property of Ernesto M. Ramos is a Family Home pursuant
to Article 153 of the Family Code.
RULLING:
No. The Pandacan property is not a family home because the Family Code cannot be
retroactively applied, so the Civil Code is the one that should be followed in this case. A family
home constructed before the affectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988, must have
been constituted either judicially or extra-judicially as provided under Articles 225, 229-231 and
233 of the Civil Code. Judicial constitution of the family home requires the filing of a verified
petition before the courts and the registration of the court’s order with the Registry of Deeds of
the area where the property is located. Meanwhile, extrajudicial constitution is governed by
Articles 240 to 242 of the Civil Code and involves the execution of a public instrument which
must also be registered with the Registry of Property. Failure to comply with either one of these
two modes of constitution will bar a judgment debtor from availing of the privilege. Ernesto
Ramos did not comply with any of this requirement therefore the petition has no merit and the
foreclosure of the said property should continue.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED.
705
Equitable PCI v. OJ Mark Trading
EQUITABLE PCI BANK, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
OJ-MARK TRADING, INC. and SPOUSES OSCAR AND EVANGELINE MARTINEZ,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 165950 August 11, 2010
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, praying for the reversal of the Decision1 dated October 29, 2004
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 77703, which denied its petition for certiorari
assailing the trial court’s orders granting respondents’ application for a writ of preliminary
injunction.
FACTS:
Respondent-spouses Oscar and Evangeline Martinez obtained loans from petitioner

Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. in the aggregate amount of Four Million Forty-Eight Thousand Eight
Hundred Pesos (P4,048,800.00). As security for the said amount, a Real Estate Mortgage
(REM) was executed over a condominium unit in San Miguel Court, Valle Verde 5,Pasig City,
Metro Manila where the spouses are residing. Respondent Oscar Martinez signed the REM
both as principal debtor and as President of the registered owner and third-party mortgagor,
respondent OJ-Mark Trading, Inc. The REM was annotated on Condominium Certificate of
Title No. PT-21363 of the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City.
Respondent-spouses defaulted in the payment of their outstanding loan obligation,
which as of October 31, 2002 stood at P4,918,160.03. In a letter dated May 15, 2002, they
offered to settle their indebtedness “with the assignment to the Bank of a commercial lot of
corresponding value” and also requested for recomputation at a lower interest rate and
condonation of penalties. While petitioner’s officers held a meeting with respondent Oscar
Martinez, the latter however failed to submit the required documents such as certificates of title
and tax declarations so that the bank can evaluate his proposal to pay the mortgage debt
via dacion en pago. Consequently, petitioner initiated the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real
706
estate mortgage by filing an ex parte petition before the Office of the Executive Judge, Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City.
In Temporary Restraining Order which was granted by the RTC and affirmed by CA and
so was injunction is also issued, respondents sought to enjoin the impending foreclosure sale
alleging that the same was hasty, premature, unreasonable and unwarranted, and also claiming
defects in the execution of the REM. Respondents imputed bad faith on the part of petitioner
who did not officially inform them of the denial or disapproval of their proposal to settle the loan
obligation by “dacion via assignment of a commercial property.” Respondents maintained that
aside from the REM being illegally notarized, incomplete and unenforceable, the obligation
subject thereof had been extinguished by the dacion proposal considering that the value of the
property offered was more than sufficient to pay for the mortgage debt. It was further averred
that the subject property is being used and occupied by respondent-spouses as a family home.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents have shown a clear legal right to enjoin the foreclosure
and public auction of the third-party mortgagor’s property while the case for annulment of REM
on said property is being tried.
RULING:
No. In the case at bar, respondents failed to show that they have a right to be protected and
that the acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of the said right. On the face of
their clear admission that they were unable to settle their obligations which were secured by the
mortgage, petitioner has a clear right to foreclose the mortgage. Where the parties stipulated in
their credit agreements, mortgage contracts and promissory notes that the mortgagee is
authorized to foreclose the mortgaged properties in case of default by the mortgagors, the
mortgagee has a clear right to foreclosure in case of default, making the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction improper. We note that the claim of exemption under Art. 153 of
the Family Code, thereby raising issue on the mortgaged condominium unit being a family home
and not corporate property, is entirely inconsistent with the clear contractual agreement of the
REM. Assuming arguendo that the mortgaged condominium unit constitutes respondents’
family home, the same will not exempt it from foreclosure as Article 155 (3) of the
707
same Code allows the execution or forced sale of a family home “for debts secured by
mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution.”
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 29, 2004 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77703 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Respondents’ application for a writ of preliminary injunction is DENIED. No costs. SO
ORDERED.
708
Josef v. Santos
ALBINO JOSEF,Petitioner,
vs.
OTELIO SANTOS,Respondent.
G.R. No. 165060 November 27, 2008
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the
November 17, 2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 80315, dismissing
petitioner’s special civil action of certiorari for failure to file a prior motion for reconsideration,
and the May 7, 2004 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.
FACTS:
Petitioner Albino Josef was the defendant in Civil Case No. 95-110-MK, which is a case
for collection of sum of money filed by herein respondent Otelio Santos, who claimed that
petitioner failed to pay the shoe materials which he bought on credit from respondent on various
dates in 1994. After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch 272, found petitioner
liable to respondent in the amount of P404,836.50 with interest at 12% per annum reckoned
from January 9, 1995 until full payment.
A writ of execution was issued on August 20, 2003 and enforced on August 21,
2003. On August 29, 2003, certain personal properties subject of the writ of execution were
auctioned off. Thereafter, a real property located at Marikina City and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-105280 was sold on October 28, 2003 by way of public auction
to fully satisfy the judgment credit. Respondent emerged as the winning bidder and a Certificate
of Sale dated November 6, 2003 was issued in his favor.
On November 5, 2003, petitioner filed an original petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, questioning the sheriff’s levy and sale of the abovementioned personal and real
properties. Petitioner claimed that the personal properties did not belong to him but to his
children; and that the real property covered by TCT No. N-105280 was his family home thus
exempt from execution. The Court of Appeals issued the assailed Resolution dismissing the
petition for failure of petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s July 16,
2003 Order granting the motion for execution and ordering the issuance of a writ therefor, as
well as for his failure to indicate in his petition the timeliness of its filing as required under the
Rules of Court. The appellate court also denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
709
ISSUE:
Whether or not the levy and sale of the personal belongings of the petitioner’s children
as well as the attachment and sale on public auction of his family home to satisfy the judgment
award in favor of respondent is legal.
RULING:
No. The levy and sale of the personal belongings of the petitioner’s children as well as
the attachment and sale on public auction of his family home to satisfy the judgement award in
favor of respondent is not legal. Petitioner, in his opposition to respondent’s motion for issuance
of a writ of execution, claimed that he was insolvent; that he had no property to answer for the
judgment credit; that the house and lot in which he was residing at the time was his family home
thus exempt from execution; that the household furniture and appliances found therein are
likewise exempt from execution; and that these furniture and appliances belonged to his
children Jasmin Josef and Jean Josef Isidro. However, instead of inquiring into the nature of
petitioner’s allegations in his opposition, the trial court ignored the same and granted
respondent’s motion for execution and was affirmed by CA. This is clearly in violation to the law
as Family Home cannot be subject to satisfy a debt except from the instances provided by the
law and an exclusive property of a possible heir cannot be subject to satisfy his parents debt in
case of insolvency of the latter.
Therefore, the trial court is hereby directed by this court (1) to conduct a solemn inquiry
into the nature of the real property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-105280, with a
view toward determining whether the same is petitioner Albino Josef’s family home, and if so,
apply the pertinent provisions of the Family Code and Rule 39 of the Rules of Court; and (2) to
conduct an inquiry into the ownership of all other properties that were levied upon and sold, with
the aim of determining as well whether these properties are exempt from execution under
existing law.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The November 17,
2003 and May 7, 2004 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 80315
710
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The July 16, 2003 Order of
the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch 272 in Civil Case No. 95-110-MK, as well as
the writ or writs of execution thus issued in said case, are hereby DECLARED VOID, and all
acts proceeding therefrom and any title obtained by virtue thereof are likewise DECLARED
VOID.
The trial court is DIRECTED to resolve, with utmost dispatch, Civil Case No. 95-110-MK
within sixty (60) days from receipt of a copy of this Decision. SO ORDERED.
711
Kelley v. Planters Products
SPOUSES AUTHER G. KELLEY, JR. AND DORIS A. KELLEY, Petitioners,

vs.
PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC. AND JORGE A. RAGUTANA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 172263 July 9, 2008
CORONA, J.:
Petitioner Auther G. Kelley, Jr. (Auther) acquired agricultural chemical products on

consignment from respondent Planters Products, Inc. (PPI) in 1989. Due to Auther's failure to
pay despite demand, PPI filed an action for sum of money against him in the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 57 (RTC Makati City). This was docketed as Civil Case No. 91-
904.
FACTS:
Petitioner Auther G. Kelley, Jr. (Auther) acquired agricultural chemical products on

consignment from respondent Planters Products, Inc. (PPI) in 1989. Due to Auther's failure to
pay despite demand, PPI filed an action for sum of money against him in the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 57 (RTC Makati City). After trial on the merits, the RTC Makati City
decided in favor of PPI and issued a writ of execution. Pursuant thereto, respondent sheriff
Jorge A. Ragutana sold on execution real property covered by TCT No. 15079 located in Naga
City. A certificate of sale was issued in favor of PPI as the highest bidder.
After being belatedly informed of the said sale, petitioners Auther and his wife Doris A.
Kelley (Doris) filed a motion to dissolve or set aside the notice of levy in the RTC Makati City on
the ground that the subject property was their family home which was exempt from execution.
Petitioners' motion was denied for failure to comply with the three-day notice requirement.
Subsequently, petitioners filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of levy and sale of the
alleged family home with damages against Ragutana and PPI in the Regional Trial Court of
Naga City, Branch 19 (RTC Naga City). The case was, however, dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction and lack of cause of action. The dismissal was upheld by the CA.
712
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner herein be allowed to prove their contention that the
property herein subject of the case is there family home.
RULING:
Yes. Petitioners anchor their action on their contention that TCT No. 15079 is the Kelley
family home. No doubt, a family home is generally exempt from execution provided it was duly
constituted as such. There must be proof that the alleged family home was constituted jointly by
the husband and wife or by an unmarried head of a family. It must be the house where they and
their family actually reside and the lot on which it is situated. The family home must be part of
the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive
properties of either spouse with the latter's consent, or on the property of the unmarried head of
the family. Therefore the court hereby remanded the case in order for the petitioner to prove
whether or not the property covered by TCT No. 15079 is a duly constituted family home and
therefore exempt from execution.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, Civil Case No. 2000-0188 captioned Spouses Auther G. Kelley, Jr. and
Doris A. Kelley v. Planters Products, Inc. and Jorge A. Ragutana is hereby REINSTATED and
this case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 19 for
determination whether or not the property covered by TCT No. 15079 is a duly constituted
family home and therefore exempt from execution. SO ORDERED.
713
Gomez v. Ines
MARY JOSEPHINE GOMEZ and EUGENIA SOCORRO C. GOMEZ-SALCEDO, petitioners,

vs.
ROEL, NOEL and JANNETTE BEVERLY STA. INES and
HINAHON STA. INES, respondents.
G.R. No. 132537 October 14, 2005
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals
reversing the Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch
27, dismissing the complaint of herein respondents for lack of jurisdiction.
FACTS:
On June 17, 1986, Mary Josephine C. Gomez and Eugenia Socorro C. Gomez- Salcedo
filed a complaint for damages before the RTC of Pasig against Marietta Dela Cruz Sta. Inez
alleging that they are the children of the cdeceased Purificacion Dela Cruz Gomez who, during
her lifetime, entrusted her rice land located at Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya to Marietta together
with the Transfer of Certificate of Title covering said land for the latter to manage and supervise.
The sisters further alleged that they have demanded for an accounting of the produce of the
said rice land while under the management of Marietta and for the return of the TCT to the
property, but the latter refused. The trial court rendered judgment against Marietta and after
such judgment became final and executor, a writ of execution was issued by the Pasig RTC, by
virtue of which, a parcel of land located at Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, registered in the name
of Marietta Dela Cruz Sta. Ines, was levied upon by Flaviano Balgos Jr., to satisfy the damages
awarded in the civil case. Said property was sold at a public auction to Mary Josephine as the
highest bidder. The sale was registered with the Register of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya. A
complaint for annulment of sale was filed by the husband and children of Marietta on the ground
that said house and lot sold during the public auction is their family residence, and is thus
exempt from execution under Section 12 (a), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, and under Article
155 of the Family Code.
714
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 155 of the Family Code is applicable in the case
RULING:
Under Article 155 of the Family Code, the family home shall be exempt from execution,
forced sale, or attachment except for, among other things, debts incurred prior to the
constitution of the family home. In the case, the house and lots of Sta.Ines family was not
constituted as a family home, whether judicially or extrajudicially, at the time Marietta incurred
her debts. Under prevailing jurisprudence, it is deemed constituted as such only upon the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, thus, the debts were incurred before the
constitution before the family home.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of

the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Special Civil Action No. 5853 entitled,
“Roel Sta. Ines, et al. v. Mary Josephine Gomez, et al.,” filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, is hereby DISMISSED. No Costs. SO ORDERED.
715
Manacop v. CA
FLORANTE F. MANACOP, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and E & L MERCANTILE, INC., respondents.
G.R. No. 97898 August 11, 1997
PANGANIBAN, J.:
This is the principal question posed by petitioner in assailing the Decision of Respondent
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 18906 promulgated on February 21, 1990 and its
Resolution promulgated on March 21, 1991, affirming the orders issued by the trial court
commanding the issuance of various writs of execution to enforce the latter's decision in Civil
Case No. 53271.
FACTS:
Petitioner Florante F. Manacop and his wife Eulaceli purchased on March 10, 1972 a
residential lot with a bungalow, in consideration of P75,000.00. On March 17, 1986, Private
Respondent E & L Mercantile, Inc. filed a complaint against petitioner and F.F. Manacop
Construction Co., Inc. before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila to collect an
indebtedness of P3,359,218.45. Instead of filing an answer, petitioner and his company entered
into a compromise agreement with private respondent. On April 20, 1986, the trial court
rendered judgment approving the aforementioned compromise agreement. It enjoined the
parties to comply with the agreement in good faith. On July 15, 1986, private respondent filed a
motion for execution which the lower court granted on September 23, 1986. However,
execution of the judgment was delayed. Eventually, the sheriff levied on several vehicles and
other personal properties of petitioner. In partial satisfaction of the judgment debt, these
chattels were sold at public auction for which certificates of sale were correspondingly issued by
the sheriff. On August 1, 1989, petitioner and his company filed a motion to quash the alias writs
of execution and to stop the sheriff from continuing to enforce them on the ground that the
judgment was not yet executory. On September 26, 1989, the lower court denied the motion to
quash the writ of execution and the prayers in the subsequent pleadings filed by petitioner and
his company. Finding that petitioner and his company had not paid their indebtedness even
though they collected receivables amounting to P57,224,319.75, the lower court held that the
case had become final and executory. It also ruled that petitioner’s residence was not exempt
from execution as it was not duly constituted as a family home, pursuant to the Civil Code.
716
ISSUE:
Whether or not a final and executory decision promulgated and a writ of execution
issued before the affectivity of the Family Code can be executed on a family home constituted
under the provisions of the said Code.
RULING:
In that case, petitioner incurred the indebtedness in 1987 or prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988. Hence, petitioner’s family home was not exempt from
attachment “by sheer force of exclusion embodied in paragraph 2, Article 155 of the Family
Code cited in Modequillo,” where the Court categorically ruled:“Under the Family Code, a family
home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family
residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the
Civil Code. If the family actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as
contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors should take the necessary precautions to protect their
interest before extending credit to the spouses or head of the family who owns the home. Article
155 provides that the family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment
except:(1) For nonpayment of taxes;(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family
home;(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution;
and (4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material men and others who
have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building. The exemption
provided is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such, and lasts so
long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. In the present case, the residential
house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family home whether judicially or
extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family home by operation of law only under
Article 153 of the Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of
the Family Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its publication in the Manila
Chronicle on August 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap year).
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for utter lack of merit. This Decision is
immediately executory. Double costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
717
Taneo v. CA
PABLITO TANEO, JR., JOSE TANEO, NENA T. CATUBIG and HUSBAND, CILIA T.
MORING and HUSBAND, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ABDON GILIG, respondents.
G.R. No. 108532 March 9, 1999
KAPUNAN, J.:
The petition is with regard to whether or not the conveyance made by way of the sheriff's
sale pursuant to the writ of execution issued by the trial court in Civil Case No. 590 is prohibited
under Sec. 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141; and whether or not the family home is exempt
from execution.
FACTS:
As a result of a judgment for recovery of property in favor of private respondent , two of

the petitioner’s properties were levied to satisfy the judgment amount. The subject properties
were sold to a public auction to the private respondent as the highest bidder. Consequently,
after petitioner’s failure to redeem the same, a final deed of conveyance was executed definitely
transferring, selling, and conveying said properties to the private respondent. The petitioners
filed an action to declare the deed of conveyance void and to quiet title over the land with a
prayer to writ of preliminary injunction. The petitioners alleged that they are the children of Pablo
Taneo and Narcisa Valaceras, who are both dead and the subject property has been acquired
through free patent, such property is therefore inalienable and not subject to any encumberance
for the payment of debt.
ISSUES:
(a) Whether or not the conveyance made by way of the sheriff’s sale pursuant to the writ of
execution issued by the trial court is prohibited.
(b) Whether or not the family home is exempt from execution.
718
RULING:
(a) Court agrees with the respondent court that the conveyance made by way of the sheriff’s
sale was not violative of the law. The final deed of conveyance ceding the subject
property to Abdon Gilig was issued after the petitioners failed to redeem the property
after the reglementary period. The petitioners are not the owners of the land and cannot
claim to be such by invoking Commonwealth Act No. 141. The prohibition does not apply
since it is clear from the records that judgment debt and the execution sale took place
prior to the approval of the application for free patent.
(b) A family home is a real right, which is gratuitous, inalienable, and free from attachment
constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is situated. It cannot be
seized by creditors except in certain special cases. It may be constituted judicially and
extrajudicially. Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the family home is deemed
constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as the family residence. The
article does not mean that it has a retroactive effect such that all existing family
residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their
occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Instances where the family home is
not exempted from the execution, forced sale or attachment under the Civil Code.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.
719
PATERNITY AND FILIATION
De Asis v. CA
MANUEL DE ASIS, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JAIME T. HAMOY, Branch 130, RTC, Kalookan City and
GLEN CAMIL ANDRES DE ASIS represented by her mother/guardian VIRCEL D.
ANDRES, respondents.
G.R. No. 127578 February 15, 1999
PURISIMA, J.:
Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking to nullify the
decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court's Orders, dated November 25,
1993 and February 4, 1994, respectively, denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint
in Civil Case No. C-16107, entitled "Glen Camil Andres de Asis, etc. vs. Manuel de Asis", and
the motion for reconsideration.
FACTS:
On October 14, 1988, Vircel D. Andres in her capacity as the legal guardian of the minor,
Glen Camil Andres De Asis, broght an action for maintenance and support against Manuel De
Asis, alleging that the defendant is the father of the subject minor and the former refused and/or
failed to provide for the maintenance of the latter, despite repeated demands.
ISSUES:
(a) Whether or not future support can be the subject of a compromise.

(b) Whether or not a former dismissal predicated upon a compromise affecting the civil
status of persons can have force and effect.
720
RULINGS:
(a) The right to receive can neither renounced nor transmitted to a third person. Article
301 of the Civil Code provides that future support cannot be the subject of a
compromise. An agreement for the dismissal of a complaint and support conditioned
upon the dismissal of the counterclaim is in the nature of a compromise which cannot
be countenanced.
(b) A former dismissal predicated upon a compromise affecting the civil status of
persons and future support cannot have force and effect and cannot bar the filing of
another action, asking for the same relief against the same defendant.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the petition under consideration is hereby DISMISSED and the decision
of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
721
Fernandez v. Fernandez
RODOLFO FERNANDEZ and MERCEDES CARANTO FERNANDEZ, HUSBAND and WIFE,

EDDIE C. FERNANDEZ and LUZ FERNANDEZ, SPOUSES, petitioners,
vs.
ROMEO FERNANDEZ, POTENCIANO FERNANDEZ, FRANCISCO FERNANDEZ, JULITA
FERNANDEZ, WILLIAM FERNANDEZ, MARY FERNANDEZ, ALEJANDRO FERNANDEZ,
GERARDO FERNANDEZ, RODOLFO FERNANDEZ and GREGORIO
FERNANDEZ, respondents.
G.R. No. 143256 August 28, 2001
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision1 of the respondent Court of
Appeals dated December 22, 1999 affirming the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court Branch
40, Dagupan City in an action for nullity of contracts, partition, recovery of possession and
damages in favor of plaintiffs-appellees, herein respondents.
FACTS:
The late Spouses Dr. Jose K. Fernandez, and Generosa A. de Venecia were the
registered owners of a parcel of land located at Dagupan City and the two storey building
constructed thereon. It is undisputed that Generosa gave birth to Rogelio who died when he
was only 12 years old as paralytic. In the testimony of Romeo Fernandez, it was revealed that
the late Spouses being childless by the death of their son, purchased a one month baby boy,
who was later on identified as Rodolfo Fernandez. He was taken care of by the couple and was
sent to school and became a dental technician. On July 20, 1982, Jose K. Fernandez died and
left his wife and Rodolfo an estate. On August 31, 1989, appellant and Generosa executed a
Deed of extra-judicial Partition. On the same day, Generosa executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
in favor of Eddie Fernandez, appellant’s son. After learning the transaction, the nephews and
nieces of the deceased, their father Genaro being a brother of Jose, filed an action to declare
the Extra-Judicial Partition of Estate and Deed of Sale void ab initio. They alleged that the
appellants were motivated by unmitigated greed, deliberate and malicious acts of depriving
them and other heirs of the deceased their rights.
722
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 1105 of the New Civil Code is applicable.
RULING:
Considering the foregoing findings, petitioner Rodolfo is not a child by nature of the
spouses Fernandez and not a legal heir of the deceased, thus the subject deed of extra-judicial
settlement of the estate between Generosa and Rodolfo is null and void insofar as Rodolfo is
concerned pursuant to Article 1105 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines which states; “A
partition which includes a person believed to be an heir but who is not shall be void only with
respect to such person. Moreover, While one’s legitimacy be questioned only in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, this doctrine has no application in a case where the
allegation by one party is that a person claiming to be a child of the deceased spouses was not
born to said deceased persons.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed judgment is hereby AFFIRMED with

Modification, as follows:
1. Respondents as legitimate heirs of Dr. Jose Fernandez are entitled to the ¼ share of the
conjugal lot and building of the deceased spouses Jose and Generosa Fernandez who died
childless and intestate;
2. The deed of extra-judicial partition is nullified insofar as the share of petitioner Rodolfo in the
conjugal lot is concerned and the title issued pursuant thereto in the name of Rodolfo
Fernandez;
3. Considering that the deed of sale is valid insofar as the ¾ share of Generosa sold to
petitioner Eddie Fernandez, TCT No. 54693 is cancelled and a new title should be issued in the
names of petitioner Eddie Fernandez and respondents as co-owners of the ¾ and ¼ shares
respectively in the conjugal building.
4. The awards of actual and moral damages and attorney's fees are deleted.
SO ORDERED.
723
Legitimate Children
Concepcion v. CA
GERARDO B. CONCEPCION, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS MA. THERESA ALMONTE, respondent.
G.R. No. 123450 August 31, 2005
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition about Gerardo B. Concepcion and private respondent Ma. Theresa
Almonte, and a child named Jose Gerardo. Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married on
December 29, 1989. After their marriage, they lived with Ma. Theresa’s parents in Fairview,
Quezon City. Almost a year later, on December 8, 1990, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose
Gerardo.
FACTS:
Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married on December 29, 1989. After their marriage,
they lived Ma. Theresa’s parents. Almost a year later, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo.
The couple’s relationship turned out to be short-lived. On December 19, 1991, the husband filed
a petition to have his marriage annulled on the ground of bigamy. He alleged that nine years
before he married Ma. Theresa, she had married one Mario Gopiao, which married was never
annulled. Gerardo also found out that Mario was still alive. The wife did not deny marrying Mario
when she was twenty years old. She, however, averred that the marriage was a sham that she
never lived with Mario at all. The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresa’s marriage to Mario was valid
and susbsisting when she married Gerardo and annulled her marriage to the latter for being
bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo to be an illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the
child was awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was granted visitation rights.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Articles 164, 166, 49 of the Family Code is applicable?
724
RULING:
The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Article 164 of the Family Code
is clear. A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate. As a
guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family
Code provides: Article 167: The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may
have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. The law
requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of the legitimacy. The
presumption of legitimacy proceeds from sexual union in marriage, particularly during the period
of conception. To overthrow this presumption on the basis of Article 166(1)(b) of the Family
Code, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access that could have
enable the husband to father the child. Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal
access is not disproved, unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary. The
presumption is quasi-collective and may be refuted only by the evidence of physical
impossibility of coitus between husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately preceded the birth of the child. In case of annulment or declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage, Article 49 of the Family Code grants visitation rights to a parent who is
deprived of custody of his children. Such visitation rights flow from the natural right of both
parent and child to each other’s company. There being no such parent-child relationship
between them, Gerardo has no legally demandable rights to visit Jose Gerardo.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The September 14, 1995 and January
10, 1996 resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40651 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
725
Angeles v. Maglaya
BELEN SAGAD ANGELES, petitioner,

vs.
ALELI ANGELES MAGLAYA, respondent.
G.R. No.153798 September 2, 2005
GARCIA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
petitioner Belen Sagad Angeles seeks to set aside the Decision dated May 29, 2002[1] of the
Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 66037, reversing an earlier Order of the Regional Trial
Court at Caloocan City which dismissed the petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of
Francisco Angeles, thereat commenced by the herein respondent Aleli “Corazon” Angeles-
Maglaya.
FACTS:
On March 25, 1998, the respondent filed a petition for letters of administration and her
appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Francisco M. Angeles. She alleged that
she is the sole legitimate child of the deceased and Genoveva Mercado, and together with
petitioner, decedent’s wife by his second marriage, are the surviving heirs of the decedent.
Petitioner opposed the petition of the respondent. She averred that respondent could not be the
daughter of Francisco for, although she was recorded as Francisco’s legitimate daughter, the
corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him. Furthermore, the respondent failed to
present the marriage contract between her supposed parents or produce any acceptable
document to prove such union.
ISSUES:
(a) Whether or not the presumption of legitimacy under Article 164 of the Family Code may
be availed by the respondent?
(b) Whether or not birth certificate may use as proof of paternity and recognition?
726
RULINGS:
(a) A party in whose favor the legal presumption exists may rely on and invoke such legal
presumption to establish a fact in issue. He need not introduce evidence to prove that
fact. For, a presumption is prima facie proof of the fact presumed. However, it cannot be
over-emphasized, that while a fact overthrown, stand as proved, the presumption of
legitimacy under Article 164 of the Family Code may be availed only upon convinvcing
proof of the factual basis. Else, the presumption of law that a child is legitimate does not
arise. A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful
marriage. Remove the elements of the lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate
filiation between parents and children.
(b) Jurisprudence teaches that a birth certificate, to be considered as validating proof of
paternity and as an instrument of recognition, must be signed by the father and mother
jointly, or by the mother if the father refuses. In this case, the Birth Certificate presented
was not signed by Francisco against whom legitimate filiation is asserted. Not even by
Genoveva, instead by the attending physician, who certified to having attended the birth
of a child. Thus, the birth certificate presented is not valid to prove the paternity.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the herein assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is

hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the order of the trial court dismissing Special
Proceedings No. C-2140 REINSTATED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
727
ARTURO R. ABALOS, petitioner,

vs.
DR. GALICIANO S. MACATANGAY, respondent.
G.R. No. 155043 September 30, 2004
TINGA, J.:
The instant petition seeks a reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 48355 entitled "Dr. Galicano S. Macatangay, Jr. v. Arturo R. Abalos and Esther Palisoc-
Abalos," promulgated on March 14, 2002. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision
which dismissed the action for specific performance filed by respondent, and ordered petitioner
and his wife to execute in favor of herein respondent a deed of sale over the subject property.
FACTS:
Spouses Arturo and Esther Abalos are the registered owner of a parcel of land with
improvements. Armed with Special Power of Attorney (SPA), Arturo executed a Receipt and
Memorandum Agreement (RMOA) dated October 17, 1989 in favor of the respondent, binding
himself to sell to respondent the subject property and not to offer the same to any other party
within thirty (30) days from date. Arturo acknowledged receipt of a check from the respondent in
certain amount, representing earnest money for the subject property, the amount of which would
be deducted from the purchase price. Further, the RMOA stated that full payment would be
effected as soon as possession of the property shall have been turned over to respondent.
Subsequently, Esther executed a SPA dated on October 25, 1989, appointing her sister to act
for and in her behalf relative to the transfer of the property to respondent. Ostensibly, a marital
squabble was brewing between the spouses at the time and to protect is interest, respondent
caused the annotation of his adverse claim on the title of the spouses to the property. On
November 16, 1989, the respondent sends a demand letter informing the spouses of his
readiness and willingness to pay the full amount of the purchase price. The letter contained a
demand upon the spouses to comply with their obligation to turn over possession of the property
to him. Arturo and Esther failed to deliver the property which prompted the respondent to cause
the annotation of another adverse claim. On January 12, 1990, respondent filed a complaint
728
against petitioners for specific performance with damages. Arturo filed his answer to the
complaint while his wife was declared in default.
ISSUES:
(a) Whether or not the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership
(b) Whether or not the consent of both spouses is needed in the sale of property under
conjugal partnership
(c) Whether or not a written consent of the other spouse is required in selling property under
conjugal partnership
RULING:
(a) Under the Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. This
right is clearly granted to him by law. More, the husband is the sole administrator. The
wife is not entitled as of right to joint administration. The right of the husband or wife to
one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the dissolution and liquidation of the
conjugal partnership is finally determined that, after settlement of conjugal obligations,
there are net assets left which can be divided between the spouses or their respective
heirs.
(b) The sale by the husband of the property belonging the conjugal partnership without the
consent of the wife when there is no showing that the latter is incapacitated is void ab
initio because it is in contravention of the mandatory requirements of Article 166 of the
Civil Code. This Article requires the consent of the wife before the husband may alienate
encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership, it follows that acts or
transactions executed against this mandatory provision are void except when the law
itself authorize their validity.
(c) The Family Code now requires the written consent of the other spouse, or authority of
the court for the disposition or encumberance of conjugal partnership property without
which, the disposition or encumberance shall be void.
729
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
complaint in Civil Case No. 90-106 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati is ordered DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
730
Jao v. CA
JANICE MARIE JAO, represented by her mother and guardian ad litem, ARLENE S.
SALGADO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V. JAO, respondents.
G. R. No. L-49162 July 28, 1987
PADILLA, J.:
Appeal by certiorari from the decision* of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 51078-R,
dated 29 August 1978, which dismissed petitioner"s action for recognition and support against
private respondent, and from the respondent Court"s resolution, dated 11 October 1978,
denying petitioner"s motion for reconsideration of said decision.
FACTS:
On October 28, 1968, petitioner Janice Marue Jao, then minor, represented by her
mother and guardian ad-litem, filed a case for recognition and support with respondent Perico V.
Jao. The latter denied paternity so the parties agreed to a blood grouping test which was in due
course conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation upon order of the trial court. The
result of the said test indicated that Janice could not have been the possible offspring by Perico
and Arlene.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the result of blood grouping test may use as an evidence for filiation?
RULING:
The findings of such blood tests are not admissible to prove the fact of paternity as they
show only a possiblility that the alleged father or any one of many others with the same blood
type may have been the father of the child. But the Uniform Act recognizes the tests have some
probative value to establish paternity where the blood type and the combination in the child is
shown to be rare, in which case the judge is given discretion to let it in.
731
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is hereby DENIED without pronouncement
as to costs. SO ORDERED.
732
Andal v. Macaraig
MARIANO ANDAL, assisted by mother Maria Dueñas as guardian ad litem, and MARIA
DUEÑAS, Petitioner,
vs.
EDUVIGIS MACARAIG, Respondents.
G.R. No. L-2474 May 30, 1951
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is a petition about Mariano Andal, a minor, assisted by his mother Maria Dueñas, as
guardian ad litem, brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur for the
recovery of the ownership and possession of a parcel of land situated in the barrio of Talacop,
Calabanga, Camarines Sur.
FACTS:
The husband was suffering from tuberculosis in such a condition that he could hardly
move and get up from his bed, with feet swollen and voice hoarse. The wife had carnal
intercourse with a man other than her husband during the first 120 days of the 300 days
immediately preceding the birth of the child. The husband soon died, but within 300 days
following dissolution of the marriage, a child was born to the wife.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the late husband is the father of the child.
RULING:
The Court held that the child is still his legitimate child. The fact that the husband was
seriously sick is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of legitimacy. There are cases
where persons suffering from such illness can do carnal act even in the most crucial stage of his
health because then they seem to be more inclined to sexual intercourse. This presumption can
only be rebutted by proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to have had access
to his wife during the first 120 days of the 300 days next preceding the birth of the child.
733
“Impossibility of access by husband to wife would include absence during the initial period of
conception, impotence which is patent, continuing and incurable; and imprisonment, unless it
can be shown that cohabitation took place through corrupt violation of prison regulation.” The
fact that the wife had illicit intercourse with a man other than her husband during the initial
period, do not preclude cohabitation between said husband and wife.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED, without pronouncement as to

costs. SO ORDERED.
734
Babiera v. Catotal
TEOFISTO BABIERA, petitioner,

vs.
PRESENTACION B. CATOTAL, respondent.
G.R. No. 138493 June 15, 2000
PANGANIBAN, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking
reversal of the March 18, 1999 Decision of the Court of Appeals(CA) in CA-GR CV No. 56031.
Affirming the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte in Special Proceedings No. 3046.
FACTS:
Presentacion B. Catotal filed a petition for the cancellation of the entry of birth of Teofista
Babiera in the Civil Registry of Ilagan City. She asserted that she is the only surviving child of
the late Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera. She alleged that Teofista is not her sister because
she is the daughter of Flora Guinto who is the housemaid of the spouses and gave birth through
‘hilot’ at the house of the spouses without their knowledge. This caused the registration of the
facts of birth of her child, by simulating that the child was the child of the spouses Eugenio, then
65 years old and Hemogena, then 54 years old, and made her to be the mother of the child.
Due to lack of evidence presented that Hermogena became pregnant and was already 54 at the
alleged time of Teofista’s birth, both the trial and appellate court declared the certificate of birth
of Teofista as null and void ab initio and ordering her Local Civil Registrar of Iligan to cancel
from the registry of live birth of Iligan City BIRTH CERTIFICATE.
ISSUES:
(a) Whether or not Article 171 of the Family Code shall be applied?
(b) Whether or not Article 170 of the Family Code shall be applied?
735
RULING:
(a) A legitimate child has the requisite standing to initiate an action to cancel the birth
certificate of one claiming to be the child of the former’s mother. Article 171 of the Family
Code states that the child’s filiation can be impugned only by the father or in special
circumstances, his heirs. It applies to instances in which the father impugns the
legitimacy of his wife’s child. This Article is not applicable in the present case because it
does not impugn petitioner’s filiation to Spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera since
there is no blood relation to impugn in the first place. In Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court, provides that a real party in interest is one “who stands to be benefited or injured
by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.”
(b) The prescriptive period set forth in Article 170 of the Family Code does not apply. An
action to cancel a person’s Birth Certificate for being allegedly void ab initio does not
prescribe.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
736
Benitez-Badua v. CA
MARISSA BENITEZ-BADUA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, VICTORIA BENITEZ- LIRIO AND FEODOR BENITEZ AGUILAR,
respondents.
G.R. No. 105625 January 24, 1994
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision of the 12th Division of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. No. CV No. 30862 dated May 29, 1992.
FACTS:
Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian owned various properties especially in
Laguna. Isabel died and followed her in the grave, seven years after. He died intestate. The
fight for administration of Vicente’s estate ensued on September 24, 1990, private respondent
Victoria Benitez- Lirio and Feodor Benitez- Aguilar, Vicente’s sister and nephew, respectively.
They prayed for the issuance of letters of administration of Vicente’s favor of private respondent
Aguilar. On November 2, 1990, petitioner opposed the petition. She alleged that she is the sole
heir of the deceased and capable of administering his estate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code shall be
contemplated?
RULING:
Articles 164, 166, 170, and 171 of the Family Code do contemplate a situation where a
child is alleged not be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple. The instant case
does not contemplated by these articles. These articles govern a situation where a husband (or
his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who
can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (a) it was physically impossible for him to
737
have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately preceded the birth of the child; (b) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the
child could not have been his child; (c) that in case of children conceived through artificial
insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either spouse was obtained through
mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against
petitioner. SO ORDERED.
738
Liyao v. Tanhoti-Liyao
WILLIAM LIYAO, JR., represented by his mother Corazon Garcia, petitioner,

vs.
JUANITA TANHOTI-LIYAO, PEARL MARGARET L. TAN, TITA ROSE L. TAN AND LINDA
CHRISTINA LIYAO, respondents.
G.R. No. 138961 March 7, 2002
DE LEON, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision dated June 4, 1999 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. C.V. No. 45394 which reversed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 167 in declaring William Liyao, Jr. as the
illegitimate (spurious) son of the deceased William Liyao and ordering Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao,
Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao to recognize and
acknowledge William Liyao, Jr. as a compulsory heir of the deceased William Liyao and entitled
to all successional rights as such and to pay the costs of the suit.
FACTS:
Corazon G. Garcia is legally married to but living separately from Ramon M. Yulo for
more than ten (10) years at the time of the institution of the civil case filed by her in favor to her
son. Corazon cohabited with the late William Liyao from 1965 up to the time of William’s
untimely demise on December 2, 1975. They lived together in the company of Corazon’s two (2)
children from her subsisting marriage. This was with the knowledge of William Liyao’s legitimate
children, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga, from his subsisting marriage with
Juanita Tanhoti Liyao. Tita Rose and Christina were both employed at the Far East Realty
Investment, Inc. of which Corazon and William were then vice president and president,
respectively. On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jr. at the Cardinal Santos
Memorial Hospital. During her three (3) day stay at the hospital, William Liyao visited and stayed
with her and the new born baby, William, Jr. (Billy). All the medical and hospital expenses, food
and clothing were paid under the account of William Liyao. William Liyao even asked his
confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez, to secure a copy of Billy’s birth certificate. He
likewise instructed Corazon to open a bank account for Billy with the Consolidated Bank and
Trust Company and gave weekly amounts to be deposited therein. William Liyao would bring
739
Billy to the office, introduce him as his good looking son and had their pictures taken together.
During the lifetime of William Liyao, several pictures were taken showing, among others, William
Liyao and Corazon together with Billy’s godfather, Fr. Julian Ruiz, William Liyao’s legal staff and
their wives while on vacation in Baguio. Corazon also presented pictures in court to prove that
that she usually accompanied William Liyao while attending various social gatherings and other
important meetings.
ISSUE:
Who shall invoke the legitimacy of the child mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil Code?
RULING:
Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is
presumed to be legitimate. The presumption of legitimacy of children does not only flow out from
a declaration contained in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and
the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded in a policy to protect innocent
offspring from the odium of illegitimacy. The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is
not conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Hence,
Article 255 of the New Civil Code provides: Article 255. Children born after one hundred and
eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following
its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate. Against this
presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the
husband having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three
hundred which preceded the birth of the child. This physical impossibility may be caused:1) By
the impotence of the husband;2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in
such a way that access was not possible;3) By the serious illness of the husband. The fact that
Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time
petitioner was conceived and born is of no moment. While physical impossibility for the husband
to have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the
child, it bears emphasis that the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned in
Article 255 of the Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs
under the conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code.
740
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45394 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
741
De Jesus v. Estate of Juan Dizon
JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE A. DE JESUS, minors, represented by

their mother, CAROLINA A. DE JESUS, petitioners,
vs.
THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON, respondent.
G.R. No. 142877 October 2, 2001
VITUG, J.:
The petition involves the case of two illegitimate children who, having been born in lawful
wedlock, claim to be the illegitimate scions of the decedent in order to enforce their respective
shares in the latter’s estate under the rules on succession.
FACTS:
The petition involves the case of two illegitimate children who, having been born in lawful
wedlock, claim to be the illegitimate scions of the decedent in order to enforce their respective
shares in the latter’s estate under the rules on succession. Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina
Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August 1964. It was during this marriage that Jacqueline A.
de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, were born, the former on 01 March 1979 and the latter
on 06 July 1982. In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged
Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de
Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died intestate on 12 March 1992, leaving behind considerable assets
consisting of shares of stock in various corporations and some real property. It was on the
strength of his notarized acknowledgment that petitioners filed a complaint on 01 July 1993 for
“Partition with Inventory and Accounting” of the Dizon estate. Respondents, the surviving
spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon, including the corporations of
which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case, arguing that the
complaint, even while denominated as being one for partition, would nevertheless call for
altering the status of petitioners from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de
Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and
deceased Juan Dizon.
742
ISSUE:
Whether or not Articles 170 and 171 shall be observed in the case?
RULING:
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on
sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in
wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof
that there is physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days of
the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity
of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife
are living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness
of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the
expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171, of the Family
Code (which took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child
would no longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed
and unassailable.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing disquisitions considered, the instant petition is

DENIED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
743
Tijing v. CA
EDGARDO A. TIJING and BIENVENIDA R. TIJING, petitioners,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ANGELITA DIAMANTE, respondents.
G.R. No. 125901 March 8, 2001
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition is a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 6, 1996, in CA-
G.R. SP No. 39056, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court in a petition for habeas
corpus of Edgardo Tijing, Jr., allegedly the child of petitioners.
FACTS:
Petitioners are husband and wife. They have six children and the youngest is Edgardo
Tijing Jr., who was born on April 27, 1989 at the clinic of midwife and registered nurse Lourdes-
Vasquez. Bienvenida served as the laundrywoman of angelita, the respondent. On August,
1989, angelita went to her house to fetch for an urgent laundry job. Since Bienvenida was on
her way to do some marketing, she asked Angelita to wait until she returned. She also left her
four-month old son, Edgardo Jr. under the care of Aangelita as she usually let her take care of
the child while Bienvenida was doing laundry. When she came back from the market, the two
were gone already. She went to Angelita’s home but she was informed that Angelita already
moved to other place. Bienvenida and her husband searched for their missing son in other
places. Notwithstanding their serious efforts, they saw no traces of his whereabouts. Four years
later, Bienvenida read in the tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez, allegedly the common
husband of Angelita. They went to the place and saw her son. She claims that the boy was
already named John Thomas Lopez. The spouses filed their petition for habeas corpus with the
trial court in order to recover their son. The petitioners presented two witnesses, Lourdes
Vasquez, the midwife and Benjamin Lopez, the brother of Tomas. Benjamin Lopez declared that
his brother could not have possibly fathered John Thomas Lopez as he was sterile. The trial
court granted the petition while in the appellate court, it reversed the decision of the lower court.
744
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Edgardo Jr. and John Thomas is the same person?
RULING:
Under the law, the attending physician or midwife in attendance of birth should cause the
recognition of such birth and only is default of the physician or midwife can the parent register
the birth of his child. A false entry in the birth certificate regarding the alleged marriage between
the parents of the child puts to doubt the other data in said birth certificate. Moreover,
resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and material evidence to
establish parentage. Bienvenida and the subject child have a common resemblance. Thus, the
court considered this in the decision. Parentage will shall be resolved using conventional
methods unless adopt the modern and scientific ways available like Deoxyrebonuclei Acid
(DNA) test.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed DECISION of the Court
of Appeals is REVERSED and decision of the Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED. Costs
against the private respondent. SO ORDERED.
745
Go Kim Huy v. Go Kim Huy
WILLIAM GO KIM HUY, petitioner,

vs.
SANTIAGO GO KIM HUY, BONIFACIO GO KIM & SONS, SANTIAGO GO KIM & SONS, Co.,
respondents.
G.R. No. 137674 September 20, 2001
BUENA, J.:
This is a petition of William Go Kim Huy in his claims hereditary rights over the mass of
property, rights and assets belonging to his estate. Bonifacio Go Kim died on February 26,
1974.
FACTS:
Bonifacio Go Kim died on February 26, 1974. William Go Kim Huy claims hereditary
rights over the mass of property, rights, and assets belonging to his estate. Heard by six RTC
judges of Quezon City, this 2 decade-old controversy started on June 18, 1980 when petitioner
filed a complaint against the respondents to declare the properties and businesses held by them
as part of the estate of Bonifacio Go Kim and compel them to render an accounting.
Respondent Santiago avers that he is the only son of Bonifacio Go Kim. He maintains that
petitioner has lived and worked with them and was treated as a family member because
petitioner’s real father was close friend of the decedent. His real parents were Gaw Gee and Ng
Kee appearing in his landing certificate. He denied any relation with petitioner ad declares that
the grant of petition for change of name from Gaw Piak to William Go Kim Huy did not make
petitioner a member of the family of Bonifacio Go Kim.
ISSUE:
Whether or not William Go Kim Huy established his filiation with the deceased?
746
RULING:
From the time of death of Bonifacio Go Kim in 1974, his heirs acquired a definite right to
inheritance. By provision of will or operation of law, his heirs are called to succeed.
Nevertheless, the burden of proof is on petitioner to establish his affirmative allegation that
Bonifacio is his father. Under our legal system, filiation is established by any of the following: (a)
the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a fial judgment; (b) an admission of legitimate
filiation in a public document or private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by
the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child or any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and Special Laws.
FALLO:
ACCORDINGLY, in line with the foregoing disquisition, the petition is hereby DENIED.
The questioned decision of the appellate court promulgated on November 12, 1998[41] and its
resolution promulgated on February 19, 1999[42] denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
are hereby AFFIRMED, subject to the modification that the award of moral damages is deleted.
SO ORDERED.
747
Tecson v. COMELEC
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners,

vs.
The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO
POE, JR.), respondents.
G.R. No. 161434 March 3, 2004
VITUG, J.:
This is a petition which raise a single question of profound importance to the nation. The
issue of citizenship is brought up to challenge the qualifications of a presidential candidate to
hold the highest office of the land. Our people are waiting for the judgment of the Court with
bated breath. Is Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver screen, and now one of the main
contenders for the presidency, a natural-born Filipino or is he not?
FACTS:
On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando
Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the
Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the
forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan"
Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. Petitioner
initiated a petition to disqualify the respondent and to deny due course or to cancel his
certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth his parents were
foreigners. His mother was Bessie Kelley Poe, an American and his father was Allan Poe, a
Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Poe, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner
asseverated that Allan Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino
citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the
allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions- first, Allan Poe contracted a
prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley, and second,
even if no such prior marriage had existed, His parents got married only a year after the birth of
respondent.
748
ISSUE:
Whether or not Fernando Poe, Jr. is a legitimate child?
RULING:
Under Article 172 of the Family Code, The filiation of legitimate children is established by
any of the following:(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate
filiation shall be proved by: (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or (2 any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. Under Article 173,
the action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be
transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these
cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action. The action
already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of the
parties”; “Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way
and on the same, evidence as legitimate children.”, “The action must be brought within the
same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph
of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.”
The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256 of the code reads: "Art.
256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.” The 1950 Civil Code
categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children into voluntary, legal or
compulsory. Voluntary recognition was required to be expressedly made in a record of birth, a
will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing. Legal acknowledgment
took place in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of an illegitimate child who was recognized
or judicially declared as natural. Compulsory acknowledgment could be demanded generally in
cases when the child had in his favor any evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an action to claim
legitimacy which would last during the lifetime of the child, and might pass exceptionally to the
heirs of the child, an action to claim acknowledgment, however, could only be brought during
the lifetime of the presumed parent. In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be
signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only by the mother if the father
749
refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the document the
name of the father who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give therein any information by
which such father could be identified. In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to
prove voluntary acknowledgment of filiation or paternity, the certificate was required to be
signed or sworn to by the father. The failure of such requirement rendered the same useless as
being an authoritative document of recognition.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS –

1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr.,
Petitioners, versus Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. "Fernando
Poe, Jr.,) and Victorino X. Fornier, Respondents," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo
Antonio Velez, Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.,
Respondent," for want of jurisdiction.
2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission
on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr.," for failure
to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Commission on Elections in
dismissing the petition in SPA No. 04-003.
No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
750
In Re: Julian Lin Wang
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF

ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY OF JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG also known as
JULIAN LIN WANG, to be amended/corrected as JULIAN LIN WANG, JULIAN LIN
WANG, duly represented by his mother ANNA LISA WANG, petitioner,
vs.
CEBU CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR, duly represented by the Registrar OSCAR B.
MOLO, respondent.
G.R. No. 159966 March 30, 2005
TINGA, J.:
This is petition, docketed as Special Proceedings Case No. 11458 CEB and raffled to
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 57, is all about the petitioner seeking to
drop his middle name and have his registered name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang
to Julian Lin Wang.
FACTS:
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents Anna
Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married to each other. When his parents
subsequently got married on September 22, 1998, they executed a deed of legitimation of their
son so that the child’s name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan
Wang.
The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore for a long time
because they will let him study there together with his sister named Wang Mei Jasmine who
was born in Singapor. Since in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother
are not carried in a person’s name, they anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will be
discriminated against because of his current registered name which carries a middle name.
Julian and his sister might also be asking whether they are brother and sister since they have
different surnames. Carulasan sounds funny in Singapore’s Mandarin language since they do
not have the letter “R” but if there is, they pronounce it as “L.” It is for these reasons that the
name of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is requested to be changed to Julian Lin Wang.
751
ISSUE:
Whether or not dropping the middle name of a minor child is contrary to Article 174 of
the Family Code.
RULLING:
Yes. Weighing petitioner’s reason of convenience for the change of his name against the
standards set in the cases he cites to support his contention would show that his justification is
amorphous, to say the least, and could not warrant favorable action on his petition. A name is
said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is absolute, intended to protect the individual
from being confused with others. (2) It is obligatory in certain respects, for nobody can be
without a name. (3) It is fixed, unchangeable, or immutable, at least at the start, and may be
changed only for good cause and by judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside the commerce of man,
and, therefore, inalienable and intransmissible by act inter vivos or mortis causa. (5) It is
imprescriptible.
The process should be in accordance to the law as specifically provided to safeguard the
public. Petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his petition for
change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment
and discretion when he reaches the age of majority. As he is of tender age, he may not yet
understand and appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of the same at this
point may just prejudice him in his rights under our laws.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
752
Illegitimate Children
Tayag v. Tayag-Gallor
VICTORIA C. TAYAG, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD A. TAYAG-GALLOR, Respondent.
G.R. No. 174680 March 24, 2008
TINGA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court
of Appeals dated 29 May 2006, and its Resolution dated 28 August 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No.
79205 which affirmed the decision of the Trial Court.
FACTS:
On 15 January 2001, respondent herein, Felicidad A. Tayag-Gallor, filed a petition for

the issuance of letters of administration over the estate of Ismael Tayag. Respondent alleged in
the petition, docketed as Special Proceeding No. 5994 (SP 5994), that she is one of the three
(3) illegitimate children of the late Ismael Tayag and Ester C. Angeles. The decedent was
married to petitioner herein, Victoria C. Tayag, but the two allegedly did not have any children of
their own.
On 7 September 2000, Ismael Tayag died intestate, leaving behind two (2) real
properties both of which are in the possession of petitioner, and a motor vehicle which the latter
sold on 10 October 2000 preparatory to the settlement of the decedent’s estate. Petitioner
allegedly promised to give respondent and her brothers P100,000.00 each as their share in the
proceeds of the sale. However, petitioner only gave each of them half the amount she promised.
Respondent further averred that on 20 November 2000, petitioner has caused the
annotation of 5 September 1984 affidavit executed by Ismael Tayag declaring the properties to
be the paraphernal properties of petitioner. The latter allegedly intends to dispose of these
properties to the respondent’s and her brother’s prejudice.
Petitioner opposed the petition, asserting that she purchased the properties subject of
the petition using her own money. She claimed that she and Ismael Tayag got married in Las
753
Vegas, Nevada, USA on 25 October 1973, and that they have an adopted daughter, Carmela
Tayag, who is presently residing in the USA. It is allegedly not true that she is planning to sell
the properties. Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the suit because respondent failed to state
a cause of action.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent’s petition for the issuance of letters of administration sufficiently

states a cause of action considering that respondent merely alleged therein that she is an
illegitimate child of the decedent.
RULING:
Yes. The allegation that respondent is an illegitimate child of the decedent suffices even
without further stating that she has been so recognized or acknowledged. A motion to dismiss
on the ground of failure to state a cause of action in the complaint hypothetically admits the truth
of the facts alleged therein. Respondent still has the duty to prove the allegation (that she is an
illegitimate child of the decedent), just as the petitioner has the right to disprove it, in the course
of the settlement proceedings.
The Proper action of the petition is for her to disprove that the respondent was indeed
not acknowledge or recognized as illegitimate children of the decedent. She should prove it in
accordance to evidence required by the court and not merely alleging it without any evidence to
disprove it and claim it to secure a dismissal of the case.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 29 May 2006 and its Resolution dated 28 August 2006 are AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
754
Verceles v. Posada
VERCELES vs. POSADA,

G.R. No. 159785 April 27, 2007
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review seeks the reversal of the Decision1 dated May 30, 2003 and the
Resolution2 dated August 27, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 50557. The
appellate court had affirmed with modification the Judgment3 dated January 4, 1995 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 42, in Civil Case No. 1401. The RTC
held petitioner liable to pay monthly support to Verna Aiza Posada since her birth on September
23, 1987 as well as moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suit.
Facts:
Respondent, Maria Clarissa Posada from Pandan, Catanduanes met a close family
friend, petitioner Teofisto I. Verceles, mayor of Pandan. He then called on the Posadas and at
the end of the visit, offered Clarissa a job. She then accepted the offer and worked as a casual
employee in the mayor’s office. Respondent and petitioner had an affair when respondent
succumbed to petitioner told her that he was unhappy with his wife, would "divorce" her anytime
and he also claimed he could appoint her as a municipal development coordinator. Respondent
then got pregnant, petitioner as the father.
Clarissa avers, petitioner, aware of her pregnancy, handed her a letter and P2,000
pocket money to go to Manila and to tell her parents that she would enroll in a CPA review
course or look for a job. Later on, petitioner went to see her in Manila and gave her another
P2,000 for her delivery. When respondent’s parents learned of her pregnancy, her father
fetched her and brought her back to Pandan where she gave birth to a baby girl, Verna Aiza
Posada. The Posadas filed a Complaint for Damages coupled with Support Pendente Lite
before the RTC against petitioner. The trial court issued a judgment in their favor and to pay a
monthly support of P2,000.00 to Verna Aiza Posada since her birth on September 23, 1987 as
he was proved to be the natural father of the above-named minor as shown by the exhibits and
testimonies of the [respondents], to pay the amount of P30,000.00 as moral damages, to pay
the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, to pay the sum of P10,000.00 as attorney’s
fees and to pay the costs of the suit. Verceles appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed
755
the judgment with modification, specifying the party to whom the damages was awarded, to pay
[respondent] Maria Clarissa Posada the sum of P15,000.00 as moral damages and
[P]15,000.00 as exemplary damages, to pay [respondents] spouses Constantino and Francisca
Posada the sum of P15,000.00 as moral damages and P15,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Hence, the petition.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the filiation of Verna Aiza Posada as the illegitimate child of
petitioner was proven
2. Whether or not respondents are entitled to damages.
Ruling:
1. Yes. Petitioner argues he never signed the birth certificate of Verna Aiza Posada as
father and that it was respondent Clarissa who placed his name on the birth certificate as father
without his consent. He further contends the alleged love letters he sent to Clarissa are not
admissions of paternity but mere expressions of concern and advice. As to the award for
damages, petitioner argues Clarissa could not have suffered moral damages because she was
in pari delicto, being a willing participant in the "consensual carnal act" between them. Petitioner
not only failed to rebut the evidence presented, he himself presented no evidence of his own.
His bare denials are telling. Well-settled is the rule that denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving which merit no weight in law and cannot be
given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters.
2. No. Article 2219 of the Civil Code which states moral damages may be recovered in
cases of seduction is inapplicable in this case because Clarissa was already an adult at the time
she had an affair with petitioner. Neither can her parents be entitled to damages. Besides, there
is nothing in law or jurisprudence that entitles the parents of a consenting adult who begets a
love child to damages. Respondents Constantino and Francisca Posada have not cited any law
or jurisprudence to justify awarding damages to them.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED.
756
Rodriguez v. Lim
RODRIGUEZ VS. LIM

509 SCRA 68
QUIASON, J.:
the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 2, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP No. 14276, which
allowed, in an action for compulsory recognition, the testimony of the mother of a natural child
on the identity of the putative father.
Facts:
On October 15, 1986, an action for compulsory recognition and support was brought
before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio-Benguet, Br. 9, by herein respondent ClaritoAgbulos
against Bienvenido Rodriguez, petitioner herein. At the trial, the plaintiff presented his mother,
FelecitasAgbulos Haber, as first witness. In the course of her direct examination, she was asked
by counsel t reveal the identity of the plaintiff’s father but the defendant’s counsel raised a timely
objection, which the court sustained. The plaintiff file before the Supreme Court a petition for
review on certiorari questioning the said order in UDK 8516 entitled “ClaritoAgbulos vs. Hon.
Romeo A. Brawner and Bienvenido Rodriguez.” On March 18, 1988, the Supreme Court
referred the petition to the Court of Appeals, which promulgated the questioned decision dated
November 2, 1988. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the action for compulsory recognition is deserve of merit
Ruling:
Yes. Under Article 172 of the Family Code, filiation of legitimate children is by any of the
following:
The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved
by:
757
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws. (265a, 266a, 267a)
Of interest is that Article 172 of the Family Code adopts the rule in Article 283 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, that filiation may be proven by "any evidence or proof that the defendant is
his father."
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. The trial court is
DIRECTED to PROCEED with dispatch in the disposition of the action for compulsory
recognition.
758
Cabatania v. Regodos
CABATANIA VS.REGODOS
G.R. No. 124814, October 21, 2004
CORONA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the March 15, 1996 decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. 36708 which in turn
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City, Branch 60 in Spec. Proc. No. 88-
C which compelled petitioner Camelo Cabatania to acknowledge private respondent Camelo
Regodos as his illegitimate son and to give support to the latter in the amount of P 500 per
month.
Facts:
Florencia testified that she was the mother of private respondent who was born on
September 9, 1982 and that she was the one supporting the child. She recounted that after her
husband left her in the early part of 1981, she went to Escalante, Negros Occidental to look for
work and was eventually hired as petitioner’s household help. It was while working there as a
maid that, on January 2, 1982, petitioner brought her to Bacolod City where they checked in at
the Visayan Motel and had sexual intercourse. Petitioner promised to support her if she got
pregnant. Florencia claimed she discovered she was carrying petitioner’s child 27 days after
their sexual encounter. The sexual intercourse was repeated in March 1982 in San Carlos City.
Later, on suspicion that Florencia was pregnant, petitioner’s wife sent her home. But petitioner
instead brought her to Singcang, Bacolod City where he rented a house for her. On September
9, 1982, assisted by a hilot in her aunt’s house in Tiglawigan, Cadiz City, she gave birth to her
child, private respondent Camelo Regodos.
Issue:
Whether or not the child of petitioner is legitimate
Ruling:
Yes. The fact that Florencia’s husband is living and there is a valid subsisting marriage
between them gives rise to the presumption that a child born within that marriage is legitimate
even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced
as an adulteress. The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the
statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the
759
mother. The presumption is grounded on the policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium
of illegitimacy.
In this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the extremely
subjective test of physical resemblance or similarity of features will not suffice as evidence to
prove paternity and filiation before the courts of law.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals in dated March 15, 1996, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz
City is reversed and set aside.
760
Eceta v. Eceta
ECETA vs. ECETA

G.R. No. 157037. May 20, 2004
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 50449 which affirmed with modification the trial court’s ruling that respondent Maria
Theresa Vell Lagura Eceta is entitled to one-eight (1/8) portion of the disputed property.
Facts:
Rosalina P. Vda. De Eceta was married to Isaac Eceta sometime in 1962. During the
subsistence of their marriage, they begot a son, Vicente. The couple acquired several property
located at Starford, Cubao, Quezon City. Isaac died in 1967, leaving behind Rosalina and
Vicente as his compulsory heirs. In 1977, Vicente died. During his lifetime however he sired
Maria Theresa an illegitimate daughter. Thus, at the time of his death his compulsory heirs are
his mother and illegitimate daughter. In 1991, Maria Theresa filed a case before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City for “Partition and Accounting with Damages” against Rosalina
alleging by virtue of her father’s death, she became Rosalina’s co-heir and co-owner of the
Cubao property. Trial, Appellate, and Supreme Court granted Maria Theresa’s prayers.
Issue:
Whether or not Maria Theresa successfully established her filiation
Ruling:
Yes. Maria Theresa successfully established her filiation with Vicente by presenting a
duly authenticated birth certificate. Vicente himself signed the birth certificate thereby
acknowledging that she is his daughter. By this act alone, Vicente is deemed to have
acknowledged his paternity over Maria Theresa. Thus, the filiation of illegitimate children like
legitimate children is established by: (a) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment; or (b) admission of legitimate filiation is public document or private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved
by: (a) the open and continuous possession of the status of the legitimate child; or (b) only other
means allowed by the Rule of the Court and special laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate
child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is
in itself a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child and no further court action is
required.
Fallo:
761
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 50449, which affirmed with modification the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 218 in Civil Case No. Q-91-8922, is AFFIRMED in
toto.
762
Alberto v. CA
ALBERTO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 86639. June 2, 1994
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 38380 affirming the Omnibus Order of the lower court dismissing petitioner’s
second Amended Complaint for insufficiency of cause of action.
Facts:
On September 18, 1953, Ma. Theresa Alberto was born out of wedlock to Aurora
Reniva with Juan Alberto as the father. She used “Alberto” as surname in all her School records
and correspondences. On September 18, 1967, Juan died intestate. His widow, Yolanda
Alberto, filed a petition for the administration of his estate. After the publication of notices, she
was appointed as the administratrix of the estate. After the Inventory and Appraisal and the
Administratrix’ Accounting were approved, the proceedings were ordered closed and
terminated. On September 15, 1978, Ma. Theresa filed a motion for leave to intervene as
oppositor and to re-open the proceedings praying that she be declared to have acquired the
status of a natural child and as such, entitled to share in the estate of the deceased. The motion
was granted by the probate court. The Court was convinced that the petitioner had been in
continuous possession of the status of a natural child. Thus, it compelled the decedent’s heirs
and estate to recognize her as a natural daughter and allow her to participate in the estate
proceedings.
Issues:
(a) Whether or not the natural child occupies the highest position under the old Civil Code
(b) Whether or not the petitioner is barred to file an action
Ruling:
(a) Yes. While he did contract marriage subsequently with another woman, it was only too
clear that he had no intentions of closing definitively that chapter in his life when he
begot his first-born. Of the different categories of illegitimate children under the old Civil
Code, the natural child occupies the highest position, she being the child of parents who,
at the time of her conception, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each
other and could, therefore, have contracted a valid marriage.
(b) No. An illegitimate child whose father or mother dies during her minority has four (4)
years from the attainment of her majority within which to file an action for the recognition.
763
The motion of the petitioner was seasonably filed three days before the expiration of the
four-year period. Hence, the said motion is valid.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Decision dated August 19, 1994 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 38380 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, which is ordered to proceed with
the trial of Civil Case No. 90-1798. The Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal and the
Register of Deeds of Rizal, Marikina Branch are directed to maintain the annotation of lis
pendensin the certificates of title to the properties subject of said case until final judgment
therein. No costs.
764
De Jesus v. Estate of Dizon
DE JESUS vs. THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON

G.R. No. 142877. October 2, 2001
VITUG, J.:
The petitioner involves the case of the illegitimate children who, having been born in
lawful wedlock, claim to be the illegitimate scions of the decedent in order to enforce their
respective shares in the latter's estate under the rules of succession.
Facts:
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August 1964. It was
during this marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, were born, the
former on 01 March 1979 and the latter on 06 July 1982. In a notarized document, dated 07
June 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own
illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died intestate on 12 March
1992, leaving behind considerable assets consisting of shares of stock in various corporations
and some real property. It was on the strength of his notarized acknowledgment that petitioners
filed a complaint on 01 July 1993 for “Partition with Inventory and Accounting” of the Dizon
estate. Respondents, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G.
Dizon, including the corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the
dismissal of the case, arguing that the complaint, even while denominated as being one for
partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners from being the legitimate
children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate
children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon.
Issue:
Whether or not voluntary recognition of illegitimate children is present
Ruling:
No. The rule that the written acknowledgment made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon
establishes petitioners’ alleged illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be validly invoked to
be of any relevance in this instance. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the paramount
declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally, one that can only be repudiated
or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. Indeed, a child so born in such
wedlock shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as having been an adulteress. The filiation of
illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth appearing in
765
the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the
absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of
the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just
a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a
separate action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on
other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable
statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the child’s acknowledgment. A scrutiny of
the records would show that petitioners were born during the marriage of their parents. The
certificates of live birth would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father.
Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon,
petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being children of Danilo de Jesus
and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done because the law itself establishes
the legitimacy of children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents. The
presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only the father, or
in exceptional instances the latter’s heirs,can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a
child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully
impugned that the paternity of the husband can be rejected.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing disquisitions considered, the instant petition is DENIED.
No costs.
766
Aparicio v. Paraguya
APARICIO vs. PARAGUYA

March 29, 1987
GANCAYCO, J:
Trinidad Montilde, a young lass of Tubigon, Bohol had a love affair with a priest, Rev. Fr.
Felipe Lumain and in the process she conceived. When she was almost four (4) months
pregnant and in order to conceal her disgrace from the public she decided to marry Anastacio
Mamburao. Father Lumain solemnized their marriage on March 4, 1924. They never lived
together as man and wife. On September 12, 1924, 192 days after the marriage, Trinidad gave
birth to Consolacion Lumain. As shown by her birth certificate her registered parents are
Trinidad and Anastacio. On October 31, 1936, Fr. Lumain died but he left a last will and
testament wherein he acknowledged Consolacion as his daughter and instituted her as the sole
and universal heir of all his property rights and interests. 3 This was duly probated in the Court of
First Instance of Bohol on June 11, 1938 and on appeal it was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
Facts:
Trinidad Montilde, a young lass had a love affair with a priest, Fr. Felipe Lumain and in
the process she conceived. When she almost four-months pregnant and in order to conceal her
disgrace in the public, she decided to marry AnastacioMamburao. Fr. Lumain solemnized their
marriage. They never lived together as man and wife. On September 12, 1924, 192 days after
the marriage, Trinidad gave birth to ConsolacionLumain. As shown by her birth certificate her
registered parents are Trinidad and Anastacio. On October 31, 1986, Fr. Lumain died but he left
a last will and testament wherein he acknowledge Consolacion his daughter and instituted her
as the sole and universal heir of all property rights and interests. This was duly probated by the
Court of First Instance of Bohol and on appeal it was affirmed by Court of appeals. Soon after
reaching the age of majority, Consolacion filed an action against Hipolito for the recovery of
certain parcel of lands she claim to have inherited from Fr. Lumain and for damages.
Issue:
Whether or not Consolacion is the lawful heir
Ruling:
Yes. One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will all his estate or any part of it
in favor of any person having capacity to succeed; Determination of paternity not even
767
necessary. In the last will and testament of Fr. Lumain, he not only acknowledged appellee,
Consolacion as his natural daughter but designated her as his only heir. Thus, Consolacion is
the lawful heir.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, its improvement of the questioned property is hereby declared to be
owned by appellant who is entitled to its possession, the judgment appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED in all other respects without pronouncement as to costs.
768
Rivero v. CA
RIVERO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 141273. May 17, 2005
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 44261 annulling the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, Branch 19,
in Civil Case No. RTC'96-3612.
Facts:
On August 27, 1996, BenedickArevalo filed a Complaint[2] against Mary Jane DyChiao-
De Guzman, Benito DyChiao, Jr., and Benson DyChiao, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Naga City, for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate child of their father, Benito DyChiao,
Sr., and for the administration and partition of his estate as he had died intestate on July 27,
1995. Since Benedick was a minor, his natural mother and guardian ad litem, Shirley Arevalo,
filed the complaint on his behalf. Concepcion, Benito Sr.’s wife, was not impleaded as she had
died on July 7, 1995. The CA nullified the decision of the RTC on the ground, inter alia, that the
filiation of Benedick could not be the subject of a compromise, and that Mary Jane had no
authority to execute the compromise agreement for and in behalf of her brothers.
Issue:
Whether or not Henry Dy Chiao had the authority to file the amended petition for Benito
Dy Chiao, Jr
Ruling:
No. The court rejects the petitioners' contention that Henry was the petitioner who filed
the amended petition before the CA. As gleaned from said petition, the petitioners were "Benito
Dy Chiao, Jr. and Benson Dy Chiao, represented by their uncle Henry S. Dy Chiao." Moreover,
Henry had the authority to file the amended petition and sign the requisite certification on non-
forum shopping when the CA admitted the amended petition and appointed him as guardian ad
litem of his nephews. In resolving whether to appoint a guardian ad litem for the respondent,
the appellate court needed only to determine whether the individual for whom a guardian was
proposed was so incapable of handling personal and financial affairs as to warrant the need for
the appointment of a temporary guardian. It only needed to make a finding that, based on clear
and convincing evidence, the respondent is incompetent and that it is more likely than not that
his welfare requires the immediate appointment of a temporary guardian. A finding that the
769
person for whom a guardian ad litem is proposed is incapable of managing his own personal
and financial affairs by reason of his mental illness is enough.
Guardians ad litem are considered officers of the court in a limited sense, and the office
of such guardian is to represent the interest of the incompetent or the minor. Whether or not to
appoint a guardian ad litem for the petitioners is addressed to the sound discretion of the court
where the petition was filed, taking into account the best interest of the incompetent or the
minor. The court has discretion in appointing a guardian ad litem that will best promote the
interest of justice. The appointment of a guardian ad litem is designed to assist the court in its
determination of the incompetent's best interest.
The records will show that no less than Benedick Arevalo sought the appointment of
Mary Jane Dy Chiao-De Guzman as guardian ad litem for respondent Benito Dy Chiao, Jr. and
his brother, Benson Dy Chiao.
Fallo:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against the
petitioners.
770
People v. Bayani
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BAYANI

October. 8, 1996
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Sgt. Moreno Bayani, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP), seeks the
reversal of the 28 April 1995 decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch
11, in Criminal Case No. 6433, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties
provided by law; to indemnify complainant Maria Elena Nieto in the amount of Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the
costs.
Facts:
Complainant charged the accused with the crime of rape allegedly committed. In 1992,
Victim, Maria Elena Nieto was a fourth-year high school student of St. Lawrence Academy, a
Catholic School of Bangui, Ilocos Norte. She was then fifteen (15) years old. At that time both
her parents were abroad as overseas contract workers. Appellant was a neighbor. He was close
to her paternal uncles, Eugenio and Rudy Nieto. One of her unclesis appellant's "kumpadre."
Maria Elena called him "uncle" and the latter's wife "auntie." Appellant often went to her
grandmother's house. She was considered a relative. He asked her if she could accompany him
to visit a friend in Laoag City. Appellant brought her to a restaurant, the City Lunch and Snack
Bar and invited her for lunch there. She declined as she was still full and suggested that they go
home. Appellant, however, first went to a friend before going home He brought her to the "third
floor of a certain building" appellant told her that "it was in the second floor where the person he
wanted to talk with was" They proceeded to the second floor of the building. Upon reaching the
door of a room at the second floor of the building, appellant took hold of her wrist and raped her.
Thereafter, Maria Elena wanted to leave. However, appellant pointed his gun at her and
threatened to kill her if she revealed the rape incident to anybody. After a while, appellant
repeated the sexual intercourse for two more times. Victim thereafter got pregnant.
Issue:
Whether or not the offender in a rape case who is married can be sentenced to
indemnify the victim and support the offspring,
Ruling:
Yes. Article 176 of the Family Code confers parental authority over illegitimate children
on the mother, and likewise provides for their entitlement to support in conformity with the
771
Family Code. As such, there is no further need for the prohibition against acknowledgment of
the offspring by an offender who is married which would vest parental authority in him.
Therefore, under Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code, the offender in a rape case who is
married can only be sentenced to indemnify the victim and support the offspring, if there be any.
In the instant case then, they should also be ordered to support his illegitimate offspring, Tracy
Jhuen Nieto, with Marie Elena Nieto, but in light of Article 201 of the Family Code, the amount
and terms thereof to be determined by the trial court only after due notice and hearing.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED, and the challenged decision of 28
April 1995 of Branch 11 of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City in Criminal Case No. 6433 is
AFFIRMED in toto. Furthermore, accused-appellant MORENO BAYANI is ordered to support
his illegitimate child Tracy Jhuen Nieto in an amount to be determined by the trial court after due
notice and hearing, called only to determine the amount and terms of support, with support in
arrears to be reckoned from 28 April 1995.
772
People v. Manahan
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MANAHAN

September 29, 1999
BELLOSILLO, J.:
MANUEL MANAHAN alias Maning was found guilty of rape and sentenced to death by the
court a quo. He was also ordered to indemnify the victim P50,000.00 as moral damages, pay
the costs, and acknowledge and support the offspring of his indiscretion. This case is now
before us on automatic review.
Facts:
Complainant Teresita Tibigar, 16 years old, worked at the Espiritu Canteen in Dagupan
City. On 5 January 1995, at about two o'clock in the morning, Teresita who was asleep was
suddenly awakened when she felt someone beside her. Upon opening her eyes she saw
accused Manuel Manahan as he immediately placed himself on top of her. . He succeeded in
having carnal knowledge of her. Within the month Teresita left the canteen and returned home
to her parents in Mangaldan, Pangasinan. The sexual encounter resulted in her pregnancy.
From there they proceeded to the police station where a statement of Teresita was taken by
SPO1 Isagani L. Ico. Police Chief Inspector Wendy G. Rosario later endorsed the complaining
witness to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan City for appropriate legal action.
Thereafter, with the assistance of her mother, Teresita filed a criminal complaint accusing
Manuel Manahan alias Maning of rape. Meanwhile, on 2 October 1995, she gave birth to a
healthy baby girl and christened her Melanie Tibigar. The accused banks heavily on his
"sweetheart theory," a usual defense in alleged rape, but the accused miserably failed to prove
that he and the complaining witness indeed had a romantic liaison as this claim was
categorically denied by her. In September 1995, the accused was arrested in connection with
the case filed by Teresita. On review ofthe records and the court sustain the conviction of the
accused. The prosecution for rape almost always involves sharply contrasting and irreconcilable
declarations of the victim and the accused.
Issue:
Whether or not the offender in a rape case, a married man, can acknowledge the child.
773
Ruling:
No. On the matter of acknowledgment and support of the child, a correction of the view
of the court a quo is in order. Article 345 of The Revised Penal Code provides that persons
guilty of rape shall also be sentenced to "acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should
prevent him from doing so," and "in every case to support the offspring." In the case before us,
compulsory acknowledgment of the child Melanie Tibigar is not proper there being a legal
impediment in doing so as it appears that the accused is a married man. As pronounced by this
Court in People v. Guerrero, 16 the rule is that if the rapist is a married man, he cannot be
compelled to recognize the offspring of the crime, should there be any, as his child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate." Consequently, that portion of the judgment under review is accordingly
deleted. In any case, the court sustains that part ordering the accused to support the child as it
is in accordance with law.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the portion of the decision of the trial court ordering the accused, a
married man, to acknowledge the child Melanie Tibigar is DELETED being contrary to law and
jurisprudence.
774
Nepomuceno v. Lopez
NEPOMUCENO vs. LOPEZ

G.R. No. 181258 March 18, 2010
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Respondent Arhbencel Ann Lopez (Arhbencel), represented by her mother Araceli Lopez
(Araceli), filed a Complaint1 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City for recognition
and support against Ben-Hur Nepomuceno (petitioner).
Facts:
Respondent claimed to have been begotten out of an extramarital affair of petitioner with
Araceli; that petitioner refused to affix his signature on her Certificate of Birth; and that, by a
handwritten note dated August 7, 1999, petitioner nevertheless obligated himself to give her
financial support in the amount ofP1,500 on the 15th and 30th days of each month beginning
August 15, 1999.
Arguing that her filiation to petitioner was established by the handwritten note, Arhbencel
prayed that petitioner be ordered to: (1) recognize her as his child, (2) give her support
pendente lite in the increased amount of P8,000 a month, and (3) give her adequate monthly
financial support until she reaches the age of majority. Petitioner countered that Araceli had not
proven that he was the father of Arhbencel; and that he was only forced to execute the
handwritten note on account of threats coming from the National People’s Army.
The trial court held that, among other things, Arhbencel’s Certificate of Birth was not
prima facie evidence of her filiation to petitioner as it did not bear petitioner’s signature; that
petitioner’s handwritten undertaking to provide support did not contain a categorical
acknowledgment that Arhbencel is his child; and that there was no showing that petitioner
performed any overt act of acknowledgment of Arhbencel as his illegitimate child after the
execution of the note. Court of appeals reversed the lower court’s decision. Hence, the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Arhbencel can demand for support, being based on her claim of filiation
to petitioner as his illegitimate daughter
Ruling:
No. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles, the following are obliged to
support each other to the whole extent set forth in the preceding article, Article 195:
1. The spouses;
2. Legitimate ascendants and descendants;
775
3. Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate
children of the latter;
4. Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate
children of the latter; and
5. Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood.
Arhbencel’s demand for support, being based on her claim of filiation to petitioner as his
illegitimate daughter, falls under Article 195(4). As such, her entitlement to support from
petitioner is dependent on the determination of her filiation.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision of July 20, 2007 is
SET ASIDE. The Order dated June 7, 2006 of Branch 130 of the Caloocan City RTC dismissing
the complaint for insufficiency of evidence is REINSTATED.
776
Rivera v. Heirs of Villanueva
RIVERA vs. HEIRS OF ROMUALDO VILLANUEVA

G.R. No. 14150 July 21, 2006
Facts:
Petitioners are allegedly the half-brothers (Elino and Dominador), the half-sister-
in-law (Soledad), and the children of a half-brother (Teofila and Cecilia) of the deceased Pacita
Gonzales (hereinafter Gonzales). Respondents Catalino, Lucia, Purificacion and Melchor, all
surnamed Villanueva, and Arnaldo V. Avendano are allegedly the siblings, full and half-blood of
Romualdo Villanueva (hereinafter Villanueva).They are denominated as the heirs of Villanueva
and are represented by Melchor. They were allowed to substitute for Villanueva upon his death.
The remaining respondents, Angelina Villanueva (hereinafter respondent Angelina) and
husband Victoriano de Luna, are allegedly the daughter and the son-in-law, respectively, of the
late Villanueva. Petitioners (Gonzales' half-brothers, etc.) filed a case for partition of Gonzales'
estate and annulment of titles and damages, with the Regional Trial Court. In dismissing the
complaint, the RTC made two findings: (1) Gonzales was never married to Villanueva and (2)
respondent Angelina was her illegitimate child by Villanueva and therefore her sole heir, to the
exclusion of petitioners.
Issue:
Whether or not Angelina was Gonzales' illegitimate daughter
Ruling:
No. Both the trial court and the CA ruled that respondent Angelina was the illegitimate
daughter of the decedent, based solely on her birth certificate. According to the assailed
decision, "the birth certificate clearly discloses that Pacita Gonzales was the mother of Angelina
Villanueva while municipal treasurer Romualdo Villanueva was denominated therein as her
father." The CA found this to be adequate proof that respondent Angelina was Gonzales'
illegitimate child.
However, a closer examination of the birth certificate reveals that respondent Angelina
was listed as "adopted" by both Villanueva and Gonzales. A record of birth is merely a prima
facie evidence of the facts contained therein.
Because the cohabitation of Villanueva and Gonzales from 1927 to 1963 was
adulterous, their property relations during those 36 years were not governed by Article 144 of
the Civil Code which applies only if the couple living together is not in any way incapacitated
from getting married.
777
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
are reversed and set aside, and a new one entered ANNULLING the deed of extrajudicial
partition with sale and REMANDING the case to the court of origin for the determination and
identification of Pacita Gonzales' heirs and the corresponding partition of her estate.
778
Cruz v. Cristobal
CRUZ vs. CRISTOBAL

G.R. No. 140422
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition assails the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated 22 July 1999 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 56402, affirming in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig
City, Branch 156, in Civil Case No. 65035 entitled, "Mercedes Cristobal, Anselmo A. Cristobal
and Elisa Cristobal Sikat vs. Eufrosina Cristobal, Florencio Cristobal, Jose Cristobal, Heirs of
Norberto Cristobal and The Register of Deeds, San Juan, M.M."
Facts:
Petitioners (Mercedes Cristobal, Anselmo Cristobal, the heirs of the deceased Socorro
Cristobal, and Elisa Cristobal-Sikat) claim that they are the legitimate children of Buenaventura
Cristobal during his first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal. On the other hand, private respondents
(Norberto, Florencio, Eufrosina and Jose, all surnamed Cristobal) are also the children of
Buenaventura Cristobal resulting from his second marriage to Donata Enriquez. Sometime in
the year 1930, Buenaventura Cristobal died intestate. More than six decades later, petitioners
learned that private respondents had executed an extrajudicial partition of the subject property
and transferred its title to their names.
To prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal, the baptismal
certificates of Elisa, Anselmo, and the late Socorro were presented. After trial on the merits, the
trial court rendered a judgment on 11 July 1997, dismissing the case, ruling that petitioners
failed to prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal as the baptismal and
birth certificates presented have scant evidentiary value and that petitioners’ inaction for a long
period of time amounts to laches. The Court of Appeals ruled that they were able to prove their
filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal thru “other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws,” but affirmed the ruling of the trial court barring their right to recover
their share of the subject property because of laches.
Issue:
Whether or not filiation was properly proven by the respondents with the deceased
Buenaventura Cristobal to acquire properties in the will.
779
Ruling:
Yes. The foregoing evidence thus suffice to convince this Court that petitioners are,
indeed, children of the late Buenaventura Cristobal during the first marriage. ART. 834. A
widower or widow who, on the death of his or her spouse, is not divorced, or should be so by
the fault of the deceased, shall be entitled to a portion in usufruct equal to that corresponding by
way of legitime to each of the legitimate children or descendants who has not received any
betterment.
If only one legitimate child or descendant survives, the widow or widower shall have the
usufruct of the third availment for betterment, such child or descendant to have the naked
ownership until, on the death of the surviving spouse, the whole title is merged in him.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court rules as follows:
(1) The Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE;
(2) Petitioners are RECOGNIZED and DECLARED as children of the late Buenaventura
Cristobal from his first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal;
(3) The Deed of Partition executed by private respondents is DECLARED not binding upon
petitioners who were not notified or did not participate in the execution thereof
780
Cabatania v. CA
CABATANIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 124814, October 21, 2004
CORONA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the March 15, 1996 decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. 36708 which in turn
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City, Branch 60 in Spec. Proc. No. 88-
C which compelled petitioner Camelo Cabatania to acknowledge private respondent Camelo
Regodos as his illegitimate son and to give support to the latter in the amount of P 500 per
month.
Facts:
Florencia testified that she was the mother of private respondent who was born on
September 9, 1982 and that she was the one supporting the child. She recounted that after her
husband left her in the early part of 1981, she went to Escalante, Negros Occidental to look for
work and was eventually hired as petitioner’s household help. It was while working there as a
maid that, on January 2, 1982, petitioner brought her to Bacolod City where they checked in at
the Visayan Motel and had sexual intercourse. Petitioner promised to support her if she got
pregnant. Florencia claimed she discovered she was carrying petitioner’s child 27 days after
their sexual encounter. The sexual intercourse was repeated in March 1982 in San Carlos City.
Later, on suspicion that Florencia was pregnant, petitioner’s wife sent her home. But petitioner
instead brought her to Singcang, Bacolod City where he rented a house for her. On September
9, 1982, assisted by a hilot in her aunt’s house in Tiglawigan, Cadiz City, she gave birth to her
child, private respondent Camelo Regodos.
Issue:
Whether or not the child of petitioner is legitimate
Ruling:
Yes. The fact that Florencia’s husband is living and there is a valid subsisting marriage
between them gives rise to the presumption that a child born within that marriage is legitimate
even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced
as an adulteress. The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the
statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the
mother. The presumption is grounded on the policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium
of illegitimacy.
781
In this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the extremely
subjective test of physical resemblance or similarity of features will not suffice as evidence to
prove paternity and filiation before the courts of law.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals in dated March 15, 1996, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz
City is reversed and set aside.
782
Lagabala v. Santiago
LAGABALA v. JOSE SANTIAGO

DECEMBER 4, 2001
Facts:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul the decision dated March 4, 1997, of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 32817, which reversed and set aside the judgment
dated October 17, 1990, Of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 54, in Civil Case No.87-
41515, finding herein petitioner to be the owner of 1/3 pro indiviso share in a parcel of land.
Jose T. Santiago owned a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 64729, located in Rizal Avenue
Extension, Sta. Cruz, Manila. Alleging that Jose had fraudulently registered it in his name alone,
his sisters Nicolasa and Amanda (now respondents herein) sued Jose for recovery of 2/3 share
of the property. On April 20, 1981, the trial court in that case decided in favor of the sisters,
recognizing their right of ownership over portions of the property covered by TCT No. 64729.
The Register of Deeds of Manila was required to include the names of Nicolasa and Amanda in
the certificate of title to said property. Jose died intestate on February 6, 1984. On August 5,
1987, respondents filed a complaint for recovery of title, ownership, and possession against
herein petitioner, Ida C. Labagala, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, to, recover from
her the 1/3 portion of said property pertaining to Jose but which came into petitioner's sole
possession upon Jose's death.
Respondents alleged that Jose's share in the property belongs to them by operation of law,
because they are the only legal heirs of their brother, who died intestate and without issue. They
claimed that the purported sale of the property made by their brother to petitioner sometime in
March 1979 was executed through petitioner's machinations and with malicious intent, to enable
her to secure the corresponding transfer certificate of title (TCT No. 172334) in petitioner's name
alone.
On October 17, 1990, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioner. Ida C. Labagala, thus
affecting their credibility. Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the
decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has adduced preponderant evidence to prove that she is the
daughter of the late Jose T. Santiago
Ruling:
Yes. Article 263 would reveal that it contemplates situations where a doubt exists that a
child is indeed a man’s child by his wife, and the husband denies the child’s filiation. It does not
783
refer to situations where a child is alleged not to be the child at all of a particular couple. A
baptismal certificate, a private document, is not conclusive proof of filiation. More so are the
entries made in an income tax return, which only shows that income tax has been paid and the
amount thereof. The Supreme Court is constrained to agree with the factual finding of the court
of Appeals that petitioner is in reality the child of Leon Labagala and Cornelia abrigas, and
contrary to her averment, not of Jose Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas. Not being a child of
Jose, it follows that petitioner cannot inherit from him through intestate succession. It now
remains to be seen whether the property in dispute was validly transferred to petitioner through
sale or donation.
784
Locsin v. Locsin
LOCSIN VS. LOCSIN

DECEMBER 10, 2001
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, seeking the reversal of the September 13, 2000 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 57708 which affirmedin toto the September 13, 1996 order of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 30, of Iloilo City in Special Proceeding No. 4742. The September 13 order of
the trial court appointed Juan E. Locsin, Jr., respondent, as the sole administrator of the
Intestate Estate of the late Juan "Jhonny" Locsin, Sr.
Facts:
Records show that eleven months after Juan "Jhonny" Locsin, Sr. died intestate on
December 11, 1990, respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. filed a "Petition for Letters of
Administration" praying that he be appointed Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the
deceased. He alleged, among others, (a) that he is an acknowledged natural child of the late
Juan C. Locsin; (b) that during his lifetime, the deceased owned personal properties which
include undetermined savings, current and time deposits with various banks, and 1/6 portion of
the undivided mass of real properties owned by him and his siblings, namely: Jose Locsin, Jr.,
Manuel Locsin, Maria Locsin Yulo, Lourdes Locsin and Ester Locsin; and (c) that he is the only
surviving legal heir of the decedent.
The heirs of Jose Locsin, Jr., the heirs of Maria Locsin, Manuel Locsin and Ester
Jarantilla, claiming to be the lawful heirs of the deceased, filed an opposition to respondent's
petition for letters of administration. They averred that respondent is not a child or an
acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin, who during his lifetime, never affixed
"Sr." in his name. The Intestate Estate of the late Jose Locsin, Jr. (brother of the deceased) also
entered its appearance in the estate proceedings, joining the earlier oppositors. To support his
claim that he is an acknowledged natural child of the deceased respondent submitted a
machine copy of his Certificate of Live Birth which contains the information that respondent's
father is Juan C. Locsin, Sr. and that he was the informant of the facts stated therein, as
evidenced by his signatures Respondent also offered in evidence a photograph showing him
and his mother, Amparo Escamilla, in front of a coffin bearing Juan C. Locsin's dead body.
The trial court, finding that Certificate of Live Birth and the photograph are sufficient
proofs of respondent's illegitimate filiation with the deceased. The CA affirmed the trial court’s
ruling
785
Issue:
Whether or not Juan Locsin proved his filiation to the deceased
Ruling:
No. Respondent's photograph with his mother near the coffin of the late Juan C. Locsin
cannot and will not constitute proof of filiation, lest the court recklessly set a very dangerous
precedent that would encourage and sanction fraudulent claims. Anybody can have a picture
taken while standing before a coffin with others and thereafter utilize it in claiming the estate of
the deceased. Respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. failed to prove his filiation with the late Juan C.
Locsin, Sr.. His Certificate of Live Birth is spurious. Indeed, respondent is not an interested
person within the meaning of Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court entitled to the
issuance of letters of administration.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 57708 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent's
petition for issuance of letters of administration is ORDERED DISMISSED.
786
Ilano v. CA
ILANO vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 104376 February 23, 1994
NOCON, J.:
After the great flood, man was commanded to go forth, be fertile, multiply and fill the
earth. Others did not heed the sequence of this command because they multiply first and then
go. Corollarily, it is now commonplace for an abandoned illegitimate offspring to sue his father
for recognition and support.
Facts:
Leoncia first met petitioner Artemio G. Ilano while she was working as secretary to Atty.
Mariano C. Virata. Sometime in 1957, Leoncia, then managing a business of her met petitioner
again who was engaged in the same business and they renewed acquaintances. Later, he
courted her more than four years. Their relationship became intimate and with his promise of
marriage, they eloped to Guagua, Pampanga in April, 1962. In June, 1962, Leoncia, who was
conceiving at that time, was fetched by petitioner and they transferred to San Juan St., Pasay
City. On October, 1962, she delivered a still-born female child at the Manila Sanitarium. The
death certificate was signed by petitioner. Thereafter, while they were living at Highway 54,
Makati, private respondent Merceditas S. Ilano was born on December 30, 1963 also at the
Manila Sanitarium. Her birth was recorded as Merceditas de los Santos Ilano, child of Leoncia
Aguinaldo de los Santos and Artemio Geluz Ilano. Leoncia submitted receipts issued by the
Manila Sanitarium to show that she was confined there under the name of Mrs. Leoncia
Ilano. The support by petitioner for Leoncia and Merceditas was sometimes in the form of cash
personally delivered by him; the signature appearing thereon having been identified by Leoncia
as that of petitioner because he often gives her checks which he issues at home and saw him
sign the checks. The respondent will sign her report cards, giv her toys, take her for a drive, eat
at restaurants, and even cuddle her to sleep.
The trial court was not fully satisfied that petitioner is the father of Merceditas. The court
of appeals reversed the lower court’s decision. Hence, the present petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Merceditas an illegitiate child of Artemio Ilano
Ruling:
Yes. Art. 283. In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to recognize the child as
his natural child:
787
(1) In cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense
coincides more or less with that of the conception;
(2) When the child is in continuos possession of status of a child of the alleged
father by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;
(3) When the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited
with the supposed father;
(4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his
father.
Significantly, the Court \believed that plaintiff's mother and defendant carried an intimate
relations. It nonetheless was not satisfied that defendant is the father of the plaintiff because it is
not convinced that her mother and defendant were in cohabitation during the period of her
conception, and took into account the testimony of Melencio S. Reyes who frequented the
apartment where Leoncia de los Santos was living and who positively testified that he took care
of all the bills and that he shared the same bed with plaintiffs mother.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of
the Court of Appeals dated December 17, 1991 and its resolution dated February 26, 1992 are
AFFIRMED
788
Fernandez v. CA
FERNANDEZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS

230 SCRA 130
PUNO, J.:
The legal dispute between the parties began when the petitioners filed Civil Case No. Q-
45567 for support against the private respondent before the RTC of Quezon City. The complaint
was dismissed on December 9, 1986 by Judge Antonio P. Solano, 1 who found that "(t)here is
nothing in the material allegations in the complaint that seeks to compel (private respondent) to
recognize or acknowledge (petitioners) as his illegitimate children," and that there was no
sufficient and competent evidence to prove the petitioners filiation.
Facts:
In 1983,VioletaEsguerra, single, met Carlito S. Fernandez, married, at the Meralco

Compound tennis courts where Violeta’s father worked as a tennis instructor. The two then
started an illicit sexual relationship six months after their first meeting. The tryst allegedly gave
birth to herein petitioners Carlo Antonio and John Paul Fernandez.
Petitioners filed a civil case for support against Carlito in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. The case however, was dismissed on the basis of immateriality, and insufficiency
and incompetence of evidence.
Another action for recognition and support was filed on February 19, 1987 at the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 87. Eventually, the decision was rendered in favor of
the petitioners.
On appeal, the decision was set aside and the complaint was dismissed by respondent
appellate court on October 20, 1992. Their motion for reconsideration was also denied in
December 22, 1922. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners are entitled to recognition and support from private
respondent?
Ruling:
No. It is the Court’s findings that that petitioners’ evidence failed to substantiate their
cause of action. Respondent appellate court was correct in applying the doctrine of resjudicata
as additional reason for dismissing the case. Firstly, we hold that petitioners cannot rely on the
photographs showing the presence of the private respondent in the baptism of petitioner Claro.
789
These photographs are far from proofs that private respondent is the father of petitioner Claro.
As explained by the private respondent, he was in the baptism as one of the sponsors of
petitioner Claro. His testimony was corroborated by Rodante Pagtakhan. Secondly, the pictures
taken in the house of Violeta showing private respondent showering affection to Claro fall short
of the evidence required to prove paternity.Thirdly, the baptismal certificates of petitioner Claro
naming private respondent as his father has scant evidentiary value. There is no showing that
private respondent participated in its preparation.Fourth, the certificates of live birth of the
petitioners identifying private respondent as their father are not also competent evidence on the
issue of their paternity. Again, the records do no show that private respondent had a hand in the
preparation of said certificates.
Fallo:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED and the Decision of the respondent
court in CA-G.R. CV No. 29182 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
790
Rodriguez v. CA
RODRIGUEZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS

245 SCRA 150
QUIASON, J.:
the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 2, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP No. 14276, which
allowed, in an action for compulsory recognition, the testimony of the mother of a natural child
on the identity of the putative father.
Facts:
On October 15, 1986, an action for compulsory recognition and support was brought
before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio-Benguet, Br. 9, by herein respondent ClaritoAgbulos
against Bienvenido Rodriguez, petitioner herein. At the trial, the plaintiff presented his mother,
FelecitasAgbulos Haber, as first witness. In the course of her direct examination, she was asked
by counsel t reveal the identity of the plaintiff’s father but the defendant’s counsel raised a timely
objection, which the court sustained. The plaintiff file before the Supreme Court a petition for
review on certiorari questioning the said order in UDK 8516 entitled “ClaritoAgbulos vs. Hon.
Romeo A. Brawner and Bienvenido Rodriguez.” On March 18, 1988, the Supreme Court
referred the petition to the Court of Appeals, which promulgated the questioned decision dated
November 2, 1988. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the action for compulsory recognition is deserve of merit
Ruling:
Yes. Under Article 172 of the Family Code, filiation of legitimate children is by any of the
following:
The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved
by:
791
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws. (265a, 266a, 267a)
Of interest is that Article 172 of the Family Code adopts the rule in Article 283 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, that filiation may be proven by "any evidence or proof that the defendant is
his father."
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. The trial court is
DIRECTED to PROCEED with dispatch in the disposition of the action for compulsory
recognition.
792
Jison v. CA
Jison vs CA
GR No. 124853, February 24, 1998
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the 27 April 1995
decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 32860[1] which reversed the decision
of Branch 24 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City in Civil Case No. 16373. [2] The latter
dismissed the complaint of private respondent Monina Jison (hereafter MONINA) for recognition
as an illegitimate child of petitioner Francisco Jison (hereafter FRANCISCO).
FACTS:
Private respondent, Monina Jison, instituted a complaint against petitioner, Francisco
Jison, for recognition as illegitimate child of the latter. The case was filed 20 years after her
mother’s death and when she was already 39 years of age.
Petitioner was married to Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940 and sometime in 1945, he
impregnated Esperanza Amolar, Monina’s mother. Monina alleged that since childhood, she
had enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as the illegitimate child of petitioner by his acts
and that of his family. It was likewise alleged that petitioner supported her and spent for her
education such that she became a CPA and eventually a Central Bank Examiner. Monina was
able to present total of 11 witnesses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Monina should be declared as illegitimate child of Francisco Jison
Ruling:
Yes. Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation may be established in the
same way and on the same evidence as that of legitimate children. Article 172 thereof provides
the various forms of evidence by which legitimate filiation is established. “To prove open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the
manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by
continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to
pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction of
paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in
society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously”.
SC ruled that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not
competence evidence as to the issue of paternity. Francisco’s lack of participation in the
preparation of baptismal certificates and school records render the documents showed as
793
incompetent to prove paternity. With regard to the affidavit signed by Monina when she was 25
years of age attesting that Francisco was not her father, SC was in the position that if Monina
were truly not Francisco’s illegitimate child, it would be unnecessary for him to have gone to
such great lengths in order that Monina denounce her filiation. Monina’s evidence hurdles the
“high standard of proof required for the success of an action to establish one’s illegitimate
filiation in relying upon the provision on “open and continuous possession”. Hence, Monina
proved her filiation by more than mere preponderance of evidence.
Since the instant case involves paternity and filiation, even if illegitimate, Monina filed
her action well within the period granted her by a positive provision of law. A denial then of her
action on ground of laches would clearly be inequitable and unjust. Petition was denied.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED and the
challenged decision of the Court of Appeals of 27 April 1995 in CA-G.R. CV No. 32860 is
AFFIRMED.
794
Pe Lim v. CA
RAYMOND PE Lim vs. Court of Appeals

270 SCRA 1
ROMERO, J.:
All too often, immature men who allow their emotions to hold sway over their rational minds
come to grief when their passions cool off, but not before inflicting irreparable psychic and
spiritual damage on their victims and the fruits of their wanton acts. As they sow the proverbial
"wild oats," they are heedless of the dire consequences they heap on their heads. When the
inevitable confrontation explodes and they are helpless to extricate themselves from the messy
situation arising from their wrongdoing, eventually they invoke the help of the courts as their
final arbiter.
Facts:
In 1978, Maribel Cruz, then 16, was a part-time student at the same time a receptionist
at the Tonight’s Club and Resthouse. It was here where she met Raymond Pe Lim on her first
night on the job. Lim allegedly wooed Maribel and the latter reciprocated. They soon lived
together with Lim paying the apartment rentals. Maribel left for Japan, already pregnant, in July
1981 and returned to Manila in October of the same year. On January 17, 1982, Maribel gave
birth to a girl and was named Joanna Rose C. Lim. Lim paid the bills for Maribel’s confinement.
Towards the latter part of 1983, petitioner abandoned the mother and child.
Unfortunately, various jobs and he from relatives were not enough to meet their needs. Maribel
asked Lim for support but, despite promises, were never given. Maribel then filed a complaint
for support in the Regional Trial Court on Manila. The trial court rendered its decision enjoining
Lim to provide support for Joanna Rose and pay litigation expenses.
Lim elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which in turn affirmed the ruling of the
Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the action for compulsory recognition is of merit?
Ruling:
Yes. Petitioner has never controverted the evidence on record. His love letters to Maribel
vowing to be a good father to Joanna Rose; pictures of himself on various occasions cuddling
Joanna Rose and Certificate of Live Birth say it all. The rule in Art. 283 of the Civil Code that
filiation may be proven by “any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father” shall govern.
795
Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation may be established in the
same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
Article 172 of the Family Code states:
"The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
'(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
'(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.'
"In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
'(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
'(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
This article adopts the rule in Article 283 of the Civil Code that filiation may be proven by
"any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
796
Tijing v. CA
TIJING vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 125901. March 8, 2001
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review is the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 6, 1996, in CA-G.R. SP
No. 39056, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court in a petition for habeas corpus of
Edgardo Tijing, Jr., allegedly the child of petitioners
Facts:
Petitioners are husband and wife. They have six children and the youngest is Edgardo
Tijing Jr., who was born on April 27, 1989 at the clinic of midwife and registered nurse Lourdes-
Vasquez. Bienvenida served as the laundrywoman of angelita, the respondent. On August,
1989, angelita went to her house to fetch for an urgent laundry job. Since Bienvenida was on
her way to do some marketing, she asked Angelita to wait until she returned. She also left her
four-month old son, Edgardo Jr. under the care of Aangelita as she usually let her take care of
the child while Bienvenida was doing laundry. When she came back from the market, the two
were gone already. She went to Angelita’s home but she was informed that Angelita already
moved to other place. Bienvenida and her husband searched for their missing son in other
places. Notwithstanding their serious efforts, they saw no traces of his whereabouts. Four years
later, Bienvenida read in the tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez, allegedly the common
husband of Angelita. They went to the place and saw her son. She claims that the boy was
already named John Thomas Lopez. The spouses filed their petition for habeas corpus with the
trial court in order to recover their son. The petitioners presented two witnesses, Lourdes
Vasquez, the midwife and Benjamin Lopez, the brother of Tomas. Benjamin Lopez declared that
his brother could not have possibly fathered John Thomas Lopez as he was sterile. The trial
court granted the petition while in the appellate court, it reversed the decision of the lower court.
Issue:
Whether or not the Edgardo Jr. and John Thomas is the same person and is the son of
petitioners
Ruling:
Yes. Under the law, the attending physician or midwife in attendance of birth should
cause the recognition of such birth and only is default of the physician or midwife can the parent
register the birth of his child. A false entry in the birth certificate regarding the alleged marriage
797
between the parents of the child puts to doubt the other data in said birth certificate. Moreover,
resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and material evidence to
establish parentage. Bienvenida and the subject child have a common resemblance. Thus, the
court considered this in the decision. Parentage will shall be resolved using conventional
methods unless adopt the modern and scientific ways available like Deoxyrebonuclei Acid
(DNA) test.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed DECISION of the Court
of Appeals is REVERSED and decision of the Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED. Costs
against the private respondent.
798
Agustin v. CA
AGUSTIN vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 162571. June 15, 2005
CORONA, J.:
At issue in this petition for certiorari is whether or not the Court of Appeals (CA) gravely
erred in exercising its discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in issuing a
decision and resolution upholding the resolution and order of the trial court, which denied
petitioner’s motion to dismiss private respondents’ complaint for support and directed the parties
to submit themselves to deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) paternity testing.
Facts:
In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe in 1992, after which they
entered into an intimate relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday on
November 10, 1999. Despite Arnel’s insistence on abortion, Fe decided otherwise and gave
birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin, on August 11. The baby’s birth certificate was
purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses
but later refused Fe’s repeated requests for Martin’s support despite his adequate financial
capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel also denied having
fathered the child. In his pre-trial brief filed on May 17, 2002, Arnel vehemently denied having
sired Martin but expressed willingness to consider any proposal to settle the case.On July 23,
2002, Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit
themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court. Arnel opposed
said motion by invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the parties to
submit themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of the applicants. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court.
Issue:
Whether DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support without
violating petitioner’s constitutional right to privacy and right against self-incrimination
Ruling:
Yes. For too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who choose to
deny their existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing technology finally provides a
much needed equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned progeny. We have long believed in
the merits of DNA testing and have repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case comes
at a perfect time when DNA testing has finally evolved into a dependable and authoritative form
799
of evidence gathering. We therefore take this opportunity to forcefully reiterate our stand that
DNA testing is a valid means of determining paternity.
Although the instant case deals with support rather than inheritance, as in Tayag, the
basis or rationale for integrating them remains the same. Whether or not respondent Martin is
entitled to support depends completely on the determination of filiation.
Given that this is the very first time that the admissibility of DNA testing as a means for
determining paternity has actually been the focal issue in a controversy, a brief historical sketch
of our past decisions featuring or mentioning DNA testing is called for.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Court of
Appeals’ decision dated January 28, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 80961 is hereby AFFIRMED.
800
Herrera v. Alba
HERRERA vs. ALBA

460 S 197
CARPIO, J.:
This is a petition for review[1] to set aside the Decision[2] dated 29 November 2000 of the
Court of Appeals (“appellate court”) in CA-G.R. SP No. 59766. The appellate court affirmed two
Orders[3] issued by Branch 48 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (“trial court”) in SP No. 98-
88759. The Order dated 3 February 2000 directed Rosendo Herrera (“petitioner”) to submit to
deoxyribonucleic acid (“DNA”) paternity testing, while the Order dated 8 June 2000 denied
Facts:
On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba represented by his mother Armi
Alba, filed before the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and damages
against petitioner. Petitioner filed his answer with counterclaim where he denied that he is the
biological father of respondent. Petitioner also denied physical contact with respondent’s
mother.
Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the
proceedings.To support the motion, respondent presented the testimony of Saturnina C. Halos,
Ph.D. When she testified, Dr. Halos was an Associate Professor at De La Salle University
where she taught Cell Biology. She was also head of the University of the Philippines Natural
Sciences Research Institute (“UP-NSRI”), a DNA analysis laboratory. She was a former
professor at the University of the Philippines in Diliman, Quezon City, where she developed the
Molecular Biology Program and taught Molecular Biology. In her testimony, Dr. Halos described
the process for DNA paternity testing and asserted that the test had an accuracy rate of
99.9999% in establishing paternity. Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended
that it has not gained acceptability. Petitioner further argued that DNA paternity testing violates
his right against self-incrimination.
In an Order dated 3 February 2000, the trial court granted respondent’s motion to
conduct DNA paternity testing on petitioner, respondent and Armi Alba.
Issue:
Whether or not a DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine
filiation
801
Ruling:
Yes.The policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the
paternity and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children, is without prejudice to the
right of the putative parent to claim his or her own defenses. Where the evidence to aid this
investigation is obtainable through the facilities of modern science and technology, such
evidence should be considered subject to the limits established by the law, rules, and
jurisprudence.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the court AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals.
802
People v. Vallejo
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VALLEJO

G.R. No. 144656. May 9, 2002
PER CURIAM:
This is an appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, Cavite City,
sentencing Gerrico Vallejo y Samartino to death and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of the
victim in the amount of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages for
the rape-slaying of a 9-year old child, Daisy Diolola, in Rosario, Cavite on July 10, 1999.
Facts:
Accused-appellant was charged for the crime of rape and homicide. When he was asked
by their mayor about the incident, he started crying and told the mayor that he killed the victim
by strangling her. Accused-appellant claimed that he was under the influence of drugs.
He admitted not only that he killed the victim but that he had before that raped
her. Accused-appellant said he laid down the victim on a grassy area near the dike. He
claimed that she did not resist when he removed her undergarments but that when he tried to
insert his penis into the victim’s vagina, she struggled and resisted. Accused-appellant said he
panicked and killed the child. He then dumped her body in the shallow river near the
“compuerta” and went home. Aida Viloria-Magsipoc, Forensic Chemist of the NBI, conducted
DNA tests on the specimens collected by Dr. Vertido. She testified that the vaginal swabs of the
victim taken by Dr. Vertido during the autopsy contained the DNA profiles of accused-appellant
and the victim. The trial court ruled in favor of the State and declared Accused guilty for the
crime of rape and homicide.
Appellant argues that the prosecution failed to show that all the samples submitted for
DNA testing were not contaminated, considering that these specimens were already soaked in
smirchy waters before they were submitted to the laboratory
Issue:
Whether or not the DNA results can be an evidence to the guilt of the accused
Ruling:
Yes.The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an association exists between the
evidence sample and the reference sample.[The samples collected are subjected to various
chemical processes to establish their profile. The test may yield three possible results:
1) The samples are different and therefore must have originated from different
sources (exclusion). This conclusion is absolute and requires no further analysis
or discussion;
803
2) It is not possible to be sure, based on the results of the test, whether the
samples have similar DNA types (inconclusive). This might occur for a variety of
reasons including degradation, contamination, or failure of some aspect of the
protocol. Various parts of the analysis might then be repeated with the same or a
different sample, to obtain a more conclusive result; or
3) The samples are similar, and could have originated from the same source
(inclusion.] In such a case, the samples are found to be similar, the analyst
proceeds to determine the statistical significance of the Similarity.
In conclusion, the court hold that the totality of the evidence points to no other conclusion
than that accused-appellant is guilty of the crime charged. Evidence is weighed not
counted. When facts or circumstances which are proved are not only consistent with the guilt of
the accused but also inconsistent with his innocence, such evidence, in its weight and probative
force, may surpass direct evidence in its effect upon the court. This is how it is in this case.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 88, Cavite City, finding accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo y Samartino GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentencing him to the
supreme penalty of DEATH and directing him to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount
of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages, is hereby AFFIRMED.
804
People v. Yatar
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. YATAR

G.R. No. 150224 May 19, 2004
PER CURIAM:
On automatic review is a Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bulanao, Tabuk,
Kalinga, Branch 25, sentencing appellant Joel Yatar alias "Kawit" to Death for the special
complex crime of Rape with Homicide, and ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim, Kathylyn
D. Uba, civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00, moral damages in the amount of
P200,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00, actual damages in the amount
of P186,410.00, or total damages amounting to P511,410.00, and costs of litigation.
Facts:
On the afternoon of June 30, accused, in order to have carnal knowledge of a certain
Kathylyn d. Uba stab the latter with a use of a blade inflicting upon her fatal injuries resulting in
the death of the victim, and on the occasion by means of force and violence had carnal
knowledge of said Kathlyn D. Uba against her will. The police discovered the victim’s panties,
brassiere, denim pants, bag and sandals beside her naked cadaver at the scene of the crime,
and they found a dirty white shirt splattered with blood within 50 meters from the house of
Isabel. After trial, appellant was convicted of the crime of Rape with Homicide, defined and
penalized under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353, otherwise
known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, and was accordingly, sentenced to Death. Hence, this
automatic review
Issue:
Whether or not there is probative value of the DNA with regards to the guilt of the
accused.
Ruling:
Yes. Significantly, subsequent testing showed that the Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of
the sperm specimen from the vagina of the victim was identical the semen to be that of
appellant’s gene type. DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a uniquely
effective means to link a suspect to a crime, or to exonerate a wrongly accused suspect, where
biological evidence has been left. For purposes of criminal investigation, DNA identification is a
fertile source of both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. It can assist immensely in effecting
a more accurate account of the crime committed, efficiently facilitating the conviction of the
guilty, securing the acquittal of the innocent, and ensuring the proper administration of justice in
every case.
805
DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime or eliminate
one from suspicion in the same principle as fingerprints are used.Incidents involving sexual
assault would leave biological evidence such as hair, skin tissue, semen, blood, or saliva which
can be left on the victim’s body or at the crime scene. Hair and fiber from clothing, carpets,
bedding, or furniture could also be transferred to the victim’s body during the assault. Forensic
DNA evidence is helpful in proving that there was physical contact between an assailant and a
victim. If properly collected from the victim, crime scene or assailant, DNA can be compared
with known samples to place the suspect at the scene of the crime.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the RTC of Bulanao, Tabuk,
Kalinga, Branch 25 in Criminal Case No. 35-98, sentencing appellant Joel Yatar alias "Kawit" to
Death for the special complex crime of Rape with Homicide is AFFIRMED.
806
Rules on DNA Evidence
RULES ON DNA EVIDENCE

A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC
(2 October 2007)
SECTION 1. Scope. This Rule shall apply whenever DNA evidence, as defined in Section 3
hereof, is offered, used, or proposed to be offered or used as evidence in all criminal and civil
actions as well as special proceedings.
DNA analysis is found to have several uses for forensic investigation, including, but not
limited to the 1) Identification of potential suspects whose DNA may match evidence left at
crime scene; 2) Exoneration of persons wrongly accused of crimes; 3) Identification of crime
and catastrophe victims; 4) Establish paternity and other family relationships, through its
variable number tandem repeats (VNTR) patterns; 5) Identification of endangered and protected
species as an aid to wildlife officials (could be used for prosecuting poachers; 6) Detection of
bacteria and other organism that may pollute air, water, soil and food; 7)Match organ donors
with recipients in transplant programs; and 8) Determination of pedigree for seed or livestock
breeds.
DNA is now being used as evidence in trial courts especially in various criminal cases. In A. M.
No. 06-11-5-SC, the Supreme Court has approved has approved on October 2, 2007 the Rules
on DNA Evidence to apply in civil, criminal and special proceedings whenever DNA is offered or
used as evidence.
The said rules defined “DNA” (acronym for “deoxyribonucleic“) as the chain of molecules found
in every nucleated cell of the body. The totality of an individual’s DNA is unique for the
individual, except identical twins. “DNA profile” refers to the genetic information derived from
DNA testing of a biological sample obtained from a person, which biological sample is clearly
identifiable as originating from that person. “DNA evidence”, on the other hand, constitutes the
totality of the DNA profiles, results and other genetic information directly generated from DNA
testing of biological samples.
While the Supreme Court provides for DNA Evidence Rules, it is important therefore that
Congress shall immediately pass the present bill centering on the capacity of forensic DNA
technology to contribute to the criminal justice system. Specifically, this bill will provide the
statutory authority for the creation of the National DNA Index System (NADIS) in the country.
The greatest role of DNA analysis lies in its capability to accelerate criminal
investigations by identifying perpetrators and excluding individual’s right at the onset of the
807
criminal investigation. With the aid of DNA analysis, a fair and swift administration of justice
system in the country can be expected.
The 2002 case of People v. Vallejo discussed DNA analysis as evidence. This may be
considered a 180 degree turn from the Court’s wary attitude towards DNA testing in the 1997 Pe
Lim case, where we stated that “DNA, being a relatively new science, xxx has not yet been
accorded official recognition by our courts.” In Vallejo, the DNA profile from the vaginal swabs
taken from the rape victim matched the accused’s DNA profile. By 2002, there was no longer
any question on the validity of the use of DNA analysis as evidence.
808
Reyes v. Mauricio
REYES VS MAURICIO
NOVEMBER 24, 2010
PEREZ, J.:
Subject of this petition is the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 10 August 2006 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 87148, affirming the Decision dated 7 July 1998 and Resolution dated 28
September 2004 of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
Facts:
The controversy stemmed from a complaint filed before the DARAB of Malolos, Bulacan
by respondents Librada F. Mauricio, now deceased, and her alleged daughter Leonida F.
Mauricio for annulment of contract denominated as Kasunduan and between Librada and
Eugenio as parties. Respondents also prayed for maintenance of their peaceful possession with
damages.
Respondents alleged that they are the legal heirs of the late Godofredo Mauricio, who
was the lawful and registered tenant of Eugenio through his predecessors-in-interest to the
subject land; that from 1936 until his death in May 1994, Godofredo had been working on the
subject land and introduced improvements consisting of fruit-bearing trees, seasonal crops, a
residential house and other permanent improvements; that through fraud, deceit, strategy and
other unlawful means.
Respondents prayed for the declaration of nullity of the Kasunduan and for an order for
Eugenio to maintain and place them in peaceful possession and cultivation of the subject
property. During trial, respondents presented a leasehold contract executed between Susana
and Godofredo to reaffirm the existing tenancy agreement. Eugenio averred that no tenancy
relationship existed between him and respondents. He clarified that Godofredo’s occupation of
the subject premises was based on the former’s mere tolerance and accommodation. Eugenio
denied signing a tenancy agreement, nor authorizing any person to sign such an agreement. He
maintained that Librada, accompanied by a relative, voluntarily affixed her signature to the
Kasunduan and that she was fully aware of the contents of the document. The trial court grant
the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the legitimacy of the child can be contested by way of defense or as a
collateral issue in another action for a different purpose.
809
Ruling:
No. The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral
issue in another action for a different purpose. The necessity of an independent action directly
impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the Mexican code (article 335) which
provides: "The contest of the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made by
proper complaint before the competent court; any contest made in any other way is void." This
principle applies under our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this view,
because they refer to "the action to impugn the legitimacy." This action can be brought only by
the husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed in the present articles.
In Braza v. City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, the Court stated
that legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the
proper party, and not through collateral attack.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the instant petition for review on
certiorari is DENIED and the Decision dated 10 August 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 87148 is AFFIRMED.
810
Estate of Ong v. Diaz
ESTATE OF ONG VS. DIAZ

540 SCRA 480
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure assailing (1) the Decision[1]of the Court of Appeals dated 23 November 2005 and (2)
the Resolution[2] of the same court dated 1 March 2006 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration in CA-G.R. CV No. 70125.
Facts:
A Complaintfor compulsory recognition with prayer for support pending litigation was
filed by minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz, represented by her mother and guardian, Jinky C. Diaz,
against Rogelio G. Ong.
As alleged by Jinky in her complaint, she and Rogelio got acquainted and this developed
into friendship and later blossomed into love. At this time, Jinky was already married to a
Japanese national, Hasegawa Katsuo, in a civil wedding.
Jinky and Rogelio cohabited and lived together. From this live-in relationship, minor Joanne
Rodjin Diaz was conceived and on 25 February 1998.
Rogelio brought Jinky to the hospital and took minor Joanne and Jinky home after
delivery. Rogelio paid all the hospital bills and the baptismal expenses and provided for all of
minor Joanne’s needs – recognizing the child as his.
Rogelio then abandoned minor Joanne and Jinky, and stopped supporting minor Joanne,
falsely alleging that he is not the father of the child.
After summons had been duly served upon Rogelio, the latter failed to file any
responsive pleading despite repeated motions for extension, prompting the trial court to declare
him in default. Jinky was allowed to present her evidence ex parte on the basis of which, the
trial court rendered a decision granting the reliefs prayed for in the complaint. The Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision. Hence, The petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Joanne Rodjin Diaz is a child and is entitled for the support of Rogelio
Ong even though petitioner is against DNA testing.
811
Ruling:
Amidst the protestation of petitioner against the DNA analysis, the resolution thereof may
provide the definitive key to the resolution of the issue of support for minor Joanne. Our
articulation in Agustin v. Court of Appeals is particularly relevant. Petitioner questions the
appropriateness of the order by the Court of Appeals directing the remand of the case to the
RTC for DNA testing given that petitioner has already died. Petitioner argues that a remand of
the case to the RTC for DNA analysis is no longer feasible due to the death of Rogelio. To our
mind, the alleged impossibility of complying with the order of remand for purposes of DNA
testing is more ostensible than real. Petitioner’s argument is without basis especially as the
New Rules on DNA Evidence[28] allows the conduct of DNA testing, either motu proprioor upon
application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, thus:
SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. – The appropriate court may,
at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue
after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the following:
(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;

(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of
DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA
testing, but the results may require confirmation for good reasons;
(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information
that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and
(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as
potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing.
From the foregoing, it can be said that the death of the petitioner does not ipso
facto negate the application of DNA testing for as long as there exist appropriate biological
samples of his DNA.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals dated 23 November 2005 and its Resolution dated 1 March
2006 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
812
Guy v. CA
GUY vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 163707. September 15, 2006
This petition for review on certiorari assails the January 22, 2004 Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79742, which affirmed the Orders dated July 21, 2000 and July
17, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138 in SP Proc. Case No. 4549
denying petitioner's motion to dismiss; and its May 25, 2004 Resolution denying petitioner's
Facts:
On June 13, 1997, private respondent – minors Karen and KamilleOanes Wei
represented by their mother RemediosOanes, filed a pertition for letters of administration before
the Regional trial court of Makati.
Private respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledge illegitimate children of
Sima Wei, who died intestate in Makati City on October 29, 1992, leaving an estate valued at
10, 000, 000. 00 consisting of real and personal properties. His known heirs are surviving
spouse Guy, children Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael all surnamed Guy. Petitioners
argued that private respondents should have established their status as illegitimate children
during the lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code, they further alleged
that private respondents’ claim had been paid, waived, abandoned, extinguished by reason of
Remedios’ June 7, 1993 Release and Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the financial
and educational assistance received from petitioner, Remedios and her minor children
discharge the estate of Sima Wei from any and all liabilities.
Issue:
Whether or not the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes private respondents from
claiming their hereditary rights
Ruling:
No.Remedios’ Release and Waiver of claim does not bar private respondents from
claiming succession rights. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and
equivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit
which legally pertains to him. Even assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of
her children, such waiver does not bar the latter’s claim. Article 104 of the Civil Code requires
judicial authorization of the said waiver which it lacks. Since the affiliation of the private
813
respondents as co heirs to Sima Wei’s Estates, it would thus be inconsistent to rule that they
waived their hereditary rights when they do not have such right.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 22, 2004 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79742 affirming the denial of petitioner's motion to
dismiss; and its Resolution dated May 25, 2004 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration,
are AFFIRMED. Let the records be REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 138 for further proceedings.
814
Rivero v. CA
RIVERO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 141273. May 17, 2005
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 44261 annulling the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, Branch 19,
in Civil Case No. RTC'96-3612.
Facts:
On August 27, 1996, BenedickArevalo filed a Complaint[2] against Mary Jane DyChiao-
De Guzman, Benito DyChiao, Jr., and Benson DyChiao, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Naga City, for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate child of their father, Benito DyChiao,
Sr., and for the administration and partition of his estate as he had died intestate on July 27,
1995. Since Benedick was a minor, his natural mother and guardian ad litem, Shirley Arevalo,
filed the complaint on his behalf. Concepcion, Benito Sr.’s wife, was not impleaded as she had
died on July 7, 1995. The CA nullified the decision of the RTC on the ground, inter alia, that the
filiation of Benedick could not be the subject of a compromise, and that Mary Jane had no
authority to execute the compromise agreement for and in behalf of her brothers.
Issue:
Whether or not Henry Dy Chiao had the authority to file the amended petition for Benito
Dy Chiao, Jr
Ruling:
No. The court rejects the petitioners' contention that Henry was the petitioner who filed the
amended petition before the CA. As gleaned from said petition, the petitioners were "Benito Dy
Chiao, Jr. and Benson Dy Chiao, represented by their uncle Henry S. Dy Chiao." Moreover,
Henry had the authority to file the amended petition and sign the requisite certification on non-
forum shopping when the CA admitted the amended petition and appointed him as guardian ad
litem of his nephews. In resolving whether to appoint a guardian ad litem for the respondent,
the appellate court needed only to determine whether the individual for whom a guardian was
proposed was so incapable of handling personal and financial affairs as to warrant the need for
the appointment of a temporary guardian. It only needed to make a finding that, based on clear
and convincing evidence, the respondent is incompetent and that it is more likely than not that
his welfare requires the immediate appointment of a temporary guardian. A finding that the
815
person for whom a guardian ad litem is proposed is incapable of managing his own personal
and financial affairs by reason of his mental illness is enough.
Guardians ad litem are considered officers of the court in a limited sense, and the office
of such guardian is to represent the interest of the incompetent or the minor. Whether or not to
appoint a guardian ad litem for the petitioners is addressed to the sound discretion of the court
where the petition was filed, taking into account the best interest of the incompetent or the
minor. The court has discretion in appointing a guardian ad litem that will best promote the
interest of justice. The appointment of a guardian ad litem is designed to assist the court in its
determination of the incompetent's best interest.
The records will show that no less than Benedick Arevalo sought the appointment of
Mary Jane Dy Chiao-De Guzman as guardian ad litem for respondent Benito Dy Chiao, Jr. and
his brother, Benson Dy Chiao.
Fallo:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against the
petitioners.
816
Briones v. Miguel
BRIONES vs. MIGUEL,

G.R. No. 156343. October 18, 2004
PANGANIBAN, J.:
An illegitimate child is under the sole parental authority of the mother. In the exercise of
that authority, she is entitled to keep the child in her company. The Court will not deprive her of
custody, absent any imperative cause showing her unfitness to exercise such authority and
care.
Facts:
Petitioner, Joey Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against respondents
Maricel Miguel and Francisca Miguel, to obtain custody of his minor child Michael Kevin
Pineda and later on passed an Amended Petition to include Loreta P. Miguel, the mother of
the minor, as one of the respondents.
According to the petitioner, Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son who was born in
Japan but he brought back his son to the Philippines to take care and to send him to school
with the help of his parents while respondent, his son’s mother, stayed in Japan and
married a Japanese citizen. Petitioner contends that respondents Maricel and Francisca
went to his to visit his son and asked his permission to take his son for recreation at SM to
which the petitioner approved not knowing that they will take his son at Batal Heights,
Santiago City to the former’s mother. The petioner then sought the help of the police and
Department of Social Welfare but his efforts were useless.Hence he filed petition for
habeas corpus pleading to have the custody of his child
Respondent denies the allegations and stated that she, not respondents Maricel and
Francisca, was he one who took their son when she arrived in the Philippines. She further
alleged that petioner was deported from Japan because he violated a law and was not
gainfully employed since then. She further contends that she returns to the Philippine every
6 months and pleads to have the custody of their child asserting Article 213, Paragraph 2 of
the Family Code and Article 363 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The court granted the
custody of Michael Kevin Pineda Miguel to his mother, Respondent Loreta P. Miguel
awarding the petitioner for visitorial rights. Hence the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not an illegitimate child be in the custody of the nat ural father?
817
Ruling:
No. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines clearly provides that "illegitimate
children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and
shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code." This is the rule regardless of whether
the father acknowledges paternity. There is thus no question that Respondent Loreta, being the
mother of and having only parental authority over the minor, is authorized to have custody of
him. Article 213 of the Family Code also states that, generally, no child under seven years of
age shall be separated from the mother, except when the court finds cause to order otherwise.
Hence, the petition was denied and deleting the assailed decision that allows the child upon
reaching the age of ten, to choose which parent to live with.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that the disposition allowing the child, upon reaching ten (10) years of age,
to choose which parent to live with is DELETED for lack of legal basis. Costs against petitioner.
818
Herrera v. Alba
HERRERA vs. ALBA

460 S 197
CARPIO, J.:
This is a petition for review[1] to set aside the Decision[2] dated 29 November 2000 of the
Court of Appeals (“appellate court”) in CA-G.R. SP No. 59766. The appellate court affirmed two
Orders[3] issued by Branch 48 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (“trial court”) in SP No. 98-
88759. The Order dated 3 February 2000 directed Rosendo Herrera (“petitioner”) to submit to
deoxyribonucleic acid (“DNA”) paternity testing, while the Order dated 8 June 2000 denied
Facts:
On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba represented by his mother Armi
Alba, filed before the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and damages
against petitioner. Petitioner filed his answer with counterclaim where he denied that he is the
biological father of respondent. Petitioner also denied physical contact with respondent’s
mother.
Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the
proceedings.To support the motion, respondent presented the testimony of Saturnina C. Halos,
Ph.D. When she testified, Dr. Halos was an Associate Professor at De La Salle University
where she taught Cell Biology. She was also head of the University of the Philippines Natural
Sciences Research Institute (“UP-NSRI”), a DNA analysis laboratory. She was a former
professor at the University of the Philippines in Diliman, Quezon City, where she developed the
Molecular Biology Program and taught Molecular Biology. In her testimony, Dr. Halos described
the process for DNA paternity testing and asserted that the test had an accuracy rate of
99.9999% in establishing paternity. Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended
that it has not gained acceptability. Petitioner further argued that DNA paternity testing violates
his right against self-incrimination.
In an Order dated 3 February 2000, the trial court granted respondent’s motion to
conduct DNA paternity testing on petitioner, respondent and Armi Alba.
Issue:
Whether or not a DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine
filiation
819
Ruling:
Yes.The policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the
paternity and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children, is without prejudice to the
right of the putative parent to claim his or her own defenses. Where the evidence to aid this
investigation is obtainable through the facilities of modern science and technology, such
evidence should be considered subject to the limits established by the law, rules, and
jurisprudence.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the court AFFIRMS the Decision of the Court of Appeals.
820
Marquino v. IAC
MARQUINO VS.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
233 SCRA 348
PUNO, J.:
For resolution are the following issues: (1) the effect of the death of the natural child
during the pendency of her action for recognition; and (2) the effect of the death of the putative
parent also during the pendency of the case.
FACTS:
Bibiana Romano-Pagadora brought a civil action for the Judicial Declaration of Filiation,
Annulment of Partition, Support, and Damages against EutiquioMarquino. Also included, as
defendants were Maria Terenal-Marquino, Eutiquio’s wife, and their children, Luz, Ana, and Eva.
Romano-Pagadora was born on December 2, 1926 by Gegoria Romano and allegedly by
Eutiquio, who was single then. The Marquinos personally knew romano-Pagadora for she was
hired as a helper in their household. She claims she has always enjoyed continuous possession
of the status of an acknowledged natural child by direct acts of the Marquinos. The Marquinos,
on the other hand, denied the allegations.
During the pendency of the trial, Bibiana died on March 17, 1979. Six days later, her
heirs were ordered to substitute for her. On May 17, 1983, the Marquinos filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that an action for recognition is intransmissible to the heirs, the same
being a personal act. The case was dismissed. The heirs of the deceased interposed an appeal
before the Intermediate Appellate Court. On August 20, 1983 however, EutiquioMarquino died.
On June 17, 1895, the appellate court decided in favor of the heirs of Romano-Pagadora
reversing the decision of the trial court. Hence this petition.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the death of the natural child during the pendency of her action for recognition
is transmissible to the heirs?
2. Whether or not after the death of the putative father the action for recognition of a natural
child can be continued against the heirs of the former
821
Ruling:
1. Yes. Art. 173 is the governing provision wherein the child can bring the action during his or
her entire lifetime and even after the death of the parents. In other words, the action does not
prescribe as long as he lives. The article cannot be given any retroactivity for it will prejudice
vested rights transmitted to them at the time of the death of their father.
2. No. In an action for compulsory recognition, the party in the best position to oppose the same
is the putative parent
himself. The need to hear the side of the putative parent is an overwhelming consideration
because of the unsettling effects of such an action on the peace and harmonious relationship in
the family of the putative parent. For this reason, Article 285 provides only two (2) exceptions
when an action for recognition transcends the death of the putative parent. Neither of these
exceptions obtains in the case at bench. Firstly, the death of Eutiquio did not occur during the
minority of Bibiana. In fact, she was already forty-five (45) years old when the recognition case
was filed on January 10, 1971. Secondly, no document was discovered, before unknown, in
which Bibiana was expressly acknowledged as a natural child. Consequently, the respondent
court erred in ruling that the action can still be continued against the heirs of Eutiquio
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 17, 1985 is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Complaint in Civil Case No. 5197 of the then Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental is DISMISSED.
822
Tayag v. CA
TAYAG VS. COURT OF APPEALS

209 SCRA 665
REGALADO, J.:
The instant petition seeks to reverse and set aside the decision 1 of respondent Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 20222, entitled "Corito Ocampo Tayag vs. Hon. Norberto C. Ponce,
Judge, Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga and Emilde Dayrit Cuyugan,"
promulgated on May 10, 1990, and its resolution denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration. 2 Said decision, now before us for review, dismissed petitioner's Petition
forCertiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction on the ground that the denial of the
motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 7938 of the court a quo is an interlocutory order and cannot be
the subject of the said special civil action, ordinary appeal in due time being petitioner's remedy.
Facts:
Emilei Dayrit Cuyugan, as other and legal guardian of minor Chad D. Cuyugan, filed a
complaint for “Claim of Inheritance” against CoritoOcampoTayag, the administatrix of the late
Atty. Ricardo Ocampo. Emilei D. Cuyugan, petitioner therein, alleged that several years before
Atty. Ocampo died, they had an illicit relationship, which later brought about Chad on October 5,
1980, therefore Chad is entitled to a share of the estate of Atty. Ocampo as one of the surviving
heirs. Petitioner Tayag, respondent therein, filed a counterclaim and a Motion to Dismiss. The
motion was denied. Likewise her Motion for Reconsideration was also denied. Tayag
proceeded to the Court of Appeals and filed a petition praying for certiorari and prohibition,
which was granted and enjoined the trial court judge to resolve petitioner’s motion to dismiss. In
compliance with the order, the trial court acted on and denied motion to dismiss the complaint.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
As a consequence, petitioner filed another petition for certiorari and prohibition with the
Court of Appeals, praying to set aside the orders of the Regional Trial Court. The Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition and denied motion for reconsideration. Hence this petition
Issue:
Whether or not the action to compel recognition has prescribed
Ruling:
Yes. Article 285 of the Civil Code provides:
823
Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only
during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the
latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of
his majority;
On the other hand, Article 175 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same
way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173,
except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which
case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Under the last-quoted provision of law, therefore, if the action is based on the record of
birth of the child, a final judgment, or an admission by the parent of the child's filiation in a public
document or in a private handwritten signed instrument, then the action may be brought during
the lifetime of the child. However, if the action is based on the open and continuous possession
by the child of the status of an illegitimate child, or on other evidence allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws, the view has been expressed that the action must be brought during the
lifetime of the alleged parent.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is DENIED and the assailed decision and resolution of
respondent Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED
824
People v. Bayani
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BAYANI

OCT. 8, 1996
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Sgt. Moreno Bayani, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP), seeks the
reversal of the 28 April 1995 decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch
11, in Criminal Case No. 6433, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties
provided by law; to indemnify complainant Maria Elena Nieto in the amount of Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the
costs
Facts:
Complainant charged the accused with the crime of rape allegedly committed. In 1992,
Victim, Maria Elena Nieto was a fourth-year high school student of St. Lawrence Academy, a
Catholic School of Bangui, Ilocos Norte. She was then fifteen (15) years old. At that time both
her parents were abroad as overseas contract workers. Appellant was a neighbor. He was close
to her paternal uncles, Eugenio and Rudy Nieto. One of her unclesis appellant's "kumpadre."
Maria Elena called him "uncle" and the latter's wife "auntie." Appellant often went to her
grandmother's house. She was considered a relative. He asked her if she could accompany him
to visit a friend in Laoag City. Appellant brought her to a restaurant, the City Lunch and Snack
Bar and invited her for lunch there. She declined as she was still full and suggested that they go
home. Appellant, however, first went to a friend before going home He brought her to the "third
floor of a certain building" appellant told her that "it was in the second floor where the person he
wanted to talk with was" They proceeded to the second floor of the building. Upon reaching the
door of a room at the second floor of the building, appellant took hold of her wrist and raped her.
Thereafter, Maria Elena wanted to leave. However, appellant pointed his gun at her and
threatened to kill her if she revealed the rape incident to anybody. After a while, appellant
repeated the sexual intercourse for two more times. Victim thereafter got pregnant.
Issue:
Whether or not the offender in a rape case who is married can be sentenced to
indemnify the victim and support the offspring.
825
Ruling:
Yes. Article 176 of the Family Code confers parental authority over illegitimate children
on the mother, and likewise provides for their entitlement to support in conformity with the
Family Code. As such, there is no further need for the prohibition against acknowledgment of
the offspring by an offender who is married which would vest parental authority in him.
Therefore, under Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code, the offender in a rape case who is
married can only be sentenced to indemnify the victim and support the offspring, if there be any.
In the instant case then, they should also be ordered to support his illegitimate offspring, Tracy
Jhuen Nieto, with Marie Elena Nieto, but in light of Article 201 of the Family Code, the amount
and terms thereof to be determined by the trial court only after due notice and hearing.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED, and the challenged decision of 28

April 1995 of Branch 11 of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City in Criminal Case No. 6433 is
AFFIRMED in toto. Furthermore, accused-appellant MORENO BAYANI is ordered to support
his illegitimate child Tracy Jhuen Nieto in an amount to be determined by the trial court after due
notice and hearing, called only to determine the amount and terms of support, with support in
arrears to be reckoned from 28 April 1995.
826
Republic v. Abadilla
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. GERSON R. ABADILLA, LUZVIMINDA M.

CELESTINO, and THE MINORS EMERSON C. ABADILLA AND RAFAEL C. ABADILLA,
REPRESENTED BY THEIR GUARDIAN AD LITEM LUZVIMINDA M. CELESTINO,
respondents.
G.R. No. 133054. January 28, 1999
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Gerson Abadilla and Luzviminda Cerlestino have been living togrther
out of wedlock. They have two minor children, namely Emerson and Rafael. Both are registered
with the surname Abadilla and the entry in the date and place of marriage of their parents
appeared as June 19, 1987 at Dingras, Ilocos Norte in their respective certificate of birth.
Through a filed amended petition for correction/cancellation of entries,
petitioners Abadilla and Celestino sought after the correction of Gerson’s name and the deletion
of the entry as to the date and place of marriage of children’s parents in their children’d birth
certificate.
The Regional Trial Court granted the petition. However, the office of the Solicitor
General petitioned for review on certiorari on the ground that the children’s surname be
changed to Celestino since their parents are unmarried.
In view of Article 176 of the Family Code, “illegitimate children shall use the
surname of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The
legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not minor respondents should bear their mother’s surname taking into
consideration their illegitimacy as children.
827
RULING:
Yes, the children should bear the surname of their mother. Since the former are
conceived and born out of a valid marriage, they are illegitimate. Thus, pursuant to Article 176 of
the Family Code, their surname should be Celestino, instead of Abadilla.
FALLO: ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 65, dated February 17, 1998 in Spcl. Proc. No. 11114-65 is
hereby MODIFIED. The Civil Registrar of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte is hereby ordered to
change the entry in the Amended Birth Certificates of respondent-minors Emerson C. Abadilla
and Rafael C. Abadilla with respect to their surname, and enter instead therein the surname
“Celestino”.
828
Verceles v. Posada
TEOFISTO I. VERCELES, petitioner,

vs.
MARIA CLARISSA POSADA, in her own behalf, and as mother of minor VERNA AIZA
POSADA, CONSTANTINO POSADA and FRANCISCA POSADA, respondents.
G.R. No. 159785 April 27, 2007
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review seeks the reversal of the Decision dated May 30, 2003 and the
Resolution dated August 27, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 50557. The
appellate court had affirmed with modification the Judgment dated January 4, 1995 of the
FACTS:
Respondent Maria Clarissa Posada, along with her parents, filed a complaint for
damages coupled with Support Pendente Lite against petitioner Teofisto Verceles before the
Virac, Catanduanes Regional Trial Court.
Clarissa bore a child named Verna Aiza. She asserted that the father of the child is
petitioner.
Verceles, mayor of Pandan, Catanduanes, offered Clarissa a job as a casual employee
in his office which was then accepted by the latter.
On separate occasions, petitioner made amorous advances with Clarissa in which the
latter initially avoided but eventually consented. Clarissa however kept the incidents to herself.
Consequently, she missed her period and got pregnant. She wrote two different letters to
verceles stating her predicament. The latter replied and said that they are to take care of the
love child. She was given money by him during her pregnancy.
Clarissa’s mother Francisca ascertained their child’s pregnancy and had her go back
home from Manila where she was sent by Verceles.
Aggrieved, the complainant against the petitioner was filed.
829
During the trial, three other handwritten letters of petitioner sent to Clarissa were
presented, as well as the former’s picture of his youth and as a public servant given to her,
bearing his handwritten notatiuons at the back.
The trial court ruled in favor of the respondents, ordering petityioner to pay monthly
support to Verna Aiza. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment with modification.
The petitioner sought after the reversal of the decision on the ground that filiation is not
yet proven.
ISSUE:
Wheter or not the fact of paternity or filiation is proven in this case at bar, thereby
recognizing Verna Aiza Posada as petitioner’s illegitimate child.
RULING:
Yes. Paternity or filiation is proven in this case at bar is proven; Verna Aiza Posada is
petitioner’s illegitimate daughter.
The letters received by Clarissa from Verceles construed that he sired Verna Aiza,
notwithstanding that he never signed the birth certificate of the child. Such were material in
establishing flilitation as provided by Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated May 30, 2003 and the Resolution dated
August 27, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 50557 are AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages and exemplary damages be DELETED.
830
In re: Adoption of Stephanie Garcia
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA

HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her
natural mother as her middle name? This is the issue raised in the instant case.
FACTS:
Petitioner Honorato B. catindig, a widower, filed a petition to adopt his

minor illegitimate child, Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, born on June 26, 1991.
Gemma Astorga Garcia is Stephanie’s mother. The child bears her mother’s
middle name and surname.
Honorato prayed that Stephanie’s middle name be changed to that of her
mother’s surname, and that her surname be changed to that of his.
The trial court granted the adoption. Stephanie now bears the surname of
her father.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or
reconsideration, seeking to allow Stephanie to use the surname of her mother as
the child’s middle name.
The action was denied, as well as the ensuing motion for reconsideration
on the ground that there is no law or jurisprudence which allows an adopted child
to use the surname of her biological mother as her middle name.
Thus, the petition was filed before the Supreme Court. Petitioner submits
that no law is prohibiting his minor adopted child f rom having a middle name,
notwithstanding that there is only one adopting parent.
ISSUE:
831
Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle
name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father.
RULING:
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to
all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including
the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother. And since there is no law prohibiting
an illegitimate adopted child by her natural father to use, as middle name he mother’s surname,
the Supreme Court found no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly MODIFIED in

the sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her mother’s surname "GARCIA" as her
middle name.
Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be entered in the decree
of adoption.
832
Briones v. Miguel
JOEY D. BRIONES, petitioner,

vs.
MARICEL P. MIGUEL, FRANCISCA P. MIGUEL and LORETA P. MIGUEL, respondents.
G.R. No. 156343 October 18, 2004
PANGANIBAN, J.:
care.
FACTS:
Petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a petition for Habeas Corpus against Maricel Pineda
Miguel, Francisca Pineda Miguel and Loreta Miguel, the mother of the minor illegitimate child,
Michael Kevin Pineda, to obtain the custody of the child.
The writ of habes corpus wa issued ordering the respondents to produce before the
Court of Appeals, the living body of Michael at March 21, 2002 at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon.
Michael was born in Japan and was brought to the Philippines by the petitioner so that
he could take care of him and send him to school since the minor child’s mother is married to
Japanese and is residing in Japan. The parents of petitioner assisted him in taking care of the
child.
One day, Maricel and Francisca visited the child and requested that they be allowed to
bring the child to a mall. The petitioner agreed since they promised that they will bring him back
in the afternoon, but they never did.
Petitioner efforted to locate the whereabouts of his son but his efforts were futile,
therefore constraining him to file a writ of Habeas Corpus with the trial court. However, the case
was withdrawn ex-parte.
He is praying that the custody oh his son be given to him as his biological father.
The mother of the child however, commented before the court and also prayed that the
custody of her minor child be given to her.
833
ISSUE:
Whether or not Joey Briones should be entitled to the custody of his minor child.
RULING:
There is no question that Respondent Loreta, being the mother of and having sole
parental authority over the minor, is entitled to have custody of him. She has the right to keep
him in her company. She cannot be deprived of that right, and she may not even renounce or
transfer it "except in the cases authorized by law."
Not to be ignored in Article 213 of the Family Code is the caveat that, generally, no child
under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, except when the court finds
cause to order otherwise.
Only the most compelling of reasons, such as the mother’s unfitness to exercise sole
parental authority, shall justify her deprivation of parental authority and the award of custody to
someone else. In the past, the following grounds have been considered ample justification to
deprive a mother of custody and parental authority: neglect or abandonment, unemployment,
immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and
affliction with a communicable disease.
Bearing in mind the welfare and the best interest of the minor as the controlling factor,
the Supreme Court held that the Appellate Court did not err in awarding care, custody, and
control of the child to Respondent Loreta. There is no showing at all that she is unfit to take
charge of him.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the disposition allowing the child, upon reaching ten (10) years of age, to
choose which parent to live with is DELETED for lack of legal basis. Costs against petitioner.
834
People v. Glabo

vs.
JUSTINIANO GLABO alias "TOTO BUGOY", accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 129248 December 7, 2001
FACTS:
21-year old victim Mila Lobrico, a mental retardate, and her 11-year old sister, Judith,
were summoned by accused-appellant, their maternal uncle, to his house. He told them to
wash the clothes of his wife. After the two sisters finished their chore, accused-appellant
ordered Judith to wash the dishes in the nearby creek, about 200 meters away from his house.
When Judith was gone, accused-appellant dragged Mila from the yard, where she was hanging
the washed clothes, into the house. He pushed her to the floor and made her lie down. He
undressed the victim, then he inserted his penis into her private organ and made push and pull
motions. Mila was overpowered by accused-appellant’s brute strength. She shouted for help,
but there were no neighbors nearby.
Suddenly, it started to rain hard, so Judith had to run back to the house for shelter. She
went directly under the house, which was elevated 3 feet above the ground. While underneath
the house, she heard someone crying on the floor above. She looked up through the bamboo
floor and saw accused-appellant on top of her elder sister. Both were naked. Judith went to the
kitchen, and she saw accused-appellant’s penis as he stood up and raised his briefs.
The two girls went home silently. They did not say a word about the incident. However,
the victim became pregnant as a result of the rape, and after six months her condition could no
longer be concealed. Severino Lobrico, Mila’s father, confronted her, but she said nothing. It
was her sister, Judith, who told their father that accused-appellant raped Mila. Severino brought
Mila to the police and filed a complaint for rape before the Municipal Trial Court.
In his defense, accused-appellant alleged that during the entire monthwhen said incident
happened, he was plowing the field of one of his sisters in Sitio Yakal, new Guinto, Taytay,
Palawan. The victim’s mother, Gloria Glabo-Lobrico, testified for the defense. She stated that
she wanted the case to be settled to restore her good relationship with accused-appellant, who
is her brother.
835
The Regional Trial Cour rendered judgment convicting accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal in the crime of rape, and ordered him give support to
complainant’s child who was born as a result of this offense.
Hence, this direct appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the offspring as a result of rape is entitled to acknowledgement and

support.
RULING:
Concerning the acknowledgement and support of the offspring of rape, Article 345 of the
Revised Penal Code provides for three kinds of civil liability that may be imposed on the
offender: a) indemnification, b) acknowledgement of the offspring, unless the law should
prevent him from so doing, and c) in every case to support the offspring.
With the passage of the Family Code, the classification of acknowledged natural children
and natural children by legal fiction was eliminated and they now fall under the specie of
illegitimate children. Since parental authority is vested by Article 176 of the Family Code upon
the mother and considering that an offender sentenced to reclusion perpetua automatically
loses the power to exercise parental authority over his children, no “further positive act is
required of the parent as the law itself provides for the child’s status.”
Hence, accused-appellant should only be ordered to indemnify and support the victim’s
child. However, the amount and terms of support shall be determined by the trial court after due
notice and hearing in accordance with Article 201 of the Family Code.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision dated September 30, 1996 of the
Regional Trial Court of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 51, in Criminal Case No.
10275, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-
appellant is ordered to pay the victim the sums of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P25,000.00
as exemplary damages, in addition to moral damages of P50,000.00. Accused-appellant is
836
further ordered to provide support to the victim's child born out of the rape, subject to the
amount and terms to be determined by the trial court in a proper proceeding.
837
Tonog v. CA
DINAH B. TONOG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and EDGAR V. DAGUIMOL,

respondents.
G.R. No. 122906. February 7, 2002
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of two (2) Resolutions
dated August 29, 1995 and November 29, 1995 issued by the former Second Division of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35971. The first resolution modified the appellate court’s
decision promulgated in the said case, and granted custody of the minor, Gardin Faith Belarde
Tonog, to private respondent. The second resolution denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
FACTS:
On September 23, 1989, petitioner Dinah B. Tonog gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde
Tonog, her illegitimate daughter with private respondent Edgar V. Daguimol. Petitioner was
then a nursing student while private respondent was a licensed physician. They cohabited for a
time and lived with private respondent’s parents and sister in the latter’s house in Quezon City
where the infant, Gardin Faith, was a welcome addition to the family.
A year after the birth of Gardin Faith, petitioner left for the United States of America
where she found work as a registered nurse. Gardin Faith was left in the care of her father and
paternal grandparents.
Subsequently, private respondent filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin Faith.
The trial court rendered judgment appointing private respondent as legal guardian of the minor.
Petitioner avers that she learned of the judgment of the trial court only on April 1, 1992.
Accordingly, she filed a petition for relief from judgment. The trial court set aside its original
judgment and allowed petitioner to file her opposition to private respondent’s petition. The
latter, in turn, filed a motion for reconsideration. In a related incident, petitioner filed on a motion
to remand custody of Gardin Faith to her.
Thereafter the trial court issued a resolution denying private respondent’s motion for
reconsideration and granting petitioner’s motion for custody of their child, Gardin. Petitioner
moved for immediate execution of the said resolution.
838
Due to the adverse turn of events, private respondent filed a petition for certiorari before
the Court of Appeals, questioning the actuations of the trial court. The appellate court dismissed
the petition on the ground of lack of merit.
Petitioner contends that she is entitled to the custody of the minor, Gardin Faith, as a
matter of law. First, as the mother of Gardin Faith, the law confers parental authority upon her
as the mother of the illegitimate minor. Second, Gardin Faith cannot be separated from her
since she had not, as of then, attained the age of seven. Employing simple arithmetic however,
it appears that Gardin Faith is now twelve years old.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner should be vested with the right to custody over their children.
RULING:
In the case at bar, the Supreme Court was asked to rule on the temporary custody of the
minor, Gardin Faith, since it appears that the proceedings for guardianship before the trial court
have not been terminated, and no pronouncement has been made as to who should have final
custody of the minor. Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor,
we find that the appellate court did not err in allowing her father (private respondent herein) to
retain in the meantime parental custody over her. Meanwhile, the child should not be wrenched
from her familiar surroundings, and thrust into a strange environment away from the people and
places to which she had apparently formed an attachment.
Moreover, whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is a question of fact to be
properly entertained in the special proceedings before the trial court. It should be recalled that in
a petition for review on certiorari, the Supreme Court rule only on questions of law. The Court is
not in the best position to assess the parties’ respective merits vis-à-vis their opposing claims
for custody. Yet another sound reason is that inasmuch as the age of the minor, Gardin Faith,
has now exceeded the statutory bar of seven years, a fortiori, her preference and opinion must
first be sought in the choice of which parent should have the custody over her person.
The Court’s pronouncement here should not be interpreted to imply a preference toward
the father (herein private respondent) relative to the final custody of the minor, Gardin Faith.
Nor should it be taken to mean as a statement against petitioner’s fitness to have final custody
of her said minor daughter. It shall be only understood that, for the present and until finally
839
adjudged, temporary custody of the subject minor should remain with her father, the private
respondent herein pending final judgment of the trial court.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The trial court is directed to
immediately proceed with hearing Sp. Proc. No. Q-92-11053 upon notice of this decision. No
840
RP v. Abadilla
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. GERSON R. ABADILLA, LUZVIMINDA M.

CELESTINO, and THE MINORS EMERSON C. ABADILLA AND RAFAEL C. ABADILLA,
REPRESENTED BY THEIR GUARDIAN AD LITEM LUZVIMINDA M. CELESTINO,
respondents.
G.R. No. 133054. January 28, 1999
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Gerson Abadilla and Luzviminda Cerlestino have been living togrther
out of wedlock. They have two minor children, namely Emerson and Rafael. Both are registered
with the surname Abadilla and the entry in the date and place of marriage of their parents
appeared as June 19, 1987 at Dingras, Ilocos Norte in their respective certificate of birth.
Through a filed amended petition for correction/cancellation of entries,
petitioners Abadilla and Celestino sought after the correction of Gerson’s name and the deletion
of the entry as to the date and place of marriage of children’s parents in their children’d birth
certificate.
The Regional Trial Court granted the petition. However, the office of the Solicitor
General petitioned for review on certiorari on the ground that the children’s surname be
changed to Celestino since their parents are unmarried.
In view of Article 176 of the Family Code, “illegitimate children shall use the
surname of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The
legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not minor respondents has the right to bear their mother’s surname taking
into consideration their illegitimacy as children.
841
RULING:
Yes, the children have the right to bear the surname of their mother. Since the former
are conceived and born out of a valid marriage, they are illegitimate. Thus, pursuant to Article
176 of the Family Code, their surname should be Celestino, instead of Abadilla.
FALLO: ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 65, dated February 17, 1998 in Spcl. Proc. No. 11114-65 is
hereby MODIFIED. The Civil Registrar of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte is hereby ordered to
change the entry in the Amended Birth Certificates of respondent-minors Emerson C. Abadilla
and Rafael C. Abadilla with respect to their surname, and enter instead therein the surname
“Celestino”.
842
Mossesgeld v. CA
MARISSA A. MOSSESGELD, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CIVIL REGISTRAR

GENERAL, respondents.
G.R. No. 111455. December 23, 1998
PARDO, J.:
The case is an appeal via certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court from
the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig, Branch 69,
dismissing the petition of the putative father, later substituted by the unwed mother, to compel
the local civil registrar of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, to register the certificate of live birth of
petitioner’s illegitimate child using the surname of the presumed father.
FACTS:
On December 2, 1989, petitioner Marissa Alfaro Mossesgeld, single, 31 years of age,

gave birth to a baby boy at the Medical City General Hospital. It was the third time that she
delivered a child. The presumed father, one Eleazar Siriban Calasan, 42 years old, a lawyer,
married, and a resident of 8632 San Jose St. Guadalupe Nuevo, Makati, Metro Manila, signed
the birth certificate of the child as the informant, indicating therein the child’s first name as
Jonathan, middle name as Mossesgeld, and last name as Calasan. Both the presumed father,
Eleazar S. Calasan and the mother Marissa A. Mossesgeld, accomplished the dorsal side of
the certificate of live birth stating that the information contained therein were true and correct. In
addition, lawyer Calasan executed an affidavit admitting paternity of the child.
On December 6, 1989, due to the refusal of the person in charge at the hospital to
placing the presumed father’s surname as the child’s surname in the certificate of live birth,
petitioner himself submitted the certificate to the office of the local civil registrar of Mandaluyong,
for registration.
On December 28, 1989, the municipal treasurer of Mandaluyong, as officer in charge of
the office of the local civil registrar, rejected the registration on the basis of Circular No. 4, dated
October 11, 1988, of the Civil Registrar General, providing that under Article 176 of the Family
Code of the Philippines, illegitimate children born on or after August 3, 1988, shall use the
surname of their mother.
843
On October 9, 1990, lawyer Eleazar S. Calasan personally went to the Local Civil
Registrar of Mandaluyong to inquire about the status of the registration of his illegitimate child’s
certificate of birth, but was furnished with a copy of the letter dated January 17, 1990, of the
Civil Registrar General denying registration of the certificate of live birth of petitioner’s
illegitimate child using the father’s surname, for it is contrary to law.
On November 7, 1990, lawyer Eleazar S. Calasan filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Pasig, Branch 69, a petition for mandamus to compel the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong,
Metro Manila, to register the certificate of live birth of his alleged illegitimate son using his
surname.
On October 29, 1991, the lower court denied the petition, ruling that illegitimate children
must use the surname of their mothers, regardless of whether or not they had been
acknowledged by their fathers in the record of birth.
On November 21, 1991, petitioner Calasan filed a motion for reconsideration of the
denial. In the meantime, on December 9, 1991, he filed a motion for leave to amend petition
and to admit amended petition, substituting the child’s mother Marissa A. Mossesgeld as the
petitioner.
On February 11, 1992, the lower court granted the motion for leave to amend petition.
However, on June 3, 1992, the lower court denied the motion for reconsideration.
In due time, petitioner interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.
On July 23, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered decision affirming the judgment
appealed from.
ISSUE:
Whether or not mandamus lies to compel the Local Civil Registrar to register a certificate
of live birth of an illegitimate child using the alleged father’s surname where the latter admitted
paternity.
RULING:
Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides that “illegitimate children
shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be
entitled to support in conformity with this Code.” This is the rule regardless of whether or not the
844
father admits paternity. Consequently, the Local Civil Registrar correctly refused to register the
certificate of live birth of petitioner’s illegitimate child using the surname of the alleged father,
even with the latter’s consent. Of course, the putative father, though a much married man,
may legally adopt his own illegitimate child. In case of adoption, the child shall be considered a
legitimate child of the adopter, entitled to use his surname.
The Family Code has effectively repealed the provisions of Article 366 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines giving a natural child acknowledged by both parents the right to use the
surname of the father. The Family Code has limited the classification of children to legitimate
and illegitimate, thereby eliminating the category of acknowledged natural children and natural
children by legal fiction.
Consequently, we rule that mandamus will not lie to compel the local civil registrar to
register the certificate of live birth of an illegitimate child using the father’s surname, even with
the consent of the latter. Mandamus does not lie to compel the performance of an act prohibited
by law.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari. We AFFIRM the
decision of the Court of Appeals and that of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig, Branch 69,
dismissing the petition for mandamus in Special Civil Action No. 60146.
845
Silva v. CA
CARLITOS E. SILVA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and SUZANNE T.

GONZALES, respondents.
G.R. No. 114742. July 17, 1997
VITUG, J.:
Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and legal duty, to care for their
children, see to their proper upbringing and safeguard their best interest and welfare. This
authority and responsibility may not be unduly denied the parents; neither may it be renounced
by them. Even when the parents are estranged and their affection for each other is lost, the
attachment and feeling for their offsprings invariably remain unchanged. Neither the law nor the
courts allow this affinity to suffer absent, of course, any real, grave and imminent threat to the
well-being of the child.
FACTS:

actress, cohabited without the benefit of marriage. The union saw the birth of two children:
Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia. Not very long after, a rift in their relationship surfaced. It
began, according to Silva, when Gonzales decided to resume her acting career over his
vigorous objections. The assertion was quickly refuted by Gonzales who claimed that she, in
fact, had never stopped working throughout their relationship. At any rate, the two eventually
parted ways.
The instant controversy was spawned, in February 1986, by the refusal of Gonzales to
allow Silva, in apparent contravention of a previous understanding, to have the children in his
company on weekends. Silva filed a petition for custodial rights over the children before the
Regional Trial Court. The petition was opposed by Gonzales who averred that Silva often
engaged in "gambling and womanizing" which she feared could affect the moral and social
values of the children.
Judgment is rendered directing respondent to allow herein petitioner visitorial rights to
his children during Saturdays and/or Sundays, but in no case should he take out the children
without the written consent of the mother or respondent herein.
846
Silva appeared somehow satisfied with the judgment for only Gonzales interposed an
appeal from the RTC’s order to the Court of Appeals.
In the meantime, Gonzales got married to a Dutch national. The newlyweds emigrated
to Holland with Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia.
On 23 September 1993, the appellate tribunal ruled in favor of Gonzales.
Judgment is rendered denying petitioner-appellee's petition for visitorial rights.
Silva comes to Supreme Court for relief.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the visitation right of a parent over his children which the trial court has
adjudged in favor of petitioner by holding that he shall have “visitorial rights to his children
during Saturdays and/or Sundays, but in no case (could) he take out the children without the
written consent of the mother” is valid.
RULING:
There is no doubt that in all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare is always
the paramount consideration. The Court shares the view of the Solicitor General, who has
recommended due course to the petition, that a few hours spent by petitioner with the children,
however, could not all be that detrimental to the children. Similarly, what the trial court has
observed is not entirely without merit; thus:
"The allegations of respondent against the character of petitioner, even assuming as
true, cannot be taken as sufficient basis to render petitioner an unfit father. The fears
expressed by respondent to the effect that petitioner shall be able to corrupt and degrade their
children once allowed to even temporarily associate with petitioner is but the product of
respondent's unfounded imagination, for no man, bereft of all moral persuasions and goodness,
would ever take the trouble and expense in instituting a legal action for the purpose of seeing
his illegitimate children. It can just be imagined the deep sorrows of a father who is deprived of
his children of tender ages."
The Court appreciates the apprehensions of private respondent and their well-meant
concern for the children; nevertheless, it seems unlikely that petitioner would have ulterior
motives or undue designs more than a parent’s natural desire to be able to call on, even if it
were only on brief visits, his own children. The trial court, in any case, has seen it fit to
847
understandably provide this precautionary measure, i.e., "in no case (can petitioner) take out
the children without the written consent of the mother."
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is REINSTATED, reversing thereby the judgment
of the appellate court which is hereby SET ASIDE. No costs.
848
David v. CA
DAISIE T. DAVID, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON R. VILLAR, respondents.
G.R. No. 111180 November 16, 1995
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a
businessman in Angeles City. Private respondent is a married man and the father of four
children, all grown-up. After a while, the relationship between petitioner and private respondent
developed into an intimate one, as a result of which a son, Christopher J., was born on March 9,
1985 to them. Christopher J. was followed by two more children, both girls, namely Christine,
born on June 9, 1986, and Cathy Mae on April 24, 1988.
The relationship became known to private respondent's wife when Daisie took
Christopher J, to Villar's house at Villa Teresa in Angeles City sometime in 1986 and introduced
him to Villar's legal wife.
After this, the children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were
eventually accepted by his legal family.
After sometime, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then six years of age, to go
with his family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused to give back the child.
Villar said he had enrolled Christopher J. at the Holy Family Academy for the next school year.
On July 30, 1991, Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J.
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 58 at Angeles City rendered a judgment in favor of the
petitioner and against the respondent. The rightful custody of the minor Christopher J. T. David
petitioner Daisie T. David;
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed
ISSUE:
Whether or not the fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a
ground for ordering him to give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child.
849
RULING:
In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out, Christopher J., being less than
seven years of age at least at the time the case was decided by the RTC, cannot be taken from
the mother's custody. Even now that the child is over seven years of age, the mother's custody
over him will have to be upheld because the child categorically expressed preference to live with
his mother. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, courts must respect the "choice of the child over
seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit" and here it has not been shown that the
mother is in any way unfit to have custody of her child. Indeed, if private respondent loves his
child, he should not condition the grant of support for him on the award of his custody to him
(private respondent).
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and private

respondent is ORDERED to deliver the minor Christopher J. T. David to the custody of his
mother, the herein petitioner, and to give him temporary support in the amount of P3,000.00,
pending the fixing of the amount of support in an appropriate action.
850
Legitimated Children
De Santos v. Angeles
MARIA ROSARIO DE SANTOS, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ADORACION G. ANGELES, JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CALOOCAN
CITY, BRANCH 121 and CONCHITA TALAG DE SANTOS, respondents.
G.R. No. 105619 December 12, 1995
ROMERO, J.:
Can natural children by legal fiction be legitimized?
FACTS:
On February 7, 1941, Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia Bona, which union was
blessed with a daughter, herein petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos. After some time, their
relationship became strained to the breaking point. Thereafter, Antonio fell in love with a fellow
doctor, Conchita Talag, private respondent herein. Antonio sought a formal dissolution of his
first marriage by obtaining a divorce decree from a Nevada court in 1949.
Obviously aware that said decree was a worthless scrap of paper in our jurisdiction
which then, as now, did not recognize divorces, Antonio proceeded to Tokyo, Japan in 1951 to
marry private respondent, with whom he had been cohabiting since his de facto separation from
Sofia. This union produced eleven children. On March 30, 1967, Sofia died in Guatemala. Less
than a month later, on April 23, 1967, Antonio and private respondent contracted a marriage in
Tagaytay City celebrated under Philippine laws. On March 8, 1981, Antonio died intestate
leaving properties with an estimated value of P15,000,000.00.
On May 15, 1981, private respondent went to court asking for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor in connection with the settlement of her late husband's estate. She
alleged, among other things, that the decedent was survived by twelve legitimate heirs, namely,
herself, their ten surviving children, and petitioner. There being no opposition, her petition was
granted.
After six years of protracted intestate proceedings, however, petitioner decided to
intervene. Thus, in a motion she filed sometime in November 1987, she argued inter alia that
private respondent's children were illegitimate. This was challenged by private respondent
although the latter admitted during the hearing that all her children were born prior to Sofia's
death in 1967.
851
On November 14, 1991, after approval of private respondent's account of her
administration, the court a quo passed upon petitioner's motion. The court, citing the case of
Francisco H. Tongoy, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. (23 SCRA 99 [1983]), declared private
respondent's ten children legitimated and thereupon instituted and declared them, along with
petitioner and private respondent, as the heirs of Antonio de Santos.
Petitioner sought a reconsideration of said order but this was denied in the court's order
dated January 9, 1992.
Hence, she filed the instant petition for certiorari on June 16, 1992, contending that since
only natural children can be legitimized, the trial court mistakenly declared as legitimated her
half brothers and sisters.
ISSUE:
Whether or not only natural children can be legitimated.
RULING:
This conclusion not only presumes that children other than those who are "natural" can
be legitimized in the first place, but also grants acknowledged natural children (and,
consequently, natural children by legal fiction) a "right" to be legitimized when no such right
exists. Legitimation is not a "right" which is demandable by a child. It is a privilege, available
only to natural children proper, as defined under Art. 269. Although natural children by legal
fiction have the same rights as acknowledged natural children, it is a quantum leap in the
syllogism to conclude that, therefore, they likewise have the right to be legitimated, which is not
necessarily so, especially, as in this case, when the legally existing marriage between the
children's father and his estranged first wife effectively barred a "subsequent marriage" between
their parents.
Natural children by legal fiction cannot be legitimized in this fashion. Our archaic law on
family relations, patterned as it is after Spanish Civil Law, frowns upon illegal relations such that
the benefits of legitimation under Chapter 3 of Title VIII do not extend, nor were they intended to
extend, to natural children by legal fiction. Article 269 itself clearly limits the privilege of
legitimation to natural children as defined thereunder. There was, therefore, from the outset, an
intent to exclude children conceived or born out of illicit relations from the purview of the law.
852
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed orders of the
court a quo dated November 14, 1991 and January 9, 1992, are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos is hereby declared the SOLE LEGITIMATE CHILD of the
decedent Antonio de Santos and, as such, entitled to all the rights accorded to her by law.
853
Abadilla v. Tabiliran
MA. BLYTH B. ABADILLA, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE JOSE C. TABILIRAN, JR., Presiding Judge, 8th MCTC, Manukan and Jose
Dalman, 9th Judicial Region, Manukan, Zamboanga del Norte, respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-92-716 October 25, 1995
PER CURIAM:
We have a list of these crooked judges whose actuations have been found to be patently
wrong and indefensible. There ought to be no objection or compunction in weeding them out
from the service. If they are not booted out now, it will take from here to eternity to clean this
Augean stable.
FACTS:
Repondent Judge Tabiliran was married to Teresita Banzuela. Sometime in 1965,
Banzuela left and abandoned their family home in Zamboanga del Norte and thereafter her
whereabouts could not be known. In 1970, tabiliran began cohabiting with Priscilla Baybayan,
with whom he had three children born in 1970, 1971 and 1975, respectively. Tabiliran and
Baybayan got married in 1986. In the marriage contract, Tabiliran represented himself as
single. Petitioner is a clerk of court assigned in the sala of respondent, charging Tabiliran for
gross immorality.
ISSUE:
Whether or not their children were legitimated by their subsequent marriage.
HELD:
Legitimation is limited to natural children and cannot include those born of adulterous
relations. The reasons for this limitation are as follows: (1) rationale of legitimation would be
destroyed; (2) it would be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of successional rights; (3)
there will be the problem of public scandal, unless social mores change; (4) it is too violent to
grant the privilege of legitimation to adulterous children as it will destroy the sanctity of the
marriage; and (5) it will be very scandalous, especially if the parents marry many years after the
birth of the child.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr. guilty of gross
immorality, deceitful conduct and corruption and, consequently, orders his dismissal from the
service. Such dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and
854
retirement benefits, and disqualification from re-employment in the government-service, all
without prejudice to criminal or civil liability.
855
856
Adopted Children
Republic v. Hughes
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and the SPOUSES JAMES ANTHONY HUGHES
and LENITA MABUNAY HUGHES, respondents.
G.R. No. 100835 October 26, 1993
VITUG, J.:
FACTS:
James Hughes, a natural born citizen of the Uni ted States of America, married
Lenita Mabunay, a Filipino Citizen, who herself was later naturalized as a citizen of that
country. The spouses jointly filed a petition with the RTC to adopt the minor niece and
nephews of Lenita, who had been living withthe couple even prior to the filing of the petition.
The minors, as well as their parents, gave consent to the adoption. The RTC rendered
a decision granting the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the spouses are allowed by law to adopt the minors.
RULING:
While James Anthony unquestionably is not permittedto adopt under any of the
exceptional cases enumerated inparagraph (3) of the aforequoted article, Lenita, however,
canqualify pursuant to paragraph (3)(a). Lenita may not thus adopta l o n e s i n c e A r t i c l e
1 8 5 r e q u i r e s a j o i n t a d o p t i o n b y t h e husband and the wife, a condition
that must be read along together with Article 184. Art 185 provides: Art. 185. Husband and
wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to
adopt his own illegitimate child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of
the other. A s amended by Executive Order 9 1 Presidential Decree
No. 603, had thus made it mandatory for both the spouses to jointly adopt when
one of them was an alien. The law was silent when both spouses were of the same nationality
857
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the respondent court is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
858
Republic v. Toledano

vs.
HONORABLE RODOLFO TOLEDANO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Third Judicial Region, Branch 69, Iba, Zambales and SPOUSES ALVIN A.
CLOUSE and EVELYN A. CLOUSE, respondents.
G.R. No. 94147 June 8, 1994
PUNO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Iba, Zambales, Branch 69, in Special Proceeding No. RTC-140-I, entitled, "In the Matter of
the Adoption of the Minor named Solomon Joseph Alcala", raising a pure question of law.
FACTS:
Spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A. Clouse who are aliens filed a petition to
adopt the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala. They are physically, mentally, morally, and financially
capable of adopting Solomon, a twelve (12) year old minor. Since 1981 to 1984, then from
November 2, 1989 upt o t h e p r e s e n t , S o l o m o n J o s e p h A l c a l a w a s a n d h a s b e e n
under the care and custody of private respondents. Solomon gave his consent to
the adoption. His mother, Nery Alcala, a widow, likewise consented to the adoption due to
poverty and inability to support and educate her son. The RTC granted the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the spouses adopt Solomon.
RULING:
Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order (E.O.)N o . 209, otherwise
known as "The Family Code of the Philippines", private respondents
spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting Solomon Joseph Alcala. Article 184,
paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly enumerates the persons who are not
qualified to adopt, viz .: (3) An alien, except: (a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks
to adopt a relative by consanguinity; (b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of
his or her Filipino spouse; or (c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to
adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter. Aliens not
859
included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with
the rules on inter-country adoption as may be provided by law. Private respondent Evelyn
A. Clouse, on the other h a n d , m a y a p p e a r t o q u a l i f y p u r s u a n t t o p a r a g r a p h
3 ( a ) o f Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her
younger brother. Unfortunately, the petition f o r a d o p t i o n c a n n o t b e g r a n t e d i n h e r
f a v o r a l o n e w i t h o u t violating Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the
husband and wife. It reads: Article 185. Husband and wife must j o i n t l y a d o p t , e x c e p t i n
t h e f o l l o w i n g c a s e s : ( 1 ) W h e n o n e spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate
child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.
Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that must be read
along together with Article 184.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the lower court is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. No costs.
860
Republic v. Hernandez
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, and

SPOUSES VAN MUNSONy NAVARRO andREGINA MUNSON y ANDRADE, respondents.
G.R. No. 117209. February 9, 1996
Facts:
On March 10, 1994, herein private respondent spouses, Van Munson y Navarro and Regina
Munson y Andrade, filed a petition to adopt the minor Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran, duly alleging
therein the jurisdictional facts required by Rule 99 of the Rules of Court for adoption, their
qualifications as and fitness to be adoptive parents, as well as the circumstances under and by
reason of which the adoption of the aforenamed minor was sought. In the very same petition,
private respondents prayed for the change of the first name of said minor adoptee to Aaron
Joseph, the same being the name with which he was baptized in keeping with religious
tradition, and by which he has been called by his adoptive family, relatives and friends since
May 6, 1993 when he arrived at private respondents’ residence.
Issue:
Whether or not the court a quo erred in granting the prayer for the change of the registered
proper or given name of the minor adoptee embodied in the petition for adoption
Whether or not there was lawful ground for the change of name.
Ruling:
The situation presented in this case does not warrant exception from the Rules under the policy
of liberal construction thereof in general, and for change of name in particular, as proposed by
private respondents and adopted by respondent judge. Liberal construction of the Rules may
861
be invoked in situations wherein there may be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a
pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and connotes
at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the Rules. Utter disregard of the Rules cannot
justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.
By Article 408 of the Civil Code, a person’s birth must be entered in the civil register. The
official name of a person is that given him in the civil register. That is his name in the eyes of
the law. And once the name of a person is officially entered in the civil register, Article 376 of the
same Code seals that identity with its precise mandate: no person can change his name or
surname without judicial authority. This statutory restriction is premised on the interest of the
State in names borne by individuals andentities for purposes of identification.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the assailed order of respondent judge is

herebyMODIFIED. The legally adopted child of private respondents shall henceforth be
officially known asKevin Earl Munson y Andrade unless a change thereof is hereafter effected in
accordance with law. In allother respects, the order is AFFIRMED.
862
Republic v. CA

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, JAIME B. CARANTO, and ZENAIDA P. CARANTO,
respondents.
G.R. No. 103695 March 15, 1996
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 24453 which affirmed in toto the decision of Branch XVI of the Regional Trial Court
of Cavite City, granting private respondents' petition for the adoption of Midael C. Mazon with
prayer for the correction of the minor's first name "Midael" to "Michael."
FACTS:
The petition at bar was filed on September 211988 by private respondents spouses
Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto for the adoption of Midael C. Mazon, then fifteen
years old, who had been living with private respondent Jaime B. Caranto since he was seven
years old. The Solicitor General opposed the petition insofar as it sought the correction of the
name of the child from "Midael" to "Michael." Thereafter the case was heard during which
private respondent Zenaida Caranto, Florentina Mazon (natural mother of the child), and the
minor testified. The RTC dismissed the opposition of the Solicitor General on the ground that
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry)
applies only to the correction of entries concerning the civil status of persons. The Solicitor
General appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his contention that the correction of names
cannot be effected in the same proceeding for adoption. On January 23, 1992, the Court of
Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. Private respondents were required to
comment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a change of name of an adoptee could be effected simultaneously with
the adoption proceeding
863
RULING:
This case falls under letter "(o)," referring to "changes of name." Indeed, it has been the
uniform ruling of this Court that Art. 412 of the Civil Code — to implement which Rule 108 was
inserted in the Rules of Court in 1964 covers "those harmless and innocuous changes, such as
correction of a name that is clearly misspelled."
The local civil registrar is required to be made a party to the proceeding. He is an
indispensable party, without whom no final determination of the case can be had. As he was not
impleaded in this case much less given notice of the proceeding, the decision of the trial court,
insofar as it granted the prayer for the correction of entry, is void. The absence of an
indispensable party in a case renders ineffectual all the proceedings subsequent to the filing of
the complaint including the judgment.
The necessary consequence of the failure to implead the civil registrar as an
indispensable party and to give notice by publication of the petition for correction of entry was to
render the proceeding of the trial court, so far as the correction of entry was concerned, null and
void for lack of jurisdiction both as to party and as to the subject matter.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
MODIFIED by deleting from the decision of the Regional Trial Court the order to the local civil
registrar to change the name "MIDAEL" to "MICHAEL" in the birth certificate of the child. In
other respects relating to the adoption of Midael C. Mazon, the decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED.
864
Republic v. Dye
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. CONCEPCION S. ALARCON

VERGARA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial
Region, Branch 62, Angeles City and SPOUSES SAMUEL ROBERT DYE, JR. and
ROSALINA D. DYE, respondents.
G.R. No. 95551. March 20, 1997
ROMERO, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent spouses Samuel R. Dye, Jr. and Rosalina Due Dye filed a petition before
the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City to adopt Maricel R. Due and Alvin R. Due, ages 13 and
12 years old, respectively, younger siblings of Rosalina on June 25, 1990. Samuel R. Dye, Jr. a
member of the United States Air Force is an American citizen who resided at the Clark Air Base
in Pampanga. His wife Rosalina is a former Filipino who became a naturalized American. They
have two children. Maricel and Alvin Due, as well as their natural parents, gave their consent to
the adoption.
On September 10, 1990, after trial, the lower court rendered its decision on granting the
petition and declaring Alvin and Maricel to be the children of the spouses Dye by adoption.
Respondent Regional Trial Court disregarded the(16) year age gap requirement of the law, the
spouses beingonly (15) years and three months and fifteen years and nine months older than
Maricel Due, on the ground that a literal implementation of the law would defeat the
very philosophy behind adoption statutes, namely, to promote the welfare of a child. The court
also found that the petitioning spouses are mentally and physically fit to adopt, possess good
moral character, sufficient financial capability, love, and affection for the intended adoptees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not spouses Dye are qualified to adopt under the law.
RULING:
No. Samuel Dye is an American and therefore, an alien, is disqualified from adopting the
minor Maricel and Alvin Due. Because he does not fall under any of the three aforeqouted
exception laid down by the law. Also, the law does not provide for an alien who is married to a
former Filipino citizen to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative by consanguinity, as an
865
exception to the general rule that aliens may not adopt. The Supreme Court is not in the position
to affirm the trial court’s decision favoring adoption in thecase at bar, for the law is clear and it
cannot be modified without violating the proscription against judicial legislation. It cannot sustain
the respondent spouses’ petition for adoption
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Angeles City in Special Proceeding No. 4203 (In the Matter of the Petition for
Adoption of the minors Maricel R. Due and Alvin R. Due), dated September 10, 1990 is
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
866
In Re: Michelle and Michael Lim
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM,

MONINA P. LIM, petitioner.
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM,
MONINA P. LIM, petitioner.
G.R. Nos. 168992-93 May 21, 2009
CARPIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Monina P. Lim (petitioner) seeking to set
aside the Decision dated 15 September 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City,
Branch 22 (trial court), in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259, which dismissed without
prejudice the consolidated petitions for adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim.
FACTS:
Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were
childless. Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as
shown by a certification of DSWD. The spouses registered the children making it appears as if
they were the parents. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. She then married an American
Citizen, Angel Olario in December 2000. Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of
the amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she
filed separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was
then 25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years and seven months old.
Michelle and her husband including Michael and Olario gave their consent to the adoption
executed in an affidavit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.
867
RULING:
Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in the case at
bar. In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercised parental authority. The use of
the word “shall” signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in
consonance with the concept of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated
to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly. The affidavit
of consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are certain requirements that he must
comply as an American Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552.
The requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot
likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7. Parental authority is merely just one of the effects of
legal adoption. It includes caring and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency
and development of their moral mental and physical character and well-being.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 15 September

2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 in SPL. PROC. Case Nos.
1258 and 1259. Costs against petitioner.
868
Landingin v. Republic
DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 164948 June 27, 2006
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77826 which reversed the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City, Branch 63 in Civil Case No. 2733 granting the Petition
for Adoption of the petitioner herein.
FACTS:
Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United States of America (USA), of Filipino
parentage and a resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition for the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon
Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos and Eugene Dizon Ramos who was born on. The minors are the
natural children of Manuel Ramos, petitioner’s brother (deceased), and Amelia Ramos- who
went to Italy, re-married there and now has two children by her second marriage and no longer
communicated with her children.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for adoption is invalid for lack of consent of the biological
mother.
RULING:
No. The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to
protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to
insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed
adoption. When she filed her petition with the trial court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was already in
effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if the written consent of the biological parents cannot be
869
obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of the minors will suffice. If, as claimed by
petitioner, that the biological mother of the minors had indeed abandoned them, she should,
thus have adduced the written consent of their legal guardian.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED.
870
Cang v. CA
HERBERT CANG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses RONALD V.

CLAVANO and MARIA CLARA CLAVANO, respondents.
G.R. No. 105308. September 25, 1998
ROMERO, J.:
Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on
the ground that the latter has abandoned them? The answer to this interesting query, certainly
not one of first impression, would have to be reached, not solely on the basis of law and
jurisprudence, but also the hard reality presented by the facts of the case.
FACTS:
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married, begot three
children. During the early years of their marriage, the Cang couple's relationship was
undisturbed. Not long thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned of
h e r husband's alleged extramarital affair. Anna Marie subsequently filed a petition for legal
separation which was granted. They had an agreement for support of the children
and that Anna Marie can enter into agreements without the written consent of Herbert.
Petitioner left for the US. M e a n w h i l e , t h e b r o t h e r a n d s i s t e r - i n - l a w o f A n n a Marie
filed for the adoption of the 3 minor Cang children. Upon learning of the adoption, Herbert went
back to the Philippines to contest it, but the petition for adoption was gra nted by the
court.
ISSUE:
W hether or not minor children can be legally adopted without the

written consent of a natural parent on the ground that the latter has abandoned them.
RULING:
A r t i c l e 2 5 6 o f t h e F a m i l y C o d e p r o v i d e s f o r i t s retroactivity "insofar as it
does not prejudice or impair vested or a c q u i r e d r i g h t s i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e C i v i l
C o d e o r o t h e r laws." As amended by the Family Code, the statutory provision o n
c o n s e n t f o r a d o p t i o n n o w r e a d s : A r t . 1 8 8 . T h e w r i t t e n consent of the following
871
to the adoption shall be necessary: (2)the parents by nature of the child , the legal
guardian, or the proper government instrumentality. B a s e d o n t h e f o r e g o i n g , i t i s
thus evident that no withstanding the amendments to the law, the
w r i t t e n consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its
validity. As clearly inferred from the foregoing provisions of law, the written consent of
the natural parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption.
Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the
parent has abandoned the child or that such parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate."In the
instant case, records disclose that petitioner's c o n d u c t d i d n o t m a n i f e s t a
settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all
p a r e n t a l c l a i m s o v e r h i s children as to, constitute abandonment. Physical estrangement
alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. While
admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was then in the United States, he was
not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. He
maintained regular communication with his wife and children through letters and
telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The
questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, as well as the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu, are SET ASIDE thereby denying the petition for adoption of Keith,
Charmaine and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang, by the spouse respondents Ronald and
Maria Clara Clavano.
872
In Re: Adoption of Stephanie Garcia

HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005
FACTS:
Petitioner Honorato B. catindig, a widower, filed a petition to adopt his

minor illegitimate child, Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, born on June 26, 1991.
Gemma Astorga Garcia is Stephanie’s mother. The child bears her mother’s
middle name and surname.
Honorato prayed that Stephanie’s middle name be changed to that of her
mother’s surname, and that her surname be changed to that of his.
The trial court granted the adoption. Stephanie now bears the surname of
her father.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or
reconsideration, seeking to allow Stephanie to use the surname of her mother as
the child’s middle name.
The action was denied, as well as the ensuing motion for reconsideration
on the ground that there is no law or jurisprudence which allows an adopted child
to use the surname of her biological mother as her middle name.
Thus, the petition was filed before the Supreme Court. Petitioner submits
that no law is prohibiting his minor adopted ch ild from having a middle name,
notwithstanding that there is only one adopting parent.
873
ISSUE:
Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle
name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father.
RULING:
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to
all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including
the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother. And since there is no law prohibiting
an illegitimate adopted child by her natural father to use, as middle name he mother’s surname,
the Supreme Court found no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
FALLO:

the sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her mother’s surname "GARCIA" as her
middle name.
Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be entered in the decree
of adoption.
874
DSWD v. Belen
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT, Field Office No. 1, San

Fernando, La Union, represented by CORAZON M. LAYUG, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE ANTONIO M. BELEN, Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Lingayen, Pangasinan, and
ELMA P. VEDAÑA, Social Welfare Officer II, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial
Court, Lingayen, Pangasinan, respondents.
A.M. No. RTJ-96-1362 July 18, 1997
REGALADO, J.:
FACTS:
This is an Administrative complaint initiated by Corazon M. Layug, Social Welfare Officer
IV of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Field Office No. 1 stationed
in San Fernando, La Union, respondent Judge Antonio M. Belen of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 38, of Lingayen, Pangasinan, is charged with rendering an erroneous decree of
adoption in violation of Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as "The Child
and Youth Welfare Code," and the corresponding Supreme Court circular thereon, namely,
Circular No. 12 dated October 2, 1986.
Respondent Elma P. Vedaña, Social Welfare Officer II, Office of the Clerk of Court,
Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan is charged with disregarding the provisions of the
same Circular No. 12 of this Court in connection with the aforementioned special proceeding.
As appears from the records, the spouses Desiderio Soriano and Aurora Bernardo-
Soriano, both of whom are naturalized American citizens, filed a verified petition for adoption of
their niece, the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea. In due time, respondent Judge Belen granted the
petition after finding that petitioner spouses were highly qualified to adopt the child as their own.
However, when the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea sought to obtain the requisite travel
clearance from the DSWD in order to join her adoptive parents in the United States, the
department uncovered what it considered as an anomalous adoption decree regarding said
minor. It turned out that the DSWD did not have any record in its files regarding the adoption
and that there was never any order from respondent judge for the DSWD to conduct a "Home
and Child Study Report" in the case. Furthermore, there was no directive from respondent judge
for the social welfare officer of the lower court to coordinate with the DSWD on the matter of the
required reports for said minor's adoption.
875
ISSUE:
Whether or not approval from the DSWD is necessary for the home and case
study reports (and whether a judge may decide based on such report).
RULING:
NO. Belen definitely rendered the adoption decree in derogation of the provisions of
Article 33 and C i r c u l a r N o . 1 2 a n d V e d a ñ a s h o u l d h a v e coordinated with
the DSWD in connection with t h e p r e p a r a t i o n o f t h e h o m e a n d c a s e s t u d y
reports.
FALLO:
ACCORDINGLY, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the
future shall be dealt with more severely by this Court, respondent Judge Antonio M. Belen of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, of Lingayen, Pangasinan is hereby CENSURED for violating
Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603 and Circular No. 12 of this Court; and respondent
Elma P. Vedaña, Social Welfare Officer II of the Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial
Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, is REPRIMANDED for violating Circular No. 12.
876
Teotico v. Del Val
VICENTE B. TEOTICO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
ANA DEL VAL, ETC., oppositor-appellant.
G.R. No. L-18753 March 26, 1965
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
FACTS:
Maria Mortera died on July 1955 leaving properties worth P600,000. She executed a will
written in Spanish, affixed her signature and acknowledged before Notary Public by her and the
witnesses. Among the legacies made in the will was the P20,000 for Rene Teotico who was
married to the testatrix’s niece, Josefina Mortera. The usufruct of Maria’s interest in the Calvo
Building were left to the said spouses and the ownership thereof was left in equal parts to her
grandchildren, the legitimate children of said spouses. Josefina was likewise instituted, as sole
and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed by will. Vicente
Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will but was opposed by Ana del Val Chan, claiming
that she was an adopted child of Francisca (deceased sister of Maria) and an acknowledged
natural child of Jose (deceased brother of Maria), that said will was not executed as required by
law and that Maria as physically and mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of its
execution and was executed under duress, threat, or influence of fear.
ISSUE:
Whether or not defendant has right to intervene in this proceeding.
HELD:
It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a

probate proceeding is that he must have an interest in the estate, will or in the property to be
affected by either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and be benefited by such as an heir
or one who has a claim against it as creditor. Under the terms of the will, defendant has no right
to intervene because she has no such interest in the estate either as heir, executor or
administrator because it did not appear therein any provision designating her as heir/ legatee in
877
any portion of the estate. She could have acquired such right if she was a legal heir of the
deceased but she is not under the CIVIL CODE. Even if her allegations were true, the law does
not give her any right to succeed the estate of the deceased sister of both Jose and Francisca
because being an illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from succeeding to the legitimate
relatives of her natural father and that relationship established by adoption is limited solely to
the adopter and adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents except
only as expressly provided by law. As a consequence, she is an heir of the adopter but not of
the relatives of the adopter.
Hence, defendant has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as legal heir in the
probate proceeding.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, with the exception of that portion of the decision which declares that the
will in question has been duly executed and admitted the same to probate, the rest of the
decision is hereby set aside. This case is ordered remanded to the court a quo for further
proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.
878
Lahom v. Sibulo
ISABELITA S. LAHOM, petitioner,

vs.
JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (previously referred to as "DR. MELVIN S. LAHOM"), respondent.
G.R. No. 143989 July 14, 2003
FACTS:
In 1971 Dr. and Mrs. Lahom filed a petition for the adoption of Jose Melvin.
On 05 May1972, the court granted the petition and ordered the Civil Registrar of
Naga City to change the name "Jose Melvin Sibulo" to "Jose Melvin
Lahom."Unfortunately, in December of 1999, Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to
rescind the decree.
Prior to the institution of the case, specifically on 22 March 1998, Republic Act (R.A.)
No.8552, also known as the Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect. The new
statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption .Jose
Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition, contending principally (a) that the trial court had
no jurisdiction over the case and (b) that the petitioner had no cause of action in view of t h e
aforequoted provisions of R.A. No. 8552. However, Petitioner
a s s e v e r a t e d , b y w a y o f opposition, that the proscription in R.A. No. 8552 should
not retroactively apply, i.e., to cases where the ground for rescission of the adoption
vested under the regime of then Article 348 of the Civil Code and Article 192 of the Family
Code.
The trial court dismissed the petition ruling that Section 19, Article VI of RA
No. 8552deleted the right of an adopter to rescind an adoption earlier granted
under the Family Code. Further, it ruled that even assuming that petitioner is entitled to
rescind the adoption, said right should have been exercised within the period allowed
by the Rules. From the averments in the petition, it appears clear that the legal grounds
for the petition have been discovered and known to petitioner for more than five (5) years,
prior to the filing of the instant petition on December 1, 1999, hence, the action if any,
had already prescribed. (Sec. 5, Rule 100 Revised Rules of Court).
879
ISSUE:
W hether the subject adoption, decreed on May 05 1972, may still be

r e s c i n d e d b y a n adopter after the effectivity of RA No. 8852?
RULING:
No. It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner
filed an a c t i o n t o r e v o k e t h e d e c r e e o f a d o p t i o n g r a n t e d i n 1 9 7 5 . B y t h e n ,
t h e n e w l a w , h a d a l r e a d y abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter under the Civil
Code and the Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. Consistently with its earlier
pronouncements, the Court should now hold that the action for rescission of the adoption
decree, having been initiated by petitioner after R.A. No.8552 had come into force, no longer
could be pursued. While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a
consequential right to r e s c i n d t h e a d o p t i o n d e c r e e e v e n i n c a s e s w h e r e t h e
a d o p t i o n m i g h t c l e a r l y t u r n o u t t o b e undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the
bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura lex sed l e x w o u l d b e t h e h a c k n e y e d
truism that those caught in the law have to live with.
I t i s s t i l l noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the legal
ties of adoption, can a l w a y s f o r v a l i d r e a s o n s c a u s e t h e f o r f e i t u r e o f c e r t a i n
b e n e f i t s o t h e r w i s e a c c r u i n g t o a n undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds
recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an adopted child his legitime and, by a will
and testament, may freely exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of
his estate.
880
SUPPORT
Lacson v. Lacson
EDWARD V. LACSON, Petitioner,

vs.
MAOWEE DABAN LACSON and MAONAA DABAN LACSON, represented by their mother
and guardian ad-litem, LEA DABAN LACSON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 150644 August 28, 2006
GARCIA, J.:
FACTS:
The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson are legitimate daughters
of petitioner Edward V. Lacson and his wife, Lea Daban Lacson. Maowee was born on
December 4, 1974, while Maonaa, a little less than a year later. Not long after the birth of
Maonaa, petitioner left their conjugal home, virtually forcing mother and children to seek,
apparently for financial reason, shelter somewhere else.
For a month, they stayed with Lea’s mother-in-law, Alicia Lacson, then with her (Lea’s)
mother and then with her brother Noel Daban. After some time, they rented an apartment only
to return later to the house of Lea’s mother.
It appears that from the start of their estrangement, Lea did not badger her husband
Edward for support, relying initially on his commitment memorialized in a note dated December
10, 1975 to give support to his daughters. As things turned out, however, Edward reneged on
his promise of support, despite Lea’s efforts towards having him fulfill the same. Lea would
admit, though, that Edward occasionally gave their children meager amounts for school
expenses. Edward’s mother, Alicia Lacson, also gave small amounts to help in the schooling of
Maowee and Maonaa.
Lea, in behalf of her two daughters, filed a complaint against Edward for support before
the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City.
In that complaint Maowee and Maonaa, thru their mother, averred that their father
Edward, despite being gainfully employed and owning several pieces of valuable lands, has not
provided them support since 1976. They also alleged that, owing to years of Edward’s failure
and neglect, their mother had, from time to time, borrowed money from her brother Noel Daban.
881
As she would later testify, Lea had received from Noel, by way of a loan, as much as
P400,000.00 to P600,000.00.
The trial court granted the sisters Maowee and Maonaa support pendente lite at
P12,000.00 per month. In that judgment, the trial court, following an elaborate formula set forth
therein, ordered their defendant father Edward to pay them a specific sum which represented
216 months, or 18 years, of support in arrears. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner should be made to pay support.
RULING:
The Court finds no adequate reason to disturb the factual determination of the CA
confirmatory of that of the trial court respecting the demand Lea made on the petitioner to
secure support for the respondents. As a matter of long and sound appellate practice, factual
findings of the CA are accorded respect, if not finality, save for the most compelling and cogent
reasons.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the appealed CA decision and
resolution are AFFIRMED.
882
Briones v. Miguel
JOEY D. BRIONES, petitioner,

vs.
MARICEL P. MIGUEL, FRANCISCA P. MIGUEL and LORETA P. MIGUEL, respondents.
G.R. No. 156343 October 18, 2004
PANGANIBAN, J.:
care.
FACTS:
Petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a petition for Habeas Corpus against Maricel Pineda
Miguel, Francisca Pineda Miguel and Loreta Miguel, the mother of the minor illegitimate child,
Michael Kevin Pineda, to obtain the custody of the child.
The writ of habes corpus wa issued ordering the respondents to produce before the
Court of Appeals, the living body of Michael at March 21, 2002 at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon.
Michael was born in Japan and was brought to the Philippines by the petitioner so that
he could take care of him and send him to school since the minor child’s mother is married to
Japanese and is residing in Japan. The parents of petitioner assisted him in taking care of the
child.
One day, Maricel and Francisca visited the child and requested that they be allowed to
bring the child to a mall. The petitioner agreed since they promised that they will bring him back
in the afternoon, but they never did.
Petitioner efforted to locate the whereabouts of his son but his efforts were futile,
therefore constraining him to file a writ of Habeas Corpus with the trial court. However, the case
was withdrawn ex-parte.
He is praying that the custody oh his son be given to him as his biological father.
The mother of the child however, commented before the court and also prayed that the
custody of her minor child be given to her.
883
ISSUE:
Whether or not Joey Briones should be entitled to the custody of his minor child.
RULING:
There is no question that Respondent Loreta, being the mother of and having sole
parental authority over the minor, is entitled to have custody of him. She has the right to keep
him in her company. She cannot be deprived of that right, and she may not even renounce or
transfer it "except in the cases authorized by law."
Not to be ignored in Article 213 of the Family Code is the caveat that, generally, no child
under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, except when the court finds
cause to order otherwise.
Only the most compelling of reasons, such as the mother’s unfitness to exercise sole
parental authority, shall justify her deprivation of parental authority and the award of custody to
someone else. In the past, the following grounds have been considered ample justification to
deprive a mother of custody and parental authority: neglect or abandonment, unemployment,
immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and
affliction with a communicable disease.
Bearing in mind the welfare and the best interest of the minor as the controlling factor,
the Supreme Court held that the Appellate Court did not err in awarding care, custody, and
control of the child to Respondent Loreta. There is no showing at all that she is unfit to take
charge of him.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the disposition allowing the child, upon reaching ten (10) years of age, to
choose which parent to live with is DELETED for lack of legal basis. Costs against petitioner.
884
Quimiguing v. Icao
CARMEN QUIMIGUING, Suing through her parents, ANTONIO QUIMIGUING and JACOBA
CABILIN, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
FELIX ICAO, defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal on points of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del
Norte (Judge Onofre Sison Abalos, presiding), in its Civil Case No. 1590, dismissing a complaint
for support and damages, and another order denying amendment of the same pleading.
FACTS:
Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the defendant, were neighbors in
Dapitan City and had close and confidential relations. Despite the fact that Icao was married,
he succeeded to have carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times under force and intimidation
and without her consent. As a result, Carmen became pregnant despite drugs supplied by
defendant and as a consequence, Carmen stopped studying. Plaintiff claimed for support at
P120 per month, damages and attorney’s fees. The complaint was dismissed by the lower
court in Zamboanga del Norte on the ground lack of cause of action. Plaintiff moved to amend
the complaint that as a result of the intercourse, she gave birth to a baby girl but the court ruled
that “no amendment was allowable since the original complaint averred no cause of action”.
ISSUE:
Whether or not plaintiff has a right to claim damages.
RULING:
Supreme Court held that “a conceive child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a
provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article
40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines”. The conceive child may also receive donations and be
885
accepted by those persons who will legally represent them if they were already born as
prescribed in Article 742.
Lower court’s theory on article 291 of the civil code declaring that support is an obligation of
parents and illegitimate children does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn violates
article 40 aforementioned.
Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao being a married man forced a
woman not his wife to yield to his lust and this constitutes a clear violation of Carmen’s rights.
Thus, she is entitled to claim compensation for the damage caused.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs
against appellee Felix Icao.
886
Francisco v. Zandueta
LUIS FRANCISCO, petitioner,

vs.
FRANCISCO ZANDUETA, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and EUGENIO LEOPOLDO
FRANCISCO, represented by his natural mother and curator ad litem, ROSARIO GOMEZ,
respondents.
G. R. No. L-43794 August 9, 1935
Goddard, J.:
This is an original petition for the writ of certiorari whereby the petitioner, Luis Francisco,
seeks to procure the abrogation of an order of the respondent judge, dated May 2, 1935,
granting the respondent, Eugenio Leopoldo Francisco, a monthly pension of P30 pendente lite.
FACTS:
Eugenio Francisco, represented by his natural mother and curator ad litem, Rosario
Gomez, instituted an action for support against petitioner Luis Francisco in a separate case,
alleging that he is the latter’s acknowledged son and as such is entitled to support.
Luis denied the allegation, claimed that he never acknowledged Eugenio as his son and
was not present at his baptism and that he was married at time of Eugenio’s birth.
Despite the denial of paternity however, respondent judge Francisco Zandueta issued an
order granting Eugenio monthly pension, pendente lite. Luis moved for reconsideration but was
denied, hence the writ for certiorari.
Praying to have the trial transferred, counsel of herein petitioner, in compromise, agreed
that his client would pay the monthly pension during the pendency of the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Eugenio Francisco is entitled to support without first establishing his
status as petitioner’s son
887
RULING:
No. The answer as to whether or not petitioner’s counsel really agreed to have him pay
the pension during the case’s pendency is not necessary to the solution of the case.
As in the case of Yangco vs Rohde, the fact of the civil status must be proven first before
a right of support can be derived. The Court ruled that it is necessary for Eugenio to prove,
through his guardian ad litem, his civil status as the petitioner’s son. As such, no right of support
can be given because the very civil status of sonship, from which the right is derived, is in
question.
It held that “(t)here is no law or reason which authorizes the granting of support to a
person who claims to be a son in the same manner as to a person who establishes by legal
proof that he is such son. In the latter case the legal evidence raises a presumption of law, while
in the former there is no presumption, there is nothing but a mere allegation, a fact in issue, and
a simple fact in issue must not be confounded with an established right recognized by a final
judgment.”
Additionally, the respondent judge was without jurisdiction to order for the monthly
support in light of herein private respondent’s absence of aforementioned status.
FALLO:
The writ prayed for is granted and the order of the respondent judge of May 2, 1935,
ordering the herein petitioner as defendant in case No. 47238 to pay the plaintiff in that case the
sum of P30 monthly, as support, pendente lite, is hereby declared null and void, without costs.
888
Ruiz v. CA
THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ, EDMOND RUIZ, Executor, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (Former Special Sixth Division), MARIA PILAR RUIZ-MONTES,
MARIA CATHRYN RUIZ, CANDICE ALBERTINE RUIZ, MARIA ANGELINE RUIZ and THE
PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, respondents.
G.R. No. 118671 January 29, 1996
PUNO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the decision dated
November 10, 1994 and the resolution dated January 5, 1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 33045.
FACTS:
Hilario Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only son, Edmond, his
adopted daughter, PR Maria Montes, a n d h i s 3 g r a n d d a u g h t e r s , a l l c h i l d r e n o f
E d m o n d . T h e testator bequeathed cash, personal and real properties and named Edmond
executor. When H. Ruiz died, the cash was distributed among Edmond and PRs according to the will.
One of the properties of the estate – a house and lot at Valle V e r d e IV,
which the testator bequeathed to the granddaughters, - was
l e a s e d o u t b y E d m o n d t o t h i r d persons. The court ordered Edmond to deposit
the rental payments totalling P540K as one-year lease of the property. In compliance, Edmond
turned over cash but only P348,583. Eventually, the court approved Edmond’s motion for the
release of P50K to pay the real estate taxes of the estate. Edmond filed another
Motion for Release of Funds. Montes opposed. She prayed for the release of the rent
payments tothe granddaughters and for the distribution of the Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge
apartments in accordance with t h e w i l l . T h e c o u r t g r a n t e d M o n t e s ' m o t i o n . T h e
c o u r t , however, delayed the release of the titles .E d m o n d w a s o r d e r e d t o s u b m i t a n
a c c o u n t i n g o f t h e expenses for administration including provisions for the support
of the granddaughters. Petitioner appealed to the CA.CA sustained the court's order.
889
ISSUE:
Whether or not the probate court, after admitting the will to p r o b a t e b u t

b e f o r e p a y m e n t o f t h e e s t a t e ' s d e b t s a n d obligations, has the authority to grant an
allowance from the funds of the estate for the support of the grandchildren.
RULING:
S e c 3 , R u l e 8 3 o f t h e R u l e s o f C o u r t is controlling. Petitioner alleges

that this provision only gives the widow and the minor or incapacitated children of the
deceased the right to receive allowances for support during the settlement of estate
proceedings. He contends that the granddaughters do not qualify for an allowance because they
are not incapacitated and are no longer minors but of legal a g e , m a r r i e d a n d g a i n f u l l y
e m p l o y e d . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e provision expressly states "children" of the deceased which
excludes the latter's grandchildren.
I t i s s e t t l e d t h a t allowances for support under Section 3 of Rule
8 3 should not be limited to the "minor or incapacitated" children of the deceased. Article 188
(now Art 133 of the Family Code) of the Civil Code, the substantive law in force at the time of the
testator's death, provides that d u r i n g t h e l i q u i d a t i o n o f t h e c o n j u g a l p a r t n e r s h i p , t h e
deceased's legitimate spouse and children, regardless of their a g e , c i v i l s t a t u s o r g a i n f u l
e m p l o y m e n t , a r e e n t i t l e d t o provisional support from the funds of the estate. The law is
r o o t e d o n t h e f a c t t h a t t h e r i g h t a n d d u t y t o s u p p o r t , especially the right to education,
subsist even beyond the age of majority. Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to
provisional support from the funds of the estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to "widow
and children" and does not e x t e n d i t t o t h e g r a n d c h i l d r e n , r e g a r d l e s s o f t h e i r
minority or incapacity. It was error for the CA to sustain the p r o b a t e c o u r t ' s o r d e r
g r a n t i n g a n a l l o w a n c e t o t h e grandchildren of the testator pending
s e t t l e m e n t o f h i s estate.
FALLO:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 33045 affirming the order dated December 22, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
156, Pasig in SP Proc. No. 10259 are affirmed with the modification that those portions of the
890
order granting an allowance to the testator's grandchildren and ordering the release of the titles
to the private respondents upon notice to creditors are annulled and set aside.
891
Sps. Lim v. Lim
SPOUSES PRUDENCIO and FILOMENA LIM, Petitioners,

vs.
MA. CHERYL S. LIM, for herself and on behalf of her minor children LESTER EDWARD S.
LIM, CANDICE GRACE S. LIM, and MARIANO S. LIM, III, Respondents.
G.R. No. 163209 October 30, 2009
CARPIO, J.:
For review is the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 28 April 2003, ordering
petitioners Prudencio and Filomena Lim (petitioners) to provide legal support to respondents
Cheryl, Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III, all surnamed Lim (respondents).
FACTS:
In 1979, respondent Cheryl S. Lim (Cheryl) married Edward Lim (Edward), son of
petitioners. Cheryl bore Edward three children, respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and
Mariano III. Cheryl, Edward and their children resided at the house of petitioners in Forbes Park,
Makati City, together with Edward’s ailing grandmother, Chua Giak and her husband Mariano
Lim (Mariano). Edward’s family business, which provided him with a monthly salary of P6,000,
shouldered the family expenses. Cheryl had no steady source of income.
On 14 October 1990, Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence, bringing the
children with her (then all minors), after a violent confrontation with Edward whom she caught
with the in-house midwife of Chua Giak in what the trial court described "a very compromising
situation.”
Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak and Mariano
(defendants) in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 140 (trial court) for support. The
trial court ordered Edward to provide monthly support of P6,000 pendente lite.
The trial court rendered judgment ordering Edward and petitioners to "jointly" provide
P40,000 monthly support to respondents, with Edward shouldering P6,000 and petitioners the
balance of P34,000 subject to Chua Giak’s subsidiary liability. In its decision, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court.
892
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to provide support to
respondents.
RULING:
The person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the obligation either by
paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person
who has a right to receive support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a
moral or legal obstacle thereto.
Here, the persons entitled to receive support are petitioners’ grandchildren and
daughter-in-law. Granting petitioners the option in Article 204 will secure to the grandchildren a
well-provided future; however, it will also force Cheryl to return to the house which, for her, is
the scene of her husband’s infidelity. While not rising to the level of a legal obstacle, as indeed,
Cheryl’s charge against Edward for concubinage did not prosper for insufficient evidence, her
steadfast insistence on its occurrence amounts to a moral impediment bringing the case within
the ambit of the exception clause of Article 204, precluding its application.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated 28 April 2003, and its Resolution dated 12 April 2004 with the MODIFICATION that
petitioners Prudencio and Filomena Lim are liable to provide support only to respondents Lester
Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III, all surnamed Lim. We REMAND the case to the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 140, for further proceedings consistent with this
ruling.
893
Verceles v. Posada
TEOFISTO I. VERCELES, petitioner,

vs.
MARIA CLARISSA POSADA, in her own behalf, and as mother of minor VERNA AIZA
POSADA, CONSTANTINO POSADA and FRANCISCA POSADA, respondents.
G.R. No. 159785 April 27, 2007
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review seeks the reversal of the Decision dated May 30, 2003 and the
Resolution dated August 27, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 50557. The
appellate court had affirmed with modification the Judgment dated January 4, 1995 of the
FACTS:
Respondent Maria Clarissa Posada, along with her parents, filed a complaint for
damages coupled with Support Pendente Lite against petitioner Teofisto Verceles before the
Virac, Catanduanes Regional Trial Court.
Clarissa bore a child named Verna Aiza. She asserted that the father of the child is
petitioner.
Verceles, mayor of Pandan, Catanduanes, offered Clarissa a job as a casual employee
in his office which was then accepted by the latter.
On separate occasions, petitioner made amorous advances with Clarissa in which the
latter initially avoided but eventually consented. Clarissa however kept the incidents to herself.
Consequently, she missed her period and got pregnant. She wrote two different letters to
verceles stating her predicament. The latter replied and said that they are to take care of the
love child. She was given money by him during her pregnancy.
Clarissa’s mother Francisca ascertained their child’s pregnancy and had her go back
home from Manila where she was sent by Verceles.
Aggrieved, the complainant against the petitioner was filed.
894
During the trial, three other handwritten letters of petitioner sent to Clarissa were
presented, as well as the former’s picture of his youth and as a public servant given to her,
bearing his handwritten notations at the back.
The trial court ruled in favor of the respondents, ordering petitioner to pay monthly
support to Verna Aiza. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment with modification.
The petitioner sought after the reversal of the decision on the ground that filiation is not
yet proven.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the fact of paternity or filiation is proven in this case at bar, thereby
recognizing Verna Aiza Posada as petitioner’s illegitimate child, making petitioner liable for
support.
RULING:
Yes. Paternity or filiation is proven in this case at bar is proven; Verna Aiza Posada is
petitioner’s illegitimate daughter.
The letters received by Clarissa from Verceles construed that he sired Verna Aiza,
notwithstanding that he never signed the birth certificate of the child. Such were material in
establishing filiation as provided by Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code.
Petitioner is liable to pay monthly support to Verna Aiza Posada.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated May 30, 2003 and the Resolution dated
August 27, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 50557 are AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages and exemplary damages be DELETED.
895
Mangonon v. CA
MA. BELEN B. MANGONON, for and in behalf of her minor children REBECCA ANGELA
DELGADO and REGINA ISABEL DELGADO. Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA, Presiding
Judge, RTC-Makati, Branch 149, FEDERICO C. DELGADO and FRANCISCO C. DELGADO,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 125041 June 30, 2006
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 20 March 1996, affirming the Order, dated 12 September 1995 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 149, Makati, granting support pendente lite to Rebecca Angela (Rica)
and Regina Isabel (Rina), both surnamed Delgado.
FACTS:
In 1975, Maria Belen Mangonon and Private Respondent Delgado married in 1975.
As the marriage was solemnized without the required consent, the marriage was annulled on
1975. Within 7 months of the annulment of their marriage, petitioner gave birth to twins Rina and
Rica. Her second husband, Danny Mangonon raised her two twins as Private Respondent
Delgado has already abandoned them.
1994 Belen Mangonon filed for a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support in
behalf of her minor children (Rica and Rina). At the time of the petition, Rica and Rina are about
to enter college in the USA. But despite their admission to the universities, they are financially
incapable
Petitioner, who earns 1,200 dollars a month, could hardly give general support to the
children, much less their required educational support. So they demanded support from Private
Respondent.
Respondent Federico failed to sign the birth certificate, hence they need a judicial
declaration in order to be legitimated. He said that their legitimacy should first be established
896
before they could claim for support. Moreover, Federico also said that he is also unable to give
support.
Trial court resolved the case and awarded a MEASLY and MICROSCOPIC
5,000pesos/child.
Petitioner was angered by this and filed the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the grandfather (FRANCISCO) can be the one to furnish support since
both the parties are unable to give support.
RULING:
Yes. First of all, the twins were able to prove their filiation, because Lolo Francisco wrote
letters to them when they were young, and that he himself wrote the surname ―Delgado‖ in the
letters which just means that Lolo Francisco consented to it. On the issue of support, An
eminent author on the subject explains that the obligation to give support rests principally on
those more closely related to the recipient. However, the more remote relatives may beheld to
shoulder the responsibility should the claimant prove that those who are called up onto provide
support do not have the means to do so. Lolo Francisco said that Petitioner has the means to
support the children, but this is BELIED by the fact that they obtained huge amounts of loans for
them to even enroll at these US universities.
There being prima facie evidence showing that petitioner and respondent Federico are
the parents of Rica and Rina, petitioner and respondent Federico are primarily charged to
support their children‘s college education.
In view however of their incapacities, the obligation to furnish said support should be
borne by respondent Francisco. Under Article199 of the Family Code, respondent Francisco, as
the next immediate relative of Rica and Rina, is tasked to give support to his granddaughters in
default of their parents.
897
It bears stressing that respondent Francisco is the majority stockholder and Chairman of
the Board of Directors of Citadel Commercial, Incorporated, which owns and manages twelve
gasoline stations, substantial real estate, and is engaged in shipping, brokerage and freight
forwarding. He is also the majority stockholder and Chairman of the Board of Directors
of Citadel Shipping which does business with Hyundai of Korea. Apart from these, he also owns
the Citadel Corporation which, in turn, owns real properties in different parts of the country. He
is likewise the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Isla Communication Co. and he owns
shares of stocks of Citadel Holdings. In addition, he owns real properties here and abroad. It
having been established that respondent Francisco has the financial means to support his
granddaughters‘education, he, in lieu of petitioner and respondent Federico, should be held
liable for support pendente lite.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.
898
De Guzman v. Perez
ROBERTO P. DE GUZMAN, petitioner,

vs.
HERNANDO B. PEREZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice, and SHIRLEY F. ABERDE,
respondents.
G.R. No. 156013 July 25, 2006
CORONA, J.:
May a parent who fails or refuses to do his part in providing his child the education his
station in life and financial condition permit, be charged for neglect of child under Article 59(4) of
PD 603?
FACTS:
Petitioner and private respondent Shirley F. Aberde became sweethearts while studying
law in the University of Sto. Tomas. Their studies were interrupted when private respondent
became pregnant. She gave birth to petitioner’s child, Robby Aberde de Guzman, on October 2,
1987.
Private respondent and petitioner never got married. In 1991, petitioner married another
woman with whom he begot two children.
Petitioner sent money for Robby’s schooling only twice — the first in 1992 and the
second in 1993. In 1994, when Robby fell seriously ill, petitioner gave private respondent
P7,000 to help defray the cost of the child’s hospitalization and medical expenses. Other than
these instances, petitioner never provided any other financial support for his son.
In 1994, in order to make ends meet and to provide for Robby’s needs, private
respondent accepted a job as a factory worker in Taiwan where she worked for two years. It
was only because of her short stint overseas that she was able to support Robby and send him
to school. However, she reached the point where she had just about spent all her savings to
provide for her and Robby’s needs. The child’s continued education thus became uncertain.
On the other hand, petitioner managed the de Guzman family corporations. He
apparently did well as he led a luxurious lifestyle. He owned at least five luxury cars, lived in a
palatial home in the exclusive enclave of Ayala Heights Subdivision, Quezon City, built a bigger
and more extravagant house in the same private community, and sent his children (by his wife)
899
to expensive schools in Metro Manila. He also regularly traveled abroad with his family. Despite
his fabulous wealth, however, petitioner failed to provide support to Robby.
In a letter dated February 21, 2000, private respondent demanded support for Robby
who was entering high school that coming schoolyear (June 2000). She explained that, given
her financial problems, it was extremely difficult for her to send him to a good school.
Petitioner ignored private respondent’s demand. The latter was thus forced to rely on the
charity of her relatives so that she could enroll her son in De La Salle high school in Lipa City.
On June 15, 2000, private respondent filed a criminal complaint for abandonment and
neglect of child under Article 59(2) and (4) of PD 603.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is liable to pay support.
RULING:
Yes. He is. Here, petitioner acknowledged Robby as his son. He has not denied that he
never contributed for his education except in two instances (1992 and 1993). He admitted that
the boy’s education was being financed by private respondent and her relatives. He stated
under oath that the last time he sent material support to his son was in 1994 when he gave
P7,000 for the latter’s hospitalization and medical expenses.
There is a prima facie showing from the evidence that petitioner is in fact financially
capable of supporting Robby’s education. The notarized GIS of the RNCD Development
Corporation indicates that petitioner owns P750,000 worth of paid-up shares in the company.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
900
Lam v. Chua
JOSE LAM, petitioner, vs. ADRIANA CHUA, respondent.

G.R. No. 131286. March 18, 2004
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision1 dated June
11, 1997 and the Resolution dated October 27, 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV.
No. 51107, entitled, "Adriana Chua, Petitioner-Appellee vs. Jose Lam, Respondent-Appellant."
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court
of Appeals Lam and Chua were married in the year 1984 and said marriage conceived a son.
Chua claims that Lam was psychologically incapacitated to comply with his marital obligations.
To justify the claims, Chua says that he is irresponsible and keeps on asking for money for
luxury items. Lam does not support his family and he rarely comes home. He was also said to
be a womanizer and mismanages their conjugal properties.
With this set-up, Chua had no choice but to agree to dissolution of their conjugal
partnership of gains and separation of properties. This was granted by the regional trial court.
The spouses have been living separately and Chua seeks the nullification of her marriage with
Lam. Chua presented evidence stating the facts given above but failed to show how much is
needed for child support.
The case was reopened at her instance and she presented evidence showing that Lam
has been married twice before their marriage which renders it bigamous. The Trial Court
declared their marriage void and ordered Lam to pay child support of 20,000 a month. This was
contested by Lam stating that a common fund was agreed upon wherein they would both
contribute 250,000 each for the support of their child. The CA affirmed the trial court’s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage should be declared null and void for psychological
incapacity or for being bigamous in nature and whether or not the 20,000 monthly support
is justified.
901
RULING:
The court ruled in the affirmative on the first issue and declared it null and void by
reason of bigamy. It was sufficiently proven that Lam was previously married and incapacitated
to marry again. Said claim was not even contested by Lam through his petitions which only
questioned the monthly support. He then is estopped from questioning the nullification
of marriage. With regard to the second issue, the court decided that the monthly support was
not justified because it was decided beyond the scope of the questions raised. Also, Chua failed
to show the amount of support actually needed and so the court upheld the concept of a fund
agreed upon.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED.
902
Reyes v. Ines-Luciano
MANUEL J. C. REYES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. LEONOR INES-LUCIANO, as Judge of the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court,
Quezon City, COURT OF APPEALS and CELIA ILUSTRE-REYES, respondents.
G.R. No. L-48219 February 28, 1979
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
No. 06928-SP entitled "Manuel J. C. Reyes, petitioner, versus, The Hon. Leonor Ines-Luciano
as Judge of the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court (Quezon City) and Celia Ilustre-Reyes,
Respondents", dismissing the petition to annul the order of the respondent Judge directing the
petitioner to give support pendente lite to his wife, Celia Ilustre-Reyes, private respondent
herein, in the amount of P40,000.00 a month.
FACTS:
Manuel Reyes attacked his wife twice with the intent to kill. A complaint was filed on
June 3, 1976: the first attempt on March was prevented by her father and the second attempt,
wherein she was already living separately from her husband, was stopped only because of her
driver’s intervention. She filed for legal separation on that ground and prayed for support
pendente lite for herself and her three children. The husband opposed the application for
support on the ground that the wife committed adultery with her physician. The respondent
Judge Ines-Luciano of the lower court granted the wife pendente lite. The husband filed amotion
for reconsideration reiterating that his wife is not entitled to receive such support during the
pendency of the case, and that even if she is entitled to it, the amount awarded was excessive.
The judge reduced the amount from P5000 to P4000 monthly. Husband filed a petition for
certiorari in the CA to annul the order granting alimony. CA dismissed the petition which made
the husband appeal to the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not support can be administered during the pendency of an action.
903
RULING:
Yes, provided that adultery is established by competent evidence. Mere allegations will
not bar her right to receive support pendente lite. Support can be administered during the
pendency of such cases. In determining the amount, it is not necessary to go into the merits of
the case. It is enough that the facts be established by affidavits or other documentary evidence
appearing in the record. [The SC on July, 1978ordered the alimony to beP1000/month from the
period of June to February 1979, after the trial, it was reverted to P4000/month based on the
accepted findings of the trial court that the husband could afford it because of his affluence and
because it wasn’t excessive.]
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby denied and the decision of the Council
of Appeals sought to be reviewed is affirmed with the modification that the support pendente lite
at the rate of Four Thousand Pesos (P4.000.00) a month should commence from March 1, 1979
without pronouncement as to costs.
904
Santero v. CFI
PRINCESITA SANTERO, FEDERICO SANTERO and WILLIE SANTERO, petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAVITE, ANSELMA DIAZ, VICTOR, RODRIGO,
ANSELMINA, MIGUEL, all surnamed SANTERO, and REYNALDO EVARISTO, in his
capacity as Administrator of the Intestate Estate of PABLO SANTERO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-61700 September 14, 1987
PARAS, J.:
This is a Petition for certiorari which questions the order of the respondent court granting
the Motion for Allowance filed by private respondents.
FACTS:
Pablo Santero, the only legitimate son of Pascual and Simona Santero, had three
children with Felixberta Pacursa namely, Princesita, Federico and Willie (herein petitioners). He
also had four children with Anselma Diaz namely, Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina, and Miguel
(herein private respondents). These children are all natural children since neither of their
mothers was married to their father. In 1973, Pablo Santero died.
During the pendency of the administration proceedings with the CFI-Cavite involving the
estate of the late Pablo Santero, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court
questioning the decision of CFI-Cavite granting allowance (allegedly without hearing) in the
amount of Php 2,000.00, to private respondents which includes tuition fees, clothing materials
and subsistence out of any available funds in the hands of the administrator. The petitioners
opposed said decision on the ground that private respondents were no longer studying, that
they have attained the age of majority, that all of them except for Miguel are gainfully employed,
and the administrator did not have sufficient funds to cover the said expenses.
Before the Supreme Court could act on saod petition, the private respondents filed
another motion for allowance with the CFI-Cavite which included Juanita, Estelita and Pedrito,
all surnamed Santero, as children of the late Pablo Santero with Anselma Diaz, praying that a
sum of Php 6,000.00 be given to each of the seven children as their allowance from the estate
of their father. This was granted by the CFI-Cavite.
905
Later on, the CFI-Cavite issued an amended order directing Anselma Diaz, mother of
private respondents, to submit a clarification or explanation as to the additional three children
included in the said motion. She said in her clarification that in her previous motions, only the
last four minor children were included for support and the three children were then of age should
have been included since all her children have the right to receive allowance as advance
payment of their shares in the inheritance of Pablo Santero. The CFI-Cavite issued an order
directing the administrator to get back the allowance of the three additional children based on
the opposition of the petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondents entitled to allowance.
RULING:
Yes, they are entitled. Being of age, gainfully employed, or married should not be
regarded as the determining factor to their right to allowance under Articles 290 and 188 of the
New Civil Code.
Records show that a hearing was made. Moreover, what the said court did was just to follow the
precedent of the court which granted previous allowance and that the petitioners and private
respondents only received Php 1,500.00 each depending on the availability of funds.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the aforementioned circumstances, the instant Petition is

hereby DISMISSED and the assailed judgment is AFFIRMED.
906
Lacson v. Lacson
EDWARD V. LACSON, Petitioner,

vs.
MAOWEE DABAN LACSON and MAONAA DABAN LACSON, represented by their mother
and guardian ad-litem, LEA DABAN LACSON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 150644 August 28, 2006
GARCIA, J.:
FACTS:
The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson are legitimate daughters
of petitioner Edward V. Lacson and his wife, Lea Daban Lacson. Maowee was born on
December 4, 1974, while Maonaa, a little less than a year later. Not long after the birth of
Maonaa, petitioner left their conjugal home, virtually forcing mother and children to seek,
apparently for financial reason, shelter somewhere else.
For a month, they stayed with Lea’s mother-in-law, Alicia Lacson, then with her (Lea’s)
mother and then with her brother Noel Daban. After some time, they rented an apartment only
to return later to the house of Lea’s mother.
It appears that from the start of their estrangement, Lea did not badger her husband
Edward for support, relying initially on his commitment memorialized in a note dated December
10, 1975 to give support to his daughters. As things turned out, however, Edward reneged on
his promise of support, despite Lea’s efforts towards having him fulfill the same. Lea would
admit, though, that Edward occasionally gave their children meager amounts for school
expenses. Edward’s mother, Alicia Lacson, also gave small amounts to help in the schooling of
Maowee and Maonaa.
Lea, in behalf of her two daughters, filed a complaint against Edward for support before
the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City.
In that complaint Maowee and Maonaa, thru their mother, averred that their father
Edward, despite being gainfully employed and owning several pieces of valuable lands, has not
provided them support since 1976. They also alleged that, owing to years of Edward’s failure
and neglect, their mother had, from time to time, borrowed money from her brother Noel Daban.
As she would later testify, Lea had received from Noel, by way of a loan, as much as
P400,000.00 to P600,000.00.
907
The trial court granted the sisters Maowee and Maonaa support pendente lite at
P12,000.00 per month. In that judgment, the trial court, following an elaborate formula set forth
therein, ordered their defendant father Edward to pay them a specific sum which represented
216 months, or 18 years, of support in arrears. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner should be made to pay support.
RULING:
The Court finds no adequate reason to disturb the factual determination of the CA
confirmatory of that of the trial court respecting the demand Lea made on the petitioner to
secure support for the respondents. As a matter of long and sound appellate practice, factual
findings of the CA are accorded respect, if not finality, save for the most compelling and cogent
reasons.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the appealed CA decision and
resolution are AFFIRMED.
908
PARENTAL AUTHORITY AND CUSTODY
Thornton v. Thornton
Thornton vs. Thornton

G.R. No. 154598 August 16, 2004,
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition to review, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the July 5, 2002
resolution[1] of the Court of Appeals, Sixteenth Division, in CA G.R. SP No. 70501 dismissing the
petition for habeas corpus on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of substance.
Facts:
Petit ioner, an Amer ican, and respondent, a Filipino, were married in

Manila. A year later, respondent gave birth to a baby girl. However, after three years,
respondent grew restless andbored as a plain housewif e. She wanted to return to
her old job as a "guest relat ions off icer" in anightclub, with the freedom to go out with
her friends. Whenever petitioner was out of the country,respondent was also often out with her friends,
leaving her daughter in the care of the househelp.Petitioner admonished respondent about her
irresponsibility but she continued her
carefreeways. On December 7, 2001, respondent lef t the f amily home with her
daughter Sequiera without notif ying her husband. She told the ser vants that
she was br inging Sequiera to Pur ok Marikit, Sta.Clara, Lamitan, Basilan Province.Petitioner
filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court in Makati City butthis was
dismissed, presumably because of the allegation that the child was in Basilan. Petitioner
thenwent to Basilan to ascertain the whereabouts of respondent and their daughter. However,
he did notf ind them there and the barangay of f ice of Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan,
issued a cert if ication thatrespondent was no longer residing there.Petitioner gave up his search
when he got hold of respondent’s cellular phone bills showingcalls from different places such
as Cavite, Nueva Ecija, Metro Manila and other provinces. Petitionerthen filed another petition
for habeas corpus, this time in the Court of Appeals which could issue a writof habeas corpus
enforceable in the entire country.However, the petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on the
909
ground that it did not have jurisdiction over the case. It ruled that since RA 8369
(The Family Courts Act of 1997) gave familycourts exclusive original jurisdiction over
petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902(An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals) and Batas Pambansa 129 (The JudiciaryReorganization Act of 1980):Under
Sec. 9 (1), BP 129 (1981) the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals)
has jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus whether or not in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. This conferment of jurisdiction was re-stated in Sec. 1, RA 7902 (1995), an act
expanding the jurisdiction of this Court. This jurisdiction finds its procedural expression in Sec.
1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court.In 1997, RA 8369 otherwise known as Family Courts Act was enacted. It provides:
Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Court.
– The Family Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:xxx xxx
xxxb. Petition for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation tothe latter.
Issue:
Whether or not there is an implied repeal of RA 7902 by RA 8369.
Held:
Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of being used in more
thanone sense. Sometimes, what the legislatur e actually had in mind is not
accurately ref lected in the language of a statute, and
its literal interpretat ion may render it mean ingless, lead to absurdit y,injustice or
contradiction. In the case at bar, a literal interpretation of the word "exclusive" will result Ingrave injustice and negate
the policy "to protect the rights and promote the welfare of children" underthe Const itution
and the United Nations Convent ion on the Rights of the Child. This mandat e
mustprevail over legal technicalities and serve as the guiding principle in construing the
provisions of RA8369.Moreover, settled is the rule in statutory construction that implied repeals are not
favored: The two laws must be absolutely incompat ible, and a clear f inding thereof
mustsurf ace, bef ore the inf erence of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is
expressed in themaxim,interpretare et concordare leqibus est optimus interpretendi,
i.e., every statute mustbe so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as
to f orm a unif orm system of jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should
be presumed to have known theexisting laws on the subject and not have enacted conflicting
statutes. Hence, all doubts mustbe resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts should be
exerted in order to harmonizeand give effect to all laws on the subject." The provisions of RA 8369 reveal
910
no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court to issue
writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors. Further,it cannot be said that the provisions of
RA 8369, RA 7092 and BP 129 are absolutely incompatible sinceRA 8369 does not prohibit the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court from issuing writs of habeascorpus in cases involving the
custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must be read inharmony with
RA 7029 and BP 129 ― that family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals
and the Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue.Petition granted.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The petition for habeas corpus in CA-
G.R.-SP-No. 70501 is hereby REINSTATED and REMANDED to the Court of Appeals,
Sixteenth Division.
911
Madrinan v. Madrinan
MADRIÑAN vs. MADRIÑAN

GR No. 159374
July 12, 2007
CORONA, J.:
When a family breaks up, the children are always the victims. The ensuing battle for
custody of the minor children is not only a thorny issue but also a highly sensitive and heart-
rending affair. Such is the case here. Even the usually technical subject of jurisdiction became
emotionally charged.
FACTS:
Petitioner Felipe N. Madriñan and respondent Francisca R. Madriñan were married on

July 7, 1993.Their union was blessed with three sons and a daughter. After a bitter quarrel on
May 18, 2002, petitioner allegedly left their conjugal abode and took their three sons with him to
Albay and subsequently to Laguna.
Respondent sought the help of her parents and parents-in-law to patch things up
between her and petitioner but failed. She then brought the matter to the Lupong
Tagapamayapa in their Barangay, but this too proved futile. Thus respondent filed a petition for
habeas corpus of the three sons in the Court of Appeals, alleging that petitioner’s act of leaving
the conjugal dwelling and going to Albay and then to Laguna disrupted the education of their
children and deprived them of their mother’s care. She prayed that petitioner be ordered to
appear and produce their sons before the court and to explain why they should not be returned
to her custody.
On September 3, 2002, petitioner filed his memorandum alleging that respondent was
unfit to take custody of their three sons because she was habitually drunk, frequently went
home late at night or in the wee hours of the morning, spent much of her time at a beer house
and neglected her duties as a mother. He claimed that, after their squabble on May 18, 2002, it
was respondent who left, taking their daughter with her. It was only then that he went to Laguna
where he worked as a tricycle driver. He also questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
claiming that under Section 5(b) of RA 8369 (otherwise known as the “Family Courts Act of
912
1997”) family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition for
habeas corpus filed by respondent.
For her part, respondent averred that she did not leave their home on May 18, 2002 but
was driven out by petitioner. She alleged that it was petitioner who was an alcoholic, gambler
and drug addict. Petitioner’s alcoholism and drug addiction impaired his mental faculties,
causing him to commit acts of violence against her and their children. The situation was
aggravated by the fact that their home was adjacent to that of her in-laws who frequently
meddled in their personal problems.
On October 21, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision asserting its authority to
take cognizance of the petition and ruling that, under Article 213 of the Family Code, respondent
was entitled to the custody of the two younger sons who were at that time aged six and four,
respectively, subject to the visitation rights of petitioner. With respect to eldest son who was
then eight years old, the court ruled that his custody should be determined by the proper family
court in a special proceeding on custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision but it was denied. Hence,
this recourse.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA had jurisdiction to issue the writ of habeas corpus as jurisdiction
over the case is lodged in the Family Courts under R.A. 8369.
HELD:
RA 8369 did not divest the CA and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas
corpus cases involving custody of minors. The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent
to revoke the jurisdiction of the CA and the SC to issue said writ. Said law should be read in
harmony with the provisions of RA 7092 (expanding the jurisdiction of the CA) and BP 129 (the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) — that family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the
CA and the SC in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue. This is in
fact affirmed by Administrative Circular 03-03-04-SC, dated April 22, 2004.
In this case, after petitioner moved out of their residence on May 18, 2002, he twice
transferred his sons to provinces covered by different judicial regions. By giving the family
courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases will result in an iniquitous situation
leaving individuals like the respondent without legal recourse in obtaining custody of her
children. Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of minors they are looking for would be
913
helpless since they cannot seek redress from family courts whose writs are enforceable only in
their respective territorial jurisdictions. This lack of recourse could not have been the intention of
RA 8369.
Moreover, under RA 8369, the family courts are vested with original exclusive jurisdiction
in custody cases, not in habeas corpus cases. Writs of habeas corpus which may be issued
exclusively by the family courts under said law pertain to the ancillary remedy that may be
availed of in conjunction with the petition for custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of
Court.
914
De Guzman v. Perez
ROBERTO DE GUZMAN, petitioner, vs. HERNANDO PEREZ, SEC. OF JUSTICE; SHIRLEY

ABERDE, respondents.
496 S 474
Facts:
Roberto and Shriley became sweethearts while studying law at Sto. Tomas. This resulted to
Shirley’s giving birth to Robby. They never got married. They lived separate lives. Roberto
married another woman and had children with her. Roberto gave support twice only (1992 &
1993); in 1994, he gave money for medical expenses because Robby was sick. He desisted in
giving support hence. Due to financial difficulties, Shirley worked as a factory worker in Taiwan
for a brief period. When Robby about to enter high school, Shirley demanded support from
Roberto who merely ignored her. While Shirley was in financial distress, Roberto lived a
luxurious lifestyle (5 luxury cars, 1 big house in Ayala, frequently travels abroad, sends his
children to expensive schools; stock shares worth P 750,000). Despite the obvious luxury,
Roberto maintains that he is financially incapable of supporting Robby. Hence, Shirley filed a
criminal case for NEGLECT of CHILD under Art. 59(4) of PD 603 in relation to Section 10(a) of
RA 7610.
Issue:
Is Shirley’s criminal case for neglect of child against Roberto tenable?
Ruling:
Roberto can be charged with NEGLECT OF CHILD. That the Secretary of Justice didn’t err
in its decision.
Tonog v. CA
915
DINAH B. TONOG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
EDGAR V. DAGUIMOL, respondents.
G.R. No. 122906. February 7, 2002
DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of two (2) Resolutions
dated August 29, 1995 and November 29, 1995 issued by the former Second Division[1] of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35971. The first resolution modified the appellate court’s
decision promulgated in the said case, and granted custody of the minor, Gardin Faith Belarde
Tonog, to private respondent. The second resolution denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
Facts:
On September 23, 1989, petitioner Dinah B. Tonog gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde
Tonog, her illegitimate daughter with private respondent Edgar V. Daguimol. Petitioner was
then a nursing student while private respondent was a licensed physician. They cohabited for a
time and lived with private respondent’s parents and sister in the latter’s house in Quezon City
where the infant, Gardin Faith, was a welcome addition to the family.
A year after the birth of Gardin Faith, petitioner left for the United States of America where
she found work as a registered nurse. Gardin Faith was left in the care of her father (private
respondent herein) and paternal grandparents.
On January 10, 1992, private respondent filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin Faith,
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-92-11053, in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On March 9,
1992, the trial court rendered judgment appointing private respondent as legal guardian of the
minor, Gardin Faith.
Issue:
With regard to guardianship, who is entitled over Gardin Faith, an illegitimate child, would it
be the father or the mother?
Ruling:
In the case at bar, we are being asked to rule on the temporary custody of the minor,
Gardin Faith, since it appears that the proceedings for guardianship before the trial court have
916
not been terminated, and no pronouncement has been made as to who should have final
custody of the minor. Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor,
we find that the appellate court did not err in allowing her father (private respondent herein) to
retain in the meantime parental custody over her. Meanwhile, the child should not be wrenched
from her familiar surroundings, and thrust into a strange environment away from the people and
places to which she had apparently formed an attachment.
A word of caution: our pronouncement here should not be interpreted to imply a preference
toward the father (herein private respondent) relative to the final custody of the minor, Gardin
Faith. Nor should it be taken to mean as a statement against petitioner’s fitness to have final
custody of her said minor daughter. It shall be only understood that, for the present and until
finally adjudged, temporary custody of the subject minor should remain with her father, the
private respondent herein pending final judgment of the trial court in Sp. Proc. No. Q-92-11053.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The trial court is directed to
immediately proceed with hearing Sp. Proc. No. Q-92-11053 upon notice of this decision. No
SO ORDERED.
917
Vancil v. Belmes
BONIFACIA VANCIL, petitioner v. HELEN BELMES, respondent

19 JUNE 2001
Petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
45650, “In the Matter of Guardianship of Minors Valerie Vancil and Vincent Vancil – Bonifacia P.
Vancil, Petitioner-Appellee, vs. Helen G. Belmes, Oppositor-Appellant,” promulgated on July 29,
1997, and its Resolution dated December 18, 1997 denying the motion for reconsideration of
the said Decision.
Facts:
Petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil is the mother of Reeder Vancil, a navy serviceman of the
United States of America who had died in the said country. During his lifetime, he had two
children from his common law wife, Helen Belmas.
Sometime in May 1987, petitioner filed guardianship proceedings over the persons and
properties of the children. A month after, petitioner was appointed legal guardian over the
persons and properties of her grandchildren. Helen, natural mother of the two children, however
submitted an opposition to the said proceedings, and concurrently, she had filed a similar
petition for guardianship.
RTC decided in favor of Bonifacia. CA reversed and favored Helen. Hence, this petition
by Bonifacia.
Issue:
Who is the legal guardian of the minors?
Ruling:
Parents are placed first in the rank of priority in matters of parental authority. The
children illegitimacy does not in any way affect the order of priority. Respondent, being the
natural mother of the minors, has the preferential right over that of the petitioner in issue of
guardianship. Petitioner as the surviving grandparent can exercise substitute parental authority
only if in case of death, absence of unsuitability of respondent.
918
This follows the provision of article 212 which qualify that the parents exercise parental
authority jointly. Article 214, which provides for the substitution of the parental authority by the
grandparents, applies only when the abovementioned conditions exist.
The case regarding the daughter Valerie is moot and academic since she had reached
the age of majority. In the case of Vincent, parental authority is vested on the father and mother
(Art. 211 of FC). It is only in the cases of death, absence, or unsuitability of the parents wherein
the parental authority is bested on the surviving grandparents (Art. 214 of FC). There is no
showing of unsuitability of the mother. Moreover, the grandmother is a naturalized American
citizen whose residence is in America. She will find it difficult to perform her rights and duties as
a guardian. Furthermore, the grandmother has not set foot in the Philippines for more than a
decade. She is old. She has a conviction of libel in a criminal case which would make her think
twice coming here to the Philippines. Lastly, the Court emphasized that jurisprudence shows
that guardianship is not allowed where the guardian is outside the jurisdiction of Philippine
courts.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with modification in the sense
that Valerie, who has attained the age of majority, will no longer be under the guardianship of
respondent Helen Belmes.
919
Bondagiy v. Bondagiy
SABRINA BONDAGIY, petitioner v. FUOZI BONDAJGIY, respondent

7 DECEMBER 2001
PARDO, J.:
Is a wife, a Christian who converted to Islam before her marriage to a Muslim and converted
back to Catholicism upon their separation, still bound by the moral laws of Islam in the
determination of her fitness to be the custodian of her children?
We apply civil law in the best interest of the children.
Facts:
Respondent Fuozi and Sabrina were married in Manila under Islamic rites. Four months
prior to such marriage, Sabina became a Muslim by conversion. . The conversion however was
not duly registered. Out of such union, they begot two children.
Sometime in 1995, the children lived in the house of Sabrina’s mother. Fouzi alleged that
he could not see his children until he got an order from the court. One year thereafter Sabrina
had the children baptized as Christian and had their names changed too.
Respondent alleged also that on various occasions, Sabrina was seen with different men
at odd hours in Manila and wearing outfits detestable under the Islamic law on culture.
Respondent then filed with the Shari ‘a court an action to obtain custody of his minor
children now ages 10 and 9 respectively. The judgment rendered by the Shari ‘a Court awarded
the custody of the minors to their father finding their mother unworthy to care for her children.
Issue:
Whether or not a Christian who converted to Islam before her marriage to a Muslim and
converted back to Catholicism upon their separation, still bounded by the moral laws of Islam in
the determination of her fitness to be the custodian of their children.
Ruling:
The court applies the civil law in the best interest of the children. The standard in the
determination of sufficiency of proof to establish the unfitness of a mother who had converted to
Muslim before marriage but had converted back to Catholicism in relation to custody of her
children is not restricted to Muslim laws. The family code shall also be taken in consideration in
920
deciding whether she is incompetent. The burden is upon the respondent to prove that the
petitioner is not worthy to have the custody of her children.
The Court found that the evidence presented by the respondent was not sufficient to
establish her unfitness according to Muslim laws or the Family Code. However the award of
custody to the wife does not deprive the husband of parental authority and visitation rights over
the children.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision in Spl. Proc. No. 13-96 is hereby
SET ASIDE. Petitioner SABRINA ARTADI BONDAGJY shall have custody over minors
Abdulaziz, and Amouaje Bondagjy, until the children reach majority age. Both spouses shall
have joint responsibility over all expenses of rearing the children.
The father, FOUZI ALl BONDAGJY, shall have visitorial rights at least once a week and may
take the children out only with the written consent of the mother.
No costs.
921
Sagala-Eslao v. CA
TERESITA SAGALA-ESLAO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA PAZ CORDERO-OUYE, respondents.
G.R. No. 116773 January 16, 1997
TORRES, JR., J:
In this petition for review, Teresita Sagala-Eslao seeks the reversal of the Court of Appeals
decision 2 dated March 25, 1994, which affirmed the trial court's judgment granting the petition
of Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye to recover the custody of her minor daughter from her mother-in-
law, Teresita Sagala-Eslao.
FACTS:
From the evidence, it appears that on June 22, 1984, petitioner Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye
and Reynaldo Eslao were married; after their marriage, the couple stayed with respondent
Teresita Eslao, mother of the husband, at 1825, Road 14, Fabie Estate, Paco, Manila; that out
of their marriage, two children were begotten, namely, Leslie Eslao who was born on February
23, 1986 and Angelica Eslao who was born on April 20,1987; in the meantime, Leslie was
entrusted to the care and custody of petitioner's mother in Sta. Ana, Pampanga, while Angelica
stayed with her parents at respondent's house; on August 6, 1990, petitioner's husband
Reynaldo Eslao died; petitioner intended to bring Angelica with her to Pampanga but the
respondent prevailed upon her to entrust the custody of Angelica to her, respondent reasoning
out that her son just died and to assuage her grief therefor, she needed the company of the
child to at least compensate for the loss of her late son. In the meantime, the petitioner returned
to her mother's house in Pampanga where she stayed with Leslie.
Subsequently, petitioner was introduced by her auntie to Dr. James Manabu-Ouye, a

Japanese-American, who is an orthodontist practicing in the United States; their acquaintance
blossomed into a meaningful relationship where on March 18, 1992, the petitioner and Dr.
James Ouye decided to get married; less than ten months thereafter, or on January 15, 1993,
the petitioner migrated to San Francisco, California, USA, to join her new husband. At present,
the petitioner is a trainee at the Union Bank in San Francisco, while her husband is a
progressive practitioner of his profession who owns three cars, a dental clinic and earns
US$5,000 a month. On June 24, 1993, the petitioner returned to the Philippines to be reunited
with her children and bring them to the United States; the petitioner then informed the
respondent about her desire to take informed the respondent about her desire to take custody of
Angelica and explained that her present husband, Dr. James Ouye, expressed his willingness to
adopt Leslie and Angelica and to provide for their support and education; however, respondent
resisted the idea by way of explaining that the child was entrusted to her when she was ten
days old and accused the petitioner of having abandoned Angelica. Because of the adamant
attitude of the respondent, the petitioner then sought the assistance of a lawyer, Atty. Mariano
de Joya, Jr., who wrote a letter to the respondent demanding for the return of the custody of
Angelica to her natural mother and when the demand remain[ed] unheeded, the petitioner
instituted the present action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent Cordero-Ouye abandoned minor Angelica Eslao.
HELD:
922
No. In the instant petition, when private respondent entrusted the custody of her minor
child to the petitioner, what she gave to the latter was merely temporary custody and it did not
constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental authority. For the right attached to parental
authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of
adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an orphan institution which do not
appear in the case at bar.
Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that "the right of
parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood,
a right supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not
created by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental
relationship.
FALLO:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from dated March 25, 1994 being in
accordance with law and the evidence, the same is hereby AFFIRMED and the petition
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
923
Dacasin v. Dacasin
HERALD BLACK DACASIN V. SHARON DACASIN
G.R. No. 168785 : February 5, 2010
CARPIO, J.:
For review[1] is a dismissal[2] of a suit to enforce a post-foreign divorce child custody

agreement for lack of jurisdiction.
Facts:
Herald, American, and Sharon, Filipino, weremarried in Manila in April 1994.They have
one daughter, Stephanie, born on September 21, 1995.
In June 1999, Sharon sought and obtained a divorce decree from the CircuitCourt, 19th
Judicial Circuit, Lake County, Illinois (Illinois court). In its ruling, the Illinoiscourt dissolved the
marriage of petitioner and respondent, awarded to respondentsole custody of Stephanie and
retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcementpurposes.
On January 28, 2002,both executed in Manila a contract for joint custody overStephanie.
In 2004,Herald filed a case against Sharon alleging that Sharon had exercised solecustody over Stephanie
contrary to their agreement.
The trial court held that (1) it is precluded from taking cognizance over thesuit
considering the Illinois court’s retention of jurisdiction to enforce itsdivorce decree, including its
order awarding sole custody of Stephanie torespondent; (2) the divorce decree is binding on
petitioner following the“nationality rule” prevailing in this jurisdiction; and (3) the Agreement is
voidfor contravening Article 2035, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code prohibitingcompromise
agreements on jurisdiction and dismissed the case.
Issue:
WON the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioner’s suit andenforce the
Agreement on the joint custody of the parties child
924
Held:
The trial court’s refusal to entertain petitioner’s suit was grounded not onits lack of power
to do so but on its thinking that the Illinois court’s divorce decree stripped itof jurisdiction. This
conclusion is unfounded. What the Illinois court retained was “jurisdictionx x x for the purpose of
enforcing all and sundry the various provisions of [its] Judgment forDissolution.” Petitioner’s suit
seeks the enforcement not of the “various provisions” of thedivorce decree but of the post-
divorce Agreement on joint child custody. Thus, the actionlies beyond the zone of the Illinois
court’s so-called “retained jurisdiction.”
WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the Orders dated 1 March 2005 and 23 June 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 60. The case is REMANDED for further
proceedings consistent with this ruling.
925
Gamboa Hirsch v. CA
AGNES GAMBOA-HIRSCH,vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FRANKLIN HARVEY HIRSCH
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which seeks to set aside the June 8, 2006
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 94329, which granted private
respondent Franklin Harvey Hirsch (Franklin) joint custody with petitioner Agnes Gamboa-
Hirsch (Agnes) of their minor daughter Simone Noelle Hirsch (Simone); and the August 3, 2006
CA Resolution denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. Petitioner also
prays for the issuance of a temporary restraining order/injunction preventing the execution and
implementation of the assailed June 8, 2006 CA Decision.
Facts:
Respondents.This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which seeks to set aside the
decision of the CA whichgranted private respondent Franklin joint custody with petitioner Agnes
of their minor daughterSimone.Spouses Franklin and Agnes started to have marital problems as
Agnes wanted to stay in MakatiCity, while Franklin insisted that they stay in Boracay Island.
When Agnes came to their conjugalhome in Boracay, and asked for money and for Franklin’s permission for
her to bring their daughter to Makati City for a brief vacation she has an intention not to come back to
Boracay.Franklin then filed a petition for habeas corpus before the CA for Agnes to produce
Simone in court,CA issued a Resolution which ordered that a writ of habeas corpus be issued
ordering that Simonebe brought before said court. CA granted Franklin joint custody with
Agnes of their minor child.Agnes filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied.Hence,
this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion when it granted joint custody
in utter disregard ofthe provisions of the Family Code, as to minors seven (7) years of age and
below.
926
Held:
The court held that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted joint
custody of theminor child to both parents.The so-called "tender-age presumption" under Article
213 of the Family Code may be overcome onlyby compelling evidence of the mother’s unfitness.
The mother is declared unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or more of the following
instances: neglect, abandonment, unemployment,immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug
addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, or affliction witha communicable disease.
Here, the mother was not shown to be unsuitable or grossly incapable ofcaring for her
minor child. All told, no compelling reason has been adduced to wrench the child from
the mother’s custody.Sole custody over Simone Noelle Hirsch is herebyAWARDED to the mother,
petitioner Agnes Gamboa-HIrsch
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The June 8,
2006 Decision and August 3, 2006 Resolution of the CA are hereby SET ASIDE. Sole custody
over Simone Noelle Hirsch is hereby AWARDED to the mother, petitioner Agnes Gamboa-
Hirsch.
927
Gualberto v. Gualberto
CRISANTO GUALBERTO, petitioner v. JOYCELYN GUALBERTO, respondent

28 June 2005
PANGANIBAN, J.
When love is lost between spouses and the marriage inevitably results in separation, the
bitterest tussle is often over the custody of their children. The Court is now tasked to settle the
opposing claims of the parents for custody pendente lite of their child who is less than seven
years of age. There being no sufficient proof of any compelling reason to separate the minor
from his mother, custody should remain with her.
Facts:
On March 2002, Crisanto Gualberto filed a motion before the lower court a petition for
the declaration of nullity of marriage of his marriage to Joycelyn Gualberto, with an ancillary
prayer for the custody pendente lite of their almost four year old son, whom Joycelyn allegedly
took away with her from the conjugal home when she decided to abandon him sometime in the
early February of the same year. The trial court heard the ancillary prayer of Crisanto for
custody pendente lite. Because Joycelyn allegedly failed to appear despite notice, and in the
face of witnesses and evidence presented, the court awarded such temporary custody to
Crisanto.
Such was affirmed by the Court of Appeals pending the resolution of the other issue
raised.
Issue:
Whether or not a child less than seven years of age, and without compelling reasons not
to, be separated from the mother, and that such custody be awarded to the father.
Ruling:
The general rule that children under seven years of age shall not be separated from their
mother finds its raison d’etre in the basic need of the minor children for the their mother loving
care. In explaining the rationale for Article 213, the Code Commission said that “The general
rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn
away from her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of
928
tender age. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for “compelling reasons” for the good
of the child; those cases must indeed be rare, if the mother’s heart is not to be unduly hurt. If
she has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and the divorce decree
(relative divorce) will ordinarily be sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, moral dereliction will
not have any effect upon the baby who is as yet unable to understand her situation”.
Exception allowed by the court has to be for compelling reasons for the good of the
child, which she had erred, like in the cases of adultery when awarded a penalty of
imprisonment.
The Court found no sufficient proof of any compelling reason to separate the minor from
his mother, custody should remain with her.
WHEREFORE, the Petition in GR No. 154994 is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and the May 17, 2002 Regional Trial Court
OrderREINSTATED. The Petition in GR No. 156254 is DISMISSED. Costs against Petitioner
Crisanto Rafaelito Gualberto V.
929
Santos v. CA
LEOUEL SANTOS, SR., petitioner v. COURT OF APPEALS, and SPOUSES LEOPOLDO and
OFELIA BEDIA, respondents
G.R. No. 113054 March 16, 1995
TORRES, JR., J.:

Children begin by loving their parents. After a time they judge them. Rarely, if ever, do
they forgive them. 1 Indeed, parenthood is a riddle of no mean proportions except for its mission.
Thus, a mother's concern for her child's custody is undying — such is a mother's love.
The right of the mother to the custody of her daughter is the issue in the case at bar.
Facts:
Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by profession,
were married and beget only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. From the time the boy was released
from the hospital until sometime thereafter, he had been in the care and custody of his maternal
grandparents, private respondents herein, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia. Petitioner and wife Julia
agreed to place Leouel Jr. in the temporary custody of the latter's parents, the respondent
spouses Bedia.
Julia Bedia-Santos, left for the United States to work. Petitioner alleged that he is not
aware of her whereabouts but private respondents claim that although abroad, their daughter
Julia had been sending financial support to them for her son. The spouses Bedia then filed a
"Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward Leouel Santos Jr.," before the RTC, with
Santos, Sr. as respondent, which was subsequently granted and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in awarding custody of the boy to his grandparents.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the fact that petitioner was unable to provide financial
support for his minor son from birth up to over three years when he took the boy from his in-laws
without permission, should not be sufficient reason to strip him of his permanent right to the
930
child's custody. While petitioner's previous inattention is inexcusable and merits only the
severest criticism, it cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable
decision against him and his efforts to keep his only child in his custody may be regarded as
serious efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To award him custody would help enhance the bond
between parent and son. It would also give the father a chance to prove his love for his son and
for the son to experience the warmth and support which a father can give.
The right of custody accorded to parents springs from the exercise of parental authority.
Parental authority or patria potestas in Roman Law is the juridical institution whereby parents
rightfully assume control and protection of their unemancipated children to the extent required
by the latter' s needs. It is a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for
the purpose of the children's physical preservation and development, as well as the cultivation
of their intellect and the education of their heart and senses. As regards parental authority,
"there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a
sacred trust for the welfare of the minor." The law vests on the father and mother joint parental
authority over the persons of their common children.
The petition is GRANTED.
931
Golangco v. CA
RENE UY GOLANGCO, petitioner v. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent

283 SCRA 493
ROMERO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to annul and set aside the resolution of
the Court of Appeals dated January 10, 1996 in CA-G.R. SP No. 38866,[1] dismissing the
petition for violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 on forum-shopping.
Facts:
A petition for annulment of marriage was filed by private respondent Lucia Carlos
Golangco against petitioner Rene Uy Golangco before the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 144. The couple had two children, Justin Rene and Stefan Rafael. During the
proceedings of the case, a hearing for custody pendente lite of the two children was held. In an
order dated July 21, 1994, the trial court awarded the two children to Lucia while Rene was
given visitation rights of at least one week in a month. Therafter Rene questioned the order
dated July 21, 1994 with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, however dismissed the
petition and instead affirmed the order of the trial court. Not contented, Rene appealed the
resolution of the Court of Appeals affirming the order dated July 21, 1994 before this court, and
the case was docketed as G.R. No. 120831. On July 17, 1995, the Court resolved to dismiss the
petition for failure of petitioner Rene to show that grave abuse of discretion had been
committeds by the appellate court.
On August 15, 1995, Lucia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction because she alleged that her
estranged husband physically abused their son Justin. Due to the incident, a criminal complaint
for slight physical injuries was filed. The trial court granted the writ of preliminary injunction
restraining Rene from seeing his children. Rene Filed a petition for certiorari, however, the court
of appeals dismissed the petition for violation for on non-forum shopping. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether Rene should be prohibited from seeing his children.
932
Ruling:
It is a fundamental and settled rule that conclusions and findings of fact by the trial court
are entitled to great weight and should not be disturbed on appeal, unless strong and cogent
reasons dictate otherwise. This is because the trial court is in a better position to examine the
real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in the case.
The court, therefore, finds no justifiable reason or exception sufficient to cause the reversal of
the trial court’s declaration in granting the writ of preliminary injunction against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The decision of
the Court of Appeals in C.A. –G.R. No. 38866 dated January 10, 1996, is SET ASIDE. The
order dated October 4, 1995, issued by the court a quo is hereby affirmed in toto.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. No. 38866 dated January 10, 1996, is SET ASIDE. The order
dated October 4, 1995, issued by the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
933
Silva v. CA
CARLITOS E. SILVA,petitioner, vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS and SUZANNE T. GONZALES, respondents.
G.R. No. 114742. July 17, 1997
VITUG, J.:
Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and legal duty, to care for their children,
see to their proper upbringing and safeguard their best interest and welfare. This authority and
responsibility may not be unduly denied the parents; neither may it be renounced by
them. Even when the parents are estranged and their affection for each other is lost, the
attachment and feeling for their offsprings invariably remain unchanged. Neither the law nor the
courts allow this affinity to suffer absent, of course, any real, grave and imminent threat to the
well-being of the child.
Facts:

actress, cohabited without the benefit of marriage. The union saw the birth of two children:
Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia. Not very long after, a rift in their relationship surfaced. It
began, according to Silva, when Gonzales decided to resume her acting career over his
vigorous objections. The assertion was quickly refuted by Gonzales who claimed that she, in
fact, had never stopped working throughout their relationship. At any rate, the two eventually
parted ways.
The instant controversy was spawned, in February 1986, by the refusal of Gonzales to
allow Silva, in apparent contravention of a previous understanding, to have the children in his
company on weekends. Silva filed a petition for custodial rights over the children before the
Regional Trial Court (“RTC”), Branch 78, of Quezon City. The petition was opposed by
Gonzales who averred that Silva often engaged in "gambling and womanizing" which she feared
could affect the moral and social values of the children.
Issue:
934
The issue is not really a question of child custody; instead, the case merely concerns the
visitation right of a parent over his children which the trial court has adjudged in favor of
petitioner by holding that he shall have “visitorial rights to his children during Saturdays and/or
Sundays, but in no case (could) he take out the children without the written consent of the
mother x x x." The visitation right referred to is the right of access of a noncustodial parent to
his or her child or children.
Ruling:
The answer is in the negative. The Constitution itself speaks in terms of the "natural and
primary rights” of parents in the rearing of the youth. Article 209, in relation to Article 220, of the
Family Code states that it is the natural right and duty of parents and those exercising parental
authority to, among other things, keep children in their company and to give them love and
affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding. The allegations of
respondent against the character of petitioner, even assuming as true, cannot be taken as
sufficient basis to render petitioner an unfit father. The fears expressed by respondent to the
effect that petitioner shall be able to corrupt and degrade their children once allowed to even
temporarily associate with petitioner is but the product of respondent's unfounded imagination,
for no man, bereft of all moral persuasions and goodness, would ever take the trouble and
expense in instituting a legal action for the purpose of seeing his illegitimate children. It can just
be imagined the deep sorrows of a father who is deprived of his children of tender ages. The
Court appreciates the apprehensions of private respondent and their well-meant concern for the
children; nevertheless, it seems unlikely that petitioner would have ulterior motives or undue
designs more than a parent’s natural desire to be able to call on, even if it were only on brief
visits, his own children.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is REINSTATED, reversing thereby the
judgment of the appellate court which is hereby SET ASIDE. No costs.
935
David v. CA
DAISIE T. DAVID, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON R. VILLAR, respondents.
G.R. No. 111180. November 16, 1995
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of
the Decision dated May 30, 1994, of the Court of Appeals, Ninth Division, in CA-G.R. SP
No. 32782.
Facts:
Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a

businessman in Angeles City. Private respondent is a married man and the father of four
children, all grown-up. After a while, the relationship between petitioner and private respondent
developed into an intimate one, as a result of which a son, Christopher J., was born on March 9,
1985 to them. Christopher J. was followed by two more children, both girls, namely Christine,
born on June 9, 1986, and Cathy Mae on April 24, 1988.
The relationship became known to private respondent's wife when Daisie took Christopher
J, to Villar's house at Villa Teresa in Angeles City sometime in 1986 and introduced him to
Villar's legal wife.
After this, the children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were
eventually accepted by his legal family.
In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then six years of age, to
go with his family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused to give back the
child. Villar said he had enrolled Christopher J. at the Holy Family Academy for the next school
year.
On July 30, 1991, Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J.
Issue:
Is the fact that private respondent is well-off a reason for depriving petitioner of the custody
of her children, especially considering that she has been able to rear and support them on her
own since they were born?
Ruling:
936
In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception,
his father, private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to another woman other than the
child's mother. As such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under the
parental authority of his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of such authority,
is entitled to have custody of him.Since, admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of her rightful
custody of her child by private respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus.
Indeed, Rule 102.1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is separated
from her husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that of a mother of an
illegitimate child who, by law, is vested with sole parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful
custody of her child.
The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground for
ordering him to give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under Art.
213 of the Family Code, "no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother
unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise."
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May
30, 1994, in CA-G.R. SP NO. 32782 is hereby AFFIRMED. The records of the case are ordered
remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27, for execution of the Decision in due
course.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
937
Espiritu and Layug v. CA and Masauding
REYNALDO ESPIRITU and GUILLERMA LAYUG, petitioners v. COURT OF APPEALS and

TERESITA MASAUDING, respondents
G.R. No. 115640 March 15, 1995
MELO, J.:
This case concerns a seemingly void marriage and a relationship which went sour. The
innocent victims are two children horn out of the same union. Upon this Court now falls the not
too welcome task of deciding the issue of who, between the father and mother, is more suitable
and better qualified in helping the children to grow into responsible, well-adjusted, and happy
young adulthood.
Facts:
Petitoner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding tbegan to maintain a
common law relationship of husband and wife when petitioner was sent by his employer, the
National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as its liaison officer while respondent
worked as a nurse in Los Angeles, California. On August 16, 1986, their daughter, Rosalind
Therese, was born. While they were on a brief vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and
Teresita got married, and upon their return to the United States, their second child, a son, this
time, and given the name Reginald Vince.
The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate and Teresita
left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California. Reynaldo brought his children home
to the Philippines, but because his assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent
back by his company to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his sister, co-petitioner
Guillerma Layug and her family.
Teresita to return to the Philippines and filed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus
against herein two petitioners to gain custody over the children, however, the trial court
dismissed the petition and suspended Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind and Reginald
and declared Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over them but with rights of visitation to
be agreed upon by the parties and to be approved by the Court. The Court of Appeals, however,
reversed the decision and gave the Teresita the custody to her children.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals disregarded the factual findings of the trial court.
938
Ruling:
The Supreme Court is inclined to sustain the findings and conclusions of the regional
trial court because it gave greater attention to the choice of Rosalind and considered in detail all
the relevant factors bearing on the issue of custody. In ascertaining the welfare and best
interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family Code to take into account all relevant
considerations. If a child is under seven years of age, the law presumes that the mother is the
best custodian. It can be overcome by "compelling reasons". If a child is over seven, his choice
is paramount but, again, the court is not bound by that choice. In its discretion, the court may
find the chosen parent unfit and award custody to the other parent, or even to a third party as it
deems fit under the circumstances.
The law is more than satisfied by the judgment of the trial court. The children are now
both over seven years old. Their choice of the parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear from
the record. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person, thus meeting the two requirements
found in the first paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code. The presumption under the
second paragraph of said article no longer applies as the children are over seven years.
Assuming that the presumption should have persuasive value for children only one or two years
beyond the age of seven years mentioned in the statute, there are compelling reasons and
relevant considerations not to grant custody to the mother. The children understand the
unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and have been affected in their emotional growth by
her behavior.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is
reversed and set aside, and the decision of Branch 96 of the Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Quezon City and presided over by the Honorable
Lucas P. Bersamin in its Civil Case No. Q-92-14206 awarding custody of the minors Rosalind
and Reginald Espiritu to their father, Reynaldo Espiritu, is reinstated. No special pronouncement
939
Perez v. CA
NERISSA Z. PEREZ, plaintiff v. THE COURT OF APPEALS and

RAY C. PEREZ, defendant
G.R. No. 118870. March 29, 1996
Facts:
Ray Perez, private respondent, is a doctor of medicine practicing in Cebu while Nerissa,
his wife who is petitioner herein, is a registered nurse. They were married and after six
miscarriages, two operations and a high-risk pregnancy, petitioner finally gave birth to Ray
Perez II in New York. The couple and their baby arrived in Cebu. After a few weeks, only
Nerissa returned to the U.S. because the respondent has to take care of his mother and
promised to her with the baby.
When Nerissa came home a few days before Ray II’s first birthday, the couple was no
longer on good terms. On July 26, 1993, Nerissa Z. Perez filed a petition for habeas corpus
asking respondent Ray C. Perez to surrender the custody of their son, Ray Z. Perez II, to her
and the court a quo issued an Order awarding custody of the one-year old child to his mother,
Nerissa Perez. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order and awarded custody of the
boy to his father.
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in awarding the custody of the child to his father.
Ruling:
When the parents of the child are separated, Article 213 of the Family Code is the
applicable law. It provides: “ART. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority
shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all
relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the
parent chosen is unfit. No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother,
unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.”
940
Since the Code does not qualify the word “separation” to mean “legal separation”
decreed by a court, couples who are separated in fact, such as petitioner and private
respondent, are covered within its terms.
The petition for review is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated
September 27, 1994 as well as its Resolution dated January 24, 1995 are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Order of the trial court dated August 27, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED.
Custody over the minor Ray Z. Perez II is awarded to his mother, herein petitioner Nerissa Z.
Perez. This decision is immediately executory.
941
Sagala-Eslao v. CA and Cordero-Ouye
TERESITA SAGALA-ESLAO, petitioner v. COURT OF APPEALS and

MARIA PAZ CORDERO-OUYE, respondents
G.R. No. 116773. January, 16,1997
TORRES, JR., J.:
Children begin by loving their parents. After a time they judge them. Rarely, if ever, do
they forgive them. Indeed, parenthood is a riddle of no mean proportions except for its
mission. Thus, a mother’s concern for her child’s custody is undying - such is a mother’s love.
Facts:
On June 22, 1984, petitioner Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao were
married after their marriage, the couple stayed with respondent Teresita Eslao, mother of the
husband. Out of their marriage, two children were begotten, namely, Leslie Eslao and Angelica
Eslao. In the meantime, Leslie was entrusted to the care and custody of petitioner's mother
while Angelica stayed with her parents at respondent's house. On August 6, 1990, petitioner's
husband Reynaldo Eslao died, petitioner intended to bring Angelica with her to Pampanga but
the respondent prevailed upon her to entrust the custody of Angelica to her, respondent
reasoning out that her son just died and to assuage her grief therefore, she needed the
company of the child to at least compensate for the loss of her late son. In the meantime, the
petitioner returned to her mother's house in Pampanga where she stayed with Leslie.
Subsequently, petitioner was introduced by her auntie to Dr. James Manabu-Ouye, a
Japanese-American, whom she became her husband. On June 24, 1993, the petitioner returned
to the Philippines then informed the respondent about her desire to take informed the
respondent about her desire to take custody of Angelica and explained that her present
husband, Dr. James Ouye, expressed his willingness to adopt Leslie and Angelica and to
provide for their support and education, however, respondent resisted the idea by way of
explaining that the child was entrusted to her when she was ten days old and accused the
petitioner of having abandoned Angelica. The RTC grants the petition in favor of petitioner and
the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto.
Issue:
Whether the court erred in not finding the petitioner fit to be given of minor, Angelica
Eslao.
942
Ruling:
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or
renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being
purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption,
guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an orphan institution. When a parent
entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document,
what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental
authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same.
Hence, when private respondent entrusted the custody of her minor child to the
petitioner, what she gave to the latter was merely temporary custody and it did not constitute
abandonment or renunciation of parental authority. For the right attached to parental authority,
being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption,
guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an orphan institution which do not appear in
the case at bar. The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
943
Oreta v. CA and Dandan
ORETA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and DANDAN, respondent.

G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998
BELLOSILLO, J .:
FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18
May 1941. They were not however blessed with children. Somewhere along the way their
relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California,
U.S.A. She submitted in the divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19 July 1950
evidencing their agreement to live separately from each other and a settlement of their conjugal
properties. On 23 July 1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks
thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but their relationship also
ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a certain Wernimont.
Facts:
Quita and Padlan were married in the Philippines, but Quita filed for divorce in California
which was granted. She remarried twice after the divorce. Upon Padlan’s death, Quita made
claims upon his estate as the surviving spouse and heir of Padlan, alleging that since Padlan
was a Filipino citizen, he remained married to her in spite of the divorce decree.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent considering that
she had secured a divorced in the USA and in fact had twice remarried
Held:
Quita’s right to inherit from Padlan depends on her citizenship at the time the divorce
was decreed. If she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, the divorce
would be valid as to her and will be recognized in the Philippines, and she would lose her right
to inherit.
Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may, be reorganized in the Philippines,
provided tahy are valid according to their national law; once proved that a wife was no longer a
Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from her husband, then she could very well lose her
right to inherit from the latter.
944
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals
ordering the remand of the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and declaring null
and void its decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs
is AFFIRMED. The order of the appellate court modifying its previous decision by granting
one-half (1/2) of the net hereditary estate to the Padlan children, namely, Claro, Ricardo,
Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of
Arturo's brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED. The Court however emphasizes that
the reception of evidence by the trial court should be limited to the hereditary rights of petitioner
as the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.
945
Libi v. IAC
WENDELL LIBI, plaintiff v. INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURT, defendant

214 SCRA 16
REGALADO, J.:
One of the ironic verities of life, it has been said, is that sorrow is sometimes a touchstone of
love. A tragic illustration is provided by the instant case, wherein two lovers died while still in the
prime of their years, a bitter episode for those whose lives they have touched. While we cannot
expect to award complete assuagement to their families through seemingly prosaic legal
verbiage, this disposition should at least terminate the acrimony and rancor of an extended
judicial contest resulting from the unfortunate occurrence.
Facts:
Deceased Julie Ann Gotiong (18 y.o.) and deceased Wendell Libi (bet. 18 and 19 y.o.)
were sweethearts for two years prior to the incident. After the girl decided to end the relationship
(finding the guy sadistic and irresponsible), the boy incessantly pursued her and prayed that
they be together again (which made the guy resort to threats). But, the girl hold steadfast to her
decision. In order to avoid the guy, the girl lived with her best friend. On the day of the incident,
the two were found shot dead with a Smith and Wesson revolver. The parents of the girl
instituted this case against the parents of the guy for damages. The Regional Trial Court
dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence. In the Court of Appeals the RTC decision was
reversed and ordered the Libi spouses to pay ,moral and exemplary damages.The court found
out by convincing evidence that Wendell Libi shot Gotiong before committing suicide.
Subsequently, the Libi spouses filed an appeal contending that they should only assume
subsidiary liability for damages cause by their minor child.
Issue:
Whether or not parental liability for damages cause by the minor child is subsidiary.
Ruling:
The parents of Wendel Libi are held liable for not exercising due diligence, diligentissimi
patris familias, (Art. 2180). The father of the guy owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit
946
box. The father and the mother each had a key. The guy knew of it. The key must have been
negligently left lying around or he had free access to it, such as the bag of his mother. The said
gun was missing. The parents were also unable to explain the photograph of their son holding a
gun. The said photograph was dedicated to the girl. Moreover, they were remiss in their duties
as parents as not being able to know that their son was a Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unite
(CANU) agent involved in a dangerous work of as either a drug informer or drug user. The
damages is based on Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. Art. 101 of RPC doesn’t apply since the guy is
or above 18 y.o. already.
The Supreme Court believes that the civil liability of parents for quasi delicts of their
minor children as contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code is primary and not subsidiary.
Accordingly, just like the rule in 2194 of the Civil Code the civil liability of the parents for crimes
committed by their minor children is likewise direct and primary and also subject to the defense
of lack of fault or negligence on their part, that is the exercise of the diligence of a good father of
the family.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent Court
of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
947
Tamargo v. CA
JENNIFER TAMARGO, plaintiff v. COURT OF APPEALS, Defendant

G.R. No. 85044. June 3, 1992
FELICIANO, J.:
On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo
with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for
damages was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, docketed as Civil
Case No. 3457-V, by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent, and petitioner
spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents against respondent spouses
Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the
tragic incident. In addition to this case for damages, a criminal information or Homicide through
Reckless Imprudence was filed [Criminal Case No. 1722-V] against Adelberto Bundoc.
Adelberto, however, was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability on the ground that he
bad acted without discernment.
Facts:
On August 20, 1982 Adelberto Bundoc, a monor of 10 years of age shot Jennifer
Tamargo. A complaint for civil and criminal action was filed by the deceased adopting parent
and natural parents against the natural parents of Bundoc. The Regional Trial Court dismissed
the case ruling that respondents were not indespensible parties to the action. On petition for
review, respondents contend that the adopting parents namely the Rapisura spouses were the
indespensible parties to the action since parental authority have shifted to them from the
moment the successful petition for adoption was filed on November 18, 1982.
Issue:
Whether or not the effects of adoption insofar as parental authority is concern maybe
given retroactive effect.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court did not consider the retroactive effect that may be given to the
decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at the time
948
when the adopting parents had no actual custody over the adopted child. This is consistent wit
the doctrine of vicarious liability. No presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the
adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses could have arisen since Adelberto Bundoc was not in
fact subject to their control at the time the tort was committed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED DUE
COURSE and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 6 September 1988, in C.A.-G.R. No.
SP-15016 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners' complaint filed before the trial
court is hereby REINSTATED and this case is REMANDED to that court for further proceedings
consistent with this Decision. Costs against respondent Bundoc spouses. This Decision is
immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
949
Hebron v. Loyola
HEBRON V LOYOLA
July 5, 2010
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Courts, not being omniscient, can only strive to determine what actually and truly transpired
based on the evidence before it and the imperfect rules that were designed to assist in establishing the
truth in disputed situations. Despite the difficulties in ascertaining the truth, the courts must ultimately
decide. In civil cases, its decision must rest on preponderance of admissible evidence.
FACTS:
This case originated from a suit for partition and damages concerning the two parcels of
land denominated as Lot Nos. 730 and 879 of the Carmona cadastre. Lot No. 730, with an area
of 17,688 square meters, was owned by Remigia Baylon who was married to Januario Loyola.
Lot No. 879, with an area of 10,278 square meters was owned by Januario Loyola, the husband
of Remigia Baylon. Januario and Remigia had seven children, namely Conrado, Jose,
Benjamin, Candida, Soledad, Cristeta and Encarnacion, all surnamed Loyola.
The administration of the said lots was entrusted to Encarnacion Loyola-Bautista. All the
heirs of Januario and Remigia received their shares in the fruits of the subject properties during
Encarnacion's administration thereof. With the latter's death on September 15, 1969,
administration of the subject properties was assumed by her daughter, Amelia Bautista-Hebron,
who, after some time, started withholding the shares of Candida and the heirs of Conrado. By
the time partition of the said properties was formally demanded on November 4, 1990, Candida
was the only one still living among the children of Januario and Remigia. The rest were survived
and represented by their respective descendants and children, to wit:
1. Conrado Loyola, by his children, Ruben Loyola, now substituted by his heirs, namely,
Josefina, Edgardo, Evelyn, Marina, Aure, Corazon and Joven Francisco, all surnamed
Loyola, and respondents Lorenzo Loyola, Candelaria Loyola, Flora Loyola, Nicardo
Loyola, Teresita Loyola-Alonza, Vicente Loyola and Rosario Loyola-Lontoc;
2. Jose Loyola, by his children, respondents Serafin Loyola, Bibiano Loyola, Roberto
Loyola, Purita Loyola-Lebrudo and Estela Loyola;
950
3. Benjamin Loyola, by his children, respondents Franco Loyola, Angelo Loyola, Rafael
Loyola, Senen Loyola, Perla Loyola-Abad, Ma. Venus Loyola-Ronquillo, Armando
Loyola as well as his daughter-in-law by his son, Eduardo Loyola, respondent Carmen
Hermosa;
4. Soledad Loyola, by her children, respondents Ester Danico, Eduardo Danico,
Mercedita Danico, Honesto Danico, Emelita Danico and Dante Danico;
5. Cristeta Loyola, by her children, respondents Efren Cabigan and Isidro Cabigan; and
6. Encarnacion Loyola-Bautista, by her son, respondent Alfredo Bautista, by petitioner
Amelia Bautista-Hebron, and by her daughter-in-law by her son, Alberto Bautista,
respondent Felicidad Bautista, and the latter's children, respondents Anjanet, Agnes,
Ayren and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Bautista.
For petitioner's failure to heed their formal demand, respondents filed with the RTC of
Imus, Cavite, Branch 20, the complaint for partition and damages from which the instant suit
stemmed. While manifesting her conformity to the partition demanded by her co-heirs, petitioner
claimed in her amended answer that Candida and the heirs of Conrado have already
relinquished their shares in consideration of the financial support extended them by her mother,
Encarnacion. In the pre-trial order, the trial court consequently limited the issue to be resolved to
the veracity of the aforesaid waiver or assignment of shares claimed by petitioner.
Trial on the merits then ensued. While conceding their receipt of financial assistance
from Encarnacion, Candida and the heirs of Conrado maintained that adequate recompense
had been effectively made when they worked without pay at the former's rice mill and household
or, in the case of Carmelita Aguinaldo-Manabo, when she subsequently surrendered her
earnings as a public school teacher to her said aunt.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOTTHE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT

CONSIDERING THAT CANDIDA LOYOLA-AGUINALDO AND THE HEIRS OF CONRADO
LOYOLA ARE BARRED BY ESTOPPEL IN ASSERTING THAT THEY ARE STILL ENTITLED
TO SHARE IN THE QUESTIONED PARCELS OF LAND.
951
RULING:
Laches is the failure of or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that
which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, or to assert a right within
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled thereto has either abandoned it or
declined to assert it.
In the present case, the book of accounts, showing the record of receipts of some heirs of their
shares, has repeated entries in Amelia's handwriting that Candida and the heirs of Conrado are no
longer entitled to shares in the fruits of the properties in litigation because they have sold or given their
share in the said properties to Encarnacion. These entries only prove that Amelia no longer recognized
the entitlement of Candida and the heirs of Conrado to their respective shares. It is relevant to note
however that the entries in the book of accounts started only on July 17, 1986. Hence, there is definite
proof of non-recognition by petitioner of Candida and the heirs of Conrado's entitlement to shares in the
subject properties starting only on July 17, 1986. Before this time, during the administration of the
properties by Encarnacion Loyola-Bautista and some undetermined number of years after her death,
Candida and the heirs of Conrado were proven to have been receiving their shares in the fruits of the
subject properties.
On record is the written demand letter for partition of the litigated properties signed by Candida
and the heirs of Conrado dated November 4, 1990. The complaint for partition was subsequently filed
on February 23, 1993.
From July 17, 1986, to November 4, 1990 only 4 years have elapsed. Even from July 17, 1986
to February 23, 1993 just six years have passed. Considering that the parties are closely related to each
other and considering also that the parties are many different heirs, some of whom reside outside the
Philippines, the passage of six years before the respondents asked for partition through the court is not
unreasonable. We find respondents not guilty of laches.
WHEREFORE the petition for review is DENIED. The February 22, 2005 Decision and the July
7, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 64105 are AFFIRMED.
952
Landingin v. Republic
DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN petitioner, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

respondent.
G.R. No. 164948, June 27, 2006
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77826 which reversed the Decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City, Branch 63 in Civil Case No. 2733 granting the Petition
for Adoption of the petitioner herein.
Facts:
On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United States of America
(USA), of Filipino parentage and a resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition for the adoption of
minors Elaine Dizon Ramos who was born on August 31, 1986; Elma Dizon Ramos, who was
born on September 7, 1987; and Eugene Dizon Ramos who was born on August 5, 1989. The
minors are the natural children of Manuel Ramos, petitioner's brother, and Amelia Ramos.
Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition that when Manuel died on May 19,
1990,the children were left to their paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramos; their biological
mother, Amelia, went to Italy, re-married there and now has two children by her second
marriage and no longer communicated with her children by Manuel Ramos nor with her in-laws
from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption; the minors are being financially
supported by the petitioner and her children, and relatives abroad; as Maria passed away on
November 23, 2000, petitioner desires to adopt the children; the minors have given their written
consent to the adoption; she is qualified to adopt as shown by the fact that she is a 57-year-old
widow, has children of her own who are already married, gainfully employed and have their
respective families; she lives alone in her own home in Guam, USA, where she acquired
citizenship, and works as a restaurant server. She came back to the Philippines to spend time
with the minors; her children gave their written consentto the adoption of the minors.
Petitioner's brother, Mariano Ramos, who earns substantial income, signified his willingness
and commitment to support the minors while in petitioner's custody.
953
Issue/s:
The issues raised by the parties in their pleadings are the following: (a) whether the
petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors without the written consent of their biological mother,
Amelia Ramos; (b) whether or not the affidavit of consent purportedly executed by the
petitioner-adopter's children sufficiently complies with the law; and (c) whether or not petitioner
is financially capable of supporting the adoptees.
Ruling:
While petitioner claims that she has the financial support and backing of her children and
siblings, the OSG is correct in stating that the ability to support the adoptees is personal to the
adopter, as adoption only creates a legal relation between the former and the latter. Moreover,
the records do not prove nor support petitioner's allegation that her siblings and her children are
financially able and that they are willing to support the minors herein. The Court, therefore,
again sustains the ruling of the CA on this issue.
While the Court recognizes that petitioner has only the best of intentions for her nieces
and nephew, there are legal infirmities that militate against reversing the ruling of the CA. In
any case, petitioner is not prevented from filing a new petition for adoption of the herein minors.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED.
954
Sombong v. CA
JOHANNA SOMBONG, petitioner v. COURT OF APPEALS, defendant

252 SCRA 663
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
Every so’ often two women claim to be the legitimate parent of the same child. One or the
other, whether for financial gain or for sheer cupidity, should be an impostor. The court is
consequently called upon to decide as to which of them should have the child’s lawful custody.
This is the very nature of this case. The child herein had considerably grown through the years
that this controversy had unbearably lagged. The wisdom of the ages should be of some help,
delicate as the case considerably is. The earliest recorded decision on the matter is extant in
the Bible, I Kings 3. As it appears, King Solomon in all his glory resolved the controversy posed
by two women claiming the same child:
Facts:
Johanna Sombong allegedly brought her daughter to the clinic of spouses Ty. After
medication Doctor Vicente Ty refused to give back the child since herein petitioner Johanna
Sombong failed to pay the cost of P300.00. The petitioner, allegedly tried to seek help from
public officers to recover her child but he availed of nothing. Subsequently, she filed a petition in
the Regional Trial Court for kidnapping of minor against the spouse Ty. The spouses disclosed
that the baby was given to their staff to act as guardian. The Court of Appeals set aside the said
decision and give to Marieta Neri Alviar, the staff of the spouses in their clinic the custody of the
said child. This is because the persons concerned cannot ascertain whether the said child really
belongs to the petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the custody of the child shall be given to Miss Neri Alviar.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court states that the custody of the child shall be given to Miss Neri Alviar
citing the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which provides that all questions regarding the care
and custody, among others, of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration. In the
same nein, the Family Code authorizes the courts to, the welfare of the child so demands,
955
deprived the parents concern of authority over the child or adopt such measures as maybe
proper under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 30574 is
AFFIRMED IN TOTO. Costs against petitioner.
956
Aquinas School v. Sps. Inton
AQUINAS SCHOOL vs. SPS. JOSE INTON and MA. VICTORIA S. INTON
G.R. No. 184202 (January 26, 2011)
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the private school's liability for the outside catechist's act of shoving a student
and kicking him on the legs when he disobeyed her instruction to remain in his seat and not
move around the classroom.
FACTS:
This case is about the private school’s liability for theoutside catechist’s act of shoving a
student and kicking himon the legs when he disobeyed her instruction to remain inhis seat and
not move around the classroom.In 1998, Jose Luis Inton (Jose Luis) was a grade threestudent
at Aquinas School (Aquinas). Respondent SisterMargarita Yamyamin (Yamyamin), a religion
teacher whobegan teaching at that school only in June of that year,taught Jose Luis’ grade
three religion class.Jose Luis left his seat and went over to a classmate to playa joke of
surprising him. Yamyamin noticed this and senthim back to his seat.After a while, Jose Luis got
up again and went over to thesame classmate.Yamyamin approached the Jose Luis and kicked
him on thelegs several times. She also pulled and shoved his head onthe classmate’s seat.She
also made the child copy the notes on the blackboardwhile seating on the floor.Respondents
Jose and Victoria Inton (the Intons) filed anaction for damages on behalf of their son Jose Luis
againstYamyamin and Aquinas before the Regional Trial Court(RTC) of Pasig City in Civil Case
67427.The Intons also filed a criminal action against Yamyamin forviolation of Republic Act
7610 to which she pleaded guiltyand was sentenced accordingly.With regard to the action for
damages, the Intons soughtto recover actual, moral, and exemplary damages, as wellas
attorney’s fees, for the hurt that Jose Luis and hismother Victoria suffered.The RTC dismissed
Victoria’s personal claims but ruled inJose Luis’ favor, holding Yamyamin liable to him for
moraldamages of P25,000.00, exemplary damagesof P25,000.00, and attorney’s fees of
P10,000.00 plus thecosts of suit.They elevate the case to the CA to increase the award
of damages and hold Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA was correct in holding Aquinassolidarily liable with Yamyamin for
the damages awarded toJose Luis.
957
RULING:
No. The school directress testified that Aquinas had anagreement with a congregation of
sisters under which, inorder to fulfill its ministry, the congregation would send religion teachers
to Aquinas to provide catechesis to itsstudents.Aquinas insists that it was not the school but
Yamyamin’sreligious congregation that chose her for the task of catechizing the school’s grade
three students, much likethe way bishops designate the catechists who would teachreligionin
public schools. Aquinas did not have control overYamyamin’s teaching methods.The Intons had
not refuted the school directress’ testimonyin this regard.Aquinas still had the responsibility of
taking steps to ensurethat only qualified outside catechists are allowed to teachits young
students. In this regard, it cannot be said thatAquinas took no steps to avoid the occurrence of
improperconduct towards the students by their religion teacher.They showed records,
certificates and diploma thatYamyamin is qualified to teach. There is no question thatshe came
from a legitimate congregation of sisters. Theyprovided Faculty Staff Manual in handling the
students.They pre-approved the content of the course she wanted toteach. They have a
classroom evaluation program for herunfortunately, she was new, therefore do not
havesufficient opportunity to observe her.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 88106 dated August 4, 2008, and HOLDS petitioner Aquinas School not
liable in damages to respondent Jose Luis Inton.
958
St. Joseph's College v. Miranda
ST. JOSEPH’S COLLEGE vs. JAYSON MIRANDA

G.R. No. 182353 (June 29, 2010)
NACHURA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 68367, which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 221, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-95-22889.
FACTS:
While inside the premises of St. Joseph’s College, the classwhere respondent Miranda
belonged was conducting ascience experiment about fusion of sulphur powder andiron fillings
under the tutelage of Rosalinda Tabugo, shebeing the teacher and the employee, while the
adviser isEstafania Abdan.Tabugo left her class while it was doing the experimentwithout having
adequately secured it from any untoward incident or occurrence. In the middle of the
experiment,[Jayson], who was the assistant leader of one of the classgroups, checked the result
of the experiment by looking into the test tube with magnifying glass. The test tube was
being held by one of his group mates who moved it close and towards the eye of [Jayson]. At
that instance, thecompound in the test tube spurted out and several particlesof which hit
[Jayson’s] eye and the different parts of thebodies of some of his group mates. As a result
thereof,[Jayson’s] eyes were chemically burned, particularly his left eye, for which he had to
undergo surgery and had to spendfor his medication. Upon filing of this case [in] the lowercourt,
his wound had not completely healed and still had to undergo another surgery.Upon learning of
the incident and because of the need for finances, [Jayson’s] mother, who was working abroad,
hadto rush back home for which she spent P36,070.00 for her fares and had to forego her
salary from November 23,1994 to December 26, 1994, in the amount of at least
P40,000.00.Jason and his parents suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish and wounded
feelings as a result of his injury dueto the petitioner’s fault and failure to exercise the degree
of care and diligence incumbent upon each one of them. Thus,they should be held liable for
moral damages.
959
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners were liable for theaccident.
HELD:
Yes. As found by both lower courts, proximate cause of theJason’s injury was the
concurrent failure of petitioners toprevent to foreseeable mishap that occurred during
theconduct of the science experiment. Petitioners werenegligent by failing to exercise the higher
degree of care,caution and foresight incumbent upon the school, itsadministrators and teachers.
"The defense of due diligenceof a good father of a family raised by [petitioner] St.Joseph
College will not exculpate it from liability because ithas been shown that it was guilty of
inexcusable laxity inthe supervision of its teachers (despite an apparent rigidscreening process
for hiring) and in the maintenance of what should have been a safe and secured environment
forconducting dangerous experiments. [Petitioner] school isstill liable for the wrongful acts of the
teachers andemployees because it had full information on the nature of dangerous science
experiments but did not take affirmativesteps to avert damage and injury to students.The fact
that there has never been any accident in thepastduring the conduct
of science experiments is not a justification to be complacent in just preserving the statusquo
and do away with creative foresight to install safetymeasures to protect the students. Schools
should notsimply install safety reminders and distribute safetyinstructional manuals. More
importantly, schools shouldprovide protective gears and devices to shield studentsfrom
expected risks and anticipated dangers.
The petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68367
is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
960
St. Mary's Academy v. Carpitanos
ST. MARY’S ACADEMY, petitioner v. SHERWIN CARPITANOS, respondent

February. 6, 2002
PARDO, J.
The case is an appeal via certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals as well as
the resolution denying reconsideration, holding petitioner liable for damages arising from an
accident that resulted in the death of a student who had joined a campaign to visit the public
schools in Dipolog City to solicit enrollment.
Facts:
St. Mary’s Academy conducted an enrollment drive for the school year. A facet of the
enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools where prospective enrollees were studying.
Defendant-appellant St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City concluded an enrolment drive for the
school year 1995-1996. As a student of St. Mary’s Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of
the campaigning group. Sherwin, along with other high school students were riding in a
Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva, were on their way to an elementary
school. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then fifteen years old and a student of the same
school. The jeep was owned by Vivicencio. The driver, James II, drove the jeep in a reckless
manner which cause it to turn turtle. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner
and as a result the jeep turned turtle.
Sherwin died as a consequence. The trial court then awarded damages to the parents
of Sherwin against the petitioner by virtue of Art. 218 and 219 of the family code.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is liable for damages for the death of Sherwin.
Ruling:
Article 218 of the Family code enumerates those who have special parental authority
over a minor child and article 219 of the same code provides that those exercising special
parental authority are principally and subsidiary liable for damages caused by the acts or
omission of the emancipated minor under their supervision, instruction or custody.
961
However, for the persons and institutions enumerated therein are to be held liable, there
must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of
the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to the accident. Thus,
injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done.
The negligence of the petitioner was only a remote cause of the accident. There was
the intervention of the negligence of the minor’s parents who drove the jeep and the detachment
of the steering wheel of the jeep was the one which caused the accident.
The Court held that for the school to be liable there must be a finding that the act or
omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because of
negligence, must have causal connection to the accident. There is no showing of such. The
immediate cause was the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Also, there was
no evidence that the school allowed the James II to drive the jeep. The one primarily liable is the
registered owner of the vehicle.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of
Appeals and that of the trial court. The Court remands the case to the trial court for
determination of the liability of defendants, excluding petitioner St. Mary’s
Academy, Dipolog City.
962
Amadora v. CA
ALFREDO AMADORA, petitioner v. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent

160 SCRA 315
CRUZ, J.:
Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was looking forward to the
commencement exercises where he would ascend the stage and in the presence of his relatives
and friends receive his high school diploma. These ceremonies were scheduled on April 16,
1972. As it turned out, though, fate would intervene and deny him that awaited experience. On
April 13, 1972, while they were in the auditorium of their school, the Colegio de San Jose-
Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his
expectations and his life as well. The victim was only seventeen years old.
Facts:
Alfredo Amadora was looking forward to the commencement exercises where he would
a stand the stage and in the presence of his relatives and friends receive his high school
diploma. These ceremonies were scheduled on April 16, 1972. As it turned out, though, fate
would intervene and deny him that awaited experience. On April 13, 1972, while they were in
the auditorium of their school, the Collegio de San Jose-Recoletes, a classmate, Pablito Daffon,
bared a gun that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life as well. The victim
was only seventeen years old.
Pablito was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. Additionally, the parents of
the victim filed this petition for civil damages against the accused with two other students (thru
their parents) together with the College, its rector, the high school principal, the dean of boys,
and the physics teacher, under Art. 2180. After Trial, the Court of First Instance of Cebu has
convicted the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs. On appeal of the respondent court,
however, the decision was reversed in all the defendants were completely absolved.
In its decision, which is now the subject of this petition for criteriorai under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, the respondent court found that Article 2180 was not applicable as the Collegio
de San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of Arts and Trades but an academic institution of
learning.
963
Issue:
Whether or not school may be held liable under diligence of bonus pater families.
Ruling:
The Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in question (Art. 2180) should
apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Following the canon of reddendo
singular singuli: Where the school is academic, responsibility for the tort committed by the
student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student. This is the general rule. [Teachers
to pupils/students] Reason: Old academic schools, the heads just supervise the teachers who
are the ones directly involved with the students. Where the school is for arts and trades, it is the
head and only he who shall be held liable as am exception to the general rule. [Heads to
apprentices] Reason: Old schools of arts and trades saw the masters (or heads of the school)
personally and directly instructed the apprentices. Therefore, the heads are not liable. The
teacher-in-charge is not also liable because there’s no showing that he was negligent in
enforcing discipline against the accused or that he waived observance of the rules and
regulations of the school, or condoned their non-observance. Also, the fact that he wasn’t
present can’t be considered against him because he wasn’t required to report on that day.
Classes had already ceased.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
964
Salvosa v. IAC
JESUS SALVOSA, petitioner V. INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURT, respondent

166 SCRA 275
PADILLA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek the reversal of the
decision 1 of respondent Intermediate Appellate Court, dated 7 December 1984, in AC-G.R. No.
CV 69876, in so far as it affirmed the decision 2 of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac
(hereinafter referred to as the Trial Court), which held, among others, petitioners solidarily hable
with Jimmy B. Abon, under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code.
Facts:
Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF, hereafter) is an academic institution. However, it is
also an institution of arts and trade. It has so advertised itself, as its own evidence shows.
Within the premises of the BCF is an ROTC Unit, the Baguio Colleges Foundation Reserve
Office Training Corps (ROTC), Half, which is under the full control of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines.
On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF, Jimmy B. Abon,
appointed armorer of ROTC, shot Napoleon Castro a student of the University of Baguio with an
unlicensed firearm which the armor took from the armory of the ROTC Unit of the BCF. As a
result, Napoleon Castro died and Jimmy B. Abon was prosecuted for, and convicted of the
crime of Homicide by Military Commision No. 30, AFP.
Subsequently, the heirs of napoleon Castro sued for damage, Impleading Jimmy B.
Abon, Roberto C. Ungos (ROTC, commandant), Benjamin Salvosa (President and Chairman of
the Borad of BCF), Jesus Salvosa (Executive Vice President of BCF), Libertad D. Quetolio
(Dean of the College of Education and Executive Trustee of BCF) and the Baguio Colleges
Foundation, Inc. as party defendants. After hearing, the Trial Court rendered a decision, (1)
sentencing defendants Jimmy B. Abon, Benjamin Salvosa and Baguio Colleges Foundation,
Inc., jointly and severally, to pay private respondents, as heirs of Napoleon Castro.
965
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner can be held solidarily liable with Jimy B. Abon for damages
under Art. 2180 of the civil code, as a consequences of the tortious act of Jimmy B. Abon.
Ruling:
Under Art. 2180 that the petition should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-
academic. Following the canon of reddendo singular singuli: Where the school is academic,
responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such
student. The teacher-in-charge is not also liable because there’s no showing that he was
negligent in enforcing discipline against the accused or that he waived observance of the rules
and regulations of the school, or condoned their non-observance. Also, the fact that he wasn’t
present can’t be considered against him because he wasn’t required to report on that day.
Classes had already ceased.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED in so far as it holds
petitioners solidarily liable with Jimmy B. Abon for his tortious act in killing of Napoleon Castro.
No costs.
966
PSBA v. CA
PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, Plaintiff v.

COURT OF APPEALS, Defendant
205 SCRA 729
PADILLA, J.:
A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985 which caused the death of Carlitos Bautista while
on the second-floor premises of the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA)
prompted the parents of the deceased to file suit in the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch
47) presided over by Judge (now Court of Appeals justice) Regina Ordoñez-Benitez, for
damages against the said PSBA and its corporate officers. At the time of his death, Carlitos was
enrolled in the third year commerce course at the PSBA. It was established that his assailants
were not members of the school's academic community but were elements from outside the
school.
Facts:
A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985 which caused the death of Carlitos Bautista, a
student of PSBA while on the second-floor premises of the Philippine School of Business
Administration (PSBA) prompted the parents of the deceased to file suit in the Regional Trial
Court. Specifically, the suit impleaded the PSBA and the following school authorities: Juan D.
Lim (President), Benjamin P. Paulino (Vice-President), Antonio M Magtalas ( Treasurer/Cashier)
Col. Pedro Sacro (Chief of Security) and a Lt. M. Soriano (Assistant Chief of Security).
Substantially, the plaintiffs (now private respondents) sought to adjudge them liable for the
victim’s untimely demise due to their alleged negligence, recklessness and lack of security
precautions, means and methods before, during and after the attack on the victim. During the
proceedings a quo, Lt. M. Soriano terminated his relationship with the other petitioners by
resigning from his position in the school.
The defendants a quo (now petitioners) sought to have the suit dismissed, alleging that
since they are presumably sued under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the complaint states no
cause of action against them, as jurisprudence on the subject is to the effect that academic
institutions, such as the PSBA.
The respondent trial courtoverruled petitioner’s contention and denied their motion to
dismiss. the respondent appellate court affirmed the trial court’s orders.
967
Issue:
Whether or not an academic institution has a bilateral obligation upon students which
both parents are bound to comply.
Ruling:
As the proceedings a quo have yet to commence on the substance of the private
respondents complaint, the record is bereft of all the material facts. Obviously, at this stage, only
the trial court can make such a determination from the evidence still to unfold.
WHERFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The court of
origin (RTC, Manila, Br. 47) is hereby ordered to continue proceedings consistent with this ruling
of the court. Costs against the petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The court of
origin (RTC, Manila, Br. 47) is hereby ordered to continue proceedings consistent with this ruling
of the Court. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
968
NAMES AND SURNAMES
Remo v. The Honorable Secretary of Foreign Affairs
Ma. Virginia V. Remo

v.
The Honorable Secretary of Foreign AffairsG.R. No. 169202, 5 March 2010, SECOND DIVISION,
CARPIO, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review of the 27 May 2005 Decision and 2 August 2005
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87710. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the Office of the President, which in turn affirmed the decision of the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs denying petitioner’s request to revert to the use of her maiden name in her
replacement passport.
Facts:
Such unjustified changes in one's name and identity in a passport,
whichi s c o n s i d e r e d s u p e r i o r t o a l l o t h e r o f f i c i
a l d o c u m e n t s , c a n n o t b e countenanced. Otherwise, undue
confusion and inconsistency in the records of passport holders will arise.
Petitoner Virginia V. Remo is married to Francisco R. Rallonza
. In herp a s s p o r t , s h e u s e d t h e l a s t n a m e o f h e r h u s b a n d a s
h e r s u r n a m e a n d h e r maiden name as her middle name. Bef ore the
expiration of her passport, shef iled an applicat ion f or its renewal with a request
to revert her surname to hermaiden name. Her request was denied.Consequently,
Remo’s counsel sent a letter to the Secretary of ForeignAf fairs to express the
same request. However, it was also denied. The Off ice,although recognizing the
non-mandatory use of the husband’s surname, statedthat the request can only be granted in
cases where a woman had not used herhusband’s surname in a previous passport,
and that reverting to one’s maidenname is only permitted in cases of annulment
of marriage, divorce, or death of the husband which was neither the case with Remo and
her husband.Remo f iled an appeal to the Off ice of the President which was
dism issed. The sam e act ion was f iled to the Court of Appeals resulting also to
denial. Allmot ions f or reconsider ations f iled to both of f ices were also denied.
Hence, thispetition.
ISSUE:
W hether or not Remo, who or iginally used her husband’s surname in

here x p i r e d p a s s p o r t , c a n r e v e r t t o t h e u s e o f h e r m a i d e n n a
m e , d e s p i t e t h e subsistence of her marriage
969
HELD:
Petition DENIED.
Title XIII of the Civil Code governs the use of surnames. In the case of amarried
woman, Article 370 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 370. A married woman may
use: ( 1 ) H E R M A I D E N F I R S T N A M E A N D S U R N A M E A N D
A D D H E R HUSBAND’S SURNAME, OR
CIVIL LAW
(2) HER MAIDEN FIRST NAME AND HER HUSBAND'S SURNAME, OR
(3)
H E R H U S B A N D ’ S F U L L N A M E , B U T P R E F I X I N G A
W O R D INDICATING THAT SHE IS HIS WIFE, SUCH AS “MRS.”
We agree with Remo that the use of the word “may” in the
aboveprovision indicates that the use of the husband’s surn
a m e b y t h e w i f e i s permissive rather than
obligatory.C l e a r l y , a m a r r i e d w o m a n h a s a n o p t i o n , b u t n o t a d u
t y , t o u s e t h e surname of the husband in any of the ways provided by
Article 370 of the CivilCode. She is therefore allowed to use not only any of the three
names providedin Art icle 370, but also her maiden name upon marriage. She is
not prohibitedfrom continuously using her maiden name once she is married because when
aw o m a n m a r r i e s , s h e d o e s n o t c h a n g e h e
r n a m e b u t o n l y h e r c i v i l status. Further, this inter
p r e t a t i o n i s i n c o n s o n a n c e w i t h t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t surnames indicate
descent. I n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , R e m o , w h o s e m a r r i a g e i s s t i l l s u b s i s t i n g
a n d w h o opted to use her husband’s sur name in her old passport, requested to
resumeher maiden name in the replacement passport arguing that no law prohibits herfrom
using her maiden name.T h e O f f i c e o f t h e S o l i c i t o r G e n e r a l ( O S G ) , o n
behalf of the Secretary
of F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , a r g u e s t h a t t h e h i g h l i g h t e d p r o v i s o i n S e
c t i o n 5 ( d ) o f R A 8239 “limits the instances when a mar ried woman may be
allowed to revert tot h e use of her maiden name in her
p a s s p o r t . ” T h e s e i n s t a n c e s a r e d e a t h o f husband, divorce decree, annulment or
nullity of marriage.Since Remo’s marriage to her husband subsists, placing her
case outsideof the pur vi ew of Section 5(d) of RA 8239 (as to the instances
when a marr iedwom an may revert to the use of her maiden name), she may not
resume hermaiden name in the replacement passport. The Court notes that Remo
would not have encountered any problem s inthe replacement passport had she
opted to cont inuously and consistently useher maiden name from the moment she was
married and from the time she firstapplied f or a Philippine passport. However, Remo
consciously chose to use
herh u s b a n d ’ s s u r n a m e b e f o r e , i n h e r p r e v i o u s p a s s p o r t a p p l i c a t i o n ,
a n d n o w desires to resume her maiden name. If we allow petitioner ’s present
request,definitely nothing prevents her in the future from requesting to revert to the useof her
husband’s surname. Such unjustified changes in one's name and
identityi n a p a s s p o r t , w h i c h i s c o n s i d e r e d s
u p e r i o r t o a l l o t h e r o f f i c i a l documents, canno
t b e c o u n t e n a n c e d . O t h e r w i s e , u n d u e c o n f u s i o n a n d inconsisten
cy in the records of passport holders will arise. Thus, f or passportissua nce
970
purposes, a married woman, such as Remo, whose marriage subsists, may not
change her family name at will.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 27 May 2005 Decision and 2 August
2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87710.
971
Yasin v. Sharia District Court
HATIMA C. YASIN, petitioner v. THE HONORABLE JUDGE SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT

THIRD SHARI'A JUDICIAL DISTRICT, defendant
G.R. No. 94986 February 23, 1995
BIDIN, J.:
On May 5, 1990, Hatima C. Yasin filed in the Shari'a District Court in Zamboanga City a
"Petition to resume the use of maiden name" (Sp. Proc. No. 06-3).
Facts:
Petitioner Hatima Yasin is. of legal age, a divorcee, a Muslin Filipino and a resident of
Suterville, Zamboanga City, Philippines. She was formerly married to a certain Hadji Idris Yasin,
also a Muslim Filipino in accordance with Muslim rites and customs, and who is now residing at
Barangay Recodo, Zamboanga City, but sometime on March 13, 1984, they were granted a
decree of divorce by the Mindanao Islamic Center Foundation, Inc., in accordance with Islamic
Law. The former husband Hadji Idris Yasin contracted another marriage to another woman and
the petitioner prayed to resume the use of her maiden name Hatima Centi y Saul in accordance
with the provisions of Rules 103, Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether or not a petition for resumption of maiden name and surname is also a petition
for change of name.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court finds the petition to resume the use of maiden name filed by
petitioner before the respondent court a superfluity and unnecessary proceeding since the law
requires her to do so as her former husband is already married to another woman after
obtaining a decree of divorce from her in accordance with Muslim laws.
Although there is no legal prohibition against obtaining a judicial confirmation of a legal
right, nevertheless, no law or rule provides for the procedure by which such confirmation may be
obtained. In view of such circumstances, the onerous requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court on change of name should not be applied to judicial confirmation of the right of a divorced
972
woman to resume her maiden name and surname. In the absence of a specific rule or provision
governing such a proceeding, where sufficient facts have been alleged supported by competent
proof as annexes, which appear to be satisfactory to the court, such petition for confirmation of
change of civil status and/or to resume the use of maiden name must be given due course and
summarily granted as in fact it is a right conferred by law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the orders of respondent court dated July
4, 1990 and August 10, 1990 are hereby SET ASIDE. Petitioner is authorized to resume her
maiden name and surname.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the orders of respondent court dated July 4, 1990
and August 10, 1990 are hereby SET ASIDE. Petitioner is authorized to resume her maiden
name and surname. SO ORDERED.
973
In re: Adoption of Stephanie Garcia

454 S 541
Facts:
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition[1] to adopt
his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among others,
that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994;[2] that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that
Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle name and surname; and that he is now a
widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name
Astorga be changed to “Garcia,” her mother’s surname, and that her surname “Garcia” be
changed to “Catindig,” his surname.
On March 23, 2001,[3] the trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the adoption.
On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration[5]
praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA)
as her middle name and on May 28, 2001,[6] the trial court denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use
the surname of his biological mother as his middle name.
Issue:
Whether an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name
when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father
Ruling:
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with petitioner
that Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname of her natural
mother. The Court said that, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie’s filiation with
her natural mother becuse under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate
heir of athe latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless hardship in the future, her
relationship or proof of that relationship with her natural mother should be maintained and that ,
974
there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her natural mother as her
middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows.
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural
father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, we find no reason why
she should not be allowed to do so.

the sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her mother’s surname “GARCIA” as her
middle name.
975
In Re: Julian Lin Wang
IN THE RE: CHANGE OF NAME OF JULIAN WANG

G.R. No. 159966. March 30, 2005
TINGA, J.:
I will not blot out his name out of the book of life.
Facts
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born to parents Anaa Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang.
The parents married some time after. They executed a deed of legitimation in favor of Julian.
The legitimation prayed for the dropping of the middle name for two reasons: (1) possible
confusion and discrimination, and (2) best interest of the child. The parents planned to send
their son to Singapore to study. They alleged that in there the middle name is disregarded. As
such, people might get confused and discriminate Julian and his sister who is already studying
there. Likewise, the Singaporean Mandarin language don’t have the letter “R,” instead they
pronounce it as “L.” In effect, the name of Julian will sound funny.
The Lower Courts denied the petition. The Office of the Solicitor General also pointed
out that the cause of change was only for mere convenience and not one of necessity. The link
between the change/dropping of the middle name and the child's welfare were not well
substantiated?
Issue:
When can a person avail of a name change?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition. The reasons are insufficient. There is no proper
and reasonable cause for a change of name. There is no showing of Singaporean laws
regarding names, and the possible effects of confusion and discrimination are imaginary than
real. Philippine law dictates that the legitimate and legitimated children shall carry the surnames
of the father and the mother.
The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be ‘proper and
reasonable cause’ for which the change is sought. To justify a request for change of name,
petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling reason therefore but also that he will
be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the grounds for change of name
976
which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in
legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and
been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a
sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and
without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no
showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of
name would prejudice public interest.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED.SO
ORDERED.
977
People v. Estrada
People v. Estrada GR# 164368-69, April 2, 2009
BRION, J.:
FACTS:
On April 4, 2001, an Information for plunder was filed with the Sandiganbayan against
respondent Estrada, among other accused. A separate Information for illegal use of alias, was
likewise filed against him. In the information, it was alleged that on or about 04 February 2000,
in the City of Manila, then President Estrada without having been duly authorized, judicially or
administratively, taking advantage of his position and committing the offense in relation to office,
i.e., in order to CONCEAL THE ill-gotten wealth HE ACQUIRED during his tenure and his true
identity as THE President of the Republic of the Philippines, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and criminally REPRESENT HIMSELF AS ‘JOSE VELARDE’ IN SEVERAL
TRANSACTIONS AND use and employ the SAID alias “Jose Velarde” which IS neither his
registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank
and/or other corporate entities.
Estrada was subsequently arrested on the basis of a warrant of arrest that the
Sandiganbayan issued. A Special Division in the Sandiganbayan was made to try, hear, and
decide the charges of plunder and related against respondent Estrada. At the trial, the People
presented testimonial and documentary evidence to prove the allegations of the Informations for
plunder, illegal use of alias, and perjury.
After the People rested in all three cases, the defense moved to be allowed to file a
demurrer to evidence in these cases. In its Joint Resolution, the Sandiganbayan only granted
the defense leave to file demurrers in illegal use of alias and perjury. The Sandiganbayan ruled
that the people failed to present evidence that proved Estrada’s commission of the offense.
ISSUE:
Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in dismissing Crim.
Case No. 26565 and in applying R.A. No. 1405 as an exception to the illegal use of alias
punishable under Commonwealth Act No. 142
978
HELD:
No. The Sandiganbayan position that the rule in the law of libel
– that mere communication to a third person is publicity – does not apply to violations of CA No.
142. In order to be held liable for a violation of CA No. 142, the user of the alias must have held
himself out as a person who shall publicly be known under that other name. In other words, the
intent to publicly use the alias must be manifest. The presence of Lacquian and Chua when
Estrada signed as Jose Velarde and opened Trust Account No. C-163 does not necessarily
indicate his intention to be publicly known henceforth as Jose Velarde. Thus, Estrada could not
be said to have intended his signing as Jose Velarde to be for public
consumption by the fact alone that Lacquian and Chua were also inside the room at that time.
The same holds true for Estrada’s alleged representations with Ortaliza and Dichavez,
assuming the evidence for these representations to be admissible. All of Estrada’s
representations to these people were made in privacy and in secrecy, with no iota of intention of
publicity.
Bank deposits under R.A. No. 1405 (the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law) are statutorily
protected or recognized zones of privacy. Given the private nature of Estrada’s act of signing
the documents as “Jose Velarde” related to the opening of the trust account, the People cannot
claim that there was already a public use of alias when Ocampo and Curato witnessed the
signing. Petition was denied.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit.
979
Cesario Ursua v. CA
CESARIO URSUA petitioner v.

COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent
G.R. No. 112170. April 10,1996.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a petition for a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
conviction of petitioner by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City for violation of Sec. 1 of C.A.
No. 142, as amended by R.A. No. 6085, otherwise known as “An Act to Regulate the Use of
Alliases”
Facts:
Petitioner Cesario Ursua, a Community Environment and Natural Resources Ofiicer
assigned in Kidapawan, Cotabato, had a complaint against him for bribery, dishonesty, abuse of
authority and giving of unwarranted benefits.
On August 1 1987, Atty. Francis Palmores, counsel of the petitioner requested to the
Office of the Ombudsman in Manila that he be furnished a copy of the complaint against
petitioner. He then asked his client Ursua to take his letter request to the office of the
Ombudsman because his law firm’s messenger, Oscar Perez, had to attend to some personal
matters.
When petitioner arrived at the Office of the Ombudsman, he wrote the name “Oscar
Perez” on the visitor’s logbook and upon receipt of the acknowledged by writing. Loida
Kahulugan, who handed the copy of complaint, learned that the person who introduced himself
as Oscar Perez was actually the petitioner, Cesario Ursua. She reported the matter to the
Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner be charged.
The trial court found him guilty of violating Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A.
No. 6085. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision on May 31, 1993. The petitioner asks for
review on his conviction in Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner violated C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085 otherwise
known as “An Act to Regulate the Use of Alias.
980
Ruling:
Cesario Ursua is acquitted of the crime charged. C.A No. 142, approved on November 7,
1936 entitled “An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases”, was amended by R.A. No. 6085on August
4 1969. C.A. No. 142 as amended was made primarily to penalize the act of using an alias
name publicly and in business transactions in addition to his real name unless such alias was
duly authorized by proper judicial proceeding.
The fact that the petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the Ombudsman as “Oscar
Perez” served only the request of his lawyer to obtain a copy of the complaint in which the
petitioner was a respondent. There is no evidence showing that he had used or was intending to
use that name as his second name in addition to his real name. Hence, the use of a fictitious
name or a different name belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign or
indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that
day forth does not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A.
6085. There exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by
a legislative measure and that a construction of which the statue is fairly susceptible is favored.
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and petitioner CESARIO
URSUA is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.
981
Absence
Bienvenido v. CA
NENITA BIENVENIDO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, LUISITA CAMACHO

and LUIS FAUSTINO C. CAMACHO, respondents.
G.R. No. 111717 October 24, 1994
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
Aurelio P. Camacho married Consejo Velasco in Manila on October 3, 1942. On

February 6, 1962, without his marriage to Consejo Velascobeing dissolved, Aurelio P. Camacho
contracted another marriage with respondent Luisita C. Camacho (Luisita) with whom he had
been livin gsince 1953 and by whom he begot a child, respondent Aurelio Luis Faustino C.
Camacho (Chito) born on May 22, 1961. The marriage was solemnized in Tokyo, Japan where
Aurelio and Luisita had been living since 1958.
There were instances during Luisita and Aurelio’s marriage when, because of their
quarrels, one or the other left the dwelling place for long periods of time. In her case Luisita
stayed on those occasions at various times in Davao City, Hongkong or Japan.
In 1967 Aurelio met petitioner Nenita T. Bienvenido, who had been estranged from her
husband, Luis Rivera. He lived with her from June 1968 until Aurelio’s death on May 28, 1988,
he lived with her, the last time in a duplex apartment in Quezon City. Petitioner’s daughter,
Nanette, stayed with them as did Aurelio’s son, Chito, who lived with them for about a year in
1976.
On April 30, 1982, Aurelio bought the house and the lot on DelgadoStreet in which they
were staying from the owners, Paz Lorenzo Infante and Suzette Infante-Moñozca. In the deed
of sale and TransferCertificate of Title No. 288350 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon
City, issued in his name, Aurelio was described as single.
982
On November 26, 1984, Aurelio executed a deed of sale of the propertyin favor of
petitioner Nenita in consideration of the sum of P250,000.00, by virtue of which Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 326681 was issued in petitioner’s name on January 11, 1985.
On September 7, 1988, Luisita and her son Chito brought this case inthe Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, seeking the annulment of the sale of the property to petitioner and the
payment to them of damages. Luisita alleged that the deed of sale was a forgery and that in any
event it was executed in fraud of her as the legitimate wife of
Aurelio.
In answer petitioner Nenita claimed that she and the late Aurelio had purchased the
property in question using their joint funds which they had accumulated after living together for
fourteen years, that the sale of the property by the late Aurelio to her was with respondent
Luisita’s consent; and that she was a purchaser in good faith.
ISSUE:
Whether the deed of sale between Aurelio and Nenita is valid.
RULING:
In the case at bar, the burden of proof was on respondents to show that Luisita and
Aurelio’s
marriage falls under any of these exceptions in order to be considered valid. They failed to
discharge this burden. Instead the contrary appears.
It has been held that the first exception refers to the subsequent marriage of the
abandoned spouse and not the remarriage of the deserting spouse, after the period of seven
years had lapsed. This exception cannot be invoked in this case in order to sustain the validity
of Aurelio’s marriage to Luisita because apparently it was Aurelio who had left his first wife. At
the time of his second marriage to Luisita, he and Luisita had already been living together as
husband and wife for five years. In fact the couple begot a child, in 1961, even before their
marriage in 1962.
983
Consequently, there is no basis for holding that the property inquestion was property of
the conjugal partnership of Luisita and the late Aurelio because there was no such partnership
in the first place.
The sale to petitioner must be presumed. Petitioner’s ownership is evidenced by a deed

of absolute sale executed with all the solemnity of a public document and by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 326681 issued in due course in her name.
Indeed, the property in question was acquired by Aurelio during a long period of
cohabitation with petitioner which lasted for twenty years (1968-1988). While petitioner knew
respondent Chito to be Aurelio’s son way back in 1976, there is nothing to show that she knew
Aurelio to be married to Luisita. To the contrary, Aurelio represented himself to be single. As far
as petitioner was concerned, Chito could have been Aurelio’s child by a woman not his wife.
There was, therefore, no basis for the Court of Appeals’ ruling that Nenita was not a buyer in
good faith of the property because she ought to have known that Aurelio was married to Luisita.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and another one is entered,
DISMISSING the complaint against petitioner and DECLARING the deed of sale executed in
her favor and Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 326681 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City issued in her name to be VALID.
984
Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG-MAGPAYO (A.K.A. JULIAN EDWARD
EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG), Respondent.
G.R. No. 189476 February 2, 2011
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
FACTS:
Born in Makati on September 9, 1972, Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo
(respondent) is the son of Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim Coseteng
who, as respondent’s certificate of live birth shows, contracted marriage on March 26, 1972.
Claiming, however, that his parents were never legally married, respondent filed on July
22, 2008 at the Regional Trial Court a Petition to change his name to Julian Edward Emerson
Marquez Lim Coseteng.
In support of his petition, respondent submitted a certification from the National Statistics
Office stating that his mother Anna Dominique "does not appear in [its] National Indices of
Marriage." Respondent also submitted his academic records from elementary up to college
showing that he carried the surname "Coseteng," and the birth certificate of his child where
"Coseteng" appears as his surname. In the 1998, 2001 and 2004 Elections, respondent ran and
was elected as Councilor of Quezon City’s 3rd District using the name "JULIAN M.L.
COSETENG."
The trial court granted respondent’s petition and directed the Civil Registrar of Makati
City to delete the entry "March 26, 1972" for "DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE OF
PARTIES"; correct the entry "MAGPAYO" in the space for the Last Name of the [respondent] to
"COSETENG"; delete the entry "COSETENG" in the space for Middle Name of the
[respondent]; and delete the entry "Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr." in the space for FATHER of
the [respondent]…
The Republic of the Philippines filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by
the trial court, hence, it, thru the OSG, lodged the present petition for review to the Court on
pure question of law.
985
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for change of name should be made through adversarial
proceedings.
RULING:
Since respondent’s desired change affects his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate,
Rule 108 applies. It reads:
SECTION 1. Who may file petition.—Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree
concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a
verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the [RTC] of
the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
SEC. 3. Parties.—When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the
civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby
shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. –Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix
the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given
to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once
a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
(emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns one’s civil status should be filed in
the civil registry in which the entry is sought to be cancelled or corrected – that of Makati in the
present case, and "all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby"
should be made parties to the proceeding.
As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was filed not in Makati where his
birth certificate was registered but in Quezon City. And as the above-mentioned title of the
petition filed by respondent before the RTC shows, neither the civil registrar of Makati nor his
father and mother were made parties thereto.
IN FINE, when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register
involves substantial and controversial alterations including those on citizenship, legitimacy of
paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule
108 of the Rules of Court is mandated.
986
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions, GRANTED. The
January 8, 2009 Decision of Branch 77 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in SP Proc.
No. Q-0863058 is NULLIFIED.
987
Silverio v. Republic
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007
CORONA, J.:
FACTS:
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. Its relevant
portions read:
(a) “Petitioner filed to present petition… solely for the purpose of making his birth records
compatible with his present sex”;
(b) “Granting the petition would be more in consonance with the principles of justice and
equity.
(c) Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and should not
be in any way taken against him.
(d) The court believes that no harm, injury or prejudice will be caused to anybody or the
community in granting the petition as it would only grant the petitioner his much awaited
happiness and the realization of their (his fiance’) dreams.
On August 18, 2003, the Republic, thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the CA.
On February 23, 2006, the CA rendered a decision in favor of the Republic, thus, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the change of the petitioner’s name and sex in his birth certificate are
allowed under Articles 4007 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court
and RA 9048.
RULING:
No. It is not allowed. A person’s name cannot be changed on the ground of sex
reassignment. No law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground
of sex reassignment. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Statutes control petitions for
988
change of name. Neither may entries in the birth certificate as to first name or sex be changed
on the ground of equity. Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that no person can change his
name or surname without judicial authority. Article 412 provides that no entry in the civil register
shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
989
RP v. Cagandahan

VS.
JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN, respondent.
GR. No. 166676 September 12, 2008
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising purely questions
of law and seeking a reversal of the Decision dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, which granted the Petition for Correction of Entries in
Birth Certificate filed by Jennifer B. Cagandahan and ordered the following changes of entries in
Cagandahan's birth certificate: (1) the name "Jennifer Cagandahan" changed to "Jeff
Cagandahan" and (2) gender from "female" to "male."
FACTS:
Jennifer Cagandahan was registered as a female in her Certificate of Live Birth. During
her childhood years, she suffered from clitoral hypertrophy and was later on diagnosed that her
ovarian structures had minimized. She likewise has no breast nor menstruation. Subsequently,
she was diagnosed of having Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), a condition where those
afflicted possess secondary male characteristics because of too much secretion of male
hormones, androgen. According to her, for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and
emotion, she has become a male person. She filed a petition at RTC Laguna for Correction of
Entries in her Birth Certificate such that her gender or sex be changed to male and her first
name be changed to Jeff.
ISSUE:
Whether or not correction of entries in her birth certificate should be granted.
990
HELD:
The Court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of
intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. SC is of the view that
where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender
classification would be what the individual, having reached the age of majority, with good reason
thinks of his/her sex. As in this case, respondent, thinks of himself as a male and considering
that his body produces high levels of male hormones, there is preponderant biological support
for considering him as being a male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes
the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons,
like respondent, is fixed.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the Republic's petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 12, 2005
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement
as to costs.
991
In re: Change of Name of Julian Wang
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF

ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY OF JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG also known as JULIAN
LIN WANG, to be amended/corrected as JULIAN LIN WANG, JULIAN LIN WANG, duly
represented by his mother ANNA LISA WANG, petitioner, vs. CEBU CITY CIVIL
REGISTRAR, duly represented by the Registrar OSCAR B. MOLO, respondent.
G.R. No. 159966. March 30, 2005
TINGA, J.:
FACTS:
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born on February 20, 1998 in Cebu City to Anna Lisa
Wang and Sing-Foe Wang. His parents were then married on September 22, 1998, thenafter,
he was legitimated and named Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. His parents had a plan to transfer to
Singapore so that the children could study there. Hence, they filed a petition for change of name
and/or correction/cancellation of entry whereby they are asking the court to drop the middle
name of Julian. According to the petition, people in Singapore do not carry the maiden
surnames of their mother, and this fact might cause Julian to be discriminated by the people
there. Also, he and his sister might have difficulties in comprehending why they have different
surnames. The RTC denied the petition holding that the cause for the petition does not fall
under the grounds recognized by law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not dropping the middle name of the minor child is contrary to Art. 174 of the
FCP.
RULING:
The Court held that the dropping of the middle name is contrary to public interest. The
State has an interest in the names borne by individuals. Change of name is a privilege and not a
right. Such action should be based on no other than the reasonable causes recognized by law.
Since the child is a legitimate Filipino child, Philippine law should apply and Singaporean law
shall not rule over the laws of the Philippines.
992
The only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is
convenience. However, how such change of name would make his integration into
Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of
his middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable
cause to drop it from his registered complete name.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED.
993
Baldos v. CA
NIEVES ESTARES BALDOS, substituted by FRANCISCO BALDOS and MARTIN BALDOS,

Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and REYNALDO PILLAZAR a.k.a. REYNALDO ESTARES BALDOS,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 170645 July 9, 2010
CARPIO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the 8 August 2005 Decision and the 22 November 2005
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 65693. The 8 August 2005 Decision
affirmed the 16 August 1999 Order of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 74) of Olongapo City in
Civil Case No. 79-0-95. The 22 November 2005 Resolution denied petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.
FACTS:
Reynaldo Pillazar, alias Reynaldo Baldos, was born on 30 October 1948. However, his
birth was not registered in the office of the local civil registrar until roughly 36 years later or on
11 February 1985. His certificate of live birth indicated Nieves Baldos as his mother and
Bartolome Baldos as his father. Nieves Baldos also appeared as the informant on the certificate
of live birth.
On 8 March 1995, Nieves Baldos filed in the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City a
complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 79-0-95, for cancellation of the late registration of
Reynaldo’s birth. She claimed that Reynaldo was not really her son.
The trial court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court’s Order.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the late registration of Reynaldo’s birth is valid.
994
RULING:
Since Reynaldo was born on 30 October 1948, the late registration of his birth is outside
of the coverage of P.D. No. 651, as amended. The late registration of Reynaldo’s birth falls
under Act No. 3753, otherwise known as the Civil Registry Law, which took effect on 27
February 1931. As a general law, Act No. 3753 applies to the registration of all births, not
otherwise covered by P.D. No. 651, as amended, occurring from 27 February 1931 onwards.
Considering that the late registration of Reynaldo’s birth took place in 1985, National Census
Statistics Office (NCSO) Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1983 governs the implementation
of Act No. 3753 in this case.
Under NCSO A.O. No. 1-83, the birth of a child shall be registered in the office of the
local civil registrar within 30 days from the time of birth. Any report of birth made beyond the
reglementary period is considered delayed. The local civil registrar, upon receiving an
application for delayed registration of birth, is required to publicly post for at least ten days a
notice of the pending application for delayed registration. If after ten days no one opposes the
registration and the local civil registrar is convinced beyond doubt that the birth should be
registered, he should register the same.
Reynaldo’s certificate of live birth, as a duly registered public document, is presumed to
have gone through the process prescribed by law for late registration of birth. It was only on 8
March 1995, after the lapse of ten long years from the approval on 11 February 1985 of the
application for delayed registration of Reynaldo’s birth, that Nieves registered her opposition.
She should have done so within the ten-day period prescribed by law. Records show that no
less than Nieves herself informed the local civil registrar of the birth of Reynaldo. At the time of
her application for delayed registration of birth, Nieves claimed that Reynaldo was her son.
Between the facts stated in a duly registered public document and the flip-flopping statements of
Nieves, we are more inclined to stand by the former.
Applications for delayed registration of birth go through a rigorous process. The books
making up the civil register are considered public documents and are prima facie evidence of
the truth of the facts stated there. As a public document, a registered certificate of live birth
enjoys the presumption of validity. It is not for Reynaldo to prove the facts stated in his
certificate of live birth, but for petitioners who are assailing the certificate to prove its alleged
falsity. Petitioners miserably failed to do so. Thus, the trial court and the Court of Appeals
correctly denied for lack of merit the petition to cancel the late registration of Reynaldo’s birth.
995
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 8 August 2005 Decision and the 22
November 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 65693 affirming the 16
August 1999 Order of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 74) of Olongapo City in Civil Case No.
79-0-95.
996
Lee v. CA
MARCELO LEE, ALBINA LEE-YOUNG, MARIANO LEE, PABLO LEE, HELEN LEE,
CATALINO K. LEE, EUSEBIO LEE, EMMA LEE, and TIU CHUAN, petitioners, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS and HON. LORENZO B. VENERACION and HON. JAIME T. HAMOY, in their
capacities as Presiding Judge of Branch 47, Regional Trial Court of Manila and Branch
130, Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, respectively and RITA K. LEE, LEONCIO LEE
TEK SHENG in their personal capacities and ROSA K. LEE-VANDERLEK, MELODY K.
LEE-CHIN, LUCIA K. LEE TEK SHENG, JULIAN K. LEE, HENRY K. LEE, MARTIN K. LEE,
VICTORIANO K. LEE, NATIVIDAD K. LEE-MIGUEL, and THOMAS K. LEE, represented by
RITA K. LEE, respondents.
G.R. No. 118387. October 11, 2001
DE LEON, JR., J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari, with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, seeks the reversal of the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals dated October 28, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP NO. 31786[2]. The assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals upheld the Orders issued by respondents Judges Hon. Lorenzo
B. Veneracion[3] and Hon. Jaime T. Hamoy[4] taking cognizance of two (2) separate petitions
filed by private respondents before their respective salas for the cancellation and/or correction
of entries in the records of birth of petitioners pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
FACTS:
Rita K. Lee, Leoncio Lee Tek Sheng, Rosa K. Lee-Vanderlek, Melody K. Lee-Chin, Lucia
K. Lee Tek Sheng-Ong, Julian K. Lee, Henry K. Lee, Martin K. Lee, Victoriano K. Lee, Natividad
K. Lee-Miguel and Thomas K. Lee (hereinafter referred to as private respondents) filed two (2)
separate petitions for the cancellation and/or correction of entries in the records of birth of
Marcelo Lee, Albina Lee-Young, Mariano Lee, Pablo Lee, Helen Lee, Catalino K. Lee, Eusebio
Lee, and Emma Lee (hereinafter referred to as petitioners). On December 2, 1992, the petition
against all petitioners, with the exception of Emma Lee, was filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila and docketed as SP. PROC. NO. 92-63692 and later assigned to Branch
47 presided over by respondent Judge Lorenzo B. Veneracion. On February 3, 1993, a similar
petition against Emma Lee was filed before the RTC of Kalookan and docketed as SP. PROC.
NO. C-1674 and assigned to the sala of respondent Judge Jaime T. Hamoy of Branch 130.
997
Both petitions sought to cancel and/or correct the false and erroneous entries in all
pertinent records of birth of petitioners by deleting and/or canceling therein the name of “Keh
Shiok Cheng” as their mother, and by substituting the same with the name “Tiu Chuan”, who is
allegedly the petitioners’ true birth mother.
The private respondents alleged in their petitions before the trial courts that they are the
legitimate children of spouses Lee Tek Sheng and Keh Shiok Cheng who were legally married
in China sometime in 1931. Except for Rita K. Lee who was born and raised in China, private
respondents herein were all born and raised in the Philippines.
Sometime in October, 1948, Lee Tek Sheng, facilitated the arrival in the Philippines from
China of a young girl named Tiu Chuan. She was introduced by Lee Tek Sheng to his family as
their new housemaid but far from becoming their housemaid, Tiu Chuan immediately became
Lee Tek Sheng’s mistress. As a result of their illicit relations, Tiu Chuan gave birth to
petitioners.
Unknown to Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents, every time Tiu Chuan gave birth
to each of the petitioners, their common father, Lee Tek Sheng, falsified the entries in the
records of birth of petitioners by making it appear that petitioners’ mother was Keh Shiok Cheng.
Since the birth of petitioners, it was Tiu Chuan who gave maternal care and guidance to
the petitioners. They all lived in the same compound Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents
were residing in. All was well, therefore, before private respondents’ discovery of the
dishonesty and fraud perpetrated by their father, Lee Tek Sheng.
The tides turned after Keh Shiok Cheng’s demise on May 9, 1989. Lee Tek Sheng
insisted that the names of all his children, including those of petitioners’, be included in the
obituary notice of Keh Shiok Cheng’s death that was to be published in the newspapers. It was
this seemingly irrational act that piqued private respondents’ curiosity, if not suspicion.
Acting on their suspicion, the private respondents requested the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to conduct an investigation into the matter.
In conclusion, as per Chinese General Hospital Patients Records, it is very obvious
that the mother of these 8 children is certainly not KEH SHIOK CHENG, but a much
younger woman, most probably TIU CHUAN. Upon further evaluation and analysis by
these Agents, LEE TEK SHENG, is in a quandary in fixing the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG
possibly to conform with his grand design of making his 8 children as their own legitimate
children, consequently elevating the status of his 2nd family and secure their future. The
doctor lamented that this complaint would not have been necessary had not the father and
998
his 2nd family kept on insisting that the 8 children are the legitimate children of KEH SHIOK
CHENG.
It was this report that prompted private respondents to file the petitions for cancellation
and/or correction of entries in petitioners’ records of birth with the lower courts.
Petitioners contend that resort to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court is improper
since private respondents seek to have the entry for the name of petitioners’ mother changed
from “Keh Shiok Cheng” to “Tiu Chuan” who is a completely different person. What private
respondents therefore seek is not merely a correction in name but a declaration that petitioners
were not born of Lee Tek Sheng’s legitimate wife, Keh Shiok Cheng, but of his mistress, Tiu
Chuan, in effect a “bastardization of petitioners.” Petitioners thus label private respondents’ suits
before the lower courts as a collateral attack against their legitimacy in the guise of a Rule 108
proceeding.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, which implements Article 412 of
the New Civil Code, can be used to make substantial changes and corrections in the entries in
the civil registry.
RULING:
YES. First of all, Article 412 is a substantive law that provides as follows: “No entry in a
civil register shall be changed or corrected, without a judicial order.”
It does not provide for a specific procedure of law to be followed except to say that the
corrections or changes must be effected by judicial order. As such, it cannot be gleaned
therefrom that the procedure contemplated for obtaining such judicial order is summary in
nature. Secondly, it is important to note that Article 412 uses both the terms “corrected” and
“changed”. In its ordinary sense, to correct means “to make or set right”; “to remove the faults or
errors from” while to change means “to replace something with something else of the same kind
or with something that serves as a substitute”. The provision neither qualifies as to the kind of
entry to be changed or corrected nor does it distinguish on the basis of the effect that the
correction or change may have. Hence, it is proper to conclude that all entries in the civil
register may be changed or corrected under Article 412. Thirdly, Republic Act 9048 which was
passed by Congress on February 8, 2001 substantially amended Article 412 of the New Civil
Code.
999
The above law speaks clearly. Clerical and typographical errors in entries of the civil register are
now corrected and changed without need of a judicial order and by the city or municipal civil
registrar or consul general. The obvious effect is to remove from the ambit of Rule 108 the
correction or changing of such errors in entries of the civil register. Hence, what is left for the
scope of operation of Rule 108 are substantial changes and corrections in the entries of the civil
register.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals dated October 28, 1994 is AFFIRMED
1000

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Persons and Family

Aguilar, S. Atanacio, C. Aquino, G. Baguiwan, J. Casildo, C.

EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS ........................................... 3

HUMAN RELATIONS .................................................................... 58

PERSONS AND PERSONALITY ................................................... 129

DOMICILE .................................................................................. 140

MARRIAGE ................................................................................. 142

THE FAMILY .............................................................................. 677

PATERNITY AND FILIATION ....................................................... 720

SUPPORT ................................................................................... 881

PARENTAL AUTHORITY AND CUSTODY .................................... 909

NAMES AND SURNAMES ........................................................... 969

Lara v. Del Rosario

MANUEL LARA ET AL. ,petitioner,

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ET. AL., petitioners,

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ET. AL., petitioners,

PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION, petitioner,

TORRES, JR., J.:

PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK EMPLOYEES UNION-N.U.B.E and PERFECTO B.

Yao Kee v. Sy Gonzales

YAO KEE, petitioner,

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION),

MENANDRO B. LAUREANO, petitioner,

JOSE E. ARUEGO, JR., petitioner,

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:p

ERNESTO BERNABE, plaintiff,

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

BENJAMIN G. TING, petitioner,

AYALA CORPORATION, petitioner,

DE LEON, JR., J.:

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner,

CESARIO URSUA, petitioner,

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and ARTURO V. PARCERO, petitioners,

MA. VILMA S. LABAD, plaintiff,

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and ARTURO V. PARCERO, petitioners,

ILLUH ASAALI, HATIB ABDURASID, INGKOH BANTALA, BASOK INGKIN, and

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner,

LORENZO LLORENTE, petitioner,

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased. PEOPLE’S

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, petitioner

AMERICAN AIRLINES, petitioner,

Standards / Norms of Human Conduct

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

TITUS B. VILLANUEVA, petitioner,

EDUARDO P. MANUEL, petitioner,

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST, petitioner,

VIOLA CRUZ, petitioner,

GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE & RADIO CORPORATION, petitioner,

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI), petitioner,

NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners,

FRANCISCO HERMOSSISIMA, plaintiff,

BEATRIZ GALANG, petitioner,

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee,

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

Land Bank of the Philippines v. Ong

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,