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A.C. No.

5161 April 14, 2004

ISIDRA TING-DUMALI, complainant,

ATTY. ROLANDO S. TORRES, respondent.

Isidra Ting-Dumali, complainant, is one of the six children of the late spouses Julita Reynante and Vicente Ting.
According to her, respondent Atty. Rolando Torres, being her brother-in-law, took advantage of his relationship
with her and her brothers and immorally used his profession when he participated in, consented to, and failed to
advice against, the perjury committed by his wife Felicisima and his sister-in-law Miriam when the two made it
appear that they were the sole heirs of the late Julita Reynante and Vicente Ting.

WON respondent should be disbarred.

Yes. Respondent’s acts or omissions reveal his moral flaws and doubtless bring intolerable dishonor to the legal
profession. The Court found respondent Atty. Rolando Torres guilty of gross misconduct and violation of the
lawyer’s oath, as well as Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thereby rendering him
unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession.

G.R. No. 86421 May 31, 1994

ROLDAN, petitioners,
THE HON. ED VINCENT ALBANO, Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch X,
as Presiding Judge Regional Trial of Manila, Branch XXV, respondents.

This case emerged from an ejectment suit filed by Vicente Caneda against Miguel and Thelma Masinsin. As a
result of the case, the trial court ordered the spouses to vacate the premises, to remove their house/apartment, to
surrender possession of the subject land, and to pay the sum of P100 a month from January 1987 as compensation
for the use of the premises until the land is actually vacated. No appeal having been taken therefrom, the judgment
became final and executory.
On August 22, 1985, the Masinsins filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC of Manila seeking the annulment
of the decision of the ejectment case and to set aside the order of its execution. Petition was dismissed.

On October 7 1985, a complaint for “Annulment of the judgment, Lease Contract and Damages” was filed by the
Masinsins asking for the nullification of the judgment in the ejectment case. The complaint was dismissed due to
res judicata.
Petitioners appealed to the CA but the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.
When petitioners refused to remove their house, a demolition order was issued. But before the completion of the
demolition, a restraining order was issued by the RTC following a petition for certiorari, with preliminary injunction
and for declaratory relief. Petition again was denied.

Petitioners again filed the same suit before a different branch of the Manila RTC. Petition was ultimately dismissed
on August 23, 1990.
In this present petition for certiorari and prohibition, petitioners contend that the MTC of Manila has lost jurisdiction
to enforce its decision in the ejectment suit, when the property in question was proclaimed an area for priority
development by the National Housing Authority on December 1 1987 by authority of PD 2016

WON MTC of Manila lost its jurisdiction to enforce its decision in the ejectment suit due to PD 2016


According to a report by manager of the Metro Manila Project Department of the National Housing Authority,
pursuant to PD No. 1967 (which after amendments became PD No. 2016), the disputed lot is not for acquisition
by the NHA. It is located outside of the NHA projects under the Zonal Improvement Project. The NHA is definitely
not acquiring the said land and therefore is not part of PD 2016. Thus the MTC of Manila has jurisdiction to enforce
its decision in the ejectment case.
What immediately catches one’s attention to this case is the evident predilection of petitioners, through different
counsel, to file pleadings, one after another, from which not even this court has been spared. The utter lack of
merit of the complainants and petitions simply evinces the deliberate intent of petitioners to prolong and delay the
inevitable execution of a decision that has long become final and executory. The petitioners through different
counsels tried to nullify the same MTC decision before different branches of the court. The lawyer’s oath is a
sacred trust that must be upheld and kept inviolable. The pertinent part of the lawyer’s oath involved in this case:

I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the
same; I will not delay any man’s cause for money or malice and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the
best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients and I impose upon
myself this obligation voluntary, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.

In no uncertain terms that any act on the part of a lawyer, an officer of the court, which visibly tends to obstruct,
pervert, impede and degrade the administration of justice is contumacious calling for both an exercise of
disciplinary action and warranting application of the contempt power.
Petition is dismissed. Petitioner’s counsel of record is strongly CENSURED and WARNED that a similar infraction
of the lawyer’s oath in the future will be dealt with most severely.

A.C. No. 10868

[Formerly CBD Case No. 07-2041]



Complainant filed a complaint affidavit before the IBP on 30 July 2007, alleging the respondent filed, on her behalf,
a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage without her consent and forged her signature on the Petition. She
also alleged that the respondent signed the said Petition as “Counsel for the Petitioner.” referring to the
complainant. The complainant stated the respondent was not her counsel but that of her husband, Leomarte
Regala Tamaray.

Whether or not the respondent violated the canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
By pretending to be the counsel of the complainant, the respondent violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR. For
allowing the use of petition with the forged signature of the complainant, the respondent violated Rule 7.03, Canon
7 and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the CPR.
Other acts of the respondent that violated Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the CPR are as follows: engaging in a scuffle
inside court chambers; openly doubting paternity of the complainant’s son; hurling incentives at a Clerk of Court;
harassing occupants of a property; using intemperate language; and engaging in an extramarital affair.
The Supreme Court found the respondent guilty of violating the following provisions of the CPR: Rule 1.01, Canon
1; Rule 7.03, Canon 7; Rule 10.01, Canon 10; and Canon 17. Violation against Rule 15.03, Canon 15 by the
respondent was dismissed. The respondent was disbarred and her name removed from the Roll of Attorneys.

A.C. No. 5379 May 9, 2003

WALTER T. YOUNG, complainant,


The Complainant - private prosecutor filed an Affidavit-Complaint by for disbarment against Attys. Ceasar G.
Batuegas, Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino and Franklin Q. Susa for allegedly committing deliberate falsehood in
court and violating the lawyer’s oath.

Complainant is the private prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 00-187627 for Murder, entitled People of the
Philippines versus Crisanto Arana, Jr., pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27. On
December 13, 2000, respondents Batuegas and Llantino, as counsel for accused, filed a Manifestation with Motion
for Bail, alleging that the accused has voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority and is under detention.

However, upon personal verification with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) where accused Arana
allegedly surrendered, complainant learned that he surrendered only on December 14, 2000, as shown by the
Certificate of Detention executed by Atty. Rogelio M. Mamauag, Chief of the Security Management Division of the

The fact remains that the allegation that the accused was in the custody of the NBI on December 13, 2000 was
They craftily concealed the truth by alleging that accused had voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority and
were under detention.
Respondent Susa, the Branch Clerk of Court of RTC of Manila, Branch 27, calendared the motion on December
15, 2000 lack of notice of hearing to the private complainant, violation of the three-day notice rule, and the failure
to attach the Certificate of Detention.

The instant case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, and recommended that
Atty. Ceasar G. Batuegas and Atty. Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino be suspended from the practice of their
profession as a lawyer for six (6) months. The complaint against Atty. Franklin Q. Susa is dismissed for lack of

W/N Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas, Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino and Franklin Q. Susa shall be disbarred for
allegedly committing deliberate falsehood in court and violating the lawyer’s oath.
The Court agrees with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner. Respondents
Batuegas and Llantino are guilty of deliberate falsehood.
A lawyer must be a disciple of truth.
He swore upon his admission to the Bar that he will do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court and
he shall conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as
well to the courts as to his clients. He should bear in mind that as an officer of the court his high vocation is to
correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct
conclusion. The courts, on the other hand, are entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing
and pleading before them. While a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his clients rights and is expected to
display the utmost zeal in defense of his clients cause, his conduct must never be at the expense of truth.
To knowingly allege an untrue statement of fact in the pleading is a contemptuous conduct that we strongly
condemn. They violated their oath when they resorted to deception.
Respondent clerk of court; should not hesitate to inform the judge if he should find any act or conduct on the part
of lawyers which are contrary to the established rules of procedure. Respondent clerk of court should not be made
administratively liable for including the Motion in the calendar of the trial court, considering that it was authorized
by the presiding judge. However, he is reminded that his administrative functions, although not involving the
discretion or judgment of a judge, are vital to the prompt and sound administration of justice. Thus, he should not
hesitate to inform the judge if he should find any act or conduct on the part of lawyers which are contrary to the
established rules of procedure

G.R. No. L-25291 January 30, 1971

ASSOCIATION-NATU, petitioners,

The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association-NATU, FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees
Association-NATU, and Insular Life Building Employees Association-NATU (hereinafter referred to as the Unions),
while still members of the Federation of Free Workers (FFW), entered into separate CBAs with the Insular Life
Assurance Co., Ltd. and the FGU Insurance Group (hereinafter referred to as the Companies).
Two of the lawyers of the Unions then were Felipe Enaje and Ramon Garcia; the latter was formerly the secretary-
treasurer of the FFW and acting president of the Insular Life/FGU unions and the Insular Life Building Employees
Association. Garcia, as such acting president, in a circular issued in his name and signed by him, tried to dissuade
the members of the Unions from disaffiliating with the FFW and joining the National Association of Trade Unions
(NATU), to no avail.

Enaje and Garcia soon left the FFW and secured employment with the Anti-Dummy Board of the Department of
Justice. Thereafter, the Companies hired Garcia in the latter part of 1956 as assistant corporate secretary and
legal assistant in their Legal Department. Enaje was hired as personnel manager of the Companies, and was
likewise made chairman of the negotiating panel for the Companies in the collective bargaining with the Unions.
Unions jointly submitted proposals to the Companies; negotiations were conducted on the Union’s proposals, but
these were snagged by a deadlock on the issue of union shop, as a result of which the Unions filed on January
27, 1958 a notice of strike for “deadlock on collective bargaining.” The issue was dropped subsequently (in short,
nagkasundo). But, the parties negotiated on the labor demands but with no satisfactory result due to a stalemate
on the matter of salary increases.
Meanwhile, 87 unionists were reclassified as supervisors without increase in salary nor in responsibility while
negotiations were going on in the Department of Labor after the notice to strike was served on the Companies.
These employees resigned from the Unions.
On May 21, 1958 the Companies through their acting manager and president, sent to each of the strikers a letter
(exhibit A) quoted verbatim as follows:
We recognize it is your privilege both to strike and to conduct picketing.
However, if any of you would like to come back to work voluntarily, you may:

Advise the nearest police officer or security guard of your intention to do so.
Take your meals within the office.
Make a choice whether to go home at the end of the day or to sleep nights at the office where comfortable cots
have been prepared.
Enjoy free coffee and occasional movies.
Be paid overtime for work performed in excess of eight hours.

Be sure arrangements will be made for your families.

The decision to make is yours — whether you still believe in the motives of the strike or in the fairness of the

Unions, however, continued on strike, with the exception of a few unionists who were convinced to desist by the
aforesaid letter
From the date the strike was called on May 21, 1958, until it was called off on May 31, 1958, some management
men tried to break thru the Unions’ picket lines xxx succeeded in penetrating the picket lines in front of the Insular
Life Building, thus causing injuries to the picketers and also to the strike-breakers due to the resistance offered by
some picketers.
Alleging that some non-strikers were injured and with the use of photographs as evidence, the Companies then
filed criminal charges against the strikers with the City Fiscal’s Office of Manila.xxx
Another letter was sent by the company to the individual strikers:
The first day of the strike was last 21 May 1958.
Our position remains unchanged and the strike has made us even more convinced of our decision.
We do not know how long you intend to stay out, but we cannot hold your positions open for long. We have
continued to operate and will continue to do so with or without you.
If you are still interested in continuing in the employ of the Group Companies, and if there are no criminal charges
pending against you, we are giving you until 2 June 1958 to report for work at the home office. If by this date you
have not yet reported, we may be forced to obtain your replacement.
Before, the decisions was yours to make.
So it is now.
Incidentally, all of the more than 120 criminal charges filed against the members of the Unions, except 3, were
dismissed by the fiscal’s office and by the courts. These three cases involved “slight physical injuries” against one
striker and “light coercion” against two others.
At any rate, because of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against them as well as the ultimatum of
the Companies giving them until June 2, 1958 to return to their jobs or else be replaced, the striking employees
decided to call off their strike and to report back to work on June 2, 1958.
* However, before readmitting the strikers, the Companies required them not only to secure clearances from the
City Fiscal’s Office of Manila but also to be screened by a management committee among the members of which
were Enage and Garcia. The screening committee initially rejected 83 strikers with pending criminal charges.
However, all non-strikers with pending criminal charges which arose from the breakthrough incident were
readmitted immediately by the Companies without being required to secure clearances from the fiscal’s office.
Subsequently, when practically all the strikers had secured clearances from the fiscal’s office, the Companies
readmitted only some but adamantly refused readmission to 34 officials and members of the Unions who were
most active in the strike, on the ground that they committed “acts inimical to the interest of the respondents,”
without however stating the specific acts allegedly committed. Some 24 of the above number were ultimately
notified months later that they were being dismissed retroactively as of June 2, 1958 and given separation pay
checks computed under Rep. Act 1787, while others (ten in number) up to now have not been readmitted although
there have been no formal dismissal notices given to them.

CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against the Companies under Republic Act 875. The
complaint specifically charged the Companies with (1) interfering with the members of the Unions in the exercise
of their right to concerted action, by sending out individual letters to them urging them to abandon their strike and
return to work, with a promise of comfortable cots, free coffee and movies, and paid overtime, and, subsequently,
by warning them that if they did not return to work on or before June 2, 1958, they might be replaced; and (2)
discriminating against the members of the Unions as regards readmission to work after the strike on the basis of
their union membership and degree of participation in the strike.

Whether or not respondent company is guilty of ULP


The act of an employer in notifying absent employees individually during a strike following unproductive efforts at
collective bargaining that the plant would be operated the next day and that their jobs were open for them should
they want to come in has been held to be an unfair labor practice, as an active interference with the right of
collective bargaining through dealing with the employees individually instead of through their collective bargaining

Although the union is on strike, the employer is still under obligation to bargain with the union as the employees’
bargaining representative.

Individual solicitation of the employees or visiting their homes, with the employer or his representative urging the
employees to cease union activity or cease striking, constitutes unfair labor practice. All the above-detailed
activities are unfair labor practices because they tend to undermine the concerted activity of the employees, an
activity to which they are entitled free from the employer’s molestation.

Indeed, when the respondents offered reinstatement and attempted to “bribe” the strikers with “comfortable cots,”
“free coffee and occasional movies,” “overtime” pay for “work performed in excess of eight hours,” and
“arrangements” for their families, so they would abandon the strike and return to work, they were guilty of strike-
breaking and/or union-busting and, consequently, of unfair labor practice. It is equivalent to an attempt to break a
strike for an employer to offer reinstatement to striking employees individually, when they are represented by a
union, since the employees thus offered reinstatement are unable to determine what the consequences of
returning to work would be.

ULP also: (super short cut na to) Hiring of Enage and Garcia with attractive compensations; respondents
reclassified 87 employees as supervisors without increase in salary or in responsibility, in effect compelling these
employees to resign from their unions; respondents, thru their president and manager, respondent Jose M. Olbes,
brought three truckloads of non-strikers and others, escorted by armed men, who, despite the presence of eight
entrances to the three buildings occupied by the Companies, entered thru only one gate less than two meters wide
and in the process, crashed thru the picket line posted in front of the premises of the Insular Life Building. This
resulted in injuries on the part of the picketers and the strike-breakers; respondents brought against the picketers
criminal charges, only three of which were not dismissed, and these three only for slight misdemeanors. As a
result of these criminal actions, the respondents were able to obtain an injunction from the court of first instance
restraining the strikers from stopping, impeding, obstructing, etc. the free and peaceful use of the Companies’
gates, entrance and driveway and the free movement of persons and vehicles to and from, out and in, of the
Companies’ buildings.

Verily, the above actuations of the respondents before and after the issuance of the letters, exhibit A and B, yield
the clear inference that the said letters formed of the respondents scheme to preclude if not destroy unionism
within them.

II. The respondents did not merely discriminate against all the strikers in general. They separated the active from
the less active unionists on the basis of their militancy, or lack of it, on the picket lines. Unionists belonging to the
first category were refused readmission even after they were able to secure clearances from the competent
authorities with respect to the criminal charges filed against them.

It is noteworthy that — perhaps in an anticipatory effort to exculpate themselves from charges of discrimination in
the readmission of strikers returning to work — the respondents delegated the power to readmit to a committee.

III. Anent the third assignment of error, the record shows that not a single dismissed striker was given the
opportunity to defend himself against the supposed charges against him. As earlier mentioned, when the striking
employees reported back for work on June 2, 1958, the respondents refused to readmit them unless they first
secured the necessary clearances; but when all, except three, were able to secure and subsequently present the
required clearances, the respondents still refused to take them back.

Indeed, the individual cases of dismissed officers and members of the striking unions do not indicate sufficient
basis for dismissal.
G.R. Nos. 174813-15 March 17, 2009

HONORABLE RTC JUDGE TEODORO A. BAY, Presiding Judge, RTC, Hall of Justice, Quezon City,
Branch 86, Respondent.

Two Informations for the crime of rape and one Information for the crime of acts of lasciviousness were filed against
petitioners Darryl Hipos et al., before Branch 86 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Petitioners filed their
Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Case[s] before the City Prosecutor. They claimed that there was no probable
cause to hold them liable for the crimes charged. The Office of the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution on the
reinvestigation affirming the Informations.

2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Lamberto C. de Vera, treating the Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Case as an
appeal of the 10 August 2004 Resolution, reversed the Resolution dated 10 August 2004, holding that there was
lack of probable cause. On the same date, the City Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw Informations before
Judge Bay. Judge Bay denied the Motion to Withdraw Informations in an Order of even date.


Can the Supreme Court compel respondent judge bay to dismiss the case through a writ of mandamus.

The rule is settled that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition thereof, such as
its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court. While the
prosecutor retains the discretion and control of the prosecution of the case, he cannot impose his opinion on the
court. The court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case. Accordingly, a motion to dismiss the case
filed by the prosecutor before or after the arraignment, or after a reinvestigation, or upon instructions of the
Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records upon reinvestigation, should be addressed to the discretion of the
court. The action of the court must not, however, impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the
People to due process of law.

There was a complaint against a Judge of First Instance which was referred to the Atty. General for investigation,
report and recommendation. There was an SC resolution which makes such proceedings confidential in nature.

The investigation was conducted secretly. Notwithstanding, the editor of El Pueblo, Severino Lozano, printed an
article written by Anastacio Quevedo, indicating that the hearing was held behind closed doors, and that the
information of the reporter was obtained from outside the screen and from comments in social circles. Then in
writing up the investigation, it came about that the testimony was mutilated and that the report reflected upon the
action of the complainant to his possible disadvantage.


Whether Lozano and Quevedo are guilty of contempt of court?

YES. They are each required to pay the nominal sum of P20

Judicial proceedings, in a case which the law requires to be conducted in secret for the proper administration of
justice, should never be, while the case is on trial, given publicity by the press.
The rule is well established that the newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarass, or influence
the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding constitute criminal contempt which is summarily
punishable by the courts. The rule is otherwise after the cause is ended. It is also regarded as an interference with
the work of the courts to publish any matters which their policy requires should be kept private, as for example the
secrets of the jury room, or proceedings in camera.
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in the SC. This power extends to administrative proceedings, as well
as to suits at law.
VICENTE SOTTO January 21, 1949

In re VICENTE SOTTO, for contempt of court.

Vicente Sotto in his own behalf.

Atty. Vicente Sotto was required to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt in connection with
his written statement of the Supreme Court's decision in the matter of Angel Parazo's case, which was published
in Manila Times and in other newspapers in the locality.

Sotto was given ten days more besides the five originally given him to file his answer, and although his answer
was filed after the expiration of the period of time given him the said answer was admitted. He does not deny the
authenticity of the statement as it has been published. He however, contends that under section 13, Article VIII of
the Constitution, which confers upon this Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure, the Supreme Court has has no power to impose correctional penalties upon the citizens,
and it can only impose fines and imprisonment by virtue of a law, and has to be promulgated by Congress with
the approval of the Chief Executive. He also alleges in his answer that "in the exercise of the freedom of speech
guaranteed by the Constitution, the respondent made his statement in the press with the utmost good faith and
with no intention of offending any of the majority of the honorable members of this high Tribunal, who, in his
opinion, erroneously decided the Parazo case; but he has not attacked, or intended to attack the honesty or
integrity of any one.”

Issue: Whether or not Sotto is guilty of contempt.


The Court finds that the respondent Sotto knowingly published false imputations against its members. He accused
them of such depravity as to have committed "blunders and injustices deliberately." He has maliciously branded
them to be incompetent, narrow-minded, perpetrators of evil, "a constant peril to liberty and democracy," to be the
opposite of those who were the honor and glory of the Philippines judiciary, to be needing a lesson in law, to be
rendering an intolerable sentence, to be needing replacement by better qualified justices.

Respondent has not presented any evidence or offered any to support his slanderous imputations, and no single
word can be found in his answer showing that he ever believed that the imputations are based on fact.

It is also well settled that an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful in his
conduct and communication to the courts, he may be removed from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as
being guilty of flagrant misconduct.