A. National Union of Workers in Hotels, etc. vs. NLRC and Peninsula Hotel, G.R. N o .

125561, March 6, 1998 —

Held: Petitioners should have complied with the prohibition to strike ordered by the NCMB when the latter dismissed the
notices of strike after finding that the alleged acts of discrimination of the hotel were not ULP, hence not "strikeable." The
refusal of petitioners to heed said proscription of the NCMB is reflective of bad faith. In light of the foregoing circumstances,
their claim of good faith must fall and we agree with the NLRC that there was no justification for the illegal strike.
We accordingly uphold the dismissal from employment of the 15 officers of the Junta who knowingly participated in the
strike. An employer may lawfully discharge employees for participating in an unjustifiable wildcat strike and especially so in
this case, because said wildcat strike was an attempt to undermine the Union's position as the exclusive bargaining
representative and was, therefore, an unprotected activity. The cessation from employment of the 15 Junta officers as a
result of their participation in the illegal strike is a consequence of their defiant and capricious decision to participate therein.

Nature”

This is a special civil action for certiorari seeking to set aside the decision of public
respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), dated February 7,
1996,[1] which affirmed the November 4, 1993 order of the med-arbiter[2] holding that the
strike held by petitioners on October 13 and 14, 1993 was illegal and declaring the 15
officers who knowingly participated in the strike to have lost their employment status. It
likewise seeks to set aside the resolution of the NLRC, dated March 28, 1996, [3] denying
the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners.
C. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank vs NLRC GR No. 156635, Jan. 11, 2016
D. BLTB vs NLRC GR No. 101858, Aug. 21, 1992
E. SSS Employee Asso. v CA 175 SCRA 686 (July 28, 1989)

Facts: The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the union’s demands concerning
the implementation of their CBA. SSS filed before the court action for damages with prayer for writ of
preliminary injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike. The court issued a temporary
restraining order pending the resolution of the application for preliminary injunction while petitioners
filed a motion to dismiss alleging the court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Petitioners
contend that the court made reversible error in taking cognizance on the subject matter since the
jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor Relations Commission as the case involves a labor
dispute. The SSS contends on one hand that the petitioners are covered by the Civil Service laws, rules
and regulation thus have no right to strike. They are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore the
court may enjoin the petitioners from striking.

Issue: Whether or not SSS employers have the right to strike

Whether or not the CA erred in taking jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Held: The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice provides guarantee
among workers with the right to organize and conduct peaceful concerted activities such as strikes. On
one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that “the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted
activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed,

subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress” referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s.
1987 of the Civil Service Commission which states that “prior to the enactment by Congress of
applicable laws concerning strike by government employees enjoins under pain of administrative
sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass
leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption
of public service.” Therefore in the absence of any legislation allowing govt. employees to strike they are
prohibited from doing so.

In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in the civil service are denominated as “government employees”
and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been
created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service and are covered by the Civil
Service Commission’s memorandum prohibiting strikes.

Neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the subject matter but instead it is the Public Sector
Labor-Management Council which is not granted by law authority to issue writ of injunction in labor
disputes within its jurisdiction thus the resort of SSS before the general court for the issuance of a writ
of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate.
F. Bangalisan vs CA GR No. 124678, Jul 31, 1997
G. Capitol Medical Center vs NLRC GR No. 147080, Apr 26, 2005

[G.R. No. 147080. April 26, 2005] CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, JAIME IBABAO, JOSE BALLESTEROS, RONALD CENTENO, NARCISO SARMIENTO, EDUARDO
CANAVERAL, SHERLITO DELA CRUZ, SOFRONIO COMANDAO, MARIANO GALICIA, RAMON MOLOD, CARMENCITA
SARMIENTO, HELEN MOLOD, ROSA COMANDAO, ANGELITO CUIZON, ALEX MARASIGAN, JESUS CEDRO, ENRICO
ROQUE, JAY PERILLA, HELEN MENDOZA, MARY GLADYS GEMPEROSO, NINI BAUTISTA, ELENA MACARUBBO,
MUSTIOLA SALVACION DAPITO, ALEXANDER MANABE, MICHAEL EUSTAQUIO, ROSE AZARES, FERNANDO
MANZANO, HENRY VERA CRUZ, CHITO MENDOZA, FREDELITA TOMAYAO, ISABEL BRUCAL, MAHALKO LAYACAN,
RAINIER MANACSA, KAREN VILLARENTE, FRANCES ACACIO, LAMBERTO CONTI, LORENA BEACH, JUDILAH RAVALO,
DEBORAH NAVE, MARILEN CABALQUINTO, EMILIANA RIVERA, MA. ROSARIO URBANO, ROWENA ARILLA, CAPITOL
MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-AFW, GREGORIO DEL PRADO, ARIEL ARAJA, and JESUS STA. BARBARA,
JR., respondents. CALLEJO, SR., J.:

FACTS: The Union filed a Notice of Strike with the (NCMB), The Union alleged as grounds for the projected strike
the following acts of the petitioner: (a) refusal to bargain; (b) coercion on employees; and (c) interference/
restraint to self-organization.[7] A series of conferences was conducted before the NCMB but no agreement was
reached. the petitioner even filed a Letter with the Board requesting that the notice of strike be dismissed;[8] the
Union had apparently failed to furnish the Regional Branch of the NCMB with a copy of a notice of the meeting
where the strike vote was conducted. On November 20, 1997, the Union submitted to the NCMB the minutes[9] of
the alleged strike vote purportedly held on November 10, 1997 at the parking lot in front of the petitioner’s
premises. It appears that 178 out of the 300 union members participated therein, and the results were as follows:
156 members voted to strike; 14 members cast negative votes; and eight votes were spoiled.[10] On November 28,
1997, the officers and members of the Union staged a strike. Subsequently, the Union filed an ex parte motion
with the DOLE, praying for its assumption of jurisdiction over the dispute. The SOLE assumed jurisdiction over the
labor disputes, Consequently, all striking workers are directed to return to work within twenty-four (24) hours
from the receipt of this Order and the management to resume normal operations and accept back all striking
workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike. In obedience to the order of the SOLE,
the officers and members of the Union stopped their strike and returned to work. The Regional Director of the
DOLE rendered a Decision denying the petition for the cancellation of the respondent Union’s certiftcate of
registration. In a parallel development, Labor Arbiter Leda rendered a Decision in favor of the petitioner, and
declared the strike staged by the respondents illegal. The Labor Arbiter ruled that no voting had taken place on
November 10, 1997; moreover, no notice of such voting was furnished to the NCMB at least twentyfour (24) hours
prior to the intended holding of the strike vote. According to the Labor Arbiter, the affidavits of the petitioner’s 17
employees who alleged that no strike vote was taken, and supported by the affidavit of the overseer of the parking
lot and the security guards, must prevail as against the minutes of the strike vote presented by the respondents.
The Labor Arbiter also held that in light of Article 263(9) of the Labor Code, the respondent Union should have filed
a motion for a writ of execution of the resolution of Undersecretary Laguesma which was affirmed by this Court
instead of staging a strike. The respondents appealed the decision to the NLRC which granted their appeal and
reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC also denied the petitioner’s petition to declare the strike
illegal. In resolving the issue of whether the union members held a strike vote on November 10, 1997, the NLRC
ruled as follows: We find untenable the Labor Arbiter’s finding that no actual strike voting took place on November
10, 1997, claiming that thi s is supported by the affidavit of Erwin Barbacena, the overseer of the parking lot across
the hospital, and the sworn statements of nineteen (19) (sic) union members. While it is true that no strike voting
took place in the parking lot which he is overseeing, it does not mean that no strike voting ever took place at all
because the same was conducted in the parking lot immediately/directly fronting, not across, the hospital building.
Further, it is apparent that the nineteen (19) (sic) hospital employees, who recanted their participation in the strike
voting, did so involuntarily for fear of loss of employment, considering that their Affidavits are uniform and pro
forma. The NLRC ruled that under Section 7, Rule XXII of DOLE Order No. 9, Series of 1997, absent a showing that
the NCMB decided to supervise the conduct of a secret balloting and informed the union of the said decision, or
that any such request was made by any of the parties who would be affected by the secret balloting and to which
the NCMB agreed, the respondents were not mandated to furnish the NCMB with such notice before the strike
vote was conducted.
ISSUE: WHETHER RESPONDENTS COMPLIED WITH THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR STAGING THE SUBJECT STRIKE.

HELD: No. We agree with the petitioner that the respondent Union failed to comply with the second paragraph of
Section 10, Rule XXII of the Omnibus Rules of the NLRC which reads: Section 10. Strike or lockout vote. – A decision
to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned
obtained by secret ballot in meetings or referenda called for the purpose. A decision to declare a lockout must be
approved by a majority of the Board of Directors of the employer, corporation or association or the partners
obtained by a secret ballot in a meeting called for the purpose. The regional branch of the Board may, at its own
initiative or upon the request of any affected party, supervise the conduct of the secret balloting. In every case, the
union or the employer shall furnish the regional branch of the Board and notice of meetings referred to in the
preceding paragraph at least twenty-four (24) hours before such meetings as well as the results of the voting at
least seven (7) days before the intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period provided in this Rule.
Although the second paragraph of Section 10 of the said Rule is not provided in the Labor Code of the Philippines,
nevertheless, the same was incorporated in the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code and has the force
and effect of law.[24] Aside from the mandatory notices embedded in Article 263, paragraphs (c) and (f) of the
Labor Code, a union intending to stage a strike is mandated to notify the NCMB of the meeting for the conduct of
strike vote, at least twenty-four (24) hours prior to such meeting. Unless the NCMB is notified of the date, place
and time of the meeting of the union members for the conduct of a strike vote, the NCMB would be unable to
supervise the holding of the same, if and when it decides to exercise its power of supervision. In National
Federation of Labor v. NLRC,[25] the Court enumerated the notices required by Article 263 of the Labor Code and
the Implementing Rules, which include the 24-hour prior notice to the NCMB: 1) A notice of strike, with the
required contents, should be filed with the DOLE, specifically the Regional Branch of the NCMB, copy furnished the
employer of the union; 2) A cooling-off period must be observed between the filing of notice and the actual
execution of the strike thirty (30) days in case of bargaining deadlock and fifteen (15) days in case of unfair labor
practice. However, in the case of union busting where the union’s existence is threatened, the cooling-off period
need not be observed. … 4) Before a strike is actually commenced, a strike vote should be taken by secret
balloting, with a 24-hour prior notice to NCMB. The decision to declare a strike requires the secret-ballot approval
of majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned.5)The result of the strike vote should
be reported to the NCMB at least seven (7) days before the intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off
period. In this case, the respondent Union failed to comply with the 24-hour prior notice requirement to the NCMB
before it conducted the alleged strike vote meeting on November 10, 1997. As a result, the petitioner complained
that no strike vote meeting ever took place and averred that the strike staged by the respondent union was illegal.
Conformably to Article 264 of the Labor Code of the Philippines[30] and Section 7, Rule XXII of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code, [31] no labor organization shall declare a strike unless supported by a majority vote
of the members of the union obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose. The requirement is
mandatory and the failure of a union to comply therewith renders the strike illegal. [32] The union is thus
mandated to allege and prove compliance with the requirements of the law. In the present case, there is a
divergence between the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter, on the one hand, and the NLRC and the CA, on the
other, in that the Labor Arbiter found and declared in his decision that no secret voting ever took place in the
parking lot fronting the hospital on November 10, 1997 by and among the 300 members of the respondent Union.
Erwin Barbacena, the overseer of the only parking lot fronting the hospital, and security guards Simon Tingzon and
Reggie Barawid, declared in their respective affidavits that no secret voting ever took place on November 10, 1997;
17 employees of the petitioner also denied in their respective statements that they were not members of the
respondent Union, and were asked to merely sign attendance papers and unnumbered votes. The NLRC and the
CA declared in their respective decisions that the affidavits of the petitioner’s 17 employees had no probative
weight because the said employees merely executed their affidavits out of fear of losing their jobs. The allegations
in the affidavits belie the claim of the respondents and the finding of the NLRC that a secret balloting took place on
November 10, 1997 in front of the hospital at the corner of Scout Magbanua Street and Panay Avenue, Quezon
City.
H. G.R. No. L-59743 May 31 1982 NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGAR WORKERS (NFSW), petitioner,
vs.ETHELWOLDO R. OVEJERA, CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE LA CARLOTA (CAC), COL. ROGELIO DEINLA, as Provincial
Commander, 3311st P.C. Command, Negros Occidental, respondents.

FACTS: In 1981, NFSW struck allegedly to compel the payment of the 13th month pay under PD 851, in addition to
the Christmas, milling and amelioration bonuses being enjoyed by CAC workers. The decision having become final
and executory entry of judgment was made. After the Marcopper decision had become final, NFSW renewed its
demand that CAC give the 13th month pay. CAC refused, NFSW filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment
(MOLE) Regional Office in Bacolod City a notice to strike based on non-payment of the 13th month pay. Six days
after, NFSW struck.

ISSUE: Whether or not under Presidential Decree 851 (13th Month Pay Law), CAC is obliged to give its workers a
13th month salary in addition to Christmas, milling and amelioration bonuses, the aggregate of which admittedly
exceeds by far the disputed 13th month pay?

HELD: CAC is obliged to give its workers a 13th month salary in addition to Christmas, milling and amelioration
bonuses stipulated in a collective bargaining agreement amounting to more than a month's pay. When this
agreement was forged on November 30,1981, the original decision dismissing the petition in the aforecited
Marcopper case had already been promulgated by this Court. On the votes of only 7 Justices, including the
distinguished Chief Justice, the petition of Marcopper Mining Corp. seeking to annul the decision of Labor Deputy
Minister Amado Inciong granting a 13th month pay to Marcopper employees (in addition to mid- year and
Christmas bonuses under a CBA) had been dismissed. But a motion for reconsideration filed by Marcopper was
pending as of November 30, 1981. In December 1981, the original decision was affirmed when this Court finally
denied the motion for reconsideration. But the resolution of denial was supported by the votes of only 5 Justices.
The Marcopper decision is therefore a Court decision but without the necessary eight votes to be doctrinal. This
being so, it cannot be said that the Marcopper decision "clearly held" that "the employer is liable to pay a 13th
month pay separate and distinct from the bonuses already given," within the meaning of the NFSW-CAC
compromise agreement. At any rate, in view of the rulings made herein, NFSW cannot insist on its claim that its
members are entitled to a 13th month pay in addition to the bonuses already paid by CAC. WHEREFORE, the
petition is dismissed for lack of merit. No costs.

Facts:
Petitioner NSFW (bargaining agent of the rank and file)
and respondent company (CAC) entered into a collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) wherein parties agreed to maintain the present
practice on the grant of Christmas bonus, milling bonus and
amelioration (improvement) bonus.
On Nov. 30, 1981, petitioner and respondent entered into
a compromise agreement two days after the strike to compel
the payment of the 13 month pay, agreeing to abide by the final
decision of the Supreme Court in any case involving the 13th month
pay if it clearly held that the employer is liable to pay the same
separate and distinct from the bonuses already given.
Meanwhile, G.R. No. 51254, Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition filed by Marcopper Mining Corporation which sought to
annul the decision of the Labor Deputy Minister granting the 13th
month pay to its employees in addition to mid-year and Christmas
bonuses under a CBA was dismissed on June 11, 1981 and became
final and executory on December 18, 1981.
On January 22, 1982, NFSW filed with the MOLE a notice
to strike based on non-payment of the 13th month pay. Six days
after, NFSW commenced a strike.
One day after the commencement of the strike, or on
January 29, 1982, a report of the strike-vote was filed by NFSW with
MOLE.
CAC filed a petition the Regional Arbitration Branch, MOLE
to declare the strike illegal, principally for being violative of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 130, that is, the strike was declared before the
expiration of the 15-day cooling-off period for unfair labor practice
(ULP) strikes, and the strike was staged before the lapse of seven
days from the submission to MOLE of the result of the strike-vote.
Labor Arbiter Ovejera declared the NFSW strike illegal.
CAC filed for a restraining order for the enforcement of the of LA’s
decision. No restraining order was issued.
Issue:
Whether or not the strike declared by NFSW is illegal.
Held:
The Supreme Court, in affirming the decision of the deputy
of labor minister, ruled that the failure of the NFSW to abide with
the mandatory cooling-off period and the 7 day strike ban made the
strike illegal and the NFSW cannot insist on its claim that its
members are entitled to a 13th month pay in addition to the
bonuses already paid by CAC.
Language of the law. — The foregoing provisions hardly
leave any room for doubt that the cooling-off period in Art. 264(c)
and the 7-day strike ban after the strike-vote report prescribed in
Art. 264(f) were meant to be, and should be deemed, mandatory.
When the law says "the labor union may strike" should the
dispute "remain unsettled until the lapse of the requisite number of
days (cooling-off period) from the mandatory filing of the notice,"
the unmistakable implication is that the union may not strike before
the lapse of the cooling-off period. Similarly, the mandatory
character of the 7-day strike ban after the report on the strike-vote
is manifest in the provision that "in every case," the union shall
furnish the MOLE with the results of the voting "at least seven (7)
days before the intended strike, subject to the (prescribed) coolingoff period." It must be stressed that the requirements of cooling-off
period and 7-day strike ban must both be complied with, although
the labor union may take a strike vote and report the same within
the statutory cooling-off period.

I. Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc (INPORT) vs. NLRC

GR No. 103560

July 6, 1995

Facts: Petitioner’s employees stopped working and gathered in a mass action to express their grievances regarding
wages, thirteenth month pay and hazard pay. Said employees were all members of the Macajalar Labor Union —
Federation of Free Workers (MLU-FFW) with whom petitioner had an existing collective bargaining agreement.

Petitioner was engaged in stevedoring and arrastre services at the port of Cagayan de Oro. The strike paralyzed
operations at said port.

The strikers filed individual notices of strike (“Kaugalingon nga Declarasyon sa Pag-Welga”) with the then Ministry
of Labor and Employment.

With the failure of conciliation conferences between petitioner and the strikers, INPORT filed a complaint before
the Labor Arbiter for Illegal Strike with prayer for a restraining order/preliminary injunction.
The National Labor Relations Commission issued a temporary restraining order. Thereafter, majority of the strikers
returned to work, leaving herein private respondents who continued their protest.

For not having complied with the formal requirements in Article 264 of the Labor Code, 3 the strike staged by
petitioner’s workers on April 30, 1985 was found by the Labor Arbiter to be illegal. 4 The workers who participated
in the illegal strike did not, however, lose their employment, since there was no evidence that they participated in
illegal acts. After noting that petitioner accepted the other striking employees back to work, the Labor Arbiter held
that the private respondents should similarly be allowed to return to work without having to undergo the required
screening to be undertaken by their union (MLU-FFW).

As regards the six private respondents who were union officers, the Labor Arbiter ruled that they could not have
possibly been “duped or tricked” into signing the strike notice for they were active participants in the conciliation
meetings and were thus fully aware of what was going on. Hence, said union officers should be accepted back to
work after seeking reconsideration from herein petitioner. 5

The NLRC affirmed with modification 8 the Arbiter’s decision. It held that the concerted action by the workers was
more of a “protest action” than a strike. Private respondents, including the six union officers, should also be
allowed to work unconditionally to avoid discrimination. However, in view of the strained relations between the
parties, separation pay was awarded in lieu of reinstatement.

Upon petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, public respondent modified the above resolution.

The Commission ruled that since private respondents were not actually terminated from service, there was no
basis for reinstatement. However, it awarded six months’ salary as separation pay or financial assistance in the
nature of “equitable relief.” The award for backwages was also deleted for lack of factual and legal basis. In lieu of
backwages, compensation equivalent to P1,000.00 was given.

Issue: Whether separation pay and backwages be awarded by public respondent NLRC to participants of an illegal
strike?

Held: Reinstatement and backwages or, if no longer feasible, separation pay, can only be granted if sufficient
bases exist under the law, particularly after a showing of illegal dismissal. However, while the union members may
thus be entitled under the law to be reinstated or to receive separation pay, their expulsion from the union in
accordance with the collective bargaining agreement renders the same impossible.

Ratio: A strike, considered as the most effective weapon of labor, 13 is defined as any temporary stoppage of work
by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. 14 A labor dispute includes any
controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of employment or the association or representation of
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment,
regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employers and employees. 15

Private respondents and their co-workers stopped working and held the mass action on April 30, 1985 to press for
their wages and other benefits. What transpired then was clearly a strike, for the cessation of work by concerted
action resulted from a labor dispute.

The complaint before the Labor Arbiter involved the legality of said strike. The Arbiter correctly ruled that the
strike was illegal for failure to comply with the requirements of Article 264 (now Article 263) paragraphs (c) and (f)
of the Labor Code. 16
The individual notices of strike filed by the workers did not conform to the notice required by the law to be filed
since they were represented by a union (MLU-FFW) which even had an existing collective bargaining agreement
with INPORT.

Neither did the striking workers observe the strike vote by secret ballot, cooling-off period and reporting
requirements.

A union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly
participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost their employment
status. 20 An ordinary striking worker cannot be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike. There must
be proof that he committed illegal acts during a strike. A union officer, on the other hand, may be terminated from
work when he knowingly participates in an illegal strike, and like other workers, when he commits an illegal act
during a strike.

In the case at bench, INPORT accepted the majority of the striking workers, including union officers, back to work.
Private respondents were left to continue with the strike after they refused to submit to the “screening” required
by the company.

Under Article 264 of the Labor Code, a worker merely participating in an illegal strike may not be terminated from
his employment. It is only when he commits illegal acts during a strike that he may be declared to have lost his
employment status. Since there appears no proof that these union members committed illegal acts during the
strike, they cannot be dismissed. The striking union members among private respondents are thus entitled to
reinstatement, there being no just cause for their dismissal.

However, considering that a decade has already lapsed from the time the disputed strike occurred, we find that to
award separation pay in lieu of reinstatement would be more practical and appropriate.

No backwages will be awarded to private respondent-union members as a penalty for their participation in the
illegal strike. Their continued participation in said strike, even after most of their co-workers had returned to work,
can hardly be rewarded by such an award.

The fate of private respondent-union officers is different. Their insistence on unconditional reinstatement or
separation pay and backwages is unwarranted and unjustified. For knowingly participating in an illegal strike, the
law mandates that a union officer may be terminated from employment. 34

Notwithstanding the fact that INPORT previously accepted other union officers and that the screening required by
it was uncalled for, still it cannot be gainsaid that it possessed the right and prerogative to terminate the union
officers from service. The law, in using the word may, grants the employer the option of declaring a union officer
who participated in an illegal strike as having lost his employment. 35

Moreover, an illegal strike which, more often than not, brings about unnecessary economic disruption and chaos in
the workplace should not be countenanced by a relaxation of the sanctions prescribed by law.

The union officers are, therefore, not entitled to any relief.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, from the foregoing premises, the petition in G.R. No. 103560 (“Gold City Integrated Port
Service Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.”) is GRANTED. One month salary for each year of service
until 1985 is awarded to private respondents who were not union officers as separation pay. The petition in G.R.
No. 103599 (“Adelo Ebuna, et al. v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.”) is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No
costs.

J. Union of Filipro Employees, et al. vs. Nestle Phil, Inc., et al., G.R. Nos. 88710-13,
December 19, 1990 —
The petitioner union (UFE) questions the power of the Secretary of Labor
under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute
tainted with national interests, or to certify the same for compulsory arbitration. UFE
contends that Articles 263 and 264 are based on the 1973 Constitution, specifically
Sec. 9 of Article II thereof, the pertinent portion of which reads:
"Sec. 9. x x x. The State may provide for compulsory arbitration.''
UFE argues that since the aforecited provision of Sec. 9 is no longer found
in the 1987 Constitution, Articles 263(g) and 264 of the Labor Code are now
"unconstitutional and must be ignored."
Ruling: On the contrary, the continued validity and operation of Articles 263
and 264 of the Labor Code has been recognized by no less than the Congress of the
Philippines when the latter enacted into law RA 6715, otherwise known as Herrera
Law, Section 27 of which amended paragraphs ( g ) and ( i ) of Article 263 of the Labor
Code.
At any rate, it must be noted that Articles 263(g) and 264 of the Labor Code
have been enacted pursuant to the police power of the State, which has been defined
as the power inherent in a Government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to
promote the order, safety, health, morals and general welfare of society. The police
3

power, together with the power of eminent domain and the power of taxation, is an inherent power of government and does
not need to be expressly conferred by the
Constitution.

K. Interphil Laboratories Ee Union vs Interphil Laboratories

GR 142824
Facts:
Petitioner is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of Respondent. They had a
CBA.

Prior to the expiration of the CBA, respondent company was approached by the petitioner, through its officers. The
Union inquired about the stand of the company regarding the duration of the CBA which was set to expire in a few
months. Salazar told the union officers that the matter could be best discussed during the formal negotiations
which would start soon.

All the rank-and-file employees of the company refused to follow their regular two-shift work schedule. The
employees stopped working and left their workplace without sealing the containers and securing the raw materials
they were working on.

To minimize the damage the overtime boycott was causing the company, Salazar immediately asked for a meeting
with the union officers. In the meeting, Enrico Gonzales, a union director, told Salazar that the employees would
only return to their normal work schedule if the company would agree to their demands as to the effectivity and
duration of the new CBA. Salazar again told the union officers that the matter could be better discussed during the
formal renegotiations of the CBA. Since the union was apparently unsatisfied with the answer of the company, the
overtime boycott continued. In addition, the employees started to engage in a work slowdown campaign during
the time they were working, thus substantially delaying the production of the company.

Respondent company filed with the National NLRC a petition to declare illegal petitioner union’s “overtime
boycott” and “work slowdown” which, according to respondent company, amounted to illegal strike. It also filed
with Office Secretary of Labor a petition for assumption
of jurisdiction. Secretary of Labor Nieves Confesor issued an assumption order over the labor dispute.
Labor Arbiter Caday submitted his recommendation to the then Secretary of Labor Leonardo A. Quisumbing. Then
Secretary Quisumbing approved and adopted the report in his Order, finding illegal strike on the part of petitioner
Union.

Issue: WON the Labor Secretary has jurisdiction to rule over an illegal strike.
Held:
On the matter of the authority and jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor and Employment to rule on the illegal
strike committed by petitioner union, it cannot be denied that the issues of “overtime boycott” and “work
slowdown” amounting to illegal strike before Labor Arbiter
Caday are intertwined with the labor dispute before the Labor Secretary.

The appellate court also correctly held that the question of the Secretary of Labor and Employment’s jurisdiction
over labor-related disputes was already settled in International Pharmaceutical, Inc. vs. Hon. Secretary of Labor
and Associated Labor Union (ALU) where the Court declared:

In the present case, the Secretary was explicitly granted by Article 263(g) of the Labor Code the authority to
assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to
the national interest, and decide the same accordingly. Necessarily, this authority to assume jurisdiction over the
said labor dispute must include and extend to all questions and controversies arising therefrom, including cases
over which the labor arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction.

Moreover, Article 217 of the Labor Code is not without, but contemplates, exceptions thereto. This is evident from
the opening proviso therein reading ‘(e)xcept as otherwise provided under this Code x x x.’ Plainly, Article 263(g) of
the Labor Code was meant to make both the Secretary (or the various regional directors) and the labor arbiters
share jurisdiction,
subject to certain conditions. Otherwise, the Secretary would not be able to effectively and efficiently dispose of
the primary dispute. To hold the contrary may even lead to the absurd and undesirable result wherein the
Secretary and the labor arbiter concerned may have diametrically
opposed rulings. As we have said, ‘it is fundamental that a statute is to be read in a manner that would breathe life
into it, rather than defeat it.

In fine, the issuance of the assailed orders is within the province of the Secretary as authorized by Article 263(g) of
the Labor Code and Article 217(a) and (5) of the same Code, taken conjointly and rationally construed to subserve
the objective of the jurisdiction vested in the
Secretary.

Petition denied.

L. Filsyn Employees Chapter vs. Drilon, et al, G.R. N o . 82225, April 5, 1989 —
Facts: Filsyn, which produced polyester raw materials for textiles, required
24-hour operations. Pursuant to the employment contracts of the employees, they
were to report for work on Sundays and holidays if their work schedules so required,
subject, of course, to additional compensation required by law.
In February 1985, the union officers filed notices of strike. Upon Filsyn's
petition, the Minister of Labor certified the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory
arbitration.
The NLRC held conciliation meetings upon the union's request. However, on
April 4,1985 (Maundy Thursday), while the conciliation meetings were still pending,
the union officers and members did not report for work. The shuttle buses that were
regularly sent to fetch employees from designated pick-up points returned with only
probationary employees on board, as the regular employees refused to board the
buses. Neither did they report for work on the next two days (Good Friday and Black
Saturday). Thus, the factory's operations stopped and the company suffered losses.
The union contended that there was no strike, the failure to work of the officers
and members on Maundy Thursday, Good Friday, and Black Saturday, being justified
because these days were legal holidays.
Ruling: The certification of the dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration
had the effect of enjoining the intended strike subject of the notices.
The concerted action of the union members and officers in not reporting
for work on April 4-6, 1985, when they were supposed to render work on those days
according to their work schedules and during the pendency of the compulsory
arbitration proceedings on the certified labor dispute, constituted an illegal strike. The strike being illegal, the officers of the
striking union who knowingly took part
in the strike are deemed to have lost their employment status.

M. PAL vs Sec of Labor, GR No. 88210, Jan. 23, 1991

N. 046 GTE DIRECTORIES CORPORATION vs. HON. AUGUSTO SANCHEZG.R. No. 76219May 27, 1991Digest by:
LEMUEL TAN
Petitioners: GTE Directories CorporationRespondents: Hon. Augusto Sanchez and GTE Directories Corporation
Employees UnionPetition/Nature of the Case: Special Civil Action for CertiorariPonente: J. Narvasa

FACTS:
1. GTE Directories Corporation is a foreign corporation engaged in the Philippines in the business of publishing the
PLDT telephone directories for Metro Manila and several provinces. Practice was for its sales representatives to be
given work assignments within specific territories. These sales territories were so plotted or mapped out as to have
"an equal number of advertisers as well as revenue" Within these territories, the sales representatives therein
assigned were given quotas;i.e., they had to "achieve a certain amount of revenue or advertisements sold,
decreased, increased or cancelled within a given period of time." At such closing date, a salesperson should have
achieved a certain amount of the revenue target designated for his grid; otherwise, he loses the forthcoming grid
or forfeits the remaining grids not yet received. The Grid System was installed for the following reasons: (1) to give
all salespersons an opportunity to contact advertisers within a reasonable period; (2) to assure GTE that it will get
its share of advertising budget from clients as early as possible; and (3) to ensure an even flow of work throughout
the company. GTE therefore launched an aggressive campaign to get what it considered to be its rightful share of
the advertising budget of its clientele before it could be allocated to other media A new "Sales Evaluation and
Production Policy" was thereafter drawn up. GTE informed all its sales representatives of the new policy in a
Memorandum - The new policy was regarded as an improvement over the previous Sales Production Policy, which
solely considered quota attainment and handling in the Sales Report for the purpose of evaluating performance.

2. It appears that the new policy did not sit well with the union. It demanded that it be given 15 days "to raise
questions or objections to or to seek reconsideration of the sales and administrative practices issued by the
Company; GTE granted

3. Two new memoranda were formulated by GTE revising the previous schedules in submitting individual reports
reflecting target revenues

4. GTE's Sales Manager sent another Memorandum to "all premise sales personnel." That memorandum observed
that most of them had omitted to submit reports regarding "the target revenue notwithstanding that "several
consultations/discussions . . . (had) been held with your DSMs

5. The sales representatives did not submit the reports. Instead their union,GTE Directories Corporation Employees
Union (hereafter, simply the union), sent a letter to the Sales Manager "only one out of nineteen sales
representatives met the P20,000 revenue handled on our first grid deadline of August 2;" that the schedule was
not "drawn (up) as a result of an agreement of all concerned" since GTE had failed to get "affirmative responses"
from "clustered groups of SRs;" that the union could not "Comprehend how cancelling non-cancelling accounts
help production;" and that its members would fail "expectations of cancelling . . . non-cancelling accounts" since it
"would result to further reduction of our pay which (they) believe is the purpose of your discriminate and
whimsical memo.

6. The union filed in behalf of the sales representatives, a notice of strike grounded on alleged unfair labor
practices of GTE

7. After sending another memorandum to 16 premise sales representatives requiring submission of individual
reports without response, GTE thereupon suspended its sales representatives "without pay for 5 working days and
warned them that their failure to submit would merit more drastic disciplinary actions; still, no sales rep complied

8. All the sales representatives were suspended anew

9. Finally, GTE gave its sales representatives an ultimatum. By memorandum, individually addressed to its sales
representatives, GTE required them, for the last time, to submit the required reports ("list of accounts to be
cancelled") within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the memorandum; otherwise, they would be terminated
"for cause."; Not one sales rep submitted a report
10. GTE terminated the employment of the recalcitrant sales representatives (14) with the undertaking to give
them "separation pay, upon proper clearance and submission of company documents, material etc., in . . . (their)
possession."

11. The union declared a strike in which about 60 employees participated

12. When conciliations proved futile, Acting Labor Minister Vicente Leogardo, Jr issued an Order assuming
jurisdiction over the dispute: all striking workers including those who were dismissed during the conciliation
proceedings, except those who have already resigned, are hereby directed to return to work and the management
of G.T.E. Directories to accept all returning employees under the same terms and conditions prevailing previous to
the strike notice and without prejudice to the determination of the obligation and rights of the parties or to the
final outcome of this dispute.

13. GTEs MR denied GTE had "accepted back to work all the returning workers except fourteen (14) whom it
previously dismissed insisting that they were legally dismissed for violation of company rules and, therefore, are
not included and may not be reinstated on the basis of a return-to-work order," and that "They were dismissed for
their alleged failure to comply with the reportorial requirement under the Sales and Administrative Practices in
effect since 1981 but which for the present is the subject of negotiations between the parties."

14. Both moved for reconsideration; affirmed resolution of LA Ople

15. GTE moved for reconsideration; rebuffed

16. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not GTE was correct in dismissing the 14 premises sales representatives for failure to comply
with company policies (whether or not the effectivity of an employer's regulations and policies is dependent upon
the acceptance and consent of the employees thereby sought to be bound)

RULING/RATIO: YES. GTE had cause to dismiss the fourteen (14) premise sales representatives who had repeatedly
and deliberately, not to say defiantly, refused to comply with its directive for submission of individual reports on
specified matters. The record shows that GTE addressed no less than (six) written official communications to said
premise sales representatives embodying this requirement

NLU vs. Insular La Yebana, Co.: Except as limited by special laws, an employer is free to regulate, according to his
own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work assignments, working methods,
time, place and manner of work, tools to be used,processes to be followed, supervision of workers, working
regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, lay-off of workers and the discipline, dismissal and recall of
work Abbott Laboratories vs. NLRC: Even as the law is solicitous of the welfare of the employees, it must also
protect the right of an employer to exercise what are clearly management prerogatives. The free will of
management to conduct its own business affairs to achieve its purpose cannot be denied. LVN, Pictures Workers
vs. LVN: So long as a company's management prerogatives are exercised in good faith for the advancement of the
employer's interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under
special laws or under valid agreements, this Court will uphold them

IN THE CASE AT BAR: It must thus be conceded that its adoption of a new "Sales Evaluation and Production Policy"
was within its management prerogative to regulate, according to its own discretion and judgment, all aspects of
employment, including the manner, procedure and processes by which particular work activities should be done.
This Court fails to see, however, how these objections and accusations justify the deliberate and obdurate refusal
of the sales representatives to obey the management's simple requirement for submission by all Premise Sales
Representatives (PSRs) of individual reports or memoranda requiring reflecting target revenueswhich is all that
GTE basically required and which it addressed to the employees concerned no less than six (6) times. The Court
fails to see how the existence of objections made by the union justify the studied disregard, or wilful disobedience
by the sales representatives of direct orders of their superior officers to submit reports. Surely, compliance with
their superiors' directives could not have foreclosed their demands for the revocation or revision of the new sales
policies or rules; there was nothing to prevent them from submitting the requisite reports with the reservation to
seek such revocation or revision.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: Respondent Union won.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and as prayed for, the Order dated October 1, 1986 of the public
respondent is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.
DOCTRINE:
To sanction disregard or disobedience by employees of a rule or order laid down by management, on the pleaded
theory that the rule or order is unreasonable, illegal, or otherwise irregular for one reason or another, would be
disastrous to the discipline and order that it is in the interest of both the employer and his employees to preserve
and maintain in the working establishment and without which no meaningful operation and progress is possible.
Deliberate disregard or disobedience of rules, defiance of management authority cannot be countenanced. This is
not to say that the employees have no remedy against rules or orders they regard as unjust or illegal. They may
object thereto, ask to negotiate thereon, bring proceedings for redress against the employer before the Ministry of
Labor. But until and unless the rules or orders are declared to be illegal or improper by competent authority, the
employees ignore or disobey them at their peril. It is impermissible to reverse the process: suspend enforcement
of the orders or rules until their legality or propriety shall have been subject of negotiation, conciliation, or
arbitration.

O. G.R. Nos. L-24267-8 May 31, 1966

PERFECTO FERRER, OSCAR FLORES, JULIAN AGUSTIN, FELICISIMO LICHUCA, PIO SUMAGIT and INHELDER
LABORATORIES, INC. and SISTER COMPANIES EMPLOYEES UNION, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, INHELDER LABORATORIES, INC., SAN ROQUE TRADING CORPORATION
AND/OR HANS INHELDER, PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER, respondents.
These are two (2) unfair labor practice cases commenced in the CIR
GR. No. L-24268 - was filed by the Management of Inhelder Laboratories, Inc. against the Labor Union of
employees and some officers and members of the Union

GR. No.L-24267- filed by the latter against the former.

2 cases were jointly tried.

Facts:

 Hon. Ansberto P. Paredes, the trial judge, rendered a decision dismissing the complaints in both cases.
 On motion for reconsideration filed by the Management, the Court of Industrial Relations en banc,
dismissed the complaint. Decreed that the officers and members of the Union who had participated in a
peaceful strike staged by the latter from July 1 to July 15, 1963, "be considered to have lost their status as
employees of the companies".
 March 27, 1963 – immediately after an election, which the Union obtained the requisites majority, it
submitted to the management a set of demands for a CBA. This led to negotiations and a draft of
agreement were incorporated. Due to additional points, another draft of agreement was prepared.
 May 29, 1963 – another draft was drawn to which the Management refers as “final draft”. However,
petitioners' representatives pressed for the inclusion of a union clause, an accumulated sick leave clause,
and an accumulated vacation leave clause, apart from the increase of the high cost of living monthly
allowance from P20.00 to P30.00, the creation of a grievance committee and a general salary increase.
 When the union’s request for the inclusion of a union shop or union security clause was not incorporated,
it refused to sign the agreement.
 June 7, 1963 – the Management sent a memorandum to all of its employees, purporting to inform them
of the status of the negotiations with their representatives, and stating that the latter had refused to sign
the draft of agreement — copies of which were made available to all employees — and instead "came
with a new demand — 'Union Shop' " — upon the ground that such was the desire of the Union members,
who had allegedly disauthorized the officers of the Union.
 June 10-15, 1963 - several members of the Union resigned.
 June 13, 1963 - Petitioners filed a 30-day notice of strike. (Reason: Respondents had been "bargaining in
bad faith"). However, the Management, in turn, filed unfair labor practice charges against the Union, for
alleged refusal to bargain.
 June 10 to June 22, 1963 — the Management had transferred 2 members of the Union, suspended a third
one and assigned still another to a work less dignified than that which he did before.
 June 24, 1963 - Petitioners filed an unfair labor practice charge against the Management, for the
suspension or demotion of union members due allegedly to union activities.
 June 25, 1963 - Union gave another notice of strike upon the ground that the Management was engaged
in unfair labor practices, by suspending, demoting, intimidating and coercing union members, on account
of their union activities.
 July 1 to July 15, 1963 – in accordance with a strike vote, the Union staged a strike.

Issue:
WON the strike was legal.

Ruling:

Respondents:
Maintained that petitioner failed to give a 30-day
notice of their intention to strike and the strike had
allegedly been called in bad faith.

Petitioners:
Strike was legal because it was provoked by alleged
unfair labor practices on the part of the respondents
and because said petitioners had acted in good faith
in staging said strike.
CIR en banc

The strike staged was not provoked by ULP on the part of the Management. Since 30 days had not
elapsed since appellants had given the corresponding notice, the strike was illegal and those who took part in it are
deemed separated from the service.

The trial judge held otherwise. Petitioners were reasonably justified in believing that the respondents'
acts constituted ULP and that petitioners had to strike in order to arrest the evil effects of said practices upon the
Union and its members.

Supreme Court

We are inclined to agree with the latter view. The fact that both parties affixed their initials to the "draft"
does not necessarily prove that the same was more "final" than the "final draft". The drafts signed was no more
than a draft of contract, not a contract in itself.

It is not true that petitioners had made new demands. The demand for a union shop or union security
clause, which was the main bone of contention, had been included in the draft of agreement. What happened,
merely, was that the demands incorporated in said draft were discussed by both parties, one after the other; that
an agreement on the former did not connote an abandonment of the latter; and that, after the settlement of one
issue, it was understood that the others would be taken up thereafter.
When the Union members learned that said document did not include the union shop or union security
clause, they withdrew from their representatives the authority to sign, on their behalf, the collective bargaining
agreement with the Management. Under these circumstances, said representatives could not validly sign said
agreement, and their refusal to do so is not and cannot be an act of bad faith.

Neither may the Union members be held to have acted in bad faith in so withdrawing said authority from
their representatives, unless the clause aforementioned were included in the agreement, since that clause was
part of their original demands and their representatives could not waive it without their consent.

Although the Management may have had the strict legal right to take against union members the
disciplinary and other administrative measures, there is no denying the fact that the time chosen by the
Management reasonably justified the belief of the Union that its real or main purpose was to discourage
membership in the Union, to discredit the officers.

The Court holds that:

 the strike in question had been called to offset what petitioners were warranted in believing in good faith
to be unfair labor practices on the part of Management;
 petitioners were not bound to wait for the expiration of thirty (30) days from notice of strike before
staging the same;
 said strike was not illegal;
 the strikers had not lost their status as employees of respondents herein.

Considering that the latter have been absolved from the charge of unfair labor practice, the reinstatement of
the strikers must be without backpay.

Wherefore, the resolution appealed from should be, as it is hereby modified accordingly, without special
pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
P. The "Good-Faith Strike" Doctrine Retraced and Reiterated
People's Industrial and Commercial Employees and Workers Org. (FFW) vs. Peoples
Industrial and Commercial Corp., G.R. No. 37687, March 15, 1982 —
Facts: On April 5,1965, the president of P ICEWO, sent to the management a
set of proposals for a collective bargaining agreement. The management on April
13, 1965 replied that the formal reply to the proposals could not be made within
the reglementary period because they would submit the said proposals to their legal
counsel for further study and instead their reply would be made on April 19, 1965.
No reply was made on that date. On April 29, 1965, individual petitioners were
dismissed. A strike was staged the next day. One day after the petitioners struck, a
new collective bargaining agreement was signed by the respondent company and
the FTLO.
The respondent company knew that a new union was formed, composed
of about 85% of the total number of its employees. It was furnished a copy of the
certification that the majority of the FTLO members are forming a new union called
PICEWO. The set of bargaining proposals was in the name of the new union. While
a company cannot be forced to sit down and bargain collectively with the new union
since it had no notice of the union's official capacity to act as the bargaining agent,
the respondent company cannot deny that it had factual knowledge of the existence
of a majority union. It could have asked for further proof that the new union was
indeed the certified bargaining agent. It did not. Instead, it dismissed individual
petitioners and signed a new CBA the day after the expiration of the old CBA, on the
pretext that FTLO was presumed to be the certified bargaining agent. Such pretext
does not seem justified nor reasonable in the face of the established fact that a new
union enjoyed a majority status within the company.
On the belief that the respondent company refused to bargain collectively with
PICEWO, individual petitioners together with the other members staged a strike.
Ruling: We have in several cases ruled that a strike may be considered legal
when the union believed that the respondent company committed unfair labor acts
and the circumstances warranted such belief in good faith although subsequently
such allegation of unfair labor practices are found out as not true.

Q. TIU AND HAYUHAY vs. NLRC

Gr. No. 123276, August 18, 1997
Facts:
RBS (company) had a CBA with GMAEU (union) which took
effect on July 2, 1989. RBS observed that a huge amount of overtime
expenses incurred which moved the president to form guidelines on
the availment of leaves and rendering of overtime work. On June 11,
1991, RBS furnished GMAEU a copy of the said guidelines and
requested the latter to comment thereon. The union did not file any
comment. RBS then implemented the said guidelines. GMAEU then
send a letter to the president. The union argued that, the union was
not consulted in the formulation of the said guidelines which
violates their CBA, the guidelines would render nugatory the CBA
provision of the same subject and the diminution of benefits being
enjoyed by all employees with respect to the mid-year bonuses
(from 2-1/2 months to 1-1/2 months constitutes a withdrawal of an
existing company policy). RBS management and GMAEU officials
met on 3 July 1991 and on 10 July 1991 to thresh out the issues
raised by GMAEU in its 26 June 1991 letter. Both talks, however,
were short lived as the union refused to hold further talks with RBS.
On 12 July 1991, GMAEU filed a Notice of Strike with the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) based on unfair labor
practices allegedly committed by RBS on grounds of violation of
existing CBA, employees coercion, union interference and
discrimination. The NCMB set a conciliation meeting on 19 July
1991, but as early as 16 July 1991 the Union held a strike vote
among its members and submitted the results thereof to the NCMB
on 18 July 1991 which showed that majority of the union members
voted to go on strike.
During the conciliation meeting held on 19 July 1991, RBS,
through counsel, informed GMAEU’s officers that RBS did not violate
any provision in the collective bargaining agreement since the
issuance of the guidelines was a management prerogative duly
recognized in their agreement. As regards GMAEU’s charges of
coercion, union interference and discrimination, RBS argued that
these alleged unfair labor practices were neither raised by the union
in its 26 June 1991 letter nor during their 3 July and 10 July 1991
talks. RBS’ counsel requested GMAEU’s officers to name the persons
or officers of RBS involved in the alleged unfair labor practices and
to state the specific act or acts complained of so that RBS
management could adequately refute said allegations or impose
appropriate disciplinary actions against its erring officers. GMAEU’s

officers, however, ignored both RBS’ and the labor conciliator’s

requests for a bill of particulars.
In a second conciliation meeting held on 25 July 1991, RBS
reiterated its request to GMAEU’s officers to furnish RBS the details
of the alleged unfair practices committed by RBS’ officers. Again, the
Union denied RBS’ request and refused to hold any further talks with
RBS management. On the same day, RBS filed a motion to dismiss
GMAEU’s notice of strike and forewarned the Union about the
consequences of an illegal strike. On 2 August 1991, the union
struck. On the same day, RBS filed a complaint for illegal strike and
unfair labor practice against GMAEU and its fourteen (14) officers
with the NLRC. Meanwhile, the Secretary of Labor immediately
assumed jurisdiction over the case, issued a return-to-work order,
and certified the case to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. In the
certified case, the labor arbiter found no factual and legal ground to
hold RBS guilty of unfair labor practices against the Union. On
appeal (docketed as NLRC-NCR CC No 00076-01), the NLRC affirmed
the labor arbiter’s decision in a resolution dated 31 July 1992.
Meanwhile, the labor arbiter continued to hear the illegal
strike case filed by RBS against GMAEU. On 18 February 1994, the
labor arbiter rendered judgment declaring the strike illegal and the
union officers who knowingly participated in the illegal strike to
have validly lost their employment status. 10 of them did not
appeal. Tiu and Hayuhay appealed.
Issue:
Whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion when it upheld the labor arbiter’s decision that
petitioners staged an illegal strike.
Held:
The notice of strike filed by the union before the NCMB on
12 July 1991 contained general allegations that RBS management
committed unfair labor practices by its gross violation of the
economic provisions in their collective bargaining agreement and by
alleged acts of coercion, union interference and discrimination
which amounted to union busting. It is the union, therefore, who
had the burden of proof to present substantial evidence to support
these allegations.
It is not disputed that prior to 12 July 1991, the union
treated RBS’ issuance of the “guidelines on the availment of leaves
and rendering of overtime services” as “gross” violations of the
existing collective bargaining agreement. In its talks with the union,
RBS painstakingly explained that the said allegation was unfounded
because the issuance of said guidelines was RBS’ management
prerogative. Up to that point, the union never raised the issue of
unfair labor practices allegedly committed by RBS’ official under
Article 248 of the Labor Code. But in its notice of strike filed two
days later, the union raised issues of coercion, discrimination, and
union interference for the first time.
Significantly, the union had two (2) conciliatory meetings
arranged by the NCMB at which it could have substantiated these
additional allegations. However, the fact that it had submitted the
results of the strike vote even ahead of the conciliatory meetings,
and continuously refused to substantiate its allegations in its notice
of strike thereafter, lends credence to the NLRC’s observation that
meikimouse

LABOR RELATIONS

DIGEST POOL : Class VI

these charges were indiscriminately hurled against RBS to give a
semblance of validity to its notice of strike.
The bottom line is that the union should have immediately
resorted to the grievance machinery established in their agreement
with RBS. In disregarding said procedure the union leaders who
knowingly participated in the illegal strike “have acted unreasonably,
and, as such, the law cannot interpose its hand to protect them from
the consequences of their behavior.”

Union members. The NLRC ordered the Hotel to grant the 61

dismissed Union members financial assistance in the amount of ½
month's pay for every year of service or their retirement benefits
under their retirement plan whichever was higher.
Upon appeal the CA promulgated its January 19, 2004
Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 76568 which dismissed the Union's
petition and affirmed the rulings of the NLRC.
Issue:
Whether or not the union, may be adjudged guilty of
staging an illegal strike despite respondents' admission that they
prevented said officers and members from reporting for work for
alleged violation of the hotel's grooming standards.

R. ABREL DIGEST – Finals [Assigned]

GR NO. 113466│December 15, 1997
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR [NFL] et al [P]
Vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION [R]

FACTS:
• R Corp is engaged in the business of fish and tuna export; its co-respondents are its corporate officers
• P union is a legitimate labor federation; 141 of its members were dismissed employees of R Corporation
• P union contends that 10 union officials who attended a certification election conference were:
1. Barred from entering the company premises and
2. Prohibited to work, allegedly due to their union activities

NLRC – Company’s actuations did not consist in a lockout but were related to disciplinary matter, which is not
connected with a labor dispute
The 10 were subjected to some disciplinary actions due to breach of company discipline, such that, they
were using their union activities to go on undertime or to justify their constant and frequent absences
[violation of company policy]

• January 25, 1993 – The workers attempted to re-enter the company’s premises but were prevented from doing
so; thus, over 200 workers staged a picket outside
The gates were barricaded; thus, blocking the ingress and egress of company vehicles, trapping 50
workers inside and paralyzing company operations
• January 26, 1993 – 700 non-striking workers were prevented from working
• January 27, 1993 – The workers returned to work due to a memorandum forged between the P union and R
corporation (explain their participation in the strike)
• The workers failed to submit their explanations; thus, the management placed them under preventive
suspension

• January 29, 1993 – P union filed a NOS [NCMB] and they filed again another NOS since it was contested by the P
corporation
The NOS alleged the following:
1. Discrimination
2. Coercion
3. Union busting
4. Black listing of union members
5. Intimidation
6. Dismissal of union officers and members
• February 3, 1993 – R corporation filed a case to declare the strike held on January 25 and 26 as illegal
• February 8, 1993 – P union filed a case for unfair labor practice and damages
• February 10, 1993 – Another conciliation was held in connection with the February 5, 1993 NOS
• February 11, 1993 – Workers barricaded the company gates, tying the same with ropes and chains and
preventing non-striking workers from entering or leaving the premises
• From February 12 to March 2, 1993, the company was constrained to ferry its workers to and from the company
premises through its wharf with the use of motorboats
• March 3, 1993 – The striking workers cut the company fence leading to the wharf, gained control of the same,
and chained close the last point of entrance and exit to and from the premises
The acts of coercion, intimidation and harassment were committed by the striking workers, including the
uttering of threats of bodily harm against non-striking workers and company officials
• March 11, 1993 – SOLE assumed jurisdiction over the dispute pursuant to a petition of the NFL filed on January
29, 1993 [NOS]
SOLE issued a Return to Work Order ordering all striking workers should return by March 15, 1993
• PNP’s intercession was ignored
• March 29, 1993 – The workers finally lifted their picket lines

NLRC – (on appeal) affirmed the decision of LA

ISSUE: W/N THE STRIKE WAS ILLEGAL → YES

RULING:
• In this case, no notice of strike, as required by Article 263 [g] was filed by P union prior to the strike on January
25 and 26
• No prior notice of the taking of a strike vote was furnished the NCMB, nor was the seven-day strike ban after the
strike vote observed
Instead, the workers immediately barricaded company premises in the afternoon of January 25, 1996,
completely disregarding the procedural steps prescribed by Art. 263 (c) and (f)

• As for the strike commenced on February 11, only six days had elapsed from the filing of the Notice to Strike on
February 5, 1993

• In addition, various illegal acts were committed by the strikers during said strike.
The strikers destroyed company property and intimidated and harassed non-striking workers in violation
of Art. 264 (e) of the Labor Code.
Likewise, barricading, chaining and padlocking of dates to prevent free ingress and egress into company
premises are also violations of the self-same article.
• The P union is wrong in asserting that the strike can be declared legal for it was done in good faith
Even if the union acted in good faith in the belief that the company was committing an unfair labor
practice, if no notice of strike and a strike vote were conducted, the said strike is illegal

ISSUE 2: W/N THE DISMISSAL OF 141 WORKERS IS BASED SOLELY ON A PRIMA FACIE FINDING THAT THEY
COMMITTED VARIOUS UNLAWFUL ACTS WHILE STAGING THEIR STRIKE → NO

• The dismissal is principally based on their refusal to return to work after the Secretary of Labor had assumed
jurisdiction over the case on March 11, 1993.
• Despite the efforts of PNP personnel to persuade the workers to comply with the Return-to-Work Order, the
strike continued until March 29, 1993 when the workers dismantled their pickets.

As held in St. Scholastica's College v.Hon. Ruben Torres and Samahan ng Manggagawang Pang-edukasyon
sa Sta. Escolastika 14 "(a) strike undertaken despite the issuance by the Secretary of Labor of an
assumption or certification order becomes a prohibited activity and thus illegal, pursuant to the second
paragraph of Art. 264 of the Labor Code, as amended . . . The union officers and members, as a result, are
 deemed to have lost their employment status for having knowingly participated in an illegal act." "Case
law, likewise, provides that by staging a strike after the assumption or certification for arbitration, the
workers forfeited their right to be readmitted to work, having abandoned their employment."

• P union’s refusal to return to work has no factual basis since the form imposing certain conditions before
admitting them back to work was prior to the return to work order issued by the SOLE on March 11, 1993
A strike (or lockout), to enjoy the protection of law, must observe certain procedural requisites mentioned in Art.
263 and the Implementing Rules, namely:

1) A notice of strike, with the required contents, should be filed with the DOLE, specifically the Regional
Branch of the NCMB, copy furnished the employer of the union;

2) A cooling-off period must be observed between the filing of notice and the actual execution of the
strike thirty (30) days in case of bargaining deadlock and fifteen (15) days in case of unfair labor practice.
However, in the case of union busting where the union's existence is threatened, the cooling-off period
need not be observed.
xxx xxx xxx

4) Before a strike is actually commenced, a strike vote should be taken by secret balloting, with a 24-hour
prior notice to NCMB. The decision to declare a strike requires the secret-ballot approval of majority of
the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned.

5) The result of the strike vote should be reported to the NCMB at least seven (7) days before the
intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period. 6

The provisions hardly leave any room for doubt that the cooling-off period in Art. 264(c) and the seven-
day strike ban after the strike-vote report prescribed in Art. 264(f) were meant to be, and should be
deemed, mandatory [Art. 264 should now read Art. 263]. 7

S. GRAND BOULEVARD HOTEL vs. GENUINE LABOR ORGANIZATION

G.R. No. 153664. July 18, 2003

FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent union entered into and signed a CBA covering the period of July 10, 1988 to July 9,
1991. On September 27, 1990, the respondent union filed a notice of strike based on the following grounds: a)
Violation of CBA; b) Coercion of employees; c) Harassment; d) Arbitrary transfer of employees; and e) Illegal
termination and suspension of employees. On October 16, 1990, the petitioner's general manager, wrote the
Acting Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE for brevity) informing him of the petitioner's decision to retrench
171 employees on a staggered basis, spread over a period of 60 days, to lessen the daily financial losses being
incurred by the petitioner. The next day, the respondent union informed the DOLE-NCR that the union will conduct
a strike vote referendum. The members of the respondent union voted to stage a strike. DOLE-NCR was thereafter
informed of the results of the strike vote referendum. On October 31, 1990, the SOLE issued a status quo ante
bellum order certifying the case to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration and enjoining the parties from engaging in
any strike or lockout.

The petitioner wrote the SOLE of its decision to implement its retrenchment program to stem its huge losses.
Subsequently, the petitioner terminated the employment of 148 employees. The remaining employees were also
informed that it will close in six months. The respondent union protested the actions of the petitioner invoking
Section 15, Article VI of the CBA. By way of riposte, the respondent union filed on November 16, 1990 another
notice of strike because of what it perceived as the petitioner's continuing unfair labor practices (ULP). On the
same day, the officers of the respondent union and some members staged a picket in the premises of the hotel,
obstructing the free ingress and egress thereto. The following day, petitioner terminated the employment of the
officers and members of the respondent union. On November 28, 1990, the SOLE issued an order certifying the
labor dispute to the NLRC. The SOLE issued a return-to-work order, which the respondent officers and members
complied.
Petitioner however filed a complaint with the Regional Arbitration Office of the NLRC for illegal strike against the
respondents on the ground that the latter failed to comply with the requirements provided under Arts. 263 and
264 of the Labor Code. In their answer, the respondents alleged that the petitioner committed ULP prior to the
filing of the November 16, 1990 notice of strike. Hence, there was no need for the respondent union to comply
with Arts. 263 and 264 of the Labor Code, as the notice filed by the union on September 27, 1990 was sufficient
compliance with the law.

After due trial, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner and declared the union officers to
have lost and forfeited their employment. When the petitioner learned of said decision, it forthwith barred the
officers and members of the respondent union from entering the hotel. The respondent union appealed the
decision to the NLRC, alleging that it had complied with the requirements laid down in Arts. 263 and 264 of the
Labor Code because its November 16, 1990 notice of strike was a mere reiteration of its September 27, 1990
notice of strike, which, in turn, complied with all the requirements of the aforementioned articles, i.e., the cooling-
off period, the strike ban, the strike vote and the strike vote report. After trial, the NLRC affirmed the decision of
the LA. It ratiocinated that the compliance by respondents of the requirements laid down in Arts. 263 and 264 of
the Labor Code respecting the September 27, 1990 notice of strike filed by the union cannot be carried over to the
November 16, 1990 notice of strike. Resultantly, for failure of the union to comply with the aforementioned
requirements for its November 16, 1990 notice of strike, the strike staged on November 16 up to November 29,
1990 was illegal. Thereafter, the respondents appealed NLRC’s decision to the CA and the latter ruled that the
strike was legal, hence, the dismissal of respondents were unjustified and without legal basis. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the strike staged by the respondent union on November 16 was legal?

HELD: NO. The requisites for a valid strike are as follows: (a) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE thirty days
before the intended date thereof or fifteen days in case of ULP; (b) strike vote approved by a majority of the total
union membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose;
and (c) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike. The
requisite seven-day period is intended to give the DOLE an opportunity to verify whether the projected strike really
carries the approval of the majority of the union members. The notice of strike and the cooling-off period were
intended to provide an opportunity for mediation and conciliation. The requirements are mandatory and failure of
a union to comply therewith renders the strike illegal. A strike simultaneously with or immediately after a notice of
strike will render the requisite periods nugatory. Moreover, a strike that is undertaken, despite the issuance by the
SOLE of an assumption or certification order, becomes a prohibited activity and, thus, illegal pursuant to Art. 264
of the Labor Code, as amended. Consequently, the union officers and members are deemed to have lost their
employment status for having knowingly participated in an illegal act.

In this case, the respondent union filed its notice of strike with the DOLE on November 16, 1990 and on the
same day, staged a picket on the premises of the hotel, in violation of the law. The respondents cannot argue
that since the notice of strike on November 16, 1990 were for the same grounds as those contained in their notice
of strike on September 27, 1990 which complied with the requirements of the law on the cooling-off period, strike
ban, strike vote and strike vote report, the strike staged by them on November 16, 1990 was lawful. The matters
contained in the notice of strike of September 27, 1990 had already been taken cognizance of by the SOLE when he
issued on October 31, 1990 a status quo ante bellum order enjoining the respondent union from intending or
staging a strike. Despite the SOLE order, the respondent union nevertheless staged a strike on November 16, 1990
simultaneously with its notice of strike, thus violating Art. 264(a) of the Labor Code, as amended, which provides
that “ x xx No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Secretary
or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of
cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout.”

While it may be true that the petitioner itself barred the officers of the respondent union from working and sent
out circulars of its decision to retrench its employees effective December 16, 1990, the same were not valid
justifications for the respondents to do away with the statutory procedural requirements for a lawful strike. There
was no immediate and imperative need for the respondents to stage a strike on the very day that the notice of
strike on November 16, 1990 was filed because the retrenchment envisaged by the petitioner had yet to take
effect on December 14, 1990. The grievances of the respondent union could still very well be ordered and acted
upon by the SOLE before December 14, 1990. The respondents' claim of good faith is not a valid excuse to dispense
with the procedural steps for a lawful strike. Thus, even if the union acted in good faith in the belief that the
company was committing an unfair labor practice, if no notice of strike and a strike vote were conducted, the said
strike is illegal. Hence, the need for a union to adhere to and comply strictly with the procedural conditions sine
qua non provided for by the law in staging a strike.

T. Topic: Effect of Certification and Violations of Order

G.R. NOS. 143013-14, December 18, 2000

TELEFUNKEN SEMICONDUCTORS EMPLOYEES UNION-FFW VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS

DE LEON, JR., J.:

FACTS:The Company and the Union reached a deadlock in their negotiations for a new collective bargaining
agreement. The Union then filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB).Acting Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment, Jose S. Brillantes, intervened and assumed
jurisdiction over the dispute. Thus, the Orderof the said Acting Secretary enjoined any strike or lockout, whether
actual or intended, between the parties.

Despite the assumption Order, the Union struck on September 14, 1995. Two (2) days later, Noticeof the Return-
to-Work Orderwas sent to the striking Union members but still some of them refused to heed the order and
continued with their picket. On September 23, 1995, violence erupted in the picket lines. The service bus ferrying
non-striking workers was stoned, causing injuries to its passengers. Thereafter, complaints for threats, defamation,
illegal detention and physical injuries were filed against the strikers.

The Company thereafter issued letters of termination for cause to the workers who did not report back to work
despite the Notice of Assumption and Return-to-Work Orders.

On October 27, 1995, the Acting Secretary of Labor issued another Orderdirecting the Company to reinstate all
striking workers "except the Union Officers, shop stewards, and those with pending criminal charges, x x x" while
the resolution of the legality of the strike was pending.
The Union filed a petition for certiorari, questioning the exclusions made in the aforesaid Orders, which the Court
granted and as a result of which ordered the reinstatement of all striking workers without exception.

In compliance with the Court’s order to the Secretary of Labor and Employment "to determine with dispatch the
legality of the strike," marathon hearings were conductedat the DOLE Office.

On May 28, 1999, the Secretary declared the strike as illegal for having been waged in open, willful and knowing
defiance of the assumption order and the subsequent return-to-work order. Consequently, the striking workers
are declared to have lost their employment status.

Dissatisfied, both the Company and the Union filed motions for reconsideration which were denied. So, they both
filed their respective petitions for certiorari with the Court of Appeals that REVERSED and SET ASIDE the
Secretary’s Decision in so far as it directs the company to pay backwages and grant financial assistance to the
striking workers.

Only the Union sought reconsideration. However, it was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.

The Union argue that for an officer to lose his employment status, it must be proved that he knowingly
participated in an illegal strike; and that in the case of an ordinary member, it must not only be demonstrated that
he actually participated in the illegal strike but also that he has committed illegal acts during the strike and which
respondent Company allegedly failed to prove.

ISSUE:Whether or not the striking workers lost their employment status and entitlement to backwages and
financial assistance grant on the ground that the strike was illegal for having been waged in open, willful and
knowing defiance of the assumption order and the subsequent return-to-work order

HELD: Yes.Under Art. 263 of the Labor Code, the moment the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over a labor
dispute in an industry indispensable to national interest, such assumption shall have the effect of automatically
enjoining the intended or impending strike. It was not even necessary for the Secretary of Labor to issue another
order directing them to return to work. The mere issuance of an assumption order by the Secretary of Labor
automatically carries with it a return-to-work order, even if the directive to return to work is not expressly stated
in the assumption order.

In this connection, Article 264(a) clearly provides that no strike or lockout shall be declared after the assumption of
jurisdiction by the President or the Secretary or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or
voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout. Any
union officer who knowingly participates in illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly
participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status.

In this case, the strike of the Union cannot be viewed as anything but illegal for having been staged in open and
knowing defiance of the assumption and return-to-work orders. The necessary consequence thereof is thatworkers
forfeited their right to be readmitted to work, having abandoned their employment, and so could be validly
replaced.

With respect to petitioners' claim of backwages, it is only when there is a finding of illegal dismissal that backwages
are granted.Sincethe strikers were not illegally dismissed, the Company is under no obligation to pay backwages to
them, especially when the record shows that the striking workers did not comply with lawful orders for them to
return to work.The same view holds with respect to the award of financial assistance or separation pay, which is
allowed only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct
or those reflecting on his moral character. Here, the strikers' open and willful defiance of the assumption order
constitute serious misconduct as well as reflective of their moral character, hence, granting financial assistance to
them is not and cannot be justified.

RESOLUTION:The petition is DISMISSED. The appealed Decision dated December 23, 1999 and the Resolution
dated April 19, 2000 of public respondent Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. No costs.

For reference:

Art. 263. Strikes, picketing and lockouts.

xxxxxxxxx

(g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry
indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the
dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption per
certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as
specified in the assumption or certification order. If one had already taken place at the time of assumption or
certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall
immediately resume operations and re-admit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before
the strike or lockout.

xxxxxxxxx
U. ST. SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RUBEN TORRES, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, and SAMAHANG NG
MANGGAGAWANG PANG-EDUKASYON SA STA. ESKOLASTIKA-NAFTEU, respondents.

 Effects of failing to comply with a return to work order

 Immediacy of returning to work.

 Whether striking union members terminated for abandonment of work after failing to comply with return-to-
work orders of the SECRETARY should by law be reinstated.
 20 July 1990: petitioner COLLEGE and private respondent UNION initiated negotiations for a first-ever
collective bargaining agreement.
 A deadlock in the negotiations prompted the UNION to file on 4 October 1990 a Notice of Strike with the
Department

 5 November 1990: UNION declared a strike which paralyzed the operations of the COLLEGE.
 Affecting as it did the interest of the students, public respondent SECRETARY:
1. immediately assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute
2. issued on the same day a return- to- work oerder.
6 November 1990, instead of returning to work, the UNION filed a motion for reconsideration of the return-to-
work order questioning inter alia the assumption of jurisdiction by the SECRETARY.

 9 November 1990, COLLEGE:

1. sent individual letters to the striking employees to return to work not later than 8:00 o'clock A.M. of 12
November 1990
2. giving notice to some twenty-three (23) workers that their return would be without prejudice to the filing of
appropriate charges against them.
 UNION presented a list of (6) demands to the COLLEGE (11 November 1990).
 The most important of these was the unconditional acceptance back to work of the striking employees which
were flatly rejected.

 14 and 15 November 1990: parties held conciliation meetings where the UNION pruned down its demands to
three (3), viz.:
1. striking employees be reinstated under the same terms and conditions before the strike;
2. no retaliatory or disciplinary action be taken against them;
3. CBA negotiations be continued.
 These efforts proved futile.

 23 November 1990: COLLEGE mailed individual notices of termination to the striking employees, which were
received on 26 November 1990, or later.
 UNION officers and members tried to return to work but were no longer accepted by the COLLEGE.

 5 December 1990: Complaint for Illegal Strike was filed against the UNION, its officers and several of its
(NLRC),

 UNION:
1. moved for the enforcement of the return-to-work order (SECRETARY) citing "selective acceptance of returning
strikers"
2. sought dismissal of the complaint.

 12 April 1991: SECRETARY issued an Order which:

1. directed the reinstatement of striking UNION members, finding that no violent or otherwise illegal act
accompanied the conduct of the strike
2. fledgling UNION like private respondent was "naturally expected to exhibit unbridled if inexperienced
enthusiasm, in asserting its existence".
3. UNION officers responsible for the violation of the return-to-work orders of 5 and 9 November 1990 and
sustained their termination.

 Petitioner questions the assumption by SECRETARY of jurisdiction to decide on termination disputes,

maintaining that such jurisdiction is vested instead in the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Art. 217
 Petitioner also invokes PAL v. Secretary stating that the labor Secretary exceeded his jurisdiction when he
restrained PAL from taking disciplinary measures against its guilty employees .
 Art. 263 of the Labor Code: all that the Secretary may enjoin is the holding of the strike.

 Petitioner contends the doctrine in

1. Sarmiento v. Tuico and
2. Union of Filipro Employees v. Nestle Philippines, Inc.:
 Workers who refuse to obey a return-to-work order are not entitled:
1. to be paid for work not done, or
2. to reinstatement to the positions they have abandoned of their refusal to return

 Private respondent UNION pleads for reinstatement of its dismissed officers considering that the picket was:
1. never characterized as a "brazen disregard of successive legal orders"
2. nor was it a willful refusal to return to work unlike in the two cases.

 The failure of UNION officers and members to immediately comply with the return-to-work orders was
because the academic institutions were not industries indispensable to the national interest.
 The UNION intimated that efforts were immediately initiated to fashion out a reasonable return-to-work
agreement with the COLLEGE, albeit, if failed.
 International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor and Employment:
 Secretary was explicitly granted by Article 263 (g) the:
1. Authority to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry
indispensable to the national interest,
2. decide the same
 This authority to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute must
1. include and extend to all questions and include and extend to all questions
2. controversies arising therefrom, including cases over which the Labor Arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction.

 The rulings above seem to run counter to that of PAL v. Secretary of but the conflict is only apparent, not real.
 We ruled in the latter case that the jurisdiction of the Secretary assumption and/or certification cases is
limited to the issues:
1. involved in the disputes or
2. submitted to him for resolution.
 Since the matter on the legality or illegality of the strike was never submitted to him for resolution, he was
thus to have exceeded his jurisdiction when he restrained the employer from taking disciplinary action against
employees who staged an illegal strike.

 Before the Secretary may take cognizance of an issue which is merely incidental to the labor dispute the same
must be:
1. involved in the labor disputed itself,
2. submitted to him for resolution.
 If it was not, as in PAL and he acted on it, that assumption of jurisdiction is tantamount to a grave abuse of
discretion.
 Otherwise, the ruling in International Pharmaceuticals will apply.

 The submission of an incidental issue of a labor dispute, in assumption and/or certification cases, to the
Secretary for his resolution is one of the instances whereby the latter may exercise concurrent jurisdiction
together with the Labor Arbiters.

 In the instant petition, the COLLEGE asked the "Secretary of Labor to take the appropriate steps under the said
circumstances."
 It likewise prayed that respondent SECRETARY uphold its termination of the striking employees.
 The issue on the legality of the termination of striking employees was properly submitted to respondent
SECRETARY for resolution.

 Interpretation which is in consonance with the intention of our labor authorities: to provide workers
immediate access to their rights and benefits without being inconvenienced by the arbitration and litigation
process

 Whether striking union members, terminated for abandonment of work after failing to comply strictly with
a return-to-work order, should be reinstated.
 Law which govern the effects of defying a return-to-work order:

1. Article 263 (g)

 Art. 263. Strikes, picketing, and lockouts. „- . . . (g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or
likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor
and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission
for compulsory arbitration.
 Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending
strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order.
 If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees
shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all
workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout.
 The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement
agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the
same . . . (as amended by Sec. 27, R.A. 6715; emphasis supplied).

2. Article 264
 Art. 264. Prohibited activities. „1¤7 (a) No labor organization or employer shall declare a strike or lockout:
1. without first having bargained collectively in accordance with Title VII of this Book or
2. without first having filed the notice required in the preceding Article or
3. without the necessary strike or lockout vote first having been obtained and reported to the Ministry.

 No strike or lockout shall be declared:

1. after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Minister or
2. after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or
3. during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout
. . . (emphasis supplied).

 Any worker whose employment has been terminated as consequence of an unlawful lockout shall be entitled to
reinstatement with full back wages.
 Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly
participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment
status: Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for
 termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike
. . . (emphasis supplied).

3. Section 6, Rule IX, of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC (which took effect on 31 August 1990) „1¤7
 Sec. 6. Effects of Defiance. „1¤7 Non-compliance with the certification order of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment or a return to work order of the Commission shall be considered an illegal act committed in the
course of the strike or lockout and shall authorize the Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission,
as the case may be, to enforce the same under pain or loss of employment status or entitlement to full
employment benefits from the locking-out employer or backwages, damages and/or other positive and/or
affirmative reliefs, even to criminal prosecution against the liable parties . . . (emphasis supplied).

 UNION maintains that the reason they failed to immediately comply with the return-to-work order:
1. questioned the assumption of jurisdiction of respondent SECRETARY.
2. being an academic institution, the school could not be considered an industry indispensable to national interest,
3. pending resolution of the issue, they were under no obligation to immediately return to work.

 Position of UNION is simply flawed.

 Article 263 (g): if a strike has already taken place at the time of assumption, "all striking . . . employees shall
immediately return to work."

This means that a return-to-work order is immediately effective and executory notwithstanding the filing of a
motion for reconsideration (University of Sto. Tomas v. NLRC).
 It must be strictly complied with even during the pendency of any petition questioning its validity (Union of
Filipro Employees v. Nestle Philippines, Inc., supra).
 The assumption and/or certification order is issued in the exercise of respondent SECRETARY's compulsive
power of arbitration and, until set aside, must be immediately complied with.

 The assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary over labor disputes involving academic institutions was already
upheld in Philippine School of Business Administration v. Noriel:
 There is no doubt that the on-going labor dispute at the school adversely affects the national interest
 It is not amiss to mention that the school is engaged in the promotion of the physical, intellectual and
emotional well-being of the country's youth.

 The respective liabilities of striking union officers and members who failed to immediately comply with the
return-to-work order is outlined in Art. 264:
 Any declaration of a strike or lockout after the Secretary of has assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute is
considered an illegal. act.
 Any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in a strike defying a return-to-work order may,
consequently, "be declared to have lost his employment status."

 Records reveal that private respondent UNION opted to defy not only the return-to-work order of 5 November
1990 but also that of 9 November 1990.
 The striking union officers and members tried to return to work only eleven (11) days after the conciliation
meetings ended in failure, or twenty (20) days after they received copy of the first return-to-work order on 5
November 1990.

 There was willful disobedience not only to one but two return-to-work orders.
 Despite containing threats of disciplinary action against some union officers and members who actively
participated in the strike, the letter dated 9 November 1990 sent by the COLLEGE enjoining the union officers
and members to return to work on 12 November 1990 presented the workers an opportunity to return to
work under the same terms and conditions or prior to the strike.
 Yet, the UNION decided to ignore the same.
 The COLLEGE, correspondingly, had every right to terminate the services of those who chose to disregard the
return-to-work orders issued by respondent SECRETARY in order to protect the interests of its students who
form part of the youth of the land.

 On the immediacy of returning to work: immediately after the order/ assumption.

 From the moment a worker defies a return-to-work order, he is deemed to have abandoned his job.
 It is already in itself knowingly participating in an illegal act.
 Respondent SECRETARY gravely abused his discretion when he ordered the reinstatement of striking union
members who refused to report back to work after he issued two (2) return-to-work orders, which in itself is
knowingly participating in an illegal act.

V. UNIVERSITY OF SAN AGUSTIN EMPLOYEES UNION-FFW vs. CA

Gr. No. 169632, March 28, 2006
Facts:
This is a case between the University of San Agustin
Employees Union-FFW (UNION) and The University of San Agustin
(UNIV).
Sometime on 2000, the parties agreed on a 5-year CBA,
the economic provisions of which are effective for 3 years only. After
the lapse of 3 years, the parties negotiated on the economic
provisions but did not agree on the terms during the remaining 2
years of the CBA and beyond.
Since the parties did not agree on the computation of
tuition incremental proceeds (TIP) which shall be the basis for the
increase of salaries, they underwent a preventive mediation
proceedings at the NCMB.
Still unresolved, the Union declared a bargaining deadlock
and thereafter filed a Notice of Strike at the NCMB, which was
expectedly opposed by the Univ through a Motion to Strike-out
Notice of Strike and Refer the Dispute to Voluntary Arbitration, since
the CBA contained a "no-strike, no-lockout" provision, and a
grievance machinery for settling disputes, including a voluntary
arbitration mechanism should the grievance machinery fail to settle
the dispute. The NCMB, however, failed to resolved the Univ's
Motion
Thereafter, both parties made a joint request for the
Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE) to assume jurisdiction
over the dispute.
On September 18, 2003, he SOLE assumed jurisdiction, and
with such assumption of jurisdiction, any strike or lockout was
strictly enjoined.
The day after the SOLE assumed jurisdiction, and on the
same day that the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order (AJO) was
supposedly served to both parties, the Union staged a strike. Union
meikimouse
DIGEST POOL : Class VI
members refused to receive a copy of the AJO assailing that only the
Union President is authorized to receive the same. The Union filed a
Petition Declare Illegal Strike and Loss of Employment Status of the
striking employees, which Petition was filed at the NLRC. Such
Petition was later on consolidated with the case pending before the
SOLE, at the request of the Univ.
The SOLE rendered a Decision resolving the various
economic issues over which the parties had a deadlock in the
collective bargaining, and likewise dismissed the Petition to Declare
Illegal Strike.
The University elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals
after its Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the SOLE.
The Court of Appeals partially granted the Petition. It
declared the strike as illegal, but affirmed the SOLE's decision
regarding the economic issues.
Both the Univ and the Union filed their respective Motions
for Reconsideration.
Basing on the CA's decision, on April 7, 2005, the Univ
served the striking employees with their notices for termination and
concurrently, the Union filed with the NCMB a second notice of
strike, this time on ground of alleged union busting.
On April 22, 2005, the parties again took initial steps to
negotiate the new CBA but said attempts proved futile. Hence, on
April 25, 2005, the Union went on strike. In reaction, the University
notified the Union that it was pulling out of the negotiations
because of the strike.
On August 23, 2005, the CA, acting on the parties'
respective motions for reconsideration, promulgated the herein
challenged Partially Amended Decision. Finding merit in the
respondent University's motion for partial reconsideration, the CA
ruled that the SOLE abused its discretion in resolving the economic
issues on the ground that said issues were proper subject of the
grievance machinery as embodied in the parties' CBA. Consequently,
the CA directed the parties to refer the economic issues of the CBA
to voluntary arbitration. The CA, however, stood firm in its finding
that the strike conducted by the petitioner Union was illegal and its
officers were deemed to have lost their employment status.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the strike was illegal and the Union Officers
deemed to have lost their employment status on their failure to
return to work immediately upon the service of AJO issued by the
SOLE.
2. Whether or not the economic provisions of the CBA should be
referred to Voluntary Arbitration.
Held:
On the first issue, the SC ruled that ART. 263 of the Labor
Code provides: ."..Such assumption or certification (of the SOLE)
shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or
impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or
certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of
assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall
immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately
resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms
and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout." The phrase

LABOR RELATIONS
"immediately return to work" indicates an almost instantaneous or
automatic compliance for a striker to return to work once an AJO
has been duly served. Therefore, the act of the striking employees is
violative of the foregoing provision.
On the second issue, the Supreme Court ruled that
economic benefits, which included the issue on the formula in
computing the TIP share of the employees, is one that arises from
the interpretation or implementation of the CBA, and these matters
should be referred to a Voluntary Arbitrator, as provided in Art. 261
and 262 of the Labor Code. The peculiar facts of the instant case
show that the University was deprived of a remedy that would have
enjoined the Union strike and was left without any recourse except
to invoke the jurisdiction of the SOLE.

W. LIWAYWAY PUBLICATIONS, INC. vs. PERMANENT CONCRETE

WORKERS UNION
Gr. No. L-25003, October 23, 1981
Facts:
Liwayway Publications, Inc. brought an action in the CFI-Manila
against Permanent Concrete Workers Union, et al. for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction and for damages it incurred when
its employees were prevented from getting their daily supply of
newsprint from its bodega.
Plaintiff alleged that it is a second sublessee of a part of the
premises of the Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. at 1000
Cordeleria Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila from Don Ramon Roces, a first
lessee from the aforesaid company. The premises of the plaintiff is
separated from the compound of Permanent Concrete Products, Inc.
by a concrete and barbed wire fence with its own entrance and road
leading to the national road. This entrance is separate and distinct
from the entrance road of the Permanent Concrete Products, Inc.
Plaintiff further alleged that it has a bodega for its
newsprint in the sublet property which it uses for its printing and
publishing business. The daily supply of newsprint needed to feed its
printing plant is taken from this bodega.
On September 10, 1964, the employees of the Permanent
Concrete Products, Inc. declared a strike against their company.
October 3, 1964 for unknown reasons and without legal
justification, Permanent Concrete Workers Union and its members
picketed, stopped and prohibited plaintiff's truck from entering the
compound to load newsprint from its bodega.
The union members intimidated and threatened with bodily
harm the employees who were in the truck. On October 6, 1964,
union members stopped and prohibited the general manager,
personnel manager, bodega-in-charge and other employees of the
plaintiff from getting newsprint in their bodega.
Plaintiff made repeated demands to the defendants not to
intimidate and threaten its employees with bodily harm and not to
blockade, picket or prohibit plaintiff's truck from getting newsprint
in their bodega. Defendants refused and continued to refuse to give
in to the demands of the plaintiff.
meikimouse

LABOR RELATIONS

DIGEST POOL : Class VI

As a consequence, plaintiff rented another bodega during
the time members of the defendant union prevented its employees
from entering its bodega in the compound of Permanent Concrete
Products, Inc. and thus incurred expenses both in terms of bodega
rentals and in transporting newsprint from the pier to the temporary
bodega.
The picket held by defendant-appellant union against their
employer prevented herein plaintiff-appellee's truck from loading
and unloading of its products inside the premises of Permanent
Concrete Products, where the plaintiff-appellee was occupying as a
sub-lessee. Hence, the latter sought to enjoin the picket.
Issue:
May a picket be enjoined at the instance of a third party?
Held:
Yes. Peaceful picketing, while being allowed as a phase of
freedom of expression guaranteed by the Constitution and could not
be curtailed even in the absence of employer-employee relationship,
is not an absolute right. The courts are not without power to localize
the sphere of demonstration, whose interest are foreign to the
context of the dispute. Thus the right may be recognized at the
instance of an "innocent bystander" who is not involved in the labor
dispute if it appears that the result of the picketing is create an
impression that a labor dispute exists between him and the
picketing union.
Notes:
Picketing is a form of protest in which people (called
picketers) congregate outside a place of work or location where an
event is taking place. Often, this is done in an attempt to dissuade
others from going in ("crossing the picket line"), but it can also be
done to draw public attention to a cause. Picketers normally
endeavor to be non-violent. It can have a number of aims, but is
generally to put pressure on the party targeted to meet particular
demands and/or cease operations. This pressure is achieved by
harming the business through loss of customers and negative
publicity, or by discouraging or preventing workers and/or
customers from entering the site and thereby preventing the
business from operating normally.
Picketing is a common tactic used by trade unions during
strikes, who will try to prevent dissident members of the union,
members of other unions and non-unionised workers from working.
Those who cross the picket line and work despite the strike are
known pejoratively as scabs.

X. Nonstrikeable: Physical Rearrangement of Office

Reliance Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission,
G.R. Nos. 86917-18, January 25, 1991 —
Facts: To avoid unnecessary loss of productive working time due to personal
and nonwork-related conversations, personal telephone calls and nonwork connected
visits by personnel to other departments, Reliance Surety Insurance, through its
underwriting Department Manager, effected a change in the seating arrangement
of its personnel in said department.
Four of those affected protested the transfer of their tables and seats, claiming
that the change was without prior notice and was done merely to harass them as union
members. When the manager insisted, a heated discussion ensued, during which the
employees hurled unprintable insults to the manager and supervisors.
They were asked to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against
them for misconduct and gross disrespect. The work atmosphere in the department
became charged as the employees refused to stay at their designated places. Hence,
the four were placed under preventive suspension and ultimately dismissed after
investigation.
The union claimed that the company was guilty of unfair labor practice
because it, among others, effected transfer and changes in the seating arrangement
to intimidate union members. While the complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair
labor practice was hibernating in the Arbitration Branch, the union filed a notice of
strike. The following day, the company received a copy of the notice of strike and a
telegram from DOLE setting the notice of strike for initial conciliation conference
on March 17. But even before the initial conference could take place, the union in
the morning of March 17 struck and picketed the company premises by forming
human barricades.
Ruling: There is no question that the strike itself was prompted by no actual,
existing unfair labor practice committed by the petitioner. In effecting a change in

Y. Phil. Metal Foundries Inc vs CIR, GR Nos. L-34948-49, May 25, 1979
PHILIPPINE METAL FOUNDRIES INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, REGAL
MANUFACTURING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION REGEMAS and CELESTINO BAYLON,
respondents.
Facts: Petitioner charged the Regal Manufacturing Employees Associations FTUP and its members, with
unfair labor practice for declaring a strike and picketing the company's premises without filing a notice of
strike in spite of the existence of a no strike, no lockout clause and grievance procedure in the collective
bargaining agreement entered into between the petitioner and the Union. In their answer to this
complaint, the Union and its members denied the charge and, as affirmative defense, alleged that the
Union requested the management for a grievance conference, stating in its invitation the time and place
of meeting, but the company, through its General Manager, refused and instead handed the Union's
President a memorandum dismissing him from work and told the Union members not to report for work,
which is in violation of the no lockout and no strike clause of the contract.

Upon the other hand, petitioner Philippine Metal Foundries, Inc. and its General Manager were
charged by private respondents with unfair labor practice for the dismissal of CelestinoBaylon, President
of the Union allegedly due to his union activities in representing and protecting the Union members in
their relations with the petitioner. To this complaint, petitioner and its manager filed an answer denying
the material allegations and alleged as affirmative defenses, that the company was constrained to
terminate the services of Baylon by reason of the fact that he had, in spite of repeated notices and
warnings from the company, frequently and repeatedly absented himself from his work as foundry worker
and by reason of said dismissal he, as President of the Union as well as an officer of the FTUP
encouraged and abetted the staging of a strike without prior notice to the company or any of the latter's
officials, in gross violation of a stipulation provided in their Collective Bargain Agreement, establishing
pickets and blocking ingress and egress to and from the company's premises, causing interruption of the
work and/or business of the company to its serious damage and prejudice.

After the joint trial of these two cases, the Court of Industrial Relations rendered decision, finding
that Baylon, as Union President, was discharged for his union activities and that the employees declared
a strike because they believed in good faith that the dismissal of their President was an unfair labor
practice. The Court declared respondents Philippine Metal Foundries, Inc. and LeopoldoRelunia, guilty of
unfair labor practice in dismissing complainant CelestinoBaylon; ordered respondents to reinstate
CelestinoBaylon to his former position with all the rights and privileges formerly appertaining thereto, with
one (1) year back wages; and dismissed the petitioner's complaint. The motion for reconsideration was
denied by Court of industrial Relations en banc.

Issue: Whether or not the strike declared by union is legal.

Whether or not CelestinoBaylon was dismissed due to his absences or to his union activities.

Held: Petition dismissed.

The question of whether an employee was discharged because of his union activities is
essentially a question of fact as to which the findings of the Court of Industrial Relations are conclusive
and binding if supported by substantial evidence considering the record as a whole.

It is admitted by petitioner that it accepted the invitation of Baylon for a grievance conference.
Yet, two hours after it accepted the letter of invitation, it dismissed Baylon without prior notice and/or
investigation. Such dismissal is undoubtedly an unfair labor practice committed by the company. Under
these facts and circumstances, Baylon and the members of the Union had valid reasons to ignore the
schedule grievance conference and declared a strike. When the Union declared a strike in the belief that
the dismissal of Baylon was due to union activities, said strike was not illegal .It is not even required that
there be in fact an unfair labor practice committed by the employer. It suffices, if such a belief in good
faith is entertained by labor, as the inducing factor for staging a strike. The strike declared by the Union in
this case cannot be considered a violation of the "no strike" clause of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement because it was due to the unfair labor practice of the employer. Moreover, a no strike clause
prohibition in a Collective Bargaining Agreement is applicable only to economic strikes.

The strike cannot be declared as illegal for lack of notice. In strikes arising out of and against a
company's unfair labor practice, a strike notice is not necessary in view of the strike being founded on
urgent necessity and directed against practices condemned by public policy, such notice being legally
required only in cases of economic strikes.

Z.
174Master Iron Labor Union v NLRC
[G.R. No.92009 | 17 February 1993]
TOPIC:Unfair Labor Practice
PONENTE: J. Melo
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
MILU is not, therefore, already asking for an economic benefit not already agreed upon, but are merely
asking for the implementation of the same. They aver that the Corporation's practice of hiring
subcontractors to do jobs outside of the company premises was a way "to dodge paying service allowance
to the workers"

Much more than an economic issue, the said practice of the Corporation was a blatant violation of the
CBA — and unfair labor practice on the part of the employee. Although the end result, should the
Corporation be required to observe the CBA, may be economic in nature because the workers would then
be given their regular working hours and therefore their just pay, not one of the said grounds is an
economic demand within the meaning of the law on labor strikes.
EMERGENCY RECIT
There was a CBA between MILU and employer. Employer Corporation later subcontracted work that was
supposedly to be done by MILU’s employees in order to avoid paying service allowances provided under
the CBA. MILU staged a strike and Corporation filed a complaint with the NLRC alleging that it was
illegal. LA and NLRC said that the strike was illegal. MILU appealed arguing that it was valid because
the ground for the strike was non-economic in nature. SC reversed and agreed with MILU that the strike
was legal. Check doctrine.
FACTS:
 Master Iron Labor Union (MILU) entered into a CBA with the Corporation with a no strike and
no lockout provision and another provision on service allowances.
 The Corporation eventually subcontracted outside workers to do the jobs of its regular workers.
 MILU filed a notice of strike. Through DOLE’s intervention, the Corporation agreed to give back
the usual work to its regular employees.
 Despite this, the Corporation continued subcontracting, arguing that the hiring of casual workers
was a management prerogative. Calls for conciliation made by MILU were ignored.
 MILU filed another notice of strike and staged the same.
 Corporation filed with the NLRC a petition to declare the strike illegal.
 In its counter complaint, MILU charged the Corporation with ULP for subcontracting work
causing the reduction of the employees’ work days.
 LA: Declared the strike illegal and affirmed the termination of petitioners.
 NLRC: Affirmed LA.
 MILU contends that notwithstanding the non-strike provision in the CBA, the strike they staged
was legal because the reasons therefor are non-economic in nature. They assert that the NLRC
abused its discretion in holding that there was "failure to exhaust the provision on grievance
procedure" in view of the fact that they themselves sought grievance meetings but the
Corporation ignored such requests.
 In holding that the strike was illegal, the NLRC relied solely on the no-strike no-lockout
 provision of the CBA. As this Court has held in Philippine Metal Foundries, Inc. vs. CIR, a no-
strike clause in a CBA is applicable only to economic strikes. Corollarily, if the strike is founded
on an unfair labor practice of the employer, a strike declared by the union cannot be considered a
violation of the no-strike clause.
ISSUE(S): W/N the strike was illegal

HELD:No, the strike was legal.

RATIO:
All told, the strike staged by the petitioners was a legal one even though it may have been called to offset
what the strikers believed in good faith to be unfair labor practices on the part of the employer

Verily, such presumption of legality prevails even if the allegations of unfair labor practices are
subsequently found out to be untrue

An economic strike is defined as one which is to force wage or other concessions from the employer
which he is not required by law to grant. In this case, petitioners enumerated in their notice of strike the
following grounds: violation of the CBA or the Corporation's practice of subcontracting workers;
discrimination; coercion of employees; unreasonable suspension of union officials, and unreasonable
refusal to entertain grievance.

The Corporation contends that MILU’s clamor for the implementation of Section 2, Article VIII of the
CBA on service allowances granted to workers who are assigned outside the company premises is an
economic issue.

On the contrary, MILU decry the violation of the CBA, specifically the provision granting them service
allowances. MILU is not, therefore, already asking for an economic benefit not already agreed upon, but
are merely asking for the implementation of the same. They aver that the Corporation's practice of hiring
subcontractors to do jobs outside of the company premises was a way "to dodge paying service allowance
to the workers"

Much more than an economic issue, the said practice of the Corporation was a blatant violation of the
CBA — and unfair labor practice on the part of the employee. Although the end result, should the
Corporation be required to observe the CBA, may be economic in nature because the workers would then
be given their regular working hours and therefore their just pay, not one of the said grounds is an
economic demand within the meaning of the law on labor strikes.

The demands of the petitioners, being covered by the CBA, are definitely within the power of the
Corporation to grant and therefore the strike was not an economic strike.

The other grounds, i.e., discrimination, unreasonable suspension of union officials and unreasonable
refusal to entertain grievance, had been ventilated before the Labor Arbiter. They are clearly unfair labor
practices as defined in Article 248 of the Labor Code.

Moreover, MILU staged the strike only after the Corporation had failed to abide by the agreement forged
between the parties upon the intervention of no less than the DOLE after the union had complained of the
Corporation's unabated subcontracting of workers who performed the usual work of the regular workers.
The Corporation's insistence that the hiring of casual employees is a management prerogative betrays its
attempt to coat with legality the illicit curtailment of its employees' rights to work under the terms of the
contract of employment and to a fair implementation of the CBA.
While it is true that an employer's exercise of management prerogatives, with or without reason, does
not per se constitute unjust discrimination, such exercise, if clearly shown to be in grave abuse of
discretion, may be looked into by the courts

Indeed, the hiring, firing, transfer, demotion, and promotion of employees are traditionally identified as
management prerogatives. However, they are not absolute prerogatives. They are subject to limitations
found in law, a collective bargaining agreement, or general principles of fair play and justice

The Corporation's assertion that it was exercising a management prerogative in hiring outside workers
being contrary to the contract of employment which, of necessity, states the expected wages of the
workers, as well as the CBA, is therefore untenable.

AA. Consolidated Labor Association of the Philippines vs. Marsman and Company, Inc.,
11 SCRA 589 (1964) —

Facts: The Union was certified as the bargaining representative of the Company's employees and commenced negotiations
with it for a CBA. Despite several meetings, the parties failed to reach an agreement, eventually leading to the filing of a
notice of strike by the Union. A strike was eventually declared by the Union when conciliation meetings at the Department of
Labor failed to produce a settlement. The strike was attended by acts of violence on the part of certain strikers. Thereafter
upon the intercession of the Secretary of Labor, the strikers agreed to return to work on the promise that the Company
would discuss their demands with them. While the Company admitted some of the strikers, it refused readmission to others
unless they ceased to be active union members. As a result, the strike and picketing were resumed.

One of the issues raised was the liability of the Company for backwages. The Union contends that the initial economic strike
had been transformed into a ULP strike when the Company discriminated against certain strikers. Hence, the Union claimed
that the strikers are entitled to backwages.

Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the CIR had the discretion whether or not to award backwages in an unfair labor
practice strike. We now come to the question of backpay. In an economic strike, the strikers are not entitled to backpay,
since the employer should get the equivalent day's work for what he pays his employees. During the time that the strike was
an economic one, complainant had no right to backpay. The industrial court could not have made a finding of unfair labor
practice with respect to such time, as none had so far been committed. This being an unfair labor practice case, it cannot,
therefore, order reinstatement much less backpay for that period. On the other hand, even after the court has made a finding
of unfair labor practice, it has the discretion to determine whether or not to grant backpay. Such discretion was not abused
when it denied backwages to complainants, considering the climate of violence which attended the strike and picket that the
complainants conducted. While the complainants ordered reinstated did not actively take part in the acts of violence, their
minatory attitude towards the Company may be gathered from the fact that from the very first day of the strike, policemen
had to patrol the strike zone in order to preserve peace.

ELIZABETH C. BASCON and NOEMI V.COLE, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

BB.
METROCEBU COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, INC., andGREGORIO IYOY
G.R. No. 144899 February 5, 2004

Facts:
 The petitioners were employees ofprivate respondent Hospital and membersof the
NAMA-MCCH, a labor union ofMCCH employees. The instant controversyarose from an intra-
union confict betweenthe NAMA-MCCH and the National LaborFederation (NFL), the mother
federation ofNAMA-MCCH. NAMA-MCCH asked MCCHto renew their Collective
BargainingAgreement (CBA). NFL, however, opposedthis move by its local afliate. Mindful ofthe
apparent intra-union dispute, MCCHdecided to defer the CBA negotiations untilthere was a
determination as to which ofsaid unions had the right to negotiate anew CBA. Believing that
their union wasthe certifed collective bargaining agent, themembers and officers of NAMA-
MCCHstaged a series of mass actions insideMCCH’s premises.

The DOLE issued certificationsstating that NAMA-MCCH was not a registered labor
organization. This fnding,however, did not deter NAMA-MCCH fromfling a notice of strike. Said
notice was,however, disregarded by the NCMB for wantof legal personality of the union. The
MCCHmanagement received reports thatpetitioners participated in NAMA-MCCH’smass
actions. Consequently, notices wereserved on all union members, petitionersincluded, asking
them to explain in writingwhy they were wearing red and blackribbons and roaming around the
hospitalwith placards.
Petitioner was dismissed fromemployment because of her participation inthe mass
action. Bascon and Cole filed acomplaint for illegal dismissal. They deniedhaving participated in
said mass actions orhaving received the notices (1) enjoiningthem from wearing armbands and
puttingup placards, with warning that disciplinarymeasure would be imposed, and (2)informing
them of the schedule of hearing.
They admit, however, to wearing armbandsfor union identity while nursing patients as
per instruction of their union leaders. TheLabor Arbiter found the terminationcomplained to be
valid and legal, anddismissed the complaint. The Labor Arbiterheld that petitioners were justly
dismissedbecause they actually participated in theillegal mass action. It also concluded that
petitioners received the notices of hearing,but deliberately refused to attend thescheduled
investigation. On appeal, theNLRC reversed the ruling of the LaborArbiter. But the CA reversed
the ruling ofthe NLRC.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners werevalidly terminated for (1) allegedlyparticipating in an

illegal strike.

Held: The Supreme Court said thatpetitioner was not validly terminated. Whilea union ofcer can
be terminated for mereparticipation in an illegal strike, anordinary striking employee, like
petitionersherein, must have participated in thecommission of illegal acts during the strike.
There must be proof that they committedillegal acts during the strike. But proofbeyond
reasonable doubt is not required.
Substantial evidence, which may justify theimposition of the penalty of dismissal, may
suffice.In case at bar, the Court of Appealsfound that petitioners’ actual participation
in the illegal strike was limited to wearingarmbands and putting up placards. Therewas no fnding
that the armbands or theplacards contained ofensive words orsymbols. Thus, neither such
wearing ofarmbands nor said putting up of placardscan be construed as an illegal act. In
fact,per se, they are within the mantle ofconstitutional protection under freedom ofspeech.
Evidence on record shows thatvarious illegal acts were committed byunidentifed union
members in the courseof the protracted mass action. But it cannothold petitioners responsible
for acts theydid not commit. The law, obviouslysolicitous of the welfare of the commonworker,
requires, before termination may beconsidered, that an ordinary union membermust have
knowingly participated in thecommission of illegal acts during a strike.
CC. DIGEST POOL : Class VI
discrimination practiced by the Company. Both are valid grounds for
going on a strike.

ABARIA vs. NLRC

Gr. No. 154113, December 7, 2011
Facts:
The National Federation of Labor (NFL) is the exclusive
bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees of Metro
Cebu Community Hospital, Inc. (MCCHI). Under the 1987 and 1991
CBAs, the signatories were Pongasi, Sr. for MCCHI, and Atty.
Alforque and Lumapguid for NFL-MCCHI.
In the CBA effective from January 1994 until December 31,
1995, the signatories were Buot as Board of Trustees Chairman, Rev.
Iyoy as MCCH Administrator and Atty. Yu as Legal Counsel of NFL,
while Nava, President of Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa MCCH (NAMAMCCH-NFL) signed the Proof of Posting. Nava
wrote Rev. Iyoy
expressing the union’s desire to renew the CBA and attaching the
proposal.
Nava subsequently requested that some of the employees
be allowed to avail of one-day union leave with pay. However,
MCCHI returned the CBA proposal to secure first the endorsement
of the legal counsel of NFL as the official bargaining representative
of MCCHI employees. Atty. Alforque informed MCCHI that the
proposed CBA submitted by Nava was never referred to NFL and
that NFL has not authorized any other legal counsel or any person
for collective bargaining negotiations. By January 1996, the
collection of union fees (check-off) was temporarily suspended by
MCCHI in view of the existing conflict between the federation and its
local affiliate.
Thereafter, MCCHI attempted to take over the room being
used as union office but was prevented to do so by Nava and her
group who protested these actions and insisted that management
directly negotiate with them for a new CBA. MCCHI referred the
matter to Atty. Alforque, NFL’s Regional Director, and advised Nava
that their group is not recognized by NFL.
In his letter addressed to Nava some of the employees’
union membership was suspended for serious violation of the
Constitution and By-Laws. Upon the request of Atty. Alforque,
MCCHI granted one-day union leave with pay for 12 union members.
The next day, several union members led by Nava and her group
launched a series of mass actions such as wearing black and red
armbands/headbands, marching around the hospital premises and
putting up placards, posters and streamers.
Atty. Alforque immediately disowned the concerted
activities being carried out by union members which are not
sanctioned by NFL. MCCHI directed the union officers led by Nava to
submit a written explanation why they should not be terminated for
having engaged in illegal concerted activities amounting to strike,
and placed them under immediate preventive suspension.
Responding to this directive, Nava and her group denied there was a
temporary stoppage of work, explaining that employees wore their
armbands only as a sign of protest and reiterating their demand for

LABOR RELATIONS
MCCHI to comply with its duty to bargain collectively. Rev. Iyoy,
having been informed that Nava and her group have also been
suspended by NFL, directed said officers to appear before his office
for investigation in connection with the illegal strike wherein they
reportedly uttered slanderous and scurrilous words against the
officers of the hospital, threatening other workers and forcing them
to join the strike. Said union officers, however, invoked the
grievance procedure provided in the CBA to settle the dispute
between management and the union.
The DOLE Regional Office issued certifications stating that
there is nothing in their records which shows that NAMA-MCCH-NFL
is a registered labor organization, and that said union submitted
only a copy of its Charter Certificate. MCCHI then sent individual
notices to all union members asking them to submit a written
explanation why they should not be terminated for having
supported the illegal concerted activities of NAMA-MCCH-NFL which
has no legal personality as per DOLE records. In their collective
response, it was explained that the picketing employees wore
armbands to protest MCCHI’s refusal to bargain; it was also
contended that MCCHI cannot question the legal personality of the
union which had actively assisted in CBA negotiations and
implementation.
NAMA-MCCH-NFL filed a Notice of Strike but the same was
deemed not filed for want of legal personality on the part of the
filer. The NCMB likewise denied their motion for reconsideration.
Despite such rebuff, Nava and her group still conducted a strike vote
during which an overwhelming majority of union members approved
the strike.
Meanwhile, the scheduled investigations did not push
through because the striking union members insisted on attending
the same only as a group. MCCHI again sent notices informing them
that their refusal to submit to investigation is deemed a waiver of
their right to explain their side and management shall proceed to
impose proper disciplinary action under the circumstances.
Thereafter, MCCHI sent termination letters to union leaders and
other members who participated in the strike and picketing
activities. It also issued a cease-and-desist order to the rest of the
striking employees stressing that the wildcat concerted activities
spearheaded by the Nava group is illegal without a valid Notice of
Strike and
warning them that non-compliance will compel
management to impose disciplinary actions against them. For their
continued picketing activities despite the said warning, more than
100 striking employees were dismissed.
Unfazed, the striking union members held more mass actions. The
means of ingress to and egress from the hospital were blocked so
that vehicles carrying patients and employees were barred from
entering the premises. Placards were placed at the hospital’s
entrance gate stating: “Please proceed to another hospital” and “we
are on protest.” Employees and patients reported acts of
intimidation and harassment perpetrated by union leaders and
members. With the intensified atmosphere of violence and
animosity within the hospital premises as a result of continued
protest activities by union members, MCCHI suffered heavy losses
due to low patient admission rates. The hospital’s suppliers also
refused to make further deliveries on credit.
meikimouse

DIGEST POOL : Class VI

With the volatile situation adversely affecting hospital
operations and the condition of confined patients, MCCHI filed a
petition for injunction in the NLRC (Cebu City). A TRO was issued.
MCCHI presented 12 witnesses (hospital employees and patients),
including a security guard who was stabbed by an identified
sympathizer while in the company of Nava’s group.
MCCHI’s
petition was granted and a permanent injunction was issued
enjoining the Nava group from committing illegal acts. The City
Government of Cebu ordered the demolition of the structures and
obstructions put up by the picketing employees of MCCHI along the
sidewalk.
Thereafter, several complaints for illegal dismissal and
unfair labor practice were filed by the terminated employees.
Executive Labor Arbiter Belarmino rendered his decision dismissing
the complaints for unfair labor practice filed by Nava and 90 other
complainants. ELA Belarmino found no basis for the charge of
unfair labor practice and declared the strike and picketing activities
illegal having been conducted by NAMA-MCCH-NFL which is not a
legitimate labor organization. The termination of union leaders was
upheld as valid. The NLRC dismissed the complaint for unfair labor
practice and illegal dismissal is affirmed. Complainants elevated the
case to the Court of Appeals which dismissed the petition on
procedural ground. Hence, a petition is filed before the Supreme
Court.
Issues:
Whether or not the strike and picketing activities
conducted by union officers and members were illegal
Whether or not union officers and members who
participated in an illegal strike can be held liable thereof
Held:
Yes, the strike is illegal.
As borne by the records, NAMA-MCCH-NFL was not a duly
registered or an independently registered union at the time it filed
the notice of strike and when it conducted the strike vot. It could not
then legally represent the union members. Consequently, the
mandatory notice of strike and the conduct of the strike vote report
were ineffective for having been filed and conducted by NAMAMCCH-NFL which has no legal personality as a
legitimate labor
organization, in violation of Art. 263 (c), (d) and (f) of the Labor Code
and Rule XXII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code.
Furthermore, the strike was illegal due to the commission
of the following prohibited activities: (1) violence, coercion,
intimidation and harassment against non-participating employees;
and (2) blocking of free ingress to and egress from the hospital,
including preventing patients and their vehicles from entering the
hospital and other employees from reporting to work, the putting up
of placards with a statement advising incoming patients to proceed
to another hospital because MCCHI employees are on strike/protest.
As shown by photographs submitted by MCCHI, as well as the
findings of the NCMB and Cebu City Government, the hospital
premises and sidewalk within its vicinity were full of placards,
streamers and makeshift structures that obstructed its use by the

LABOR RELATIONS
public who were likewise barraged by the noise coming from strikers
using megaphones. On the other hand, the affidavits executed by
several hospital employees and patients narrated in detail the
incidents of harassment, intimidation, violence and coercion, some
of these witnesses have positively identified the perpetrators. The
prolonged work stoppage and picketing activities of the striking
employees severely disrupted hospital operations that MCCHI
suffered heavy financial losses.
The findings of the Executive Labor Arbiter and NLRC, as
sustained by the appellate court, clearly established that the striking
union members created so much noise, disturbance and obstruction
that the local government authorities eventually ordered their
removal for being a public nuisance. This was followed by an
injunction from the NCMB enjoining the union leaders from further
blocking the free ingress to and egress from the hospital, and from
committing threats, coercion and intimidation against non-striking
employees and patients/vehicles desiring to enter for the purpose of
seeking medical treatment/confinement. By then, the illegal strike
had lasted for almost five months.
Art. 264 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended, provides for
the consequences of an illegal strike to the participating workers: x
x Any union officer who knowingly participates in illegal strike and
any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the
commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have
lost his employment status: Provided, That mere participation of a
worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for
termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been
hired by the employer during such lawful strike.
The above provision makes a distinction between workers
and union officers who participate in an illegal strike: an ordinary
striking worker cannot be terminated for mere participation in an
illegal strike. There must be proof that he or she committed illegal
acts during a strike. A union officer, on the other hand, may be
terminated from work when he knowingly participates in an illegal
strike, and like other workers, when he commits an illegal act during
a strike.
Considering their persistence in holding picketing activities
despite the declaration by the NCMB that their union was not duly
registered as a legitimate labor organization and the letter from
NFL’s legal counsel informing that their acts constitute disloyalty to
the national federation, and their filing of the notice of strike and
conducting a strike vote notwithstanding that their union has no
legal personality to negotiate with MCCHI for collective bargaining
purposes, there is no question that NAMA-MCCH-NFL officers
knowingly participated in the illegal strike.
With respect to the dismissed union members, although
MCCHI submitted photographs taken at the picket line, it did not
individually name those striking employees and specify the illegal act
committed by each of them. As to the affidavits executed by nonstriking employees, they identified mostly union
officers as the
persons who blocked the hospital entrance, harassed hospital
employees and patients whose vehicles were prevented from
entering the premises. Only some of these witnesses actually named
a few union members who committed similar acts of harassment
and coercion.

DD. National Federation of Labor vs. NLRC, GR No. 113466, Dec. 15, 1997
HELD:

In the case at bar, no notice of strike, as required by Article 263 (c) was filed by NFL prior to the strike on January 25 and
26. No prior notice of the taking of a strike vote was furnished the NCMB, nor was the seven-day strike ban after the strike
vote observed. Instead, the workers immediately barricaded company premises in the afternoon of January 25, 1996,
completely disregarding the procedural steps prescribed by Article 263(c) and (f). As for the strike commenced on February
11, only six days had elapsed from the filing of the Notice to Strike on February 5, 1993. In addition, various illegal acts were
committed by the strikers during said strike. It can be gleaned from the record that the strikers destroyed company property
and intimidated and harassed non-striking workers in violation of Article 264(c) of the Labor Code. Likewise, barricading,
chaining and padlocking of gates to prevent free ingress and egress into company premises are also violations of the self-
same article. Arguing that despite its failure to comply with the statutory requirements necessary for a valid strike, NFL
asserts that the same can be declared legal for it was done in good faith, citing the cases of People s Industrial and
Commercial Employees and Workers Organization (FEW) vs. Peoples Industrial and Commercial Corp., 112 SCRA 440
(1982) and Philippine Metal Foundries, Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 90 SCRA 135
(1979). The reliance is misplaced. People's Industrial did not rule that the procedural
steps can be dispensed with even if the union believed in good faith that the company
was committing an unfair labor practice. While it is true that Philippine Metal held
that a strike cannot be declared as illegal for lack of notice, however, it is important
to note that said case was decided in 1979. At this juncture, it must be stressed that
with the enactment of Republic Act No. 6715 which took effect on March 21, 1989,
the rule now is that such requirements as the filing of a notice of strike, strike vote,
and notice given to the Department of Labor are mandatory in nature. 2

Thus, even if the union acted in good faith in the belief that the company
was committing an unfair labor practice, if no notice of strike and a strike vote were
conducted, the said strike is illegal.
3