SECOND DIVISION

[A.M. No. P-02-1644. November 11, 2004]

ARNEL S. CRUZ, complainant, vs. ATTY. LUNINGNING Y. CENTRON,

Acting Clerk of Court, RTC-OCC, Calapan City, respondent.

RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is an administrative matter which stemmed from a letter-complaint dated

January 2, 2001, originally filed with the Office of the Ombudsman, by Arnel S. Cruz
against Atty. Luningning Y. Centron, Clerk of Court VI, Regional Trial Court, Calapan City,
Oriental Mindoro, for acts constitutive of gross misconduct.
In a letter dated January 26, 2001, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
referred the instant matter to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) of this Court.[1]
Complainant alleges: Atty. Centron assisted a certain Gloria Logdat and Conchita de
la Cruz in consummating the sale of a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 2186, in the name of one Joaquina Jabat. Respondents assistance
consisted in preparing and notarizing the documents of sale. The said sale is illegal
because the property covered by the sale is still the subject of reconstitution and Extra-
Judicial Settlement among the heirs. As a result of the illegal sale, Logdat and de la Cruz
are charged with estafa through falsification of public documents. Respondent took
advantage of her being a lawyer to solicit the trust and confidence of the buyers of the
subject parcel of land. Respondent is involved in the disappearance of OCT No. 2186,
and she refuses to surrender the title which is in the possession of one of her
relatives.[2] Complainant prays that respondent be disbarred and removed from office.
In compliance with an Indorsement dated September 24, 2001 of the OCA,
respondent filed her Comment dated October 29, 2001, denying involvement in the
preparation of the documents and in the consummation of the sale of the parcel of land
covered by OCT No. 2186. Respondent claims that her only participation in the said sale
is that she was the one who notarized the deed of sale on account that she was requested
by the parties to notarize the same because they cannot afford the notarial fee being
charged by the notary public they earlier approached. Respondent also denies any
involvement in the alleged loss of the owners duplicate copy of OCT No. 2186. She claims
that Conchita Acyatan de la Cruz and Gloria Acyatan Salamat-Logdat gave the said
certificate of title to their lawyer, Atty. Apolonia A. Comia-Soguilon.[3]
On July 26, 2002, the OCA submitted a report finding the complaint to be without
basis. However, the OCA observed that respondent violated the provisions of Section
242 of the Revised Administrative Code as well as Section G, Chapter VIII of the Manual
for Clerks of Court when she notarized a deed of conveyance, a document which is not
connected with the exercise of her official functions and duties as Ex-Officio Notary
Public. Accordingly, the OCA recommended that respondent be fined in the amount
of P2,000.00 and sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar act(s) in the future
will be dealt with more severely.
In a resolution dated February 17, 2003, we resolved to require the parties to manifest
within ten days from notice if they are willing to submit the matter for resolution on the
basis of the pleadings filed. In compliance therewith, complainant filed a manifestation
dated March 28, 2003, indicating his desire to submit the case for resolution on the basis
of the pleadings filed. Respondent failed to file the required manifestation within the period
allowed by the Court.
In a Resolution dated March 8, 2004, we required respondent to show cause why she
should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for her failure to file the required
manifestation.
In a Compliance dated May 3, 2004, respondent explained that her failure to timely
file her manifestation was brought about by her heavy volume of work and enormous
responsibility as Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Calapan City. She
manifested her desire to submit the instant case for resolution on the basis of the
pleadings filed.
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the OCA.
In administrative cases for disbarment or suspension against lawyers, the quantum
of proof required is clearly preponderant evidence and the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant.[4]
In the present case, we find that complainant failed to present clear and preponderant
evidence to show that respondent had direct and instrumental participation in the
preparation of documents and the subsequent sale of the subject parcel of land covered
by OCT No. 2186. Aside from the deed of sale covering the subject parcel of land which
was notarized by respondent, no competent evidence was shown that would directly link
her to the said sale. While it may be logical to assume that respondent was the one who
prepared the deed of sale since she was the one who notarized it, we cannot give
evidentiary weight to such a supposition in the absence of any evidence to support it.
Moreover, complainants allegation that respondent influenced the buyers of the subject
parcel of land is contradicted by the sworn affidavit of Adelfa Manes, who is one of the
buyers of the disputed piece of land. Manes attested to the fact that respondent did not
convince nor influence them in buying the subject property. Likewise, we find no
competent evidence to prove that respondent is responsible for the alleged loss of the
owners duplicate copy of OCT No. 2186.
Nonetheless, we find that respondent is guilty of violating Section 41 (as amended by
Section 2 of R. A. No. 6733)[5] and Section 242[6] of the Revised Administrative Code, in
relation to Sections G,[7] M[8] and N,[9] Chapter VIII of the Manual for Clerks of Court.
Under these provisions, Clerks of Court are notaries public ex officio, and may thus
notarize documents or administer oaths but only when the matter is related to the exercise
of their official functions. As we held in Astorga vs. Solas,[10] clerks of court should not, in
their ex-officio capacity, take part in the execution of private documents bearing no
relation at all to their official functions.[11] In the present case, it is not within respondents
competence, as it is not part of her official function and duty, to notarize the subject deed
of sale. Respondent is guilty of abuse of authority.
In Astorga,[12] we imposed a fine of P5,000.00 on a clerk of court who was found guilty
of notarizing various documents and administering oaths on matters which are alien to
his official duties. In the present case, it appearing that this is respondents first offense of
this nature and that she has only notarized one document, we find the OCAs
recommended penalty of a fine of P2,000.00 commensurate to the offense committed.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Luningning Y. Centron, Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court of
Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro, is found guilty of abuse of authority and is hereby
ORDERED to pay a FINE of P2,000.00. She is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of
the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., on official leave.
Tinga, J., on leave.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 129416. November 25, 2004]

ZENAIDA B. TIGNO, IMELDA B. TIGNO and ARMI B. TIGNO, petitioners,

vs. SPOUSES ESTAFINO AQUINO and FLORENTINA AQUINO
and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

DECISION
TINGA, J.:

The controversy in the present petition hinges on the admissibility of a single

document, a deed of sale involving interest over real property, notarized by a
person of questionable capacity. The assailed ruling of the Court of Appeals,
which overturned the findings of fact of the Regional Trial Court, relied primarily
on the presumption of regularity attaching to notarized documents with respect
to its due execution. We conclude instead that the document has not been duly
notarized and accordingly reverse the Court of Appeals.
The facts are as follow:
 On 11 January 1980, respondent spouses Estafino and Florentina Aquino
(the Aquinos) filed a complaint for enforcement of contract and damages
against Isidro Bustria (Bustria). The complaint sought to enforce an alleged
[1]

sale by Bustria to the Aquinos of a one hundred twenty thousand (120,000)

square meter fishpond located in Dasci, Pangasinan. The property was not
registered either under the Land Registration Act or under the Spanish
Mortgage Law, though registrable under Act No. 3344. The conveyance was
[2]

covered by a Deed of Sale dated 2 September 1978.

Eventually, Bustria and the Aquinos entered into a compromise agreement,
whereby Bustria agreed to recognize the validity of the sale, and the Aquinos in
turn agreed to grant to Bustria the right to repurchase the same property after
the lapse of seven (7) years.
Upon submission, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch VII,
approved and incorporated the compromise agreement in a Decision which it
rendered on 7 September 1981.
Bustria died in October of 1986. On 1 December 1989, petitioner Zenaida
[3]

B. Tigno (Tigno), in substitution of her deceased father Isidro

Bustria, attempted to repurchase the property by filing a Motion for
[4]

Consignation. She deposited the amount of Two Hundred Thirty Thousand

Pesos (P200,000.00) with the trial court, now Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 55 at Alaminos, Pangasinan. On 18 December 1989, the Aquinos filed
an opposition, arguing that the right to repurchase was not yet demandable and
that Tigno had failed to make a tender of payment. In an Order dated 10
October 1999, the RTC denied the Motion for Consignation. [5]

In June of 1991, Tigno filed a Motion for a Writ of Execution, which was
likewise opposed by the Aquinos, and denied by the RTC. Then, on 6
September 1991, Tigno filed an action for Revival of Judgment, seeking the
[6]

revival of the decision in Civil Case No. A-1257, so that it could be executed
accordingly. The Aquinos filed an answer, wherein they alleged that Bustria
[7]

had sold his right to repurchase the property to them in a deed of sale dated 17
October 1985. [8]

Among the witnesses presented by the Aquinos during trial were Jesus De
Francia (De Francia), the instrumental witness to the deed of sale, and former
Judge Franklin Cario (Judge Cario), who notarized the same. These two
witnesses testified as to the occasion of the execution and signing of the deed
of sale by Bustria. Thereafter, in their Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence,
the Aquinos offered for admission as their Exhibit No. 8, the deed of sale (Deed
of Sale) purportedly executed by Bustria. The admission of the Deed of
[9]

Sale was objected to by Tigno on the ground that it was a false and fraudulent
document which had not been acknowledged by Bustria as his own; and that
its existence was suspicious, considering that it had been previously unknown,
and not even presented by the Aquinos when they opposed Tignos
previous Motion for Consignation. [10]

In an Order dated 6 April 1994, the RTC refused to admit the Deed of
Sale in evidence. A Motion for Reconsideration praying for the admission of
[11]

said exhibit was denied in an Order dated 27 April 1994. [12]

Then, on 18 August 1994, a Decision was rendered by the RTC in favor of

Tigno. The RTC therein expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the Deed of
Sale, characterizing the testimonies of De Francia and Cario as
conflicting. The RTC likewise observed that nowhere in the alleged deed of
[13]

sale was there any statement that it was acknowledged by Bustria; that it was
[14]

suspicious that Bustria was not assisted or represented by his counsel in

connection with the preparation and execution of the deed of sale or that [15]

Aquino had raised the matter of the deed of sale in his previous Opposition to
the Motion for Consignation. The RTC then stressed that the previous Motion
[16]

for Execution lodged by Tigno had to be denied since more than five (5) years
had elapsed from the date the judgment in Civil Case No. A-1257 had become
final and executory; but the judgment could be revived by action such as the
instant complaint. Accordingly, the RTC ordered the revival of the judgment
dated 7 September 1981 in Civil Case No. A-1257. [17]

The Aquinos interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. In the [18]

meantime, the RTC allowed the execution pending appeal of its Decision. On [19]

23 December 1996, the Court of Appeals Tenth Division promulgated

a Decision reversing and setting aside the RTC Decision. The appellate court
[20]

ratiocinated that there were no material or substantial inconsistencies between

the testimonies of Cario and De Francia that would taint the document with
doubtful authenticity; that the absence of the acknowledgment and substitution
instead of a jurat did not render the instrument invalid; and that the non-
assistance or representation of Bustria by counsel did not render the document
null and ineffective. It was noted that a notarized document carried in its favor
[21]

the presumption of regularity with respect to its due execution, and that there
must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant evidence to
contradict the same. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that the RTC erred
in refusing to admit the Deed of Sale, and that the document extinguished the
right of Bustrias heirs to repurchase the property.
After the Court of Appeals denied Tignos Motion for Reconsideration, the [22]

present petition was filed before this Court. Tigno imputes grave abuse of
discretion and misappreciation of facts to the Court of Appeals when it admitted
the Deed of Sale. He also argues that the appellate court should have declared
the Deed of Sale as a false, fraudulent and unreliable document not supported
by any consideration at all.
The general thrusts of the arguments posed by Tigno are factually based.
As such, they could normally lead to the dismissal of this Petition for Review.
However, while this Court is not ordinarily a trier of facts, factual review may
[23]

be warranted in instances when the findings of the trial court and the
intermediate appellate court are contrary to each other. Moreover, petitioner
[24]

raises a substantial argument regarding the capacity of the notary public, Judge
Cario, to notarize the document. The Court of Appeals was unfortunately silent
on that matter, but this Court will take it up with definitiveness.
The notarial certification of the Deed of Sale reads as follows:

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)

PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN ) S.S.
MUNICIPALITY OF ALAMINOS )

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 17th day of October 1985 at

Alaminos, Pangasinan both parties known to me to be the same parties who executed
the foregoing instrument.

FRANKLIN CARIO
Ex-Officio Notary Public
Judge, M.T.C.
Alaminos, Pangasinan

There are palpable errors in this certification. Most glaringly, the document
is certified by way of a jurat instead of an acknowledgment. A jurat is a distinct
creature from an acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is the act of one who
has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court and
declaring it to be his act or deed; while a jurat is that part of an affidavit where
the officer certifies that the same was sworn before him. Under Section 127 of
[25]

the Land Registration Act, which has been replicated in Section 112 of
[26]

Presidential Decree No. 1529, the Deed of Sale should have been
[27]

acknowledged before a notary public. [28]

But there is an even more substantial defect in the notarization, one which
is determinative of this petition. This pertains to the authority of Judge Franklin
Cario to notarize the Deed of Sale.
 It is undisputed that Franklin Cario at the time of the notarization of the Deed
of Sale, was a sitting judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Alaminos. Petitioners point out, citing Tabao v. Asis, that municipal judges
[29] [30]

may not undertake the preparation and acknowledgment of private documents,

contracts, and other acts of conveyance which bear no relation to the
performance of their functions as judges. In response, respondents claim that
[31]

the prohibition imposed on municipal court judges from notarizing documents

took effect only in December of 1989, or four years after the Deed of Sale was
notarized by Cario. [32]

Respondents contention is erroneous. Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and

Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) judges are empowered to perform the
functions of notaries public ex officiounder Section 76 of Republic Act No. 296,
as amended (otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948) and Section 242
of the Revised Administrative Code. However, as far back as 1980 in Borre v.
[33]

Moya, the Court explicitly declared that municipal court judges such as Cario
[34]

may notarize only documents connected with the exercise of their official
duties. The Deed of Sale was not connected with any official duties of Judge
[35]

Cario, and there was no reason for him to notarize it. Our observations as to
the errant judge in Borre are pertinent in this case, considering that Judge Cario
identified himself in the Deed of Sale as Ex-Officio Notary Public, Judge, MTC:

[A notary ex officio] should not compete with private law practitioners or regular
notaries in transacting legal conveyancing business.

In the instant case, it was not proper that a city judge should notarize documents
involving private transactions and sign the document in this wise: "GUMERSINDO
ARCILLA, Notary Public Ex-Officio, City Judge" (p. 16, Rollo, Annex D of
Complaint). In doing so, he obliterated the distinction between a regular notary
and a notary ex officio. [36]

There are possible grounds for leniency in connection with this matter, as
Supreme Court Circular No. I-90 permits notaries public ex officio to perform
any act within the competency of a regular notary public provided that
certification be made in the notarized documents attesting to the lack of any
lawyer or notary public in such municipality or circuit. Indeed, it is only when
there are no lawyers or notaries public that the exception applies. The facts of
[37]

this case do not warrant a relaxed attitude towards Judge Carios improper
notarial activity. There was no such certification in the Deed of Sale. Even if one
was produced, we would be hard put to accept the veracity of its contents,
considering that Alaminos, Pangasinan, now a city, was even then not an
[38]

isolated backwater town and had its fair share of practicing lawyers.
 There may be sufficient ground to call to task Judge Cario, who ceased
being a judge in 1986, for his improper notarial activity. Perhaps though, formal
sanction may no longer be appropriate considering Judge Carios advanced
age, assuming he is still alive. However, this Decision should again serve as
[39]

an affirmation of the rule prohibiting municipal judges from notarizing

documents not connected with the exercise of their official duties, subject to the
exceptions laid down in Circular No. 1-90.
Most crucially for this case, we should deem the Deed of Sale as not having
been notarized at all. The validity of a notarial certification necessarily derives
from the authority of the notarial officer. If the notary public does not have the
capacity to notarize a document, but does so anyway, then the document
should be treated as unnotarized. The rule may strike as rather harsh, and
perhaps may prove to be prejudicial to parties in good faith relying on the
proferred authority of the notary public or the person pretending to be one. Still,
to admit otherwise would render merely officious the elaborate process devised
by this Court in order that a lawyer may receive a notarial commission. Without
such a rule, the notarization of a document by a duly appointed notary public
will have the same legal effect as one accomplished by a non-lawyer engaged
in pretense.
The notarization of a document carries considerable legal effect.
Notarization of a private document converts such document into a public one,
and renders it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. Thus,
[40]

notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it engages public interest

in a substantial degree and the protection of that interest requires preventing
those who are not qualified or authorized to act as notaries public from imposing
upon the public and the courts and administrative offices generally. [41]

On the other hand, what then is the effect on the Deed of Sale if it was not
notarized? True enough, from a civil law perspective, the absence of
notarization of the Deed of Sale would not necessarily invalidate the transaction
evidenced therein. Article 1358 of the Civil Code requires that the form of a
contract that transmits or extinguishes real rights over immovable property
should be in a public document, yet it is also an accepted rule that the failure to
observe the proper form does not render the transaction invalid. Thus, it has
been uniformly held that the form required in Article 1358 is not essential to the
validity or enforceability of the transaction, but required merely for
convenience. We have even affirmed that a sale of real property though not
[42]

consigned in a public instrument or formal writing, is nevertheless valid and

binding among the parties, for the time-honored rule is that even a verbal
contract of sale or real estate produces legal effects between the parties. [43]
 Still, the Court has to reckon with the implications of the lack of valid
notarization of the Deed of Sale from the perspective of the law on evidence.
After all, the case rests on the admissibility of the Deed of Sale.
Clearly, the presumption of regularity relied upon by the Court of Appeals
no longer holds true since the Deed of Sale is not a notarized document. Its
proper probative value is governed by the Rules of Court. Section 19, Rule 132
states:

Section 19. Classes of documents.For the purpose of their presentation in evidence,

documents are either public or private.

Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of
the Philippines, or of a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and
testaments; and

(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by

law to be entered therein.

All other writings are private. (Emphasis supplied.)

The Deed of Sale, invalidly notarized as it was, does not fall under the
enumeration of public documents; hence, it must be considered a private
document. The nullity of the alleged or attempted notarization performed by
Judge Cario is sufficient to exclude the document in question from the class of
public documents. Even assuming that the Deed of Sale was validly notarized,
it would still be classified as a private document, since it was not properly
acknowledged, but merely subscribed and sworn to by way of jurat.
Being a private document, the Deed of Sale is now subject to the
requirement of proof under Section 20, Rule 132, which states:

Section 20. Proof of private document.Before any private document offered as

authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved
either:

(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

 (b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the
maker.

Any other private document need only be identified as that which is claimed to be.

The Deed of Sale was offered in evidence as authentic by the Aquinos, who
likewise insist that its enforceability militates against Tignos claim.
Correspondingly, the burden falls upon the Aquinos to prove its authenticity and
due execution. The Court of Appeals clearly erred in not appreciating the Deed
of Sale as a private document and in applying the presumption of regularity that
attaches only to duly notarized documents, as distinguished from private
documents.
Did the RTC err then in refusing to admit the Deed of Sale? We hold that it
did not. Section 20, Rule 132 provides ample discretion on the trier of fact before
it may choose to receive the private document in evidence. The RTC wisely
refused to admit the Deed of Sale, taking great lengths as it did to explain its
doubts as to its veracity. The RTC was not convinced of the proffered proof by
the Aquinos, and the exercise of its sound discretion as the primary trier of fact
warrants due respect.
The most telling observation of the RTC relates to the fact that for the very
first time respondents alleged the existence of the Deed of Sale when they filed
their answer to petitioners current action to revive judgment. Prior to the
[44]

initiation of the present action, Tigno had tried to operationalize and implement
the Compromise Agreement through two judicial means: consignation and
execution of judgment. The Aquinos duly opposed these prior attempts of the
petitioner to exercise the right to repurchase, but they did not raise then the
claim that such right to repurchase was already extinguished by the Deed of
Sale. Tigno attempted to exercise the right to repurchase only a few years after
the execution of the Deed of Sale to which respondents themselves were
signatories. Thus, it is incredulous that the Aquinos did not invoke the Deed of
Sale when they opposed in court petitioners successive attempts at
consignation and execution of judgment. The Deed of Sale, if in existence and
valid, would have already precluded Tignos causes of action for either
consignation or execution of judgment. The only believable conclusion, as
drawn by the RTC, was that the Deed of Sale had yet to be created when
petitioner moved in 1990 for consignation and execution of judgmentan
existential anomaly if we were to agree with the respondents that such
document had been signed and notarized back in 1985.
The dubiousness in origin of the Deed of Sale is not alleviated by the other
observations of the RTC. It also pointed to certain incredible aspects in the
Aquinos tale of events. It noted that no receipts were ever presented by the
respondents to evidence actual payment of consideration by them to Bustria,
despite the allegation of the respondents that the amount was covered by seven
(7) receipts. The Aquinos claimed that Bustria kept all the receipts, an
[45]

assertion which the RTC found as unbelievable, citing ordinary human nature
to ask for receipts for significant amounts given and to keep the same. In itself,
[46]

the absence of receipts, or any proof of consideration, would not be conclusive

since consideration is always presumed. However, given the totality of the
circumstances surrounding this case, the absence of such proof further militates
against the claims of the Aquinos.
We can appreciate in a similar vein the observation of the Court of Appeals
that Bustria did not bother to seek his lawyers assistance as regards the
execution of the Deed of Sale, considering that the subject property had
previously been fiercely litigated. Although the Court of Appeals was correct in
ruling that the document would not be rendered null or ineffective due to the
lack of assistance of counsel, the implausibility of the scenario strikes as odd
and therefore reinforces the version found by the RTC as credible.
The Court likewise has its own observations on the record that affirm the
doubts raised by the Court of Appeals. Isidro Bustria, who would die in 1986,
was already ninety-three (93) years old when he allegedly signed the Deed of
Sale in 1985. Still, the Aquinos asserted before the RTC that Bustria traveled
unaccompanied from his home in Dasol, Pangasinan, passing through two
towns to Alaminos, to execute the Deed of Sale. Without discrediting the
accomplishments of nonagenarians capable of great physical feats, it should
be acknowledged as a matter of general assumption that persons of Bustrias
age are typically sedentary and rarely so foolhardy as to insist on traveling
significant distances alone.
Also of note is the fact that there are glaring differences as to the alleged
signature of Bustria on the Deed of Sale and as it otherwise appears on the
judicial record. Bustrias signature in the 1981 Compromise Agreement is
noticeably shaky which is not surprising, considering that it was subscribed
when Bustria was eighty-nine (89) years old. However, Bustrias signature on
the Deed of Sale, which if genuine was affixed when he was already ninety-
three (93) years old, is remarkably steady in its strokes. There are also other
evident differences between Bustrias signature on the Deed of Sale and on
other documents on the record.
Admittedly, these doubts cast above arise in chief from an appreciation of
circumstantial evidence. These have to be weighed against the findings of the
Court of Appeals that the fact that Bustria signed the Deed of Sale was
established by the respective testimonies of witnesses De Francia and Judge
Cario. In its own appreciation of these testimonies, the RTC alluded to notable
inconsistencies in their testimonies. As a final measure of analysis, the Court
shall now examine whether the appellate court was in error in reversing the
conclusion of the RTC on these testimonies.
The inconsistencies cited by the RTC were that De Francia testified that
Judge Cario himself prepared and typed the Deed of Sale in his office, where
the document was signed, while Judge Cario testified that he did not type
[47]

the Deed of Sale since it was already prepared when the parties arrived at his
office for the signing. On this point, the Court of Appeals stated with utter
[48]

nonchalance that a perusal of the record revealed no material or substantial

inconsistencies between the testimonies of Judge Cario and De Francia.
Strangely, the appellate court made no comment as to the inconsistency
pointed out by the RTC as to who prepared the Deed of Sale. If the only point
of consideration was the due execution of the Deed of Sale, then the Court of
Appeals should have properly come out with its finding. Other variances aside,
there are no contradictions in the testimonies of Judge Cario and De Francia
on the question of whether or not Bustria signed the Deed of Sale.
However, as earlier established, the Deed of Sale is a private document.
Thus, not only the due execution of the document must be proven but also its
authenticity. This factor was not duly considered by the Court of Appeals. The
testimonies of Judge Cario and De Francia now become material not only to
establish due execution, but also the authenticity of the Deed of Sale. And on
this point, the inconsistencies pointed out by the RTC become crucial.
The matter of authenticity of the Deed of Sale being disputed, the identity of
the progenitor of this all-important document is a material evidentiary point. It is
disconcerting that the very two witnesses of the respondent offered to prove
the Deed of Sale, flatly contradict each other on the basis of their own personal
and sensory knowledge. Worse, the purported author of the Deed of
Sale disavowed having drafted the document, notwithstanding the contrary
testimony grounded on personal knowledge by the documentary witness.
Establishing the identity of the person who wrote the Deed of Sale would
not ordinarily be necessary to establish the validity of the transaction it covers.
However, since it is the authenticity of the document itself that is disputed, then
the opposing testimonies on that point by the material witnesses properly raises
questions about the due execution of the document itself. The inconsistencies
in the testimonies of Judge Cario and De Francia are irreconcilable. It is not
possible to affirm the testimony of either without denigrating the competence
and credibility of the other as a witness. If Judge Cario was truthful in testifying
that he did not write the Deed of Sale, then doubt can be cast as to the reliability
of the notarial witness De Francia. It takes a leap of imagination, a high level of
gumption, and perverse deliberation for one to erroneously assert, under oath
and with particularities, that a person drafted a particular document in his
presence.
However, if we were to instead believe De Francia, then the integrity of the
notary public, Judge Cario, would be obviously compromised. Assuming that
Judge Cario had indeed authored the Deed of Sale, it would indeed be odd that
he would not remember having written the document himself yet sufficiently
recall notarizing the same. If his testimony as to authorship of the document is
deemed as dubious, then there is all the reason to make a similar assumption
as to his testimony on the notarization of the Deed of Sale.
These inconsistencies are not of consequence because there is need to
indubitably establish the author of the Deed of Sale. They are important
because they cast doubt on the credibility of those witnesses of the Aquinos,
presented as they were to attest to the due execution and authenticity of
the Deed of Sale. The Court of Appeals was clearly in error in peremptorily
disregarding this observation of the RTC.
As a result, we are less willing than the Court of Appeals to impute
conclusive value to the testimonies of de Francia and Judge Cario. The totality
of the picture leads us to agree with the trial court that the Deed of Sale is
ineluctably dubious in origin and in execution. The Court deems as correct the
refusal of the RTC to admit the Deed of Sale, since its due execution and
authenticity have not been proven. The evidence pointing to the non-existence
of such a transaction is so clear and convincing that it is sufficient even to rebut
the typical presumption of regularity arising from the due execution of notarial
documents. However, for the reasons stated earlier, the Deed of Sale is
ineluctably an unnotarized document. And the lower court had more than
sufficient basis to conclude that it is a spurious document.
Since the validity of the Deed of Sale has been successfully assailed,
Tignos right to repurchase was not extinguished at the time of the filing of
the Petition for revival of judgment, as correctly concluded by the RTC. The
Court of Appeals being in error when it concluded otherwise, the reinstatement
of the RTC Decision is warranted.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated 23
December 1996 and Resolution dated 9 June 1997 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 49879 is REVERSED, and the Decision dated 18 August 1994
of the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan, Branch 55, in Civil Case
No. A-1918 is REINSTATED. Costs against respondents.
 SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario,
JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION

[ A.C. No. 9364 [Formerly CBD Case No. 13-3696], February 08, 2017 ]

FLORDELIZA E. COQUIA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. EMMANUEL E.

LAFORTEZA, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Disbarment dated February 6, 2012 filed by
Flordeliza E. Coquia[1] (Coquia) against respondent Atty. Emmanuel E.
Laforteza (Atty. Laforteza), docketed as A.C. No. 9364, for Conduct
Unbecoming of a Lawyer due to the unauthorized notarization of
documents relative to Civil Case No. 18943.[2]

Atty. Laforteza was a former Clerk of Court of Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 68, Lingayen, Pangasinan, having assumed office in November 17,
2004 until January 31, 2011.[3] On February 1, 2011, Arty. Laforteza
transferred to the Department of Justice.[4]

In her Complaint, Coquia alleged that on January 7, 2009, while in office as

clerk of court, Atty. Laforteza conspired with Clemente Solis (Clemente) to
falsify two (2) documents, to wit: (1) an Agreement between Clemente Solis
and Flordeliza Coquia,[5] and the (2) Payment Agreement executed by
Flordeliza Coquia, and subsequently notarized the said documents. Coquia
claimed that the documents were forged to make it appear that on the said
date, she subscribed and sworn to the said documents before Atty.
Laforteza when in truth and in fact on the said date and time, she was
attending to her classes at the Centro Escolar University in Manila as
evidenced by the certified true copy of the Centro Escolar University
Faculty Daily Time Record for the period of December 16, 2008 to January
14, 2009.[6]

Coquia asserted that under the law, Atty. Laforteza is not authorized to
administer oath on documents not related to his functions and duties as
Clerk of Court of RTC, Branch 68, Lingayen, Pangasinan. Thus, the instant
complaint for disbarment for conduct unbecoming of a lawyer.

On January 12, 2012, the Office of the Bar Confidant referred the complaint
to Atty. Cristina B. Layusa, Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant, Office
of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court, for appropriate action.[7]

On March 19, 2012, the Court resolved to require Atty. Laforteza to

comment on the complaint against him.[8]

In compliance, Atty. Laforteza submitted his Comment[9] dated July 2, 2012

where he denied the allegations in the complaint. Atty. Laforteza recalled
that on January 7, 2009, while attending to his work, fellow court
employee, Luzviminda Solis (Luzviminda), wife of Clemente, with other
persons, came to him. He claimed that Luzviminda introduced said persons
to him as the same parties to the subject documents. Luzviminda requested
him to subscribe the subject documents as proof of their transaction
considering that they are blood relatives. Atty. Laforteza claimed that he
hesitated at first and even directed them to seek the services of a notary
public but they insisted for his assistance and accommodation. Thus, in
response to the exigency of the situation and thinking in all good faith that
it would also serve the parties' interest having arrived at a settlement, Atty.
Laforteza opted to perform the subscription of the jurat. He, however,
insisted that at that time of subscription, after propounding some
questions, he was actually convinced that the persons who came to him are
the same parties to the said subject documents.[10]

Atty. Laforteza likewise denied that there was conspiracy or connivance

between him and the Solis'. He pointed out that other than the subject
documents and Coquia's bare allegation of conspiracy, no evidence was
presented to substantiate the same. Atty. Laforteza lamented that he was
also a victim of the circumstances with his reliance to the representations
made before him. He invoked the presumption of regularity and extended
his apology to this Court should his act as a subscribing officer be deemed
improper.[11]

In a Joint-Affidavit[12] dated July 2, 2012 of Clemente and Luzviminda, both

denied to have connived or conspired with Atty. Laforteza in the
preparation and execution of the subject documents. They narrated that
Atty. Laforteza in fact initially refused to grant their request to notarize the
subject documents but they were able to convince him to assist them in the
interest of justice. Clemente insisted that he was one of the signatories in
the said documents and that he has personal knowledge that the signature
of Coquia inscribed in the same documents are her true signatures having
seen her affixed her signatures.[13]

On October 11, 2012, the Court resolved to refer the instant case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.[14]

During the mandatory conference, both parties agreed that Atty. Laforteza
is authorized to administer oaths. However, as to the requirement to
establish the identity of the parties, Atty. Laforteza admitted that he does
not personally know both Coquia and Clemente, and he merely relied on
Luzviminda and Lorna Viray, who are known to him as fellow court
employees, to establish the identities of the parties. He likewise admitted
that Coquia did not sign the documents in his presence and that someone
present on the said date allegedly owned the signature of Coquia as hers.[15]

In its Report and Recommendation[16] dated December 18, 2013, the IBP-
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) recommended that the instant
complaint be dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence.

However, in a Notice of Resolution No. XXI-2014-818 dated October 11,

2014, the IBP-Board of Governors resolved to reversed and set aside the
Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD, and instead reprimanded
and cautioned Atty. Laforteza to be careful in performing his duties as
subscribing officer.[17]

We concur with the findings of the IBP-Board of Governors, except as to the

penalty.

In administrative cases for disbarment or suspension against lawyers, the

quantum of proof required is clearly preponderant evidence and the burden
of proof rests upon the complainant.[18] In the absence of cogent proof, bare
allegations of misconduct cannot prevail over the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official functions.[19]

In the instant case, We find that Coquia failed to present clear and
preponderant evidence to show that Atty. Laforteza had direct and
instrumental participation, or was in connivance with the Solis1 in the
preparation of the subject documents. While it may be assumed that Atty.
Laforteza had a hand in the preparation of the subject documents, We
cannot give evidentiary weight to such a supposition in the absence of any
evidence to support it. The Court does not thus give credence to charges
based on mere suspicion and speculation.[20]

As to the allegation of unauthorized notarization:

As early as the case of Borre v. Moya,[21] this Court had already clarified
that the power of ex officio notaries public have been limited to notarial
acts connected to the exercise of their official functions and duties.

Consequently, the empowerment of ex officio notaries public to perform

acts within the competency of regular notaries public - such as
acknowledgments, oaths and affirmations, jurats, signature witnessing,
copy certifications, and other acts authorized under the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice - is now more of an exception rather than a general rule.
They may perform notarial acts on such documents that bear no relation to
their official functions and duties only if (1) a certification is included in the
notarized documents attesting to the lack of any other lawyer or notary
public in the municipality or circuit; and (2) all notarial fees charged will be
for the account of the government and turned over to the municipal
treasurer. No compliance with these two requirements are present in this
case.

In the instant case, it is undisputed that Atty. Laforteza notarized and

administered oaths in documents that had no relation to his official
function. The subject documents, to wit: (1) an Agreement between
Clemente Solis and Flordeliza Coquia,[22] and the (2) Payment Agreement
executed by Flordeliza Coquia, are both private documents which are
unrelated to Atty. Laforteza's official functions. The civil case from where
the subject documents originated is not even raffled in Branch 68 where
Atty. Laforteza was assigned. While Atty. Laforteza serve as notary
public ex officio and, thus, may notarize documents or administer oaths, he
should not in his ex-officio capacity take part in the execution of private
documents bearing no relation at all to his official functions.

Under the provisions of Section 41[23] (as amended by Section 2 of R. A. No.

6733[24]) and Section 242[25] of the Revised Administrative Code, in relation
to Sections G,[26] M[27] and N,[28] Chapter VIII of the Manual for Clerks of
Court, Clerks of Court are notaries public ex officio, and may thus notarize
documents or administer oaths but only when the matter is related to the
exercise of their official functions.[29] In Exec. Judge Astorga v.
Solas,[30] the Court ruled that clerks of court should not, in their ex-
officio capacity, take part in the execution of private documents bearing no
relation at all to their official functions. Notarization of documents that
have no relation to the performance of their official functions is now
considered to be beyond the scope of their authority as notaries public ex
officio. Any one of them who does so would be committing an unauthorized
notarial act, which amounts to engaging in the unauthorized practice of law
and abuse of authority.

As to the Violation of Notarial Law:

We likewise agree and adopt the findings of the IBP-Board of Governors

which found Atty. Laforteza to have violated the Notarial Law.

In this case, it is undisputed that Atty. Laforteza failed to comply with the
rules of notarial law. He admitted that he notarized a pre-signedsubject
document presented to him. He also admitted his failure to personally
verify the identity of all parties who purportedly signed the subject
documents and who, as he claimed, appeared before him on January 7,
2009 as he merely relied upon the assurance of Luzviminda that her
companions are the actual signatories to the said documents. In
ascertaining the identities of the parties, Atty. Laforteza contented himself
after propounding several questions only despite the Rules' clear
requirement of presentation of competent evidence of identity such as an
identification card with photograph and signature. Such failure to verify the
identities of the parties was further shown by the fact that the pertinent
identification details of the parties to the subject documents, as proof of
their identity, were lacking in the subject documents' acknowledgment
portion. Atty. Laforteza even affixed his signature in an incomplete notarial
certificate. From the foregoing, it can be clearly concluded that there was a
failure on the part of Atty. Laforteza to exercise the due diligence required
of him as a notary public ex-officio.

Notarization of documents ensures the authenticity and reliability of a

document. Notarization of a private document converts such document into
a public one, and renders it admissible in court without further proof of its
authenticity. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must
be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and
appended to a private instrument. Notarization is not an empty routine; to
the contrary, it engages public interest in a substantial degree and the
protection of that interest requires preventing those who are not qualified
or authorized to act as notaries public from imposing upon the public and
the courts and administrative offices generally.[31]

Hence, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons
who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and
personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what
are stated therein. The purpose of this requirement is to enable the notary
public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party
and to ascertain that the document is the party's free act and deed.[32]

The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice stresses the necessity of the affiant's
personal appearance before the notary public Rule II, Section 1 states:

SECTION 1. Acknowledgment.—"Acknowledgment" refers to an act in

which an individual on a single occasion:

(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents and
integrally complete instrument or document;

(b) is attested to be personally known to the notary public or

identified by the notary public through competent evidence of
identity as defined by these Rules; and

(c) represents to the notary public that the signature on the instrument or
document was voluntarily affixed by him for the purposes stated in the
instrument or document, declares that he has executed the instrument or
document as his free and voluntary act and deed, and, if he acts in a
particular representative capacity, that he has the authority to sign in that
capacity. (Emphasis supplied)
Rule IV, Section 2(b) further states:

SEC. 2. Prohibitions. - x x x
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as
signatory to the instrument or document —

(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization;
and

(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise

identified by the notary public through competent evidence of
identity as defined by these Rules.
Thus, a document should not be notarized unless the persons who are
executing it are the very same ones who are personally appearing before the
notary public. The affiants should be present to attest to the truth of the
contents of the document and to enable the notary to verify the genuineness
of their signature. Notaries public are enjoined from notarizing a fictitious
or spurious document. In fact, it is their duty to demand that the document
presented to them for notarization be signed in their presence. Their
function is, among others, to guard against illegal deeds.[33] For this reason,
notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in
the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in
the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined.[34]

PENALTY

While Atty. Laforteza was merely an ex-officio notary public by virtue of his
position as clerk of court then, it did not relieve him of compliance with the
same standards and obligations imposed upon other commissioned
notaries public.[35] However, this Court can no longer acquire
administrative jurisdiction over Atty. Laforteza for the purpose of imposing
disciplinary sanctions over erring court employees since the instant
complaint against him was filed after he has ceased to be a court employee.

In Talisic vs. Atty. Rinen,[36] respondent, as ex-officio notary public, failed

to verify the identity of all the parties to the document. Thus, the Court
ordered his notarial commission revoked and disqualified him from being
commissioned as a notary public for a period of one year. We deem it
proper to impose the same penalty.

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, Arty. Emmanuel E. Laforteza's

notarial commission, if there is any, is REVOKED, and he
is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public for a
period of one (1) year. He is likewise STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to
be appended to Atty. Laforteza's personal record. Further, let copies of this
Resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office
of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the
courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Mendoza, Leonen, and Jardeleza,* JJ., concur.

*Designated Additional Member per Special Order No. 2416, dated January
4, 2017.

[1] Rollo, pp. 1-4.

[2] Clemente Solis v. Flordeliza E. Coquia.

[3] Rollo, p. 45.

On January 8, 2016, Atty. Emmanuel E. Laforteza was appointed as

[4]

Prosecutor II in the OPP-Pangasinan, id. at 1.

[5] Rollo, pp. 10-11.

[6] Id. at 65.

[7] Id. at 19.

[8] Id. at 35.

[9] Id. at 45-49.

[10] Id. at 46.

[11] Id. at 47.

[12] Id. at 41-43.

[13] Id. at 42.

[14] Id. at 54.

[15] Id. at 88.

[16] Id. at 88-89.

[17] Id. at 86-87.

[18] Cruz v. Atty. Centron, 484 Phil. 671, 675 (2004).

[19] Atty. Reyes v. Jamora, 634 Phil. 1, 7 (2010).

[20] Id.

[21] 188 Phil. 362, 369 (1980).

[22] Rollo, pp. 10-11.

Sec. 41. Officers Authorized to Administer Oath. The following officers

[23]

have general authority to administer oaths: President; Vice-President;

Members and Secretaries of both Houses of the Congress; Members of the
Judiciary; Secretaries of Departments; provincial governors and lieutenant-
governors; city mayors; municipal mayors; bureau directors; regional
directors; clerks of courts; registrars of deeds; other civilian officers in the
public service of the government of the Philippines whose appointments are
vested in the President and are subject to confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments; all other constitutional officers; and notaries public.

[24]An Act to Amend Section 21, Title I, Book I of the Revised

Administrative Code of 1987, Granting Members of Both Houses of the
Congress of the Philippines the General Authority to Administer Oaths, and
for Other Purposes.
[25]Sec. 242. Officers acting as notaries public ex officio. - Except as
otherwise specially provided, the following officials, and none other, shall
be deemed to be notaries public ex officio, and as such they are authorized
to perform, within the limits of their territorial jurisdiction as hereinbelow
defined, all the duties appertaining to the office of notary public.(a) The
Chief of the Division of Archives, Patents, Copyrights, and Trade-marks, the
Clerk of the Supreme Court, the Clerk of the Court of First Instance of the
Ninth Judicial District, the Chief of the General Land Registration Office,
and the Superintendent of the Postal Savings Bank Division, Bureau of
Posts when acting within the limits of the City of Manila.(b) Clerks of
Courts of First Instance outside of the City of Manila, when acting within
the judicial districts to which they respectively pertain.(c) Justices of the
peace, within the limits of the territory over which their jurisdiction as
justices of the peace extends; but auxiliary justices of the peace and other
officers who are by law vested with the office of justice of the peace ex
officio shall not, solely by reason of such authority, be also entitled to act in
the capacity of notaries ex officio.(d) Any government officer or employee
of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu appointed notary public ex
officio by the judge of the Court of First Instance, with jurisdiction
coextensive with the province wherein &e appointee is stationed, and for a
term of two years beginning upon the first day of January of the year hi
which the appointment is made. [The Department of Mindanao and Sulu,
as a special political division has been abolished by section 1 of Act 2878.]
The authority conferred in subsections (a) and (b) hereof may, in the
absence of the chief or clerk of court, be exercised by an assistant chief,
acting chief, or deputy clerk of court pertaining to the office in question.

The provisions of Section G, Chapter VIII of the Manual for Clerks of

[26]

Court are essentially the same as the provisions of Section 242 of the
Revised Administrative Code.

The provisions of Section M, Chapter VIII of the Manual for Clerks of

[27]

Court are lifted from Section 41 of the Revised Administrative Code, as

amended.

[28]Section N. DUTY TO ADMINISTER OATH. Officers authorized to

administer oaths, with the exception of notaries public, municipal judges
and clerks of court, are not obliged to administer oaths or execute
certificates save in matters of official business; and with the exception
of notaries public, the officer performing the service in those matters shall
 charge no fee, unless specifically authorized by law. (Emphasis ours)

[29] Exec. Judge Astorga v. Solas, 413 Phil. 558, 562 (2001).

[30] Supra.

Sps. Anudon v. Atty. Cefra, A.C. No. 5482, February 10, 2015, 750 SCRA
[31]

231, 240.

[32] Id.

[33] Sps. Domingo v. Reed, 513 Phil. 339, 350 (2005).

[34] Supra note 21.

[35] 726 Phil. 497, 501 (2014).

[36] Supra.

Problem Areas in Legal Ethics – Gross Misconduct – Malpractice of Law – Misconduct

In 2007, Corazon Nevada, filed a disbarment case against Atty. Rodolfo Casuga. Nevada
alleged the following:

1. That Atty. Casuga acquired several pieces of jewelry from her; the jewelries include diamond
earrings and diamond rings amounting P300,000.00. and a Rolex gold watch worth
$12,000.00; that Casuga assured her that he will sell them; but despite repeated demands,
Casuga never remitted any money nor did he return said jewelries.
2. That in 2006, Casuga, taking advantage of his close relationship with Nevada (they belong to
the same religious sect), Casuga represented himself as the hotel administrator of the hotel
(Mt. Crest) that Nevada own; that as such, Casuga was able to enter into a contract of lease
with one Jung Chul; that he negotiated an office space with Chul in said Hotel for P90,000.00;
that Casuga notarized said agreement; that he forged the signature of Edwin Nevada
(husband); that he never remitted the P90k to Nevada.

In his defense, Casuga said:

1. That Nevada actually pawned said jewelries in a pawnshop; that she later advised Casuga’s
wife to redeem said jewelries using Mrs. Casuga’s wife; that Casuga can sell said jewelries
and reimburse herself from the proceeds; that he still has possession of said jewelries.
2. That he never received the P90,000.00; that it was received by a certain Pastor Oh; that he
was authorized as an agent by Edwin Nevada to enter into said contract of lease.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is merit in Atty. Casuga’s defense.

HELD: No. Atty. Casuga is in violation of the following:
1. Gross Misconduct: Casuga misrepresented himself as a duly authorized representative
of Nevada when in fact he was not. He never adduced evidence showing that he was duly
authorized either by Edwin or Corazon. He also dialed to adduce evidence proving that he
never received the P90k from Chul. On the contrary, a notarized letter showed that Casuga
did receive the money. His misrepresentations constitute gross misconduct and his mere
denial does not overcome the evidence presented against him.
2. Violated Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: It is his duty as a lawyer
to account for all moneys and property of his client that may come to his possession. This is
still applicable even though said property/money did not come to his possession by virtue of
a lawyer-client relationship. He failed to adduce evidence to prove his claim that Nevada
pawned said jewelries. He never presented receipts. Further, even assuming that Nevada did
pawn said items, Casuga was still duty bound to return said jewelries upon demand by
Nevada.
3. Violation of Notarial Rules: He signed a document (contract of lease) in behalf of
another person without authorization. His forgery made him an actual party to the contract. In
effect he was notarizing a document in which he is party in violation of the notarial rules (Secs.
1 and 3, Rule IV).
4. Malpractice of Law: As a summation of all the above violations, Casuga is guilty of
Malpractice and Misconduct. Such act is punishable under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court. However, the Supreme Court deemed that disbarment is too severe a punishment
against Casuga. He was suspended for 4 years from the practice of law. His notarial
commission was likewise revoked and he is disqualified to be a notary public while serving
his suspension. The Supreme Court emphasized: the penalty of disbarment shall be meted
out only when the lawyer’s misconduct borders on the criminal and/or is committed under
scandalous circumstance.

PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and
set aside the Decision[1] and Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA),
dated April 20, 2009 and August 25, 2009, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No.
104261. The assailed CA Decision annulled the Decision of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR Case No. 05-0441-05
and reinstated the Decision of the Labor Arbiter (LA) in the same case,
while the CA Resolution denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The instant petition arose from a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by
petitioner against respondents with the NLRC, National Capital Region,
Quezon City. Petitioner alleged that: on August 1, 2003, he was hired by
respondent corporation as administrator of the latter's Eye Referral Center
(ERC); he performed his duties as administrator and continuously received
his monthly salary of P20,000.00 until the end of January 2005; beginning
February 2005, respondent withheld petitioner's salary without notice but
he still continued to report for work; on April 11, 2005, petitioner wrote a
letter to respondent Manuel Agulto (Agulto), who is the Executive Director
of respondent corporation, informing the latter that he has not been
receiving his salaries since February 2005 as well as his 14th month pay for
2004; petitioner did not receive any response from Agulto; on April 21,
2005, petitioner was informed by the Assistant to the Executive Director as
well as the Assistant Administrative Officer, that he is no longer the
Administrator of the ERC; subsequently, petitioner's office was padlocked
and closed without notice; he still continued to report for work but on April
29, 2005 he was no longer allowed by the security guard on duty to enter
the premises of the ERC.

On their part, respondents contended that: upon petitioner's representation

that he is an expert in corporate organizational structure and management
affairs, they engaged his services as a consultant or adviser in the
formulation of an updated organizational set-up and employees' manual
which is compatible with their present condition; based on his claim that
there is a need for an administrator for the ERC, he later designated himself
as such on a trial basis; there is no employer-employee relationship
between them because respondents had no control over petitioner in terms
of working hours as he reports for work at anytime of the day and leaves as
he pleases; respondents also had no control as to the manner in which he
performs his alleged duties as consultant; he became overbearing and his
relationship with the employees and officers of the company soured leading
to the filing of three complaints against him; petitioner was not dismissed
as he was the one who voluntarily severed his relations with respondents.

On January 20, 2006, the LA assigned to the case rendered a

Decision[3] dismissing petitioner's complaint. The LA held, among others,
that petitioner failed to establish that the elements of an employer-
employee relationship existed between him and respondents because he
was unable to show that he was, in fact, appointed as administrator of the
ERC and received salaries as such; he also failed to deny that during his
stint with respondents, he was, at the same time, a consultant of various
government agencies such as the Manila International Airport Authority,
Manila Intercontinental Port Authority, Anti-Terrorist Task Force for
Aviation and Air Transportation Sector; his actions were neither supervised
nor controlled by the management of the ERC; petitioner, likewise, did not
observe working hours by reporting for work and leaving therefrom as he
pleased; and, he was receiving allowances, not salaries, as a consultant.

On appeal, the NLRC reversed and set aside the Decision of the LA. The
NLRC declared petitioner as respondents' employee, that he was illegally
dismissed and ordered respondents to reinstate him to his former position
without loss of seniority rights and privileges with full backwages. The
NLRC held that the basis upon which the conclusion of the LA was drawn
lacked support; that it was incumbent for respondents to discharge the
burden of proving that petitioner's dismissal was for cause and effected
after due process was observed; and, that respondents failed to discharge
this burden.[4]

Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the

NLRC in its Resolution[5] dated May 30, 2008.

Respondents then filed a Petition for Certiorari[6] with the CA.

In its assailed Decision, the CA annulled and set aside the judgment of the
NLRC and reinstated the Decision of the LA. The CA held that the LA was
correct in ruling that, under the control test and the economic reality test,
no employer-employee relationship existed between respondents and
petitioner.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied it in its

Resolution dated August 25, 2009.

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari based on the following
grounds:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ABUSED ITS

DISCRETION IN NOT DISMISSING RESPONDENTS' PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI ON THE GROUND THAT RESPONDENTS SUBMITTED A
VERIFICATION THAT FAILS TO COMPLY WITH THE 2004 RULES ON
NOTARIAL PRACTICE.
 II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ABUSED ITS

DISCRETION IN RULING THAT NO EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE
RELATIONSHIP EXISTS BETWEEN RESPONDENTS AND
PETITIONER.[7]
As to the first ground, petitioner contends that respondents' petition
for certiorari filed with the CA should have been dismissed on the ground
that it was improperly verified because the jurat portion of the verification
states only the community tax certificate number of the affiant as evidence
of her identity. Petitioner argues that under the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice, as amended by a Resolution[8] of this Court, dated February 19,
2008, a community tax certificate is not among those considered as
competent evidence of identity.

The Court does not agree.

This Court has already ruled that competent evidence of identity is not
required in cases where the affiant is personally known to the notary
public.[9]

Thus, in Jandoquile v. Revilla, Jr.,[10] this Court held that:

If the notary public knows the affiants personally, he need not

require them to show their valid identification cards. This rule is
supported by the definition of a "jurat" under Section 6, Rule II of the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice. A "jurat" refers to an act in which an individual
on a single occasion: (a) appears in person before the notary public and
presents an instrument or document; (b) is personally known to the notary
public or identified by the notary public through competent evidence of
identity; (c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the
notary; and (d) takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to
such instrument or document.[11]
Also, Section 2(b), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides
as follows:

SEC. 2. Prohibitions -

(a) x x x
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as
signatory to the instrument or document -

(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization;
and

(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by

the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by
these Rules.
Moreover, Rule II, Section 6 of the same Rules states that:

SEC 6. Jurat. - "Jurat" refers to an act in which an individual on a single

occasion:

(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument
or document;

(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary

public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules;

(c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and

(d) takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to such

instrument or document.
In legal hermeneutics, "or" is a disjunctive that expresses an alternative or
gives a choice of one among two or more things.[12] The word signifies
disassociation and independence of one thing from another thing in an
enumeration.[13]

Thus, as earlier stated, if the affiant is personally known to the notary

public, the latter need not require the former to show evidence of identity
as required under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, as amended.

Applying the above rule to the instant case, it is undisputed that the
attorney-in-fact of respondents who executed the verification and
certificate against forum shopping, which was attached to respondents'
petition filed with the CA, is personally known to the notary public before
whom the documents were acknowledged. Both attorney-in-fact and the
notary public hold office at respondents' place of business and the latter is
also the legal counsel of respondents.

In any event, this Court's disquisition in the fairly recent case of Heirs of
Amada Zaulda v. Isaac Zaulda[14] regarding the import of procedural rules
vis-a-vis the substantive rights of the parties, is instructive, to wit:

[G]ranting, arguendo, that there was non-compliance with the verification

requirement, the rule is that courts should not be so strict about procedural
lapses which do not really impair the proper administration of justice. After
all, the higher objective of procedural rule is to ensure that the substantive
rights of the parties are protected. Litigations should, as much as possible,
be decided on the merits and not on technicalities. Every party-litigant
must be afforded ample opportunity for the proper and just determination
of his case, free from the unacceptable plea of technicalities.

In Coca-Cola Bottlers v. De la Cruz, where the verification was marred only

by a glitch in the evidence of the identity of the affiant, the Court was of the
considered view that, in the interest of justice, the minor defect can be
overlooked and should not defeat the petition.

The reduction in the number of pending cases is laudable, but if it would be

attained by precipitate, if not preposterous, application of technicalities,
justice would not be served. The law abhors technicalities that impede the
cause of justice. The court's primary duty is to render or dispense justice.
"It is a more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical
lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on appeal rather than
dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties,
giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting
in more delay, if not miscarriage of justice."

What should guide judicial action is the principle that a party-litigant

should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his
complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor, or
property on technicalities. The rules of procedure should be viewed as mere
tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate
rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. At this
juncture, the Court reminds all members of the bench and bar of the
admonition in the often-cited case of Alonso v. Villamor:

Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust. Technicality,

when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great
hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts.
There should be no vested rights in technicalities.[15]
Anent the second ground, petitioner insists that, based on evidence on
record, an employer-employee relationship exists between him and
respondents.

The Court is not persuaded.

It is a basic rule of evidence that each party must prove his affirmative
allegation.[16] If he claims a right granted by law, he must prove his claim by
competent evidence, relying on the strength of his own evidence and not
upon the weakness of that of his opponent.[17] The test for determining on
whom the burden of proof lies is found in the result of an inquiry as to
which party would be successful if no evidence of such matters were
given.[18] In an illegal dismissal case, the onus probandi rests on the
employer to prove that its dismissal of an employee was for a valid
cause.[19] However, before a case for illegal dismissal can prosper, an
employer-employee relationship must first be established.[20] Thus, in filing
a complaint before the LA for illegal dismissal, based on the premise that he
was an employee of respondents, it is incumbent upon petitioner to prove
the employer-employee relationship by substantial evidence.[21]

In regard to the above discussion, the issue of whether or not an employer-

employee relationship existed between petitioner and respondents is
essentially a question of fact.[22] The factors that determine the issue
include who has the power to select the employee, who pays the employee's
wages, who has the power to dismiss the employee, and who exercises
control of the methods and results by which the work of the employee is
accomplished.[23] Although no particular form of evidence is required to
prove the existence of the relationship, and any competent and relevant
evidence to prove the relationship may be admitted, a finding that the
relationship exists must nonetheless rest on substantial evidence, which is
that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion.[24]

Generally, the Court does not review factual questions, primarily because
the Court is not a trier of facts.[25] However, where, like here, there is a
conflict between the factual findings of the LA and the CA, on one hand,
and those of the NLRC, on the other, it becomes proper for the Court, in the
exercise of its equity jurisdiction, to review and re-evaluate the factual
issues and to look into the records of the case and re-examine the
questioned findings.[26]

Etched in an unending stream of cases are four standards in determining

the existence of an employer-employee relationship, namely: (a) the
manner of selection and engagement of the putative employee; (b) the
mode of payment of wages; (c) the presence or absence of power of
dismissal; and, (d) the presence or absence of control of the putative
employee's conduct. Most determinative among these factors is the so-
called "control test."[27]

Indeed, the power of the employer to control the work of the employee is
considered the most significant determinant of the existence of an
employer-employee relationship.[28] This test is premised on whether the
person for whom the services are performed reserves the right to control
both the end achieved and the manner and means used to achieve that
end.[29]

In the present case, petitioner contends that, as evidence of respondents'

supposed control over him, the organizational plans he has drawn were
subject to the approval of respondent corporation's Board of Trustees.
However, the Court agrees with the disquisition of the CA on this matter, to
wit:

[Respondents'] power to approve or reject the organizational plans drawn

by [petitioner] cannot be the control contemplated in the "control test." It is
but logical that one who commissions another to do a piece of work should
have the right to accept or reject the product. The important factor to
consider in the "control test" is still the element of control over how the
work itself is done, not just the end result thereof.

Well settled is the rule that where a person who works for another performs
his job more or less at his own pleasure, in the manner he sees fit, not
subject to definite hours or conditions of work, and is compensated
according to the result of his efforts and not the amount thereof, no
employer-employee relationship exists.[30]
What was glaring in the present case is the undisputed fact that petitioner
was never subject to definite working hours. He never denied that he goes
to work and leaves therefrom as he pleases.[31] In fact, on December 1-31,
2004, he went on leave without seeking approval from the officers of
respondent company. On the contrary, his letter[32] simply informed
respondents that he will be away for a month and even advised them that
they have the option of appointing his replacement during his absence. This
Court has held that there is no employer-employee relationship where the
supposed employee is not subject to a set of rules and regulations governing
the performance of his duties under the agreement with the company and is
not required to report for work at any time, nor to devote his time
exclusively to working for the company.[33]

In this regard, this Court also agrees with the ruling of the CA that:

Aside from the control test, the Supreme Court has also used the economic
reality test in determining whether an employer-employee relationship
exists between the parties. Under this test, the economic realities prevailing
within the activity or between the parties are examined, taking into
consideration the totality of circumstances surrounding the true nature of
the relationship between the parties. This is especially appropriate when, as
in this case, there is no written agreement or contract on which to base the
relationship. In our jurisdiction, the benchmark of economic reality in
analyzing possible employment relationships for purposes of applying the
Labor Code ought to be the economic dependence of the worker on his
employer.

In the instant case, as shown by the resume of [petitioner], he concurrently

held consultancy positions with the Manila International Airport Authority
(from 04 March 2001 to September 2003 and from 01 November 2004 up
to the present) and the Anti-Terrorist Task Force for Aviation and Air
Transportation Sector (from 16 April 2004 to 30 June 2004) during his
stint with the Eye Referral Center (from 01 August 2003 to 29 April 2005).
Accordingly, it cannot be said that the [petitioner] was wholly dependent on
[respondent] company.[34]
In bolstering his contention that there was an employer-employee
relationship, petitioner draws attention to the pay slips he supposedly
received from respondent corporation. However, he does not dispute the
findings of the CA that there are no deductions for SSS and withholding tax
from his compensation, which are the usual deductions from employees'
salaries. Thus, the alleged pay slips may not be treated as competent
evidence of petitioner's claim that he is respondents' employee.

In addition, the designation of the payments to petitioner as salaries, is not

determinative of the existence of an employer-employee
relationship.[35] Salary is a general term defined as a remuneration for
services given.[36] Evidence of this fact, in the instant case, was the cash
voucher issued in favor of petitioner where it was stated therein that the
amount of P20,000.00 was given as petitioner's allowance for the month of
December 2004, although it appears from the pay slip that the said amount
was his salary for the same period.

Additional evidence of the fact that petitioner was hired as a consultant and
not as an employee of respondent corporation are affidavits to this effect
which were executed by Roy Oliveres[37] and Aurea Luz Esteva,[38] who are
Medical Records Custodian and Administrative Officer, respectively, of
respondent corporation. Petitioner insists in its objection of the use of these
affidavits on the ground that they are, essentially, hearsay. However, this
Court has ruled that although the affiants had not been presented to affirm
the contents of their affidavits and be cross-examined, their affidavits may
be given evidentiary value; the argument that such affidavits were hearsay
was not persuasive.[39] Likewise, this Court ruled that it was not necessary
for the affiants to appear and testify and be cross-examined by counsel for
the adverse party.[40] To require otherwise would be to negate the rationale
and purpose of the summary nature of the proceedings mandated by the
Rules and to make mandatory the application of the technical rules of
evidence.[41]

These affidavits are corroborated by evidence, as discussed above, showing

that petitioner has no definite working hours and is not subject to the
control of respondents.

Lastly, the Court does not agree with petitioner's insistence that his being
hired as respondent corporation's administrator and his designation as
such in intra-company correspondence proves that he is an employee of the
corporation. The fact alone that petitioner was designated as an
administrator does not necessarily mean that he is an employee of
respondents. Mere title or designation in a corporation will not, by itself,
determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship.[42] In this
regard, even the identification card which was issued to petitioner is not an
adequate proof of petitioner's claim that he is respondents' employee. In
addition, petitioner's designation as an administrator neither disproves
respondents' contention that he was engaged only as a consultant.

As a final point, it bears to reiterate that while the Constitution is

committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of the working
class, it should not be supposed that every labor dispute will be
automatically decided in favor of labor.[43] Management also has its rights
which are entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of simple fair
play.[44] Out of its concern for the less privileged in life, the Court has
inclined, more often than not, toward the worker and upheld his cause in
his conflicts with the employer.[45] Such favoritism, however, has not
blinded the Court to the rule that justice is in every case for the deserving,
to be dispensed in the light of the established facts and the applicable law
and doctrine.[46]

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision and

Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated April 20, 2009 and August 25,
2009, respectively, in CA-G.R. SPNo. 104261, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Del Castillo,** Villarama, Jr., Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

July 3, 2015

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs / Mesdames:

Please take notice that on June 17, 2015 a Decision, copy attached hereto,
was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original
of which was received by this Office on July 3, 2015 at 9:33 a.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.)
WILFREDO V. LAPITAN
Division Clerk of Court

* Per Special Order No. 2059 dated June 17, 2015.

Designated Acing Member in lieu of Associate Justice Presbitero J.

**

Velasco, Jr., per Special Order No. 2060 dated June 17, 2105.

Penned by Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan-Castillo, with Associate

[1]

Justices Mario L. Guariña III and Marlene Gonzales-Sison, concurring;

Annex "A" to Petition, rollo pp. 34-51.

[2] Id. at 53-56.

[3] Annex "C" to Petition, id. at 58-73.

[4] Annex "E" to Petition, id. at 163-170.

[5] Annex "F" to Petition, id. at 172-173.

[6] CA rollo, pp. 2-20.

[7] Rollo, pp. 14-15.

[8] A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC.

[9] Amora, Jr. v. COMELEC, et al., 655 Phil. 467, 479 (2011).
[10] A.C. No. 9514, April 10, 2013, 695 SCRA 356.

[11] Jandoquile v. Revilla, Jr., supra, at 360. (Emphasis ours)

[12] Guzman v. Commission on Elections, et al., 614 Phil. 143, 160 (2009).

[13] Id.

[14] G.R. No. 201234, March 17, 2014.

[15] Amada Zaulda v. Isaac Zaulda, supra. (Citations omitted)

Lopez v. Bodega City (Video-Disco Kitchen of the Phils.) and/or Torres-

[16]

Yap, 558 Phil. 666, 673 (2007).

[17] Id. at 673-674.

[18] Id. at 674.

[19] Id.

[20] Id.

[21] Id.

Legend Hotel (Manila) v. Realuyo, G.R. No. 153511, July 18, 2012, 677
[22]

SCRA, 10, 19.

[23] Id.

[24] Id.

[25] Id.

[26] Id. at 19-20.

[27] Sasan, Sr. v. NLRC, 4th Div., et al., 590 Phil. 685, 708-709 (2008).

[28] Legend Hotel (Manila) v. Realuyo, supra note 22, at 22.

[29] Id.

[30] See CA Decision, rollo, pp. 43-44. (Citations omitted)

[31] See rollo, pp. 243-244; CA rollo, p. 49.

[32] Rollo, p. 158.

Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. v. National Labor Relations

[33]

Commission, 259 Phil. 65, 72 (1989).

[34] See CA Decision, rollo, pp. 46-47. (Citations omitted)

Almirez v. Infinite Loop Technology Corporation, 516 Phil. 705, 716

[35]

(2006).

[36] Id.

[37] Rollo, pp. 219-226.

[38] Id. at 231-233.

Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. v. Dumapis, et al., 584 Phil. 100, 109
[39]

(2008), citing Bantolino v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc., 451 Phil. 839,
845 (2003).

Id. at 109-110, citing Rase v. NLRC, G.R. No. 110637, October 7, 1994,
[40]

237 SCRA 523, 534.

[41] Id.at 109-110.

[42] Okol v. Slimmers World International, et al., 623 Phil. 13, 18 (2009).

Javier v. Fly Ace Corporation, G.R. No. 192558, February 15, 2012, 666
[43]

SCRA 382, 399-400.

[44] Id. at 400.

[45] Id.
 [46] Id.

SECOND DIVISION

CHARLES B. BAYLON, A.C. No. 6962

Complainant,
Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

- versus - PUNO, C.J.,
REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.

ATTY. JOSE A. ALMO, Promulgated:

Respondent.
June 25, 2008
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This case stemmed from the administrative complaint filed by the
complainant at the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) charging the respondent
with fraud and deceit for notarizing a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) bearing the
forged signature of the complainant as the supposed principal thereof.

Complainant averred that Pacita Filio, Rodolfo Llantino, Jr. and his late wife,
Rosemarie Baylon, conspired in preparing an SPA[1] authorizing his wife to
mortgage his real property located in Signal Village, Taguig. He said that he was out
of the country when the SPA was executed on June 17, 1996, and also when it was
notarized by the respondent on June 26, 1996. To support his contention that he was
overseas on those dates, he presented (1) a certification [2] from the Government of
Singapore showing that he was vaccinated in the said country on June 17, 1996; and
(2) a certification[3] from the Philippine Bureau of Immigration showing that he was
out of the country from March 21, 1995 to January 28, 1997. To prove that his
signature on the SPA was forged, the complainant presented a report [4] from the
National Bureau of Investigation stating to the effect that the questioned signature
on the SPA was not written by him.

The complainant likewise alleged that because of the SPA, his real property
was mortgaged to Lorna Express Credit Corporation and that it was subsequently
foreclosed due to the failure of his wife to settle her mortgage obligations.

In his answer, the respondent admitted notarizing the SPA, but he argued that
he initially refused to notarize it when the complainants wife first came to his office
on June 17, 1996, due to the absence of the supposed affiant thereof. He said that he
only notarized the SPA when the complainants wife came back to his office on June
26, 1996, together with a person whom she introduced to him as Charles Baylon. He
further contended that he believed in good faith that the person introduced to him
was the complainant because said person presented to him a Community Tax
Certificate bearing the name Charles Baylon. To corroborate his claims, the
respondent attached the affidavit of his secretary, Leonilita de Silva.

The respondent likewise denied having taken part in any scheme to commit
fraud, deceit or falsehood.[5]

After due proceedings, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline recommended

to the IBP-Board of Governors that the respondent be strongly admonished for
notarizing the SPA; that his notarial commission be revoked; and that the
respondent be barred from being granted a notarial commission for one year.[6]

In justifying its recommended sanctions, the IBP-Commission on Bar

Discipline stated that
In this instance, reasonable diligence should have compelled herein
respondent to ascertain the true identity of the person seeking his legal
services considering the nature of the document, i.e., giving a third party
authority to mortgage a real property owned by another. The only saving
grace on the part of respondent is that he relied on the fact that the person
being authorized under the SPA to act as agent and who accompanied the
impostor, is the wife of the principal mentioned therein.[7]
 On October 22, 2005, the IBP-Board of Governors issued Resolution No.
XVII-2005-109 which reads:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondents failure to properly
ascertain the true identity of the person seeking his legal services
considering the nature of the document, Atty. Jose A. Almo is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year and
Respondents notarial commission is Revoked and Disqualified (sic)
from reappointment as Notary Public for two (2) years.[8]

In our Resolution[9] dated February 1, 2006, we noted the said IBP Resolution.

We agree with the finding of the IBP that the respondent had indeed been negligent
in the performance of his duties as a notary public in this case.

The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be

overemphasized. In Santiago v. Rafanan,[10] we explained,

. . . Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is

invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are
qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts
a private document into a public document thus making that document
admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial
document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts,
administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon
the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a
private instrument.

For this reason, notaries public should not take for granted the
solemn duties pertaining to their office. Slipshod methods in their
performance of the notarial act are never to be countenanced. They are
expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their duties, which
are dictated by public policy and are impressed with public interest.[11]
Mindful of his duties as a notary public and taking into account the nature of the
SPA which in this case authorized the complainants wife to mortgage the subject
real property, the respondent should have exercised utmost diligence in ascertaining
the true identity of the person who represented himself and was represented to be the
complainant.[12] He should not have relied on the Community Tax Certificate
presented by the said impostor in view of the ease with which community tax
certificates are obtained these days.[13]As a matter of fact, recognizing the established
unreliability of a community tax certificate in proving the identity of a person who
wishes to have his document notarized, we did not include it in the list of competent
evidence of identity that notaries public should use in ascertaining the identity of
persons appearing before them to have their documents notarized.[14]

Moreover, considering that respondent admitted[15] in the IBP hearing on February

21, 2005 that he had already previously notarized some documents [16] for the
complainant, he should have compared the complainants signatures in those
documents with the impostors signature before he notarized the questioned SPA.

WHEREFORE, the notarial commission, if still extant, of respondent Atty.

Jose A. Almo is hereby REVOKED. He is likewise DISQUALIFIED to be
reappointed as Notary Public for a period of two years.

To enable us to determine the effectivity of the penalty imposed, the

respondent is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this Decision to this
Court.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the courts all over the country. Let a copy of
this Decision likewise be attached to the personal records of the respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

 Supreme Court
Manila

EN BANC

SERGIO G. AMORA, JR., G.R. No. 192280

Petitioner,
Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,*
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
- versus -
PEREZ,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO, JJ.

Promulgated:

January 25, 2011

 COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
ARNIELO S. OLANDRIA,
Respondents.

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
NACHURA, J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of
the Rules of Court, seeking to annul and set aside the Resolutions dated April 29,
2010[1] and May 17, 2010,[2] respectively, of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) in SPA No. 10-046 (DC).
First, the undisputed facts.
 On December 1, 2009, petitioner Sergio G. Amora, Jr. (Amora) filed his
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Mayor of Candijay, Bohol. At that time, Amora
was the incumbent Mayor of Candijay and had been twice elected to the post, in
the years 2004 and 2007.

To oppose Amora, the Nationalist Peoples Coalition (NPC) fielded Trygve L.

Olaivar (Olaivar) for the mayoralty post. Respondent Arnielo S. Olandria (Olandria)
was one of the candidates for councilor of the NPC in the same municipality.

On March 5, 2010, Olandria filed before the COMELEC a Petition for

Disqualification against Amora. Olandria alleged that Amoras COC was not properly
sworn contrary to the requirements of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) and the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Olandria pointed out that, in executing his COC,
Amora merely presented his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) to the notary public,
Atty. Oriculo Granada (Atty. Granada), instead of presenting competent evidence
of his identity. Consequently, Amoras COC had no force and effect and should be
considered as not filed.

Amora traversed Olandrias allegations in his Answer cum Position

Paper.[3] He countered that:

1. The Petition for Disqualification is actually a Petition to Deny Due Course

or cancel a certificate of candidacy. Effectively, the petition of Olandria is filed out
of time;

2. Olandrias claim does not constitute a proper ground for the cancellation
of the COC;
 3. The COC is valid and effective because he (Amora) is personally known to
the notary public, Atty. Granada, before whom he took his oath in filing the
document;

4. Atty. Granada is, in fact, a close acquaintance since they have been
members of the League of Muncipal Mayors, Bohol Chapter, for several years; and

5. Ultimately, he (Amora) sufficiently complied with the requirement that

the COC be under oath.

As previously adverted to, the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the
petition and disqualified Amora from running for Mayor of Candijay, Bohol.

Posthaste, Amora filed a Motion for Reconsideration[4] before the

COMELEC en banc. Amora reiterated his previous arguments and emphasized the
asseverations of the notary public, Atty. Granada, in the latters affidavit,[5] to wit:

1. The COMELECs (Second Divisions) ruling is contrary to the objectives and

basic principles of election laws which uphold the primacy of the popular will;

2. Atty. Granada states that while he normally requires the affiant to show
competent evidence of identity, in Amoras case, however, he accepted Amoras CTC
since he personally knows him;

3. Apart from the fact that Amora and Atty. Granada were both
members of the League of Municipal Mayors, Bohol Chapter, the two consider each
other as distant relatives because Amoras mother is a Granada;
 4. It is a matter of judicial notice that practically everybody knows
the Mayor, most especially lawyers and notaries public, who keep
themselves abreast of developments in local politics and have frequent dealings
with the local government; and

5. In all, the COC filed by Amora does not lack the required formality of an
oath, and thus, there is no reason to nullify his COC.

Meanwhile, on May 10, 2010, national and local elections were held. Amora
obtained 8,688 votes, equivalent to 58.94% of the total votes cast, compared to
Olaivars 6,053 votes, equivalent to only 41.06% thereof. Subsequently, the
Muncipal Board of Canvassers of Candijay, Bohol, proclaimed Amora as the winner
for the position of Municipal Mayor of Candijay, Bohol.[6]
A week thereafter, or on May 17, 2010, in another turn of events, the
COMELEC en banc denied Amoras motion for reconsideration and affirmed the
resolution of the COMELEC (Second Division). Notably, three (3) of the seven (7)
commissioners dissented from the majority ruling. Commissioner Gregorio
Larrazabal (Commissioner Larrazabal) wrote a dissenting opinion, which was
concurred in by then Chairman Jose A.R. Melo and Commissioner Rene V.
Sarmiento.

In denying Amoras motion for reconsideration and upholding Olandrias

petition for disqualification of Amora, the COMELEC ratiocinated, thus:

[Amora] himself admitted in his Motion that the Second Division was
correct in pointing out that the CTC is no longer a competent evidence of
identity for purposes of notarization.

The COC therefore is rendered invalid when [petitioner] only presented

his CTC to the notary public. His defense that he is personally known to
the notary cannot be given recognition because the best proof [of] his
contention could have been the COC itself. However, careful examination
of the jurat portion of the COC reveals no assertion by the notary public
that he personally knew the affiant, [petitioner] herein. Belated
production of an Affidavit by the Notary Public cannot be given weight
because such evidence could and should have been produced at the
earliest possible opportunity.

The rules are absolute. Section 73 of the Election Code states:

Section 73. Certificate of Candidacy. No person shall be

eligible for any elective public office unless he files a sworn
certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.

Under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004 (Rules), the

requirements of notarization of an oath are:

Section 2. Affirmation or Oath. The term Affirmation or

Oath refers to an act in which an individual on a single
occasion:

(a) appears in person before the notary public;

(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified

by the notary public through competent evidence of
identity as defined by these Rules; and

(c) avows under penalty of law to the whole truth of the

contents of the instrument or document.
 The required form of identification is prescribed in [S]ection 12 of
the same Rules, to wit:

Section 12. Competent Evidence of Identity. The phrase

competent evidence of identity refers to the identification
of an individual based on:

(a) at least one current identification document issued

by an official agency bearing the photograph and signature
of the individual. x x x.

It is apparent that a CTC, which bears no photograph, is no longer

a valid form of identification for purposes of Notarization of Legal
Documents. No less than the Supreme Court itself, when it revoked the
Notarial Commission of a member of the Bar in Baylon v. Almo, reiterated
this when it said:

As a matter of fact, recognizing the established unreliability

of a community tax certificate in proving the identity of a
person who wishes to have his document notarized, we did
not include it in the list of competent evidence of identity
that notaries public should use in ascertaining the identity
of persons appearing before them to have their documents
notarized.

Seeking other remedies, [Amora] maintained that Section 78 of the

Election Code governs the Petition. Said section provides that:

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate

of candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny due
course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed
 by the person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under
Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any
time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided,
after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days
before the election.

[Amora] however failed to note that the Petition relies upon an entirely
different ground. The Petition has clearly stated that it was invoking
Section 73 of the Election Code, which prescribes the mandatory
requirement of filing a sworn certificate of candidacy. As properly
pointed out by [Olandria], he filed a Petition to Disqualify for Possessing
Some Grounds for Disqualification, which, is governed by COMELEC
Resolution No. 8696, to wit:

B. PETITION TO DISQUALIFY A CANDIDATE PURSUANT TO

SECTION 68 OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE AND
PETITION TO DISQUALIFY FOR LACK OF QUALIFICATIONS
OR POSSESSING SOME GROUNDS FOR DISQUALIFICATION

1. A verified petition to disqualify a candidate

pursuant to Section 68 of the OEC and
the verified petition to disqualify a candidate
for lack of qualifications or possessing some
grounds for disqualification may be filed on
any day after the last day for filing of
certificates of candidacy but not later than
the date of proclamation;
 xxxx

3. The petition to disqualify a candidate for lack of

qualification or possessing some grounds for
disqualification, shall be filed in ten (10)
legible copies, personally or through a duly
authorized representative, by any person of
voting age, or duly registered political party,
organization or coalition of political parties on
the ground that the candidate does not
possess all the qualifications as provided for
by the Constitution or by existing law or who
possesses some grounds for disqualification as
provided for by the Constitution or by existing
law.

xxxx

Finally, we do not agree with [Amora] when he stated that the Second
Divisions Resolution practically supplanted congress by adding another
ground for disqualification, not provided in the omnibus election code or
the local government code. The constitution is very clear that it is
congress that shall prescribe the qualifications (and disqualifications) of
candidates for local government positions. These grounds for
disqualification were laid down in both laws mentioned by [Amora] and
COMELEC Resolution 8696.[7]

Hence, this petition for certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion to the
COMELEC. On June 15, 2010, we issued a Status Quo Ante Order and directed
respondents to comment on the petition. As directed, Olandria and the COMELEC
filed their respective Comments[8] which uniformly opposed the petition.
Thereafter, Amora filed his Reply.[9]

Amora insists that the Petition for Disqualification filed by Olandria is actually
a Petition to Deny Due Course since the purported ground for disqualification
simply refers to the defective notarization of the COC. Amora is adamant that
Section 73 of the OEC pertains to the substantive qualifications of a candidate or
the lack thereof as grounds for disqualification, specifically, the qualifications and
disqualifications of elective local officials under the Local Government Code (LGC)
and the OEC. Thus, Olandrias petition was filed way beyond the reglementary
period of twenty-five (25) days from the date of the filing of the disputed COC.

Moreover, Amora maintains that his COC is properly notarized and not
defective, and the presentation of his CTC to the notary public to whom he was
personally known sufficiently complied with the requirement that the COC be
under oath. Amora further alleges that: (1) Olaivar, his opponent in the mayoralty
post, and likewise a member of the NPC, is purportedly a fraternity brother and
close associate of Nicodemo T. Ferrer (Commissioner Ferrer), one of the
commissioners of the COMELEC who disqualified him; and (2) Olaivar served as
Consultant for the COMELEC, assigned to the Office of Commissioner Ferrer.

Olandria and the COMELEC reiterated the arguments contained in the COMELEC en
banc resolution of May 17, 2010.

Amoras petition is meritorious.

We find that the COMELEC ruling smacks of grave abuse of discretion, a

capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. Certiorari lies where a court or any tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion.[10]
 In this case, it was grave abuse of discretion to uphold Olandrias claim that
an improperly sworn COC is equivalent to possession of a ground for
disqualification. Not by any stretch of the imagination can we infer this as an
additional ground for disqualification from the specific wording of the OEC in
Section 68, which reads:

SEC. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or

protest in which he is party is declared by final decision of a competent
court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having: (a) given money or
other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters
or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of
terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an
amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or
made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104;
or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86, and 261, paragraphs d, e, k,
v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person
who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall
not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said
person has waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a
foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided
for in the elections laws.

and of Section 40 of the LGC, which provides:

SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified

from running for any elective local position:
 (a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving
moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative

case;

(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of

allegiance to the Republic;

(d) Those with dual citizenship;

(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here

or abroad;

(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who

have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of
the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and

(g) The insane or feeble-minded.

It is quite obvious that the Olandria petition is not based on any of the grounds for
disqualification as enumerated in the foregoing statutory provisions. Nowhere
therein does it specify that a defective notarization is a ground for the
disqualification of a candidate. Yet, the COMELEC would uphold that petition upon
the outlandish claim that it is a petition to disqualify a candidate for lack of
qualifications or possessing some grounds for disqualification.
The proper characterization of a petition as one for disqualification under the
pertinent provisions of laws cannot be made dependent on the designation,
correctly or incorrectly, of a petitioner. The absurd interpretation of Olandria,
respondent herein, is not controlling; the COMELEC should have dismissed his
petition outright.

A petition for disqualification relates to the declaration of a candidate as ineligible

or lacking in quality or accomplishment fit for the position of mayor. The distinction
between a petition for disqualification and the formal requirement in Section 73 of
the OEC that a COC be under oath is not simply a question of semantics as the
statutes list the grounds for the disqualification of a candidate.

Recently, we have had occasion to distinguish the various petitions for

disqualification and clarify the grounds therefor as provided in the OEC and the
LGC. We declared, thus:
To emphasize, a petition for disqualification on the one hand, can
be premised on Section 12 or 68 of the OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC. On
the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only
be grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said
certificate that is false. The petitions also have different effects. While a
person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to
continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or
denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all,
as if he/she never filed a CoC. Thus, in Miranda v. Abaya, this Court made
the distinction that a candidate who is disqualified under Section 68 can
validly be substituted under Section 77 of the OEC because he/she
remains a candidate until disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been
denied due course or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted
because he/she is never considered a candidate.[11]
Apart from the qualifications provided for in the Constitution, the power to
prescribe additional qualifications for elective office and grounds for
disqualification therefrom, consistent with the constitutional provisions, is vested
in Congress.[12] However, laws prescribing qualifications for and disqualifications
from office are liberally construed in favor of eligibility since the privilege of holding
an office is a valuable one.[13] We cannot overemphasize the principle that where a
candidate has received popular mandate, all possible doubts should be resolved in
favor of the candidates eligibility, for to rule otherwise is to defeat the will of the
people.[14]

In stark contrast to the foregoing, the COMELEC allowed and confirmed the
disqualification of Amora although the latter won, and was forthwith proclaimed,
as Mayor of Candijay, Bohol.

Another red flag for the COMELEC to dismiss Olandrias petition is the fact
that Amora claims to personally know the notary public, Atty. Granada, before
whom his COC was sworn. In this regard, the dissenting opinion of Commissioner
Larrazabal aptly disposes of the core issue:

With all due respect to the well-written Ponencia, I respectfully voice my

dissent. The primary issue herein is whether it is proper to disqualify a
candidate who, in executing his Certificate of Candidacy (COC), merely
presented to the Notary Public his Community Tax Certificate.

The majority opinion strictly construed the 2004 Rules on Notarial

Practice (the 2004 Notarial Rules) when it provided that valid and
competent evidence of identification must be presented to render Sergio
G. Amora, Jr.s [petitioners] COC valid. The very wording of the 2004
Notarial Rules supports my view that the instant motion for
reconsideration ought to be granted, to wit:
 Section 2. Affirmation or Oath . The term Affirmation or
Oath refers to an act in which an individual on a single
occasion:

(a) appears in person before the notary public;

(b) is personally known to the notary public or

identified by the notary public through competent evidence
of identity as defined by these Rules; and

(c) avows under penalty of law to the whole truth

of the contents of the instrument or document.

As quoted supra, competent evidence of identity is not required

in cases where the affiant is personally known to the Notary Public, which
is the case herein. The records reveal that [petitioner] submitted to this
Commission a sworn affidavit executed by Notary Public Oriculo A.
Granada (Granada), who notarized [petitioners] COC, affirming in his
affidavit that he personally knows [petitioner].

[Respondent], on the other hand, presented no evidence to

counter Granadas declarations. Hence, Granada[s] affidavit, which
narrates in detail his personal relation with [petitioner], should be
deemed sufficient.

The purpose of election laws is to give effect to, rather than

frustrate, the will of the voters. The people of Candijay, Bohol has
already exercised their right to suffrage on May 10, 2010 where
[petitioner] was one of the candidates for municipal mayor. To disqualify
 [petitioner] at this late stage simply due to an overly strict reading of the
2004 Notarial Rules will effectively deprive the people who voted for him
their rights to vote.

The Supreme Courts declaration in Petronila S. Rulloda v.

COMELEC et al. must not be taken lightly:

Technicalities and procedural niceties in election cases

should not be made to stand in the way of the true will of
the electorate. Laws governing election contests must be
liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in
the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere
technical objections.

Election contests involve public interest, and technicalities

and procedural barriers must yield if they constitute an
obstacle to the determination of the true will of the
electorate in the choice of their elective officials. The Court
frowns upon any interpretation of the law that would
hinder in any way not only the free and intelligent casting
of the votes in an election but also the correct
ascertainment of the results.[15]

Our ruling herein does not do away with the formal requirement that a COC be
sworn. In fact, we emphasize that the filing of a COC is mandatory and must comply
with the requirements set forth by law.[16]

Section 2 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice lists the act to which an
affirmation or oath refers:
 Sec. 2. Affirmation or Oath. The term Affirmation or Oath refers to an act
in which an individual on a single occasion:

(a) appears in person before the notary public;

(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the

notary public through competent evidence of identity as
defined by these Rules; and

(c) avows under penalty of law to the whole truth of the

contents of the instrument or document.

In this case, however, contrary to the declarations of the COMELEC, Amora

complied with the requirement of a sworn COC. He readily explained that he and
Atty. Granada personally knew each other; they were not just colleagues at the
League of Municipal Mayors, Bohol Chapter, but they consider each other as
distant relatives. Thus, the alleged defect in the oath was not proven by Olandria
since the presentation of a CTC turned out to be sufficient in this instance. On the
whole, the COMELEC should not have brushed aside the affidavit of Atty. Granada
and remained inflexible in the face of Amoras victory and proclamation as Mayor
of Candijay, Bohol.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission on

Elections in SPA No. 10-046 (DC) dated April 29, 2010 and May 17, 2010,
respectively, are ANULLED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 109849. February 26, 1997]

MAXIMINO FUENTES, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS,

THIRTEENTH DIVISION, AND VIRGILIO UY, BRIGIDO
SAGUINDANG, LEONCIO CALIGANG, ET AL., respondents.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

In deciding this appeal, the Court reiterates the oft-stated doctrine that
factual findings of the Court of Appeals affirming those of the trial court are
binding on this Court unless there is a clear showing that such findings are
tainted with arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error.
This is a petition under Rule 45 seeking a reversal of the Decision of the [1]

Court of Appeals promulgated on March 22, 1993, in CA-G.R. SP No. 29910.

[2]

The Antecedent Facts

The facts of the case as gleaned from the respondent Court of Appeals
Decision are as follows:

(Herein petitioner) Maximino Fuentes and (herein private respondents) Virgilio Uy, et
al. are owners of adjoining parcels of land situated in Dela Paz, Clarin, Misamis
Occidental. The (herein petitioners) land declared in his name is identified as Lot No.
1358, Pls 707 while that of the defendant Virgilio Uy, titled in the latters name, is
identified as Lot No. 1357.

The boundary lines of the adjoining lands had been relocated twice by Engineer
Armelito Amores in surveys conducted before the case for forcible entry was
filed. When the case was already filed, further relocation surveys were conducted, this
time, by Engineer Norberto Iyog thru a court order on the litigated portion consisting
of 411 square meters which according to the plaintiff was forcibly taken and entered
into by (herein private respondents).

In hearing the case, the MCTC of Clarin-Tudela stated the issues to be as follows:
 1. Was there an act of dispossession effected by the defendants on the
disputed property whereby the plaintiff was dispossessed of the disputed
property? and

2. To whom did the area of 411 square meters belong?

The trial court making a review of the evidence on record held that the (herein private
respondents) have superior evidence to disprove the allegations of (herein petitioner)
and on the basis of which, it found that the (herein private respondents) have not
committed the acts complained of by (herein petitioner), in the main pointing to the
statement of the witness Alfredo Dantes as reflected in the stenographic notes
particularly indicated as tsn, p. 46, proceedings of February 8, 1991, wherein said
witness appeared to have testified that he bought the land from the heirs of the
original owner, one Gadiane, which he improved gradually by putting up a dike which
in effect was only an improvement of an already existing dike and in 1976, he had
entered into an agreement with (herein private respondents) to develop the property on
a sharing basis which finally culminated in his selling the said area in 1980 to the
(herein private respondents).

What appeared to have impressed the trial court most is expressed in its statement that
the (herein petitioner) should have questioned the action of the (herein private
respondents) in improving the dike and having it fenced, and also, why it was only in
1987 when he tried to restrain the (herein private respondents) when the same dike
had existed many years before. The part of the decision in connection with said
questions of the court is herein quoted:

This court finds it strange for the (herein petitioner) for him to question the action of
the defendant in fencing the dikes. If it appeared to him that the dike fenced by the
defendant which is the same dike existing when Dantes bought the property from
Gadiane really belonged to him, why did he not question the same many years
before? Yet, all the time when Dantes, since 1970 and later the (herein private
respondent) in 1976, made improvements on the dike, the plaintiff did not make any
adverse move to restrain them. It was only in 1987 when he made the initial move of
trying to restrain (herein private respondent) which prompted the latter to cause a (sic)
relocation surveys which were conducted by Engr. Amores twice.

Prescinding from the foregoing findings, the trial court said it found nothing wrong
for the (herein private respondents) to have fenced the dike after the relocation survey
conducted by Engr. Amores which the (herein petitioner) had attended and further
stated that the act of fencing the dike and cutting the nipa palms did not violate the
property rights of the (herein petitioner) for the (herein private respondents) only
acted to assert what properly belongs to them and on the basis of (the) Commissioners
Report more or less indicating the foregoing circumstances, it held that there was in
fact no forcible dispossession of property and that further, the area of 411 square
meters under dispute factually belongs to (herein private respondent) Virgilio Uy.

The decision of the MCTC of Clarin-Tudela was appealed by the (herein plaintiff) and
the RTC Ozamis City resolved to affirm the decision of the MCTC deleting only the
monetary award therein granted in favor of the (herein private respondents).

The (herein) petitioner in the case before (the respondent Court of Appeals) has raised
two (2) purported errors of the court below thus:

That the honorable Regional Trial Court, Branch 15-A, Ozamiz City, gravely erred in
deciding that (herein petitioner) had no evidence to support the allegation that (herein
private respondents) entered the portion in question by force and intimidation.

That the honorable Regional Trial Court Branch 15-A, Ozamiz City, erred in
sustaining that the (herein private respondents) did not commit any act constituting
forcible entry.[3]

The Issue

Hence, petitioner Maximino Fuentes filed the present six-page petition

alleging the same assignment of errors raised before the Court of Appeals as
follows:

1. That the Honorable Regional Trial Court, Branch 15-A, Ozamiz City, gravely
erred in deciding that plaintiff had no evidence to support the allegation that
defendants entered the portion in question by force and intimidation.

2. That the Honorable Regional Trial Court, Branch 15-A, Ozamiz City, erred in sustaining
that the defendants did not commit any act constituting forcible entry.[4]

In his Memorandum, the petitioner consolidated these into a single

issue: Who is in actual, physical and prior possession of the portion in question?

The Courts Ruling

The petition for review is unmeritorious.

 Jurisprudence teaches us that (a)s a rule, the jurisdiction of this Court in
cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals x x x is limited to the review and
revision of errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate court, as its
findings of fact are deemed conclusive. As such this Court is not duty-bound to
analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the
proceedings below. This rule, however, is not without exceptions. The findings
[5]

of fact of the Court of Appeals, which are as a general rule deemed conclusive,
may admit of review by this Court: [6]

(1) when the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are
contradictory;

(2) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or

conjectures;

(3) when the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is
manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;

(4) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;

(5) when the appellate court, in making its findings, goes beyond the issues of the
case, and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee;

(6) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a misapprehension

of facts;

(7) when the Court of Appeals fails to notice certain relevant facts which, if
properly considered, will justify a different conclusion;

(8) when the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;

(9) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific
evidence on which they are based; and

(10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
absence of evidence but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on
record.

After a thorough review of the case at bench, the Court finds that the petition
raises no substantial question of law. The question raised as to who has prior
actual possession over the contested portion of land is patently a question of
fact beyond the pale of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which mandates that only
questions of law be raised in the petition. [7]

Moreover, petitioner utterly failed to show the presence of any of the

previously mentioned exceptions to justify the Courts review of the factual
findings of the Court of Appeals. On the contrary, the factual findings and
conclusion of the Metropolitan Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, and
Court of Appeals in the instant case regarding the issue raised in this petition
are consistent and backed up by the extant evidence. Prevailing jurisprudence
uniformly holds that findings of facts of the trial court, particularly when affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon this Court. [8]

All in all, the petition, viewed in its entirety, sorely fails to demonstrate any
reversible error committed by the respondent Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED for utter lack of merit. Double costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.