PEOPLE v. FREDDIE MURILLO
Pastor, the Court explained that while there is no definite
FACTS:
SPO2 Nieves received a report that Paz Abiera was missing. The
following day, Ramon Saraos, a barangay tanod, received a request
from Sarah Murillo, mother of appellant and Arlan Murillo, to
investigate a foul smell emanating from the house of Paz. Said house
was being shared by Paz and her two nephews, appellant and Arlan.
When they arrived at the house, they removed the toilet bowl and
opened the septic tank where they recovered parts of human arms and
legs. SPO2 Nieves later ordered that the two brothers be brought to
Block 6. After about 30 minutes, SPO2 Nieves received a call from the
radio saying that Freddie Murillo already admitted to having killed his
aunt Paz using a knife.
The RTC Parañaque found appellant Freddie Murillo guilty of the
crime of murder with the qualifying and/or generic aggravating
circumstances of treachery or alevosia and or evident premeditation
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death.
APPELLANT ‘SARGUMENT:
His plea of guilt was improvident since there was no indication that he
fully understood that the qualifying circumstances charged in the
information would result to the penalty of death.
ISSUE:
WON there was an improvident plea of guilt. – YES
RULING:
The SC held that there was an improvident plea of guilt that warrants
the remand of the case to the trial court.
Rule 116 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of
evidence. — When the accused pleads guilty to a capital
offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences
of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt
and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also
present evidence in his behalf.
Under the said rule, three things are required from the trial court
when a plea of guilty to a capital offense is entered:
(1) the court must conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness of the plea and the accused's full
comprehension of the consequences thereof;
(2) the court must require the prosecution to present
evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise
degree of his culpability; and
(3) the court must ask the accused if he desires to present
evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.
The searching inquiry referred to here means more than just
informing cursorily the accused that he faces jail term. The inquiry
must expound on the events that actually took place during the
arraignment, the words spoken and the warnings given, with special
attention to the age of the accused, his educational attainment and
socio-economic status as well as the manner of his arrest and detention,
the provision of counsel in his behalf during the custodial and
preliminary investigations, and the opportunity of his defense counsel
to confer with him.
The trial court must also explain to the accused the essential elements
of the crime he is charged with as well as its respective penalties and
civil liabilities. The exact length of imprisonment under the law and
the certainty that he will serve time at the national penitentiary or a
penal colony must be fully explained to the accused. The court must
also explain to the accused that once convicted, he could be meted the
death penalty and that it is a single and indivisible penalty that will be
imposed regardless of any mitigating circumstance that may have
attended the commission of the felony. The court must also direct a
series of questions to the defense counsel to determine whether he has
conferred with the accused and has completely explained to the latter
the meaning of a plea of guilt. This formula is mandatory and absent
any showing that it has been followed, a searching inquiry cannot
be said to have been undertaken.
In People vs.
and concrete rule as to how a trial judge must conduct a "searching
inquiry", the following guidelines should nevertheless be observed:
1. Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was
brought into the custody of the law; (b) whether he had the
assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and
preliminary investigations; and (c) under what conditions he
was detained and interrogated during the investigations. This
is intended to rule out the possibility that the accused has
been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by
actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent
quarters or simply because of the judge's intimidating robes.
2. Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether
he had conferred with, and completely explained to, the
accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty.
3. Elicit information about the personality profile of the
accused, such as his age, socio-economic status, and
educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy
index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of
guilty.
4. Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or
nature of the penalty under the law and the certainty that he
will serve such sentence. For not infrequently, an accused
pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad
advice or because of promises of the authorities or parties of
a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It
is the duty of the judge to ensure that the accused does not
labor under these mistaken impressions because a plea of
guilty carries with it not only the admission of authorship of
the crime proper but also of the aggravating circumstances
attending it, that increase punishment.
5. Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is
charged and fully explain to him the elements of the crime
which is the basis of his indictment. Failure of the court to
do so would constitute a violation of his fundamental right
to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation against
him and a denial of his right to due process.
6. All questions posed to the accused should be in a language
known and understood by the latter.
7. The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused in
pleading guilty, is truly guilty. The accused must be required
to narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or furnish its
missing details.
In the case at bar, records do not show that a searching inquiry was
ever conducted by the judge when appellant entered his plea of guilty.
Appellant was never asked about the circumstances of his arrest and
detention, not even when SPO2 Nieves himself in his testimony
mentioned that he ordered that the two brothers be brought to "Block
6" for questioning without the presence of counsel. Where or what kind
of place "Block 6" is, was not even explained by the witness neither
did the court nor the defense counsel ask the witness to clarify said
point. The Court also did not ask appellant about the circumstances of
his arraignment as well as his age and educational attainment. He was
also neither apprised of the consequences of his plea nor was it
explained to him that the penalty imposable for the crime attended by
its qualifying circumstances as alleged in the Information is death
regardless of the presence of mitigating circumstances.
Moreover, records show that defense counsel Atty. Dante O. Garin,
never cross-examined three of the four witnesses of the prosecution.
There is also no record anywhere that the defense counsel presented
evidence for the accused nor that the trial court even inform him of his
right to do so if he so desires.
As to whether the circumstances warrant a remand of the criminal case,
the Court has held that it must be shown that as a result of such
irregularity there was inadequate representation of facts by either the
prosecution or the defense during the trial. What justifies the remand
of the criminal case to the trial court is the unfairness or complete
miscarriage of justice in the handling of the proceedings a quo as
occasioned by the improvident plea of guilt.
 In this case, apart from the testimony of appellant, the prosecution
does not have any other evidence to hold him liable for the crime
charged. Hence, it is imperative to remand the case for the proper
arraignment and trial of the accused, considering not only the accused's
improvident plea of guilt but also his lawyer's neglect in representing
his cause.
PEOPLE v. PRINCE FRANCISCO y ZAFE
FACTS:
At the wake of one Sulpicio Go, the victim, Ramil, was sitting nearby
on a parked motorcycle talking to someone. Appellant then appeared
from behind and started stabbing Ramil using a knife.
Appellant was indicted for murder. During arraignment, appellant
pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. However, during the pre-trial
on March 4, 2003, he withdrew his former plea. Consequently, on the
same hearing, he was re-arraigned and he pleaded guilty.
Through the March 4, 2003 Order from the pre-trial proceeding, it was
shown that the RTC conducted searching questions to determine that
appellant voluntarily entered his guilty plea and that he understood its
consequences. The RTC further ordered the setting of the case for the
prosecution to adduce evidence proving the guilt of appellant beyond
reasonable doubt and to determine the degree of his culpability.
The RTC also found the evidence presented by the prosecution
sufficient to prove that appellant committed the crime charged
qualified by treachery.
The appellate court likewise found appellant guilty of the crime of
Murder. It held that, while there were no transcripts of stenographic
notes in the records pertaining to the searching inquiry conducted by
the RTC on March 4, 2003, still the prosecution was able to establish
the culpability of appellant by means of evidence independent of his
admission of guilt.
APPELLANT ‘SARGUMENT:
He assails the March 4, 2003 Order of the trial court as being
precipitate considering that the trial judge failed to ascertain the
voluntariness of his plea of guilt when he did not fully understand its
consequences and significance. He also maintains that he was not
given opportunity to present evidence.
ISSUE:
1. WON the RTC erred in convicting appellant of the crime of murder.
– NO
2. WON he was given opportunity to present evidence. - YES
RULING:
1. Section 3, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure pertinently provides:
Section 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of
evidence. — When the accused pleads guilty to a capital
offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences
of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt
and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may
present evidence in his behalf.
The indispensable requirement of searching inquiry was elucidated
in People v. Mangila:
To breathe life into this rule, we made it mandatory for trial
courts to do the following:
(1) conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness
and full comprehension of the consequences of the
accused's plea;
(2) require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused
and the precise degree of his culpability; and
(3) inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present
evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so if he so
desires. (Emphasis supplied.)
Moreover, the trial court must be satisfied that:
the accused has not been coerced or placed under a state of
duress either by actual threats or physical harm coming from
malevolent or avenging quarters, and this it can do either by
eliciting from the accused himself the manner in which he
has been brought into the custody of the law and whether he
had the assistance of competent counsel during the custodial
and preliminary investigations or by ascertaining from him
the conditions of his detention and interrogation during the
investigation.
It is also imperative that "a series of questions directed at defense
counsel on whether or not counsel has conferred with the accused and
has completely explained to him the meaning of a plea of guilt are well-
taken steps along those lines."
In People v. Bello, the Court explained that:
"A 'searching inquiry,' under the Rules, means more than
informing cursorily the accused that he faces a jail term but
so also, the exact length of imprisonment under the law and
the certainty that he will serve time at the national
penitentiary or a penal colony."
Lastly, it has been mandated that the accused or his or her counsel be
furnished with a copy of the complaint and the list of witnesses against
the accused.
It has to be made clear that the purpose of the searching inquiry is
"not only to satisfy the trial judge himself but also to aid the Supreme
Court in determining whether the accused really and truly understood
and comprehended the meaning, full significance and consequences of
his plea."
In the instant case, the records do not include any transcript of
stenographic notes pertaining to the searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the plea
of guilty made by appellant. The March 4, 2003 Order of the RTC
unequivocally demonstrates that the trial court conducted a searching
inquiry ascertaining the voluntariness and full comprehension of
appellant. However, the unavailability of the transcript of stenographic
notes does not necessarily connote that no searching inquiry was made
by the trial court. The trial court is entitled to the presumption of
regularity of performance of duty under Sec. 2 (m), Rule 131 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, absent any factual or legal
basis to disregard this presumption. The March 4, 2003 Order should
have been challenged within the reglementary period to prevent its
finality, if the contents were false or inaccurate, which appellant failed
to do.
Even assuming arguendo that there was no searching inquiry made,
still the ascribed error will not grant relief to appellant for belatedly
raising the issue for the first time on appeal. And most importantly, the
conviction of appellant was not made solely on his guilty plea —
improvident or not — but on the evidence adduced by the prosecution
proving beyond reasonable doubt appellant's culpability and liability
for murder. Consequently, even if his plea of guilt during the pre-trial
on March 4, 2003 be viewed as improvident, still appellant's conviction
for murder stands as duly proved by the prosecution.
Thus, the Court emphatically ruled in People v. Baun:
Where the trial court receives evidence to determine
precisely whether or not the accused has erred in admitting
his guilt, the manner in which the plea of guilty is
made (improvidently or not) loses legal significance, for
the simple reason that the conviction is based on the
evidence proving the commission by the accused of the
offense charged. (Emphasis supplied.)
The rule now stands, "even in cases in which the accused pleads
guilty to a capital offense, the prosecution is still required to present
evidence to prove his guilt and the precise degree of his culpability."
In other words, notwithstanding the plea of guilt, evidence must be
adduced to determine the precise participation of the accused in the
perpetuation of the capital offense — whether as principal,
accomplice, or accessory — as well as the presence or absence of
modifying circumstances. And "the accused may also present evidence
in his behalf" either to rebut the prosecution's evidence or to show the
presence of mitigating circumstances.
2. Appellant waived his right to present evidence
Under Sec. 3, Rule 116, the accused may present evidence in his
behalf — it is, therefore, not mandatory for the defense to present
evidence but is only accorded an opportunity to do so, which, in the
instant case, was waived by the defense.
Here, the defense chose not to present any witnesses which amounts to
a waiver to present evidence. This was not objected to by appellant.
Thus, there was an implied acquiescence on the part of appellant not
to present himself or other witnesses even though he was entitled to
present evidence to prove, inter alia, mitigating circumstances under
Sec. 3 of Rule 116.
Thus, issues raised for the first time on appeal are barred by estoppel
— arguments not raised in the original proceedings cannot be
considered on review.
PEOPLE v. ELPIDIO PASTOR
FACTS:
Accused-appellant was charged with the crime of Incestuous Rape. He
was arraigned and, with the assistance of PAO lawyer, entered a plea
of not guilty.
During the hearing, Atty. Damalerio of PAO manifested that accused-
appellant had decided to change his plea from Not Guilty to Guilty.
The trial court ordered that the previous plea of not guilty be set aside
and that accused-appellant be arraigned anew.
Upon re-arraignment, accused-appellant entered a plea of guilty to the
Information which was read and translated to him in the Visayan
dialect. Thereafter, the trial court propounded clarificatory questions
to accused-appellant to ascertain whether he understood the
consequences of his plea.
Accused-appellant then testified on the mitigating circumstances of
plea of guilty, voluntary surrender and drunkenness which is not
habitual. The prosecution admitted the plea of guilty and voluntary
surrender. Accused-appellant offered evidence to prove drunkenness.
The trial court rendered judgment finding accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of incestuous rape.
APPELLANT ‘SARGUMENT:
The trial court failed to conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the
accused-appellant's plea. Allegedly, the questions propounded to the
accused-appellant were limited to his family background and personal
circumstances.
ISSUE:
WON the case should be remanded for a full-blown trial. - YES
RULING:
Section 3, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides, viz:
"SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of
evidence. — When the accused pleads guilty to a capital
offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences
of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt
and the precise degree of his culpability. The accused may
present evidence in his behalf."
When a plea of guilty to a capital offense is entered, the trial court is
duty bound to:
(1) conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of the
plea and the accused's full comprehension of the
consequences thereof;
(2) require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the
guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability;
and
(3) inquire from the accused if he desires to present evidence
on his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.
I.
Anent the first requirement, the searching inquiry must determine
whether the plea of guilt was based on a free and informed judgment.
Hence, it must focus on (1) the voluntariness of the plea, and (2) the
full comprehension of the consequences of the plea. Although there is
no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge must conduct a
"searching inquiry," we have held that the following guidelines
should be observed:
1. Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was
brought into the custody of the law; (b) whether he had the
assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and
preliminary investigations; and (c) under what conditions he
was detained and interrogated during the investigations. This
is intended to rule out the possibility that the accused has
been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by
actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent
quarters or simply because of the judge's intimidating robes.
2. Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether
he had conferred with, and completely explained to, the
accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty.
3. Elicit information about the personality profile of the
accused, such as his age, socio-economic status, and
educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy
index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of
guilty.
4. Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or
nature of the penalty under the law and the certainty that he
will serve such sentence. For not infrequently, an accused
pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad
advice or because of promises of the authorities or parties of
a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It
is the duty of the judge to ensure that the accused does not
labor under these mistaken impressions because a plea of
guilty carries with it not only the admission of authorship of
the crime proper but also of the aggravating circumstances
attending it, that increase punishment.
5. Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is
charged and fully explain to him the elements of the crime
which is the basis of his indictment. Failure of the court to
do so would constitute a violation of his fundamental right
to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation against
him and a denial of his right to due process.
6. All questions posed to the accused should be in a language
known and understood by the latter.
7. The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused in
pleading guilty, is truly guilty. The accused must be required
to narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or furnish its
missing details.
In the case at bar, the records will show that the trial court miserably
failed to discharge its duty to conduct a "searching inquiry". The
questions propounded by the trial court failed to show the
voluntariness of the plea of guilt of accused-appellant nor did the
questions demonstrate that he fully understood the consequences of his
plea.
First, all the questions propounded by the court were couched in
English but there is nothing in the records to show that accused-
appellant had a good comprehension, or at least, a nodding
acquaintance with the English language. The records also do not show
whether the judge translated and explained his questions to accused-
appellant in a language or dialect known and understood by the
latter. Accused-appellant is a simple fisherman and his educational
background is unknown.
Second, the trial court failed to explain to accused-appellant the
elements of the crime of rape. Moreover, when the trial court asked
accused-appellant if he knew that by pleading guilty he may be
sentenced to a death penalty, the latter answered "I do not know what
will be the outcome of my pleading guilty, Your Honor." Given the
vagueness of accused-appellant's answer, the trial court went no further
to find out whether or not he fully comprehended the consequences of
his plea. In addition, accused-appellant was not categorically advised
that his plea of guilt would not under any circumstance affect or reduce
his sentence. When accused-appellant attempted to prove the
mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty, voluntary surrender and
drunkenness, he was under the mistaken assumption that his liability
would be reduced. He was not warned that the penalty of death is
indivisible and is not affected by either aggravating or mitigating
circumstances.
Third, when accused-appellant was questioned by the court as to the
act he committed, he answered that he "was led to think bad about my
daughter because my wife left me." Again, the answer is hardly
comprehensible yet, the court failed to probe deeper into the material
details of the crime.
We hold that in the absence of a "searching inquiry" into the
voluntariness of the plea of guilt of accused-appellant and his full
comprehension of the consequences thereof, the re-arraignment of
accused-appellant is fatally flawed.
II.
The second requirement prescribes that the trial court must order the
prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused-appellant and the precise
degree of his culpability beyond reasonable doubt. It must be stressed
that under the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, a conviction in
capital offenses cannot rest alone on a plea of guilt. The prosecution
evidence must be sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction
independently of the plea of guilty.
Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside if
such plea is the sole basis of the judgment. If, however, the trial court
relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused, the
conviction must be sustained, because then it is predicated not merely
on the guilty plea of the accused but on evidence proving his
commission of the offense charged.
In this case, the judge failed to state the factual and legal reasons on
which he based accused-appellant's conviction. There is no discussion
of the facts of the case and the qualifying circumstances alleged in the
information, in utter disregard of the constitutional injunction that "no
decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based." Moreover, there was practically no evidence presented to
prove force and intimidation as well as the relationship of accused-
appellant with complainant.
As held in the case of People vs. Alberto Chua, the mere fact that
accused-appellant is her father and therefore exercises moral
ascendancy over his daughter cannot ipso facto justify this Court to
conclude that the victim was intimidated. Since the relationship of
complainant to accused-appellant has not been sufficiently established,
it was error for the trial court to impose the penalty of death.
III.
Under the third requirement, the court must ask the accused if he
desires to present evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so if he
desires. In the present case, there is nothing in the records to show that
accused-appellant was informed, either by his counsel or by the court,
of his right to present evidence, if he so desires.
Very glaring is the manifest lack of enthusiasm of the defense counsel,
Atty. Damalerio, for his client's cause when he refused to cross
examine the complainant, on the pretext that accused-appellant has
pleaded guilty. This utter lack of concern is further aggravated by Atty.
Damalerio's lackadaisical and perfunctory discharge of his obligation
to present evidence in behalf of accused-appellant. After the
prosecution rested its case, Atty. Damalerio manifested that since the
accused-appellant had already pleaded guilty, he is not presenting any
defense, and merely prayed that his client be credited with the
mitigating circumstances earlier claimed by him. Hence, the SC held
that the case must be REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings.
PEOPLE v. SILVESTRE MATE y ABAD
FACTS:
An information was filed with the Circuit Criminal Court of Rizal
against Silvestre Mate y Abad, John Doe alias "Ben Almine Bohol",
Peter Doealias "Oscar" and Henry Doe alias "Doro" for the crime of
Kidnapping for Ransom with Murder and Frustrated Murder.
Upon arraignment, the accused Silvestre Mate pleaded guilty to the
charge of kidnapping for ransom with murder, and frustrated murder,
despite having been informed by the trial judge of the nature and
consequences of his plea and after having previously executed three
extrajudicial confessions narrating in detail how the crime was planned
and committed, whereby Martina Caldoza, the maid of the Butlers was
stabbed to death, Mrs. Caroline Butler was shot at the back which
could have caused her death were it not for timely medical intervention
and Susan Butler was carried away with the ransom money.
The trial court, before conducting hearings for the reception of
evidence, immediately convicted the accused of the crime charged and
sentenced him to death. Long after such conviction, the accused
testified as a witness for the prosecution against his co-accused in the
crime, Albino Bohol and affirmed the same narration of events
contained in his extra- judicial confessions.
APPELLANT ‘SARGUMENT:
The trial court committed a serious error in rendering judgment of
conviction immediately after Mate had pleaded guilty to the crime
charged on the basis of his plea of guilty and before receiving any
evidence.
ISSUE:
WON rendering judgment immediately after the accused had pleaded
guilty justifies the setting aside of the judgment of conviction. - NO
RULING:
While the trial court committed an error in rendering judgment
immediately after the accused had pleaded guilty, and, thereafter,
conducted hearings for the reception of the evidence for the
prosecution, such an irregularity, is insufficient to justify the setting
aside of the judgment of conviction, considering that it is supported by
the judicial and extra-judicial confessions of the accused and by other
evidence.
In the case of People vs. Dumdum, the Court held:
"The trial court committed an irregularity in pronouncing
judgment on the two accused in open court immediately after
they had pleaded guilty and then later on requiring the
prosecution to present evidence.
"However, the irregularity does not justify the setting aside
of the judgment of conviction which is supported by the
judicial and extra-judicial confessions of the accused and
other evidence."
Also, the confessions are all admissible against Mate because it
appears with clarity that he voluntarily and spontaneously gave those
narrations without compulsion from anybody. In fact, when he testified
against Bohol, he affirmed those narrations again.
PEOPLE v. ROGELIO GUMIMBA y MORADANTE and
RONTE ABABO (acquitted)
FACTS:
Appellant Rogelio Gumimba y Morandante and co-accused Ronie
Abapo were charged with the crime of rape with homicide of an eight
(8)-year old child. Both entered a plea of not guilty on arraignment.
Magallano and Arañas testified that at around 9 o'clock in the evening,
appellant went to Magallano's home and confessed to him that he alone
and by himself raped and killed his (appellant's) niece. Subsequently,
Magallano accompanied appellant to the residence of Arañas where he
reiterated his confession. Appellant repeated his narration and
confessed to the barangay captain that he had raped and killed the
victim, and that he was alone when he committed the crime. They then
turned him over to the police authorities.
Appellant manifested though counsel (before the court) that he would
like to change his earlier plea of not guilty to a plea of guilty. The RTC
ordered appellant's re-arraignment and the latter accordingly entered a
plea of guilty.
The prosecution continued with the presentation of its evidence in
chief. Before resting its case, the prosecution presented appellant as
witness against his co-accused Abapo. Appellant testified that he and
Abapo raped and killed the victim.
RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime as
charged. On the other hand, the trial court acquitted Abapo on the
ground that his guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE:
WON the RTC erred in convicting the accused-appellant. - NO
RULING:
Accordingly, a plea of guilty to such charges calls into play the
provisions of Section 3, Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, thus —
Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of
evidence. — When the accused pleads guilty to a capital
offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences
of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt
and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may
present evidence in his behalf.
Based on this rule, when a plea of guilty to a capital offense is entered,
there are three (3) conditions that the trial court must observe to obviate
an improvident plea of guilty by the accused:
(1) it must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness
and full comprehension by the accused of the consequences
of his plea;
(2) it must require the prosecution to present evidence to
prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his
culpability; and
(3) it must ask the accused whether he desires to present
evidence on his behalf, and allow him to do so if he so
desires.
In the instant case, when the accused entered a plea of guilty at his re-
arraignment, it is evident that the RTC did not strictly observe the
requirements under Section 3, Rule 116 above. A mere warning that
the accused faces the supreme penalty of death is insufficient.
Such procedure falls short of the exacting guidelines in the conduct of
a "searching inquiry," as follows:
1. Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was
brought into the custody of the law; (b) whether he had the
assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and
preliminary investigations; and (c) under what conditions he
was detained and interrogated during the investigations. This
is intended to rule out the possibility that the accused has
been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by
actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent
quarters or simply because of the judge's intimidating robes.
2. Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether
he had conferred with, and completely explained to, the
accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty.
3. Elicit information about the personality profile of the
accused, such as his age, socio-economic status, and
educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy
index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of
guilty.
4. Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or
nature of the penalty under the law and the certainty that he
will serve such sentence. For not infrequently, an accused
pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad
advice or because of promises of the authorities or parties of
a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It
is the duty of the judge to ensure that the accused does not
labor under these mistaken impressions because a plea of
guilty carries with it not only the admission of authorship of
the crime proper but also of the aggravating circumstances
attending it, that increase punishment.
5. Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is
charged and fully explain to him the elements of the crime
which is the basis of his indictment. Failure of the court to
do so would constitute a violation of his fundamental right
to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation against
him and a denial of his right to due process.
6. All questions posed to the accused should be in a language
known and understood by the latter.
7. The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused in
pleading guilty, is truly guilty. The accused must be required
to narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or furnish its
missing details.
The inefficacious plea of guilty notwithstanding, the totality of the
evidence for the prosecution undeniably establishes appellant's guilt
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide. Apart
from his testimony upon changing his plea to a plea of guilty, appellant
gave a subsequent testimony when he was presented by the prosecution
as a witness against his co-accused. This second testimony which
constitutes another judicial confession, replete with details and made
consciously as it was, cured the deficiencies which made his earlier
plea of guilty improvident.
While the trial court found appellant's second testimony insofar as it
implicated his co-accused to be unworthy of credence, there is
absolutely nothing on record which militates against its use as basis for
establishing appellant's guilt. In fact, in his Brief, appellant submits
that he must be convicted of simple rape alone and not rape with
homicide. Thus, he admits in writing, albeit implicitly, that he raped
the victim.
Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only
if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment. If the trial court relied on
sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused, the conviction
must be sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty
plea of the accused but on evidence proving his commission of the
offense charged.
As ruled in People v. Derilo:
As a rule, this Court has set aside convictions based on pleas
of guilty in capital offenses because of improvidence thereof
and when such plea is the sole basis of the condemnatory
judgment. However, where the trial court receives evidence
to determine precisely whether or not the accused has erred
in admitting his guilt, the manner in which the plea of guilty
is made (improvidently or not) loses legal significance, for
the simple reason that the conviction is based on evidence
proving the commission by the accused of the offense
charged.
Thus, even without considering the plea of guilty of
appellant, he may still be convicted if there is adequate
evidence on record on which to predicate his conviction. . . .
Here, the prosecution was able to establish, through the separate
testimonies of appellant, that Abapo raped the victim first. Thereafter,
appellant followed suit. Once they had finished with their dastardly
acts, they stabbed and killed the victim with a long bolo which
belonged to appellant. Moreover, through the testimony of the
physician who conducted the autopsy on AAA's body, it was
established that the victim had 6 and 12 o'clock lacerations on her
external genital organ. Thus, it is clear that the rape was consummated.
Thus, the finding of guilt as pronounced by the RTC and the Court of
Appeals should be sustained.