Consolidated Cases

1.
Arcaba vs Tabancura
Deed of Donation || Article 87 FC
 Francisco Comille and Zosima has a lot in Dipolog, Zamboanga Del Norte.
 Francisco created a deed of donation (a parcel of land) to Cirila, for her loyalty for 10 years as a house helper/ care giver.
 Nieces (respondents) the descendants filed for petition, that the deed of donation was not valid because Francisco and Cirilo cohabited with each
other.
 She denied that they had sexual intercourse. But document showed that she used the last name of Francisco whenshe applied for Business and
Sanitary Permits and she even signed Cirila Commille in the Death Certificate.
 RTC and CA ruled in favor of the Respondents.
ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by Francisco in Arcaba’s favor was valid.
HELD:
The court in this case considered a sufficient proof of common law relationship wherein donation is not valid. The conclusion was based on the testimony
of Tabancura and certain documents bearing the signature of “Cirila Comille” such as application for business permit, sanitary permit and the
death certificate of Francisco. Also, the fact that Cirila did not demand her wages is an indication that she was not simply a caregiver –
employee.
Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in sex at the very least,
cohabitation is a public assumption of men and women holding themselves out to the public as such.
Hence, the deed of donation by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.
“Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the
spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife without
a valid marriage.”
2. San Luis vs San Luis

Article 26 Family Code, Article 140 (CPG) and 148 (Coownership)
 Felicimo had 3 marriages. 1st marriage he had 6 children, she died and after 5 years he remarried Mary Lee, a US Citizen, in Hawaii. They had
one son. Mary lee filed a divorce and was finalized in 1973.
 After a year he married Felicidad Sagalongos in US. They lived in Alabang, Muntinlupa City. He was the elected Governor in the Province of
Laguna.
 He died after 18 years. Felicidad executed a letter of administration and respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets
and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. She filed the petition in the RTC of Makati City.
 Children by 1st marriage filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of :
o Improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been
filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death.
o He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the
latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) Trial Court: denied the motion to dismiss, ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition and that
venue was properly laid. Mila filed a motion for inhibition against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. Thus, a new trial ensued.
(2) Trial Court (new): dismissed the petition for letters of administration.
o It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition
should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City.
o It found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind
Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would
impair the vested rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate children.
(3) CA: reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court
o Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term "place of residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person as
distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he
actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of administration was properly filed in Makati City.
o Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn
v. Romillo, Jr (Genesis of Article 26 par2 of the FC)
ISSUES:
(1) Whether venue was properly laid
(2) Whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s marriage to
Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.
(3) Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration.
RULING:
(1) Yes, the venue was proper. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed
in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death."
For purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place
of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. While petitioners
established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up
to the time of his death. From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of his estate.
(2) Yes. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently,
the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a
divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers
codified the law already established through judicial precedent.
The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to
file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of
the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A.
With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the
annotated text of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated
in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved. Therefore, this case should be remanded
to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and
Felicisimo.
(3) Yes. Respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as
his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the
subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their
joint efforts during their cohabitation.
3. Uy vs. CA , November 29, 2000

Article 124 of FC||
FACTS:
 Dr. Ernesto Jardelaza suffered stroke that rendered him comatose. Gilda, wife of the latter, filed a petition in RTC Iloilo to be allowed as sole
administrator of their conjugal property and be authorized to sell the same as her husband is physically incapacitated to discharge his functions.
 She further contest that such illness of the husband necessitated expenses that would require her to sell their property in Lot 4291 and its
improvement to meet such necessities.
 RTC ruled in favor of Gilda contending that such decision is pursuant to Article 124 of FC and that the proceedings thereon are governed by the
rules on summary proceedings.
 The son of the spouses, Teodoro, filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the petition made by her mother was essentially a petition for
guardianship of the person and properties of his father. As such it cannot be prosecuted in accordance with the provisions on summary
proceedings instead it should follows the rules governing special proceedings in the Revised Rules of Court requiring procedural due
process particularly the need for notice and a hearing on the merits.
 He further reiterated that Chapter 2 of the FC comes under the heading on “Separation in Fact Between Husband and Wife” contemplating a
situation where both spouses are of disposing mind. Hence, he argued that this should not be applied in their case.
 During the pendency of the motion, Gilda sold the property to her daughter and son in law. Upon the appeal by Teodoro, CA reversed the
decision of the lower court.
ISSUE: WON Gilda as the wife of a husband who suffered stroke, a cerebrovascular accident rendering him comatose, without motor and mental faculties,
may assume sole powers of administration of the conjugal property and dispose a parcel of land with improvements.
HELD:
SC ruled in favor of Teodoro. The rule on summary proceedings does not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or
incompetent to give consent.
In this case, trial court found that subject spouse was incompetent who was in a comatose condition and with a diagnosis of brain stem infract. Hence, the
proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court. The law provides that wife who assumes sole powers of
administration has the same powers and duties as a guardian. Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as administrator of the conjugal
property, must observe the procedure for the sale of the ward’s estate required of judicial guardians, and not the summary judicial proceedings
under FC. SC further held that such incapacity of the trial court to provide for an opportunity to be heard is null and void on the ground of lack of due
process.
4. Tarrosa , DeLeon v. De Leon, July 23, 2009

FACTS:
 On July 20, 1965, Bonifacio De Leon, then single, and the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC) entered into a Conditional
Contract to Sell for the purchase on installment of a lot situated in Quezon City.
 On April 24, 1968, Bonifacio married Anita de Leon. They had two children, Danilo and Vilma.
 On June 22, 1970, PHHC executed a Final Deed of Sale in favor of Bonifacio upon full payment of the price of the lot. TCT was issued on
February 24, 1972 in the name of Bonifacio, “single.”
 On January 12, 1974, Bonifacio sold the lot to his sister, Lita, and her husband, Felix Tarrosa. The Deed of Sale did not bear the written
consent and signature of Anita. On February 29, 1996, Bonifacio died.
 Three months later, Tarrosa spouses registered the Deed of Sale. Anita, Danilo, and Vilma filed a reconveyance suit allegeing that Bonifacio
was still the owner of the lands.
 Tarrosa spouses averred that the lot Bonifacio sold to them was his exclusive property because he was still single when he acquired it from
PHHC. They further alleged that they were not aware of the marriage between Bonifacio and Anita at the time of the execution of the Deed of
Sale.
 The RTC ruled in favor of Anita De Leon et al stating that the lot in question was the conjugal property of Bonifacio and Anita. The CA affirmed
the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
W/N the property that Bonifacio has purchased on installment before the marriage although some installments were paid during the marriage would be
considered conjugal property
HELD:
Yes. The subject lot which was once owned by PHHC and covered by the Conditional Contract to Sell was only transferred during the marriage of Bonifacio
and Anita. The title to the property was only passed to Bonifacio after he had fully paid the purchase price on June 22, 1970. This full payment was made
more than 2 years after his marriage to Anita on April 24, 1968. In effect, the property was acquired during the existence of the marriage. Hence,
ownership to the property is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership.
5. Dela Cruz vs Dela Cruz 130 Phil 324

Article 178 and Article 127 of the Family Code
178 of the new Civil Code which read: "The separation in fact between husband and wife without judicial approval, shall not affect the conjugal partnership,
except that . . . if the husband has abandoned the wife without just cause for at least one year, she may petition the court for a receivership, or
administration by her of the conjugal partnership property, or separation of property".
FACTS:
 The plaintiff and the defendant were married in Bacolod City on February 1, 1938, with 6 children. During their coverture they acquired
properties, varied business ventures which all are registered under their names. They are indebted to Philippine National Bank and the
Development Bank of the Philippines.
 The plaintiff Estrella de la Cruz filed a complaint on July 22, 1958 with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, alleging in essence
that her husband, the defendant Severino de la Cruz, had not only abandoned her but as well was mismanaging their conjugal partnership
properties, and praying for (1) separation of property, (2) monthly support of P2,500 during the pendency of the action, and (3) payment of
P20,000 as attorney's fees, and costs.
 Defendant argued that he did not abandon his wife but admitted they live separately when he transferred his sleeping quarters to his
office, his intention was not, as it never has been, to abandon his wife and children, but only to teach her a lesson as she was
quarrelsome and extremely jealous of every woman. From the time he started living separately in Mandalagan up to the filing of the
complaint, the plaintiff herself furnished him food and took care of his laundry, and that he never maintained a mistress. He has also never
failed to give them financial support. Defendant channeled devoted his time to the management of their properties.
 Trial court rendered judgment ordering separation and division of the conjugal assets. CA certified the case to SC with conjugal asset over
500,000.
ISSUES:
1. Did the separation of the defendant from the plaintiff constitute abandonment in law that would justify a separation of the conjugal partnership properties
2. Was the defendant's failure and/or refusal to inform the plaintiff of the state of their business enterprises such an abuse of his powers of administration
of the conjugal partnership as to warrant a division of the matrimonial assets?
RULING:
1. No. The fact that the defendant never ceased to give support to his wife and children negatives any intent on his part not to return to the conjugal abode
and resume his marital duties and rights.
2. No. For "abuse" to exist, it is not enough that the husband perform an act or acts prejudicial to the wife. Nor is it sufficient that he commits acts injurious
to the partnership, for these may be the result of mere inefficient or negligent administration. Abuse connotes willful and utter disregard of the interests of
the partnership, evidenced by a repetition of deliberate acts and/or omissions prejudicial to the latter. If there is only physical separation between the
spouses (and nothing more), engendered by the husband's leaving the conjugal abode, but the husband continues to manage the conjugal properties with
the same zeal, industry, and efficiency as he did prior to the separation, and religiously gives support to his wife and children, as in the case at bar, we are
not disposed to grant the wife's petition for separation of property.
Decree on separation of the conjugal properties, is reversed and set aside.
6. BA Finance Corp vs CA
Article 161 of the Civil Code/ Article 121 in the FC.
Facts:
 Augusto Yulo, applied for a Loan to BA Finance Corp, the amt of 591,003. He gave a promissory note, as a representative of AL Industries, with a
special power of Atty signed by his wife, Lily Yulo, who is the owner of the company.
 2 mos before the loan was given, Augusto already left the conjugal home. He was not able to pay the loan.
 Petitioner filed a motion for writ of attachment alleging that spouses were guilty of fraud with execution of Deed of Assignment assigning the
rights, titles and interests over a construction contract executed by and between the spouses and A. Soriano Corporation.
 The trial court issued the writ of attachment prayed for thereby enabling the petitioner to attach the properties of A & L Industries. .
Apparently not contented with the order, the petitioner filed another motion for the examination of attachment debtor, alleging that
the properties attached by the sheriff were not sufficient to secure the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered by it in the case.
This was likewise granted by the court.
 Private respondent Lily Yulo filed her answer with counterclaim, alleging that although Augusta Yulo and she are husband and wife, the
former had abandoned her and their children five (5) months before the filing of the complaint; that they were already separated when the
promissory note was executed; that her signature in the special power of attorney was forged because she had never authorized
Augusto Yulo in any capacity to transact any business for and in behalf of A & L Industries, which is owned by her as a single proprietor, that
she never got a single centavo from the proceeds of the loan mentioned in the promissory note; and that as a result of the illegal attachment of
her properties, which constituted the assets of the A & L Industries, the latter closed its business and was taken over by the new owner.
 RTC ruled to dismissed AL Industries and Lilly from the liability and ordered Petitioner to pay Lily for actual damages and unrealized profits,
exemplary damages and atty fees.
 CA affirmed RTCs ruling.
ISSUE: WON A&L Industries can be held liable for the obligations contracted by the husband.
HELD:
A&L Industries is a single proprietorship, whose registered owner is Lily Yulo. The said proprietorship was established during the marriage and assets were
also acquired during the same. Hence, it is presumed that the property forms part of the conjugal partnership of the spouses and be held liable for the
obligations contracted by the husband. However, for the property to be liable, the obligation contracted by the husband must have redounded to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership. The obligation was contracted by Augusto for his own benefit because at the time he incurred such obligation, he had
already abandoned his family and left their conjugal home
He likewise made it appear that he was duly authorized by his wife in behalf of the company to procure such loan from the petitioner. Clearly, there must
be the requisite showing that some advantage accrued to the welfare of the spouses.
Thus, the Court ruled that petitioner cannot enforce the obligation contracted by Augusto against his conjugal properties with Lily. Furthermore, the writ of
attachment cannot be issued against the said properties and that the petitioner is ordered to pay Lily actual damages amouting to P660,000.00.
7. Johnson & Johnson vs CA

Article 161 of the Civil Code/ Article 121 in the FC.
Facts:
 Delilah Vinluan purchased products from petitioner for her retail business under the name of “Vinluan Enterprises” incurring an obligation of
P235,880.89 for which she issued seven checks of varying amounts and due dates that bounced and were dishonored for having been drawn
against insufficient funds.
 Partial payments were made after several demands. When no further payments were made to settle the obligation, J&J filed a complaint against
the spouses for collection of the principal obligation plus interest with damages.
 RTC rendered decision in favor of J&J and found that there was no “privity of contract between J&J and defendant husband Alejo
Vinluan regarding the obligations incurred by the wife”.
 Husband was made a co-owner of the enterprise after the obligation involved in this action has been incurred.
 The court then issued a writ of execution directing the sheriff to execute judgment on the properties of the wife. However, the 2 notices of
levy on execution covered not only her exclusive paraphernal properties but also the properties of the conjugal partnership of the
spouses.
 This led the husband to file a third-party claim seeking the lifting of the levy on the conjugal properties.
 Trial court denied the third-party claim since Alejo’s consent became evident when he did not seek the intervention of the Court to air his
objections in his wife’s engaging business coupled by the fact that he made several representations for the settlement of his wife’s account. Thus,
even his own capital may be liable aside from the conjugal and paraphernal property.
 Private respondent elevated the matter to CA, charging the trial court with grave abuse of discretion for effectively reversing its own final
judgment. CA upheld private respondent. Hence this petition by J&J.
ISSUE: WON a husband may be held liable for the debts incurred by his wife without his consent and did not benefit the conjugal partnership?
HELD:
SC held that respondent court correctly ruled that the trial court cannot, in the guise of deciding the third-party claim, reverse its final decision.
Only the wife and her paraphernal property can be held liable. And since the power of the execution of judgment extends only to properties belonging to
the judgment debtor alone, the conjugal property and the capital of the husband cannot be levied upon.
In any event that Delilah’s paraphernal properties are insufficient, in order to bind the conjugal partnership properties, the debts and obligations contracted
by either the husband or the wife must be for the benefit of the conjugal partnership and that the husband must consent to his wife’s engaging
in business. The respondent court already found that the husband did not give his consent neither did the obligation incurred by the wife redound to the
benefit of the family.
'Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the
conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.’
8. Villanueva vs. IAC Case Digest
Article 148 of Civil Code
Article 109 of Family Code
Facts:
 1952 Spouses Graciano Aranas and Nicolasa Bunsa owned a parcel of land in Capiz/ inherited this land.
 After they died, their surviving children, Modesto and Federico Aranas adjudicated the land to themselves under a deed of extrajudicial partition.
 Modesto Aranas obtained a Torrens title in his name from the Capiz Registry of Property. Modesto was married to Victoria Comorro but they had
no children.
 After the death of Modesto, his two surviving illegitimate children named Dorothea and Teodoro borrowed P18,000 from Jesus Bernas. As
a security they mortgaged to Bernas their father’s property. In the loan agreement executed between the parties, a relative Raymundo Aranas,
signed the agreement as a witness.Dorothea and Teodoro failed to pay their loan.
 As a result, Bernas caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage and acquired the land at the auction sale as the highest bidder.
 About a month later, Consolacion Villanueva and Raymundo Aranas filed a complaint against spouses Bernas praying that the property entered in
the loan agreement be cancelled and they be declared co-owners of the land.
 They ground their cause of action upon their alleged discovery on two wills executed by Modesto Aranas and his wife Victoria. Victoria’s will
stated that her interests, rights and properties, real and personal as her share from the conjugal partnership be bequeathed to Consolacion
and Raymundo and also to Dorothea and Teodoro in equal shares. Modesto’s will, on the other hand, bequeathed to his two
illegitimate children all his interest in his conjugal partnership with Victoria as well as his own capital property brought by him to his marriage.
 RTC rendered in favor of the defendants (spouses Bernas) and against the plaintiffs. CA affirmed RTCs ruling.
Issue:
Whether or not the property mortgaged be a conjugal property of the spouses Modesto and Victoria.
Ruling:
Even if it be assumed that the husband’s acquisition by succession of the lot in question took place during his marriage, the lot would nonetheless be his
“exclusive property” because it was acquired by him “during the marriage by lucrative title”.
Certain it is that the land itself, which Modesto had inherited from his parents, Graciano and Nicolasa, is his exclusive and private property. The
property should be regarded as his own exclusively, as a matter of law, by will it was bequeathed to his illegitimate children.
9. BPI vs Posadas 56 Phil 215

FACTS:
 -The estate of Adolphe Oscar Schuetze is the sole beneficiary named in the life-insurance policy for $10,000, issued by the Sun Life Assurance
Company of Canada on January 14, 1913.
 The record shows that the deceased Adolphe Oscar Schuetze married the plaintiff-appellant Rosario Gelano on January 16, 1914.
o Bank of the Philippine Islands, was appointed administrator of the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze's testamentary estate by an order dated
March 24, 1928, entered by the Court of First Instance of Manila. On July 13, 1928, the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada,
whose main office is in Montreal, Canada, paid Rosario Gelano Vda. de Schuetze upon her arrival at Manila, the sum of P20,150,
which was the amount of the insurance policy on the life of said deceased, payable to the latter's estate.
 On the same date Rosario Gelano Vda. de Schuetze delivered the money to said Bank of the Philippine Islands, as administrator of the deceased's
estate, which entered it in the inventory of the testamentary estate, and then returned the money to said widow.
 The present complaint seeks to recover from the defendant Juan Posadas, Jr., Collector of Internal Revenue, the amount of P1,209 paid by
the plaintiff under protest, in its capacity of administrator of the estate of the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze, as inheritance tax upon the sum
of P20,150, which is the amount of an insurance policy on the deceased's life, wherein his own estate was named the beneficiary.
 Lower Court ruled in favor of the defendant under Section 1536 of the Administrative Code
SEC. 1536. Conditions and rate of taxation. — Every transmission by virtue of inheritance, devise, bequest, gift mortis causa or advance in
anticipation of inheritance, devise, or bequest of real property located in the Philippine Islands and real rights in such property; of any franchise
which must be exercised in the Philippine Islands; of any shares, obligations, or bonds issued by any corporation or sociedad anonima organized
or constituted in the Philippine Islands in accordance with its laws; of any shares or rights in any partnership, business or industry established in
the Philippine Islands or of any personal property located in the Philippine Islands shall be subject to the following tax:
ISSUE:
WON the proceeds of a life-insurance policy is subject to inheritance tax.
RULING:
By virtue of the foregoing, we are of opinion and so hold:
(1) That the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the insured's estate, on which the premiums were paid by the conjugal partnership, constitute
community property, and belong one-half to the husband and the other half to the wife, exclusively;
(2) that if the premiums were paid partly with paraphernal and partly conjugal funds, the proceeds are likewise in like proportion paraphernal in part and
conjugal in part; and
(3) that the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the insured's estate as the beneficiary, if delivered to the testamentary administrator of the former
as part of the assets of said estate under probate administration, are subject to the inheritance tax according to the law on the matter, if they belong to the
assured exclusively, and it is immaterial that the insured was domiciled in these Islands or outside.
CA decision is reversed. Defendant is ordered to return ½ of the tax collected upon the amount of P20,150, being the proceeds of the insurance
policy on the life of the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze, after deducting the proportional part corresponding to the first premium.
10. Wong vs IAC

GR No. 70082, August 19, 1991
Article 121 FC
FACTS:
 Romario Henson married Katrina on January 1964. They had 3 children however, even during the early years of their marriage, the spouses had
been most of the time been living separately.
 During the marriage or on about January 1971, the husband bought a parcel of land in Angeles from his father using the money borrowed from
an officemate.
 Sometime in June 1972, Katrina entered an agreement with Anita Chan where the latter consigned the former pieces of jewelry valued at
P321,830.95. Katrina failed to return the same within the 20 day period thus Anita demanded payment of their value.
 Katrina issued in September 1972, check which was dishonored due to lack of funds.
 The spouses Anita Chan and Ricky Wong filed action for collection of the sum of money against Katrina and her husband Romarico. The reply
with counterclaim filed was only in behalf of Katrina.
 Trial court ruled in favor of the Wongs then a writ of execution was thereafter issued upon the 4 lots in Angeles City all in the name of
Romarico Henson married to Katrina Henson. 2 of the lots were sold at public auction to Juanito Santos and the other two with Leonardo
Joson. A month before such redemption, Romarico filed an action for annulment of the decision including the writ and levy of execution.
 RTC ruled in favor of the Wong’s and CA affirmed lower court’s decision.
ISSUE: WON debt of the wife without the knowledge of the husband can be satisfied through the conjugal property.
HELD:
The spouses had in fact been separated when the wife entered into the business deal with Anita. The husband had nothing to do with the business
transactions of Katrina nor authorized her to enter into such.
The properties in Angeles were acquired during the marriage with unclear proof where the husband obtained the money to repay the loan. Hence, it is
presumed to belong in the conjugal partnership in the absence of proof that they are exclusive property of the husband and even though they had been
living separately. A wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things necessary for support of the family. The writ
of execution cannot be issued against Romarico and the execution of judgments extends only over properties belonging to the judgment
debtor.
The conjugal properties cannot answer for Katrina’s obligations as she exclusively incurred the latter without the consent of her husband nor they did
redound to the benefit of the family. There was also no evidence submitted that the administration of the partnership had been transferred to Katrina by
Romarico before said obligations were incurred. In as much as the decision was void only in so far as Romarico and the conjugal properties concerned,
Spouses Wong may still execute the debt against Katrina, personally and exclusively.
11. Carlos vs Abelardo
GR No. 146504, April 4, 2002
Article 121 | CPG FC
FACTS:
 Honorio Carlos filed a petition against Manuel Abelardo, his son-in-law for recovery of the $25,000 loan used to purchase a house and lot located
at Paranaque.
 Spouses loaned $25,000 from petitioner. It was in October 1989 when the petitioner issued a check worth as such to assist the spouses in
conducting their married life independently. Years after they did not pay. Thereafter the husband, son in law, sent threats against petitioner.
 In 1994, petitioner made a formal demand but the spouses failed to comply with the obligation.
 Spouses, who were already living separately, filed their responses separately. Abelardo contended that the amount was never intended as a loan
but his share of income on contracts obtained by him in the construction firm and that the petitoner could have easily deducted the debt from his
share in the profits.
 RTC’s decision was in favor of the petitioner, however CA reversed and set aside trial court’s decision for insufficiency of evidence. Evidently,
there was a check issued worth $25,000 paid to the owner of the Paranaque property which became the conjugal dwelling of the spouses. The
wife executed an instrument acknowledging the loan but Abelardo did not sign.
ISSUE: WON a loan obtained to purchase the conjugal dwelling can be charged against the conjugal partnership.
HELD:
Yes, as it has redounded to the benefit of the family. They did not deny that the same served as their conjugal home thus benefiting the family. Hence,
the spouses are jointly and severally liable in the payment of the loan. Abelardo’s contention that it is not a loan rather a profit share in the construction
firm is untenable since there was no proof that he was part of the stockholders that will entitle him to the profits and income of the company.
Hence, the petition was granted and Abelardo is ordered to pay the petitioner in the amount of $25,000 plus legal interest including moral and exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees.
12. CHING vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 124642 February 23, 2004
Facts
 On September 1978, Philippine Blooming Mills Company (PBMCI) obtained a 9-millionpeso loan from Allied Banking Corporation (ABC).
 Alfredo Ching ( Exec Vice Pres of PBMCI) together with two other persons executed a continuing guarantee with ABC binding themselves jointly
and severally liable for the PBMCI obligations. The extent of their guarantee is up to 38 million pesos.
 PBMCI failed to settle the loans which amounted to P12,612,972.88 (exclusive of interests, penalties and other bank charges.)
 Together with the writ of preliminary attachment, the sheriff levied (seized)the 100,000 common shares of City Corporation stocks registered
solely to Alfredo Ching.
 Mrs.Ching filed a petition to set aside the levy of the 100,000 common shares. According to her, the shares were purchased out of the conjugal
funds. She also argued that the loan of PBMCI did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership (or family).
 RTC ruled in favor of the Plaintiff after several motions. CA reversed RTC’s assailed decision and ordered for the wri of attachment, stating the Mrs
Ching is not a party of the case hence she has no right of action.
Issue:
Whether or not the argument of Mrs. Ching is tenable.
Ruling:
Yes. ABC has the burden of proof to show that the common shares registered solely to the name of Alfredo Ching were owned by the latter. Just because
Mr. Ching‘s name appeared as the sole registrant of the shares in the corporate books of CityCorp, that doesn‘t mean that it is his exclusive property and
not to the conjugal partnership. As held in the case of Ayala Investment and Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, the court said that ―signing
as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession. It is not embarking in a business.‖
For the conjugal partnership to become liable, it is important to show that the family received benefits and advantages from the liability incurred. There is
no presumption that when a husband entered into an accommodation agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would be benefited. The
benefits must be those directly resulting from the loan.
Therefore, Mr. Alfredo Ching‘s common shares must not be levied because he is not the sole owner of such stocks. The shares belong to the conjugal
partnership.Under Article 121 of the Family Code.
Article 161(1) of the New Civil Code (now Article 121[2 and 3]60 of the Family Code of the Philippines) provides:
Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
(1) All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same
purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership.
Continuing Guarantee Comprehensive Surety- CGCS.
13. ROBERTO and VENUS BUADO vs COURT OF APPEALS and ROMULO NICOL
G.R. No. 145222 April 24, 2009
FACTS:
 Mr. and Mrs. Buado filed a civil case against Erlinda Nicol (Slander Criminal case where she was ordered to pay damages)
 The personal properties of Erlinda were insufficient to pay the damages.
 The sheriff levied and auctioned the property of Erlinda. An auction sale was held with the petitioners as the highest bidder. A certificate of
sale was issued in favor of Mr.and Mrs. Buado.
 After almost one year, the husband of Erlinda, Romulo Nicol, filed a complaint for the annulment of certificate of sale and damages with
preliminary injunction against petitioners and deputy sheriff.
 He argued that there was no proper publication and posting for the auction sale. He also claimed that the judgment obligation of Erlinda Nicol
amounted to P40,000 only. The spouses Buado obtained the P500,000 worth of property for only P51,685.
 The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition of Romulo Nicol.
As correctly pointed out by the defendants, any flaw in the implementation of the writ of execution by the implementing sheriff must be brought
before the court issuing the writ of execution. Besides, there are two (2) remedies open to the plaintiff, if he feels that the property being levied
on belongs to him and not to the judgment debtor. The first remedy is to file a third-party claim. If he fails to do this, a right is reserved to him to
vindicate his claim over the property by any proper action. But certainly, this is not the proper action reserved to the plaintiff to vindicate his claim
over the property in question to be ventilated before this court. As earlier stated, this case should have been addressed to Branch 19, RTC Bacoor
as it was that court which issued the writ of execution.6
 The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and held that Branch 21 has jurisdiction to act on the complaint filed by the respondent in
this case.
 The petitioners filed a petition where they said that the Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion for reversing the decision given by
the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the obligation of Erlinda Nicol arising from her criminal liability is chargeable to the conjugal partnership.
HELD:
NO. Erlinda Nicol‟s liability is not chargeable to the conjugal partnership. Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by either
spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of
the debtor-spouse, the same advantage is not accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains.
The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments for the liability of the debtor-spouse.Petitioners argue that the obligation of the
wife arising from her criminal liability is chargeable to the conjugal partnership.The Supreme Court does not agree to the contention of Mr. and Mrs.
Buado.In Guadalupe v. Tronco, this Court held that the car which was claimed by the third party complainant to be conjugalproperty was being levied upon
to enforce "a judgment for support" filed by a third person, the third-party claim of the wifeis proper since the obligation which is personal to the husband is
chargeable not on the conjugal property but on hisseparate property. Hence, the filing of a separate action by Romulo Nicol was proper.The decision of the
Court of Appeals is affirmed.
14. EUSTAQUIO MALLILIN, JR., vs. MA. ELVIRA CASTILLO
G.R. No. 136803 June 16, 2000 [Article 148-Property Regime of Bigamous Marriage]
FACTS:
 Mallilin and Castillo cohabited together while their respective marriage still subsisted.
 During their union, they set up Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation. The business flourished and the couple acquired real and personal
properties which were registered solely in Castillo's name.
 Due to irreconcilable differences, the couple separated.
 Mallilin filed a complaint for partition and/or payment of Co-ownership share, accounting and damages against Castillo.
 Castillo, in her answer, alleged that co-ownership could not exist between them because according to Article 144 of the Civil Code, rules on co-
ownership shall govern the properties acquired by a man and a woman living together as husband and wife but not married, they are not
capacitated to marry each other because of their valid subsisting marriage.
 She claimed to be the exclusive owner of all real and personal properties involved in Mallilin's action of partition on the ground that they were
acquired entirely out of her own money and registered solely in her name.
ISSUE:
Whether or not co-ownership exists between them.
RULING:
Yes. Co-ownership exists between Mallilin and Castillo even though they are incapacitated to marry each other. Article 144 of the Civil Code does not
cover parties living in an adulterous relationship. Their property regime falls under Article 148 of the Family Code where co-ownership is limited,
properties acquired by them through their joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
contributions which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal.
15. Francisco vs Master Iron Works

GR. No. 151967, February 16, 2005
FACTS:
 Josefina Castillo was 24 years old when she and Eduardo Francisco got married on January 1983.
 The latter was then employed as Vice President in a Private Corporation.
 During her marriage, Josefina acquired two parcels of land where Imus Bank executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Josefina.
 An affidavit of waiver was executed by Eduardo where he declared that prior to his marriage with Josefina, the latter purchased the land with her
own savings and that he waived whatever claims he had over the property.
 When Josefina mortgaged the property for a loan, Eduardo affixed his marital conformity to the deed.
 In 1990, Eduardo who was then a General Manager, bought bags of cement from defendant but failed to pay the same. The latter filed a
complaint for recovery and trial court rendered judgment against Eduardo.
 The court then issued a writ of execution and the sheriif issued a notice of levy on execution over the alleged property of Josefina for the recovery
of the balance of the amount due under the decision of the trial court.
 Petitioner filed a third party claim over the 2 parcels of land in which she claimed as her paraphernal property. Also she filed an annulment on the
ground that when they were married on January 15, 1983, Eduardo was already married to one Carmelita Carpio (case annulled- bigamous
marriage), to which RTC dismissed case in favor of the plaintiff.
 CA reversed decision of RTC, ruling that property was part of the Conjugal Partnership.
ISSUE: WON the subject property is the conjugal property of Josefina and Eduardo.
HELD:
The Court ruled that petitioner failed to prove that she acquired the property with her personal funds before her cohabitation with Eduardo and that she was
the sole owner. The Deed of Absolute Sale on record showed it was issued after her marriage. Their case fall under Article 148 and since they got married
before the Family Code, the provision, pursuant to Art 256, can be applied retroactively if it does not prejudice vested rights. Petitioner likewise failed that
she had any vested right.
Where the parties are in a void marriage due to a legal impediment that invalidates such marriage, Art 148 should be applied. In the absence of proof that
the wife/husband has actually contributed money, property, or industry to the properties acquired during such union the presumption of co-ownership will
not arise.
The petition was denied for lack of merit. The decision of CA that the property was conjugal was affirmed.
16. Abing vs Waeyan Digest

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through
their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and
of the household.
Facts:
In 1986, John Abing and Juliet Waeyan cohabited as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. Together, they bought a 2-storey residential
house. In December 1991, Juliet left for Korea and worked thereat, sending money to John which the latter deposited in their joint account. In 1992,
their house was renovated and to it was annex a structure which housed a sari-sari store. In 1994, Juliet returned.
In 1995, they decided to partition their properties as their relationship soured. They executed a Memorandum of Agreement. Unfortunately,
the document was left unsigned by the parties although signed by the witnesses thereto. Under their unsigned agreement, John shall leave the
dwelling with Juliet paying him the amountof P428,870.00 representing John's share in all their properties. Juliet paid John the sum of P232,397.66 by way
of partial payment of his share, with the balance of P196,472.34 to be paid by Juliet in twelve monthly installment.
Juliet, however, failed to make good the balance. John demanded Juliet to vacate the annex structure. Juliet refused, prompting John to file an
ejectment suit against her. John alleged that he alone spent for the construction of the annex structure with his own funds and thru the money he
borrowed from his relatives. He added that the tax declaration for the structure was under his name.
-MTC ruled in favor of John. But CA reversed MTC, John’s evidence failed to provide evidence that the annex was constructed using John’s money.
Issue: Does John exclusively own the property subject of the suit?
Held:
No. Other than John's bare allegation that he alone, thru his own funds and money he borrowed from his relatives, spent for the construction of the annex
structure, evidence is wanting to support such naked claim.
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through
their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and
of the household.
The law is clear. In the absence of proofs to the contrary, any property acquired by common-law spouses during their period of cohabitation is presumed to
have been obtained thru their joint efforts and is owned by them in equal shares. Their property relationship is governed by the rules on co-ownership. And
under this regime, they owned their properties in common "in equal shares."
Being herself a co-owner, Juliet may not be ejected from the structure in question. She is as much entitled to enjoy its possession and ownership
as John. Juliet's failure to pay John the balance of the latter's share in their common properties could at best give rise to an action for a sum of money
against Juliet, or for rescission of the said agreement and not for ejectment. (John Abing vs Juliet Waeyan, G.R. NO. 146294, July 31, 2006)
17. Tumlos vs Fernandez

GR No. 137650, April 12, 2000
FACTS:
Mario and Lourdes Fernandez were plaintiffs in an action for ejectment filed against Guillerma, Gina and Toto Tumlos. In the complaint, spouses Fernandez
alleged that they are the absolute owners of an apartment building that through their tolerance they allowed the Tumlos’ to occupy the apartment for the
last 7 years without payment of any rent. It was agreed that Guillerma will pay 1,600 a month while the other defendants promised to pay 1,000 a month
which was not complied with. Demand was made several times for the defendants to vacate the premises as they are in need of the property for the
construction of a new building.
Defendants appealed to RTC that Mario and Guillerma had an amorous relationship and that they acquired the property in question as their love nest. It
was likewise alleged that they lived together in the said apartment building with their 2 children for about 10 years and that Gullerma administered the
property by collecting rentals from the lessees until she discovered that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of their marriage.
ISSUE: WON Guillerma is a co-owner of the said apartment under Article 148.
HELD:
SC rejected the claim that Guillerma and Mario were co-owners of the subject property. The claim was not satisfactorily proven by Guillerma since there
were no other evidence presented to validate it except for the said affidavit. Even if the allegations of having cohabited with Mario and that she bore him
two children were true, the claim of co-ownership still cannot be accepted. Mario is validly married with Lourdes hence Guillerma and Mario are not
capacitated to marry each other. The property relation governing their supposed cohabitation is under Article 148 of the Family Code. Actual contribution is
required by the said provision in contrast to Art 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household are regarded as
contributions to the acquisitions of common property by one who has no salary, income, work or industry. Such is not included in Art 148. If actual
contribution is not proven then there can be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.
18. Docena vs Lapesura
GR No. 140153, March 28, 2001
FACTS:
Casiano Hombria, private respondent, filed a complaint for the recovery of a parcel of land against his lessees, petitioner-spouses, Antonio and Alfreda
Docena. The spouses claimed ownership of the land based on the occupation since time immemorial. The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with CA alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in issuing orders and that of the sheriff in issuing the writ of demolition.
CA dismissed the petition on the ground that the petition was filed beyond the 60-day period provided in the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure and that the
certification of non-forum shopping attached thereto was signed by only one of the petitioners.
ISSUE: WON it is sufficient that the certification of non-forum shopping was signed by only one of the petitioners.
HELD: In view of the property involved which is a conjugal property, the petition questioning the writ of demolition thereof originated from an action for
recovery brought against the spouses and is clearly intended for the benefit of the conjugal partnership and the wife as point out was in the province of
Samar whereas the petition was prepared in Metro Manila, a rigid application of the rules on forum shopping that would disauthorize a husband’s signing the
certification in his behalf and that of his wife is too harsh.
In the previous court rulings, certificate of non-forum shopping should be sign by all the petitioners in a case. However, in the case at bar, such certificate
signed by Antonio Docena alone should be deemed to constitute substantial compliance with the rules. The two petitioners in this case are husband and
wife and their residence is the subject property alleged to be a conjugal property. Under the Family Code, the administration of the conjugal property
belongs to the husband and wife jointly. However, unlike an act of alienation or encumbrance where the consent of both spouses is required, joint
management or administration does not require that the husband and wife always act together. Each spouse may validly exercise full power of
management alone, subject to the intervention of the court in proper cases.
Hence, petition is granted and the case is remanded to CA for further proceedings.
19. Hontiveros vs RTC
GR No. 125465, June 29, 1999
FACTS:
Petitioner spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a complaint for damages against private respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson. The
petitioners alleged that they are the owners of a parcel of land in Capiz and that they were deprived of income from the land as a result of the filing of the
land registration case. In the reply, private respondents denied that they were married and alleged that Gregorio was a widower while Teodora was
single. They also denied depriving petitioners of possession of and income from the land. On the contrary, according to the private respondents, the
possession of the property in question had already been transferred to petitioners by virtue of the writ of possession. Trial court denied petitioner’s motion
that while in the amended complaint, they alleged that earnest efforts towards a compromise were made, it was not verified as provided in Article 151.
ISSUE: WON the court can validly dismissed the complaint due to lack of efforts exerted towards a compromise as stated in Article 151.
HELD:
SC held that the inclusion of private respondent Teodora Ayson as defendant and Maria Hontiveros as petitioner takes the case out of the scope of Article
151. Under this provision, the phrase “members of the same family” refers to the husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants and descendants,
and brothers and sisters whether full or half-blood. Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not given any legal effects in this
jurisdiction. Teodora and Maria as spouses of the Hontiveros’ are regarded as strangers to the Hontiveros family for purposes of Article 151.

GR No. 137650, April 12, 2000
FACTS:
HELD:
21. Martinez vs Martinez

GR No. 162084, June 28, 2005
Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts
toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were, in fact, made, the case must be dismissed.
FACTS:
 Daniel Martinez Sr. and Natividad de Guzman-Martinez were the owners of a parcel of land. The former executed a last will and testament
directing the subdivision of the property into 3 lots bequeathed to each of his sons namely Rodolfo, Manolo (designated as administrator of
the estate), and Daniel Jr.
 In October 1997, Daniel Sr. died. Rodolfo then found a deed of sale purportedly signed by his father on September 1996 where it appears that
the land was sold to Manolo and his wife Lucila and was also issued to them.
 Rodolfo filed a complaint against his brother Manolo and sister-in-law Lucila for the annulment of the deed of sale and cancellation of the TCT.
 Spouses wrote Rodolfo demanding him to vacate the property which the latter ignored and refused to do so. This prompted the spouses to file a
complaint for unlawful detainer against Rodolfo.
 This matter was referred to the barangay for conciliation and settlement but none was reached. It was alleged in the position paper of the
spouses that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made but the same proved futile.
 The trial court declared that the spouses Martinez had substantially complied with Article 151 of the Family Code of the Philippines17 based on the
allegations of the complaint and the appended certification to file action issued by the barangay captain.
 CA rendered judgment granting the petition and reversing the decision of the RTC. The appellate court ruled that the spouses Martinez had failed
to comply with Article 151 of the Family code. The CA also held that the defect in their complaint before the MTC was not cured by the filing of an
amended complaint because the latter pleading was not admitted by the trial court.
ISSUE: WON spouses Martinez complied with the requirements of Art 151 of the Family Code.
HELD:
No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint that earnest efforts toward a compromise
have been made, but the same have failed.
Lucila Martinez, the respondent’s sister-in-law was one of the plaintiffs in the case at bar. The petitioner is not a member of the same family as that of her
deceased husband and the respondent. Her relationship with the respondent is not one of those enumerated in Article 150. It should also be noted that
the petitioners were able to comply with the requirements of Article 151 because they alleged in their complaint that they had initiated a proceeding against
the respondent for unlawful detainer in the katarungan Pambarangay in compliance with PD1508 and that after due proceedings, no amicable settlement
was arrived at resulting in the barangay chairman’s issuance of a certificate to file action.
Reaffirmed the judgment of RTC.
22. Manalo vs CA
GR No. 129242, January 16, 2001
FACTS:
Troadic Manalo who died on February 1992, was survived by his Pilar and his 11 children. The deceased left several real properties in Manila and a business
in Tarlac. In November 1992, herein respondents, 8 of the surviving children, filed a petition with RTC Manila for the judicial settlement of the estate of
their late father and for appointment of their brother Romeo Manalo as administrator thereof. Hearing was set on February 11, 1993 and the herein
petitioners were granted 10 days within which to file their opposition to the petition.
ISSUE: WON the case at bar is covered under Article 151 where earnest efforts toward compromise should first be made prior the filing of the petition.
HELD:
It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averments and the character of the relief were sought in the
complaint or petition, shall be controlling. The careful scrutiny of the petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement and distribution of the
estate belies herein petitioners’ claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The provision of Article 151 is applicable only to ordinary civil
actions. It is clear from the term “suit” that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or other in a court of justice in which the
plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an injury or enforcement of a right. It is also the intention of the Code
Commission as revealed in the Report of the Code Commission to make the provision be applicable only to civil actions. The petition for issuance of letters
of administration, settlement, and distribution of estate is a special proceeding and as such a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a
status, a right, or a particular fact. Hence, it must be emphasized that herein petitioners are not being sued in such case for any cause of action as in fact
no defendant was pronounced therein.
23. Modequillo vs. Breva 185 SCRA 766

Facts:
On January 29, 1988, a judgment was rendered by the Court of Appeals entitled
"Francisco Salinas,etal. vs. Jose Modequillo, et al.”
The said judgment having become final and executory, a writ of execution was issued by the RTC of Davao City to satisfy the said judgment on the goods
and chattels of the defendants Jose Modequilloand Benito Malubay at Davao del Sur. The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located atDavao del
Sur registered inthe name of defendant and a parcel of agricultural land located at Malalag, Davao del Sur. A motion toquash and/or to set aside levy of
execution was filed by defendant Jose Modequillo alleging thereinthat the residential land located at Poblacion Malalag is where the family home is built
since 1969 priorto the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachmentunder Articles 152 and 153 of the Family
Code except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof,and thatthe judgment debt sought to be enforced against the family home of defendant is not
one of thoseenumerated under Article 155 of the Family Code. An opposition thereto was filed by the plaintiffs.
Issue: Whether or not a final judgment in an action for damages may be satisfied by way of execution of afamily home constituted under the Family Code.
Ruling:Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it isoccupied as a family residence. There is no need
to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially asrequired in the Civil Code. If the family actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family homeas
contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors should take the necessary precautions to protect theirinterest before extending credit to the spouses or head of
the family who owns the home. In thepresent case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family home
whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family home by operation of law onlyunder Article 153 of the Family Code.
24. Manacop vs. CA

277 SCRA 941
Facts:
Petitioner Florante F. Manacop and his wife Eulaceli purchased residential lot with a bungalow. Private Respondent E & L Merchantile, Inc. filed a complaint
against petitioner and F.F. Manacop Construction Co., Inc. before the RTC of Pasig, Metro Manila to collect indebtedness. Instead of filing an answer,
petitioner and his company entered into a compromise agreement with private respondent. The trial court rendered judgment approving the aforementioned
compromise agreement. It enjoined the parties to comply with the agreement in good faith. Private respondent filed a motion for execution which the lower
court granted. However, execution of the judgment was delayed. Eventually, the sheriff levied on several vehicles and other personal properties of
petitioner. These chattels were sold at public auction for which certificates of sale were correspondingly issued by the sheriff. Petitioner and his company
filed a motion to quash the alias writs of execution and to stop the sheriff from continuing to enforce them on the ground that the judgment was not
yet executory. Private respondent opposed the motion. The lower court denied the motion to quash the writ of execution and
the prayers in the subsequent pleadings filed by petitioner and his company. Finding that petitioner and his company had not paid their indebtedness even
though they collected receivables, the lower court held that the case had become final and executory. It also ruled that petitioner's residence was not
exempt from execution as it was not duly constituted as a family home, pursuant to the Civil Code.
Issue:
Whether or not a writ of execution of a final and executory judgment issued before the effectivity of the Family Code be executed on a house and lot
constituted as a family home under the provision of FamilyCode.
Ruling:
The petition is denied for utter lack of merit. It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153 FC have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences
are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the FC and are exempt from execution for
the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the FC. Art. 162 simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of
the FC, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the FC.
25. VILMA G. ARRIOLA and ANTHONY RONALD G. ARRIOLA, Petitioners, vs. JOHN NABOR C. ARRIOLA, Respondent.
[G.R. No. 177703, January 28, 2008]
Facts:
Fidel Arriola died and is survived by his legal heirs: John Nabor Arriola (respondent) ,his son with his first wife , and Vilma G. Arriola, his second wife and
his other son, Anthony Ronald Arriola (petitioners).
On Feb. 16, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision ordering the partition of the parcel of land covered by TCT No 383714 (84191) left by the decedent Fidel S.
Arriola by and among his heirs John Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola in equal shares of one-third (1/3) each without
prejudice to the rights of creditors or mortgagees thereon, if any.
However, the parties failed to agree on how to divide the above mentioned property and so the respondent proposed to sell it though public auction. The
petitioners initially agreed but refused to include in the auction the house standing on the subject land. The respondent then filed an Urgent Manifestation
and Motion for Contempt of Court but was denied by the RTC for lack of merit.
When a motion of reconsideration was still denied by the RTC, the respondent elevated the case to the CA with a petition for certiorari and prayed that he
be allowed to push through with the auction of the subject land including the house built on it. The CA granted the petition and ordered the public auction
sale of the subject lot including the house built on it. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the said motion. Hence this petition for
review on Certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the subject house is covered by the judgement of partition
Ruling:
The Supreme Court agree that the subject house is covered by the judgment of partition but in view of the suspended proscription imposed under Article
159 of the family code, the subject house immediately partitioned to the heirs. Article 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the
wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated. Article 153. The
family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as
any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as
hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, applying these concepts, the subject house as well as the specific portion of the subject land on which it stands are deemed constituted as a family
home by the deceased and petitioner Vilma from the moment they began occupying the same as a family residence 20 years back.
Article 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for
as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor.
This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home. (Emphasis supplied.)
26. Belen Sagad ANGELES vs Aleli “Corazon” Angeles MAGLAYA

(G.R. No. 153798; Sept 2, 2005; J. Garcia)
FACTS:
Francisco Angeles died intestate on January 21, 1998 in the City of Manila, leaving behind 4 parcels of land and a building, among other valuable
properties. Respondent Corazon claims that as the sole legitimate child of the deceased and Genoveva Mercado has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications required of an administrator.
Petitioner Belen claims, as Francisco’s second wife and surviving spouse, that she should be made administratix of Francisco’s estate. She claims that
respondent could not be the daughter of Francisco for, although she was recorded as Francisco’s legitimate daughter, the corresponding birth certificate was
not signed by him. Further she said that respondent, despite her claim of being the legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado, has not presented
the marriage contract between her supposed parents or produced any acceptable document to prove such union. She also said that she and Francisco
adopted a child.
Respondent in turn alleged that per certification of the appropriate offices, the January to December 1938records of marriages of the Civil Registrar
of Bacolor, Pampanga where the alleged 1938 Francisco-Genoveva wedding took place, were destroyed. She also dismissed the adoption as of little
consequence, owing to her having interposed with the Court of Appeals a petition to nullify the decree of adoption entered by the RTC at Caloocan.
Respondent testified having been in open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. Four other witnesses testified on her behalf, and
she also offered in evidence her birth certificate which contained an entry stating that she was born at the Mary Johnston Hospital, Tondo, Manila, to
Francisco Angeles and Genoveva Mercado and whereon the handwritten word “Yes” appears on the space below the question “Legitimate? (Legitimo?)”.
Pictures taken during respondent’s wedding as bride to Atty. Guillermo T.Maglaya; a copy of her marriage contract, and her scholastic and government
service records, were alsooffered as evidence.RTC ruled in favour of Petitoner, CA ruled in favor of respondent.
ISSUE:
WoN respondent is the legitimate child of decedent Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Mercado?
HELD:
NO. CA erred in giving respondent presumptive legitimacy. A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage (FC Art
146). However, the presumption of legitimacy under Art 164 may be availed only upon convincing proof of the factual basis therefor parents
were legally married and that his/her conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of thatmarriage. Respondent failed to present evidence of
Francisco’s marriage to Genoveva, thus she cannot bepresumed legitimate. Further, the Birth Certificate presented was not signed by Francisco against
whomlegitimate filiation is asserted. Not even by Genoveva. It was only signed by the attending physician making itonly proof of the fact of the birth of a
child.
The legitimate filiation of a child is a matter fixed by law itself , it cannot be made dependent on the declaration of the attending physician or
midwife, or that of the mother of the newborn child. None of the evidence respondent presented is enough to prove filiation or recognition.Further, RTC
Caloocan in the case respondent filed to nullify the adoption of Francisco and Belen of their child, said that respondent is NOT a legitimate child of
Francisco and Genoveva; following the rule on conclusiveness of judgment, herein respondent is precluded from claiming that she is the legitimate
daughter of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado. In fine, the issue of herein respondent’s legitimate filiation to Francisco and the latter’s marriage to
Genoveva, having been judicially determined in a final judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction, has thereby become res judicata and may not again
be resurrected or litigated between herein petitioner and respondent or their privies in a subsequent action, regardless of the form of the latter. Finally, it
should be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator of the estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of
kin of the deceased.
27. Andal vs Macaraig

GR No. 2474, May 30, 1951
FACTS:
Mariano Andal, a minor, assisted by his mother Maria Duenas, filed a complaint for the recovery of the ownership and possession of a parcel of land owned
by Emiliano Andal and Maria Duenas. Eduvigis Macaraig, herein defendant, donated the land by virtue of donation propter nuptias in favor of Emiliano. The
latter was suffering from tuberculosis in January 1941. His brother, Felix, then lived with them to work his house and farm. Emiliano became so weak that
he can hardly move and get up from his bed. Sometime in September 1942, the wife eloped with Felix and lived at the house of Maria’s father until
1943. Emiliano died in January 1, 1943 where the wife did not attend the funeral. On June 17, 1943, Maria gave birth to a boy who was, herein petitioner.
ISSUE: WON Mariano Andal is a legitimate child of the deceased.
HELD:
Considering that Mariano was born on June 17, 1943 and Emiliano died on January 1, 1943, the former is presumed to be a legitimate son of the latter
because he was born within 300 days following the dissolution of the marriage. The fact that the husband was seriously sick is not sufficient to overcome
the presumption of legitimacy. This presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to have had access to his
wife during the first 120 days of the 300 days next preceding the birth of the child. Impossibility of access by husband to wife includes absence during the
initial period of conception, impotence which is patent, and incurable; and imprisonment unless it can be shown that cohabitation took place through corrupt
violation of prison regulations. Maria’s illicit intercourse with a man other than the husband during the initial period does not preclude cohabitation
between husband and wife.
Hence, Mariano Andal was considered a legitimate son of the deceased making him the owner of the parcel land.
28. Benitez-Badua vs CA
GR No. 105625, January 24, 1994
FACTS:
Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian were owners of various properties located in Laguna. Isabel died in 1982 while his husband died in
1989. Vicente’s sister and nephew filed a complaint for the issuance of letters of administration of Vicente’s estate in favor of the nephew, herein private
respondent. The petitioner, Marissa Benitez-Badua, was raised and cared by the deceased spouses since childhood, though not related to them by blood,
nor legally adopted. The latter to prove that she is the only legitimate child of the spouses submitted documents such as her certificate of live birth where
the spouses name were reflected as her parents. She even testified that said spouses continuously treated her as their legitimate daughter. On the other
hand, the relatives of Vicente declared that said spouses were unable to physically procreate hence the petitioner cannot be the biological child. Trial court
decided in favor of the petitioner as the legitimate daughter and sole heir of the spouses.
ISSUE: WON petitioner’s certificate of live birth will suffice to establish her legitimacy.
HELD:
The Court dismissed the case for lack of merit. The mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a
valid adoption. It does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and her legal rights. Such act amounts to simulation of the child's birth or
falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public document.
It is worthy to note that Vicente and brother of the deceased wife executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the latter. In the notarized
document, they stated that they were the sole heirs of the deceased because “she died without descendants and ascendants”. In executing such deed,
Vicente effectively repudiated the Certificate of Live Birth of the petitioner where it appeared thathe was the petitioner’s father.
29. GERARDO B. CONCEPCION vs. CA and MA. THERESA ALMONTE

G.R. No. 123450 August 31, 2005
FACTS:
 Gerardo Concepcion married Theresa Amonte, who had a subsisting with Gapiao.
 Gerardo and Amonte had a son.They stayed together for
 Gerardo filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground of bigamy, alleging that her marriage with Mario Gopiao on
December 10, 198- was never annulled.
 Although Ma. Theresa did not deny marrying Mario, she averred that the marriage was a sham and that she have never lived with Mario at all.
 The trial court said otherwise, and ruled that Ma. Theresa’s marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting, thus declaring her marriage to Gerardo as
void ab initio. It deemed Jose Gerardo to be an illegitimate child and the custody was awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was granted
visitation rights. Also, it allowed the child to use the surname of his father.
 Ma. Theresa appealed and pleaded for the reverse of the court’s decisions. The Court of Appeals ruled that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma.
Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during her first marriage considering the fact that the second marriage was void from the beginning. Therefore,
the child Jose Gerardo – under the law – is the child of the legal and subsisting marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario Gopiao.
 Gerardo Concepcion moved for the reconsideration of the decision.
Issue:
Whether the child is the legitimate child of Ma. Theresa and Gopiao or the illegimate child of Ma. Theresa and Gerardo.
Held:
The child, Jose Gerardo, is the legitimate child of Ma. Theresa and Mario Gopiao.
The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised as per Art. 164 of the Family Code which states, “A child who is conceived or born during the
marriage of his parents is legitimate.” It is fully supported by Art. 167 of the Family Code which states, “The child shall be considered legitimate although
the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.”. The law requires that every reasonable presumption
be made in favor of the legitimacy. It is grounded on the policy to protect the innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right to bear the surnames of his father Mario and mother Ma. Theresa, in conformity with the provisions
of the Civil Code on surnames. Also, there being no such parent-child relationship between the child and Gerardo, Gerardo has no legally demandable right
to visit the child.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Gerardo is hereby DENIED. The resolution of the Court of Appeals in favor of respondents is AFFIRMED.
30. Liyao vs Liyao GR No 138961 Mar 7 2002
FACTS:
Petitioner, William Liyao Jr, represented by his mother Corazon Garcia, filed an action for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate (spurious) son of the
late William Liyao Sr against herein respondents, the legitimate wife and children of the deceased.
Corazon is legally married but living separately from her husband allegedly for more than ten years at the time of the institution of this civil case.
She cohabited with the late William until his death. Petitioner alleged that he “was in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of the child of said
William Liyao,” having been “recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent during his lifetime and presented witnesses and evidence to prove
his allegations. On the other hand, respondents painted a different picture of the story.
RTC rendered judgment in favour of petitioner.
CA reversed the ruling of RTC, favoured the presumption of legitimacy of the child and gave weight to the testimonies of the witnesses of the respondents
that Corazon and her husband were seen together during the period she cohabited with the deceased.
ISSUE: WON the petition initiated by Corazon to compel recognition by respondents can prosper.
WON petitioner’s action to impugn his legitimacy is proper.
RULING: No. It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy
or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.(Art 167,FC)
No. We cannot allow petitioner to maintain his present petition and subvert the clear mandate of the law that only the husband, or in
exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of a child born in a valid and subsisting marriage. The child himself cannot
choose his own filiation. If the husband, presumed to be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is fixed, and the
latter cannot choose to be the child of his mother’s alleged paramour. On the other hand, if the presumption of legitimacy is overthrown, the child cannot
elect the paternity of the husband who successfully defeated the presumption. (Art 170-171, FC)
31. Eceta vs Eceta

GR No. 157037, May 20, 2004
FACTS:
 Rosalina Vda de Eceta was married to Isaac Eceta in 1926. They had a son named Vicente. The husband died in 1967 leaving Rosalina and
Vicente as his compulsory heirs. Vicente died.However, the deceased (Vicente) has an illegitimate daughter named Theresa whose grandmother
was Rosalina, the petitioner.
 Rosalina filed case in RTC Partition and Accounting with Damages"2 against Rosalina alleging that by virtue of her father’s death, she became
Rosalina’s co-heir and co-owner of the Cubao property
 RTC ruled Maria Theresa Eceta is entitled to one fourth share of said property;
 Rosalina appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification the trial court’s ruling| appealed Decision is hereby
AFFIRMED subject to the MODIFICATION that the one-fourth (1/4) share erroneously decreed to Appellee is hereby REDUCED to one-eight (1/8)
undivided share of the entire disputed property, covered by TCT No. 61036, in accordance with law.
ISSUE: WON the admission made by Rosalina that Theresa was her granddaughter is enough to prove the filiation with the deceased.
HELD:
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by:
(1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by:
(1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a
consummated act of acknowledgement of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for
compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. However, what was tried before
the trial court and CA was for partition and accounting of damages only. The filiation or compusolry recognition by Vicente of Theresa was never put in
issue. In fact both agreed in the trial court’s pre trial order that Theresa was Rosalina’s granddaughter. The deceased establishing acknowledgement of his
paternity over Theresa nevertheless signed the duly authenticated birth certificate shown by the latter. Hence, the Court granted 1/8 share of the land to
Theresa.
32. Ernestina Bernabe vs Carolina Alejo
374 SCRA 180 – Civil Law – Preliminary Title – Application of Laws – No retroactive effect if vested rights are impaired
Facts:
 The late Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with Carolina Alejo (Secretary). The son was born on September 18, 1981 and was
named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died on August 13, 1993 (wife Rosalina died too) leaving Ernestina as the sole surviving heir. Therafter,
Carolina in behalf of Adrian filed the aforesaid complaint praying that Adrian be declared as acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe.
 The RTC dismissed the complaint ruling that under the provision of the Family Code, the death of the putative father had barred the action. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that in the interest of justice, Adrian should be allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal
Bernabe since the boy was born in 1981; his rights are governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code. Hence, appeal was interposed in the Supreme
Court.
 the trial court granted Ernestina Bernabes Motion for Reconsideration of the trial courts Decision and ordered the dismissal of the Complaint for
recognition. Citing Article 175 of the Family Code, the RTC held that the death of the putative father had barred the action.
 In its Order dated October 6, 1995, the trial court added that since the putative father had not acknowledged or recognized Adrian Bernabe in
writing, the action for recognition should have been filed during the lifetime of the alleged father to give him the opportunity to either affirm or
deny the childs filiation.
 Court of Appeals ruled that in the interest of justice, Adrian should be allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe. Because
the boy was born in 1981, his rights are governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code, which allows an action for recognition to be filed within four
years after the child has attained the age of majority. The subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not take away that right.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Family Code shall have retroactive effect.
HELD: Applying recent jurisprudence, the Supreme Court hold that Article 285 of the Civil Code is a substantive law as it gives Adrian the right to file his
petition for recognition within 4 years from attaining majority age. Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair or take Adrian’s right to file an action for
recognition because that right had already vested prior to its enactment.
ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the
attainment of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents
recognize the child.
In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the document.
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die
during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same, evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in
which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
ART. 255. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws
33. Jison vs. CA

GR No. 124853, February 24, 1998
FACTS:
 Private respondent, Monina Jison, instituted a complaint against petitioner, Francisco Jison, for recognition as illegitimate child of the latter. The
case was filed 20 years after her mother’s death and when she was already 39 years of age.
 Petitioner was married to Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940 and sometime in 1945, he impregnated Esperanza Amolar, Monina’s mother. Monina
alleged that since childhood, she had enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as the illegitimate child of petitioner by his acts and that of his
family. It was likewise alleged that petitioner supported her and spent for her education such that she became a CPA and eventually a Central
Bank Examiner. Monina was able to present total of 11 witnesses.
ISSUE: WON Monina should be declared as illegitimate child of Francisco Jison.
HELD:
Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation may be established in the same way and on the same evidence as that of legitimate
children. Article 172 thereof provides the various forms of evidence by which legitimate filiation is established.
“To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of
the supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure
charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat the child as
such in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously”.
The following facts was established based on the testimonial evidences offered by Monina:
1. That Francisco was her father and she was conceived at the time when her mother was employed by the former;
2. That Francisco recognized Monina as his child through his overt acts and conduct.
SC ruled that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competence evidence as to the issue of paternity. Francisco’s lack of
participation in the preparation of baptismal certificates and school records render the documents showed as incompetent to prove paternity. With regard
to the affidavit signed by Monina when she was 25 years of age attesting that Francisco was not her father, SC was in the position that if Monina were truly
not Francisco’s illegitimate child, it would be unnecessary for him to have gone to such great lengths in order that Monina denounce her filiation. Monina’s
evidence hurdles the “high standard of proof required for the success of an action to establish one’s illegitimate filiation in relying upon the provision on
“open and continuous possession”. Hence, Monina proved her filiation by more than mere preponderance of evidence.
Since the instant case involves paternity and filiation, even if illegitimate, Monina filed her action well within the period granted her by a positive provision of
law. A denial then of her action on ground of laches would clearly be inequitable and unjust. Petition was denied.
34. SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ VS GRACIA

Jenie San Juan dela Cruz vs Ronald Paul S. Gracia, in his capacity as City Civil Registrar
G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009
FACTS:
Jenie was denied the registration of her child's birth because the document attached to the Affidavit to use the Surname of the Father (AUSF) entitled
"Autobiography," did not include the signature of the deceased father, and “because he was born out of wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior to
his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the child.”
Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for injunction/registration of name against Gracia. The trial court held that even if Dominique, the father, was
the author of the unsigned handwritten Autobiography, the same does not contain any express recognition of paternity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the unsigned handwritten instrument of the deceased father of minor Christian can be considered as a recognition of paternity.
RULING:
Yes.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her father if the latter had previously
recognized him/her as his offspring through an admission made in a pubic of private handwritten instrument.
Article 176, as amended, does not explicitly state that there must be a signature by the putative father in the private handwritten instrument.
The following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an
admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the
requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be
shown to have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence.

GR No. 137650, April 12, 2000
FACTS:
HELD:
36. Diwata Ramos Landingin vs. Republic, G.R. No. 164948

FACTS:
Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United States of America (USA), of Filipino parentage and a resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition for the
adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos and Eugene Dizon Ramos who was born on. The minors are the natural children of Manuel
Ramos, petitioner’s brother (deceased), and Amelia Ramos- who went to Italy, re-married there and now has two children by her second marriage and no
longer communicated with her children .
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for adoption is invalid for lack of consent of the biological mother?
HELD:
No. The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted
interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption. When she
filed her petition with the trial court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was already in effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if the written consent of the biological parents
cannot be obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of the minors will suffice. If, as claimed by petitioner, that the biological mother of the minors
had indeed abandoned them, she should, thus have adduced the written consent of their legal guardian.
37. In Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Jude Lim
GR No. 168992-93, May 21, 2009
FACTS:
Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were childless. Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose
parents were unknown as shown by a certification of DSWD. The spouses registered the children making it appears as if they were the
parents. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. She then married an American Citizen, Angel Olario in December 2000. Petitioner decided to adopt the
children by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she filed separate petitions for adoption
of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was then 25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years and seven months
old. Michelle and her husband including Michael and Olario gave their consent to the adoption executed in an affidavit.
ISSUE: WON petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.
HELD:
Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which
was not present in the case at bar. In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercised parental authority. The use of the word “shall” signifies that
joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated
to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly. The affidavit of consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are
certain requirements that he must comply as an American Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552. The requirements on
residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7. Parental authority is merely just one of the
effects of legal adoption. It includes caring and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and development of their moral mental and
physical character and well-being.
38. Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda

35 Phil 252
FACTS:
Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y Rueda, respondent, were married on January 7, 1915 and had a residence at 115 Calle San
Marcelino Manila. They stayed together for a month before petitioner returned to her parent’s home. Goitia filed a complaint against respondent for
support outside the conjugal home. It was alleged that respondent demanded her to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs. Petitioner
refused to perform such acts and demanded her husband other than the legal and valid cohabitation. Since Goitia kept on refusing, respondent maltreated
her by word and deed, inflicting injuries upon her lops, face and different body parts. The trial court ruled in favor of respondent and stated that Goitia
could not compel her husband to support her except in the conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree granting her separation or divorce from
respondent. Goitia filed motion for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside the conjugal home.
HELD:
The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created merely in the act of marriage. The law provides that the husband, who is obliged to
support the wife, may fulfill the obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, this option
given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the husband to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven away from the
conjugal home because of his wrongful acts. In the case at bar, the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical
assault of the husband, she can therefore claim support from the husband for separate maintenance even outside the conjugal home.
39. De Asis vs. CA
GR No. 127578, February 15, 1999
FACTS:
Vircel Andres as legal guardian of Glen Camil Andres de Asis, filed an action in 1988 for maintenance and support against the alleged father Manuel De Asis
who failed to provide support and maintenance despite repeated demands. Vircel later on withdrew the complaint in 1989 for the reason that Manuel
denied paternity of the said minor and due to such denial, it seems useless to pursue the said action. They mutually agreed to move for the dismissal of the
complaint with the condition that Manuel will not pursue his counter claim. However in 1995, Vircel filed a similar complaint against the alleged father, this
time as the minor’s legal guardian/mother. Manuel interposed maxim of res judicata for the dismissal of the case. He maintained that since the obligation
to give support is based on existence of paternity between the child and putative parent, lack thereof negates the right to claim support.
ISSUE: WON the minor is barred from action for support.
HELD:
The right to give support cannot be renounced nor can it be transmitted to a third person. The original agreement between the parties to dismiss the initial
complaint was in the nature of a compromise regarding future support which is prohibited by law. With respect to Manuel’s contention for the lack of filial
relationship between him and the child and agreement of Vircel in not pursuing the original claim, the Court held that existence of lack thereof of any filial
relationship between parties was not a matter which the parties must decide but should be decided by the Court itself. While it is true that in order to claim
support, filiation or paternity must be first shown between the parties, but the presence or lack thereof must be judicially established and declaration is
vested in the Court. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties. Hence, the first dismissal cannot bar the filing of another action asking for the
same relief (no force and effect). Furthermore, the defense of res judicata claimed by Manuel was untenable since future support cannot be the subject of
any compromise or waiver.
40. Salientes vs Abanilla

GR No. 162734 August 29, 2006
Facts:
 Loran Abanilla and Marie Salientes are the parents of theminor, Lorenzo. They loved with Marie's parents. Due to in-law problems, Abanilla
suggested to his wife that theytransfer to their own house, but Salientes refused. Abanillaleft the house, and was thereafter prevented from
seeing hisson.
 Abanilla, in his personal capacity and as a representative of his son, filed a petition for habeas corpus and custodybefore the RTC of Muntinlupa
City. The trial court orderedthe Salienteses to produce and bring before the court thebody of Lorenzo, and to show cause why the child shouldnot
be discharged from restraint.
 Salienteses filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, but itwas dismissed. CA stated that the order of the trial court didnot award custody but was
simply a standard order issuedfor the production of restrained persons. The trial court wasstill about to conduct a full inquiry. A subsequent MR
waslikewise denied.
 Salienteses filed the current appeal by certiorari.
Issue:
1.Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari against the trial court's order
2.Whether the remedy of the issuance of a writ of habeascorpus is available to the father
Ruling:
1. The CA rightfully dismissed the petition for certiorari
• Salientes:
• the order is contrary to the Family Code which provides that no child under seven years of age shallbe separated from the mother unless the
court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise
• even assuming that there were compelling reasons,the proper remedy for private respondent was simplyan action for custody, but not habeas
corpus.Petitioners assert that habeas corpus is unavailableagainst the mother who, under the law, has the rightof custody of the minor. They insist there
was noillegal or involuntary restraint of the minor by hisown mother. There was no need for the mother toshow cause and explain the custody of her very
ownchild.
• Abanilla:
• the writ of habeas corpus is available against anyperson who restrains the minor’s right to see hisfather and vice versa. He avers that the
instantpetition is merely filed for delay, for had petitioners really intended to bring the child before the court in accordance with the new rules on custody of
minors
• under the law, he and petitioner Marie Antonette have shared custody and parental authority over their son. He alleges that at times when
petitioner Marie Antonette is out of the country as required of her job as an international flight stewardess, he, the father, should have custody of their son
and not the maternal grandparents.
• The CA was correct in holding that the order of the trialcourt did not grant custody of the minor to any of theparties but merely directed petitioners to
produce the minorin court and explain why they are restraining his liberty. The assailed order was an interlocutory order precedent tothe trial court’s full
inquiry into the issue of custody, whichwas still pending before it.
• an interlocutory order is not appealable but the aggrievedparty may file an appropriate special action under Rule 65. The aggrieved party must show that
the court gravelyabused its discretion in issuing the interlocutory order. Inthe present case, it is incumbent upon petitioners to showthat the trial court
gravely abused its discretion in issuingthe order.
2. Habeas corpus is available to the father
• Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld from a person entitled thereto. UnderArticle 211 of the Family Code,
respondent Loran and petitioner Marie Antonette have joint parental authority over their son and consequently joint custody. Further, although the couple is
separated de facto, the issue of custody hasyet to be adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent, both parents are
still entitled to the custody of their child. In the present case,private respondent’s cause of action is the deprivation of hisright to see his child as alleged in
his petition. Hence, theremedy of habeas corpus is available to him.
41. St. Mary's Academy vs Carpitanos

GR No. 143363, February 6, 2002
Article 218 and 219 of the Family Code
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those exercising special parental authority are principally and solidarily liable
for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor while under their supervision, instruction, or custody.[10]
FACTS:
 Herein petitioner, conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996 They visited schools from where prospective enrollees were
studying.
 Sherwin Carpitanos joined the campaign. Along with the other high school students, they rode a Mitsubishi jeep owned by Vivencio Villanueva on
their way to Larayan Elementary School.
 Such jeep was driven by James Daniel II, a 15 year old student of the same school. It was alleged that he drove the jeep in a reckless manner
which resulted for it to turned turtle. Sherwin died due to this accident.
 RTC ruled in favor of the Carpitanos, Court of Appeals promulgated a decision reducing the actual damages to P25,000.00 but
otherwise affirming the decision a quo, in toto
ISSUE: WON petitioner should be held liable for the damages.
HELD:
CA held petitioner liable for the death of Sherwin under Article 218 and 219 of the Family Code where it was pointed that they were negligent in
allowing a minor to drive and not having a teacher accompany the minor students in the jeep. However, for them to be held liable, the act or
omission to be considered negligent must be the proximate cause of the injury caused thus, negligence needs to have a causal connection to the
accident. It must be direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by any efficient intervening causes. The parents of the victim failed to show such
negligence on the part of the petitioner. The spouses Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was not the reckless driving of
James but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Futhermore, there was no evidence that petitioner allowed the minor to
drive the jeep of Villanueva. The mechanical defect was an event over which the school has no control hence they may not be held liable for the death
resulting from such accident.
The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to 3rd persons for
injuries caused while it is being driven on the road. It is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages
for the death of Sherwin. Case was remanded to the trial court for determination of the liability of the defendants excluding herein petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of
Appeals[18] and that of the trial court.[19] The Court remands the case to the trial court for determination of the liability of defendants, excluding petitioner St.
Marys Academy, Dipolog City.
42. Libi vs. IAC

FACTS:
Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were a sweetheart until the former broke up with the latter after she found out the Wendell was irresponsible and
sadistic. Wendell wanted reconciliation but was not granted by Julie so it prompted him to resort to threats. One day, there were found dead from a single
gunshot wound each coming from the same gun. The parents of Julie herein private respondents filed a civil case against the parents of Wendell to recover
damages. Trial court dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence but was set aside by CA.
ISSUE: WON the parents should be held liable for such damages.
HELD:
The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed under Art 2180 of the Civil Code and Art. 101 of Revised Penal Code
covered obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses. The court held that the civil liability of the parents for quasi-delict of their minor
children is primary and not subsidiary and that responsibility shall cease when the persons can prove that they observe all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage. However, Wendell’s mother testified that her husband owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their
bedroom. Each of the spouses had their own key. She likewise admitted that during the incident, the gun was no longer in the safety deposit
box. Wendell could not have gotten hold of the gun unless the key was left negligently lying around and that he has free access of the mother’s bag where
the key was kept. The spouses failed to observe and exercise the required diligence of a good father to prevent such damage.
43. Laperal vs. Republic

GR No. 18008, October 30, 1962
FACTS:
The petitioner, a bona fide resident of Baguio City, was married with Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria on March 1939. However, a decree of legal separation was
later on issued to the spouses. Aside from that, she ceased to live with Enrique. During their marriage, she naturally uses Elisea L. Santamaria. She filed
this petition to be permitted to resume in using her maiden name Elisea Laperal. This was opposed by the City Attorney of Baguio on the ground that it
violates Art. 372 of the Civil Code. She was claiming that continuing to use her married name would give rise to confusion in her finances and the eventual
liquidation of the conjugal assets.
ISSUE: Whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general will prevail over the specific provision of Art. 372 of the Civil Code with regard to
married woman legally separated from his husband.
HELD:
In legal separation, the married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of the vinculum. The finding that petitioner’s continued
use of her husband surname may cause undue confusion in her finances was without basis. It must be considered that the issuance of the decree of legal
separation in 1958, necessitate that the conjugal partnership between her and Enrique had automatically been dissolved and liquidated. Hence, there could
be no more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.
Furthermore, applying Rule 103 is not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of Elisea for to hold otherwise would be to provide for an easy
circumvention of the mandatory provision of Art. 372.
Petition was dismissed.
44. Llaneta vs Agrava Case Digest

G.R. No. L-32054, May 15, 1974
FACTS:
Atanacia Llaneta was married with Serafin Ferrer whom she had a child named Victoriano Ferrer. Serafin died and about four years later Atanacia had a
relationship with another man out of which Teresita Llaneta, herein petitioner, was born. All of them lived with Serafin’s mother in Manila. Teresita was
raised in the household of the Ferrer’s using the surname of Ferrer in all her dealings throughout her schooling. When she was 21 years old, she applied for
a copy of her birth certificate in Sorsogon as it is required to be presented in connection with a scholarship grant. It was then that she discovered that her
registered surname was Llaneta and that she was the illegitimate child of Atanacia and an unknown father. She then filed a petition for change of name
from Teresita Llaneta to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer on the ground that her use thenceforth of the surname Llaneta, instead of Ferrer, which she had been
using, would cause untold difficulties and confusion. After trial, the respondent judge denied the petition on the ground that the change of name would give
the false impression that Teresita is a legitimate daughter of Serafin.
ISSUE:
Whether Teresita can have her surname changed to Ferrer
HELD:
Yes. The petitioner has established that she has been using the surname Ferrer for as long as she can remember; that all her records in school and
elsewhere, put her name down as Teresita Ferrer; that her friends and associates know her only as Teresita Ferrer; and that even the late Serafin Ferrer’s
nearest of kin have tolerated and still approve of her use of the surname Ferrer. Indeed, a sudden shift at this time by the petitioner to the name of Teresita
Llaneta (in order to conform to that appearing in the birth certificate) would result in confusion among the persons and entities she deals with and entail
endless and vexatious explanations of the circumstances of her new name.
The principle that disallows change of name as would give the false impression of family relationship, relied by the respondent judge, remains valid but only
to the extent that the proposed change of name would in great probability cause prejudice or future mischief to the family whose surname it is that is
involved or to the community in general. In the case at bar, however, the late Serafin Ferrer’s widowed mother, Victoria, and his two remaining brothers,
Nehemias and Ruben, have come forward in earnest support of the petition. Adequate publication of the proceeding has not elicited the slightest opposition
from the relatives and friends of the late Serafin Ferrer. The State (represented by the Solicitor General’s Office), which has an interest in the name borne
by every citizen within its realm for purposes of identification, interposed no opposition at the trial after a searching cross-examination, of Teresita and her
witnesses. It is beyond cavil that those living who possess the right of action to prevent the surname Ferrer from being smeared are proud to share it with
Teresita. (Llaneta vs Agrava, G.R. No. L-32054, May 15, 1974)
45. Lapuz-Sy vs. Eufemio

43 SCRA 177
FACTS:
Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio Eufemio on August 1953. They were married civilly on September 21, 1934 and
canonically after nine days. They had lived together as husband and wife continuously without any children until 1943 when her husband abandoned her.
They acquired properties during their marriage. Petitioner then discovered that her husband cohabited with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about
1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio should be deprived of his
share of the conjugal partnership profits.
Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lapuz-Sy on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Trial
proceeded and the parties adduced their respective evidence. However, before the trial could be completed, respondent already scheduled to present
surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a vehicular accident on May 1969. Her counsel duly notified the court of her death. Eufemio moved to dismiss the
petition for legal separation on June 1969 on the grounds that the said petition was filed beyond the one-year period provided in Article 102 of the Civil
Code and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation. Petitioner’s counsel moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father,
Macario Lapuz.
ISSUE: Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for legal separation, abate the action and will it also apply if the action involved
property rights.
HELD:
An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved. These rights are mere effects of decree of
separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these
claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more
radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.
The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic and there could be no further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that
automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6
could be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.
46. Gandiongco vs Penaranda

GR No. 72984, November 27, 1987
FACTS:
Private respondent, Teresita Gandionco, filed a complaint against herein petitioner, Froilan Gandionco for legal separation on the ground of concubinage as
a civil case. Teresita also filed a criminal complaint of concubinage against her husband. She likewise filed an application for the provisional remedy of
support pendent elite which was approved and ordered by the respondent judge. Petitioner moved to suspend the action for legal separation and the
incidents consequent thereto such as the support for pendent elite, in view of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him. He contends that the civil
action for legal separation is inextricably tied with the criminal action thus, all proceedings related to legal separation will have to be suspended and await
the conviction or acquittal of the criminal case.
ISSUE: Whether or not a civil case for legal separation can proceed pending the resolution of the criminal case for concubinage.
HELD:
Supreme Court ruled that the contentions of the petitioner were incorrect. A civil action for legal separation on the ground of concubinage may proceed
ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is not one to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense,
even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live
separately, with the legal consequences thereof including the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody of the children, support and
disqualifications from inheriting from the innocent spouse. Decree of legal separation may be issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence, where no
criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary.
Furthermore, the support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an action for legal separation, and granted at the discretion of the judge. If in
case, the petitioner finds the amount of support pendente lite ordered as too onerous, he can always file a motion to modify or reduce the same.
47. Bugayong vs Ginez

GR No. 10033, December 28, 1956
FACTS:
Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the US Navy was married with Leonila Ginez on August 1949 at Pangasinan while on furlough leave. Immediately
after the marriage, they lived with the sisters of Bugayong in said municipality before he went back to duty. The couple came to an agreement that Ginez
would stay with his sisters who later moved in Manila. On or about July 1951, she left the dwelling of the sisters-in-law and informed her husband by letter
that she had gone to Pangasinan to reside with her mother and later on moved to Dagupan to study in a local college.
Petitioner then began receiving letters from Valeriana Polangco, (plaintiff’s sister-in-law) and some from anonymous writers, which were not produced at the
hearing, informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife. He admitted that his wife informed him by letter that a certain Eliong kissed her. All these
communications, prompted him in October 1951 to seek the advice of the Navy Chaplain who asked him to consult with the navy legal department.
In August 1952, Bugayong went to Pangasinan and looked for his wife. They met in the house of the defendant’s godmother. They proceeded to the
house of Pedro, cousin of the plaintiff where they stayed for 1 day and 1 night as husband and wife. The next day, they slept together in their own house.
He tried to verify with Leonila the truth on the information he received but instead of answering, she merely packed up and left which he took as a
confirmation of the acts of infidelity. He then filed a complaint for legal separation.
ISSUE: Whether there was condonation between Bugayong and Ginez that may serve as a ground for dismissal of the action.
HELD:
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation. A single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the
parties ordinarily is sufficient to constitute condonation and where the parties live in the same house, it is presumed that they live on terms of matrimonial
cohabitation.
Furthermore, Art. 100 of the Civil Code states that the legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no
condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage.
48. WILLIAM H. BROWN vs. JUANITA YAMBAO

G.R. No. L-10699 October 18, 1957
Facts:
On July 14, 1955, William H. Brown filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila to obtain legal separation from his lawful wife Juanita Yambao. He
alleged under oath that while interned by the Japanese invaders, from 1942 to 1945, at the University of Sto. Tomas internment camp, his wife engaged in
adulterous relations with one Carlos Field of whom she begot a baby girl. Brown learned of his wife‘s misconduct only in 1945, upon his release from
internment. Thereafter the spouse lived separately. Yambao however testified that after liberation, Brown lived martially with another woman and had
begotten children by her.
The court denied the legal separation filed on the ground that Brown‘s action had already prescribed.
Issue:
Whether or not the action had already prescribed.
Ruling:
The court below also found, and correctly held that the appellant's action was already barred, because Brown did not petition for legal separation
proceedings until ten years after he learned of his wife's adultery, which was upon his release from internment in 1945. Under Article 102 of the new Civil
Code, action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one (1) year from and after the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years
from and after the date when such cause occurred. Appellant's brief does not even contest the correctness of such findings and conclusion. The courts can
take cognizance of prescription as a defense because actions seeking a decree of legal separation, or annulment of marriage, involve public interest and it is
the policy of our law that no such decree be issued if any legal obstacles thereto appear upon the record.
49. Pacete vs Carriaga

231 SCRA 321
FACTS:
Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita
de la Concepcion, as well as for legal separation between her and Pacete, accounting and separation of property. She averred in her complaint that she
was married to Pacete on April 1938 and they had a child named Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently contracted a second marriage with Clarita de la
Concepcion and that she learned of such marriage only on August 1979. Reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred
to continue living with Clarita.
The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an extension within which to file an answer, which the court partly granted. Due to unwanted
misunderstanding, particularly in communication, the defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the court. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion
to declare the defendants in default, which the court forthwith granted. The court received plaintiffs’ evidence during the hearings held on February 15, 20,
21, and 22, 1980. After trial, the court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff on March 17,1980.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file their answer, in declaring
petitioners in default and in rendering its decision on March 17, 1980 which decreed the legal separation of Pacete and Alanis and held to be null and void
the marriage of Pacete to Clarita.
HELD:
The Civil Code provides that “no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-
appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between parties exists. If there is no
collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.”
The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of
marriages, under Article 88) is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract.
Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an action for legal separation must “in no case be tried before six
months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition,” obviously in order to provide the parties a “cooling-off” period. In this interim, the court should
take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.
The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further or underscored by the inclusion of a provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court
which provides that no defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or for legal separation. Therefore, “if the defendant in an action for annulment of
marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties
exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.”
50. Macadangdang vs. CA

108 SCRA 314
Facts:
Respondent Elizabeth Mejias is a married woman, her husbandbeing Crispin Anahaw. She allegedly had intercourse with petitioner Antonio Macadangdang
sometime in March, 1967. She also alleges that due to the affair, she and her husband separated in 1967. She gave birth to a baby boy who was named
Rolando Macadangdang in baptismal rites. Respondent, then plaintiff, filed a complaint for recognition and support against petitioner, then defendant, with
the CIF of Davao. Defendant, now petitioner, Macadangdang filed his answer, opposing plaintiff's claim and praying for its dismissal. The lower court in a
pre-trial conference, issued a Pre-trial Order formalizing certain stipulations, admissions and factual issues on which both parties agreed. Correspondingly,
upon agreement of the parties, an amended complaint was filed by plaintiff. In its decision rendered, thelower court dismissed the complaint. The decision
invoked positiveprovisions of the Civil Code and Rules of Court and authorities.
Issue:
Whether or not the wife may institute an action that would bastardize her child without giving her husband, the legally presumed father, an opportunity to
be heard.
Ruling:
SC find no merit in petitioner’s submission that the questioned decision had not become final and executory since the law explicitly andclearly provides for
the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugalpartnership as among the effects of the final decree of legal separation. It also appears that her claim against
petitioner is a disguised attempt to evade the responsibility and consequence of her reckless behavior at the expense of her husband, her illicit lover and
above all her own son. For this Court to allow, much less consent to, the bastardizationof respondent's son would give rise to serious and far-
reachingconsequences on society. This Court will not tolerate scheming married women who would indulge in illicit affairs with married men and then exploit
the children born during such immoral relations by using them to collect from such moneyed paramours. This would be the form of wrecking the stability of
two families. This would be a severe assault on morality.

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1.

2. San Luis vs San Luis

3. Uy vs. CA , November 29, 2000

4. Tarrosa , DeLeon v. De Leon, July 23, 2009

5. Dela Cruz vs Dela Cruz 130 Phil 324

7. Johnson & Johnson vs CA

9. BPI vs Posadas 56 Phil 215

10. Wong vs IAC

12. CHING vs. COURT OF APPEALS

15. Francisco vs Master Iron Works

16. Abing vs Waeyan Digest

17. Tumlos vs Fernandez

20. Tumlos vs Fernandez

21. Martinez vs Martinez

23. Modequillo vs. Breva 185 SCRA 766

24. Manacop vs. CA

26. Belen Sagad ANGELES vs Aleli “Corazon” Angeles MAGLAYA

27. Andal vs Macaraig

29. GERARDO B. CONCEPCION vs. CA and MA. THERESA ALMONTE

31. Eceta vs Eceta

33. Jison vs. CA

34. SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ VS GRACIA

35. Tumlos vs Fernandez

36. Diwata Ramos Landingin vs. Republic, G.R. No. 164948

38. Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda

40. Salientes vs Abanilla

41. St. Mary's Academy vs Carpitanos

42. Libi vs. IAC

43. Laperal vs. Republic

44. Llaneta vs Agrava Case Digest

45. Lapuz-Sy vs. Eufemio

46. Gandiongco vs Penaranda

47. Bugayong vs Ginez

48. WILLIAM H. BROWN vs. JUANITA YAMBAO

49. Pacete vs Carriaga

50. Macadangdang vs. CA

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