ALFREDO P. PACIS and CLEOPATRA D.

PACIS, petitioners, A criminal case for homicide was filed against Matibag before branch VII of
vs. this Court. Matibag, however, was acquitted of the charge against him
because of the exempting circumstance of “accident” under Art. 12, par. 4 of
the Revised Penal Code.

JEROME JOVANNE MORALES, respondent On 8 April 1998, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of petitioners.
G.R. No. 169467
February 25, 2010 Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its Decision5dated 11 May
Ponente: CARPIO, J.: 2005, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s Decision and absolved
respondent from civil liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.6
Nature of the Case
This petition for review. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals
denied in its Resolution dated 19 August 2005.
Brief:
Assails the 11 May 2005 Decision and the 19 August 2005 Resolution of the Hence, this petition.
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60669.
Action of Court/s:
FACTS: RTC: In favor of petitioners ordering defendants to pay damages
CA: Reversed the decision of the RTC
On January 19, 1991, Alfred Dennis Pacis, then 17 years old and a first year SC: Defendant is negligent, thus civilly liable.
student at the Baguio Colleges Foundation taking up BS Computer Science,
died due to a gunshot wound in the head which he sustained while he was at Issue:
the Top Gun Firearm[s] and Ammunition[s] Store located at Upper Mabini
Street, Baguio City. Whether respondent, as a gun owner may be held civilly liable.

The gun store was owned and operated by defendant Jerome Jovanne
Morales.
With Alfred Pacis at the time of the shooting were Aristedes Matibag and
Jason Herbolario. They were sales agents of the defendant, and at that
particular time, the caretakers of the gun store.
The bullet which killed Alfred Dennis Pacis was fired from a gun brought in
by a customer of the gun store for repair.
Rationale:
YES.
As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable about
firearms safety and should have known never to keep a loaded weapon in his
store to avoid unreasonable risk of harm or injury to others. Respondent has
the duty to ensure that all the guns in his store are not loaded. Firearms should
be stored unloaded and separate from ammunition when the firearms are not
needed for ready-access defensive use.16 With more reason, guns accepted by
the store for repair should not be loaded precisely because they are defective
and may cause an accidental discharge such as what happened in this case.
Respondent was clearly negligent when he accepted the gun for repair and
placed it inside the drawer without ensuring first that it was not loaded. In the
first place, the defective gun should have been stored in a vault. Before
accepting the defective gun for repair, respondent should have made sure that
it was not loaded to prevent any untoward accident. Indeed, respondent should
never accept a firearm from another person, until the cylinder or action is open
and he has personally checked that the weapon is completely unloaded.17 For
failing to insure that the gun was not loaded, respondent himself was
negligent. Furthermore, it was not shown in this case whether respondent had
a License to Repair which authorizes him to repair defective firearms to
restore its original composition or enhance or upgrade firearms.

Clearly, respondent did not exercise the degree of care and diligence required
of a good father of a family, much less the degree of care required of someone
dealing with dangerous weapons, as would exempt him from liability in this
case.

Supreme Court Ruling:

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 11 May 2005

Decision and the 19 August 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 60669. We REINSTATE the trial court’s Decision dated 8 April
1998.
 medical and hospitalization expenses, the cost of the motorcycle’s repair,
PHILIPPINE HAWK CORPORATION, petitioner
attorney’s fees, and other just and equitable reliefs.
vs.
VIVIAN TAN LEE, respondent. The accident involved a motorcycle, a passenger jeep, and a bus with Body
No. 119. The bus was owned by petitioner Philippine Hawk Corporation, and
was then being driven by Margarito Avila.
G.R. No. 166869
In its Decision dated March 16, 2001, the trial court rendered judgment
February 16, 2010
against petitioner and defendant Margarito Avila. The trial court found that
Ponente: PERALTA, J.
before the collision, the motorcycle was on the left side of the road, just as the
passenger jeep was. Prior to the accident, the motorcycle was in a running
Nature of the Case:
position moving toward the right side of the highway. The trial court agreed
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
with the bus driver that the motorcycle was moving ahead of the bus from the
left side of the road toward the right side of the road, but disagreed that the
Brief:
motorcycle crossed the path of the bus while the bus was running on the right
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 of the Decision of the Court of
side of the road.
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 70860, promulgated on August 17, 2004,
affirming with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court with
of Quezon City, Branch 102, dated March 16, 2001, in Civil Case No. Q-91-
modification in the award of damages.
9191, ordering petitioner Philippine Hawk Corporation and Margarito Avila
to jointly and severally pay respondent Vivian Tan Lee damages as a result of
Action of Courts:
a vehicular accident.
RTC: The trial court found Margarito Avila guilty of simple negligence.
CA: affirmed the decision of the trial court with modification in the award of
FACTS:
damages.
SC: Sustained the Court of Appeals
On March 15, 2005, respondent Vivian Tan Lee filed before the RTC of
Quezon City a Complaint2 against petitioner Philippine Hawk Corporation
Issue/s:
and defendant Margarito Avila for damages based on quasi-delict, arising
from a vehicular accident that occurred on March 17, 1991 in Barangay
1. Whether or not negligence may be attributed to petitioner’s driver, and
Buensoceso, Gumaca, Quezon. The accident resulted in the death of
whether negligence on his part was the proximate cause of the accident,
respondent’s husband, Silvino Tan, and caused respondent physical injuries.
resulting in the death of Silvino Tan and causing physical injuries to
respondent.
On June 18, 1992, respondent filed an Amended Complaint,3 in her own
2. Whether or not petitioner is liable to respondent for damages.
behalf and in behalf of her children, in the civil case for damages against
3. Whether or not the damages awarded by respondent Court of Appeals are
petitioner. Respondent sought the payment of indemnity for the death of
proper.
Silvino Tan, moral and exemplary damages, funeral and interment expenses,
Rationale:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
1. YES. Petitioner seeks a review of the factual findings of the trial court, Appeals dated August 17, 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 70860 is hereby
which were sustained by the Court of Appeals, that petitioner’s driver AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Philippine Hawk Corporation
was negligent in driving the bus, which caused physical injuries to and Margarito Avila are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally
respondent and the death of respondent’s husband. The rule is settled that respondent Vivian Lee Tan: (a) civil indemnity in the amount of Fifty
the findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00); (b) actual damages in the amount of One
Appeals, are conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence on Hundred Twenty-Seven Thousand One Hundred Ninety-Two Pesos and
record. The Court has carefully reviewed the records of this case, and Eighty-Five Centavos (P127,192.85); (c) moral damages in the amount of
found no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the trial court. Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80,000.00); (d) indemnity for loss of earning
2. YES. Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to capacity in the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00); and (e)
another, there instantly arises a presumption that the employer failed to temperate damages in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00).
exercise the due diligence of a good father of the family in the selection
or supervision of its employees. To avoid liability for a quasi- Costs against petitioner.
delict committed by his employee, an employer must overcome the
presumption by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care
and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision
of his employee. The Court upholds the finding of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals that petitioner is liable to respondent, since it failed to
exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and
supervision of its bus driver, Margarito Avila, for having failed to
sufficiently inculcate in him discipline and correct behavior on the road.
Indeed, petitioner’s tests were concentrated on the ability to drive and
physical fitness to do so. It also did not know that Avila had been
previously involved in sideswiping incidents.
3. YES. The Court of Appeals correctly awarded civil indemnity for the
death of respondent’s husband, temperate damages, and moral damages
for the physical injuries sustained by respondent in addition to the
damages granted by the trial court to respondent. The trial court
overlooked awarding the additional damages, which were prayed for by
respondent in her Amended Complaint. The appellate court is clothed
with ample authority to review matters, even if they are not assigned as
errors in the appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary in
arriving at a just decision of the case.

Supreme Court Ruling: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee

vs.
JESSIE VILLEGAS MURCIA, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 182460
March 9, 2010
Ponente: PEREZ, J.
Nature of the Case:
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Brief:
The subject of review is the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming with
modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which found
appellant Jessie Villegas Murcia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes
of arson and frustrated homicide.
FACTS:
In an Information dated 6 April 2004, appellant was accused of the crime of
arson committed as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of March, 2004, in the Municipality of Bauang,
Province of La Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, motivated by some evil motive,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously set fire and burn a
residential house knowing the same to be inhabited by one FELICIDAD M.
QUILATES burning and killing said FELICIDAD M. QUILATES as well as
burning and damaging nine (9) other neighboring houses in the process, to the
damage and prejudice of said house-owners in the aggregate amount of
THREE MILLION PESOS (Php3,000,000.00), Philippines Currency, as well
as to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of FELICIDAD QUILATES.
The charge is qualified by the resulting death of Felicidad M. Quilates.
Appellant was also charged in another Information for frustrated homicide,
the accusatory portion reads:
That on or about the 24th day of March, 2004, in the Municipality of Bauang,
Province of La Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with a knife
one, Alicia Q. Manlupig inflicting upon the latter stab wounds, thus
performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of
homicide as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it be reason of
causes independent of the will; that is, by the timely medical attendance
rendered to said Alicia Q. Manlupig which prevented her death, all to the
damage and prejudice of said offended party.
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. Trial on the
merits ensued.
On 30 May 2006, decision was rendered by the RTC, finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of arson and frustrated homicide. The trial court
found that the corpus delicti in arson, as well as the identity of the perpetrator,
were established beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. While there
was no evidence to directly link appellant to the crime, the trial court relied
on circumstantial evidence.
In view of the penalty imposed, the case was forwarded to the Court of
Appeals for automatic review and judgment.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s findings but reduced the
penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.
Appellant filed a notice of appeal, which was given due course by the Court
of Appeals on 22 January 2008. In a Resolution dated 7 July 2008, this Court
required the parties to simultaneously submit their respective supplemental
briefs. Appellant and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) both filed their
manifestations, stating that they would no longer file any supplemental briefs 2. The award of P10,000.00 as actual damages in favor of the heirs of
and instead adopt their respective briefs. Felicidad Quilates is deleted.

Appellant admitted to the crime of frustrated homicide, hence the review is 3. Appellant is ordered to pay Eulogio Quilates the amount of P200,000.00
limited to the crime of arson. as temperate damages.

Actions of the Court: The award of P250,000.00 as actual damages in favor of Eulogio Quilates is
RTC: Appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of arson and frustrated deleted.
homicide.
CA: Affirmed the trial court’s findings but reduced the penalty from death
to reclusion perpetua.
SC: Affirmed the CA with modifications as to award.

Issue:

Whether the award for temperate damages is proper.

Rationale:

YES. We award temperate damages in accordance with Art. 2224 of the Civil
Code, providing that temperate damages may be recovered when the court
finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from
the nature of the case, be proven with certainty. It is thus reasonable to expect
that the value of the house burned down amounted to at least P200,000.00.

Supreme Court Ruling:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision finding appellant JESSIE VILLEGAS

MURCIA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of arson and
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS:

1. Appellant is ordered to indemnify the heirs of Felicidad Quilates the

amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 as death indemnity; and
P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee
vs.
MARCELO BUSTAMANTE y ZAPANTA, NEIL BALUYOT y
TABISORA, RICHARD DELOS TRINO y SARCILLA, HERMINIO
JOSE y MONSON, EDWIN SORIANO y DELA CRUZ and ELMER
SALVADOR y JAVALE, appellants.
G.R. No. 172357
March 19, 2010
Ponente: DEL CASTILLO, J.
Nature of the Case:
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Brief:
This is an appeal from the July 19, 2005 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00665 which affirmed in toto the March 17,
2000 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch
109, finding the appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder. Also assailed is the March 6, 2006 Resolution3 of the CA denying
the separate motions for reconsideration filed by the appellants.
FACTS:
On May 22, 1998, two Informations were filed against the herein appellants,
together with Carlito Lingat and Mutalib Abdulajid, charging them with the
crimes of Murder and Arbitrary Detention. The Informations read:
That in the early morning of June 01, 1997, between 2:00 to 3:00 o’clock [in
the morning], or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Pasay City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused
NEIL BALUYOT, RICHARD DELOS TRINO, HERMINIO JOSE, EDWIN
SORIANO, MARCELO BUSTAMANTE, and CARLITO LINGAT, all
public officers, being then members of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Force, assigned [at] the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), and
accused ELMER SALVADOR and MUTALIB ABDULAJID, security
guards, also assigned at the NAIA, conspiring and confederating with one
another, with intent to kill and taking advantage of their superior strength, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously tie a plastic nylon cord
around the neck of one Romeleo A. Quintos, and hang him at the end portion
of the detention cell, which caused the instantaneous death of said Romeleo
A. Quintos to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said victim.
That on or about June 01, 1997, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, all
public officers, being then members of the Philippine National Police Force
assigned at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, conspiring and
confederating with each other, committing the offense in relation to their
office, and without any legal ground, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously detain and restrain Romeleo A. Quintos of his personal
liberty, without his consent and against his will since midnight of May 31,
1997 until around 3:15 a.m. of June 01, 1997 when said Romeleo A. Quintos
was found dead inside the detention cell.
Neil Baluyot (Baluyot), Richard Delos Trino (Delos Trino), Herminio Jose
(Jose), Edwin Soriano (Soriano), Marcelo Bustamante (Bustamante), Carlito
Lingat (Lingat) and Elmer Salvador (Salvador), were arraigned on July 14,
1998 where they all entered a plea of not guilty. Mutalib Abdulajid
(Abdulajid) remains at large.
After due proceedings, the trial court promulgated its Decision dated March
17, 2000, the decretal portion reads:
“In view of all the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Neil
Baluyot yTabisora, Richard delos Trino y Sarcilla, Herminio Jose y Mozon,
Edwin Soriano y dela Cruz, Marcelo Bustamante y Zapanta, Carlito
Lingat ySalvador, Elmer Salvador y Javale, and Mutalib Abdulajid guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER in Criminal Case No. 98-0457. It
appearing on evidence that the accused voluntarily surrendered at the
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group as evidenced by Exh. 21, the
Court credits them with the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender
and hereby sentences each of them to RECLUSION PERPETUA and for each
accused to pay the heirs of the victim indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00.
In Criminal Case No. 98-0548 for Arbitrary Detention, it appearing from the
evidence that the victim Romeleo Quintos was detained at the IID for three
(3) hours and fifteen (15) minutes, the same is punished or penalized under
Art. 124, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.
The CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC in a Decision dated July 19, 2005.
Actions of the Court:
RTC: Appellants are found guilty.
CA: affirmed the Decision of the RTC
SC:Decision of the CA is modified.
Issue:
Whether the award for exemplary damages is proper.
Rationale:
YES.
We note that both the trial court and the CA awarded the heirs of the victim
only the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. In line with prevailing
jurisprudence, we also award the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages.
Further, we also award the amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages
pursuant to our ruling in People v. Angeles, 596 SCRA 304 (2009) where we
held that “under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be
awarded in criminal cases when the crime was committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances, (in this case, abuse of superior strength). This is
intended to serve as deterrent to serious wrongdoings and as vindication of
undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured, or as a
punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. The imposition of
exemplary damages is also justified under Article 2229 of the Civil Code in
order to set an example for the public good.” In addition, and in lieu of actual
damages, we also award temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00.
Supreme Court Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the July 19, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00665 is MODIFIED. Appellants Neil Baluyot, Richard
Delos Trino, Herminio Jose, Edwin Soriano, Marcelo Bustamante, and Elmer
Salvador, are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
pay the heirs of Romeleo Quintos the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages,
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P3,000,000.00 as lost income. In view
of the death of Carlito Lingat pending appeal and prior to the finality of his
conviction, Criminal Case No. 98-0547 is DISMISSED and the appealed
Decision is SET ASIDE insofar as Carlito Lingat is concerned. Insofar as
Mutalib Abdulajid is concerned, the March 17, 2000 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109 in Criminal Case No. 98-0547 is
NULLIFIED for failure of the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over his
person. Consequently, the appealed July 19, 2005 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00665 is likewise SET ASIDE insofar as
Mutalib Abdulajid is concerned.
ROÑO SEGURITAN y JARA, petitioner
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent
G.R. No. 172896
April 19, 2010
Ponente: DEL CASTILLO, J.
Nature of the Case:
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals.
Brief:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated February 24, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR No. 25069 which
affirmed with modification the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 06 in Criminal Case No. VI-892 finding petitioner
Roño Seguritan y Jara guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide. Likewise impugned is the Resolution dated May 23, 2006 which
denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
FACTS:
On October 1, 1996, petitioner was charged with Homicide in an
Information,6 the accusatory portion of which reads as follows:
“That on or about November 25, 1995, in the municipality of Gonzaga,
province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, ROÑO SEGURITAN y JARA alias Ranio, with intent
to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack
and box one Lucrecio Seguritan, inflicting upon the latter head injuries which
caused his death.
During the arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter,
trial ensued.
On February 5, 2001, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting petitioner
of homicide.
On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the Judgment of the RTC.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by the CA in
its Resolution dated May 23, 2006.
Courts Actions:
RTC: Convicting petitioner of homicide.
CA: Affirmed the RTC decision
SC: Decision of the CA is affirmed.
Issue:
Whether a civil indemnity may be awarded.
Rationale:
YES.
In lieu of actual damages, the heirs of the victim can still be awarded
temperate damages. When pecuniary loss has been suffered but the amount
cannot, from the nature of the case, be proven with certainty, temperate
damages may be recovered. Temperate damages may be allowed in cases
where from the nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be
adduced, although the court is convinced that the aggrieved party suffered
some pecuniary loss.
Moral damages was correctly awarded to the heirs of the victim without need
of proof other than the fact that a crime was committed resulting in the death
of the victim and that the accused was responsible therefor. The award of
P50,000.00 as moral damages conforms to existing jurisprudence.
Supreme Court Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 25069 finding petitioner Roño Seguritan y Jara
guilty of homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of six years and
one day of prision mayor as minimum, to 12 years and one day of reclusion
temporal as maximum, and to pay the heirs of Lucrecio Seguritan the amounts
of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P135,331.00 as loss of earning capacity
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that petitioner is further ordered to pay
P25,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages, and P50,000.00
as civil indemnity.

NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., petitioner

vs.
SPOUSES EDWARD J. HESHAN AND NELIA L. HESHAN AND
DARA GANESSA L. HESHAN, REPRESENTED BY HER PARENTS
EDWARD AND NELIA HESHAN, respondents
G.R. No. 179117
February 3, 2010
Ponente: CARPIO-MORALES, J.
Nature of the Case:
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court
of Appeals.
FACTS:
In July 1998, Edward Heshan (Edward) purchased three (3) roundtrip tickets
from Northwest Airlines, Inc. (petitioner) for him, his wife Nelia Heshan
(Nelia) and daughter Dara Ganessa Heshan (Dara) for their trip from Manila
to St. Louis, Missouri, USA and back to attend an ice skating competition
where then seven year old Dara was to participate.
When Dara’s participation in the ice skating event ended on August 7, 1998,
the Heshans proceeded to the airport to take the connecting flight from St.
Louis to Memphis on their way to Los Angeles. At the airport, the Heshans
first checked-in their luggage at the airport’s “curbside check-in” near the
entrance.2 Since they arrived three hours early for their 6:05 p.m. flight
(Flight No. 972M), the Heshans whiled away the time at a nearby coffee shop.
At 5:15 p.m. when the check-in counter opened, Edward took to the line
where he was second in the queue. When his turn came and presented the
tickets to petitioner’s customer service agent Ken Carns (Carns) to get the
boarding passes, he was asked to step aside and wait to be called again.
After all the other departing passengers were given their boarding passes, the
Heshans were told to board the plane without any boarding pass given to them
and to just occupy open seats therein. Inside the plane, the Heshans noticed
that only one vacant passenger seat was available, which was offered to Dara,
while Edward and Nelia were directed to occupy two “folding seats” located
at the rear portion of the plane. To respondents, the two folding seats were
crew seats intended for the stewardesses.
Upset that there were not enough passenger seats for them, the Heshans
complained to the cabin crew about the matter but were told that if they did
not like to occupy the seats, they were free to disembark from the plane. And
disembark they did, complaining thereafter to Carns about their situation.
Petitioner’s plane then departed for Memphis without respondents onboard.
The Heshans were later endorsed to and carried by Trans World Airways to
Los Angeles. Respondents arrived in Los Angeles at 10:30 p.m. of the same
day but had to wait for three hours at the airport to retrieve their luggage from
petitioner’s Flight No. 972M. Respondents stayed for five days more in the
U.S. before going back home to Manila.
On September 24, 1998, respondents sent a letter to petitioner to demand
indemnification for the breach of contract of carriage.8 Vialetter of December
4, 1998, petitioner replied that respondents were prohibited to board Flight
No. 972M for “verbally abus[ing] [the] flight crew.”
As their demand remained unheeded, respondents filed a complaint for breach
of contract with damages at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City.
Branch 96 of the RTC, by Decision of August 20, 2002, rendered judgment
in favor of respondents.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, by Decision of June 22, 2007, sustained the
trial court’s findings but reduced the award of moral and exemplary damages
to P2 million and P300,000, respectively.
Reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court, petitioner filed the
present petition for review upon the issues of whether the appellate court.
Courts Actions:

RTC: Rendered judgment in favour of respondents.

CA: Affirmed the RTC
SC: Affirmed the CA with modifications as to award.

Issue:

Whether respondents are entitled to damages.

Rationale:

The petition is in part meritorious. There is a need to substantially reduce the

moral damages awarded by the appellate court. While courts are given
discretion to determine the amount of damages to be awarded, it is limited by
the principle that the amount awarded should not be palpably and
scandalously excessive.

Moral damages are neither intended to impose a penalty to the wrongdoer,

nor to enrich the claimant. Taking into consideration the facts and
circumstances attendant to the case, an award to respondents of P500,000,
instead of P2,000,000, as moral damages is to the Court reasonable.

Supreme Court Ruling:

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals

are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The award of moral damages is
reduced to P500,000. In all other respects, the Decision is AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee

vs.
EMELDO “Pamentolan” OBINA, AMADO RAMIREZ, and
CARLITO “Masoc” BALAGBIS, accused; EMELDO “Pamentolan”
OBINA and AMADO RAMIREZ, accused-appellants
G.R. No. 186540
April 14, 2010
Ponente: NACHURA, J decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special
Nature of the Case:
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Brief:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, assailing the Decision1 dated January 30, 2008 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00634.
FACTS:
On February 1, 1996, appellants were charged before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of robbery with rape in an Information which reads:
“That on or about January 30, 1996, at about 1:30 o’clock in the morning at
Brgy. Campesao, Borongan, Eastern Samar and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and
helping one another with intent to gain, with the use of force and intimidation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry
away Eight Hundred Pesos (P800.00) cash belonging to the herein offended
party and on the occasion of said robbery said Imeldo Obina alias
PAMENTOLAN, with lewd design and with the use of force and intimidation
and in conspiracy with his other co-accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the offended party
[AAA] against her will.
When arraigned, all the accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
On February 6, 1998, the RTC of Borongan, Eastern Samar, rendered a
complex crime of Robbery with Rape.
Appellants Obina and Ramirez filed their respective appeals; while accused
Balagbis withdrew his appeal on January 21, 2000.
On January 30, 2008, the CA rendered a Decision which affirmed the RTC
decision.
Hence, this appeal.
Courts Actions:
RTC: Finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex
crime of Robbery with Rape
CA: Affirmed the RTC Decision.
SC: Affirmed the CA.
Issue:
Whether civil indemnity is proper.
Rationale:
YES. The civil indemnity and moral damages are separately granted in rape
cases without need of proof other than the commission of the crime. Civil
indemnity is mandatorily awarded to the rape victim on the finding that rape
was committed.10It is in the nature of actual or compensatory damages.
Similarly, moral damages are automatically awarded to rape victims without
need of pleading or proof; it is assumed that a rape victim actually suffered
moral injuries, entitling her to this award. That the victim suffered trauma,
with mental, physical, and psychological suffering, is too obvious to still
require recital at the trial by the victim, since we assume and acknowledge
such agony as a gauge of her credibility.

Supreme Court Ruling:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated January 30, 2008
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00634 is hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against appellants.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee

vs.
ALBERTO TABARNERO and GARY TABARNERO, accused-
appellants
G.R. No. 168169
February 24, 2010
Ponente: LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J admitted having killed Ernesto, but claimed that it was an act of self-defense.
Nature of the Case:
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Brief:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-
H.C. No. 00027 dated April 29, 2005. In said Decision, the Court of Appeals
affirmed with modification the August 29, 2002 Decision2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 78 of Malolos, Bulacan, in Crim. Case No. 888-
M-2000, convicting herein appellants Alberto Tabarnero (Alberto) and Gary
Tabarnero (Gary) of the crime of Murder.
FACTS:
Late at night on October 23, 1999, Gary went to the house of the deceased
Ernesto Canatoy (Ernesto), where the former used to reside as the live-in
partner of Mary Jane Acibar (Mary Jane), Ernesto’s stepdaughter. Gary and
Ernesto had a confrontation during which the latter was stabbed nine times,
causing his death. The versions of the prosecution and the defense would later
diverge as regards the presence of other persons at the scene and other
circumstances concerning Ernesto’s death.
On 27 March 2000, warrants for the arrest of Gary and Alberto were issued
by the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan.
On April 22, 2001, Gary surrendered to Barangay TanodEdilberto
Alarma.5 When he was arraigned on April 30, 2001, Gary pleaded NOT
GUILTY to the crime charged. During this time, Alberto remained at large.
On May 21, 2001, a pre-trial conference was conducted. Therein, Gary
Thus, pursuant to Section 11(e), Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, a reverse trial
ensued.
On August 29, 2002, the RTC rendered its Decision convicting Gary and
Alberto of the crime of murder.
Gary and Alberto appealed to this Court. After the parties had filed their
respective briefs, this Court, in People v. Mateo, modified the Rules of Court
in so far as it provides for direct appeals from the RTC to this Court in cases
where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
Pursuant thereto, this Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals, where
it was docketed as CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00027.
On April 29, 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction with
modification as regards exemplary damages.
From the Court of Appeals, the case was elevated to this Court anew when
Gary and Alberto filed a Notice of Appeal on May 13, 2005.34 In its
Resolution on August 1, 2005, this Court required both parties to submit their
respective supplemental briefs, if they so desire. Both parties manifested that
they were adopting the briefs they had earlier filed with this Court.
Courts Actions:
RTC: Convicting Gary and Alberto of the crime of murder.
CA: Affirmed the RTC Decision with modification as to exemplary damages.
SC: Affirmed CA Decision.
Issue:
Whether the award for damages should include civil indemnity ex delito.
Rationale:
YES. The Solicitor General claims that the award of P55,600.00 in actual
damages is not proper, considering the lack of receipts supporting the same.
However, we held in People v. Torio, 404 SCRA 623 (2003) that: Ordinarily,
receipts should support claims of actual damages, but where the defense does
not contest the claim, it should be granted. Accordingly, there being no
objection raised by the defense on Alma Paulo’s lack of receipts to support
her other claims, all the amounts testified to are accepted. In the case at bar,
Teresita Acibar’s testimony was dispensed with on account of the admission
by the defense that she incurred P55,600.00 in relation to the death of Ernesto.
This admission by the defense is even more binding to it than a failure on its
part to object to the testimony. We therefore sustain the award of actual
damages by the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

The Solicitor General likewise alleges that a civil indemnity ex delito in the
amount of P50,000.00 should be awarded. Article 2206 of the Civil Code
authorizes the award of civil indemnity for death caused by a crime. The
award of said civil indemnity is mandatory, and is granted to the heirs of the
victim without need of proof other than the commission of the crime.
However, current jurisprudence have already increased the award of civil
indemnity ex delictoto P75,000.00. We, therefore, award this amount to the
heirs of Ernesto.

Supreme Court Ruling:

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C.

No. 00027 dated April 29, 2005 is hereby AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that appellants Alberto and Gary Tabarnero are further
ordered to pay the heirs of Ernesto Canatoy the amount of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity.

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, petitioner

vs.
REYNALD R. SUAREZ, respondent
G.R. No. 167750
March 15, 2010
Ponente: CARPIO, J his secretary, Petronila Garaygay (Garaygay), to confirm from BPI whether
Nature of the Case:
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals.
Brief:
This petition for review1 assails the Decision dated 30 November 20042 and
Resolution dated 11 April 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
76988, affirming the trial court’s decision of 18 October 2002 and denying
reconsideration.
FACTS:
Respondent Reynald R. Suarez (Suarez) is a lawyer who used to maintain
both savings and current accounts with petitioner Bank of the Philippine
Islands’ (BPI) Ermita Branch from 1988 to 1997.
Sometime in 1997, Suarez had a client who planned to purchase several
parcels of land in Tagaytay City, but preferred not to deal directly with the
land owners. In accordance with his client’s instruction, Suarez transacted
with the owners of the Tagaytay properties, making it appear that he was the
buyer of the lots. As regards the payment of the purchase money, Suarez and
his client made an arrangement such that Suarez’s client would deposit the
money in Suarez’s BPI account and then, Suarez would issue checks to the
sellers. Hence, on 16 June 1997, Suarez’s client deposited a Rizal Commercial
Banking Corporation (RCBC) check with a face value of P19,129,100,
representing the total consideration of the sales, in BPI Pasong Tamo Branch
to be credited to Suarez’s current account in BPI Ermita Branch.
Aware of the banking system’s 3-day check clearing policy, Suarez instructed
the face value of the RCBC check was already credited to his account that
same day of 16 June 1997. According to Garaygay, BPI allegedly confirmed
the same-day crediting of the RCBC check. Relying on this confirmation,
Suarez issued on the same day five checks of different amounts totaling
P19,129,100 for the purchase of the Tagaytay properties.
The next day, Suarez left for the United States (U.S.) for a vacation. While
Suarez was in the U.S., Garaygay informed him that the five checks he issued
were all dishonored by BPI due to insufficiency of funds and that his current
account had been debited a total of P57,200 as penalty for the dishonor.
Suarez’s secretary further told him that the checks were dishonored despite
an assurance from RCBC, the drawee bank for the sum of P19,129,100, that
this amount had already been debited from the account of the drawer on 16
June 1997 and the RCBC check was fully funded.
On 19 June 1997, the payees of the five BPI checks that Suarez issued on 16
June 1997 presented the checks again.
Since the RCBC check (which Suarez’s client issued) had already been
cleared by that time, rendering Suarez’s available funds sufficient, the checks
were honored by BPI.
Subsequently, Suarez sent a letter to BPI demanding an apology and the
reversal of the charges debited from his account. Suarez received a call from
Fe Gregorius, then manager of the BPI Ermita Branch, who requested a
meeting with him to explain BPI’s side. However, the meeting did not
transpire.
Suarez sent another letter to BPI addressed to its president, Xavier Loinaz.
Consequently, BPI representatives asked another meeting with Suarez.
Upon Suarez’s request, BPI delivered to him the five checks which he issued
on 16 June 1997. Suarez claimed that the checks were tampered with,
specifically the reason for the dishonor, prompting him to send another letter
informing BPI of its act of falsification by making it appear that it marked the
checks with “drawn against uncollected deposit (DAUD) and not “drawn
against insufficient fund” (DAIF). In reply, BPI offered to reverse the penalty
charges which were debited from his account, but denied Suarez’s claim for
damages. Suarez rejected BPI’s offer.
Claiming that BPI mishandled his account through negligence, Suarez filed
with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for damages, docketed as Civil
Case No. 98-574.
The Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 136 rendered judgment in
favor of Suarez.
BPI appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s
decision.
The Court of Appeals denied BPI’s motion for reconsideration in its 11 April
2005 Resolution.
Hence, this petition.
Courts Actions:
RTC:BPI was negligent thus, damages was awarded to Suarez.
CA: Affirmed trial court decision.
SC: Sets aside the decision of the CA and all damages. Awards nominal
damages to Suarez.
Issue:
Whether respondent is entitled to damages as a result of petitioner’s
negligence in handling its account.
Rationale:
The following are the conditions for the award of moral damages: (1) there is
an injury—whether physical, mental or psychological—clearly sustained by
the claimant; (2) the culpable act or omission is factually established; (3) the
wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury
sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award of damages is predicated on any
of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
While the erroneous marking of DAIF, which BPI belatedly rectified, was not
the proximate cause of Suarez’s claimed injury, the Court reminds BPI that
its business is affected with public interest. It must at all times maintain a high
level of meticulousness and should guard against injury attributable to
negligence or bad faith on its part. Suarez had a right to expect such high level
of care and diligence from BPI. Since BPI failed to exercise such diligence,
Suarez is entitled to nominal damages to vindicate Suarez’s right to such high
degree of care and diligence. Thus, we award Suarez P75,000.00 nominal
damages.
Supreme Court Ruling:
WHEREFORE, THE COURT GRANTS THE PETITION IN PART. THE
COURT SETS ASIDE THE 30 NOVEMBER 2004 DECISION AND 11
APRIL 2005 RESOLUTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-G.R.
CV NO. 76988, AND DELETES THE AWARD OF ALL DAMAGES AND
FEES. THE COURT AWARDS TO RESPONDENT REYNALD R.
SUAREZ NOMINAL DAMAGES IN THE SUM OF P75,000.00.
ROSIE QUIDET, petitioner
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent
G.R. No. 170289
April 8, 2010
Ponente: DEL CASTILLO, J consequence of which the victim died immediately thereafter.
Nature of the Case:
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Brief:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the Court
of Appeal’s (CA) July 22, 2005 Decision1 in CA-G.R. CR No. 23351 which
affirmed with modifications the March 11, 1999 Decision2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 20 in Criminal Case Nos.
92-079 and 92-080.
FACTS:
On January 13, 1992, petitioner Rosie Quidet (petitioner), Feliciano Taban,
Jr. (Taban), and Aurelio Tubo (Tubo) were charged with homicide in Criminal
Case No. 92-079 for the death of Jimmy Tagarda (Jimmy) allegedly
committed as follows:
“That on or about the 19th day of October 1991 at 8:00 o’clock in the evening,
more or less, at Barangay Looc, Salay, Misamis Oriental, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
Feliciano Taban, Jr., Rosie Quidet and Aurelio Tubo, with intent to kill,
conspiring, confederating, x x x and [sic] helping one another, taking
advantage of the darkness of the night, in order to facilitate the commission
of the offense with the use of sharp pointed x x x instruments which the
accused conveniently provided themselves did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stab one Jimmy Tagarda thus the
victim sustained several wounds in different parts of his body and as a
On even date, the aforesaid accused were charged with frustrated homicide in
Criminal Case No. 92-080 for the stab wounds sustained by Jimmy’s cousin,
Andrew Tagarda (Andrew), arising from the same incident, viz:
“That on or about the 19th day of October 1991 at 8:00 o’clock in the evening,
more or less, at Barangay Looc, Salay, Misamis Oriental, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
with intent to kill, and with the use of sharp pointed x x x instrument, and x x
x conspiring, confederating and helping one another, and taking advantage of
the night [in] order to facilitate the commission of the offense, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and stab one
Andrew Tagarda thereby hitting his left chest and nose, the accused having
performed all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of
Homicide as a consequence except for reason or cause independent of the will
of the accused that is, the stab was deflected by the victim.
Upon arraignment, all the accused entered a plea of not guilty in Criminal
Case No. 92-080 (frustrated homicide). Meanwhile, in Criminal Case No. 92-
079 (homicide), Taban entered a voluntary plea of guilt while petitioner and
Tubo maintained their innocence. Accordingly, on June 24, 1992, the trial
court rendered a partial judgment sentencing Taban to imprisonment of six
(6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years,
two (2) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and
ordering him to pay the heirs of Jimmy P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity. Thereafter, joint trial ensued.
On May 16, 1995, the RTC rendered a judgment finding petitioner and Tubo
guilty of homicide and all three accused (petitioner, Tubo and Taban) guilty
of frustrated homicide.
From this judgment, only petitioner appealed to the CA.
On July 22, 2005, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision, affirming with indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as temperate
modifications, the judgment of the RTC. damages.

The CA also deleted the award of civil indemnity to the heirs of Andrew
because the same was not fully substantiated.
Courts Actions:
RTC: Guilty of frustrated homicide.
CA: Affirmed with modifications the RTC decision.
SC: Affirmed with modification the CA decision.
Issue:
2) In Criminal Case No. 92-080, Feliciano Taban, Jr. and Aurelio Tubo are
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted homicide and are meted
the sentence of four (4) months of arresto mayor in its medium period as
minimum to four (4) years of prision correccional in its medium period as
maximum. They are ordered to solidarily pay Andrew Tagarda P30,000.00 as
moral damages. Rosie Quidet is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
slight physical injuries and is meted the sentence of fifteen (15) days
of arresto menor. He is ordered to pay Andrew Tagrda P5,000.00 as moral
damages.

Whether the CA is correct in deleting the award of civil indemnity to the heirs 3) The period of preventive imprisonment of Feliciano Taban, Jr., Aurelio
of Andrew because the same was not fully substantiated. Tubo and Rosie Quidet shall be credited in their favor in accordance with
Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
Rationale:
4) The bail bond of Rosie Quidet is cancelled.
NO. Civil indemnity is automatically granted to the heirs of the deceased
victim without need of further evidence other than the fact of the commission
of the crime. In addition, the trial court should have awarded moral damages
in the sum of P50,000.00 in consonance with current jurisprudence. As to
actual damages, the prosecution was able to prove burial-related expenses
with supporting receipt only to the extent of P5,000.00.

Supreme Court Ruling:

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The July 22, 2005

Decision of the Court of Appeal’s in CA-G.R. CR No. 23351 is AFFIRMED
with the following MODIFICATIONS:

1) In Criminal Case No. 92-079, Rosie Quidet is found guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of slight physical injuries and is meted the sentence of
fifteen (15) days of arresto menor. He is ordered to pay the heirs of Jimmy PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee
Tagarda P5,0000.00 as moral damages. Feliciano Taban, Jr. and Aurelio Tubo vs.
are ordered to solidarily pay the heirs of Jimmy Tagarda P50,0000 as civil ROLANDO BAUTISTA IROY, appellant
G.R. No. 187743
March 3, 2010
Ponente: NACHURA, J reported what he saw to their Zone Leader, a certain Evelyn Geraldino
Nature of the Case:
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Brief:
For final review by the Court is the trial court’s conviction of appellant
Rolando Bautista Iroy for qualified rape. In the December 15, 2008
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02947, the
appellate court affirmed with modification the June 22, 2007 Decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 69, Pasig City, in Criminal Case Nos.
128200-H and 128201-H.
FACTS:
Appellant, a widower and a fish ball vendor, rented a room in the house of
prosecution witness Jojo Sarmiento (Sarmiento). Appellant lived there
together with his daughter AAA and son BBB. At around 8:30 p.m. on May
31, 2004, while Sarmiento was in the restroom answering the call of nature,
he noticed that the partition wall was shaking. He got out of the restroom and
moved closer to the partition wall, which also served as the wall of appellant’s
room. Intrigued, Sarmiento peeped through a hole on the wall and, to his
surprise, he saw appellant and his daughter standing face to face, with
appellant’s shorts pushed down to his knees, while his daughter AAA was
naked. Appellant was having sexual intercourse with his daughter in a
standing position. AAA was pushing appellant but the latter persisted in
having sexual intercourse with her. After satisfying his lust, appellant ordered
his daughter to get dressed.
Sarmiento did not try to stop appellant, since the former was afraid that the
latter might create a scandal or commotion. The following day, Sarmiento
(Geraldino), and asked her to report the incident to the police.
On June 1, 2004, Geraldino called the Municipality’s Public Order and Safety
Officer, Abdon C. Lozano (Lozano), and reported the incident. Responding
to the report, Lozano immediately went to the house of Geraldino to verify
the information. On his way, he met AAA, whom he confronted. AAA readily
admitted that her father sexually abused her not only on May 31, 2004, but
also on May 15, 2004. Her father purportedly threatened to kill her if she
refused to have sexual intercourse with him.
When examined by Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Paul Ed dela Cruz Ortiz, AAA
was found to be in a non-virgin state. Based on the testimony of Ma. Victoria
Delfin of the National Statistics Office, AAA was fourteen (14) years old at
the time she was sexually abused on May 15 and 31, 2004, it appearing in her
Certificate of Live Birth that AAA was born on October 4, 1989.
Consequently, in an Information dated June 2, 2004, appellant was charged
with qualified rape under paragraph 1(a), Article 266-A of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC). Subsequently, another Information of even date, similarly
charging appellant with qualified rape, was filed before the trial court. Except
for the date of the alleged commission, which was May 31, 2004, said
Information was committed against the same victim and was similarly worded
as the first Information.
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered the June 22, 2007
Decision, convicting appellant of qualified rape and imposing the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. It further ordered appellant to pay the victim the
amount of P75,000.00 as moral damages.
On review, the appellate court affirmed with modification the ruling of the
trial court.
Action of Court/s:
 MODIFICATION that the award for exemplary damages is increased to
RTC: Convict the appellant of qualified rape and imposing the penalty P30,000.00.
of reclusion perpetua. It further ordered appellant to pay the victim the
amount of P75,000.00 as moral damages.
CA: Affirmed the RTC decision.
SC: Amount of Exemplary damages was increased.

Issue:

Whether the appellate court is correct when it modified the award for
damages.

Rationale:

YES. The appellate court correctly ruled when it modified that, in addition to
the award of civil indemnity of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00),
appellant is likewise ordered to pay the victim, AAA, another Seventy-Five
Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as moral damages. Civil indemnity, which is
actually in the nature of actual or compensatory damages, is mandatory upon
the finding of the fact of rape. Moral damages are automatically granted in a
rape case without need of further proof other than the fact of its commission.
For it is assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries
entitling her to such an award.

Exemplary Damages; Amount of exemplary damages should have been

increased to P30,000.00 in accordance with People of the Philippines vs.
Lorenzo Layco, Sr., 587 SCRA 803 (2009).—It, however, erred when it only
awarded Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary damages.
The amount should have been P30,000.00, in accordance with People of the
Philippines v. Lorenzo Layco, Sr., 587 SCRA 803 (2009) in order to serve as
public example and to protect the young from sexual abuse.
Supreme Court Ruling: DORIS U. SUNBANUN, petitioner
vs.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the December 15, 2008 Decision of the AURORA B. GO, respondent
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02947 is AFFIRMED WITH G.R. No. 163280
February 2, 2010
Ponente: CARPIO, J.
Nature of the Case:
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals.
Brief:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the 30 September 2003
Decision and the 18 March 2004 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 67836.
FACTS:
Petitioner Doris U. Sunbanun is the owner of a residential house located at
No. 68-F Junquera Street, Cebu City. On 7 July 1995, respondent Aurora B.
Go leased the entire ground floor of petitioner’s residential house for one year
which was to expire on 7 July 1996. As required under the lease contract,
respondent paid a deposit of P16,000 to answer for damages and unpaid rent.
To earn extra income, respondent accepted lodgers, mostly her relatives, from
whom she received a monthly income of P15,000. Respondent paid the
monthly rental until March 1996 when petitioner drove away respondent’s
lodgers by telling them that they could stay on the rented premises only until
15 April 1996 since she was terminating the lease. The lodgers left the rented
premises by 15 April 1996, and petitioner then padlocked the rooms vacated
by respondent’s lodgers.
On 10 May 1996, respondent filed an action for damages against petitioner.
Respondent alleged that she lost her income from her lodgers for the months
of April, May, and June 1996 totaling P45,000. Respondent, who worked in
Hongkong, also incurred expenses for plane fares and other travel expenses
in coming to the Philippines and returning to Hongkong.
On the other hand, petitioner argued that respondent violated the lease
contract when she subleased the rented premises. Besides, the lease contract
was not renewed after its expiration on 7 July 1996; thus, respondent had no
more right to stay in the rented premises. Petitioner also moved to dismiss the
complaint in the trial court for failure to comply with
prior barangay conciliation.
During the pre-trial, petitioner moved for the case to be submitted for
judgment on the pleadings considering that the only disagreement between
the parties was the correct interpretation of the lease contract. Respondent did
not object to petitioner’s motion. The trial court then directed the parties to
submit their respective memoranda, after which the case would be considered
submitted for decision.
In its decision dated 28 March 2000, the trial court held that the case is not
covered by the barangay conciliation process since respondent is a resident
of Hongkong. The trial court noted that petitioner did not controvert
respondent’s allegation that petitioner ejected respondent’s lodgers sometime
in March 1996 even if the contract of lease would expire only on 7 July 1996.
The trial court found untenable petitioner’s contention that subleasing the
rented premises violated the lease contract. The trial court held that
respondent’s act of accepting lodgers was in accordance with the lease
contract which allows the lessee “to use the premises as a dwelling or as
lodging house.” Thus, the trial court ordered petitioner to pay respondent
actual damages of P45,000 for respondent’s lost income from her lodgers for
the months of April, May, and June 1996, and attorney’s fees of P8,000.
The Court of Appeals held that petitioner’s act of forcibly ejecting
respondent’s lodgers three months prior to the termination of the lease
contract without valid reason constitutes breach of contract. Petitioner also
violated Article 1654 of the Civil Code which states that “the lessor is obliged
to maintain the lessee in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease for
the duration of the contract.” The Court of Appeals awarded P50,000 as moral
damages to respondent for breach of contract and for petitioner’s act of pre-
terminating the lease contract without valid reason, which shows bad faith on WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition. The Court AFFIRMS the 30
the part of petitioner. The Court of Appeals also awarded respondent P50,000 September 2003 Decision and the 18 March 2004 Resolution of the Court of
as exemplary damages for petitioner’s oppressive act. Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67836.

Action of Court/s:

RTC: Ordered the petitioner to pay actual damages.

CA: Awarded moral and exemplary damages.
SC: Affirm the appellate court’s decision.

Issue:

Whether the CA erred in modifying the award for damages.

Rationale:

NO. We agree with the appellate court that petitioner’s act of ejecting
respondent’s lodgers three months before the lease contract expired without
valid reason constitutes bad faith. What aggravates the situation was that
petitioner did not inform respondent, who was then working in Hongkong,
about petitioner’s plan to pre-terminate the lease contract and evict
respondent’s lodgers. Moral damages may be awarded when the breach of
contract was attended with bad faith.

Exemplary Damages; Attorney’s Fees; Award of exemplary damages and

attorney’s fees affirmed.—We affirm the award of exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees. Exemplary damages may be awarded when a wrongful act is
accompanied by bad faith or when the defendant acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner which would justify
an award of exemplary damages under Article 2232 of the Civil Code. Since
the award of exemplary damages is proper in this case, attorney’s fees and
cost of the suit may also be recovered as provided under Article 2208 of the SULPICIO LINES, INC., petitioner
Civil Code. vs.

Supreme Court Ruling:

DOMINGO E. CURSO, LUCIA E. CURSO, MELECIO E. CURSO, hundreds of other passengers of the ill-fated vessel. At the time of his death,
SEGUNDO E. CURSO, VIRGILIO E. CURSO, DIOSDADA E. Dr. Curso was 48 years old, and employed as a resident physician at the Naval
CURSO, and CECILIA E. CURSO, respondents District Hospital in Naval, Biliran. He had a basic monthly salary of
G.R. No. 157009 P3,940.00, and would have retired from government service by December 20,
March 17, 2010 2004 at the age of 65.

On January 21, 1993, the respondents, allegedly the surviving brothers and
Ponente: BERSAMIN, J. sisters of Dr. Curso, sued the petitioner in the RTC in Naval, Biliran to claim
damages based on breach of contract of carriage by sea, averring that the
Nature of the Case: petitioner had acted negligently in transporting Dr. Curso and the other
passengers. They stated, among others, that their parents had predeceased Dr.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Curso, who died single and without issue; and that, as such, they were Dr.
Curso’s surviving heirs and successors in interest entitled to recover moral
Brief: and other damages.1 They prayed for judgment, as follows: (a) compensatory
damages of P1,924,809.00; (b) moral damages of P100,000.00; (c) exemplary
Are the surviving brothers and sisters of a passenger of a vessel that sinks or corrective damages in the amount deemed proper and just; (d) expenses of
during a voyage entitled to recover moral damages from the vessel owner as litigation of at least P50,000.00; (e) attorney’s fees of P50,000.00; and (f)
common carrier? costs of suit.

This is the question presented in the appeal taken by the common carrier from
the reversal by the Court of Appeals (CA) of the decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) dismissing the complaint for various damages filed by the
surviving brothers and sisters of the late Dr. Cenon E. Curso upon a finding
that force majeure had caused the sinking. The CA awarded moral and other
damages to the surviving brothers and sisters.
The petitioner denied liability, insisting that the sinking of the vessel was due
to force majeure (i.e., Typhoon Unsang), which exempted a common carrier
from liability. It averred that the MV Doña Marilyn was seaworthy in all
respects, and was in fact cleared by the Philippine Coast Guard for the voyage;
and that after the accident it conducted intensive search and rescue operations
and extended assistance and aid to the victims and their families.

On July 28, 1995, the RTC dismissed the complaint upon its finding that the
FACTS: sinking of the vessel was due to force majeure. The RTC concluded that the
officers of the MV Doña Marilyn had acted with the diligence required of a
On October 23, 1988, Dr. Curso boarded at the port of Manila the MV Doña common carrier; that the sinking of the vessel and the death of its passengers,
Marilyn, an inter-island vessel owned and operated by petitioner Sulpicio including Dr. Curso, could not have been avoided; that there was no basis to
Lines, Inc., bound for Tacloban City. Unfortunately, the MV Doña consider the MVDoña Marilyn not seaworthy at the time of the voyage; that
Marilyn sank in the afternoon of October 24, 1988 while at sea due to the the findings of the Special Board of Marine Inquiry (SBMI) constituted to
inclement sea and weather conditions brought about by investigate the disaster absolved the petitioner, its officers, and crew of any
Typhoon Unsang. The body of Dr. Curso was not recovered, along with negligence and administrative liability; and that the respondents failed to
prove their claim for damages.

The respondents appealed to the CA, contending that the RTC erred: (a) in
considering itself barred from entertaining the case by the findings of fact of
the SBMI in SBMI-ADM Case No. 08-88; (b)in not holding that the petitioner
was negligent and did not exercise the required diligence and care in
conducting Dr. Curso to his destination; (c) in not finding that the MV Doña
Marilyn was unseaworthy at the time of its sinking; and (d) in not awarding
damages to them.
In its decision dated September 16, 2002,3 the CA held and disposed:
“Based on the events described by the appellee’s witness, the Court found
inadequate proof to show that Sulpicio Lines, Inc., or its officers and crew,
had exercised the required degree of diligence to acquit the appellee of
liability.
In the first place, the court finds inadequate explanation why the officers of
the M.V. Doña Marilyn had not apprised themselves of the weather reports
on the approach of typhoon “Unsang” which had the power of a signal no. 3
cyclone, bearing upon the general direction of the path of the M.V. Doña
Marilyn. If the officers and crew of the Doña Marilyn had indeed been
adequately monitoring the strength and direction of the typhoon, and had
acted promptly and competently to avoid the same, then such a mishap would
not have occurred.
Furthermore, there was no account of the acts and decision of the crew of the
ill-fated ship from 8:00 PM on October 23, 1988 when the Chief Mate left his
post until 4:00 AM the next day when he resumed duty. It does not appear
what occurred during that time, or what weather reports were received and
acted upon by the ship captain. What happened during such time is important
in determining what information about the typhoon was gathered and how the
ship officers reached their decision to just change course, and not take shelter
while a strong typhoon was approaching.
Furthermore, the Court doubts the fitness of the ship for the voyage, since at
the first sign of bad weather, the ship’s hydraulic system failed and had to be
repaired mid-voyage, making the vessel a virtual derelict amidst a raging
storm at sea. It is part of the appellee’s extraordinary diligence as a common
carrier to make sure that its ships can withstand the forces that bear upon them
during a voyage, whether they be the ordinary stress of the sea during a calm
voyage or the rage of a storm. The fact that the stud bolts in the ships hydraulic
system gave way while the ship was at sea discredits the theory that the
appellee exercised due diligence in maintaining the seaworthy condition of
the M.V. Doña Marilyn. xxx.
Hence, this appeal, in which the petitioner insists that the CA committed
grievous errors in holding that the respondents were entitled to moral damages
as the brothers and sisters of the late Dr. Curso; that the CA thereby
disregarded Article 1764 and Article 2206 of the Civil Code, and the ruling
in Receiver for North Negros Sugar Co., Inc. v. Ybañez, whereby the Supreme
Court disallowed the award of moral damages in favor of the brothers and
sisters of a deceased passenger in an action upon breach of a contract of
carriage.
Action of the Court/s:
RTC: Dismissed the complaint.
CA: Respondents were entitled to moral damages.
SC: Award for moral damages were deleted and set aside.
Issue:
Whether the surviving brothers and sisters of a passenger of a vessel that sinks
during a voyage entitled to recover moral damages from the vessel owner as
common carrier.
Rationale:
NO. The solemn power and duty of the courts to interpret and apply the law
do not include the power to correct the law by reading into it was is not written
therein.—As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for
damages predicated on a breach of contract, unless there is fraud or bad faith.
As an exception, moral damages may be awarded in case of breach of contract
of carriage that results in the death of a passenger, in accordance with Article
1764, in relation to Article 2206 (3), of the Civil Code, which provide: x x x
The foregoing legal provisions set forth the persons entitled to moral
damages. The omission from Article 2206 (3) of the brothers and sisters of
the deceased passenger reveals the legislative intent to exclude them from the
recovery of moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the
deceased. Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius. The solemn power and duty of
the courts to interpret and apply the law do not include the power to correct
the law by reading into it what is not written therein. Thus, the CA erred in
awarding moral damages to the respondents.

The purpose of moral damages is indemnity or reparation, that is, to enable

the injured party to obtain the means, diversions, or amusements that will
serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone by reason of the tragic
event. According to Villanueva v. Salvador, 480 SCRA 39 (2006), the
conditions for awarding moral damages are: (a) there must be an injury,
whether physical, mental, or psychological, clearly substantiated by the
claimant; (b) there must be a culpable act or omission factually established;
(c) the wrongful act or omission of the defendant must be the proximate cause
of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (d) the award of damages is
predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. To be
entitled to moral damages, the respondents must have a right based upon law.
It is true that under Article 1003 of the Civil Code they succeeded to the entire
estate of the late Dr. Curso in the absence of the latter’s descendants,
ascendants, illegitimate children, and surviving spouse. However, they were
not included among the persons entitled to recover moral damages, as
enumerated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.

Supreme Court Ruling:

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is granted, and the award
made to the respondents in the decision dated September 16, 2002 of the Court
of Appeals of moral damages amounting to P100,000.00 is deleted and set PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
aside. vs.
ANTHONY RANTE Y REYES, accused-appellant
G.R. No. 184809
March 29, 2010
Ponente: PEREZ, J.
Nature of the Case:
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Brief:
Before Us for final review is the trial court’s conviction of the appellant for
the rape of a twelve-year old girl.
FACTS:
In an Information dated 14 December 2000,2 the appellant was accused of the
crime of RAPE allegedly committed as follows:
“That on or about the 13th day of December 2000, in xxx City, Philippines,
the said accused with force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously grab and drag into a vacant house along xxx Street,
this City, AAA, a minor, 12 years old[,] after hitting her on the head with a
h[o]llow block, and once inside undress her and thereafter had carnal
knowledge of her all against her will and without her consent to the damage
and prejudice of said offended party.”
On 8 February 2001, appellant entered a plea of not guilty.
On trial, four (4) witnesses testified for the prosecution, namely: victim
AAA; Dr. Mary Ann Gajardo, Philippine National Police, Camp Crame,
Quezon City, who confirmed the existence of the medico-legal report
prepared by one of their medico-legal officers; Robert Baltores,
a Barangay Security Development Officer member, who testified on the
series of events relating to the recording of the rape incident at
the barangay outpost and the arrest of appellant; and Vicente Cielo, a member
of the volunteer group in the barangay, who brought the accused to
the barangay.
On 29 July 2004, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 106, Quezon City,
rendered its decision34 in Criminal Case No. Q-00-97271, finding appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape, and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. It also ordered him to indemnify AAA in the
amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
On 28 February 2008, the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED the decision of the
trial court.
On 2 April 2008, the Court of Appeals gave due course to the appellant’s
notice of appeal. This Court required the parties to simultaneously file their
respective supplemental briefs, but both manifested that they will no longer
file supplemental pleadings.
The lone assignment of error in the appellant’s brief is that the trial court
gravely erred in finding him guilty as charged despite the failure of the
prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Action of the Court/s:
RTC: Appellant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape, and sentenced
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. It also ordered him to
indemnify AAA in the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages, and
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
CA: Affirmed the RTC Decision.
SC: Affirmed the appellate court’s decision with modification as to award for
damages.
Issue:
Whether the award for exemplary damages is proper.
 deterrent to elders who abuse and corrupt the youth, and to protect the
Rationale: latter from sexual abuse.

YES. The rich jurisprudence in rape cases shows that there are two legal bases Supreme Court Ruling:
for awarding exemplary damages. People v. Dalisay, 605 SCRA 806 (2009)
is instructive. Thus: [B]y focusing only on Article 2230 as the legal basis for WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the Decision
the grant of exemplary damages—taking into account simply the attendance dated 28 February 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
of an aggravating circumstance in the commission of a crime, courts have lost 00184 finding ANTHONY RANTE Y REYES GUILTY beyond reasonable
sight of the very reason why exemplary damages are awarded. Catubig is doubt of the crime of rape. In addition to the awards of civil indemnity and
enlightening on this point, thus—Also known as ‘punitive’ or ‘vindictive’ moral damages each in the amount of P50,000.00, he is further ordered to pay
damages, exemplary or corrective damages are intended to serve as a deterrent P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
to serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton
invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of
outrageous conduct. These terms are generally, but not always, used
interchangeably. In common law, there is preference in the use of exemplary
damages when the award is to account for injury to feelings and for the sense
of indignity and humiliation suffered by a person as a result of an injury that
has been maliciously and wantonly inflicted, the theory being that there
should be compensation for the hurt caused by the highly reprehensible
conduct of the defendant—associated with such circumstances as willfulness,
wantonness, malice, gross negligence or recklessness, oppression, insult or
fraud or gross fraud—that intensifies the injury. The terms punitive or
vindictive damages are often used to refer to those species of damages that
may be awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct.
In either case, these damages are intended in good measure to deter the
wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct in the future. Being
corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be awarded, not
only in the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also where the
circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous
conduct of the offender. In much the same way as Article 2230 prescribes
an instance when exemplary damages may be awarded, Article 2229, the main
provision, lays down the very basis of the award. xxx Recently, in People of
the Philippines v. Cristino Cañada, 602 SCRA 378 (2009), People of the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
Philippines v. Pepito Neverio, 597 SCRA 149 (2009) and The People of the vs.
Philippines v. Lorenzo Layco, Sr., 587 SCRA 803 (2009), the Court MARIANO OFEMIANO alias Maning, accused-appellant
awarded exemplary damages to set a public example, to serve as G.R. No. 187155
February 1, 2010
Ponente: VELASCO, JR., J to her mother her harrowing experience but the latter dismissed her report.
Nature of the Case:
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Brief:
This is an appeal from the November 10, 2008 Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01356 entitled People of the
Philippines v. Mariano Ofemiano which affirmed the July 17, 2000
Decision in Criminal Case No. 9659-B of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 25 in Biñan, Laguna. The RTC convicted accused-appellant Mariano
Ofemiano of rape.
FACTS:
AAA3 is BBB’s eldest daughter. When BBB separated from her husband, she
left her three children in the care of her mother in Bicol province. In March
1995, however, BBB fetched AAA and brought her to Caloocan City to live
with her and her lover, accused-appellant Mariano Ofemiano, and their
children.
On the very night of AAA’s arrival in Caloocan City, Ofemiano sexually
molested her. At around midnight, while asleep with her half brothers and
mother, AAA was awakened by the weight pressing on her body and saw that
Ofemiano was already on top of her. AAA struggled by pushing Ofemiano
but he was able to hold her arms. He then removed her shorts and panty and
proceeded to have sexual intercourse with her. She tried to awaken her mother
but she could not be roused.
The sexual molestations continued almost everyday thereafter. AAA revealed
In January 1996, the family transferred to Siniloan, Laguna, and then in July
1996 to Biñan, Laguna. Just three days after their transfer, while everyone
else was asleep, Ofemiano crept on top of AAA and pressed his body on her.
He then removed her underwear and pumped his penis into her vagina. To
prevent AAA from screaming, Ofemiano covered her mouth with his hand
and threatened to kill her if she divulged to anyone what he had done.
Afraid of Ofemiano’s threats, and not finding solace from her mother, AAA
just kept quiet. But in September 1996, AAA visited her aunt in Landayan,
San Pedro, Laguna and found the courage to tell the latter about her ordeal.
Enraged, her aunt immediately reported the matter to the authorities.
On September 18, 1996, AAA underwent a medical examination. Municipal
Health Officer Dr. Lolita Macaraig found that AAA’s genitals had several old
healed lacerations, which could have been caused by a penetration of a hard
object or by sexual intercourse.
Thereafter, on February 7, 1997, an Information for rape was filed against
Ofemiano.
During trial, Ofemiano denied the charges against him. He claimed that
AAA’s grandmother concocted the imputation against him because she was
angry at him for cohabiting with her daughter, BBB. He also insinuated that
BBB’s former lover had instigated the false charges against him because he
was jealous of him.
BBB corroborated Ofemiano’s testimony.
In a Decision dated July 17, 2000, the RTC convicted Ofemiano of the crime
of simple rape.
The case was appealed to the CA.
Affirming the credibility of the complaining witness, the CA held that there
was nothing in the victim’s testimony that would render her statements
improbable. The appellate court noted that Ofemiano used his parental
authority over the victim in order to coerce her to submit to his sexual desires.
It also observed that the lack of support from the victim’s mother contributed
to the victim’s sense of helplessness and resignation.
The CA then held that the inconsistencies in the victim’s statements—on the
dates when the rape took place—were immaterial to the gravamen of the
offense and, thus, have no effect on the victim’s credibility.
The CA, however, modified the award of civil indemnity. It reduced the trial
court’s award of civil indemnity from PhP 75,000 to PhP 50,000 in the
absence of evidence proving a larger amount.
Hence, we have this appeal.
dispositive portion of the affirmed July 17, 2000 Decision of the RTC shall
read:
“WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing considerations, the Court
hereby finds accused MARIANO OFEMIANO alias “MANING” GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE as defined and penalized
under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, and accordingly he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
Furthermore, aforesaid accused is hereby ordered to indemnify
complainant the following sums:
a) PhP 50,000—civil indemnity;
b) PhP 50,000—moral damages;
c) PhP 30,000—exemplary damages; and
d) to pay the costs of suit.”

Action of the Court/s:

RTC: Convicted appellant for the crime of simple rape.

CA: Affirmed the RTC decision.
SC: Affirmed the CA but with modifications as to damages.

Issue:

Whether award for damages is proper.

Rationale:

YES. As regards the award of damages, the appellate court correctly reduced
the award of civil indemnity from PhP 75,000 to PhP 50,000 in favor of the
victim. In cases of simple rape, civil indemnity of PhP 50,000 is automatically
awarded without need of pleading or proof.

Supreme Court Ruling: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee

vs.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the CA’s November 10, 2008 Decision ROMULO GARCIA y MACEDA, accused-appellant.
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01356 with MODIFICATION. As modified, the G.R. No. 177740
April 5, 2010
Ponente: VILLARAMA, JR., J.
Nature of the Case:
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Brief:
On appeal is the Decision1 dated July 26, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02170, which affirmed with modification the Decision2 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City, Branch 213, in
Criminal Case No. MC-00-107-H, convicting and sentencing appellant
Romulo Garcia y Maceda to reclusion perpetua for the crime of rape.
FACTS:
On March 27, 2000, an Information for rape was filed against appellant which
reads as follows:
“That on or about the 6th day of January 2000, in the City of Mandaluyong,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie
and have carnal knowledge of one [AAA],4 five (5) years of age and his
grandniece by affinity thus sexual abuse prejudicial to the child’s
development.
Upon arraignment on April 13, 2000, appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio,
pleaded not guilty to the charge. On June 20, 2000, both parties stipulated
during pre-trial that the victim AAA was a minor, being born on June 22,
1994. Thereafter, trial ensued on the merits.
On July 1, 2004, the trial court promulgated its decision convicting appellant
as charged. He is further ordered to indemnify the victim in the amount of
Fifty Thousand (Php 50,000.00) Pesos, by way of moral damages.SO
ORDERED.”
In view of the Death Penalty imposed by the trial court, the entire records of
the case were forwarded to this Court for automatic review. In a
Resolution dated January 24, 2006, the Court referred the case to the Court of
Appeals for appropriate action and disposition pursuant to the Court’s
pronouncement in People v. Mateo.
After a review of the case, the Court of Appeals reduced the penalty of death
imposed by the trial court to reclusion perpetua in view of the abolition of the
Death Penalty by Republic Act No. 9346.
Action of the Court/s:
RTC: Convicted the appellant as charged and ordered to pay moral damages.
CA:Reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetual.
SC: Uphold the award for civil indemnity.
Issue:
Whether the CA properly awarded damages.
Rationale:
YES. We likewise uphold the award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity made
by the courts a quo as the award is in line with existing case law. We have
held that if the rape is perpetrated with any of the attending qualifying
aggravating circumstances that require the imposition of the death penalty,
the civil indemnity for the victim shall be P75,000.00.
In rape cases, moral damages are awarded without need of proof other than
the fact of rape, because it is assumed that the victim has suffered moral
injuries entitling her to such an award. The moral damages awarded in the
instant case, however, should be increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00
pursuant to current jurisprudence on qualified rape. Exemplary damages in
the amount of P30,000.00 are also called for, by way of public example, and
to protect the young from sexual abuse.

Supreme Court Ruling:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 26, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02170 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION
in that appellant is further ordered to indemnify the victim P75,000.00 as
moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

With costs against the accused-appellant.

ROÑO SEGURITAN y JARA, petitioner

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent
G.R. No. 172896
April 19, 2010
Ponente: DEL CASTILLO, J
Nature of the Case:
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals.
Brief:
2
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated February 24, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR No. 25069 which
affirmed with modification the Judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 06 in Criminal Case No. VI-892 finding petitioner
Roño Seguritan y Jara guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide. Likewise impugned is the Resolution dated May 23, 2006 which
denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
FACTS:
On October 1, 1996, petitioner was charged with Homicide in an
Information, the accusatory portion of which reads as follows:
“That on or about November 25, 1995, in the municipality of Gonzaga,
province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, ROÑO SEGURITAN y JARA alias Ranio, with intent
to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack
and box one Lucrecio Seguritan, inflicting upon the latter head injuries which
caused his death.”
During the arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter,
trial ensued.
On February 5, 2001, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting petitioner
of homicide. Actual damages was also awarded.
On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the Judgment of the RTC.
Action of Court/s:
RTC: Convicting petitioner of ho,icide with actual damages awarded.
CA: Loos of earning capacity was awarded.
SC: Affirm the appellate court
Issue:
Whether the award for damages was proper.
Rationale:
YES. As regards the amount of damages, civil indemnity must also be
awarded to the heirs of Lucrecio without need of proof other than the fact that
a crime was committed resulting in the death of the victim and that petitioner
was responsible therefor. Accordingly, we award the sum of P50,000.00 in
line with current jurisprudence.
The award of P135,331.00 for the loss of earning capacity was also in
order. The prosecution satisfactorily proved that the victim was earning an
annual income of P14,000.00 from the harvest of pineapples. Besides, the
defense no longer impugned this award of the trial court.
However, the other awards of damages must be modified. It is error for the
trial court and the appellate court to award actual damages of P30,000.00 for
the expenses incurred for the death of the victim. We perused the records and
did not find evidence to support the plea for actual damages. The expenses
incurred in connection with the death, wake and burial of Lucrecio cannot be
sustained without any tangible document to support such claim. While
expenses were incurred in connection with the death of Lucrecio, actual
damages cannot be awarded as they are not supported by receipts.
In lieu of actual damages, the heirs of the victim can still be awarded
temperate damages. When pecuniary loss has been suffered but the amount
cannot, from the nature of the case, be proven with certainty, temperate
damages may be recovered. Temperate damages may be allowed in cases
where from the nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be
adduced, although the court is convinced that the aggrieved party suffered
some pecuniary loss. In this regard, the amount of P25,000.00 is in accordance
with recent jurisprudence.

Moral damages was correctly awarded to the heirs of the victim without need
of proof other than the fact that a crime was committed resulting in the death
of the victim and that the accused was responsible therefor. The award of
P50,000.00 as moral damages conforms to existing jurisprudence.

Supreme Court Ruling:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 25069 finding petitioner Roño Seguritan y Jara
guilty of homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of six years and
one day of prision mayor as minimum, to 12 years and one day of reclusion
temporal as maximum, and to pay the heirs of Lucrecio Seguritan the amounts
of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P135,331.00 as loss of earning capacity
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that petitioner is further ordered to pay
P25,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages, and P50,000.00
as civil indemnity.

TITUS B. VILLANUEVA, petitioner

vs.
EMMA M. ROSQUETA, respondent
G.R. No. 180764
January 19, 2010
Ponente: ABAD, J
Nature of the Case:
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Brief:
This case is about the right to recover damages for alleged abuse of right
committed by a superior public officer in preventing a subordinate from doing
her assigned task and being officially recognized for it.
FACTS:
Respondent Emma M. Rosqueta (Rosqueta), formerly Deputy Commissioner
of the Revenue Collection and Monitoring Group of the Bureau of Customs
(the Bureau), tendered her courtesy resignation from that post on January 23,
2001, shortly after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office. But
five months later on June 5, 2001, she withdrew her resignation, claiming that
she enjoyed security of tenure and that she had resigned against her will on
orders of her superior.
Meantime, on July 13, 2001 President Arroyo appointed Gil Valera (Valera)
to respondent Rosqueta’s position. Challenging such appointment, Rosqueta
filed a petition for prohibition, quo warranto, and injunction against petitioner
Titus B. Villanueva (Villanueva), then Commissioner of Customs, the
Secretary of Finance, and Valera with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila in Civil Case 01-101539. On August 27, 2001 the RTC issued a
temporary restraining order (TRO), enjoining Villanueva and the Finance
Secretary from implementing Valera’s appointment. On August 28, 2001 the
trial court superseded the TRO with a writ of preliminary injunction.
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP 66070. On September 14, 2001 the CA issued its own
TRO, enjoining the implementation of the RTC’s injunction order. But the
TRO lapsed after 60 days and the CA eventually dismissed the petition before
it.
On November 22, 2001 while the preliminary injunction in the quo
warranto case was again in force, petitioner Villanueva issued Customs
Memorandum Order 40-2001, authorizing Valera to exercise the powers and
functions of the Deputy Commissioner.
During the Bureau’s celebration of its centennial anniversary in February
2002, its special Panorama magazine edition featured all the customs deputy
commissioners, except respondent Rosqueta. The souvenir program,
authorized by the Bureau’s Steering Committee headed by petitioner
Villanueva to be issued on the occasion, had a space where Rosqueta’s picture
was supposed to be but it instead stated that her position was “under
litigation.” Meanwhile, the commemorative billboard displayed at the
Bureau’s main gate included Valera’s picture but not Rosqueta’s.
On February 28, 2002 respondent Rosqueta filed a complaint5 for damages
before the RTC of Quezon City against petitioner Villanueva in Civil Case Q-
02-46256, alleging that the latter maliciously excluded her from the
centennial anniversary memorabilia. Further, she claimed that he prevented
her from performing her duties as Deputy Commissioner, withheld her
salaries, and refused to act on her leave applications. Thus, she asked the RTC
to award her P1,000,000.00 in moral damages, P500,000.00 in exemplary
damages, and P300,000.00 in attorney’s fees and costs of suit.
But the RTC dismissed respondent Rosqueta’s complaint, stating that
petitioner Villanueva committed no wrong and incurred no omission that
entitled her to damages. The RTC found that Villanueva had validly and
legally replaced her as Deputy Commissioner seven months before the
Bureau’s centennial anniversary.
But the CA reversed the RTC’s decision, holding instead that petitioner
Villanueva’s refusal to comply with the preliminary injunction order issued
in the quo warranto case earned for Rosqueta the right to recover moral
damages from him. Citing the abuse of right principle, the RTC said that
Villanueva acted maliciously when he prevented Rosqueta from performing
her duties, deprived her of salaries and leaves, and denied her official
recognition as Deputy Commissioner by excluding her from the centennial
anniversary memorabilia. Thus, the appellate court ordered Villanueva to pay
P500,000.00 in moral damages, P200,000.00 in exemplary damages and
P100,000.00 in attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. With the denial of his
motion for reconsideration, Villanueva filed this petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45.
Action of the Court/s:
RTC: Dismissed the complaint.
CA:Reversed RTC decision and damages.
SC: Affirmed the appellate court decision with modification as to damages.
immediate cause of the plaintiff’s anguish in the cases specified in Article
2219 of the Civil Code.
The Court, however, finds the award of P500,000.00 excessive. As it held
in Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Alejandro, moral damages
are not a bonanza. They are given to ease the defendant’s grief and suffering.
Moral damages should reasonably approximate the extent of hurt caused and
the gravity of the wrong done. Here, that would be P200,000.00.
The Court affirms the grant of exemplary damages by way of example or
correction for the public good but, in line with the same reasoning, reduces it
to P50,000.00. Finally, the Court affirms the award of attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses but reduces it to P50,000.00.
Supreme Court Ruling:

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in holding petitioner Villanueva liable in
damages to respondent Rosqueta for ignoring the preliminary injunction order
that the RTC issued in the quo warranto case (Civil Case 01-101539), thus
denying her of the right to do her job as Deputy Commissioner of the Bureau
and to be officially recognized as such public officer.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision
of the Court of Appeals dated April 30, 2007 in CA-G.R. CV 85931 with
MODIFICATION in that petitioner Titus B. Villanueva is ORDERED to pay
respondent Emma M. Rosqueta the sum of P200,000.00 in moral damages,
P50,000.00 in exemplary damages, and P50,000.00 in attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses.

Rationale:

Under the abuse of right principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a
person must, in the exercise of his legal right or duty, act in good faith. He
would be liable if he instead acts in bad faith, with intent to prejudice another.
Complementing this principle are Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil Code which
grant the latter indemnity for the injury he suffers because of such abuse of
right or duty.

The CA correctly awarded moral damages to respondent Rosqueta. Such

damages may be awarded when the defendant’s transgression is the