CHAPTER 2

SOUTHERN VIOLENCE AND THAKSIN SHINAWATRA

GOVERNMENT’S POLICIES

A. Southern Violence: Origins and Development

The Kingdom Raya Patani (Greater Patani) was once an independent state

under the rule of Malacca, which included the current Thai provinces of Pattani, Yala

and Narathiwat as well as the Malaysian states of Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedar and

Perlis, and the population was predominately Malay Muslims until it was annexed by

the Kingdom of Siam in 1785. Despite being politically under Siamese suzerainty, the

people of Patani were culturally aligned with Malacca. Since the annexation, Patani

was considered a vassal and so paid bunga mas dan perak — gold and silver

decorated plants that were dispatched annually, or at least two or three years to

Ayutthaya, the former Thai capital.1 The existing rulers of Patani were sidelined;

leaders loyal to Siam were appointed, and this led to revolts by Raja Tengku Lamidin

during 1789-91 and later by his successor Dato Pengkalan in 1808.2

During the reign of King Chulalongkorn (Rama V), the Kingdom of Patani

was divided into seven smaller provinces (Area of the Seven Provinces): Saiburi (or

Teluban), Pattani, Nongchik, Yala, Yaring (or Yamu), Ra-ngae (Legeh or

1
Jeff Upward, “Insurgency in Southern Thailand: The Cause of Conflict and the Perception
of Threat,” University of Ballarat, http://www.ballarat.edu.au/ard/bssh/school/capstone/Jeff%
20Upward.pdf (accessed 15 June 2008).
2
S. P. Harish, “Changing Conflict Identities: The Case of the Southern Thailand
Discord,” Working Paper no. 107 (Singapore: Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies,
2006), p. 4.

14
 15

Tanjongmas), and Rahman.3 Furthermore, a policy of administrative centralisation

known as the thesaphiban system of provincial administration was introduced. It

aimed at the exertion of more direct control from Bangkok over subordinate areas,

which included the Malay tributary states. The three southern provinces, and four

districts in Songhkla, are around 80 percent Malay-Muslim, in a country that is 90

percent Buddhist.4 The Malay nobility were officially removed from power and Thai

Buddhist civil servants were placed in charge of the southern provinces. Those

assigned to the southern provinces were unfamiliar with the customs, Islamic law, and

Malay language of the general population, thus creating a rift between the governors

and the governed.5 Resistance to the authority of Bangkok began at once and resulted

in violence. This was also the time when the separatist idea was first originated by one

of the royals named Tengku Abdul Kadir Kamaruddin, who passed the idea to his son

Tengku Mahmud Mahyideen of the next generation.6

During the European colonisation period, the area was colonised by the

British. In 1909, Siam and Britain signed the Anglo-Siamese Treaty, an agreement

that divided the boundaries between Siam and British Malaya. This involved

relinquishing the semi-autonomous peninsula states of Kalantan, Terengganu, Kedar

and Perlis to British Malaya. In return, Siam was recognised as the processor of the

state of Pattani, and in following current western practices of state encompassment,

3
Sara A. Jones, “Framing the Violence in Southern Thailand: Three Waves of Malay-
Muslim Separatism,” (Master’s Thesis, Faculty of the Center for International Studies, Ohio
University), 2007, p. 36.
4
John Funston, “Thailand’s Southern Fires: The Malaysian Factor,” UNEAC Asia
Papers no. 26 (NSW: UNEAC, 2008), p. 56.
5
Jones, p. 36.
6
Surin Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism: A Case Study of the Malay-Muslims
of Southern Thailand (Bangkok: Thai Khadi Research Institute, Thammasat University,
1985), pp. 57-58.
 16

Pattani was officially made a province of Thailand and brought under Bangkok’s

administrative control.7

The beginning of Malay-Muslim nationalism can be traced back to the reign

(1910-1925) of King Vajiravudh (Rama VI). His new brand of Thai nationalism and

centralisation of power came to be strongly resisted by Malay Muslims.8 However, in

an attempt to lessen the resistance of the southern provinces, King Vajiravudh adapted

his public policies by instructing and guiding his Interior Minister to pursue the

following: 9

1. Whatever practices or regulations appeared to oppose Islam should be

abolished immediately. Any new guidelines must not be in violation of the

Islamic religious teaching.

2. The level of taxation among the Malays should not be higher than what

people in Malaya were required to contribute.

3. The public officials to be assigned to Pattani should be honest and polite.

No officials should be sent there as a punishment because of their misbehavior

in other areas.

The coup in 1932 brought an end to absolute monarchy, and Thailand was

transformed into a constitutional monarchy. Having seized power in Thailand, Field

Marshal Pibun Songkram introduced a policy on forced assimilation and Thai

nationalism affecting Malay Muslims in education, language, dress and religious

7
Upward, p. 5.
8
Ramasamy Palanisamy, “Conflict in Southern Thailand: The 2004 Upsurge,” paper
presented in the International Conference on Population and Development in Asia: Critical
Issues for Sustainable Development, Phuket, Thailand, 20-22 March, 2006, p. 3.
9
Chidchanok Rahimmula, “Peace Resolution: A Case Study of Separatist and
Terrorist Movement in Southern Border Provinces of Thailand,” Songklanakarin Journal of
Social Sciences and Humanities 10, no. 1 (2004): 101.
 17

practices. The policy of compulsory Thai education led to resistance, resentment and

the emergence of secessionist movements.10 The Pibun Songkram government further

enacted a series of legislations called Ratthaniyom (Thai Customs Decree) to socialise

people into adopting a common language and identity.11 Pibun Songkram, fearing

pondoks (Islamic schools) as havens of rebellious teaching and behavior, especially

attempted to enforce the use of the Thai language in all pondoks in the South. Done to

force Thai cultural assimilation, it had a reverse impact and effectively mobilised

pondoks as centers for spreading ideas of pan-Malay nationalism and Islamic

revivalism.12

In the provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, Pibun Songkram completely

eliminated both the Sharia Court (Islamic court) and the Muslim Qadi (Muslim

judges). Administration of civil law in accordance with the precepts of Islamic law

was an essential religious-cultural feature of the Malay Muslims. Pibun Songkram

also revoked the legal traditions of marriage and inheritance. The government forced

all Malay Muslims under Thai civil jurisdiction. Thus, Thai civil courts had full legal

control over Islamic matters.13 Indeed, these laws were perceived as an insult to the

Malay Muslims’ religion and culture. The ultra-nationalistic policies of the Pibun

Songkram government, therefore, led to fierce rebellions.14

During the Second World War, the Pibun Songkram government allied with

the Japanese to regain territories previously lost to European colonialism while the

10
Supara Janchitfah, Violence in the Mist: Reporting on the Presence of Pain in
Southern Thailand (Bangkok: Kobfai, 2005), p. 45.
11
Rohan Gunaratna, et al., Conflict and Terrorism in Southern Thailand (Singapore:
Marshall Cavendish, 2005), p. 4.
12
Daniel J. Pojar, “Lessons Not Learned: The Rekindling of Thailand’s Pattani
Problem,” (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey California, 2005), p. 18.
13
Ibid., p. 19.
14
Funston, p. 57.
 18

Malay Muslims were with the British alliance, hoping to gain support for an

independent Patani State. Pibun Songkram’s regime ended in 1944. When the war

ended with the Western Allies victory, the government for the next few years reversed

Pibun Songkram’s policy course. In 1945, the government passed the Patronage of

Islam Act.15 This act created several new Islamic entities including a royally

appointed leader of Islam in Thailand called the Chularajmontri, a National Council

for Islamic Affairs and equivalent provincial-level councils for those areas with a

majority population of Muslims.16

An important historical event in the conflict was the revolt in 1948 by the

Malay Muslims in southern Thailand. The consequent revolt came, after Pibun

Songkram’s return to power, when his government had rejected demands put forward

by Haji Sulong, the President of the Islamic Religious Council.17 Haji Sulong’s seven-

point demands were as follows:18

1. The government of Siam should have a person of high rank possessing full

power to govern the four provinces of Patani, Yala, Narathiwat, and Satul

[Satun], and this person should be a Muslim born within one of the provinces

and elected by the populace. The person in this position should be retained

without being replaced.

2. All of the taxes obtained within the four provinces should be spent only

within the provinces.

15
Pojar, p. 19
16
Ibid.
17
Thanet Aphornsuvan, “Origins of Malay Muslim ‘Separatist’ in Southern Thailand,”
Asia Research Institute (ARI) Working Paper Series no. 31 (October 2004), p. 7.
18
Ibid., p. 33.
 19

3. The government should support education in the Malay medium [language]

up to the fourth grade in parish schools within the four provinces.

4. Eighty percent of the government officials within the four provinces should

be Muslims born within the provinces.

5. The government should use the Malay language within government offices

alongside the Siamese language.

6. The government should allow the Islamic Council to establish laws

pertaining to the customs and ceremonies of Islam with the agreement of the

[above noted] high official;

7. The government should separate the religious court from the civil court in

the four provinces and [give the former] full authority to conduct cases.

Haji Sulong was arrested on 16 January 1948. The arrest of Haji Sulong

provoked the renewal of insurrection, which escalated further after his disappearance

and presumed murder by the Thai police in 1954.19 However, a large and alarming

insurrection occurred in 1948 from 26-28 April, originating from clashes in the

village of Dusun Nyor, Narathiwat province—an incident later known as the “Dusun

Nyor Rebellion.” It was commonly understood as an attempted revolt in response to

the arrest of Haji Sulong.20 However, the reasons for the outbreak of conflict

remained contested.21 By one account, it began as a misunderstanding by security

forces who saw a religious gathering as preparation for a rebellion, and by another

account as preparation for a jihad against Chinese communists.22 Subsequently, the

Dusun Nyor Rebellion has been obliterated under the story line of the Haji Sulong’s

19
Aphornsuvan, p. 7.
20
Ibid.
21
Funston, p. 57.
22
Ibid.
 20

Rebellion.23 This marked the beginning of armed insurgency within southern

Thailand.24

Malay-Muslim militancy and separatism were consolidated with the

establishment of Patani People’s Movement (PPM) in 1947 and Gabungan Melayu

Patani Raya (GAMPAR or the Greater Patani Melayu Association) in 1948. Both

groups called for an independent state of Patani.

Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat became the Thai prime minister in 1959 and

under his leadership, the government initiated a policy that enacted and enforced the

strictest regulation of the pondoks to date. He justified this on paper by making the

pondoks private institutions that would receive funding, but only at the cost of

complete central government oversight by the Ministry of Interior.25

It was not until the government of General Kriangsak Chamanan that the first

national security policy in the southern border provinces was introduced in 1978. It

aimed at bringing peace and order to the region as well as promoting a better

understanding of the issue with Muslim countries.

Efforts to bring peace and order to the region were carried out by General

Prem Tinsulanond when he took office as Thai prime minister in 1980. He established

the Southern Border Provincial Administration Centre (SBPAC) in 1981 to supervise

and oversee the problems in political and psychosocial aspects. The SBPAC was

assigned to work in collaboration with the Internal Security Operations Command

Area 4, which established the 43rd Civilian-Police-Military Task Force (CPM 43) to

prevent and suppress all kinds of terrorist movements in the southern border

23
Aphornsuvan, p. 7.
24
Pojar, p. 21.
25
Ibid.
 21

provinces. SBPAC was attached to the Ministry of Interior while the CPM 43

operated under the command of the 4th Army Area Commanding General. Several key

decisions made by Prime Minister Prem, as well as bilateral cooperation between

Thailand and Malaysia in the 1980’s, largely eliminated both states’ security concerns

regarding insurgents in the border provinces.26 Furthermore, in 1993, hundreds of

remaining separatists gave up their arms in response to an amnesty policy pursued by

the Thai government. With their military wings clipped, separatist leaders went into

exile – many resettled in Western Europe, while others opted for Malaysia and

elsewhere in Southeast Asia where they have taken up citizenship in their respective

host countries.27 The amnesty policy offered Muslims in the South a role in the

administration of the Thai state. A number of Muslims had served as members of the

Parliament and were allowed to voice their opinions on the administration of the

southern border provinces through SBPAC. For twenty years, SBPAC and CPM 43

helped reduce violence in southern Thailand.

Thailand has become modern state but not a “contemporary” state, as it has

not embraced cultural diversity, though it succeeded in bringing peace to southern

Thailand in the 1980’s.28 The Thai state has never fully allowed Islam to play an

important role in society. Clearly, the ultra-nationalistic and assimilationist policies

adopted by Thai governments limited religious and cultural rights and freedom of the

Muslims in southern Thailand.

26
Pojar, p. 46.
27
Don Pathan, “Thai-Malaysian Ties, A New Chapter in the South” The Nation,
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/specials/south2years/jun2005.php (accessed 23 September 2008).
28
Kraisak Choonhavan, Member of the House of Representatives of Thailand,
Democrat Party and Deputy Leader, Democrat Party; Kraisak previously served as the
Member of the Senate and as Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs (2000-
2006), interview with the author, 20 July 2009.
 22

For decades, Malays in southern Thailand and Malaysia have maintained close

people-to-people links. For example, families often have relatives across the border,

Thais have crossed the border for education in Malaysia, while some Malaysians have

moved in the opposite direction to study at renowned pondoks in Thailand, and large

numbers of Thai Muslims have sought employment in Malaysia.29

B. Resurgence of Southern Violence

A resurgence of southern violence began in 2004 with an army camp raid in

Narathiwat, followed by the disappearance of Muslim-lawyer Somchai Neelapaijit,

the Krue Se Mosque incident, the Tak Bai protest and the flight of 131 Thai-Muslim

villagers from southern Thailand into northern Malaysia. Moreover, the recent events

in southern Thailand, including daily assassinations of Buddhist monks, police

officers, teachers and local citizens—both Muslims and Buddhists, show that the

intermixing of religion with ethnicity has also resulted in destroying social relations

between Thai Muslims and Thai Buddhists who had been living as neighbours for

centuries.30

Thaksin Shinawatra was elected prime minister in 2001 and his government,

for years, had downplayed the violence in southern Thailand. In March 2002, Thaksin

dismantled the SBPAC and the CPM 43. With his customary arrogance, Thaksin

29
Funston, pp. 56-57.
30
Imtiyaz Yusuf, “The Southern Thailand Conflict and the Muslim World,” paper
presented in the public seminar on “Southern Violence and the Thai State,” (“Non-Violence,
Violence and the Thai Society” Research Project, first year), organised by Senior Research
Scholar, the Thailand Research Fund in Cooperation with Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn
Anthropology Centre and the Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University, Bangkok,
Thailand, 18-19 August 2006, p. 13.
 23

publicly stated, “There’s no separatism, no ideological terrorists, just common

bandits.”31 The dismantling of the SBPAC and CPM 43 removed an important

channel through which southerners could express their grievances. Instead, the

southern policy was handed over to the National Security Council and to the Royal

Thai Police. However, in 2004, Thaksin reversed his position, and came to regard the

insurgency as the local front in the Global War on Terrorism.

In conducting a survey on the level of politically related violence in the three

southern border provinces of Pattani, Narathiwat, and Yala, Srisompob Jitpiromsri

and Panyasak Sobhonvasu found that from 1993 to 2004 there were 2,593 incidents of

politically related violence—only 750, or 39 percent, occurred between 1993 and

2003, while a remarkable 71 percent, or 1,843, took place in 2004 (including January

of 2005).… Eighteen percent of incidents occurred between 1993 and 2000, while 82

percent of incidents took place from 2001 to 2004 (including January of 2005).32

According to the survey, the level of politically-related violence significantly

increased during Thaksin’s premiership, thus, reflecting his government’s inability to

curtail the violence (Figures 2.1 and 2.2).

31
BBC News, “Thai Districts Impose Martial Law,” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/4402748.stm (accessed 11 September 2008).
32
Srisompob Jitpiromsri and Panyasak Sobhonvasu, “Unpacking Thailand’s Southern
Conflict: The Poverty of Structural Explanations,” in Rethinking Thailand’s Southern Violence,
ed. Duncan McCargo (Singapore: NUS Press, 2007), p. 90.
 24

Figure 2.1

Escalation of Violence in Southern Thailand from 1993 to 2004 with

Number of Incidents

Source: Srisompob Jitpiromsri and Panyasak Sobhonvasu, “Unpacking

Thailand’s Southern Conflict: The Poverty of Structural Explanations,”
in Rethinking Thailand’s Southern Violence, ed. Duncan McCargo
(Singapore: NUS Press, 2007), p. 91.
 25

Figure 2.2

Comparison of Ten Years of Violence by Province

Source: Srisompob Jitpiromsri and Panyasak Sobhonvasu, “Unpacking

Thailand’s Southern Conflict: The Poverty of Structural Explanations,”
in Rethinking Thailand’s Southern Violence, ed. Duncan McCargo
(Singapore: NUS Press, 2007), p. 91.

Since the year 2004, a new policy that was designed to achieve prompt and

effective results was implemented to resolve the violence, but this failed,

consequently bringing the situation to the crisis point.33 However, when Thaksin was

re-elected in 2005, the emphasis of his government’s security policy this time was on

southern violence: “The Government will solve the problem in the southern border

provinces by mobilizing resources and improving administration and management

according to the principles of understanding, reaching-out, development, and strict

law enforcement to achieve peace and safety of life and property in the area at the

earliest. The Government is also determined to improve the quality of life and well-
33
Chidchanok Rahimmula, “Violence in the South: A Crisis Issue,” in Knowledge
and Conflict Resolution: The Crisis of the Border Region of Southern Thailand, eds. Utai
Dulyakasem and Lertchai Sirichai (Nakhon Si Thammarat: Walailak University, 2005), p. 4.
 26

being of the people in the area in a sustainable manner by emphasizing the

participation of every sector, building national and communal reconciliation,

dispensing fairness and justice, strictly eliminating dark influences and corruption by

government officials, together with poverty eradication, education development, and

economic and social development in line with the special characteristics of the area,

way of life, and culture of the people, including cooperating with other countries,

especially neighboring countries, in developing, preventing, and solving the problem

of transnational crime and disruption of peace in the border areas.”34

On 4 October 2004, The Thaksin government established the Southern Border

Provinces Peace-Building Command (SBPPC) to end the violence in the South and

bring about security through unified and integrated efforts by the military, the police,

civil servants, and the general public.35 The SBPPC’s five strategies included the

following:36

Strategy 1: Promoting peace protecting resources;

Strategy 2: Building trust and economic and social strength;

Strategy 3: Developing the potential of people;

Strategy 4: Developing cooperation with neighbouring countries;

Strategy 5: Exercising good and sound administration and management.

In an attempt to lessen the violence with a softer approach, Thaksin announced

the establishment of the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) on 28 March

34
The Royal Thai Embassy, Washington, D.C., “Policy Statement of the Government
of His Excellency Thaksin Shinawatra Prime Minister of Thailand, Delivered to the National
Assembly on Wednesday, 23 March 2005,” http://thaiembdc.org/politics/govtment/policy/
55thpolicy/index_e.html (accessed 2 June 2006).
35
Government Public Relations Department, Thailand, Inside Thailand Review 2005:
Government Drive (Bangkok: PRD, 2005).
36
“Vision and Mission,” Southern Border Provinces Peace-Building Command,
http://www.southpeace .go.th/eng/vision.html (accessed 12 July 2008).
 27

2005, and appointed former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun as chair, and

Dr. Prawes Wasi, a senior citizen, as deputy chair, charged with recommending

policies, measures, mechanisms and ways conducive to reconciliation and peace in

Thai society, particularly in the three southern border provinces. The NRC had 48

members from all sectors of society. Figure 2.3 suggests that from 2004 to 2005, the

numbers of deaths and injuries had risen from 389 to 564 and 610 to 1103

respectively, despite several attempts to lessen the levels of violence by the Thaksin

government. Obviously, an increase in the numbers of deaths and injuries proved the

Thaksin government’s failure to contain the violence and the tendency towards an

escalation of violence in the year ahead.

Figure 2.3

Deaths and Injuries from Violence in the Three Southern Provinces, 2004-2005

Source: Thansrethakij Information Center, “The Crisis in Southern

Thailand: The National Reconciliation Commission and the Emergency
Decree.” Health Information System Development Office
http://www.hiso.or.th/hiso/picture/reportHealth/ThaiHealth2006/
ENG2006-Health-Issues1.pdf.
 28

The NRC proposed the lifting of martial law imposed in the southern

provinces as a step towards settling the conflict peacefully. Although Thaksin had

initially agreed to the proposal, he subsequently changed his mind and continued to

implement martial law under pressure from the military, which argued that in the

absence of martial law, the military would forfeit the legal grounds for dispatching its

troops.37

Although the Thai Rak Thai party’s members of parliament (the Wada faction)

who were Muslims had links with members of separatist organisations (some even

were relatives), southern violence continued to grow. These kinds of linkages brought

about a “complex political culture”38 in southern Thailand.

Many insurgents have sought to attack the symbols of the Thai state39, i.e.,

Buddhist monks, government teachers, police and soldiers. For instance, an

elementary school teacher, Juling Pangamoon, was brutally beaten by a group of men

in a school where she taught in Narathiwat and died after almost eight months in a

coma. The incident shocked the entire country and became a glaring example of

tensions between Buddhists and Malay Muslims in the three southernmost

provinces.40 The army camp raid on 4 January 2004 that killed four soldiers and

seized over 400 weapons is another example.

Thaksin was overthrown in a military coup on 19 September 2006 led by

General Sonthi Boonyaratglin (Leader of the Council for Democratic Reform or

37
National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan, “Southeast Asia: Harmonizing Major
Powers Relations,” East Asian Strategic Review (2006), http://www.nids.go.jp/english/
dissemination/east-asian/pdf/2006/east-asian_e2006_05.pdf (accessed 12 July 2008).
38
Choonhavan, interview.
39
Ibid.
40
“Rest in Peace, Kru Juling,” The Nation, 9 January 2007,
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2007/01/09/headlines/headlines_30023628.php (accessed
1 July 2009).
 29

CDR/Council for National Security or CNS). The CNS/CDR called it an

administrative reform rather than a coup d’état. Some foreigners staying in Bangkok

called it “a non-classical coup d’état” for it had no signs of an abrupt political change

– no fighting, no arson, no hand-grenade explosions and no sounds of sirens from

ambulance cars.41 According the CDR/CNS, the main incidents leading to the

political reform and the reasons given for the coup included:42

1. Rampant corruption and conflict of interests

2. Policy errors leading to the violation of rights and liberties

3. Inefficiency of various organizations in supervising the administration of

state affairs and in providing checks and balances of the administration

4. Intensification of serious division in the society which affected almost all

institutions in the country

5. The protracted election détente

6. The prolonged political vacuum as the country was left with nether a

government, a House of Representatives nor a full-house Senate for more

than half a year

7. The acts verging on lèse-majesté against the Monarch

8. The likelihood of ensuing public unrest and severe confrontation

In addition to the main incidents leading to the political reform and the reasons

given for the coup, the CDR/CNS stated that the Thaksin government mismanaged

and illegitimately implemented national security policy in the three southern border

provinces—as evidenced by its flawed decision to dissolve the SBPAC and the

41
Council for National Security, Restoring Democracy in Thailand: A Factual Account:
Before and After 19 September 2006 – Executive Summary (Bangkok: CNS, 2006), p. 3.
42
Council for National Security, Restoring Democracy in Thailand: A Factual
Account: Before and After 19 September 2006 (Bangkok: CNS, 2006), pp. 4-18.
 30

CPM 43, both of which had earned a longstanding recognition as effective

organisations in dealing with problems in the area.43

Major Incidents in Southern Thailand Since 2004

Army Camp Raid

On 4 January 2004, approximately 100-armed militants raided the Royal Thai

Army’s 4th Engineering Battalion in Cho Airong district, Narathiwat province (the

Narathiwat Rajanakarin military camp), killing four soldiers and seizing over 400

weapons including assault rifles, machine guns, pistols and ammunition. Thaksin’s

immediate response to the army camp raid was to blame the army for its

incompetence, showing no sympathy for the four murdered soldiers: “If you have a

whole battalion there and you’re negligent, then you deserve to die.”44 The militant

raid was a direct challenge to the government as it was reported to be well organised

and carried out after Thaksin’s statement regarding the problems in southern Thailand

as being caused by “common bandits.” Following the raid, the army instituted martial

law in Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat and dispatched a large number of troops into the

area.

Disappearance of Muslim Lawyer Somchai Neelapaijit

Somchai Neelapaijit, the 53-year-old chair of Thailand’s Muslim Lawyers

Association and vice-chairman of the Human Rights Committee of the Lawyers’

43
Council for National Security, Restoring Democracy in Thailand – Executive
Summary, p. 8.
44
“Southern Violence: Pattani Hit, Martial Law Declared,” The Nation, 6 January
2004, p. 1.
 31

Council of Thailand, “disappeared” on 12 March 2004.45 His disappearance caused a

stir because he was defending alleged militants associated with the raid on the

Narathiwat Rajanakarin military camp and said they had been tortured while in police

custody. In April 2004, five police officers were arrested, but the officers pleaded not

guilty and were released on bail. On 12 January 2006, the Bangkok’s Central

Criminal Court found Police Major Ngen Tongsuk guilty of physically assaulting

Somchai and sentenced him to three years imprisonment, while the other four accused

police officers were acquitted due to insufficient evidence.46 The next day, Thaksin

publicly stated that government officials were involved in Somchai’s abduction and

killing. On 15 April 2005, Somchai’s wife, Angkhana, submitted a formal complaint

to the United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances

expressing disappointment that the authorities in Thailand had failed to solve the

case.47

Krue Se Mosque Incident

On 28 April 2004, there was an assault on the Krue Se mosque in Pattani in

which the Thai army gunned down 32 insurgents who carried out attacks against 10

police stations across Pattani, Yala and Songkhla and retreated to the mosque. By the

end of the day, 105 militants, 1 civilian and 5 members of the security forces were

dead. The dead assailants wore red turbans and carried no guns to the clashes, which,

45
Human Rights Watch, “Thai Government’s Failed Response to Problems of
Disappearances,” http://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/thailand0307/6.htm (accessed 21 March 2008).
46
Ibid.
47
Ibid.
 32

then, were seen as suicide attacks since authorities had guns.48 It was said that the

violence resembled the Dusun Nyor Rebellion in Narathiwat on 28 April 1948.

Tak Bai Incident

On 25 October 2004, a demonstration gathered outside a police station in the

town of Tak Bai in Narathiwat province. This gathering was to protest the

incarceration of six Malay-Muslim village defense volunteers detained for allegedly

supplying weapons to militants.49 They were made to take off their shirts and lie on

the ground, and their hands were tied behind their backs. Later that afternoon, they

were thrown by soldiers into trucks to be taken to the Ingkayuth military camp in

Pattani. Along the way, 78 detainees died of suffocation in the trucks. This incident

sparked widespread protests across the South, and indeed across Thailand, since many

non-Muslim Thais were appalled at the army’s behaviour.50 Thaksin, however, gave

the army his full support, and no one has been charged with any offence in relation to

the Tak Bai incident.51 His first response was to defend the army’s actions, saying that

the reason 78 men died was that they were fasting during Ramadan, did not drink

liquids, stayed in the sun and were already very weak.52

48
Sarinthorn Ratjareonkhajorn, “Violence Situation in Thailand’s Three Southern
Border Provinces,” Institute of Public Policy Studies (IPPS), http://www.fpps.or.th/news.
php?detail=n1149480173.news (accessed 25 October 2008).
49
Palanisamy, p. 10.
50
Private Detective Thailand, “South Thailand Insurgency,” http://www.private-detective-
thailand.com/index.php?lay=show&ac=article&Id=264632 (accessed 17 November 2008).
51
Ibid.
52
Kamol Hengkietisak, “Thaksin and His Ministers in Damage Control,” Bangkok
Post, 31 October 2004, p. P4.
 33

The Flight of 131 Thai-Muslim Villagers from Southern Thailand into

Northern Malaysia

In July 2005, the government issued an executive decree that effectively

imposed a state of emergency in the southern provinces, granting immunity from

prosecution for any act committed by officers in the line of duty.53 Former Prime

Minister and chair of the National Reconciliation Commission Anand Panyarachun

described the decree as a “license to kill.” As a result, 131 Muslim villagers fled

across the border to Malaysia to seek asylum. The Thai government immediately

sought reassurances from the Malaysian government that the issue would be dealt

with quietly. The Malaysian government then promptly facilitated a visit by the

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, a move that the Thai government

regarded as needlessly provocative. Since then, relations between Thailand and

Malaysia have been severed.

C. Causes of Southern Violence

There have been numerous studies claiming that violence in southern Thailand

emerged from several factors. What follows is the identification of potential causes of

southern violence.

In 2006, the NRC issued a report, “Overcoming Violence Through the Power

of Reconciliation.” The NRC report followed a medical model, offering a diagnosis

and prognosis for the southern violence before suggesting some therapeutic

53
Michael Vatikiotis, “Resolving Internal Conflicts in Southeast Asia: Domestic
Challenges and Regional Perspectives,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 28, no. 1 (2006): 40.
 34

measures.54 The NRC offered the following diagnosis of violence in the southern

border provinces:55

• People in the area have been denied justice and do not have access to the

national justice process. At the same time, some state officials and groups of

people resort to violence out of the perception that the justice system cannot

be relied upon.

• There is a confusion in State policy between a peaceful approach and

traditional means of solving the problems with the use of force. State agencies

lack unity and coordination, which results in gaps between policy and

implementation. Moreover, citizens in the southern border provinces are not

given adequate political space to employ peaceful approaches in fighting

injustice and in demanding what they desire.

• Children and youth in the area do not have access to education that is

efficient enough to enable them to enter the workforce. There is also an

imbalance between secular and religious education.

• Local villagers are faced with internal conflict. On the one hand, their natural

way of life is being threatened by massive forces of capitalism/materialism

against which they feel helpless. On the other hand, there is a discrepancy

between the older generation that prefers a simple way of life along religious

principles without wishing to challenge the external forces, and the newer

54
Duncan McCargo, ed. Rethinking Thailand’s Southern Violence (Singapore: NUS
Press, 2007), p. 168.
55
National Reconciliation Commission, Report of the National Reconciliation
Commission: Overcoming Violence Through the Power of Reconciliation (Bangkok: NRC,
2006), pp. 12-13.
 35

generation that either adapts itself to the threatening forces or resorts to

various forms of resistance.

• These problems in the southern border provinces have thrown into sharper

contrast the differences between the majority Thai Muslims of Malay descent

and the minority Thai Buddhists, whether in their differing views on the local

military presence, on the use of the Executive Decree on the Administration of

Public Affairs in Emergency Situations B.E. 2548 (2005), or on the control of

pondok schools. This may be due to the increasingly distinct self-identity of

each group and a decline in the acceptance of traditionally shared cultural

institutions.

• The phenomenon of violence and all these problems take place within the

Thai socio-political context where cultural diversity is viewed by some as a

threat to the state and national security instead of a force of strength in Thai

society, while others fail utterly to recognize its importance.

However, in its diagnosis, the NRC argued that religion was not the cause of

the violence but just one factor invoked by those who sought to legitimise their

actions.56 Moreover, world events, such as the 9/11 attack on the United States, or the

US response of invading Afghanistan and Iraq, can also be linked to the violence

because they can be cited in claiming that the Muslim world is under attack by

American imperialism in an unjust war.57

Imtiyaz Yusuf asserts that the problems in southern Thailand are the results of

decades of economic neglect, lack of employment opportunities for the local Muslims

in both public and private sectors, cultural insensitivity of the bureaucracy and the
56
McCargo, p. 168.
57
National Reconciliation Commission, p. 37.
 36

non-recognition of the religious, linguistic and cultural diversity within the Thai

polity.58 Furthermore, Yusuf argues that, with regard to the integration and

assimilation policy pursued by Thai governments, the Malay Muslims of southern

Thailand view national integration as entailing their own cultural disintegration, for

Thai Buddhism and Malay Islam belong to two different cosmological orientations,

and if the Thai state is the manifestation of the Buddhist cosmology, the Malay

Muslims do not want to be a part of it.59

According to Wattana Sugunnasil, four key factors that caused resentment and

violence are as follows:60

1) Widespread perception that the local Muslims have not benefited from the

development programs implemented since 1960s.

2) Resentment at government attempts to impose Buddhist social, cultural,

and economic domination.

3) Rejection of the secular orientation of the Thai state, which is seen as

incompatible with the region’s devoutly Muslim ways.

4) Fear and distrust of the security forces, whose activities in the region are

viewed as heavy-handed and repressive.

Chaiwat Satha-Anand asserts that political history, economic conditions, and

injustice in society are factors attributing to conflicts in the southern Thailand while

Surin Pitsuwan argues that ethnic differences and differences in the ways of life,

58
Yusuf, p. 24.
59
Ibid., p. 12.
60
Wattana Sugunnasil, “Islam, Radicalism, and Violence in Southern Thailand,” in
Rethinking Thailand’s Southern Violence, ed. Duncan McCargo (Singapore: NUS Press,
2007), p. 113.
 37

cultures and historical and religious backgrounds are the causes of the problems.61

Furthermore, Imron Maluleem found in his analysis that the three southern border

provinces have been plagued with seven problems: 1) the problem concerning

religious, ideal, language and cultural identities; 2) psychological problem; 3)

economic problem; 4) educational problem; 5) ethnic problem; 6) political problem;

and 7) administrative problem, whereas Puwadon Songprasert listed four problems: 1)

ethnic and religious conflicts; 2) economic and social conditions of Muslims prior to

the Korean War, 3) effects from development policies for national security and the

dissolution of SBPAC.62

Kraisak Choohavan, a former member of the Thai Senate and chairman of the

Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, points out that the limited role of Islam in Thai

society, economic deprivation, violations of Malay Muslims’ rights by the state and

lack of access to education are the causes of southern violence which have led to a

“collective protest” by the Muslim community against the Thai state.63 State power is

concentrated in the hands of state officials and there has been a lack of representation

by Malay Muslims in the local administrative structure. Additionally, Kraisak

believes that fighting for the rights and freedom of Muslims has become a global

trend (the 9/11 incident, for instance) which brings about the revitalisation of

“Mujahideen” or “Jihadi” in the form of Islamic terrorist organisations.64

Kraisak also suggests that Thaksin’s “iron fist” policies, including the

adoption of a more repressive measure to contain southern violence only served to

61
Ratjareonkhajorn.
62
Sugunnasil, p. 113.
63
Choonhavan, interview.
64
Ibid.
 38

worsen the situation.65 In addition, under the emergency decree, extrajudicial killings

by the police occurred in southern Thailand due to impunity that permitted them. Such

actions were described as a violation of human rights and an affront to the rule of law.

The police also blacklisted members of parliament who were Muslims and even

prosecuted innocent people allegedly accused of being insurgents.66 This, thus,

created grievances among Muslim relatives of the accused. They sought revenge on

the police and government officials by fighting back.

Drug trafficking is a major cause of violence and socio-economic problems in

southern Thailand.67 Many drug traffickers have opted to smuggle illicit drugs from

neighbouring countries via the Andaman Sea or the Gulf of Thailand to the southern

region. Southern Thailand, therefore, has become an area where systematic illegal

activities including illicit drug trafficking is extensive. Illicit drugs are distributed to

clients in eastern and southern Thailand, and Bangkok, or in Malaysia. It has also

been claimed that some police officers are involved in illegal activities. In addition,

local leaders, government officials and influential figures have been revealed as

traffickers.68 The Thai government often said that the attacks on police and security

bases or checkpoints were the work of gangs, including drug smugglers, trying to

cover up their illegal activities.

Having reviewed various sources of information on the resurgence of southern

violence, Sara A. Jones points out seven possible culprits:69

65
Choonhavan, interview.
66
Ibid.
67
Ibid.
68
Pasuk Phongpaichit, “Thailand’s Illegal Economy and Public Policy,” seminar
paper delivered at the Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan,
November 1999, p. 1.
69
Jones, p. 65.
 39

1) A turf war between the military and police due to the dismantling of the

SBPAC and CPM 43 and shifting of power away from the military to the

police (under equipped to deal with the situation);

2) Retaliation by disgruntled business owners who did not receive government

contracts;

3) Violence between rival gangs and/or criminal organizations;

4) Typical criminal racketeering and/or drug smuggling;

5) Disgruntled or corrupt local government officials (e.g., politicians, police,

military);

6) Malay-Muslim separatists;

7) Southern citizens reacting to what is seen as an unjust and biased central

government.

Aurel Croissant identifies five factors that caused the recent outburst of

violence. They are as follows:70

1) Absolute and Relative Economic Deprivation. The political articulation of

ethnic consciousness in Pattani can be explained as a response to the

economic, culture and political subordination of the Muslim communities

as a consequence of “internal colonialism.” Thailand is the paradigmatic

case of internal colonialism in which the deepening economic disparities

between the prime center (Bangkok) and the rural hinterland have resulted

in economic underdevelopment of the South.

2) Political Subordination and Social Discrimination. Economic deprivation

is amplified by perceived political and cultural subordination. Although

70
Aurel Croissant, “Unrest in South Thailand: Contours, Causes and Consequences
Since 2001,” Strategic Insights IV, issue 2 (February 2005): 46-49.
 40

the government was keen in theory to increase the number of Muslims in

the bureaucracy, in practice numerous obstacles ranging from educational

attainment to demands for social conformity have limited such

recruitment. While the vast majority of the people are Thai-speaking

Buddhists, the southern Muslims are ethnically Malay, who speak their

own dialect (yawi), which few non-Muslims can speak or understand.

Social capital and civil society are significantly weaker in southern

Thailand than in the rest of the country. Furthermore, the South has a

reputation as a ‘trouble shooter region’ characterized by a high crime rate,

lawlessness, endemic corruption within the bureaucracy, smuggling, small-

arms trade and other forms of illegitimate business. Economic

backwardness, cultural hegemony of Thai Buddhism, and the widespread

feelings of deliberate neglect of the South by Bangkok.

3) The Growth of Islamism. As almost everywhere in the Muslim world, the

past two decades have seen a stronger emphasis of Islamic identity among

Thai Muslims. According to the Ministry of Education, there were more

than 500 private Islamic schools in south Thailand in 2004, and some

ponoh (pondok) became breeding grounds for potential radical Muslims.

4) Shift of Government Policies. The insurgency problem in the south

reemerged after the election of January 2001. The Thai Rak Thai party-led

government decided to impose greater central control over a region

traditionally dominated by the TRT’s main opponent, the Democrat Party.

Upon taking office, Thaksin announced his intention to make major

changes in the government’s policy in the South. The government’s

 41

decision in mid-2002 to dissolute the Yala-based South Border Provinces

Administration Centre (SBPAC) has been widely criticized as a mistake

that deepened the problems of information gathering and information

analysis. The same year also saw the abolition of an Army-run joint

civilian-police-military border security office known as CMP 43 and the

handing over of security in the South to the police forces.

5) Low Quality of Crisis Management. Instead of recognizing that the country

had an insurgency problem, the government blamed the violence on gangs

of organized criminals. What has further angered local Muslims was

Thaksin’s seeming insensitivity not only to the steady deteriorating

situation in the South, but particularly the humanitarian tragedies of both

April 28 and October 25, 2004. Cultural insensitivity and an increasing

number of human rights violations committed by the police and the

military have provoked fear and anger and strengthened the cause of the

insurgents.

D. Separatism and Irredentism

Political separatism has been treated as one branch of rebellions against the

state by groups of dissatisfied members or would-be members of a nation; most are

based on ethnic identities, which have become the minority in their states after the

struggle for independence.71 With regard to the separatist movements in southern

Thailand, Thanet Aphornsuvan argues that ‘separatism’ was in fact invented and

71
Aphornsuvan, p. 4.
 42

reinforced by the Thai authorities to suppress and intimidate regional political

assertions of their own aspirations and identities.72 The Pibun Songkram

government’s policy on forced assimilation and Thai nationalism only fed more

Muslim separatist movements. Previously, only ruling elites were involved in such

movements, but at this time, the masses also began to organise their own

movements.73 Additionally, the Haji Sulong’s Rebellion and the Dusun Nyor

Rebellion are regarded as the beginning of an increased resentment, and separatist

movements in southern Thailand became much stronger.

Astri Suhrke, the author of “Irredentism Contained: The Thai Muslim Case,”

identifies the violence within the region as both a ‘separatist’ and ‘irredentist’

problem.74 By definition, ‘irredentism’ involves both internal and external parties. An

irredentist conflict involves four immediate parties: 1) the “unredeemed” minority

group; 2) the government of the country of residence, known as the “host

government”; 3) the government of the country with which the minority groups

associates itself, known as the “mother government”; 4) the nationalist sympathizers

in the mother country.75 Suhrke also asserts that the mother government and the

nationalist sympathizers may or may not be identical; but the more they adopt similar

attitudes towards the minority group, the more the particular problem takes on the

shape of an interstate conflict, i.e., it becomes externalised.76

Furthermore, the intensity of hostility generated by the irredentist movement is

influenced by the relations between the host government and the minority group, and

72
Aphornsuvan, p. 3.
73
Janchitfah, p. 45.
74
Upward, p. 12.
75
Ibid.
76
Ibid.
 43

the perceived grievances of the latter. Tension tends to be activated by two types of

policies pursued by the host government; policies that neglect the political and

economic development of the minority group cause agitation within the group for “a

better life,” and this may lead the group to demand incorporation with the mother

government; host government policies that stress integration and assimilation of the

minority group may produce the same result.77

With regard to Thai-Muslims, by identifying themselves as Malays, southern

Muslims living at the border could potentially identify themselves with another nation

state, namely Malaysia, designated in Suhrke’s schema as the mother government.78

In achieving their objectives, Thai-Muslim separatists and irredentists have fought

against the Thai authorities for several decades, and the Thai Malay separatist and

irredentist movement has inevitably resulted in serious conflicts between Thailand

and Malaysia.

E. Major Insurgent Groups

Patani People’s Movement (PPM)

Patani People’s Movement (PPM) was formed by Haji Sulong in 1947 as a

response to the assimilation policy pursued by the Pibun Songkram government. This

organisation was committed to fight for an independent Patani. In addition to the

PPM’s commitment, they called for self-rule and Islamic law in southern Thailand.

PPM was in fact the precursor of several separatist groups in southern Thailand.
77
Upward, p. 12.
78
Ibid., p. 14.
 44

Gabungan Melayu Patani Raya (GAMPAR)

In 1948, Gabungan Melayu Patani Raya (GAMPAR or the Greater Patani

Melayu Association) was set up in the state of Kelantan by Tengku Mahmud

Mahyideen, aimed at incorporating Thailand’s four southern provinces and

establishing an Islamic Patani Malay State. The objectives of the organisation are as

follows:79

1. To unite and liberate persecuted Malay people in the four southernmost

provinces of Thailand and establish an Islamic Malay State.

2. To address Malay people’s needs, both religiously and traditionally.

3. To elevate the social status and quality of life of Malay people and make

them as landowners who have high status in terms of humanity, justice,

freedom and proper education.

Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani (BNPP)/Barisan Islam Pembebasan Patani

(BIPP)

In 1959, the Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani (BNPP or the National

Liberation Front of Patani), developed from GAMPAR after the death of Tengku

Mahmud Mahyideen. This group helped to advertise Patani to people in the South and

the whole country [Malaysia] and to the Arab world, and sent some of their youth to

study at a number of universities in the Middle East, including Egypt and Saudi

79
Rahimmula, p. 8.
 45

Arabia.80 Also, having its base in the state of Kelantan, this group developed a good

relationship with the Parti Islam SeMalaysian (PAS or Islamic Party of Malaysia). It

further encouraged Patani Malays to adopt Malaysian citizenship. In 1986, BNPP

changed its name to Barisan Islam Pembebasan Patani (BIPP or Patani Islamic

Liberation Front) to emphasise its commitment to Islam.81

Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) or Liberation Front of Republic Patani

(LFRP)

In 1960, Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN or National Revolutionary Front) or

Liberation Front of Republic Patani (LFRP) was established by Abdul Karim Hassan.

It was considered an elitist separatist group with the intention of establishing an

Islamic Republic. Their base of support was mainly in the pondoks. BRN split into

three factions: BRN-Congress, the main military wing; BRN-Coordinate, focusing on

political agitation and urban sabotage; BRN-Ulema, which coordinates a following

among the Islamic clergy.82 However, the BIPP’s “orthodox Islam” came into conflict

with the BRN’s “Islamic socialism” and thus weakened both organisations’ militancy.

In May 2003, local Thai authorities found documents regarding the BRN-

Coordinate’s “seven-step plan” that was aimed at liberating Patani. It was first created

80
Rahimmula, p. 9.
81
Palanisamy, p. 6.
82
Croissant, p. 45.
 46

in 1992 and is now believed to be in step six. The BRN-Coordinate’s “seven-step

plan” is as follows: 83

1. Creating public awareness in Islam (religion), Malay (nationality) and

Patani homeland, invasion/occupation [by the Thai state] and the struggle for

independence;

2. Creating mass support through religious teaching at various levels,

including tadika (Koranic elementary schools), pondoks (Islamic boarding

schools), and private Islamic colleges and provincial Islamic committees;

3. Setting up secretive organizational structure;

4. Recruiting and training [of ethnic Malay Muslim] youth to become militant,

aiming to have 3,000 strong well-trained and well-disciplined troops;

5. Building nationalist and independence struggle ideology among government

officials [of ethnic Malay Muslim origin] and ethnic Malay Muslims [of the

southern border provinces] who went to work in Malaysia;

6. Launching a new wave of attacks;

7. Declaring a revolution.

It is believed that the strongest separatist group today is the BRN-Coordinate,

which has a youth wing (Pemuda) established in 1992. The group’s forces are divided

into three components: the first component is a 200-strong commando force in charge

of overseeing strategy; the second component consists of small local mobile combat

units or RKK (Runda Kumpulan Kecil - RKK). The term, used to describe small

mobile combat units in Indonesia, has been adopted by the insurgent groups; the third

83
Sunai Phasuk, “Conflicts in Southern Thailand: Attacks on Human Rights,” Human
Rights Watch, Asia Division, http://www.isisthailand.org/ISIS_Events/20080830/ISIS%20
Understand%20The%20Southern% 20Conflict.ppt (accessed 27 April 2009).
 47

component consists of an agitation force with no more than 10,000 members. These

groups are active in 230 villages in the area, gathering intelligence and causing daily

disturbances.84

Patani United Liberation Organisation (PULO)

Tengku Bira or Kabir Abdul Rahman formed Pertubuhan Perpaduan

Pembebasan Patani (PULO or Patani United Liberation Organisation) in 1968. The

ideology of PULO is based on UBANGTAPEKEMA (Ugama, Bangsa, Tanach, Air,

and Perikemanusiaan), which stands for Religion, Race/Nationalism, Homeland, and

Humanitarianism.85

PULO became the largest and most effective insurgent movement. The aims

of PULO are as follows: 86

1. PULO is a political organisation for the people of Patani. PULO aims to:

a. unite all active political parties among the people of Patani against the

Thai imperialist

b. unite and actively fight for freedom, world liberty against prevalent

colonialists, both old and new. (We) will fight the imperialists in every

way with strength and the force of weapons. (We) will especially fight

the Israelis who occupy the Arabs’ land

84
National Reconciliation Commission, p. 14.
85
Jones, p. 52.
86
Chaiwat Satha-Anand, “Islam and Violence: A Case Study of Violent Events in the
Four Southern Provinces, Thailand, 1976-1981,” USF Monographs in Religion and Public
Policy, no. 2 (Department of Religious Studies, University of South Florida, Florida, USA,
1987), pp. 15-16.
 48

2. PULO has its own history and ideology, which constitute a particular

political, military, economic order that is most conducive to the hope,

custom, and wish of the people of Patani.

3. The doctrine of the federation (sic) adheres to the concept of nation-state,

which is, in turn, defined by Islam, nationality and humanitarianism….

4. Liberation of Patani from the yoke of the Thai imperialist is a matter of life

and death for the Patani people in every level at all times. With all our

might, the people of Patani will try and continue to fight for the freedom of

Patani and the emergence of an Islamic Republic.

PULO has received international support, particularly from the Middle East as

well as from students in Malaysia and Pakistan. The Palestine Liberation Organisation

(PLO) supported them in 1974, followed by Syria in 1976, and Libya in 1977, which

promoted their great reputation and acceptance from Islamic countries.87 In

conducting violence against Thai authorities, PULO’s military wing, called the Patani

United Liberation Army (PULA) has been responsible for several bombings and arson

attacks. The Malaysian Islamic opposition party, Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS),

which is still extremely influential in the northern provinces of Malaysia, especially

Kelantan, has always been very closely allied to PULO.88

New Patani United Liberation Organisation (New PULO)

A-rong Muleng and Haji Abdul Rohman Bazo established New Patani United

Liberation Organization (New PULO) in 1995 as a dissident faction of PULO, with its
87
Rahimmula, p. 14.
88
Pojar, p. 51.
 49

goal of achieving self-autonomy through less dramatic but more consistent actions

than PULO. New PULO’s focus has been on “carrying out minor attacks that are

intended to constantly harass and pester police, local authorities and other symbols of

Thai socio-political suppression, particularly schools.”89 It was reported that New

PULO hired young drug addicts to carry out many of their attacks. However, PULO,

New PULO, BRN-Congress, BNP, and BIPP combined in 1989 and formed a

coalition called Bersatu.

Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Patani (GMIP)

In 1995, Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Patani (GMIP or Mujahideen Patani

Movement) was established by Afghan veterans with the intention of liberating

Patani—as part of an international Islamic agenda. In late 2001, it called for an

international jihad and support for Osama bin Laden.90

Bersatu (The United Front for the Independence of Patani)

Bersatu (The United Front for the Independence of Patani), an alliance

between PULO, New PULO, BRN-Congress, BNP, and BIPP, was formed in 1989

when leaders of these groups held a joint meeting called ‘the gathering of the fighters

for Patani.’91 The meeting agreed to set up the “Payong Organisation” to unify its

efforts in establishing an Islamic state. In the late 1990s, Bersatu organised

89
Jones, p. 53.
90
Palanisamy, p. 8.
91
Jones, p. 53.
 50

“Operation Falling Leaves,” a series of coordinated attacks aimed at killing off state

workers, law enforcement personnel, local government officials, schoolteachers and

other perceived symbols of Thai Buddhist repression.92

92
Jones, p. 53.