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Business & Auction
Perspective
Confidential. All rights reserved.
What is Auction
• An auction is a process of buying and selling goods or services by
offering them up for bid, taking bids, and then selling the item to the
highest bidder.
• The word "auction" is derived from the Latin augeō which means "I
increase" or "I augment“
• Auctions have a long history, having been recorded as early as 500
B.C.
• According to Herodotus, in Babylon auctions of women
for marriage were held annually. The auctions began with the woman
the auctioneer considered to be the most beautiful and progressed to
the least. It was considered illegal to allow a daughter to be sold
outside of the auction method.
2
What is Auction
• The open ascending price auction is arguably the most common
form of auction in use today. Participants bid openly against one
another, with each subsequent bid required to be higher than the
previous bid.
– An auctioneer may announce prices, bidders may call out their bids
themselves (or have a proxy call out a bid on their behalf), or bids may be
submitted electronically with the highest current bid publicly displayed
3
Different Types of Auction
• The range of auctions that take place is extremely wide and one can
buy almost anything, from a house to an insurance policy and
everything in-between.
• In recent past Internet / technology has been extensively used as a
vehicle for hosting auctions.
• English auction - This is the most familiar form of an auction; it is
also known as an open outcry or an ascending price auction. The
type of auction is commonly used to sell wine, art, antiques, cattle,
tobacco, and many other goods.
• Dutch auction - In the Netherlands, this form is used to sell produce
and flowers, and hence the name. This is also known as a
descending price auction. In Zamibia they use this auction to sell fish.
The bidding starts at an a very high price and is progressively
lowered until a buyer claims the item.
4
Different Types of Auction
• First-price sealed-bid auction or Blind Auction: In this type of auction
all bidders simultaneously submit sealed bids so that no bidder
knows the bid of any other participant.
– The highest bidder pays the price they submitted.
– This type of auction is distinct from the English auction, in that bidders can
only submit one bid each. Furthermore, as bidders cannot see the bids of
other participants they cannot adjust their own bids accordingly
• Vickrey auction: Second-price sealed-bid auction: This is identical to
the sealed first-price auction except that the winning bidder pays the
second-highest bid rather than his or her own
– In a buyer-bid auction, the highest bidder buys the item and pays the
amount of the second highest bid.
– In a seller-bid auction, the lowest bidder sells the item and is paid the
amount of the second lowest bid.
5
Spectrum Auction: International Experience
• Finland (1999)
– First country to award 3G licences
– Beauty contest . It was not price based.
– Four operators awarded spectrum
• Japan (2000)
– Beauty contest
– Three operators
• France (2001)
– Beauty contest + auction
– $ 4.5 billion per licence for the first two licences and later auctioning for
remaining two licences
6
Spectrum Auction Design (International Exper)
• UK Auction (2000)
– Five licences – four for established operators and only one for a new
operator
• US (2004)
– Simultaneous multiple round auction
– Reserve price set to $ 10 billion
7
Key Variables
• What are the key variables with regards to a successful spectrum
allocation process?
8
Key Variables
• What are the key variables with regards to a successful spectrum
allocation process?
– Maximise revenue proceeds from the Auctions
– Obtain a market determined price of spectrum
– Allocate spectrum through a transparent process
– Ensure quick rollout of services
– Ensure efficient use of spectrum and avoid hoarding
– Maintain & stimulate competition in the sector
– Maintain & enhance telecom service quality
9
Learning's & Key Variables
• As per McMillan (1995) – “Auctions can do more than raise revenues
and generate an efficient match of licences to firms. Auctions are
flexible policy tools”.
• From the regulatory and policy perspective:
– spectrum auctions should ensure efficient usage by allocating it to
those entities that value it the most, while also generating revenues for
governments
– shall balance the interests of government, industry & consumers
– shall foster competition
• The Spectrum Allocation process should be
– objective, transparent & difficult to challenge
– should prevent collusion & avoid excessive speculation
10
Spectrum Auction in India
Confidential. All rights reserved.
2010 – 3G Spectrum Auction
• Economic Times: May 19, 2010
– The auction for 3G mobile licence ended today with RCom, Bharti and Aircel
bagging 13 circles each, and will leave the government with a Rs 67,710
crore revenue windfall.
– The government had fixed a reserve price of Rs 3,500 crore for 3G
spectrum and had estimated to raise Rs 35,000 crore from the sale.
– Operators had welcomed the format in the mock auction.
– "I calculated Rs 35,000 crore (revenue from 3G and Broadband Wireless
spectrum sale) in the Budget. I'm getting Rs 67,000 crore, almost double.
So, (I will get) that much elbow room," Finance MinisterPranab Mukherjee
– "I'm happy to see that the government is going to earn more than expected,"
Telecom Minister A Raja said.
– "We would like to point out that the auction format and severe spectrum
shortage, along with ensuing policy uncertainty, drove the prices beyond
reasonable levels. As a result, we could not achieve our objective of pan-
India 3G footprint in this round," Bharti said in a statement.
12
2012 Spectrum Auction
• Economic Times: Nov 15, 2012
– The government has garnered just Rs 9,407 crore, less than a quarter of
what it expected, as the much hyped second generation (2G) airwaves
auctions evoked a tepid response from mobile phone companies,
exacerbating concerns about the Centre's ability to meet its fiscal deficit
target
– "We have sold 42.37% of the total airwaves that were put up for sale. There
were no bids for Delhi, Mumbai, Karnataka and Rajasthan, and these four
zones contribute 50% of the reserve price. The government will have to take
some serious policy decisions, including whether the auctions should be re-
run in these four circles with a lower reserve price," telecom secretary R
Chandrasekhar told ET.
– In all circles, bids were at the base price with the exception of Bihar, where
they ended marginally higher, according to data released by the telecom
department on its website.
13
2010 3G Spectrum Auction
Confidential. All rights reserved.
Few Questions
• Why 3G Auction was important?
• Who will get impacted with the 3G Auction & how?
• Does it make a difference as to how the auction was conducted?
• Why is policy framework / changes important for an industry & its
stakeholders?
15
Market Overview at time of 3G Auctions
• The telecom sector in India has witnessed unparalleled growth
• According to TRAI the total number of telecom subscribers (wireless +
wireline) base in the country was 695 million in 2010, with a
teledensity of 59
• It had witnessed a CARG of more than 20 per cent from 2002-09.
• The wireless segment in India is much larger than the wire line
segment
– is growing steadily due to the convenience and utility it offers
– hold a major market share of approx.95 per cent.
– subscriber base of the wire line segment is decreasing
• Revenues of the Indian telecom industry are projected to reach US$
45 billion by 2012
• Increasing network coverage and competitive tariffs – these are
16
the two most prominent catalysts that are contributing to the growth
of the Indian Telecommunication sector.
Challenges at time of 3G Auctions
• Industry is fragmented & intensity of competition is very high,
resulting in benefits for end user .
– There are total of 15 operators in the country and each mobile circle has 8
to 10 players
• Fall in ARPU and significant declines in minutes of usage
• Growth has started to taper and EBITA / Margins have decreased
• Current revenues of telecom operators predominantly come from
voice services, which have been commoditised due to intense
competition among the operators.
• This is witnessing a big shift as industry is poised to drive growth
through other avenues, necessitating huge investments in
infrastructure, licence cost, marketing cost etc.
• Scarce spectrum
• Regulatory environment
17
Introduction to 3G Auctions in India
• “DoT” alloted the rights to use certain specified radio spectrum
frequencies in the 2.1GHz band (the “3G Spectrum”) and in the
2.3GHz band (unpaired) (the “BWA Spectrum”) by means of auction in
various telecom service areas in India
• Auction was conducted in April 2010
• 34 days and 183 rounds of bidding
• NM Rothschild & Sons (India) Private Limited and DotEcon Limited
advised the Government on the Auctions
18
Introduction
• The sale of wireless waves made government richer by 67,719 crore from
private operators
• Additionally they got 16000 crore from state owned operators
• The government had fixed a reverse price of 3500 crore and had originally
estimated to raise 35000 crore
• Auction format and spectrum shortage, along with existing policy uncertainty,
drove the prices
• Such high payments by the industry will ensure
– breakeven will be in the long term
– There will be pressure on the companies to be profitable and stay afloat for
next few years
– Makes it important for the industry to roll-out 3G quickly in intrest of retaining
top 10% of customers
– Analyst estimates that industry will have to bear an intrest burden of anything
between 3000 to 3500 crore annually to finance their 3G dream
19
Introduction
• No pan India player means that companies will rely on roaming
agreements to have seamless rollout across the country
• Will make week operators unviable and trigger M&A
• Investment in good Telecom technology and roll-out of basic telecom
services to priority areas, might get delayed
20
Spectrum
• 3 to 4 blocks of paired spectrum (2*5 MHz) was auctioned in each of
the 22 service areas
• The radio spectrum frequencies offered were 1920-1980 MHz, paired
with 2110-2170 MHz, in 2.1 GHz band
• Right to use the spectrum at specified frequencies was allocated for a
period of 20 year
• The award of spectrum by itself does not confer the right to provide
services.
– For instance, in order to provide mobile telephony using the 3G
Spectrum, the Successful Bidder will also need to possess or
acquire, as the case may be, a UAS/ CMTS licence for the relevant
service areas.
21
3G Auction
• Service areas were categorised into 4 categories
• There were a total of 22 areas
– Metro (3)
– ‘A’ Category (5)
– ‘B’ Category (8)
– ‘C’ Category (6)
• Each area had either 3 or 4 blocks available for auction
• Not more than one block of 3G Spectrum shall be allocated to any
single Bidder in a service area.
• The Government reserved the right to change the frequencies without
assigning any reason at any point of time in the 1920-1980MHz paired
with 2110-2170MHz (2.1GHz band)
22
Reservation for BSNL/ MTNL
• The Government has allocated one block of 2X5MHz spectrum in
Delhi and Mumbai for MTNL and one block of 2X5MHz of spectrum in
the remaining service areas for BSNL
• BSNL and MTNL did not participate in the 3G Auction, but were
required to match the Winning Price achieved in the respective
service areas in the 3G Auction as payment for the spectrum allotted
to them.
23
Auction Details
• 3 Stage process – “Controlled, Simultaneous, Ascending e-auction”
– Pre-Qualification Stage
– Clock Stage
– Frequency Identification Stage
• The e-auction was conducted over the Internet. Bidders were able to
access the Electronic Auction System using standard web browsing
software.
24
Pre-qualification Stage
• During a pre-qualification stage, an auctioneer defines criteria that
should be satisfied by all prospective bidders. Doyle & McShane
(2003) point out that the criteria used should ideally be objective,
transparent, and not impose a significant burden on prospective
bidders.
• An auctioneer screens out bidder’s who do not meet the criteria,
before the auction process starts. Unlike the beauty-contest process
of allocating spectrum, no comparison is made across the prospective
bidders at this stage.
• To ensure that there is no bias built into the process, the criteria
for qualification should be objective and transparent.
25
Pre-qualification Stage
• 3G Spectrum auction started with issue of NIA 2010 by GoI on 25th
February, 2010.
• The notice was floated with a well defined objective the document
detailed out rules that governed the license award process and listed
timetable with key dates and details pertaining to all subsequent
stages of spectrum award process.
• Applications were invited from prospective bidders who meet the
eligibility criteria specified in NIA (2010).
• Based on the applications, the government pre-qualified applicants
who met the eligibility criteria for participation in the auction
26
3G Auction Objectives
The Government has set itself the following objectives for the Auctions:
• Obtain a market determined price of 3G/ BWA spectrum through a
transparent process;
• Ensure efficient use of spectrum and avoid hoarding
• Stimulate competition in the sector;
• Promote rollout of 3G and Broadband services
• Maximise revenue proceeds from the Auctions;
• Resolve congestion issues related to second generation (“2G”) mobile
services
27
Eligibility criteria to participate in the Auctions
• Any entity:
• (i) that holds a Unified Access Services (“UAS”)/ Cellular Mobile
Telephone Service (“CMTS”) licence; or
• (ii) that:
– (a) has previous experience of running 3G telecom services either
directly or through a majority-owned subsidiary; and
– (b) gives an undertaking to obtain a UAS licence through a New
Entrant Nominee UAS Licensee as per DoT guidelines before
starting telecom operations
• can bid for 3G Spectrum
• a wholly and directly owned company shall also be entitled to use the
qualifications of its owner
28
Eligibility criteria to participate in the Auctions
• Award of spectrum does not confer a right to provide any telecom
services, and these are governed by the terms and conditions of the
licence obtained by the operator.
• The DoT guidelines stipulate that a UAS licence or an ISP licence can
only be awarded to an Indian Company. Hence, any foreign applicants
will need to form, or acquire, an Indian company, to obtain a UAS
licence or an ISP-category ‘A’ licence.
• However, they are allowed to participate in the Auctions directly and
apply for or acquire a licence subsequently through an Indian
company, where they hold at least 26% equity stake.
29
Prospective New Entrants
• For the avoidance of doubt, a Prospective New Entrant who is pre-
qualified or is declared a Successful Bidder shall not be
automatically awarded a UAS licence or an ISP-category ‘A’
licence, as applicable.
• Prospective New Entrants are advised to ensure that they satisfy the
conditions for the award of a UAS licence or an ISP-category ‘A’
licence, as applicable. This includes the relevant provisions for making
an FDI into the telecom services sector in India
• Also, the Prospective New Entrants must note that this Notice does
not imply in any way that such Bidders, if successful in winning 3G/
BWA Spectrum and in obtaining a UAS licence, will also be awarded
start-up 2G spectrum.
30
New entrants – foreign entities
• Foreign entities are permitted to participate in the Auctions, however,
the UAS/ CMTS/ ISP-category ‘A’ licence conditions and the FDI
provisions imply that such a foreign entity can operate a telecom
service in India only through an Indian company with no more than
74% foreign shareholding (subject to the approval of the FIPB for the
foreign shareholding in excess of 49%).
• However interested foreign entities are allowed to participate in the
Auctions directly, and obtain a licence subsequently, either through
application for a new licence or through acquisition of an existing
licensee (subject to the applicable M&A guidelines).
• FIPB approval is contingent on security clearances and, under certain
circumstances, could take considerable time.
31
Roll-out obligations for 3G Spectrum
• Roll-out obligations different for different area
• Metro service area: The licensee to whom the spectrum is assigned shall be
required to provide required street level coverage using the 3G Spectrum in at
least 90% of the service area within five years of the Effective Date
• Category A, B and C service areas: The licensee to whom the spectrum is
assigned shall ensure that at least 50% of the District Headquarters (“DHQ”)
in the service area will be covered using the 3G Spectrum, out of which at
least 15% of the DHQs should be rural Short Distance Charging Areas
(“SDCA”), within five years of the Effective Date
• If the licensee does not achieve its roll out obligations, it shall be allowed a
further period of one year to do so by making a payment of 2.5% of the
Successful Bid Amount per quarter as liquidated damages. If the operator
does not complete its roll out obligations even within the extended period of
one year, the spectrum assignment shall be withdrawn.
32
Spectrum usage charges
• A spectrum usage charge (over and above the spectrum auction price and the
applicable licence fees) as a percentage of the Adjusted Gross Revenue
(“AGR”) shall be payable by Successful Bidders as per rules notified by the
Government from time to time.
• Annual spectrum charges payable quarterly in advance by operators that are
successful in the 3G Auction as per the licence conditions:
• Spectrum slab - Annual spectrum charges (as a percentage of AGR)
• Up to 4.4 MHz – 3%
• Up to 6.2 MHz – 4%
• Up to 8.2 MHz – 5%
• ---------------
• Up to 12.5 MHz – 7%
• Up to 15 MHz – 8%
33
Spectrum usage charges
• Annual spectrum charges shall be applicable from the date of award
of right to use allotted spectrum commercially.
• However, there shall be a moratorium of one year from this date on
the payment of spectrum charges for the standalone 3G as well as
stand-alone 3G + BWA operators (i.e. winners of 3G/BWA Spectrum
who do not hold 2G spectrum).
• The moratorium of one year shall not be applicable to operators
holding 2G + 3G Spectrum
34
Duration
• The right to use the 3G Spectrum shall be valid for 20 years from the
Effective Date unless revoked or surrendered earlier, subject to the
operator continuing to have a UAS/ CMTS licence.
• In case the UAS/ CMTS licence is cancelled/ terminated for any
reason, the spectrum usage rights shall stand withdrawn forthwith.
35
Breach, revocation and surrender
• In case neither the Successful Bidder nor any of its Associated
Licensees has the relevant service licence for a service area where it
has been declared a Successful Bidder, it must apply for, or otherwise
acquire the relevant service licence in the service area in accordance
with the terms of this Notice, within three (3) months of it being
declared a Successful Bidder, failing which the Government shall
have the right to revoke the spectrum.
• The operator may surrender the spectrum, by giving notice of at least
60 calendar days in advance. In that case, it shall also notify all its
customers of consequential withdrawal of service by giving 30
calendar days notice to each of them. The operator shall pay all fees
payable by it until the date on which the surrender of the spectrum
becomes effective.
• If at any stage, the spectrum allocation is revoked, withdrawn, varied
or surrendered, no refund will be made
36
Auction Anti-competitive activity
• Anti-competitive activity: Bidders must not enter into any
arrangements with suppliers of equipment or software that would
restrict the supplier’s ability to supply such equipment or software to
other Bidders for the purposes of planning, building or operating a
network utilising the frequencies to be auctioned.
• Bidders are also not permitted to agree with suppliers of equipment or
software any form of restriction as to the prices charged or other terms
and conditions that such suppliers may agree with any other Bidder
• No person, whether individual or corporate, can act for or on behalf of
or advise more than one Bidder that is participating in any of Auctions
in respect of the Auctions.
• Bidders shall also not be permitted to disclose the status of their
participation, including whether they continue to bid in any or all
service areas, in any of the Auctions, until the completion of the
relevant Auction.
37
Assignment of spectrum for New Entrants
• Upon receipt of the Successful Bid Amount, the DoT (WPC) shall
issue a Letter of Intent allocating the frequencies to the Successful
Bidder;
• Upon the Successful Bidder obtaining a UAS licence or an ISP-
category ‘A’ licence, as applicable, the DoT shall assign the specified
spectrum;
• က In case the Successful Bidder acquires an existing licensee,
necessary amendments to the licence of the acquired entity will need
to be made prior to assignment of spectrum;
38
Reserve price for future Auctions
• If a further round of auction for 3G Spectrum or BWA Spectrum takes
place within 12 months from the date of completion of the current
round or the relevant Auction, the Reserve Price in such a round will
be the same as the Successful Bid Amount in the current round of the
relevant Auction for the respective service area
39
Mergers & Acquisitions
• Unless otherwise notified by DoT in due course, if two or more
licensees holding 3G Spectrum blocks in a service area merge, then
they shall be allowed to retain only one 3G Spectrum block and
surrender the remaining 3G Spectrum blocks in that service area.
40
Key Points: Pre-Qualification Stage
• The pre-qualification criteria laid out in NIA (2010), were objective and
transparent.
• It ensured that the bidders have previous experience of running 3G
telecom services and complied with requisite license and ownership
rules.
• Clear guidelines were defined for prospective new entrants.
• Interested foreign entities were also allowed to participate in the
auctions. Conditions were specified to ensure that any new foreign
entity would necessarily have to partner with an Indian firm in order to
bid for 3G licence.
41
Key Points: Pre-Qualification Stage
• Unlike condition of 2G auctions, where licence and spectrum auction
were clubbed and were issued together, it was clearly specified in NIA
(2010) that a prospective new entrant who is pre-qualified or is
declared a successful bidder shall not be automatically awarded
a telecom licence
• He would have to apply for relevant licence separately.
• The move to limit the auction to just allocation of spectrum and not
couple it with issue of licence for prospective new entrants was stated
to be the reason for creating an uncertainty.
– This, coupled with prevailing policy uncertainty around 2G spectrum, was
perhaps the cause that dissuaded the foreign players from participating
in the auction.
– No new large foreign telecom player participated in the auction. This
potentially may impact the long term competitive landscape and new
investments in the industry.
42
Key Points: Pre-Qualification Stage
• During spectrum auction, it is common for auctioneers to ask for up-
front deposit.
– These deposits can be revoked and act as a financial penalty. This
reduces the risk and offsets the costs associated with default.
– The amount of these deposits has a co-relation to potential risk of
default by the bidders. However, the amount of deposit should not be
increased to an extent that it deters smaller players from participating in the
auction.
• During the Indian 3G auction process,
– prospective bidders were required to submit an earnest money amount, in
the form of a bank guarantee.
– The amount of earnest money to be deposited was dependent upon service
areas bidder wished to bid for during the auction and was in range of 12.5%
to 25% of the reserve price of that area
– Given the potential lucrative 3G market in metros, chances of default after
winning was low and hence up-front deposit was kept at 12.5% of reserve
43 price. For less lucrative markets like category ‘C’ service areas, amount was
25%
Key Points: Pre-Qualification Stage
• In order to ensure that the bidder was not constrained in making a bid
for the combination of service areas during the clock rounds, bidders
made sufficiently large earnest money deposits.
• This allowed them to bid for the combinations of service areas in
which they wish to obtain spectrum.
• For example Bharti, Vodafone and Reliance made an earnest money
deposit of INR 5050 million, which was the maximum amount to
enable them to bid in all 22 circles.
44
Clock Stage
• A Clock Stage established the Bidders to be awarded a block in each of the
service areas where there is at least one block available to auction
• In this stage, in each 3G Service Area Bidders had bid for a generic block (i.e.
a right to a single 2X5MHz spectrum block but not linked to any specific
frequency).
• The Clock Stage consisted of a number of rounds. These rounds stopped
once
– (i) for every 3G Service Area the number of bids at the prices set in the last completed
Clock Round is less than or equal to the number of blocks available; and
– there are no opportunities for Bidders to increase their demand allowed by
the Activity i.e. The ‘activity requirement’ specified by auctioneer has been
increased to the maximum level (is set to be 100%)
• This will establish a common Winning Price for all blocks within a service
area, and the Winning Bidders in each service area
45
Clock Stage
• In the Clock Stage, there was simultaneous bidding for blocks across all the
3G Service Areas
• Bidding proceeds in rounds (Clock Rounds)
• During each Clock Round, bids were placed for some or all of the 3G Service
Areas
• In each Clock Round, Bidders was told the Clock Round price of a block in
each of the 3G Service Areas.
• Bidders was able to bid for at most one generic block in each service area.
• Therefore, in each Clock Round, a Bidder’s decision consisted of a yes/no
choice for each of the 3G Service Areas whether to make a Bid at a price
equal to the current Clock Round price for that area.
• By bidding on a service area, if that Bid becomes a Winning Bid, the Bidder
commits to buy a block in that service area at a price not greater than the
Clock Round price of the round when the Bid was submitted.
46
Clock Stage
• The pricing during clock rounds was determined by the auctioneer. In
the first clock round, the price of a generic block in each service area
was set equal to the reserve price.
• For subsequent rounds, the clock round prices in each service area
were determined by the auctioneer depending on excess demand in
the previous completed clock round.
• Excess demand was defined as difference between number of bids
made in a particular clock round and the number of blocks available in
that service area.
• If for a particular service area, the excess demand was zero or
positive, the clock round price was increased basis a criteria pre-
defined in NIA (2010). For example, if the excess demand was two,
price was increased by 5%. If the excess demand was negative, price
in the current round was kept equal to price of the last completed
clock round.
47
Clock Stage
• Price increments during clock rounds varied by service area and were
positively related to excess demand in each service area. This
ensured that price of different service areas were independent of the
price in other blocks and were primarily dependent on the demand in
that block only.
48
Clock Stage
• Bidders Eligibility Rules & Auction Activity Rules
– Activity rules were defined for the clock rounds to regulate the bidding
activity.
– The number and combination of service areas, where a bidder could bid was
constrained by the earnest money deposited by him
– In addition of this the activity of a bidder was further constrained by his
eligibility in that clock round.
– Bidder’s eligibility for any clock round was determined by auction
administrator. The initial bidder’s eligibility was calculated based on the
earnest money deposit made by the bidder.
– For any subsequent clock round, bidder’s eligibility was dependent upon his
activity level and activity requirement specified by an auctioneer.
– As the clock rounds progressed; all bidders were required to demonstrate
sufficient bidding activity. A bidders bidding activity in a particular round,
determined his eligibility to bid in the subsequent rounds.
49
Clock Stage
• Bidders Eligibility Rules & Auction Activity Rules
– Bidder’s entitlement to make bids was curtailed by the auctioneer, if he did
not maintain his required activity level.
– As the auction progressed, auction administrator increased the activity
requirements in steps.
– The level of activity requirement was being controlled by the auctioneer. For
example in the first clock round, activity requirement was 80% which went
on for several rounds and this was subsequently increased to 100% in
phases
50
Clock Stage
• At the end of each Clock Round, the Provisional Winning Bidders and
Provisional Winning Prices in each service area were determined as
follows:
– for each Bidder, only the highest Bid (if any) submitted by that
Bidder for a block in that service area during any completed Clock
Round will be considered;
– the highest Bid (if any) of each Bidder will be ranked in descending
order of value and then, if necessary, according to the tie-breaking
criteria
– where n is the number of blocks available in a service area, the first
n Bids in that service area according to this ranking will become
Provisional Winning Bids, and the Bidders who submitted these Bids
will become the Provisional Winning Bidders
51
Clock Stage: Key Points
• By not allowing any bidder to bid for more than one block of spectrum in any
service area, auctioneer wanted to ensure that
– no player wins more than one block of spectrum.
– no operator has an opportunity to hoard the spectrum, and get undue dominant
position in the market.
– there are a minimum of three to four 3G service providers in each service area,
leading to a healthy competition.
• This process of pricing and price increment during different clock
rounds ensured that
– there was no flair up of prices as the auction progressed.
– Prices were increasing in a calibrated manner, using well defined,
transparent mechanism that was uniformly applicable to all service areas
and consistent through-out the auction for all clock rounds.
– The price of each block of spectrum got linked to the demand for that
service area. This was clearly reflected in the final results of the auction.
Delhi and Mumbai, accounted or 39 percent of the total value of pan-India
licence.
52
Clock Stage: Key Points
• Bidder’s eligibility rules and auction activity requirements specified by auction
administrator ensured that
– all bidders continue to participate actively, as the clock rounds progressed.
– Bidders did not get an opportunity to flare up / distort the bid price by being passive
during multiple clock rounds in a sequence and then suddenly biding in a particular
clock round with a large bid amount.
• By using a well defined, transparent and calibrated mechanism for
price increments, auctioneer ensured that
– price of a block of spectrum in any service area increased in proportion to
the demand by various participants.
– since bidders were being informed before each clock round about their
eligibility and associated activity requirement, they had time to plan their
bids during the clock round
53
Key Terms T
• Bidders Eligibility
– Bidder’s eligibility for any clock round was determined by auction
administrator. The initial bidder’s eligibility was calculated based on the
earnest money deposit made by the bidder.
– For any subsequent clock round, bidder’s eligibility was dependent upon his
activity level and activity requirement specified by an auctioneer.
– As the clock rounds progressed; all bidders were required to demonstrate
sufficient bidding activity. A bidders bidding activity in a particular round,
determined his eligibility to bid in the subsequent rounds.
– Bidder’s entitlement to make bids was curtailed by the auctioneer, if he did
not maintain his required activity level.
– As the auction progressed, auction administrator increased the activity
requirements in steps.
– The level of activity requirement was being controlled by the auctioneer. For
example in the first clock round, activity requirement was 80% which went
on for several rounds and this was subsequently increased to 100% in
phases
54
Key Terms T
• Excess Demand
– The pricing during clock rounds was determined by the auctioneer. In the
first clock round, the price of a generic block in each service area was set
equal to the reserve price.
– For subsequent rounds, the clock round prices in each service area were
determined by the auctioneer depending on excess demand in the previous
completed clock round.
– Excess demand was defined as difference between number of bids made in
a particular clock round and the number of blocks available in that service
area.
55
Frequency Identification Stage
• The Clock Stage was be followed by a Frequency Identification Stage
• This stage identified specific frequencies available to the Winning
Bidders.
• The frequencies identified were announced simultaneous with the
outcome of the Clock Stage.
• The initial identification of the frequencies was performed
automatically by the Electronic Auction System through a random
allocation mechanism
• Winning Bidders had to pay the sum of the relevant Winning Prices
set in the Clock Stage for service areas in which they are assigned a
block.
• All Winning Bidders in a service area had equal Winning Prices as a
consequence of the Auction Rules.
56
Auction Strategy to control Collusion & Speculation
• Collusion needs to be deterred during the auction process. During
any auction process, if confidential information like bidders business
case, status of their participation etc. is made public, it can impact the
bid price and bidding strategy of other bidders.
• Confidential information should not be allowed to be shared among
bidders.
• Various measures were used to deter collusion during Indian 3G
auction process.
– Apart from use of technology to maintain confidentiality of such critical
information, other rules and guidelines were specified to prevent collusion
and anti competitive activity among bidders
–
57
Auction Strategy to control Collusion & Speculation
• Various measures were used to deter collusion during Indian 3G
auction process.
– It was clearly specified in NIA (2010) that no individual or corporate was
allowed to act for or on behalf of or advise more than one bidder who is
participating in the auction.
– Bidders were prohibited from entering into any arrangements with suppliers
of equipment or software that would restrict the supplier’s ability to supply
such equipment or software to other bidders.
– Ownership restrictions were also laid out, specifying that applicants having
common ownership of more than 10% will be disqualified at the pre-
qualification stage itself.
– Government had reserved the right to disqualify any bidder if he was found
colluding with any other bidder in anti-competitive activity.
– In event of disqualification, actions like forfeiting the earnest money deposit,
imposing a fine, and pressing for penal action were specified to be taken
against the bidder
58
Speculation During Auction Process
• It is important for auctioneers to control speculation during the auction
process
• Speculation distorts the price discovery and could lead to unrealistic
price of spectrum being auctioned.
• Doyle & McShane (2003) point out that speculation tends to arise in
situations where information is imperfect, and particularly where some
bidders are better informed than others.
• It can also occur where the rules of an auction are biased towards
favouring participation by certain types of bidder, giving rise to
asymmetry among participants. This bias was observed in the auction
for PCS‘C Block’ spectrum in the US in the mid-1990s where
participation by women, minorities, small businesses and rural
telephone companies was favoured over large corporate businesses
59
Speculation During Auction Process
• Speculators try to win the object being auctioned with the objective of
subsequently selling it a higher price.
• If necessary check and balances are not put into the auction process,
speculators can default on paying for the object won during auction.
• This is more likely to happen when they discover that market price of
the object won during auction is less than the auction price.
• On the other hand, if the speculation leads to unrealistic increase in
price of the spectrum being auctioned, it potentially leads to delay in
roll-out of services. India had encountered this problem in the past,
during auction of 2G spectrum.
60
Speculation During Auction Process
• Different measures were used to control speculation during the
auction process. These were
• Auctioneer ensured symmetric distribution of information to bidders.
All bidders were equally informed, at all times, during the auction
process.
– To start with, a comprehensive document called NIA was issued to all
bidders with details about auction rules & procedures, eligibility conditions
and application requirements.
– After the pre-qualification stage, the identities of bidders, their ownership
structure, amount of earnest money deposited by them were made public.
– During the clock stage of auction, detailed information was provided to all
bidders after each completed clock round. This included details like total
number of bids received, excess demand and provisional winning bids.
– At the end of the final clock round, each bidder was informed about the
winning prices, the winning bids and the identities of the winning bidders.
61
Speculation During Auction Process
• Stringent payment terms and earnest money requirement contributed to the
deterrence for excessive speculative activity.
• Successful bidders were asked to deposit the successful bid amount within 10
calendar days of the close of the auction. In case they failed to do so, the
earnest money deposit would have been forfeited.
• To control speculation, the price and price increment during each clock round
were also controlled by the auctioneer. This ensured that auction prices did
not flare up in a particular round and were increased in a controlled manner.
• Another tool used by the auctioneer to deter speculator was use of a clause,
wherein time bound roll-out obligations were mandated for the winners.
• Stringent roll-out obligations with penalty clause were laid down.\
• Terms for merger & acquisitions were laid out to avoid repeat of 2008
scenario, wherein many companies that had bagged licences for INR 16 510
million sold it in open market for huge valuations. The terms clearly specified
that deterred speculators who try to win the spectrum being auctioned with the
objective of subsequently selling it a higher price.
62
Achievements of Objectives
Objective Comment
Obtain a market • The auction process was transparent
determined price of 3G/ • Rules of auction were predetermined & declared to
BWA spectrum through bidders
a transparent process • All bidders had access to same information
throughout the process
• All bid data will be released to allow verification of
the results
• Auction was highly competitive with no evidence of co-
ordinated bidding
• Price determined in the auction is the true market
determined price for spectrum
• this was the lowest price at which demand was
equal to supply in each of 22 service areas
• all bidders had the opportunity throughout the
process to bid for any circles that they wanted to –
they only stopped bidding once prices increased
beyond their threshold levels
63
Achievements of Objectives
Objective Comment
Ensure efficient use of • Bidders moderated their demand for spectrum as prices
spectrum and avoid increased
hoarding • Successful bidders outbid other potential users,
ensuring spectrum is efficiently awarded
• In order to optimise returns from spectrum, winners
necessarily had to put the spectrum to use at the
earliest so as to make profitable use of spectrum
• There was no evidence of any bidder trying to corner the
market for spectrum
64
Achievements of Objectives
Objective Comment
Stimulate competition in • The outcome produced a diverse range of providers
the sector • Auction design ensured that there was no unsold lots
• There are 4 to 5 operators of 3G service in each of
the service area
65
Achievements of Objectives
Objective Comment
Promote rollout of 3G • Strong competition & high valuations suggest that
and Broadband winners have strong business plans and it will be in their
services interest to rollout services at the earliest opportunity and
to a wide population in order to maximize returns
• Bidders appeared to have factored in the ‘early mover
advantage’ in their pricing strategy, as they will be able to
beat competition through early roll-out of services
• Provision of one blocks of spectrum to state owned
service providers (BSNL / MTNL) should help in rolling
out the services in rural areas
•Conditions mandated as part of auction will ensure that
roll-out will be fast and winning operators can not sit on
the spectrum without rolling out the service
66
Achievements of Objectives
Objective Comment
Maximise revenue • Features of auction designed to stimulate competition
proceeds from the and promote revenue generation worked well
Auctions
• The revenue proceeds were arrived through a thorough
competitive auction process and bidders had bid upto
levels which can be justified by their business plans
• Revenues exceeded Government & most analysts
expectations
•
67
Achievements of Objectives
Objective Comment
Resolve congestion • All available spectrum was allocated and there were no
issues related to unused slots
second generation • Provision of 4-5 blocks of 2*5 MHz spectrum to
(“2G”) mobile services successful bidders (including BSNL & MTNL) should help
them to address quality of service issues in their existing
2G network
68
2012 Spectrum Auction
Confidential. All rights reserved.
2012 Spectrum Auction
• Economic Times: Nov 15, 2012
– The government has garnered just Rs 9,407 crore, less than a quarter of
what it expected, as the much hyped second generation (2G) airwaves
auctions evoked a tepid response from mobile phone companies,
exacerbating concerns about the Centre's ability to meet its fiscal deficit
target
– "We have sold 42.37% of the total airwaves that were put up for sale. There
were no bids for Delhi, Mumbai, Karnataka and Rajasthan, and these four
zones contribute 50% of the reserve price. The government will have to take
some serious policy decisions, including whether the auctions should be re-
run in these four circles with a lower reserve price," telecom secretary R
Chandrasekhar told ET.
– In all circles, bids were at the base price with the exception of Bihar, where
they ended marginally higher, according to data released by the telecom
department on its website.
70
2012 Spectrum Auction
• In 2012, the DoT auctioned 2G spectrum in both GSM and CDMA
bands. The government put on sale 271.25 MHz of spectrum.
• The 1800 MHz band and 800 MHz band are currently being used for
GSM and CDMA services respectively.
• Eleven blocks having 1.25 MHz each in the 1800 MHz frequency band
were auctioned, except in Mumbai and Delhi where only eight blocks
were available.
• Three of the eleven blocks, in each circle, were reserved or new
telecom players for operators whose licences were cancelled by the
Supreme Court on 2 February 2012, following the 2G spectrum scam.
• Existing players whose licences were not affected by the Supreme
Court verdict can bid for only 2 blocks in each circle. This applies to all
circles of Airtel and Vodafone, and in some circles for Idea.
71
2012 Spectrum Auction
• Three blocks of 1.25 MHz frequency each in the 800 MHz band were
also available for auction.
• Initially, only Videocon Telecommunications Limited and Tata
Teleservices (Tata DoCoMo CDMA) had applied to participate in the
auction for spectrum in 800MHz band (CDMA).
• Both companies withdrew their applications before 5 November, the
last date for withdrawal of applications.
• The withdrawals meant that there were no bidders left and the CDMA
spectrum auction was subsequently cancelled.
• The final list of bidders was announced on 6 November. This was
followed by a mock auction on 7 and 8 November and the e-auction of
1,800 MHz band began on 12 November
72
2012 Spectrum Auction
• 5 companies which participated in the auction for spectrum in
1800MHz band (GSM) were: Airtel, Idea, Vodafone, Videocon,
Telecommunications Limited, Telewings Communications Services
Private Limited
• The auction took place over 2 days (starting 12 November and ending
14 November) and consisted of 14 rounds.
• The government received bids worth a total of 9,407 crore, far lower
than its target of 280 billion from the sale of 2G spectrum in the GSM
band.
• None of the bidders bid for a pan-India spectrum for which the reserve
price was set at Rs140 billion for 5 MHz of airwaves.
• Out of the 140 blocks of spectrum on offer, 102 got bids.
• Delhi, Mumbai, Karnataka and Rajasthan circles did not receive any
bids.
73
2013 Spectrum Auction
Confidential. All rights reserved.
2013 Spectrum Auction
• In 2013, the DoT auctioned 2G spectrum in GSM (1800 MHz) and
CDMA (800 MHz) bands.
• The Government decided to sell airwaves in Delhi, Mumbai,
Karnataka and Rajasthan for 1800 MHz band, and pan India for the
800 MHz band.
• The Government also announced that it would auction the unsold
spectrum in the 1800 MHz band from the 2012 spectrum auction,
immediately after the first round, which began on 11 March, got over
in order to comply with a Supreme Court order.
• The government reduced the reserve price for 1800 MHz by 30% and
for 800 MHz by 50% from the 2012 spectrum auction.
75
2013 Spectrum Auction
• The Government had planned to auction airwaves in Delhi, Mumbai
and Kolkata for 900 MHz band simultaneously with the 1800 MHz
band.
• But, it was not able to finalise the auction for the 900 MHz band as
incumbent operators had moved the Delhi High Court, seeking its
intervention to stop the auction of the 900 MHz bandwidth, after they
failed to get a response from the DoT on their plea for renewal of
licences for the 900 MHz spectrum band which they had bought in
November 1994.
76
2013 Spectrum Auction
• In total, the Government planned to auction 50 MHz of airwaves in the
1800 MHz band and 76.25 MHz of spectrum in the 800 MHz band in
the 2013 spectrum auction.
• The Government put CDMA spectrum worth 64 billion (US$1.1 billion)
up for auction and fixed the price of 900 MHz, two times higher than
1800 MHz.
• DoT issued notice inviting applications for spectrum auction on 30
January 2013,
• The auction for all three bands was planned to begin on 11 March
2013. However, no bidders expressed interest in the 1800 MHz and
900 MHz bands and as a result, the auction for those bands was
postponed indefinitely.
• The auction for spectrum in 800 MHz band proceeded as planned on
11 March.
77
2013 Spectrum Auction
• Response to the 2013 spectrum auction was poor.
• While there were no bidders for spectrum in 1800 MHz and 900 MHz
bands, MTS India was the only bidder for airwaves in 800 MHz band.
• Airtel and Idea were reluctant to participate in the spectrum auction for
due to steep pricing of the auction airwaves and the also because of
their debt levels and weakening cash flow.
• The sole bidder in the auction was Sistema Shyam TeleServices
Limited (SSTL), under the brand name MTS, who bid for spectrum in
the 800 MHz band.
78
2013 Spectrum Auction
• The auction was held on 11 March and lasted little over 4 hours.
• The auction ended in three rounds with lone bidder SSTL putting in
bids at the minimum bid price.
• Sistema Shyam TeleServices Limited (SSTL), under the brand name
MTS, won telecom spectrum in 8 circles for 36.39 billion
(US$610 million).
• In all, 24 blocks (of 1.25 MHz of spectrum each) in 8 telecom circles
were allocated out of 61 blocks that were put for auction.
• Approximately, 40% of the spectrum that was put for auction and 56%
of the value of spectrum put for auction was sold
79
2013 Spectrum Auction
• SSTL bought 3 blocks each in Delhi, Kolkata, Gujarat, Karnataka,
Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Uttar Pradesh (West) and West Bengal telecom
circles.[26]
• SSTL did not bid for the other 3 circles where spectrum was being
auctioned – Mumbai, Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh (East) circles.
• The terms of the auction include payment of 25% of the final bid
amount by SSTL to the Government within 10 days, followed by a
payment moratorium until March 2016.
• The Government will not get any upfront payment from the auction as
16.58 billion (US$280 million) has to be adjusted against the license
fee SSTL had already paid in 2008.
80
Thank you
Confidential. All rights reserved.
Terms
• CMTS: Cellular Mobile Telephony Service
• BWA: Broadband Wireless Access
• UAS: Unified Access Licence
• WPS: Wireless Planning Commission
• ITU: International Telecom Union
82
Policy & Regulatory Framework
• WPC (Wireless Planning Commission): Spectrum Management
• DoT: Licensor and frequency management for telecom
• Telecom Commission: Exclusive policy making function of the
DoT
• GoT–IT(Group on Telecom and IT) Handles ad–hoc issues
• TRAI: Independent Regulator
• TDSAT: Disputes settlement body
83