SPL Research

THE COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS
ACT OF 2002 (REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165)
PEOPLE vs. SONIA NUARIN

G.R. No. 188698
July 22, 2015
DOCTRINE:
A successful prosecution for the sale of illegal drugs requires more than the perfunctory presentation of
evidence establishing each element of the crime: the identities of the buyer and seller, the transaction or
sale of the illegal drug, and the existence of the corpus delicti.
In securing or sustaining a conviction under R.A. No. 9165, the intrinsic worth of these pieces of evidence,
especially the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti, must definitely be shown to have been preserved.
This requirement necessarily arises from the illegal drug’s unique characteristic that renders it indistinct, not
readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering, alteration, or substitution either by accident or
otherwise. Thus, to remove any doubt on the identity and integrity of the seized drug, evidence must
definitely show that the illegal drug presented in court is the same illegal drug actually recovered from the
accused appellant.
FACTS:
The prosecution charged the appellant Sonia with violation of Sections 53 and 11 respectively, of R.A. No.
9165 as a result of a buy-bust operation. The defense presented a different set of facts, alleging that
appellant was a victim of illegal search and extortion. In this appeal, appellant raises the defense that the
chain of custody was broken. The State counters that the prosecution was able to establish that the sale of
shabu between the appellant and the poseur-buyer was consummated. It also maintained that the
nonpresentation in court of the original marked money, the forensic chemist, the informant, and the
original marked money was not fatal in the prosecution for
illegal drugs.
ISSUE: WON the guilt of the accused was proven beyond reasonable doubt by following the chain of custody
rule.
RULING:
No. Under Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, it is required that:
1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
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In the case at bar, the proper procedure was not shown to have been complied with by the members of the
buy-bust team, as PO1 Manalo himself admitted that the police did not make an inventory and photograph
the seized items either at the place of seizure or at the police station. In addition, the police did not offer any
acceptable reason why they failed to do a basic requirement like a physical inventory of the seized drugs,
considering that there were only three (3) sachets taken from the appellant.
The records do not show that the sachets were marked in the presence of the appellant. In People v. Sanchez,
we explained that the "marking" of the seized items to truly ensure that they are the same items that enter
the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence should be done:
(1) in the presence of the apprehended violator and
(2) immediately upon confiscation.
We explained therein that this step initiates the process of protecting innocent persons from dubious and
concocted searches, and of protecting as well the apprehending officers from harassment suits based on
planting of evidence under Section 29 and on allegations of robbery or theft.
Hence, herein appellant is acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Q and A’s
1. Q: What are the elements for illegal sale of drugs?
A: In every prosecution for illegal sale of drugs, the following elements must be sufficiently proved:
(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object and the consideration;
(2) the delivery of the thing sold ;and
(3) the payment therefor.
In other words, there is a need to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused actually sold
and delivered a prohibited drug to another, and that the former indeed knew that what he had sold and
delivered to the latter was a prohibited drug. To reiterate, what is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, plus the presentation in court of
corpus delicti as evidence.
2. Q: Briefly define “Buy-Bust Operation”.
A: A buy–bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to for the
purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan.
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PEOPLE VS FREDDIE LADIP
G.R. No. 196146
March 12 2014
DOCTRINE:
Strict step-by-step adherence to the procedural requirements under RA 9165 and its IRR, a.k.a Chain of
Custody Rule, is not required; what is important is to ensure the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. Thus,
“marking upon immediate confiscation” does not exclude the possibility that marking can be at the police
station or office of the apprehending team.
FACTS:
As a result of a buy-bust operation, herein accused was charged of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. For his
defense, he alleges that he was a victim of illegal warrantless search and arrest. Failing to overcome the
presumption of regularity, he was convicted in the RTC and later in CA. Hence this appeal, the accused
primarily arguing that the police officers failed to follow the Chain of Custody Rule, because the marking of the
confiscated drug was made in the police station and not in the immediate place of arrest.
ISSUE: Whether the accused should be acquitted because the drug was not marked immediately in the place
of arrest.
RULING:
No. Failure to comply with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 will not render the arrest of the accused illegal, nor will
it result to the inadmissibility in evidence against the accused of the illegal drugs seized in the course of the
entrapment operation. What is of utmost relevance is the preservation of the integrity and maintenance of
the evidentiary value of the confiscated illegal drugs, for in the end, the same shall necessarily be the thrust
that shall determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.
In the prosecution of offenses relating to illegal sale, peddling and conveyance of prohibited drugs, what is of
material and pivotal importance is proof that the sale of drugs actually took place, coupled with the
presentation of the corpus delicti as evidence, and furthermore, that there is no showing of any indicia of ill or
improper motive on the part of the police operatives to impute such serious crime against accused as
manifested by their witnesses’ spontaneous and categorical declarations and account of the incident. These
were all established and proven beyond reasonable doubt in the instant case.
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Q and A’s
1. Q: Will the failure of the police officers to take photographs of the illegal drug render it inadmissible?
A: The failure of the prosecution to conduct a physical inventory and take photograph of the seized item
does not ipso facto render inadmissible in evidence the items seized. There is a proviso in the implementing
rules stating that when it is shown that there exist justifiable grounds and proof that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the evidence have been preserved, the seized items can still be used in determining the
guilt or innocence of the accused.
2. Q: What are the elements of illegal possession of regulated or prohibited drugs?
A: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified to be a prohibited or regulated
drug;
(2) such possession is not authorized by law; and
(3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.
PEOPLE vs. ENRICO MIRONDO

G.R. No. 210841
October 14, 2015
DOCTRINE:
It is of paramount importance that the identity of the dangerous drug be established beyond reasonable
doubt; and that it must be proven with certitude that the substance bought during the buy-bust operation is
exactly the same substance offered in evidence before the court. In fine, the illegal drug must be produced
before the court as exhibit and that which was exhibited must be the very same substance recovered from the
suspect.
Hence, failure to introduce the subject narcotic substance as an exhibit during trial is fatal to the prosecution's
cause.
FACTS:
Accused-appellant was convicted of violating Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 for selling illegal
drugs. According to the prosecution, the accused was arrested through a buy-bust operation in Laguna.
According to the accused, he was a victim of illegal arrest and extortion as he was accosted while inside his
residence.
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In this appeal, accused-appellant asserts that the charge of illegal drug deal is a complete fabrication and
frame-up inasmuch as no sufficient evidence was adduced by the prosecution to prove that a legitimate buy-
bust operation was conducted against him. He argues that the omission of the police operatives to observe
the procedures outlined by Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, particularly on the taking of photographs and the
physical inventory of the subject narcotic in the presence of the personalities mentioned in said law, creates
serious doubt on the existence of such allegedly confiscated drug.
He assails the prosecution evidence for its failure to establish the proper chain of custody of the seized shabu
which shed uncertainty on its identity and integrity. He asserts that the plastic sachet containing 0.03 gram of
shabu which was allegedly recovered from him was not presented before the trial court for identification.
ISSUE: Whether the lower court erred in finding the accused guilty despite the broken chain of custody of the
illegal drug.
RULING:
Yes. For a successful prosecution of an offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following essential
elements must be proven: (1) that the transaction or sale took place; (2) the corpus delicti or the illicit drug
was presented as evidence; and (3) that the buyer and seller were identified.
In the case at bench, the Court finds that the second element is wanting. It appears that the subject 0.03 gram
of shabu allegedly confiscated from the accused was never presented in evidence during the trial for
identification by the prosecution witnesses, albeit the same had been formally offered by the prosecution.
In other words, the subject drug shall be actually presented in court where the witnesses will be asked to
identify the same drug, in order to verify if it is still the same drug confiscated at the buybust operations.
Instead of following this, the prosecution endeavored to establish the existence and identity of the narcotic
substance supposedly seized from Mirondo through mere photographs depicting him together with the
subject shabu and the buybust money consisting of two (2) one hundred peso bills.
Accordingly, the prosecution failed to prove the indispensable element of corpus delicti of the case.
Q and A’s
1. Q: Discuss the links that the prosecution must establish in the chain of custody in a buy-bust operation
A: The links that the prosecution must establish in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation to be as
follows:
First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer;
Second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer;
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Third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and
Fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the
court.
PEOPLE vs. ADRIANO y SALES

GR NO. 208169
OCTOBER 8, 2014
PEREZ, J.
FACTS:
On or about 25th of October 2008, in the City of Taguig, Philippines, through a buy-bust operation, Edward
Adriano y Sales was apprehended, for without being authorized by law, sell, deliver, and give away to a poseur
buyer, zero point twelve (0.12) gram of a white crystalline substance, commonly known as "shabu" which is a
dangerous drug, in consideration of the amount of Two Hundred Pesos (Php200.00) which is in violation of
Section 5, Article II of the Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. No. 9165), otherwise known as Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act (CDDA) of 2002.
Adriano was convicted in the lower courts, hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the elements for prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous drugs are present.
RULING:
In prosecutions for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following two (2) elements must be duly established:
(1) proof that the transaction or sale took place; and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the
illicit drug as evidence.
In the case at bar, the prosecution duly established the two (2) elements: (1) to account that the transaction
or sale indeed took place, PO1 Morales narrated the transaction in a clear and direct manner; and (2) the
seized illegal drugs and marked money were presented before the trial court as proof of the identity of the
object of the crime and of the corpus delicti.
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PEOPLE vs. BAYAN
GR NO. 200987
AUGUST 20, 2014
PEREZ, J.
DOCTRINE
(1) What are the elements for illegal sale of dangerous drugs?
(1) proof that the transaction or sale took place; and
(2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence
(2) What does “buy-bust” operation means?

A buy-bust operation is "a form of entrapment, in which the violator is caught in flagrante delicto and the
police officers conducting the operation are not only authorized but duty bound to apprehend the violator
and to search him for anything that may have been part of or used in the commission of the crime."
In People v. Agulay, buy-bust operation is a form of a valid and effective mode of apprehending drug
pushers: A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which in recent years has been accepted as a valid
and effective
mode of apprehending drug pushers. In a buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from
the offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the offense. If carried out with due
regard for constitutional and legal safeguards, a buy-bust operation deserves judicial sanction.
FACTS:
On or about the 5th day of July 2003, in Quezon City, Philippines, Ronaldo Bayan y Neri, not authorized by law
to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any dangerous drug, did then and there, willfully and
unlawfully sell, dispense, deliver, transport, distribute or act as broker in the said transaction, zero point zero
three (0.03) grams of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride known as Shabu, a dangerous drug. Appellant
Ronaldo Bayan y Neri was charged following a buy-bust operation for violation of Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165.
Appellant maintains that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of appellant dueto
theglaring inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the elements for prosecution of illegal sale of shabu are sufficiently proven.
RULING:
In every prosecution for illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must be sufficiently proved: (1) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and
the payment therefor. Indeed, all these elements were duly established. Appellant was caught in flagrante
delicto selling shabu through a buy-bust operation conducted by the operatives of SDEU of the Novaliches
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Police Station. The poseur-buyer, PO2 Mendoza, positively testified that the sale took place and appellant was
the author thereof.
DOCTRINE:
(1) Whether or not the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of appellant due to
the glaring inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses.
Jurisprudence dictates that minor inconsistencies do not affect the credibility of the witness. We have held
that "discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring to minor details, and not
in actuality touching upon the central fact of the crime, do not impair their credibility. Testimonies of
witnesses need only corroborate each other on important and relevant details concerning the principal
occurrence. In fact, such minor inconsistencies may even serve to strengthen the witnesses’ credibility as
they negate any suspicion that the testimonies have been rehearsed."
(2) Whether or not the failure to present the buy-bust money fatal to the prosecution’s cause.
It is not indispensable in drug cases since it is merely corroborative evidence, and the absence thereof
does not create a hiatus in the evidence for the prosecution provided the sale of dangerous drugs is
adequately proven and the drug subject of the transaction is presented before the court. Neither law nor
jurisprudence requires the presentation of any money used in the buy-bust operation.
PEOPLE vs. CASABUENA

GR NO. 186455 741 SCRA 80
NOVEMBER 19, 2014
BRION, J.
FACTS:
That on or about the 4th day of February, 2004, in the City of Laoag, Philippines, Rosalinda Casabuena, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell in a buy-bust operation to Armando Joaquin acting as
the poseur-buyer 0.0139 gram of shabu, a dangerous drug, contained in one plastic sachet, without any
license or authority to sell the same, in violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
The appellant essentially maintains that the chain of custody over the seized drug was broken. She added that
the integrity and evidentiary value of the object evidence had not been preserved.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the requirements in prosecution for the illegal sale of prohibited drug under Section 5 of RA No.
9165 have been complied with.
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2. Whether the chain of custody over the seized drug was broken.
RULING:
In a prosecution for the illegal sale of a prohibited drug under Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165, the prosecution must
prove the following elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration;
and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. All these require evidence that the sale
transaction transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti, i.e., the body or substance
of the crime that establishes that a crime has actually been committed, as shown by presenting the object of
the illegal transaction. To remove any doubt or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the seized drug,
evidence must definitely show that the illegal drug presented in court is the same illegal drug actually
recovered from the accused appellant; otherwise, the prosecution for possession or for drug pushing under
R.A. No. 9165 fails. These conditions were not met in the present case, as the prosecution did not even
attempt to offer any justification why it failed to inventory and to photograph the seized items. The Court
cannot simply presume what these justifications are. Contrary to the CA’s ruling, the so called "field test of the
drugs recovered" and its turn over to the crime laboratory together with the marked money are not the
procedures mandated by Section 21 and its IRR.
The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs is embodied in Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II
of R.A. No. 9165, which states:
1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. [Emphasis ours]
This is implemented by Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A.
No.9165, which reads:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused
or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided,
that the physical inventory and photographs hall be conducted at the place where the search warrant
is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that noncompliance with
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
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Strict compliance with the prescribed procedure is required because of the illegal drug's unique characteristic
rendering it indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering, alteration or substitution either
by accident or otherwise.
The outlined procedure, however, was not shown to have been complied with by the members of the buy-
bust team, and nothing on record suggests that they had extended reasonable efforts to comply with the
said statutory requirement in handling the seized evidence
To be sure, Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR offers some flexibility in complying with the express
requirements under paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, i.e.,"noncompliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of
and custody over said items[.]"This saving clause, however, applies only where the prosecution recognized the
procedural lapses and thereafter explained the cited justifiable grounds, and when the prosecution
established that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized had been preserved.
These conditions were not met in the present case, as the prosecution did not even attempt to offer any
justification why it failed to inventory and to photograph the seized items. The Court cannot simply presume
what
Hence, the Court resolved to ACQUIT the accused.
DOCTRINES:
What is the Chain of Custody Requirement?
In prosecutions involving narcotics, the narcotic substance itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense
and its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt demands that unwavering exactitude be observed in establishing the corpus delicti. The
chain of custody rule performs this function as it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of
the evidence are removed.
The rule seeks to settle definitively whether the object evidence subjected to laboratory examination and
presented in court is the same object allegedly seized from appellant. Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002
defines chain of custody as "the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction."
The chain of custody rule requires that there be testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the
object seized was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who touched
it would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the
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witness’ possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the
next link in the chain.
PEOPLE vs. DELA TRINIDAD

GR NO. 199898
SEPTEMEBER 3, 2014
PEREZ, J.
FACTS:
On or about October 21, 2008, in the City of Naga, Philippines Leo Dela Trinidad y Oballes, accused, without
authority of law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally have in his possession, custody and
control nine and one-half (9 ½) bricks of suspected dried marijuana leaves with fruiting tops weighing more or
less 475 grams including its (sic) wrapper; two (2) big bricks of suspected dried marijuana leaves with fruiting
tops weighing more or less 550 grams including its (sic) wrapper; four (4) pieces of medium size cubes of
suspected dried marijuana leaves weighing more or less 41.1 grams including its (sic) plastic containers;
eighteen (18) pieces of small cubes of suspected dried marijuana leaves with fruiting tops weighing more or
less 55.4 grams including its (sic) plastic container; and seventy-seven (77) pieces of small empty transparent
plastic sachet, with a total weight of more or less 1,121.5 grams, which is a dangerous drug, in violation of
Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime charged despite
the prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING:
In the prosecution of illegal possession of regulated or prohibited drugs, the following elements must be
established: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified to be prohibited or
regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the drug.
As correctly ruled by the CA, these elements were duly established by the prosecution. Jurisprudence is
consistent in that mere possession of a prohibited drug constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or
animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of any satisfactory explanation.
The ruling of the Supreme Court in People v. Lagman is instructive.It held that illegal possession of regulated
drugs is mala prohibita, and, as such, criminal intent is not an essential element. However, the prosecution
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must prove that the accused had the intent to possess (animus posidendi) the drugs.
Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive possession. Actual
possession exists when the
drug is in the immediate possession or control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession
exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise
dominion and control over the place where it is found. Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The
accused cannot avoid conviction if his right to exercise control and dominion over the place where the
contraband is located, is shared with another. It must be emphasized that the finding of illicit drugs and
paraphernalia in a house or building owned or occupied by a particular person raises the presumption of
knowledge and possession thereof which, standing alone, is sufficient to convict.
Here, accused-appellant failed to present any evidence to overcome such presumption. He merely insisted
that he was framed and had no knowledge of where the prohibited drugs came from. In the absence of any
contrary evidence, he is deemed to be in full control and dominion of the drugs found in his house.
DOCTRINE:
(1) What are the elements to be established in the prosecution of illegal possession of regulated or
prohibited drugs?
(1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified to be prohibited or regulated drug;
(3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.
(2) Does mere possession of a prohibited drug constitute a prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus
possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of any satisfactory explanation?
Jurisprudence is consistent in that mere possession of a prohibited drug constitutes prima facie evidence
of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of any satisfactory
explanation.
In People v. Lagman, it is instructive.It held that illegal possession of regulated drugs is mala prohibita,
and, as such, criminal intent is not an essential element. However, the prosecution must prove that the
accused had the intent to possess (animus posidendi) the drugs.
(3) What does possession under the law include?
Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive possession. Actual
possession exists when the drug is in the immediate possession or control of the accused. On the other
hand, constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or
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when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place
where it is found. Exclusive possession or control is not necessary.
(4) Does the finding of illicit drugs and paraphernalia in a house or building owned or occupied by a
particular person raises the presumption of knowledge and possession thereof?
It must be emphasized that the finding of illicit drugs and paraphernalia in a house or building owned or
occupied by a particular person raises the presumption of knowledge and possession thereof which,
standing alone, is sufficient to convict.
TIONCO vs. PEOPLE

GR NO. 192284 752 SCRA 598
MARCH 11, 2015
DEL CASTILLO, J.
FACTS:
On or about July 24, 2002, in the City of Manila, Philippines, Alex Tionco y Ortega, accused, without being
authorized by law to possess any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have
in his possession and under his custody and control white crystalline substance known as shabu placed in one
(1) heat sealed transparent plastic sachet weighing ZERO AND POINT ZERO FOUR SEVEN (0.047) GRAM,
containing methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, without the corresponding license or
prescription thereof.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in giving full weight and credence to the prosecution’s
evidence (notwithstanding) the apprehending team’s failure to prove the integrity and identity of the alleged
confiscated shabu.
RULING:
"For illegal possession of regulated or prohibited drugs, the prosecution must establish the following
elements: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2)
such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug."
As correctly found by the CA, the prosecution was able to establish through testimonial, documentary and
object evidence the aforesaid elements. The circumstances on how petitioner was seen holding and examining
a piece of plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance, how the same was confiscated from him by
the police officers, and his eventual arrest were aptly narrated by PO1 Sta. Maria in a direct and consistent
manner. In open court, the same witness positively identified petitioner as the person holding the plastic
sachet. He also identified the plastic sachet marked "ATO" as the same item confiscated from petitioner. There
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is nothing on record to show that petitioner was legally authorized to possess
the same. And having been caught in flagrante delicto, there is prima facie evidence that petitioner freely and
consciously possessed the drug, which he failed to rebut. Indeed, all the elements of the offense charged are
obtaining in this case.
DOCTRINE
(1) What are the elements in prosecution of illegal possession of regulated or prohibited drugs?
For illegal possession of regulated or prohibited drugs, the prosecution must establish the following
elements:
(1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified to be a prohibited drug;
(3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs. RAMONITO B. ASIGNAR

G.R. No. 206593
November 10, 2015
FACTS:
Prosecution’s allegation:
That on August 24, 2004, at about 6:45 a.m. in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent and without being authorized by law, did then and
there sell, deliver or give away to a poseur buyer the following: one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic packet
of 0.02 gram of white crystalline substance placed in a plastic pack locally knowns as "shabu" containing
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. He was also charged for illegal possession and under
his control the following: two (2) disposable lighters used as an improvised burner one plastic paraphernalia
for repacking shabu which are instruments and/or equipments fit or intended for smoking, consuming,
administering, ingesting or introducing any dangerous drug into the body.
Accused appellant’s defense:
In his testimony, accused claims that he was extorted. However, he failed to produce any witness to
corroborate the said claim.
ISSUE:
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Whether the Supreme Court should affirm the conviction of herein accused
for violating RA. 9165, or the Anti-Dangerous Drugs Act.
RULING:
Yes the conviction should be affirmed. For the successful prosecution of the illegal sale of shabu, only the
following elements are essential: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the
consideration; and (2)the delivery of the thing sold and its payment. What is material is proof that the sale
actually took place, coupled with the presentation of evidence of the seized item, as part of the corpus delicti.
The delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and receipt by the seller of the marked money successfully
consummate the buy-bust transaction.
The prosecution has already established the presence of all the elements. PO1 Solana,who acted as the
poseur-buyer, positively identified [accused-appellant] as the person who came out to meet him, and dealt
with him and the informant during the buy-bust operation. It was accused-appellant himself who gave a
plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. During the examination of the white crystalline
substance bought by PO1 Solana from accused-appellant together with the three (3) other plastic packets
containing traces of white crystalline substance tested positive for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a
dangerous drugs, per Chemistry report No. D-1525-2005 issued by the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory.
For illegal possession of regulated or prohibited drugs, the prosecution mustestablish the following elements:
(1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug. All the
elements were established in this case. Incident to his lawful arrest, when he was frisked three (3) plastic
packets containing traces of white crystalline substance, later on found to be traces of a dangerous drug, was
taken from his possession. In a number of cases, it has been declared that mere possession of a regulated
drug per se constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possendi sufficient to convict an accused
absent a satisfactory explanation of such possession - the onus probandi is shifted to the accused, of
knowledge or animus possidendi. Mere possession of the prohibited substance and the burden of proof is
upon accused-appellant to show that he has a license or permit under law to possess the prohibited drug. The
accused-appellant failed to explain his possession of the prohibited drug. Accused-appellant was misled in his
belief that the burden to prove the lack of license or permit to possess the prohibited drug lies with the
prosecution.
DOCTRINES:
15
What are the essential elements in order to be prosecuted for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs?
For the successful prosecution of the illegal sale of shabu, only the following elements are essential: (1) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (2)the delivery of the
thing sold and its payment. What is material is proof that the sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation of evidence of the seized item, as part of the corpus delicti. The delivery of the illicit drug to the
poseur-buyer and receipt by the seller of the marked money successfully consummate the buy-bust
transaction.
What are the elements to be liable for illegal possession of dangerous drugs?
For illegal possession of regulated or prohibited drugs, the prosecution mustestablish the following elements:
(1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.
Is mere possession of dangerous drugs sufficient to prosecute an accused?
Yes it is sufficient. Mere possession of a regulated drug per se constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge
or animus possendi sufficient to convict an accused absent a satisfactory explanation of such possession -
the onus probandi is shifted to the accused, of knowledge or animus possidendi. Mere possession of the
prohibited substance and the burden of proof is upon accused-appellant to show that he has a license or
permit under law to possess the prohibited drug.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs. DENNIS E. TANCINO.

G.R. No. 200598
June 18, 2014
FACTS:
Tancinco was lawfully arrested without a warrant after information of his being armed and engaging in a pot
session with other persons was given to the police officers who then investigated and pursued the lead of the
BIN informant. Incident to the lawful warrantless arrest of Tancinco is a search on his person made by the
police officers which then yielded his illegal possession of shabu.
16
Tancinco’s roughly drawn scene is that of a frame-up, and that he was
eventually charged with illegal possession of shabu because he did not turn state witness against Nodalo.
Tancinco cites the testimony of PO2 Dio as flawed for declaring that he did not clearly see Tancinco holding
the firearm. He further avers that if he did own the firearm seized, as alleged by the prosecution, he would not
have tried to conceal it beside a bingo machine which can easily be spotted by people as their location at that
time was a public place. To do so was contrary to human nature.
ISSUE:
Whether the arrest and the seizure of prohibited drugs from herein accused is valid.
RULING:
Yes, the arrest and the seizure of the prohibited drugs is valid. To begin with, the testimony of the police
officers, including PO2 Dio, as to what went down when they arrested Tancinco was direct, straightforward
and positive. PO2 Dio’s statement that he did not clearly see Tancinco holding the firearm does not detract
from the prosecutions’ evidence and story that Tancinco was arrested while attempting to conceal a firearm
and could not produce a license to carry thereof when asked by the police officers. Immediately thereafter, as
an incident to a lawful warrantless arrest, Tancinco was searched and found to have three (3) sachets of shabu
in his possession.
The presumption that official duty has been regularly performed, and the corresponding testimony of the
arresting officers on the buy-bust transaction, can only be overcome through clear and convincing evidence
showing either of two things: (1) that they were not properly performing their duty, or (2) that they were
inspired by any improper motive. In the face of the straightforward and direct testimony of the police officers,
and absent any improper motive on their part to frame up Tancinco, stacked against the bare and thin self-
serving testimony of Tancinco, the court find no reason to overturn the lower courts’ findings.
As found by the lower courts, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the elements of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs: (1) the accused is in possession of the object identified as a prohibited or
regulatory drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said drug.
Tancinco does not even attempt to explain his possession of the three (3) sachets of shabu, only that such
were not validly obtained and resulted from his unlawful arrest. Clearly, given the foregoing explication,
Tancinco was in possession of three (3) sachets of shabu in the total quantity of 5.36 grams, which possession
conscious knew these to be shabu, a dangerous drug.
Thus, between the positive assertions of the witnesses for the [prosecution] and the negative averments of
[Tancinco], the former undisputedly deserves more credence and are entitled to greater evidentiary value.
The defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has been viewed with disfavor for it can easily be concocted and
17
is a common defense ploy in most prosecutions for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act. Denial is a weak form of defense, particularly when it is not substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence.
DOCTRINES:
How can the presumption of regularity in a buy-bust operation be overcome?
It can only be overcome through clear and convincing evidence showing either of two things: (1) that they
were not properly performing their duty, or (2) that they were inspired by any improper motive.
What are the elements of illegal possession of dangerous drugs?
As found by the lower courts, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the elements of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs: (1) the accused is in possession of the object identified as a prohibited or
regulatory drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said drug.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VIVIAN BULOTANO.

G.R. No. 190177
June 11, 2014
FACTS:
Upon a tip-off, a team of agents from the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) conducted a buy-bust
operation Sto. Niño, Cagayan de Oro City, toentrap Bulotano for allegedly selling illegal drugs or shabu.
Acting as poseur-buyers, PO1 DizonDagaraga (PO1 Dagaraga), together with an informant, approached
Bulotano, who was playing a card game with two (2) other persons inside a billiard hall. When Bulotano
noticed the two, she approached them and asked what they were looking for. PO1 Dagaraga replied that he
wants to buy P200.00 worth of shabu. After Bulotano handed PO1 Dagaraga a transparent plastic sachet
containing crystals, PO1 Dagaraga handed Bulotano marked money in the amount of P200.00.Immediately,
PO1 Dagaraga went out of the billiard hall to call the back-up officers to arrest Bulotano.
Bulotano claims that during her arrest, she was merely playing a card game when three (3) armed men
suddenly barged into the billiard hall and approached her. According to Bulotano, one of the three (3) armed
men introduced himself as a policeman, after which, she was brought outside and made to board a police
vehicle. Bulotano further claims that during the entire incident, she was in a state of shock and was never
informed of the reason for her arrest, as well as of her constitutional rights. Contrary to the prosecution’s
allegation of facts, Bulotano claims that she found out the reason for her arrest only upon arrival at the PDEA-
18
Region 10 Office, where PO1. She further alleged that the arresting officers failed to
comply with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 which provides for the procedure that ensures that what was
confiscated is the one presented in court.
ISSUE:
Whether or non-compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 renders the arrest illegal.
RULING:
The court ruled on the negative. The elements necessary for the prosecution of the illegal sale of drugs are as
follows: (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of
the thing sold and payment therefor. The prosecution,to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, must present
in evidence the corpus delicti of the case. The corpus delicti is the seized illegal drugs.
The duty of the prosecution is not merely to present in evidence the seized illegal drugs. It is essential that the
illegal drugs seized from the suspect is the very same substance offered in evidence in court as the identity of
the drug must be established with the same unwavering exactitude as that required to make a finding of guilt.
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 provides for the procedure that ensures that what was confiscated is the
one presented in court. The law requires that requires that upon seizure of illegal drug items, the
apprehending team having initial custody of the drugs shall (a) conduct a physical inventory of the drugs and
(b) take photographs thereof (c) in the presence of the person from whom these items were seized or
confiscated and (d) a representative from the media and the Department of Justice and any elected public
official (e) who shall all be required to sign the inventory and be given copies thereof.
In sum, the procedural requirements of Section 21, Republic Act No. 9165 were not followed. First,no
photograph of the seized shabu was taken. Second, the arresting officers did not immediately mark the seized
shabu at the scene of the crime. Third, although there was testimony about the marking of the seized items at
the police station, the records do not show that the marking was done in the presence of Bulotano. Fourth, no
representative of the media and the Department of Justice, and any elected official attended the conduct of
the physical inventory and signed the inventory. And finally, the Chemistry Report was not duly notarized.
Without doubt, the arresting officers failed to strictly comply with the requirements provided in Section
21.However, noncompliance with the enumerated requirements in Section 21 of the law, does not
automatically exonerate the accused. Upon proof that noncompliance was due to justifiable grounds, and that
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, the seizure and custody over said items are not, by the noncompliance, rendered void. This is
the "chain of custody" rule.
19
In the instant case, in detail, the records of the case indicate that after
Bulotano’s arrest, she was taken to the police station and turned over to the police investigator. Although
there were no photographs taken, PO1 Dagaraga, the poseur-buyer and arresting officer, testified that he
personallymade the markings "DGD" (representing his initials) on the plastic sachet containing crystalline
substance. PO1 Dagaraga also testified that he was the one who drafted the inventory. PO1 Dagaraga, also,
drafted the request for chemical laboratory examination. After drafting the request, it was still PO1 Dagaraga,
who delivered the plastic sachet containing crystalline substance,which had the marking "DGD" to the PNP
Chemical Laboratory for examination. The request, together with the sachet containing crystalline substance,
was received by SPO1 Tabligan. Then, it was transferred to the Forensic Chemical Officer, P/S Insp.
Madroño.The plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance was later on determined to be positive for Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride or shabu.
Despite noncompliance with the requirements in Section 21, there is no showing of a break in the chain in the
custody.
DOCTRINES:
What are the elements for illegal sale of drugs?
The elements necessary for the prosecution of the illegal sale of drugs are as follows: (a) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and payment
therefor. The prosecution,to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, must present in evidence the corpus delicti
of the case. The corpus delicti is the seized illegal drugs.
Is non-compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 renders the arrest of accused illegal, and seize
item inadmissible?
No. noncompliance with the enumerated requirements in Section 21 of the law, does not automatically
exonerate the accused. Upon proof that noncompliance was due to justifiable grounds, and that the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, the
seizure and custody over said items are not, by the noncompliance, rendered void. This is the "chain of
custody" rule.
THE PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINESvs. CHARLIE SORIN

G.R. No. 212635
March 25, 2015
FACTS:
20
Appellant Charlie Sorin was arrested following a buy-bust operation
conducted by the PNP. Sorin was then brought to the police station. At the police station, PO2 Dador turned
over the seized items and the marked money to SPO1 Mugot, who marked the same, prepared the inventory
and request for laboratory examination, and sent the seized items to the PNP Crime Laboratory.Appellant was
charged and the RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165.
Appellant argues that there are unjustified gaps in the chain of custody of the drugs allegedly seized from him
and that such warrant his acquittal.
On the other hand, the prosecution avers that a buy-bust operation took place where the seized items and the
marked money were recovered and marked, and that when the seized sachets were transmitted to the PNP
Crime Laboratory, the same tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the unjustified gaps in the chain of custody of the drugs allegedly seized from appellant
warrant his acquittal.
RULING:
Yes. The Court found that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the substance allegedly
confiscated from Sorin due to unjustified gaps in the chain of custody, thus warranting his acquittal.
Records bear out that PO2 Dador, i.e., the apprehending officer who seized the sachets from Sorin during the
buy-bust operation conducted on November 2, 2005, failed to mark the same and, instead, turned them over
unmarked to SPO1 Mugot who was the one who conducted the marking; prepared the request for laboratory
examination of the seized sachets, Sorin’s urine, and the marked money; delivered the said request, together
with the seized sachets and marked money, to the PNP Crime Laboratory; and later received the examination
results. PO2 Dador had, in fact, admitted that the sachets he seized from Sorin were not even marked in his
presence.
The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or
related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of the
criminal proceedings, thus, preventing switching, planting, or contamination of evidence.
It is well-settled that in criminal prosecutions involving illegal drugs, the presentation of the drugs which
constitute the corpus delicti of the crime calls for the necessity of proving with moral certainty that they are
the same seized items. The lack of conclusive identification of the illegal drugs allegedly seized from the
21
accused strongly militates against a finding of guilt. As reasonable doubt persists
on the identity of the drugs allegedly seized from the accused, the latter’s acquittal should come as a matter
of course.
Q and A’s
1) What are the essential elements of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II
of RA 9165?
In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the following
elements must concur: (a) the identities of the buyer and seller, object, and consideration; and (b) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it.
As the dangerous drug itself forms an integral and key part of the corpus delicti of the crime, it is therefore
essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the
prosecution must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the dangerous drug, from the
moment it was seized from the accused up to the time it was presented in court as proof of the corpus
delicti.(People vs. Sorin, G.R. No. 212635, March 25, 2015)
2) Will non-compliance with the "chain of custody rule” automatically render the seizure and custody of
the items void and invalid?
No. While the "chain of custody rule" demands utmost compliance from the police officers, Section 21 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 as well as jurisprudence, nevertheless provides that non-
compliance with the requirements of this rule will not automatically render the seizure and custody of the
items void and invalid, so long as: (a) there is a justifiable ground for such noncompliance; and (b) the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. Hence, any deviation from the prescribed
procedure must be justified, but, at all times, should not affect the integrity and evidentiary value of the
confiscated items.(People vs. Sorin, G.R. No. 212635, March 25, 2015)
THE PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINESvs. FERNANDO RANCHE HAVANA

G.R. No. 198450
January 11, 2016
FACTS:
On November 4, 2005, appellant Fernando Havana was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by
the PNP. The appellant was taken to the police station for investigation. He was thereafter charged, trial
ensued and the RTC found appellant guilty as charged.
22
The appellant contends that the belated submission of the pre-operation report to
the PDEA after the buy-bust operation violates RA 9165; and that the non-presentation of the unnamed
"civilian informant" who allegedly brokered the transaction with him casts serious doubts on the factuality of
the buy-bust operation.
On the other hand, the prosecution avers that coordination with the PDEA is not an indispensable
requirement before police authorities may carry out a buy-bust operation and that informers are almost
always never presented in court because of the need to preserve their invaluable service to the police.
Also, appellant argues thatthere is failure on the part of the prosecution to establish a continuous and
unbroken chain of custody of the seized illegal drug and lack of integrity of the evidence in view of the police
officers’ non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of RA 9165.
On its part, the Solicitor General asserts that the essential elements of the offense charged had been
adequately established and that the appellant’s bare denial cannot prevail over the positive and
straightforward testimonies of the police operatives who are presumed to have performed their duties
regularly.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the belated submission of the pre-operation report to the PDEA after the buy-bust
operation violates RA 9165 and the non-presentation of the informant casts serious doubts on the
factuality of the buy-bust operation;
2. Whether or not there is failure on the part of the prosecution to establish a continuous and unbroken
chain of custody of the seized illegal drug.
RULING:
1) No. Coordination with the PDEA is not an indispensable requirement before police authorities may carry
out a buy-bust operation; that in fact, even the absence of coordination with the PDEA will not invalidate a
buy-bust operation. Neither is the presentation of the informant indispensable to the success in
prosecuting drug-related cases. Informers are almost always never presented in court because of the need
to preserve their invaluable service to the police. Unless their testimony is absolutely essential to the
conviction of the accused, their testimony may be dispensed with since their narrations would be merely
corroborative to the testimonies of the buy-bust team.
2) Yes. The Court found that the prosecution utterly failed to establish convincingly the chain of custody of
the alleged seized plastic pack subject matter hereof. In fact only PO2 Enriquez and SPO1 Cañete testified
in respect to the identity of the alleged evidence. However, from their testimonies, the prosecution was
23
not able to account for the linkages in the chain while the plastic pack was not
or no longer in their respective possession.
While both witnesses testified that after the sale and apprehension of the appellant, the poseur-buyer
turned over the subject pack of shabu to their team leader SPO1 Espenido, there is no record as to what
happened after the turn-over. SPO1 Espenido to whom the specimen was allegedly surrendered by the
poseur-buyer was not presented in court to identify the person to whom it was given thereafter and the
condition thereof while it was in his possession and control. The prosecution did not bother to offer any
explanation for his non-presentation as a witness. This is a significant gap in the chain of custody of the
illegal stuff.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DATSGANDAWALI Y GAPAS AND NOL PAGALAD Y ANAS
GR No. 193385
DECEMBER 1, 2014
FACTS:
Version of the Prosecution
On June 30, 2003, a confidential informant informed the Baler Police Station 2 that a possible drug deal would
take place at the corner of Sto. Niño St. and Roosevelt Avenue, San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City. A buy-
bust team was thereupon created. Upon the exchange of a plastic sachet containing crystalline substance and
the bust money, the herein respondents were arrested by the team and brought to the Baler Police Station 2.
Upon examination, the substance recovered was confirmed to be methylamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu.
Version of the Defense
At about 6:35 a.m. of June 30, 2003, while waiting for a bus at Litex, Fairview, Quezon City, Pagalad was
arrested for unknown reason by PO1 Sarangaya. When questioned, he told the arresting officer that he has a
companion Gandawali, who was likewise later arrested. Both were then brought to Police Station 2 at Baler,
Quezon City where PO1 Sarangaya demanded from them P15,000.00 in exchange for their release.
Unfortunately, they were unable to produce the money, hence,their incarceration.
24
Gandawali and Pagalad explained that despite their wrongful
apprehension and the police’s act of extortion, they did not file any case against them because they were
afraid and were also unfamiliar with the procedures in filing a case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused should be acquitted because the police officers failed to preserve the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized item, i.e the buy bust money was not presented in Court.
RULING:
Appellants’ contention that the consideration of the sale was not established since the buy-bust money was
not presented as evidence is unavailing. Suffice it to say that “[n]either law nor jurisprudence requires the
presentation of any of the money used in a buy-bust operation x x x.”
“It is sufficient to show that the illicit transaction did take place, coupled with the presentation in court of the
corpus delicti in evidence. These were done, and were proved by the prosecution’s evidence.”
The integrity and evidentiary value of the dangerous drug seized from appellants were duly proven by the
prosecution to have been properly preserved; its identity, quantity and quality remained untarnished.
Q and A’s:
1.) What are the elements of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs?
a. the identity ofthe buyer and the seller, the object and consideration ofthe sale; and
b. the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
Equally settled is the rule that “[t]he delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the
seller of the marked money successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction.
2.) Does the non-presentation of the buy-bust money in court have the effect of acquittal of the accused?
No. Suffice it to say that “[n]either law nor jurisprudence requires the presentation of any of the money
used in a buybust operation x x x.”
“It is sufficient to show that the illicit transaction did take place, coupled with the presentation in court of
the corpus delicti in evidence. These weredone, and were proved by the prosecution’s evidence.”
25
3.) Should the rules laid down in Section 21(1), Article II of RA 9165 be
strictly observed by the buy-bust police concerning recovered dangerous drugs?
The law mandates that the officer taking initial custody of the drug shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, conduct the physical inventory of the same and take a photograph thereof in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),and any
elected public official, who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof.
The explicit directive of the above statutory provision notwithstanding, the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the said law provide a saving clause whenever the procedures laid down in the law are not
strictly complied with, to wit:
x x x Provided, further, that noncompliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.”
Thus, gleaned from a plain reading of the implementing rules, the most important factor is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be used to
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. As long as the evidentiary value and integrity of the illegal
drug are properly preserved, strict compliance of the requisites under Section 21 of RA 9165 may be
disregarded.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VENERANDO DELA CRUZ Y SEBASTIAN

GR No. 193670
DECEMBER 3, 2014
FACTS:
On July 25, 2003, police asset Warren Ebio (Ebio) received information from another asset that he could
purchase shabu by calling a certain person. He thus called the said person through cellular phone and agreed
to meet with him in front of the Barangay Hall of Lerma, Naga City. Accordingly, a pre-operation plan to entrap
the alleged seller was immediately drawn up in coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency. A
buy-bust team was formed by the police.
Ebio proceeded towards the meeting place while the other two positioned themselves nearby. A few minutes
later, a man riding a motorcycle arrived. The buy-bust team recognized him as-the seller based on his attire as
26
described by him to Ebio. Ebio introduced himself as the buyer. When the
man asked for payment, he gave him the buy-bust money. The man then took out two transparent plastic
sachets containing white crystalline substance from his right pocket and gave them to Ebio. Thereupon, the
accused was arrested. Upon examination, the substance was confirmed to be shabu.
Accused contends that the operation was a frame-up.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused should be acquitted since:
1. It was not made clear by the prosecution where the markings of the three sachets of shabu were
made, and
2. The prosecution failed to show whether there was already a clear understanding between appellant
and the poseur-buyer with respect to the quantity of shabu allegedly being purchased.
RULING:
1. Failure to mention the place where the three plastic sachets of shabu were marked does not
constitute a gap in the chain of custody of evidence. Chain of custody is "the duly recorded authorized
movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or
laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory
to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction."
It eliminates doubts concerning the proper preservation of the identity and integrity of the corpus
delicti or the shabu in this case. Marking of the seized shabu is the initial stage in the chain of custody in buy-
bust operations. As requisites, the marking must be made in the presence of the apprehended offender and
upon immediate confiscation, and this contemplates seven marking at the nearest police station or office of
the apprehending team.
Clearly, the prosecution was able to establish the chain of custody of the shabu from its possession by
the police officers, testing in the laboratory to determine its composition, until the same was presented as
evidence in court. Hence, even if there was no statement as to where the markings were made, what is
important is that the seized specimen never left the custody of PO3 Bong on until he turned over the same to
SPO1 Antonio and that thereafter, the chain of custody was shown to be unbroken.
2. The existence of the illegal sale of the shabu does not depend on an agreement about its
quantity and price since the offense is consummated after the exchange of the illegal drug for the marked
money. Hence, Ebio’s testimony that appellant asked for the money before handing over the shabu and that
he received the sachets of shabu after giving appellant the P1,500.00, is by itself sufficient.
Q and A’s:
27
1.) What are the elements of the Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs?
a. the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and consideration ofthe sale; and
2.) Does failure to state where the substance was marked constitute a gap in the chain of custody of the
recovered drugs?
Failure to mention the place where the three plastic sachets of shabu were marked does not constitute a
gap in the chain of custody of evidence. Chain of custody is "the duly recorded authorized movements and
custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory
equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction."
Clearly, the prosecution was able to establish the chain of custody of the shabu from its possession by the
police officers, testing in the laboratory to determine its composition, until the same was presented as
evidence in court. Hence, even if there was no statement as to where the markings were made, what is
important is that the seized specimen never left the custody of PO3 Bong on until he turned over the same
to SPO1 Antonio and that thereafter, the chain of custody was shown to be unbroken.
3.) Is there a need for an actual agreement between the accused and the poseur-buyer of the quantity and
price of the object of sale for the buy-bust operation and the arrest to be valid?
No. The existence of the illegal sale of the shabu does not depend on an agreement about its quantity and
price since the offense is consummated after the exchange of the illegal drug for the marked money.
Hence, Ebio’s testimony that appellant asked for the money before handing over the shabu and that he
received the sachets of shabu after giving appellant the P1,500.00, is by itself sufficient.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MANOLITO OPIANA Y TANAEL

GR No. 200797
JANUARY 12, 2015
FACTS:
On April 8, 2008, the Makati police officers and Makati Anti-Drug Abuse Council (MADAC) operatives
conducted an entrapment/buybust operation on appellant who was reportedly engaged in illegal drug trade in
28
Brgy. Guadalupe Viejo, Makati City. MADAC operative Sherwin Sydney Serrano
(Serrano) acted as poseurbuyer.
After having been introduced by the informant as a "scorer" of shabu, appellant and Serrano negotiated for
the sale of P300.00 worth of shabu. Serrano gave appellant the P300 marked money and in exchange,
appellant handed to Serrano a heat-sealed sachet containing white crystalline substance. After making the
prearranged signal, appellant was apprehended and when bodily frisked, 19 heat-sealed sachets were
recovered from his possession. Laboratory examination revealed that all 20 heat-sealed sachets yielded
positive results for shabu.
Appelant asserted that the police officers mistook him as the "Noli" who was known to be a drug peddler in
their area. He argued that he is known in their place as "Noli Mekaniko," and not the drug peddler.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused should be acquitted since it was unclear what happened to the specimen after it
was delivered to the crime laboratory and examined by the forensic chemist or how it was brought to the
court, hence, a gap in the chain of custody.
RULING:
x x x [T]he marking of the evidence was testified to by Serrano whereas the testimony of the investigator x x x
was stipulated upon by the prosecution and the defense. The recovered items were turned over to PO1 Randy
C. Santos upon his conduct of investigation. The request for laboratory examination was delivered by PO1
Gimena on 08 April 2008 at 2125H and the same was received by PSI Jocelyn J. Belen whose testimony was
likewise stipulated upon. Although there has been no photographs taken and no testimony as to what
happened with the evidence after the same was submitted for laboratory examination, the same was
positively identified by Serrano during trial. x x x
The integrity and evidentiary value of the illicit drug were properly preserved.
Q and A’s:
2.) What is the penalty for the unauthorized sale of dangerous drugs?
Under the law, the penalty for the unauthorized sale of shabu, regardless of its quantity and purity, is
life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10 million. However, with the
enactment of RA 9346, only life imprisonment and fine shall be imposed.
29
Thus, the penalty imposed by the trial court and affirmed by the CA, i.e., life
imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00, is proper.
The penalty for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, on the other hand, is imprisonment of twelve
(12)years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from P300,000.00 to P400,000.00, if
the quantity of the dangerous drug is less than five (5) grams. In this case, appellant was found to have
been in illegal possession of 0.74 gram of shabu.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAMIL DORIA DAHIL AND ROMMEL CASTRO Y CARLOS
GR No. 212196
JANUARY 12, 2015
FACTS:
Version of the Prosecution
For a couple of weeks, the agents of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), Region 3, conducted
surveillance and casing operations relative to the information they received that a certain alias "Buddy" and
alias "Mel" were trafficking dried marijuana.
After an entrapment operation both accused, conspiring and confederating and mutually helping one another,
were charged with illegal sale of six (6) tea bags of dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing TWENTY SIX GRAMS
AND EIGHT THOUSAND NINETY EIGHT TEN THOUSANDTHS OF A GRAM (26.8098), which is a dangerous drug,
without authority whatsoever.
Dahil was charged with possession of 20.6642 grams of marijuana or about the 29th day of September, 2002,
in the City of Angeles, Philippines
Castro was charged with possession of 130.8286 grams of marijuana on or about the 29th day of September,
2002, in the City of Angeles, Philippines.
Version of the Defense
In his defense, Dahil claimed that on September 29, 2002, a tricycle driver came looking for him after he had
arrived home. He saw the tricycle driver with another man already waiting for him. He was then asked by the
unknown man whether he knew a certain Buddy in their place. He answered that there were many persons
named Buddy. Suddenly, persons alighted from the vehicles parked in front of his house and dragged him into
one of the vehicles. He was brought to Clark Air Base and was charged with illegal selling and possession of
marijuana.
For his part, Castro testified that on September 29, 2002, he was on 4th Street of Marisol, Barangay Ninoy
Aquino, Angeles City, watching a game of chess when he was approached by some men who asked if he knew
a certain Boy residing at Hardian Extension. He then replied that he did not know the said person and then the
30
men ordered him to board a vehicle and brought him to Clark Air Base where he
was charged with illegal possession of marijuana.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was gross disregard of the procedural safeguards which generated clouds of doubts as
to the identity of the seized items presented in evidence resulting in a gap in chain of custody of the
recovered substance.
RULING:
Yes. The presentation of the dangerous drugs as evidence in court is material if not indispensable in every
prosecution for the illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs.
To discharge its duty of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, therefore, the
Prosecution must prove the corpus delicti. That proof is vital to a judgment of conviction. On the other hand,
the Prosecution does not comply with the indispensable requirement of proving the violation of Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 9165 when the dangerous drugs are missing but also when there are substantial gaps in the
chain of custody of the seized dangerous drugs that raise doubts about the authenticity of the evidence
presented in court.
The inventory of the property was not immediately conducted after seizure and confiscation as it was only
done at the police station. Notably, Article II, Section 21(a) of the IRR allows the inventory to be done at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending team whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizures. In this case, however, the prosecution did not even claim that the PDEA Office Region 3
was the nearest office from TB Pavilion where the drugs were seized. The prosecution also failed to give
sufficient justification for the delayed conduct of the inventory.
There is doubt as to the identity of the person who prepared the Inventory of Property Seized. According to
the CA decision, it was Sergeant dela Cruz who prepared the said document. PO2 Cruz on the other hand,
testified that it was their investigatorwho prepared the document while SPO1 Licu’s testimony was that a
certain SPO4 Jamisolamin was their investigator.
There were conflicting claims on whether the seized items were photographed in the presence of the accused
or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected public
official. When questioned on the conduct of the inventory, PO2 Corpuz testified that no pictures of the seized
items were taken while SPO1 Licu said that pictures of the accused were taken. From the vague statements of
the police officers, the Court doubts that photographs of the alleged drugs were indeed taken.
Worse, not all of the seized drugs were properly marked. And surprisingly, there was no testimony from the
witnesses as to the turnover of the seized items to SPO4 Jamisolamin.
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Hence, both accused were acquitted since given the procedural lapses, serious
uncertainty hangs over the identity of the seized marijuana that the prosecution presented as evidence before
the Court. In effect, the prosecution failed to fully prove the elements of the crime charged, creating a
reasonable doubt on the criminal liability of the accused.
Q and A’s:
1.) Is the presentation of the dangerous drug seized during a buy-bust operation in court necessary?
Yes. The presentation of the dangerous drugs as evidence in court is material if not indispensable in
every prosecution for the illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs.
2.) What are the procedures mandated by law with respect to confiscated dangerous drugs?
The apprehending team, after seizure and confiscation, to immediately (1) conduct a physically
inventory; and (2) photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the DOJ, and any elected public official who shall be required tosign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof.
3.) What are the links in the chain of custody rule that must be established?
In People v. Kamad, the Court identified the links that the prosecution must establish in the chain of
custody in a buy-bust situation to be as follows: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the
illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal
drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the
investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth,
the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court.
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MANUEL R. PORTUGUEZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
GR No. 194499
JANUARY 14, 2015
FACTS:
Version of the Prosecution:
On April 16, 2003, a confidential asset went to the Pasig City Police Station, City Hall Detachment, to report
the illegal drug activities of a certain alias Bobot at Balmores Street, Barangay Kapasigan, Pasig City. Upon
receipt of the information, the chief of said station formed a buy-bust team wherein PO1 Mariano was
designated as the poseur-buyer. After coordinating with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) and
preparing the buy-bust money, the team and its asset proceeded to Balmores Street.
When PO1 Mariano and the asset met petitioner and Bobot on the road, the asset asked petitioner, "P’re,
meron pa ba?" At this point, petitioner looked at PO1 Mariano and thereafter, attempted to run. However,
PO1 Mariano was able to take hold of him. Then, the other police operatives arrived. Petitioner was asked to
open his hand. Upon seeing the suspected shabu on his hand, they arrested petitioner, informed him of his
constitutional rights and boarded him on their service vehicle. The seized substance was confirmed to be
shabu.
Version of the Defense:
Petitioner testified that at the time of his arrest, he was fixing the katam and was eating in front of his house
with his friends Jonjon Reynoso, Jonjing Reynoso and Junior Da Silva. Two persons from the Pasig Police
headquarters arrived and spoke to his sister who used to work at the said headquarters. When his sister called
him, he was mistaken to be Bobot and thus, they arrested him. Petitioner denied that he was in possession of
the shabu allegedly seized from him. He claimed that he saw the said shabu for the first time at the
headquarters. Petitioner also claimed that at the time he was arrested on April 16, 2003, Bobot was actually
detained at a jail in Bicutan.
Dawn Portuguez, daughter of petitioner, testified that in the afternoon of April 16, 2003, two male persons
arrived at the house of her aunt and asked for her father. She testified that petitioner was then sleeping in the
nearby house of his friend, Junior. She then called for her father and, upon their return, four persons, one of
whom was in police uniform, approached them and arrested petitioner.
Petitioner claims that there were no inventory and photographs of the prohibited item allegedly seized from
him.
33
ISSUE:
Whether or not the arrest was valid and the seized substance was admissible since no sale was made
between the poseur buyer and the accused.
RULING
Yes, the arrest was valid. A close look at the sequence of events narrated by the prosecution witnesses
particularly by PO1 Mariano indicates that an intended buy-bust operation was about to be carried out against
Bobot. Said operation was not successful as no sale took place between the intended poseur buyer, PO1
Mariano, and Bobot. Bobot was also able to evade arrest.
Nonetheless, PO1 Mariano and the asset chanced upon an ongoing transaction between accused and Bobot. It
bears stressing that petitioner was particularly identified by PO1 Mariano as the person who bought the
suspected sachet of shabu from Bobot. When petitioner attempted to run, PO1 Mariano was able to grab him.
And when petitioner was asked to open his hand, found in his possession was the same sachet that he bought
from Bobot. Through chemical analysis, the contents of the same sachet were found to be shabu.
It is clear that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized drugs were preserved. This Court,
therefore, finds no reason to overturn the findings of the RTC that the drugs seized from petitioner were the
same ones presented during trial. Accordingly, the Court held that the chain of custody of the illicit drugs
seized from accused remains unbroken, contrary to the assertions of petitioner.
Q and A’s:
2.) What is the probative value of the testimonies of witnesses who are police officers in drug cases?
It is a settled rule that in cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to
prosecution witnesses who are police officers, for they are presumed to have performed their duties in
a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary
3.) What is the effect in the case of the non-compliance with Section 21 of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165?
Noncompliance with the abovementioned requirements is not fatal. Noncompliance with Section 21 of
the IRR does not make the items seized inadmissible. What is imperative is "the preservation of the
integrity and the evidential value of the seized items as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
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RA 3019: THE ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
THE PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES vs. HENRY T. GO

G.R. No. 168539 March 25, 2014
FACTS:
Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against Henry T. Go, who was then
the Chairman and President of PIATCO, for having supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo
Enrile in entering into a contract which is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
Secretary Enrile was no longer indicted because he died prior to the issuance of the resolution finding
probable cause. The Sandiganbayan granted the motion to quash filed by respondent for lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the accused reasoning that the alleged co-conspirator-Secretary Enrile was already
deceased long before the case was filed in court.
Respondent-accused contends that by reason of the death of Secretary Enrile, there is no public officer who
was charged in the Information and, as such, prosecution against respondent may not prosper.
Prosecution argues that the avowed policy of the State and the legislative intent to repress graft or corrupt
practices would be frustrated if the death of a public officer would bar the prosecution of a private person
who conspired with such public officer in violating the Anti-Graft Law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent, a private person, may be indicted for conspiracy in violating Section 3(g) of
R.A. 3019 even if the public officer, with whom he was alleged to have conspired, has died prior to the filing
of the Information.
RULING:
Yes. The Court agreed with the prosecution that the avowed policy of the State and the legislative intent to
repress "acts of public officers and private persons alike, which constitute graft or corrupt practices," would be
frustrated if the death of a public officer would bar the prosecution of a private person who conspired with
such public officer in violating the Anti-Graft Law.
It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public officer with whom respondent
can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however, that the allegation of conspiracy
between them can no longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing
extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor
35
did it remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy between him and private respondent. Stated differently,
the death of Secretary Enrile does not mean that there was no public officer who allegedly violated Section 3
(g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict
Secretary Enrile for infringement of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019.14 Were it not for his death, he should
have been charged.
The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, among
others, is that such private person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The law,
however, does not require that such person must, in all instances, be indicted together with the public officer.
If circumstances exist where the public officer may no longer be charged in court, as in the present case where
the public officer has already died, the private person may be indicted alone.
DANILO O. GARCIA and JOVE SD. BRIZUELA, vs.SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE

G.R. No. 197204
March 26, 2014
FACTS:
For the 3rd quarter of calendar year 1992, the PNP Office of the Directorate for Comptrollership issued and
released an amount of P20,000,000, for the purchase of combat clothing and individual equipment (CCIE)
items of the PNP in La Trinidad, Benguet. After a post-audit and an investigation, charges were filed against
petitioners on the alleged fictitious CCIE purchase of CRECOM PNP worth P20,000,000.
Petitioners submit that the prosecution failed to prove the second (that the accused acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence) and third (that the accused caused undue injury
to any party including the Government, or giving any private party unwarranted advantage) essential elements
of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 to convict them of anti-graft and corrupt practices.Petitioners anchor their defense
on the nature of their respective positions to prove that they acted within the bounds of their functions.
On the other hand, the prosecution maintains that all the essential elements of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 had
been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting petitioners of the crime charged.
36
RULING:
No. The Sandiganbayan did not err in convicting petitioners of the crime charged.
On the second element that the accused acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence, the Court found that the defense of Garcia and Brizuela is weak since their defense mainly rests on
the presumption of regularity in the discharge of their official functions.
Garcia did not refute the allegation made by Brizuela that he turned over the total amount of P20,000,000 to
Garcia in the presence of Luna.Further, Garcia claimed that the signatures appearing above his names in the
PNP Personnel Payrolls, as well as the issued LBP checks, were forged. However, Garcia did not endeavor to
prove otherwise. Forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence
and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery.Thus, the presumption of validity and regularity
prevails over allegations of forgery and fraud.
Brizuela, on the other hand, admitted in his sworn statement that he gave the entire amount of P20,000,000
to Garcia after encashing the checks. Brizuela did not even question why the said amount should be turned
over to Garcia nor did Brizuela report the unusual transaction to higher authorities. He even raised the
defense of compliance with a superior's perceived lawful order and disowned accountability for funds he
disbursed which were eventually used for illegal or unauthorized purposes. The facts as established show that
Brizuela took part in the act of issuing and encashing government checks, then in misappropriating the funds
by submitting documents showing that the funds were allegedly used to pay personnel in the payroll but the
personnel later turned out to be fictitious persons. As CRECOM Disbursing Officer, Brizuela should have seen
to it that the funds were legally and properly disbursed for the purpose for which they were released. Clearly,
Brizuela's actions were tainted with evident bad faith.
Lastly, the third element of the offense - that the act of the accused caused undue injury to any party,
including the Government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in the
discharge of the functions of the accused - was also established. Proof of the extent of damage is not essential,
it being sufficient that the injury suffered or the benefit received is perceived to be substantial enough and not
merely negligible.
In the present case, the prosecution's evidence duly proved that petitioners, using their official positions, by
dishonesty and breach of sworn duty, facilitated the approval and release of government funds amounting to
P20,000,000 supposedly for the purchase of CCIE items of PNP personnel. However, the recipients of the
P20,000,000 turned out to be fictitious PNP personnel, and up to now the P20,000,000 remains unaccounted
for.
37
Q and A’s
1) What are the three essential elements for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019?
The three essential elements for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 are:
(1) that the accused is a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;
(2) that the accused acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and
(3) that the accused caused undue injury to any party including the Government, or giving any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.(Garcia vs. People, G.R. No.
197204, March 26, 2014)
COLOMA VS SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NO. 205561
SEPTEMBER 24, 2014
MENDOZA, J.
Facts: Coloma was the Director of PNPA at the time of the alleged violation of R.A. No. 3019. Then he was
assigned to assist in the search for a suitable construction site of the Philippine National Police Regional
Training Site 9 (RTS 9). When Coloma was relieved he was ordered to render a termination report. Coloma
reported that the project was substantially completed. But based from investigation and inspection, there
were reportedly irregularities with the cost and percentage of completion among many others. The
Sandiganbayan rendered the assailed decision finding Coloma guilty as charged. It found that all the essential
elements of the crime of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 were present in the case. Coloma,
irrefutably a public officer at the time of the disputed transactions, acted with evident bad faith in his
transactions concerning RTS 9. On appeal, Coloma asserted that he did not act in bad faith by being one of the
signatories of the account because he was only following orders. Further he contested the credibility of the
witness presented by the prosecution.
Issue: Whether Coloma was properly convicted of the crime for the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019?
Held: Yes. In the case at bench, it is readily apparent that Coloma decries the Sandiganbayan’s evaluation of
the witnesses’ testimonies. By asserting this, Coloma, in effect, raises questions of facts that may not be
delved into by the Court. Coloma was charged with the crime of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019
which has the following essential elements: (a) the accused must be a public officer discharging
administrative, judicial or official functions; (b) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence; and (c) his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the
government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
functions. All these elements exist in this case.
38
Q and A’s:
1.)What are the element of the violation of Sec 3 (e) RA 3019?
a) the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;
b) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and
(c) his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions
2.)How is the second element of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 committed?
The second element of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 may be committed in three ways, that is, through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. Proof of any of these three in
connection with the prohibited acts mentioned in Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 is enough to convict.
3.)What is the meaning of "partiality," "bad faith," and "gross negligence?
"Partiality" is synonymous with "bias" which "excites a disposition to see and report matters as they are
wished for rather than as they are." "Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it
imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty
through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud." "Gross negligence has been so
defined as negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation
where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to
consequences in so far as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care which even inattentive
and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property."
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS BORJA

GR NO. 201830
NOVEMBER 10, 2015
PERLAS-BERNARBE, JR.,J.
FACTS: The Board of Directors of San Pablo City Water District passed separate resolutions dismissing its
division chiefs on the basis of the administrative complaint filed by its General Manager, Borja. Borja on his
authority awarded backwages and other employment benefits. Water concessionaires seek to compel Borja to
refund such amount paid for the backwages. The CA ruled that the backwages could not be charged against
SPCWD, in view of the doctrine that where a public officer removes or dismisses another officer wrongfully, he
39
acts outside the scope of his authority and hence, shall be held personally liable.
Borja was also criminally charged for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019,for causing undue
injury to SPCWD when
he paid thebackwages and other benefits from the water district’s funds.Borja contends that there is absence
of bad faith.
ISSUE: Whether or not the of the accused for a crime in violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019
was proper?
HELD: No. The Supreme Court holds that Borja acted in a manner prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
By causing SPCWD to pay the backwages and other benefits due Eje and Tolentino, Borja clearly placed said
office in a financial disadvantage as it was made to pay a liability which did not belong to it.Thus, while the
absence of bad faith may negate criminal liability for graft and corrupt practices under Section 3 (e) of RA
3019, it does not automatically absolve Borja of administrative liability for conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, considering that the only question material to the latter is whether the public officer’s
acts tarnished the image or integrity of the public office.
Q and A’s:
1.)What is the difference between the commission and graft practices and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of service?
The elements for the commission of graft and corrupt practices under Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, are different
from what constitutes conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, which is an administrative
offense. The following are the essential elements for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019:
(1) The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;
(2) He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and
(3) That his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.
On the other hand, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service has been consistently held to pertain
to acts that tarnish the image and integrity of the public office, although not necessarily related or connected
to the public officer’s function.
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RIVERA VS PEOPLE
G.R. No. 156577
December 3, 2014
Mendoza, J.
FACTS: The DPWH, DILG, and the Development Coordinating Council for Leyte and Samar entered a
memorandum of agreement for the construction of riverine boats to be used as floating clinics. Subsequently,
the DOH Region VIII entered into a negotiated contract with PAL Boat Industry.An anonymous letter from a
concerned citizen sent to the Office of the Ombudsman stating that the boats were built many months ago but
they had been left rotting on land. Upon investigation all the accusedwhom are accountable were charged
with violation of RA 3019 for entering into the negotiated contract without approval and the construction
having blatant defects. Petitioners contended that they did not cause undue injury and that there was no
conspiracy to commit the crime.
Issue: Whether or not the of the accused for a crime in violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019
was proper?
Held: The Supreme Court has reviewed and scrutinized the records and found no cogent reason to reverse
the conviction of the petitioners, who were charged with violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The essential
elements of such crime are as follows:
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;
2. The accused must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence;
and
3. The action of the accused caused undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private
party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of the functions of the accused.
The Supreme Court finds that the petitioners indeed (1) committed undue injury to the government and (2)
gave unwarranted benefits to PAL Boat through manifest partiality.
Q and A’s:
1.)What are the ways by which a public official violates Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 in the performance of
his functions?
41
(1) by causing undue injury to any party, including the Government; or (2) by giving
any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference. The accused may be charged under
either mode or both. The disjunctive term"or" connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of Section 3(e)
of R.A. No. 3019.
2.)What is undue injury?
Undue injury in the context of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 should be equated with that civil law concept of
"actual damage." Unlike in actions for torts, undue injury in Sec. 3(e) cannot be presumed even after a wrong
or a violation of a right has been established. Its existence must be proven as one of the elements of the
crime. In fact, the causing of undue injury, or the giving of any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
through manifest partiality, evident bad faithor gross inexcusable negligence constitutes the very act punished
under thissection. Thus, it is required that the undue injury be specified, quantified and proven to the point of
moral certainty.
3.)What is the Arias Doctrine?
Arias doctrine states that "[a]ll heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and
on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations."
4.)Is the Arias Doctrine absolute?
The Arias doctrine is not an absolute rule. It is not a magic cloak that can be used as a cover by a public officer
to conceal himself in the shadows of his subordinates and necessarily escape liability. Thus, this ruling cannot
be applied to exculpate the petitioners in view of the peculiar circumstances in this case which should have
prompted them, as heads of offices, to exercise a higher degree of circumspection and, necessarily, go beyond
what their subordinates had prepared.
VALENCERINA VS PEOPLE
G.R. No. 206162
December 10, 2014
Mendoza, J.
FACTS: The Sandiganbayan found Valencerina, a highranking officer of the Government Service Insurance
System, guilty of giving unwarranted benefits to Ecobel Land Incorporated on account of his participation in
the unjustified issuance of GSIS Surety Bond. The accused contends that the issuance alone of the surety
bonds is not tantamount to graft and that the prosecution failed to prove all the elements of the crime of
allegedly giving unwarranted benenefit to Escobel. The prosecution contends that irregularities in the issuance
of bonds have been adequately proven.
42
HELD: The Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan in finding Valencerina guilty of violating Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 based upon the pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution.
In finding Valencerina guilty of giving undue advantage or preference to Ecobel, in violation of Section 3(e) of
the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Sandiganbayan was convinced that the elements of the crime
were duly established. These elements, as enumerated by the Supreme Court are as follows:
(1) the offender is a public officer;
(2) the act was done in the discharge of the public officer’s official, administrative or judicial functions; (3) the
act was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; and
(4) the public officer caused any undue injury to any party, including the Government, orgave any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference.
Q and A’s:
1.)How is the third element of the crime of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 committed?
The third element of the crime of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 may be committed in three ways,
that is, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. Proof of anyof these
three in connection with the prohibited acts mentioned in Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 is enough to convict.
2.)What are the ways by which Sec 3 (e) of RA 3019 maybe violated?
There are two ways by which Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 may be violated first by causing undue injury to
any party, including the government and second, by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit,
advantage or preference. Although neither mode constitutes a distinct offense, an accused may be charged
under either mode or both.
43
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7080:
AN ACT DEFINING AND PENALIZING THE CRIME OF PLUNDER
JUAN PONCE ENRILE vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

GR No. 213455
AUGUST 11, 2015
FACTS:
It was alleged in the information filed before the Sandiganbayan that the accused Enrile, then a Philippine
Senator, JESSICA LUCILA G. REYES, then Chief of Staff of Senator Enrile’s Office, both public officers, have
committed the offense in relation to their respective offices, conspiring with one another and with JANET LIM
NAPOLES, RONALD JOHN LIM, and JOHN RAYMUND DE ASIS constituting amassing, accumulating, and/or
acquiring ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED
THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (Php172,834,500.00) through a combination or series of overt
criminal acts.
The acts committed are as follows:
a.) by repeatedly receiving from NAPOLES and/or her representatives LIM, DE ASIS, and others, kickbacks
or commissions under the following circumstances: before, during and/or after the project
identification, NAPOLES gave, and ENRILE and/or REYES received, a percentage of the cost of a project
to be funded from ENRILE’S Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF), in consideration of ENRILE’S
endorsement, directly or through REYES, to the appropriate government agencies, of NAPOLES’
nongovernment organizations which became the recipients and/or target implementors of ENRILE’S
PDAF projects, which duly-funded projects turned out to be ghosts or fictitious, thus enabling NAPOLES
to misappropriate the PDAF proceeds for her personal gain;
b.) by taking undue advantage, on several occasions, of their official positions, authority, relationships,
connections, and influence to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense and to the damage and
prejudice, of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
Enrile, before his arraignment, filed a motion for bill of particulars regarding the information but was denied
by the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan for being mere reiteration of his allegations and that the details
asked for is evidentiary in nature, hence, best ventilated during trial. The subsequent oral motion for
reconsideration was also denied for the same reason.
44
ISSUE:
Whether or not the motion for bill of particulars was the proper remedy.
RULING:
Yes, a motion for bill of particulars is the proper remedy. When allegations in an Information are vague or
indefinite, the remedy of the accused is not a motion to quash, but a motion for a bill of particulars.
The purpose of a bill of particulars is to supply vague facts or allegations in the complaint or information to
enable the accused to properly plead and prepare for trial. It presupposes a valid Information, one that
presents all the elements of the crime charged, albeit under vague terms. Notably, the specifications that a bill
of particulars may supply are only formal amendments to the complaint or Information. Thus, if the
Information is lacking, a court should take a liberal attitude towards its granting and order the government to
file a bill of particulars elaborating on the charges. Doubts should be resolved in favor of granting the bill to
give full meaning to the accused’s Constitutionally-guaranteed rights.
Notably, the government cannot put the accused in the position of disclosing certain overt acts through the
Information and withholding others subsequently discovered, all of which it intends to prove at the trial. This
is the type of surprise a bill of particulars is designed to avoid. The accused is entitled to the observance of all
the rules designated to bring about a fair verdict. This becomes more relevant in the present case where the
crime charged carries with it the severe penalty of capital punishment and entails the commission of several
predicate criminal acts involving a great number of transactions spread over a considerable period of time.
Notably, conviction for plunder carries with it the penalty of capital punishment; for this reason, more process
is due, not less. When a person’s life interest – protected by the life, liberty, and property language recognized
in the due process clause – is at stake in the proceeding, all measures must be taken to ensure the protection
of those fundamental rights.
While both the motion to dismiss the Information and the motion for bill of particulars involved the right of an
accused to due process, the enumeration of the details desired in Enrile’s supplemental opposition to issuance
of a warrant of arrest and for dismissal of information and in his motion for bill of particulars are different
viewed particularly from the prism of their respective objectives.
In the former, Enrile took the position that the Information did not state a crime for which he can be
convicted; thus, the Information is void; he alleged a defect of substance. In the latter, he already impliedly
admits that the Information sufficiently alleged a crime but is unclear and lacking in details that would allow
him to properly plead and prepare his defense; he essentially alleged here a defect of form. Note that in the
former, the purpose is to dismiss the Information for its failure to state the nature and cause of the accusation
against Enrile; while the details desired in the latter (the motion for bill of particulars) are required to be
45
specified in sufficient detail because the allegations in the
Information are vague, indefinite, or in the form of conclusions and will not allow Enrile to adequately prepare
his defense unless specifications are made.
That every element constituting the offense had been alleged in the Information does not preclude the
accused from requesting for more specific details of the various acts or omissions he is alleged to have
committed. The request for details is precisely the function of a bill of particulars. Hence, while the
information may be sufficient for purposes of stating the cause and the crime an accused is charged, the
allegations may still be inadequate for purposes of enabling him to properly plead and prepare for trial.
The motion for bill of particulars is partly granted with respect to the facts sought deemed by the Court to be
material and necessary.
Q and A’:
1.) When is an information deemed sufficient?
To be considered as sufficient and valid, an information must state the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions constituting the offense; the name of
the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the
offense was committed.
If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the
statute penalizing it. The acts or omissions constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating
circumstances alleged must be stated in ordinary and concise language; they do not necessarily need to be
in the language of the statute, and should be in terms sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is charged and what qualifying and aggravating circumstances are
alleged, so that the court can pronounce judgment.
The Rules do not require the Information to exactly allege the date and place of the commission of the
offense, unless the date and the place are material ingredients or essential elements of the offense, or are
necessary for its identification.
2.) What is the difference between ultimate facts and evidentiary facts?
Ultimate facts is defined as “those facts which the expected evidence will support. The term does not refer
to the details of probative matter or particulars of evidence by which these material elements are to be
established.” It refers to the facts that the evidence will prove at the trial.
46
Ultimate facts has also been defined as the principal, determinative, and
constitutive facts on whose existence the cause of action rests; they are also the essential and determining
facts on which the court's conclusion rests and without which the judgment would lack support in essential
particulars.
Evidentiary facts, on the other hand, are the facts necessary to establish the ultimate facts; they are the
premises that lead to the ultimate facts as conclusion. They are facts supporting the existence of some
other alleged and unproven fact.
3.) What is a bill of particulars? What function is served by a motion for bill of particulars?
When allegations in an Information are vague or indefinite, the remedy of the accused is not a motion to
quash, but a motion for a bill of particulars.
In general, a bill of particulars is the further specification of the charges or claims in an action, which an
accused may avail of by motion before arraignment, to enable him to properly plead and prepare for trial.
In civil proceedings, a bill of particulars has been defined as a complementary procedural document
consisting of an amplification or more particularized outline of a pleading, and is in the nature of a more
specific allegation of the facts recited in the pleading. The purpose of a motion for bill of particulars in civil
cases is to enable a party to prepare his responsive pleading properly.
Although the application for the bill of particulars is one addressed to the sound discretion of the court it
should nonetheless exercise its discretion within the context of the facts and the nature of the crime
charged in each case and the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation
against him.
4.) What is the difference between a motion to quash and a motion for bill of particulars?
A bill of particulars presupposes a valid Information while a motion to quash is a jurisdictional defect on
account that the facts charged in the Information does not constitute an offense.
5.) What are the elements of Plunder?
The elements of plunder are:
a. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his
family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates, or other persons;
b. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of the
following overt or criminal acts:
(a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the
public treasury;
47
(b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift,
share, percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or
entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or
position of the public officer concerned;
(c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of governmentowned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries;
(d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any
other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any
business enterprise or undertaking;
(e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or
implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests;
or
(f) by taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to
unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the
Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines; and
c. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or
acquired is at least P50,000,000.00.
48
PROBATION LAW
ALMEROVS PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 188191
718 SCRA 698
MARCH 12, 2014
SERENO, CJ.
FACTS: Petitioner is the accused for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and multiple physical injuries.
The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) found petitioner guilty and sentenced him to suffer prisioncorreccional in its
medium and maximum periods. Petitioner filed an Application for Probation. The posecutor opposed his
application on the ground that he was known to be uncooperative, habitually absent, and had even neglected
to inform the court of his change of address. The RTC found that the MTC committed grave abuse of discretion
in rendering judgment without first ruling on his Formal Offer of Exhibits since, technically, petitioner had not
yet rested his case. It also ruled that the promulgation of judgment was similarly tainted with grave abuse of
discretion, because petitioner was not present at the time. The CA ruled that the RTC should have confined
itself to determining whether or not the MTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s
application for probation. Since no appeal or other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law is available against the denial of probation, a Rule 65 petition is clearly the appropriate remedy.
However, the trial court erred in taking cognizance of supplemental grounds assailing the judgment of
conviction, because an application for probation is a waiver of the right to appeal from the judgment of
conviction and effectively renders the same final.
ISSUE: Whether probation and appeal are mutually exclusive remedies?
HELD: Yes. In the present case, petitioner cannot make up his mind whether to question the judgment, or
apply for probation, which is necessarily deemed a waiver of his right to appeal.While he did not file an appeal
before applying for probation, he assailed the validity of the conviction in the guise of a petition supposedly
assailing the denial of probation. In so doing, he attempted to circumvent P.D. No. 968, as amended by P.D.
1990, which seeks to make appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies.
DOCTRINE: Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to a penitent qualified offender. It essentially
rejects appeals and encourages an otherwise eligible convict to immediately admit his liability and save the
49
state of time, effort and expenses to jettison an appeal. The law expressly requires
that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail of probation. This outlaws the
element of speculation on the part of the accused — to wager on the result of his appeal — that when his
conviction is finally affirmed on appeal... he now applies for probation as an "escape hatch" thus rendering
nugatory the appellate court's affirmance of his conviction. An accused applying for probation is deemed to
have accepted the judgment. The application for probation is an admission of guilt on the part of an accused
for the crime which led to the judgment of conviction.This was the reason why the Probation Law was
amended: precisely to put a stop to the practice of appealing from judgments of conviction – even if the
sentence is probationable – for the purpose of securing an acquittal and applying for the probation only if the
accused fails in his bid.
VILLAREAL VS PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 151258
743 SCRA 351
DECEMBER 1, 2014
SERENO, CJ.
FACTS:
Seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law signified their intention to join
the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity. Their initiation rites were scheduled to last for three days. The neophytes
were subjected to hazing. One of the neophytes died as a consequence. A criminal case for homicide was filed
against 35 members of Aquila Fraternity. Some of the respondents (Tecson et al) were found guilty only of
slight physical injuries by the CA. According to the said respondents they immediately applied for probation
after the CA rendered its decision lowering their criminal liability from the crime of homicide, which carries a
non probationable sentence, to slight physical injuries, which carries a probationable sentence. Tecson etal.
contend that, as a result, they have already been discharged from their criminal liability and the cases against
them closed and terminated. They argue that Branch 130 of Caloocan City Regional Trial Court (RTC) had
already granted their respective Applications for Probation.
ISSUE: Whether the completion by Tecson et al. of the terms and conditions of their probation discharged
them from their criminal liability, and closed and terminated the cases against them?
HELD:
No. The finality of a CA decision will not bar the state from seeking the annulment of the judgment via a Rule
65 petition. It must be clarified, however, that the finality of judgment evinced in Section 7 of Rule 120 does
not confer blanket invincibility on criminal judgments. We have already explained in our Decision that the rule
on double jeopardy is not absolute, and that this rule is inapplicable to cases in which the state assails the very
jurisdiction of the court that issued the criminal judgment. The orders of Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 have
no legal effect, as they were issued without jurisdiction.
Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted
and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an
appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and
50
upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no
application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the
judgment of conviction. It is obvious from the foregoing provision that the law requires that an application for
probation be filed withthe trial court that convicted and sentenced the defendant, meaning the court of
origin. Here, the trial court that originally convicted and sentenced Tecsonetal.of the crime of homicide was
Branch 121 – not Branch 130 – of the Caloocan City RTC.
DOCTRINE: It must be reiterated that probation is not a right enjoyed by the accused. Rather, it is an act of
grace or clemency conferred by the state. It is a special prerogative granted by law to a person or group of
persons not enjoyed by others or by all. Accordingly, the grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion of
the court which is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society, and only incidentally for the
benefit of the accused. The Probation Law should not therefore be permitted to divest the state or its
government of any of the latter’s prerogatives, rights or remedies, unless the intention of the legislature to
this end is clearly expressed, and no person should benefit from the terms of the law who is not clearly within
them.
PAGADUANVS CSC
G.R. NO. 206379
741 SCRA 334
NOVEMBER 19, 2014
MENDOZA, J.
FACTS: Cecilia Pagaduan filed a notarized complaint with the Civil Service Commission charging Salvador with
the administrative offenses of falsification and misrepresentation. Pagaduan alleged that Salvador did not
actually possess the necessary budgeting experience required by her position. MTCC found Salvador guilty of
falsification of public documents. Salvador did not appeal and then applied for probation. Her application was
granted and she was placed under probation for a period of one (1) year. Pagaduan filed a second
administrative complaint against Salvador, this time for the offense of conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude a sufficient ground for dismissal from government service.
ISSUE: Whether probation has the effect of erasing conviction?
HELD: No. Salvador did not appeal from the said judgment and, instead, filed an application for probation
which was granted. It has been held that an application for probation is an admission of guilt. Salvador argues
that her conviction and eventual discharge from probation presents another administrative case to be filed
against her because to do so would defeat the purpose of the Probation Law which was to erase the effect of
conviction and to restore civil rights that were lost or suspended.
DOCTRINE: Application for probation is an admission of guilt. Suffice it to state that probation does not erase
the effects and fact of conviction, but merely suspends the penalty imposed. While indeed the purpose of the
Probation Law is to save valuable human material, it must not be forgotten that unlike pardon, probation does
not obliterate the crime for which the person under probation has been convicted. The reform and
51
rehabilitation of the probationer cannot justify his retention in the
government service. Probation only affects the criminal liability of the accused, and not his administrative
liabilities
DIMAKUTA VS PEOPLE
GR 206513
773 SCRA 228
OCTOBER 20, 2015
PERALTA, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Mustapha Dimakuta was indicted for Violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 or the Special
Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discriminatory Act. After trial, the RTC promulgated its
decision which convicted petitioner of the crime charged. Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
CA modified decision of the RTC finding Dimakuta guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness. Instead of appealing further
the case, CA allowed him to apply for Probation and remanded the case to the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether Dimakuta can still apply for probation despite having filed an appeal with the CA?
HELD: No. The Probation Law “expressly requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction
before he can avail himself of probation. This outlaws the element of speculation on the part of the accused –
to wager on the result of his appeal – that when his conviction is finally affirmed on appeal, the moment of
truth well nigh at hand and the service of his sentence inevitable, he now applies for probation as an ‘escape
hatch,’ thus rendering nugatory the appellate court's affirmance of his conviction.”
Probation should not be granted to the accused in the following instances:
1. When the accused is convicted by the trial court of a crime where the penalty imposed is within the
probationable period or a fine, and the accused files a notice of appeal; and
2. When the accused files a notice of appeal which puts the merits of his conviction in issue, even if there is an
alternative prayer for the correction of the penalty imposed by the trial court or for a conviction to a lesser
crime, which is necessarily included in the crime in which he was convicted where the penalty is within the
probationable period.
DOCTRINE: Probation is not a right granted to a convicted offender; it is a special privilege granted by the
State to a penitent qualified offender, who does not possess the disqualifications under Sec 9 of PD 968 as
52
amended. Sec 4 of the Probation Law prohibits granting an
application for probation if an appeal from the sentence of conviction has been perfected by the accused.
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW

ZAFRAVS PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 176317
JULY 23, 2014
730 SCRA 438
BERSAMIN, J.
FACTS: Appellant was the only Revenue Collection Agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), Revenue
District 3, in San Fernando, La Union from 1993-1995. An audit team was tasked to audit the cash and noncash
accountabilities of the appellant. The audit team sent to appellant a demand letter requiring him to restitute
an accountable amount. Appellant ignored the letter, thus, prompting the institution of the 18 cases for
malversation of public funds through falsification of public document against him. RTC convicted the
petitioner of the crime charged. The findings of fact of the RTC were affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE: Whether ISLAW is applicable in determining the maximum sentence for the 18 counts of malversation?
HELD: Yes. The penalties prescribed under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code should be divided into three
periods, with the maximum period being the penalty properly imposable on each count, except in any instance
where the penalty for falsification would be greater than such penalties for malversation. Under Section 1 of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, an indeterminate sentence is imposed on the offender consisting of a
maximum term and a minimum term.The maximum term is the penalty under the Revised Penal Code
properly imposed after considering any attending circumstance; while the minimum term is within the range
of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense committed. The
Indeterminate Sentence Lawwas applicable here, save for the counts for which the imposable penalty was
reclusion perpetua.
DOCTRINE: An indeterminate sentence is imposed on the offender consisting of a maximum term and a
minimum term.
53
GEROCHE ET AL. VS PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 179080
742 SCRA 514
NOVEMBER 26, 2014
PERALTA, J.
FACTS: The petitioners are accused of violation of domicile. The RTC acquitted them with the above case but
were found guilty of the crime less serious physical injuries. The CA on the other hand found them guilty of
violation of domicile. Petitioners argue that there is double jeopardy. The Supreme Court denied the
petitioners’ appeal because an appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question
including one not raised by the parties. When an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he or
she waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the
review of the appellate court.
ISSUE: Whether there is a requirement to impose an indeterminate sentence upon the conviction of the
accused?
HELD: Yes. In imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the RPC, the Indeterminate Sentence
Lawrequires courts to impose upon the accused an indeterminate sentence. The maximum term of the prison
sentence shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
rules of the said Code. Yet the penalty prescribed by Article 128 of the RPC is composed of only two, not three,
periods. In which case, Article 65 of the same Code requires the division into three equal portions the time
included in the penalty, forming one period of each of the three portions.
DOCTRINE: In imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the RPC, the Indeterminate Sentence
Law requires courts to impose upon the accused an indeterminate sentence.
54
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9775: ANTI-CHILD PORNOGRAPHY ACT
DISINI, JR. vs. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

GR NO. 203335
FEBRUARY 18, 2014
SERENO, J.
FACTS:
These consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime
Prevention Act of 2012, unconstitutional and void.
Petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyberspace
activities violate certain of their constitutional rights. The government of course asserts that the law merely
seeks to reasonably put order into cyberspace activities, punish wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on
the system. Pending hearing and adjudication of the issues presented in these cases, on February 5, 2013 the
Court extended the original 120day temporary restraining order (TRO) that it earlier issued on October 9,
2012, enjoining respondent government agencies from implementing the cybercrime law until further orders.
ISSUE:
Constitutionality of Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography.
RULING:
Section 4(c)(2) of the Cybercrime Law
55
Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. – The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this
Act:
(c) Contentrelated Offenses:
(2) Child Pornography. — The unlawful or prohibited acts defined and punishable by Republic Act No. 9775 or
the AntiChild Pornography Act of 2009, committed through a computer system: Provided, That the penalty to
be imposed shall be (1) one degree higher than that provided for in Republic Act No. 9775.
It seems that the above merely expands the scope of the AntiChild Pornography Act of 200931 (ACPA) to cover
identical activities in cyberspace.
In theory, nothing prevents the government from invoking the ACPA when prosecuting persons who commit
child pornography using a computer system. Actually, ACPA’s definition of child pornography already
embraces the use of "electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means." Notably, no one
has questioned this ACPA provision.
Of course, the law makes the penalty higher by one degree when the crime is committed in cyberspace. But
no one can complain since the intensity or duration of penalty is a legislative prerogative and there is rational
basis for such higher penalty. The potential for uncontrolled proliferation of a particular piece of child
pornography when uploaded in the cyberspace is incalculable.
Petitioners point out that the provision of ACPA that makes it unlawful for any person to "produce, direct,
manufacture or create any form of child pornography" clearly relates to the prosecution of persons who aid
and abet the core offenses that ACPA seeks to punish. Petitioners are wary that a person who merely doodles
on paper and imagines a sexual abuse of a 16-yearold is not criminally liable for producing child pornography
but one who formulates the idea on his laptop would be. Further, if the author bounces off his ideas on
Twitter, anyone who replies to the tweet could be considered aiding and abetting a cybercrime. The question
of aiding and abetting the offense by simply commenting on it will be discussed elsewhere below.
For now the Court must hold that the constitutionality of Section 4(c)(2) is not successfully challenged.
WHEREFORE, VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL.
DOCTRINE:
(1) What does Cybercrime Law aims to regulate?

The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace. Using his laptop or computer, a
person can connect to the internet, a system that links him to other computers and enable him, among
other things, to:
56
1. Access virtual libraries and encyclopedias for all kinds of
information that he needs for research, study, amusement, upliftment, or pure curiosity;
2. Post billboard-like notices or messages, including pictures and videos, for the general public or for
special audiences like associates, classmates, or friends and read postings from them;
3. Advertise and promote goods or services and make purchases and payments;
4. Inquire and do business with institutional entities like government agencies, banks, stock exchanges,
trade houses, credit card companies, public utilities, hospitals, and schools; and
5. Communicate in writing or by voice with any person through his email address or telephone.
(2) Definition of Child.

"Child" refers to a person below eighteen (18) years of age or over, but is unable to fully take care of
himself/herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental
disability or condition.
A child shall also refer to:

(1) a person regardless of age who is presented, depicted or portrayed as a child as defined herein; and
(2) computer-generated, digitally or manually crafted images or graphics of a person who is represented or
who is made to appear to be a child as defined herein. Sec. 3(a), RA No. 9775
(3) Definition of Child Pornography.

"Child pornography" refers to any representation, whether visual, audio, or written combination thereof,
by electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means, of child engaged or involved in
real or simulated explicit sexual activities. Sec. 3(b), RA No. 9775
57
RA 9346: AN ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY IN THE PHILIPPINES
PEOPLE vs. COLENTAVA

GR NO. 190348
750 SCRA 165
FEBRUARY 9, 2015
DEL CASTILLO, J.
FACTS:
Appellant was charged with qualified rape for raping her daughter “AAA”, who is a minor (16 years old),
defined and penalized under paragraph (1) of Article 266A of the Revised Penal Code(RPC), in relation to
paragraph (1) of Article 266B thereof, in three separate Informations.
In a Joint Judgment dated April 23, 2007, the RTC found appellant guilty as charged.On appeal, the CA affirmed
with modification the RTC’s conviction of appellant. Hence, the present appeal.
The appellant contends that there is a discrepancy in the dates in the allegations and testimonies of the
commission of rape. Further, he asserts that the private complainant’sactuations after the incidents negate
the possibility of rape.
ISSUE:
1.Whether or not the guilt of the accused has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
2.Whether or not the private complainant’s actuations after the incident negate the possibility of rape.
3.Proper penalty.
58
RULING:
The Court affirms the lower court’s conviction of appellant for three counts of qualified rape.
(1) In this case, both the trial court and the [CA] found that the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish
all the elements of qualified rape. This Court sees no reason to depart from the findings of the lower
courts. "AAA’s" testimony on her harrowing experience in the hands of appellant was found by the lower
courts to be positive, straightforward, categorical and steadfast. Moreover, the evidence on record
established that "AAA" was just 16years old when appellant, her own father, had carnal knowledge of her.
Clearly,all the elements of qualified rape are present in this case.
The alleged inconsistency in the date of the third rape is trivial and forgivable, since a victim of rape cannot
possibly give an exacting detail for each of the previous incidents as these may just be but mere
Fragments of a prolonged and continuing nightmare, a bad experience she might even be struggling to
forget. Verily, the exact date of rape is not an essential element of the crime, and the mere failure to give
a precise date, let alone an incorrect estimate, will not discredit the testimony of the victim.
(2) "AAA’s" conduct after the rape incidents does not negate the fact that she was raped; Intimidation is
attendant in the commission of the crimes of qualified rape. It has been held in the case of People vs.
Saludo that while "the conduct of the victim immediately following the alleged sexual assault is of utmost
importance as it tends to establish the truth or falsity of the charge of rape, it is not accurate to say that
there is a typical reaction or norm of behavior among rape victims, as not every victim can be expected to
act conformably with the usual expectation of mankind and there is no standard behavioral response
when one is confronted with a strange or startling experience, each situation being different and
dependent on the various circumstances prevailing in each case.
(3) Under Article 266B of the RPC, the death penalty shall be imposed when the victim of rape is below 18
years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the victim. The death
penalty cannot, however, be imposed in view of Republic Act No. 9346.49 In lieu of the death penalty, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole shall be imposed. Hence, the Court finds proper
the penalty imposed by the CA upon appellant which is reclusion perpetua without eligibility of parole in
each of the three counts of qualified rape.
DOCTRINES:
(1) In lieu of the death penalty, what shall be imposed?
SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed.
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(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the
nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the
penalties of the Revised Penal Code.
(2) Does a person convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be
reduced to reclusion perpetua eligible for parole?
SEC. 3. Person convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced
to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise
known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
(3) Does improper motive a defense in the crime of rape?

The Court has ruled that a young girl’s revelation that she had been raped cannot be easily labeled as a
mere concoction. In People v. Melivo, it was held that:
It takes much more for a sixteen year old lass to fabricate a story of rape, have her private parts
examined, subject herself to the indignity of a public trial and endure a lifetime of ridicule. Even when
consumed with revenge, it takes a certain amount of psychological depravity for a young woman to
concoct a story which would put her own father for the most of his remaining life to jail and drag
herself and the rest of her family to a lifetime
of shame.
It must be added that the defenses of denial and improper motive can only prosper when substantiated by
clear and convincing evidence.
PEOPLE vs. CATAYTAY

GR. NO. 190348 739 SCRA 201
OCTOBER 22, 2014
DE CASTRO, J.
FACTS:
This is an Appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG .R. CR No. 32275 dated August 11, 2010
affirming the conviction of accused appellant Leonardo Cataytay y Silvano for the crime of rape.
Accused appellant Cataytay was charged of said crime in an Information:

That on or about the 7th day of September 2003, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, with lewd designs[,] and by means of force and
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intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have
carnal knowledge [of AAA], 19 years of age but with a mental age of a 5 year old, hence, a retardate, or
demented, which is known to accused at the time of the commission of the offense, against her will and
consent and to her damage and prejudice.
The RTC rendered its Judgment finding accused appellant guilty as charged. The case was elevated to the
Court of Appeals, however, the appeal was denied. Hence, this petition.
The accused-appellant maintains that the court a quo gravely erred in convicting him despite
the prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. And that the court a quo gravely erred in
convicting the accused-appellant despite the fact that he was illegally arrested.
ISSUE:
1.Whether or not the guilt of the accused-appellant has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
2.Proper penalty.
RULING:
(1) At the outset, the Court agree with accused-appellant that the details concerning the manner of the
commission of the rape, which was merely narrated by AAA at the barangay outpost, is hearsay and
cannot be considered by this Court. A witness can testify only on the facts that she knows of his own
personal knowledge, or more precisely, those which are derived from her own perception. A witness may
not testify on what she merely learned, read or heard from others because such testimony is considered
hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what she has learned, read or heard.
Notwithstanding the inadmissibility of the details of the rape which BBB merely heard from AAA’s
narration, the Court nevertheless find no reason to disturb the findings of fact of the trial court. Despite
lacking certain details concerning the manner in which AAA was allegedly raped, the trial court, taking into
consideration the mental incapacity of AAA and qualifying her to be a child witness, found her testimony
to be credible and convincing.
The Court have pronounced time and again that both denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses which
cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witness that the accused
committed the crime. Thus, as between a categorical testimony which has a ring of truth on one hand, and
a mere denial and alibi on the other, the former is generally held to prevail. For the defense of alibi to
prosper, it must be sufficiently convincing
as to preclude any doubt on the physical impossibility of the presence of the accused at the locus criminis
or its immediate vicinity at the time of the incident.
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(2) As regards accused appellant’s civil liability, the RTC ordered him to pay AAA in
the amount of P75,000.00 as moral damages and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages. The Court of Appeals
modified the trial court’s decision by granting the additional award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and
reducing the award of exemplary damages to P30,000.00. In accordance, however, to People v. Lumaho,
where the penalty for the crime committed is death which cannot be imposed because of Republic Act
No. 9346, we increase the amounts of indemnity and damages to be imposed as follows: P100,000.00 as
civil indemnity; P100,000.00 as moral damages; and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages. In addition,
the Court impose 6% interest per annum from finality of judgment until fully paid.
DOCTRINES:
1. Credence of denial and alibi.

The Court have pronounced time and again that both denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses which
cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witness that the accused
committed the crime. Thus, as between a categorical testimony which has a ring of truth on one hand, and
a mere denial and alibi on the other, the former is generally held to prevail. For the defense of alibi to
prosper, it must be sufficiently convincing
as to preclude any doubt on the physical impossibility of the presence of the accused at the locus criminis
or its immediate vicinity at the time of the incident.
PEOPLE vs. ESTONILO

GR NO. 201565
738 SCRA 205
OCTOBER 13, 2O14
DE CASTRO, J.
FACTS:
In this appeal, accused appellants Ex Mayor Carlos Estonilo, Sr. (Carlos, Sr.), Mayor Reinario Estonilo (Rey),
Edelbrando Estonilo (Edel), Eutiquiano Itcobanes (Nonong), and Calvin Dela Cruz (Bulldog) seek liberty from
the judgment of conviction rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 45, Manila, which found them
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Murder with Direct Assault in Criminal Case No.
05238607.
The above named accused appellants, along with four others, namely: Nonoy Estonilo (Nonoy), Titing Booc
(Titing), and Gali Itcobanes (Gali), and Orlando Tagalog Materdam (Negro) were all charged in an Information
dated July 30, 2004 that reads: That on or about April 5, 2004 at 8:00 o’clock in the evening thereof, at Celera
Elementary School,6 Brgy. Villa Inocencio, Municipality of Placer, Province of Masbate, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, with intent to kill, armed with firearms,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with evident premeditation and treachery, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one FLORO A. CASAS, while in the
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performance of his duty being the District Supervisor of public schools,
hitting the latter on the different parts of his body which caused his instantaneous death.
After trial, the RTC found the accused appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. All five
accused-appellants appealed the foregoing RTC decision to the Court of Appeals alleging that the RTC erred in
concluding that motive was duly established, in appreciating the prosecution evidence and disregarding the
salient points of the defense evidence, and in convicting the accused. In its May 12,2011 Decision, the Court of
Appeals affirmed with modification the RTC decision. The CA corrected the penalty imposed, and explained
that reclusion perpetua is an indivisible penalty which should be imposed without specifying the duration. The
accused-appellant moved for reconsideration, which the CA denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
1.Whether or not the crime of rape has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
2.Proper penalty.
RULING:
(1) To successfully prosecute the crime of murder, the following elements must be established: (1) that a
person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended by any of the
qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) that the killing is not
parricide or infanticide.
In this case, the prosecution was able to clearly establish that (1) Floro was killed; (2) Ex Mayor
Carlos, Sr., Rey,Edel, Nonong, and Calvin were five of the nine perpetrators who killed him; (3) the killing
was attended by the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation as testified to by prosecution
eyewitnesses, Servando and Antipolo, as well as treachery as below discussed; and (4) the killing of Floro
was neither parricide nor infanticide.
Of the four elements, the second and third elements are essentially contested by the defense. The Court
finds that the prosecution unquestionably established these two elements.
For the second element, the prosecution presented pieces of evidence which when joined together point
to the accused-appellants as the offenders. Foremost, there is motive to kill Floro. It was Floro’s support
for Vicente Cotero, who was Rey’s opponent for the position of mayor in Placer, Masbate. Second, the
prosecution was able to establish that the accused appellants planned to kill Floro on two separate
occasions. Third, Antipolo was an eye witness to the killing. His testimony was corroborated by another
witness, Serapion, who testified having seen the accused-appellants leaving the school a few minutes after
he heard the gunshots
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As for the third element of qualifying circumstance, the prosecution witness,
Servando, testified that he was present on the two occasions when the accused-appellants were planning
tokill Floro. His categorical and straight forward narration proves the existence of evident premeditation.
(2) The offense is a complex crime, the penalty for which is that for the graver offense, to be imposed in the
maximum period. Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, provides
for the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the felony of murder; thus, the imposable penalty should
have been death. Plus the fact that there exists an aggravating circumstance, pursuant to Article 63,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, the proper penalty is death. But the imposition of death penalty
has been prohibited by Republic Act No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty
in the Philippines"; thus, the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, properly imposed upon accused
appellants the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
DOCTRINES:
1. Definition of circumstantial evidence.

Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue
may be established by inference. It consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the
existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience.
i.e. the circumstantial evidence consists of the testimonies of Servando and Serapion.
PEOPLE vs. FAMUDULAN

GR NO. 212194 761 SCRA 653
JULY 6, 2015
VILLARAMA, J.
FACTS:
Before us is an appeal from the October 3, 2013 Decision 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG. R. CR-H.C. No.
05447 which affirmed with modification appellant Rod Famudulan's conviction for the crime of statutory rape
as defined under Article 266A(l)(d)4 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, (RPC) in Criminal Case No. P7904
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 41, Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro.
Appellant, a 42yearold man, was accused and charged with the crime of statutory rape against AAA, who, with
her mother and father, filed an Information with the provincial prosecutor which reads:
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That on or about the 1st day of January, 2010 at around 12:00
o'clock noon, in Barangay [XXX], Municipality of [YYY], Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines, a
place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, ROD FAMUDULAN y
Fedelin, with lewd and unchaste designs, by means of violence, force and intimidation, did lie and
succeeded in having sexual intercourse of one [AAA], a six (6) year old girl minor, against the latter's
will and without her consent, acts which affects her moral, psychological and emotional growth, to her
damage and prejudice.
In its January 12, 2012 Decision, the RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
statutory rape. The RTC gave credence to AAA’s testimony since she was a child of tender years, AAA being
only seven years old. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's ruling but modified the award of damages. Hence,
this appeal.
ISSUE:
1.Proper penalty.
RULING:
The Supreme Court agree with both the CA and the RTC that appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of statutory rape.
The Court are constrained to modify the penalty imposed by the RTC and the CA. Article 266B provides that in
cases of qualified statutory rape the penalty imposed shall be death, viz.:
ART. 266B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua.
x xxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
x xxx
5. When the victim is a child below seven (7) years old.
However, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 934635 prohibited the imposition of the death penalty. Sections 2 and 3 of
R.A. No. 9346 instead prescribes that the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole be
imposed in cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or the sentence will be reduced to
reclusion perpetua, to wit:
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SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:
(a) The penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of
the Revised Penal Code; or
x xxx
SEC.3. Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to
reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known
as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
RA 6539: THE ANTI-CARNAPPING ACT
PEOPLE vs. CHARLIE CHARLIE FIELDAD, RYAN CORNISTA and EDGAR PIMENTEL
G.R. No. 196005
October 1, 2014
FACTS:
Herein appellants were inmates who have escaped from the BJMP Compound, Anonas, Urdaneta City. They
were charged in conspiracy with others, for the murder of two jail guards and for willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously taking, one (1) Tamaraw Jeep belonging to Benjamin J. Bauzon without the latter’s knowledge and
consent, which accused used as a getaway vehicle.
Accused appellants’ defense:
Appellants argue that the testimony of the vehicle owner, Benjamin Bauzon, cannot be considered for being
hearsay because he was merely informed that his Tamaraw jeep was missing.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony of the vehicle owner is mere hearsay, rendering it inadmissible and insufficient
to prove the crime charged.
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RULING:
The court ruled that appellants’ argument is misplaced. Bauzon had personal knowledge that when he arrived
home, his Tamaraw jeep was no longer at the place where he parked it.
Under the law, carnapping is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without
consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.The
elements of the crime of carnapping are that: (1) there is an actual taking of the vehicle; (2) the offender
intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle; (3) the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender
himself; and (4) the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof, or it was committed by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.
All the elements of carnapping are present in this case. Both appellants admitted that they boarded the
Tamaraw jeep and drove away in it. The owner of the vehicle, BenjaminBauzon, testified that he did not
consent to the taking of his vehicle by appellants.
As for intent to gain, the court reiterated the ruling in People v. Bustinera:
Intent to gain or animus lucrandiis an internal act, presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle.
Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain. The term "gain" is not merely
limited to pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which in any other sense may be derived orexpected
from the act which is performed. Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken without the owner’s
consent constitutes gain.
DOCTRINES:
1. What are the elements of carnapping?
Carnapping is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without consent, or by
means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.The elements of the crime
of carnapping are that: (1) there is an actual taking of the vehicle; (2) the offender intends to gain from the
taking of the vehicle; (3) the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself; and (4) the taking is
without the consent of the owner thereof, or it was committed by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons, or by using force upon things.
2. What is the penalty for carnapping?
Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is defined in Section Two of this Act, shall,
irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years
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and eight months and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the
carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon things; and by
imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years, when the
carnapping is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the
carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the
occasion thereof.
RA 8049: The Anti-Hazing Law
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LTSG. DOMINADOR BAYABOS, et al.

G.R. No. 171222
February 18, 2015
FACTS:
The school authorities of the Philippine Merchant Marine Academy (PMMA) were criminally charged before
the Sandiganbayan as accomplices to hazing under the Anti-Hazing Law.
The defense argued that PMMA should not be considered a fraternity, a sorority, or an organization. On the
other hand, the Comment/Opposition of the Special Prosecutor was, silent on the issue of whether the
academy was considered an "organization" within the meaning of the Anti-Hazing Law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PMMA should be considered a fraternity, a sorority, or an organization.
RULING:
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Yes. The Court rejected the contention of respondents that PMMA should not be
considered an organization. Under the Anti-Hazing Law, the breadth of the term organization includes – but is
not limited to – groups, teams, fraternities, sororities, citizen army training corps, educational institutions,
clubs, societies, cooperatives, companies, partnerships, corporations, the PNP, and the AFP. Attached to the
Department of Transportation and Communications, the PMMA is a government-owned educational
institution established for the primary purpose of producing efficient and well-trained merchant marine
officers. Clearly, it is included in the term organization within the meaning of the law.
Q and A’s:
1) What are the essential elements of the crime of hazing?
The crime of hazing is thus committed when the following essential elements are established:
(1) a person is placed in some embarrassing or humiliating situation or subjected to physical or

psychological suffering or injury; and
(2) these acts were employed as a prerequisite for the person’s admission or entry into an organization.
In the crime of hazing, the crucial ingredient distinguishing it from the crimes against persons defined
under Title Eight of the Revised Penal Code is the infliction by a person of physical or psychological
suffering on another in furtherance of the latter’s admission or entry into an organization. (People vs.
Bayabos, G.R. No. 171222, February 18, 2015)
2) May school authorities and faculty members who have had no direct participation in the act of hazing
nonetheless be charged as accomplices?
Yes. In the case of school authorities and faculty members who have had no direct participation in the act,
they may nonetheless be charged as accomplices if it is shown that:
(1) hazing, as established by the elements of hazing, occurred;
(2) the accused are school authorities or faculty members; and
(3) they consented to or failed to take preventive action against hazing in spite actual knowledge thereof.
(People vs. Bayabos, G.R. No. 171222, February 18, 2015)
3) What does the term organization include under the Anti-Hazing Law?
Under the Anti-Hazing Law, the breadth of the term “organization” includes – but is not limited to –
groups, teams, fraternities, sororities, citizen army training corps, educational institutions, clubs, societies,
69
cooperatives, companies, partnerships, corporations, the PNP, and the AFP.
Attached to the Department of Transportation and Communications, the PMMA is a government-owned
educational institution established for the primary purpose of producing efficient and well-trained
merchant marine officers. Clearly, it is included in the term organization within the meaning of the law.
(People vs. Bayabos, G.R. No. 171222, February 18, 2015)
4) Is the allegation that the purported acts were not covered by the exemption (relating to the duly
recommended and approved "testing and training procedure and practices" for prospective regular
members of the AFP and the PNP) an essential element of the crime under the Anti-Hazing Law?
No. This exemption is an affirmative defense in, not an essential element of, the crime of accomplice to
hazing. It is an assertion that must be properly claimed by the accused, not by the prosecution. The reason
for this rule is that the accused carry the burden of proof in establishing by clear and convincing evidence
that they have satisfied the requirements thereof. Thus, the prosecution’s failure to point out in the
Information that the exception is inapplicable would not justify the quashal of that Information. (People vs.
Bayabos, G.R. No. 171222, February 18, 2015)
DANDY L. DUNGO and GREGORIO A. SIBAL, JR., vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 209464
July 1, 2015
FACTS:
Marlon Villanueva was a neophyte of Alpha Phi Omega.At around 3:00 o'clock in the morning of January 14,
2006, petitioners Dandy L. Dungo and Gregorio A. Sibal, Jr.,brought Marlon Villanueva to J.P. Rizal Hospital
Emergency Room. Dr. Ramon Masilungan, who was then the attending physician at the emergency room, tried
to revive Marlon but to no avail. The latter did not respond to resuscitation and was pronounced dead.The
RTC found petitioners Dandy L. Dungo (Dungo) and Gregorio A. Sibal, Jr. (Sibal), guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8049. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s
decision in toto.
Petitioners argue that they cannot be convicted of a crime not stated or necessarily included in the
information. The amended information charged them for actual participation in hazing, yet, both the RTC and
the CA found them guilty of violating R.A. No. 8049 because of inducing the victim to be presentduring the
initiation rites.
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In its Comment, the State, through the Solicitor General, asserted that the phrases
"planned initiation" and "in conspiracy with more or less twenty members and officers" in the amended
information sufficiently cover "knowingly cooperated in carrying out the hazing by inducing the victim to be
present thereat."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the amended information, which avers a criminal charge of hazing by actual participation,
sufficiently cover hazing by inducement.
RULING:
Yes. The Court agreed with the OSG that the "planned initiation rite" as stated in the information included the
act of inducing Villanueva to attend it. In ordinary parlance, a planned event can be understood to have
different phases. Likewise, the hazing activity had different stages and the perpetrators had different roles
therein, not solely inflicting physical injury to the neophyte. One of the roles of the petitioners in the hazing
activity was to induce Villanueva to be present. Dungo and Sibal not only induced Villanueva to be present at
the resort, but they actually brought him there. They fulfilled their roles in the planned hazing rite which
eventually led to the death of Villanueva. The hazing would not have been accomplished were it not for the
acts of the petitioners that induced the victim to be present.
Secrecy and silence are common characterizations of the dynamics of hazing. To require the prosecutor to
indicate every step of the planned initiation rite in the information at the inception of the criminal case, when
details of the clandestine hazing are almost nil, would be an arduous task, if not downright impossible. The law
does not require the impossible (lex non cognit ad impossibilia).
Q and A’s:
1) How does the law define hazing?
Section 1 of R.A. No. 8049 defines hazing as an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for admission into
membership in a fraternity, sorority or organization by placing the recruit, neophyte or applicant in some
embarrassing or humiliating situations such as forcing him to do menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks or
activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical or psychological suffering or injury.(Dungo vs. People, G.R.
No. 209464, July 1, 2015)
2) What are the elements of the crime of hazing?
The elements of the crime of hazing are:
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(1) That there is an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for admission into membership in a fraternity,
sorority or organization;
(2) That there must be a recruit, neophyte or applicant of the fraternity, sorority or organization; and
(3) That the recruit, neophyte or applicant is placed in some embarrassing or humiliating situations such as
forcing him to do menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting him to
physical or psychological suffering or injury.(Dungo vs. People, G.R. No. 209464, July 1, 2015)
3) Is the crime of hazing under R.A. No. 8049 a malum prohibitum or malum in se?
The crime of hazing under R.A. No. 8049 is malum prohibitum.Having in mind the potential conflict between
the proposed law and the core principle of mala in se adhered to under the RPC, the Congress did not simply
enact an amendment thereto. Instead, it created a special law on hazing, founded upon the principle of mala
prohibita. In Vedana vs. Valencia, the Court noted that in our nation's very recent history, the people had
spoken, through the Congress,to deem conduct constitutive of hazing, an act previously considered harmless
by custom, as criminal. The act of hazing itself is not inherently immoral, but the law deems the same to be
against public policy and must be prohibited. Accordingly, the existence of criminal intent is immaterial in the
crime of hazing. Also, the defense of good faith cannot be raised in its prosecution.(Dungo vs. People, G.R. No.
209464, July 1, 2015)
4) Is the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong a mitigating circumstance under the Anti-Hazing Law? Is
consent of the victim a valid defense?
No. Recognizing the malum prohibitum characteristic of hazing, the law provides that any person charged with
the said crime shall not be entitled to the mitigating circumstance that there was no intention to commit so
grave a wrong. Also, the framers of the law intended that the consent of the victim shall not be a defense in
hazing.(Dungo vs. People, G.R. No. 209464, July 1, 2015)
5) How may the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused be overcome and his guilt for the
crime of hazing be proven beyond reasonable doubt?
Through careful case-build up and proper presentation of evidence before the court, it is not impossible for
the exalted constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused to be overcome and his guilt for the crime
of hazing be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution must bear in mind the secretive nature of
hazing, and carefully weave its chain of circumstantial evidence. Likewise, the defense must present a genuine
defense and substantiate the same through credible and reliable witnesses. The counsels of both parties must
also consider hazing as a malum prohibitum crime and the law's distinctive provisions.(Dungo vs. People, G.R.
No. 209464, July 1, 2015)
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6) What are the different classes of persons who are held liable as principals and accomplices under the
law?
Section 4 of the law provides for the different classes of persons who are held liable as principals and
accomplices:
(1) The first class of principals would be the actual participants in the hazing. If the person subjected to hazing
or other forms of initiation rites suffers any physical injury or dies as a result thereof, the officers and
members of the fraternity, sorority or organization who actually participated in the infliction of physical
harm shall be liable as principals.
(2) The second class of principals would be the officers, former officers, or alumni of the organization, group,
fraternity or sorority who actually planned the hazing. Although these planners were not present when the
acts constituting hazing were committed, they shall still be liable as principals.
(3) The third class of principals would be officers or members of an organization group, fraternity or sorority
who knowingly cooperated in carrying out the hazing by inducing the victim to be present thereat. These
officers or members are penalized, not because of their direct participation in the infliction of harm, but
due to their indispensable cooperation in the crime by inducing the victim to attend the hazing.
(4) The fourth class of principals would be the fraternity or sorority's adviser who was present when the acts
constituting hazing were committed, and failed to take action to prevent them from occurring. The liability
of the adviser arises, not only from his mere presence in the hazing, but also his failure to prevent the
same.
(5) The last class of principals would be the parents of the officers or members of the fraternity, group, or
organization. The hazing must be held in the home of one of the officers or members. The parents must
have actual knowledge of the hazing conducted in their homes and failed to take any action to avoid the
same from occurring.
(6) The law also provides for accomplices in the crime of hazing. The school authorities, including faculty
members, who consented to the hazing or who have actual knowledge thereof, but failed to take any
action to prevent the same from occurring shall be punished as accomplices.
(7) Likewise, the owner of the place where the hazing was conducted can also be an accomplice to the crime.
The owner of the place shall be liable when he has actual knowledge of the hazing conducted therein and
he failed to take any steps to stop the same. (Dungo vs. People, G.R. No. 209464, July 1, 2015)
73
PD 1866 AS AMENDED BY RA 8294: ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARM
ARNULFO JACABAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 184355
March 23, 2015
FACTS:
At about 12:45 in the morning of July 16, 1999, a search warrant was implemented by P/S Insp. Dueñas.
Before reaching petitioner's house, the policemen invited three (3) barangay tanods from Guadalupe's
Barangay outpost to accompany them to the house of the petitioner.After an exhaustive search was done,
firearms and ammunitions were recovered from the searched premises.
Firstly, petitioner claims that he is not the owner of the house where the firearms were found but his uncle,
Gabriel Arda. On the other hand, the state contends that it was petitioner and his wife who were at the house
at 12:45 a.m. of July 16, 1999; and that petitioner did not protest his arrest.
74
Lastly, petitioner claims that there was discrepancy in the testimony of PO3 Sarte as
to the time the raid was conducted. On the other hand, the state avers that PO3 Sarte was able to explain her
mistake when she previously stated that the search was conducted at 12:45 noon of July 16, 1999 instead of
12:45 in the morning as she was hungry when she first testified.
ISSUES:
1) Whether the petitioner is the owner of the house and should not therefore be acquitted of the crime
charged;
2) Whether or not the discrepancy in the testimony of PO3 Sarte is enough to acquit the petitioner of the
crime charged.
RULING:
1) Yes. The petitioner is the owner of the house and should not be acquitted of the crime charged.If the
accused is not really the owner of the house where the firearm, ammunitions and other items were found,
he should have protested his arrest. But in the instant case there was no protest at all. Also, the defense
failed to explain what the petitioner was doing in the house at 12:45 in the morning.
Even assuming that petitioner is not the owner of the house where the items were recovered, the
ownership of the house is not an essential element of the crime under PD 1866 as amended. In fact, he
indeed had control of the house as shown by the following circumstances:
(1) When the PAOCTF went to the house to serve the search warrant, petitioner was very angry and
restless and even denied having committed any illegal act, but he was assured by P/SInsp. Dueñas that he
has nothing to answer if they would not find anything, thus, he consented to the search being conducted;
(2) while the search was ongoing, petitioner merely observed the conduct of the search and did not make
any protest at all; and
(3) petitioner did not call for the alleged owner of the house.
2) No. Minor discrepancy in the testimony of PO3 Sarte is not enough to acquit the petitioner of the crime
charged. Minor discrepancies might be found in her testimony, but this does not damage the essential
integrity of the evidence in its material whole, nor should it reflect adversely on the witness' credibility as
it erases suspicion that the same was perjured. Here, prior testimony of PO3 Sarte as to the time of the
raid is considered only a trivial matter which is not even enough to destroy or discredit her credibility.
The record likewise does not reveal that PO3 Sarte was actuated by ill-motive in so testifying against
appellant. Thus, when there is nothing to indicate that a witness was actuated by improper motives, her
positive declarations on the witness stand, made under solemn oath, deserve full faith and credence.
75
Q and A’s
1) What are the essential elements of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions?
The essential elements in the prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions are:
(1) the existence of subject firearm; and,
(2) the fact that the accused who possessed or owned the same does not have the corresponding license for it.
(Jacaban vs. People, G.R. No. 184355, March 23, 2015)
2) Is ownership of the firearms and ammunition an essential element of the crime of illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition?
No. The unvarying rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition. What the law requires is merely possession, which includes not only actual physical possession,
but also constructive possession or the subjection of the thing to one’s control and management.(Jacaban vs.
People, G.R. No. 184355, March 23, 2015)
3) Are the penalties prescribed in the Revised Penal Code applicable in the prosecutionof the crime of
illegal possession of firearms and ammunition?
Yes. Albeit, PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294, is a malum prohibitum and that the Revised Penal Code is
generally not applicable, it has been held that when a special law, which is a malum prohibitum, adopts the
nomenclature of the penalties in the Revised Penal Code, the latter law shall apply.(Jacaban vs. People, G.R.
No. 184355, March 23, 2015)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ZALDY SALAHUDDIN

G.R. No. 206291
January 18, 2016
FACTS:
On February 10, 2004, at around 5:30 in the afternoon, Atty. Segundo Sotto Jr., a prominent law practitioner
in Zamboanga City, was shot multiple times and killed by assailants on a motorcycle. Both Liezel Mae Java, the
victim’s niece and accompanying the victim in the owner-type jeep during the incident, and Juanchito Vicente
Delos Reyes, a Security Guard, close to the scene during the incident, positively identified the petitioner to
have been one of the assailants. Upon the arrest of the petitioner, the agents recovered a .45 caliber firearm
76
from the accused. Records showed petitioner to have no existing record of any
firearms license, permit to transport or permit to carry firearms outside of his residence.
Firstly, the defense claims that the result of the ballistic examination that the slugs test-fired from the gun
recovered from petitioner when he was arrested, were different from the 2 slugs recovered from the body of
the victim. On the other hand, prosecution claims that it was still able to establish the special aggravating
circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm in the commission of the crime; that the actual firearm used by
petitioner in shooting the victim was a "short gun;" and that petitioner was not issued a firearms license, a
permit to carry or permit to transport firearms outside of residence
Lastly, the defense claims that petitioner was at the house of the Barangay Captain and could not have been in
the place of the incident. In support of his claim, he insists that the barangay officials, who testified for the
defense, are credible witnesses, and that their testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit, since they
testified in a categorical and frank manner, and were not shown to have any improper motive to falsely testify
in court.
On the other hand, the state avers that the defences are unworthy of belief and credence, as they were
established mainly by petitioner himself, his friends and comrades-in-arms. Also, that it was not physically
impossible for appellant to be present at the crime scene because the barangay hall where he supposedly
stayed the whole day was just about 44 kilometers away and can be reached within a travel time of about 1
hour and 30 minutes.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the trial court was correct in appreciating the presence of the use of unlicensed firearm
in the commission of the crime as an aggravating circumstance;
2) Whether or not the defense of alibi should be upheld thereby acquitting the petitioner.
RULING:
1) Yes. The trial court correctly appreciated the presence of the said aggravating circumstance in imposing
the penalty against petitioner.
Despite the result of the ballistic examination that the slugs test-fired from the gun recovered from
petitioner when he was arrested, were different from the 2 slugs recovered from the body of the victim,
the prosecution was still able to establish the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed
firearm in the commission of the crime. Given that the actual firearm used by petitioner in shooting the
victim was not presented in court, the prosecution has nonetheless proven through the testimony of Delos
Reyes that the firearm used by petitioner was a "short gun." It has also established through the testimony
77
of SPO3 Ronnie Eleuterio and the Certification from the FESAGS of the PNP that
petitioner was not issued a firearms license, a permit to carry or permit to transport firearms outside of
residence.
2) No. Prosecution witnesses Java and Delos Reyes were clear and consistent in the identification of appellant
as the one who fatally shot Atty. Segundo several times.In the case at bar, eyewitnesses Liezel Mae Java
and Juanchito Delos Reyes positively and categorically identified the accused-appellant to be the assailant
in the murder. Liezel Mae Java, in her testimony, stated that she was one hundred percent (100%) sure
that the accused-appellant was the man who shot her uncle.These direct, straightforward and positive
testimonies of the aforesaid witnesses pointing to the accused appellant as the gunman created strong
and credible evidence against him, thus no weight can be given to the alibi of the accused.
Q and A’s
1) Can the existence of a firearm be established by testimony even without the presentation of the
firearm?
Yes. In People v. Dulay, the Court ruled that the existence of the firearm can be established by testimony even
without the presentation of the firearm. In the said case, it was established that the victims sustained and died
from gunshot wounds, and the ballistic examinations of the slugs recovered from the place of the incident
showed that they were fired from a .30 carbine rifle and a .38 caliber firearm. The prosecution witnesses
positively identified appellant therein as one of those who were holding a long firearm, and it was also proven
that he was not a licensed firearm holder. Hence, the trial court and the CA correctly appreciated the use of
unlicensed firearm as a special aggravating circumstance. (People vs. Salahuddin, G.R. No. 206291, January 18,
2016)
2) How can the existence or non-existence of a license to carry or own a firearm be proven?
The existence or non-existence of a license to carry or own a firearm can be proven by presenting written or
testimonial evidence. In People v. De Leon, the Court found that the said aggravating circumstance was not
proven by the prosecution because it failed to present written or testimonial evidence to prove that appellant
did not have a license to carry or own a firearm. Although jurisprudence dictates that the existence of the
firearm can be established by mere testimony, the fact that appellant therein was not a licensed firearm
holder must still be established.(People vs. Salahuddin, G.R. No. 206291, January 18, 2016)
78
RA 9208: ANTI-TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS ACT OF 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SHIRLEY A. CASIO,
GR No. 211465
December 3, 2015
FACTS:
Version if the Prosecution
On May 3, 2008, at about 1am, the accused Casio hired and/or recruited AAA, a minor, 17 years old and BBB
for the purpose of prostitution and sexual exploitation, by acting as their procurer for different customers, for
money, profit or any other consideration in Cebu City.
The accused was apprehended after an entrapment operation headed by the Police and the International
Justice Mission, a nongovernmental organization.
Version of the accused
79
In defense, accused testified thatshe worked as a laundry woman. On the
evening of May 2, 2008, she went out to buy supper. While walking, she was stopped by two men on board a
blue car. The two men asked her if she knew someone named Bingbing. She replied that she only knew
Gingging but not Bingbing. The men informed her that they were actually looking for Gingging, gave her a
piece of paper with a number written on it, and told her to tell Gingging to bring companions. When accused
arrived home, she contacted Gingging. Gingging convinced her to come because allegedly, she would be given
money by the two males.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the operation was an entrapment

2.) Whether or not accused should be acquitted since the victim consented to having sex for money
RULING:
1. Yes, the entrapment operation was valid.
American federal courts and a majority of state courts use the "subjective" or "origin of intent" test laid
down in Sorrells v. United States to determine whether entrapment actually occurred. The focus of the
inquiry is on the accused's redisposition to commit the offense charged, his state of mind and inclination
before his initial exposure to government agents.
Some states, however, have adopted the "objective" test. . . . Here, the court considers the nature of the
police activity involved and the propriety of police conduct. The inquiry is focused on the inducements
used by government agents, on police conduct, not on the accused and his predisposition to commit the
crime.
Applying the Subjective test, It was the accused-appellant who commenced the transaction with PO1
Luardo and PO1 Veloso by calling their attention on whether they wanted girls for that evening, and when
the officers responded, it was the accused-appellant who told them to wait while she would fetch the girls
for their perusal. This shows that accused was predisposed to commit the offense because she initiated
the transaction.
The entrapment would still be valid using the objective test. The police merely proceeded to D. Jakosalem
Street in Barangay Kamagayan. It was accused who asked them whether they wanted girls. There was no
illicit inducement on the part of the police for the accused to commit the crime.
2. No, the accused should not be acquitted
80
Knowledge or consent of the minor is not a defense under Republic Act No.
9208. As defined under Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 9208, trafficking in persons can still be committed
even if the victim gives consent. The victim’s consent is rendered meaningless due to the coercive, abusive,
or deceptive means employed by perpetrators of human trafficking. Even without the use of coercive,
abusive, or deceptive means, a minor’s consent is not given outof his or her own free will.
Q and A’s
1.) What are the elements of trafficking in persons?
Under Republic Act No. 10364, the elements of trafficking in persons have been expanded to include the
following acts:
(1) The act of "recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation, transfer, maintaining,
harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim’s consent or knowledge, within or across
national borders;"
(2) The means used include "by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction,
fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or,
the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over
another person"
(3) The purpose of trafficking includes "the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of
sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs
2.) Is the knowledge or consent of the victim a valid defense?
Knowledge or consent of the minor is not a defense under Republic Act No. 9208. As defined under Section
3(a) of Republic Act No. 9208, trafficking in persons can still be committed even if the victim gives consent.
The victim’s consent is rendered meaningless due to the coercive, abusive, or deceptive means employed
by perpetrators of human trafficking. Even without the use of coercive, abusive, or deceptive means, a
minor’s consent is not given out of his or her own free will.
3.) What are the tests for a valid entrapment operation?
American federal courts and a majority of state courts use the "subjective" or "origin of intent" test laid
down in Sorrells v. United States to determine whether entrapment actually occurred. The focus of the
inquiry is on the accused's redisposition to commit the offense charged, his state of mind and inclination
before his initial exposure to government agents.
81
Some states, however, have adopted the "objective" test. . . . Here, the court
considers the nature of the police activity involved and the propriety of police conduct. The inquiry is
focused on the inducements used by government agents, on police conduct, not on the accused and his
predisposition to commit the crime.
82
ANTI-ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT ACT
PEOPLE VS DAUD
G.R. NO. 197539
JUNE 2, 2014
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
FACTS: All the accused herein were charged before the RTC with illegal recruitment in large scale. They are
charged for conspiring and confederating together and both of them mutually helping and aiding one another,
representing themselves to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for
employment abroad, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, for a fee, recruit and promise
employment abroad without first securing the required license or authority from the Department of Labor and
Employment thus deemed committed in large scale and therefore amounting to economic sabotage. The
defense solely relied on the testimony of the appellant since the other co-accused eluded arrest and remained
at large.
ISSUE: Whether the conviction of the accused for the crime of illegal recruitment is proper?
HELD: Yes. The crime of illegal recruitment, according to the Supreme Court is committed when, among other
things, a person, who without being duly authorized according to law, represents or gives the distinct
impression that he or she has the power or the ability to provide work abroad convincing those to whom the
representation is made or to whom the impression is given to thereupon part with their money in order to be
assured of that employment. This is what obtains in this case.
Contrary to appellant’s mistaken notion, it is not the issuance or signing of receipts for the placement fees that
makes a case for illegal recruitment, but rather the undertaking of recruitment activities without the necessary
license or authority. The absence of receipts to evidence payment is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution’s
cause. A person charged with the illegal recruitment may be convicted on the strength of the testimony of the
complainants, if found to be credible and convincing.
DOCTRINE:
What is illegal recruitment?
Illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or
procuring workers and includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad,
whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a nonlicensee or nonholder of authority contemplated under
Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the
Philippines: Provided, That any such nonlicensee or nonholder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a
fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall likewise include the
following acts, whether committed by any person, whether a nonlicensee, nonholder, licensee or holder of
authority:
83
(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his documentation and
processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take place without
the worker’s fault. Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an
offense involving economic sabotage.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons
conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against
three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.
What are the elements of recruitment in large scale?
To constitute illegal recruitment in large scale, three elements must concur: (a) the offender has no valid
license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of
workers; (b) the offender undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of "recruitment and placement"
under Article13(b) of the Labor Code, or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the
said Code (now Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042); and (c) the offender committed the same against three or
more persons, individually or as a group.
PEOPLE VS FERNANDEZ
G.R. NO. 199211
JUNE 4, 2014
BRION, J.
FACTS: The Regional Trial Court convicted the appellant of the crimes of illegal recruitment in large scale and
five counts of estafa.The RTC gave full faith and credence to the testimonies of the complainants that the
appellant promised them employment abroad. The trial court ruled that the appellant represented to the
complainants that he had the power and ability to send them in Hongkong, and that by virtue of this
representation and fraud, the complainants were convinced to part with their money in order to be employed.
HELD: For illegal recruitment in large scale to prosper, the prosecution has to prove three essential elements,
namely: (1) the accused undertook a recruitment activity under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice under
Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) the accused did not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage in the
recruitment and placement of workers; and (3) the accused committed such illegal activity against three or
more persons individually or as a group.
In the present case, the appellant promised the five complainants that there were jobs available for them in
Hongkong; and that through his help, they could be deployed for work within a month or two. He exacted
money from them for the plane ticket, hotel accommodation, processing of visa and placement fees. Notably,
the prosecution presented a Certification of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) Licensing
Branch, showing that the appellant had no authority or license to lawfully engage in the recruitment and
placement of workers. These acts constitute illegal recruitment.
84
DOCTRINE:
When is there illegal recruitment?
There is illegal recruitment when one who does not possess the necessary authority or license gives the
impression of having the ability to send a worker abroad. Corollarily, where the offense is committed against
three or more persons, as in this case, it is qualified to illegal recruitment in large scale which provides a higher
penalty under Article 39(a) of the Labor Code.
PEOPLE VS MATEO
G.R. NO. 198012
APRIL 22, 2015
DEL CASTILLO, J.
FACTS: The five private complainants met appellants on separate occasions in Malate, Manila to apply for
overseas employment. Appellant Mateo, representing himself to have a tie-up with some Japanese firms,
promised them employment in Japan as conversion mechanics, welders, or fitters for a fee. Appellants also
promised that they could facilitate private complainants’ employment as direct hires and assured their
departure within three weeks. However, after the private complainants paid the required fees appellants
failed to secure any overseas employment for them. Reaponsents essentially claimed that the prosecution
failed to prove the elements of the crimes for which they were charged because there was no evidence that
they received money from the private complainants.
HELD: Yes. The offense of illegal recruitment in large scale has the following elements: (1) the person charged
undertook any recruitment activity as defined under Section 6 of RA 8042; (2) accused did not have the license
or the authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment of workers; and, (3) accused committed the same
against three or more persons individually or as a group.These elements are obtaining in this case.
Respondents’ argument that there was no proof that they received money from the private complainants
deserves no credence. Suffice it to say that money is not material to a prosecution for illegal recruitment
considering that the definition of "illegal recruitment" under the law includes the phrase "whether for profit or
not." Besides, even if there is no receipt for the money given by the private complainants to appellants, the
former’s respective testimonies and affidavits clearly narrate the latter’s involvement in the prohibited
recruitment.
85
Q and A’s:
Can a person convicted for illegal recruitment can be separately convicted for estafa?
Well settled is the rule that a person convicted for illegal recruitment under the [law] may, for the same acts,
be separately convicted for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(a) of the [Revised Penal Code]. The elements of
estafa are: (1) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit; and (2) the
offended party or a third party suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation.
86

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THE COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS

ACT OF 2002 (REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165)

PEOPLE vs. SONIA NUARIN

(1) in the presence of the apprehended violator and

(2) immediately upon confiscation.

1. Q: What are the elements for illegal sale of drugs?

(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the

object and the consideration;

(2) the delivery of the thing sold ;and

(3) the payment therefor.

2. Q: Briefly define “Buy-Bust Operation”.

2. Q: What are the elements of illegal possession of regulated or prohibited drugs?

(2) such possession is not authorized by law; and

(3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.

PEOPLE vs. ENRICO MIRONDO

PEOPLE vs. ADRIANO y SALES

Adriano was convicted in the lower courts, hence this petition.

(2) What does “buy-bust” operation means?

PEOPLE vs. CASABUENA

Hence, the Court resolved to ACQUIT the accused.

What is the Chain of Custody Requirement?

PEOPLE vs. DELA TRINIDAD

(3) What does possession under the law include?

TIONCO vs. PEOPLE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs. RAMONITO B. ASIGNAR

Accused appellant’s defense:

Is mere possession of dangerous drugs sufficient to prosecute an accused?

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs. DENNIS E. TANCINO.

Accused appellant’s defense:

How can the presumption of regularity in a buy-bust operation be overcome?

What are the elements of illegal possession of dangerous drugs?

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VIVIAN BULOTANO.

Accused appellant’s defense:

What are the elements for illegal sale of drugs?

THE PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINESvs. CHARLIE SORIN

THE PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINESvs. FERNANDO RANCHE HAVANA

Version of the Prosecution

Version of the Defense

1.) What are the elements of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs?

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VENERANDO DELA CRUZ Y SEBASTIAN

Accused contends that the operation was a frame-up.

Whether or not the accused should be acquitted since:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MANOLITO OPIANA Y TANAEL

Version of the Prosecution

Version of the Defense

Version of the Prosecution:

Version of the Defense:

THE PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES vs. HENRY T. GO

DANILO O. GARCIA and JOVE SD. BRIZUELA, vs.SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE

1.)What are the element of the violation of Sec 3 (e) RA 3019?

3.)What is the meaning of "partiality," "bad faith," and "gross negligence?

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS BORJA

2.)What is undue injury?

3.)What is the Arias Doctrine?

4.)Is the Arias Doctrine absolute?

(1) the offender is a public officer;

JUAN PONCE ENRILE vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

The acts committed are as follows:

1.) When is an information deemed sufficient?

5.) What are the elements of Plunder?

The elements of plunder are:

ISSUE: Whether probation and appeal are mutually exclusive remedies?