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Some Implications of Beliefs

in Altruism, Free Will, and
Nonreductionism
a a
Raymond Michael Bergner & Abby Ramon
a
Illinois State University
Accepted author version posted online: 24 May
2013.Published online: 26 Jul 2013.

To cite this article: Raymond Michael Bergner & Abby Ramon (2013) Some
Implications of Beliefs in Altruism, Free Will, and Nonreductionism, The Journal of
Social Psychology, 153:5, 598-618, DOI: 10.1080/00224545.2013.798249

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00224545.2013.798249

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 The Journal of Social Psychology, 2013, 153(5), 598–618
Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

Some Implications of Beliefs in Altruism,

Free Will, and Nonreductionism
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RAYMOND MICHAEL BERGNER

ABBY RAMON
Illinois State University

ABSTRACT. In this research, we explored correlates of individuals’ beliefs in altruism,

free will, and nonreductionism, as opposed to contrasting beliefs in psychological
egoism, determinism, and biological reductionism. Beliefs in altruism, free will, and
nonreductionism were associated with heightened a) senses of meaning in life, b) levels
of life satisfaction, c) beliefs in morality as a legitimate and important dimension of life,
and d) standards of personal moral conduct; they were not associated with levels of social
isolation. Implications of these findings are discussed.
Keywords: altruism, belief systems, determinism, free will, love, psychological egoism,
reductionism

A CERTAIN CLUSTER OF BELIEFS, often put forth as compatible with a

modern scientific outlook, is becoming increasingly prevalent in the American
and other cultures (Nagel, 2012; Paulhus & Carey, 2011; Polt, 2012; Tallis, 2011).
These beliefs are the following: a) that all human behavior is essentially self-
interested—i.e., is enacted for the self’s own benefit (versus that it is sometimes
enacted out of an unselfish caring for another’s well-being); b) that all behav-
ior is determined (versus genuinely chosen); and c) that all human psychological
phenomena (thoughts, motives, decisions, beliefs, etc.) are reducible to (i.e., are
nothing over and above) brain and other biological processes (versus that they are
not so reducible). The purpose of this research is not to argue either the intel-
lectual merits of these beliefs or the contention that having a modern scientific
outlook requires them. The purpose, rather, is to explore (for the first time in two of
these cases) some important differences in peoples’ lives that may be empirically
associated with them.

Address correspondence to Raymond Michael Bergner, Illinois State University,

Department of Psychology, 440 DeGarmo Bldg., Normal, IL 61790-4110, USA; rmbergn@
ilstu.edu (e-mail).

598
 Bergner & Ramon 599

Beliefs and Their Hypothesized Implications

In this section, we first define the beliefs at issue in this research and then
articulate what we hypothesize to be their implications for five quality of life
variables: sense of meaning in life, level of life satisfaction, belief in morality
as a valid and important dimension of life, level of personal moral standards, and
social isolation.
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Contrasting Beliefs: Altruism Versus Psychological Egoism

Belief in altruism is belief that there is such a reality as one person “being
genuinely invested in the well-being of another person (or persons) for that other’s
own sake” (Hegi and Bergner, 2010, p. 621; cf. Batson, 2002; Clark & Monin,
2006; Rempel & Burris, 2005; Singer, 1984; Sprecher & Fehr, 2005). It is belief
to the effect that humans are both capable of, and on many occasions are in fact
motivated in their behavior by, an unselfish desire to benefit others that cannot be
reduced to some variety of self-interest.
Psychological egoism, in contrast, is the position that every human action
is fundamentally motivated by self-interest—i.e., that it is engaged in for the
benefit of the person behaving (Feinberg, 2008; May, 2011; Slote, 1964). A ver-
sion of cynicism, the position is one to the effect that every behavior, no matter
how unselfishly beneficial to others it may appear, is enacted basically for self-
benefitting reasons such as to avoid the experience of guilt, anxiety, or other
dysphoric emotions; to gain social approval; to feel good about oneself; to cre-
ate a quid pro quo situation in which others will be obligated to reciprocate one’s
prosocial behavior; and/or to preserve one’s own genes (Dawkins, 1976, 2006;
Feinberg, 2008; May, 2011; Slote, 1964).
The concept of human love, in its various forms, has been shown in some
research to have as its core essential characteristic the element of altruism. In a
study by Hegi and Bergner (2010), participants were given tasks in which they
were required to make judgments about the presence or absence of love in roman-
tic, parental, friendship, and caretaking relationships that were described to them.
They were asked in particular to judge the implications if different relationship
characteristics such as trust, respect, intimacy, and investment in the well-being
of the other for the other’s own sake (i.e., altruism) were missing from these
relationships. Uniquely, and overwhelmingly for all four kinds of relationships,
participants judged that the absence of altruism would mean for them that person
A in the described relationship did not love person B at all. Unlike other char-
acteristics, such as trust and intimacy, the absence of altruism implied for them
the absence of love itself. This finding is consistent with the empirical work of
Clark and Monin (2006) and Sprecher and Fehr (2005), the theoretical work of
Rempel and Burris (2005), and the historical analysis of the history of the concept
of love by Singer (1984). On this evidence, psychological egoism, the denial that
 600 The Journal of Social Psychology

there is any such reality as altruism, becomes significantly a denial of the reality
of love itself.

Contrasting Beliefs: Free Will Versus Determinism

Belief in free will is belief that there is such a reality as genuine choice,
understood as a state of affairs wherein persons consider behavioral alternatives,
are genuinely able to select from among them the one that they subsequently
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enact, and are thus truly capable of doing otherwise than what they actually do.
It is belief to the effect that persons are not complete pawns of causal forces
but retain some power of genuine self-determination over their behavior (Hoefer,
2010; Hospers, 1997; McKenna, 2011; Monroe & Malle, 2010). Belief in deter-
minism, as understood conventionally as well as by most philosophers (Hoefer,
2010; Hospers, 1997; McKenna, 2011), is belief to the effect that such self-
determination is an illusion and that all human behavior is the inevitable product
of causal forces (be they psychological, biological, evolutionary, environmental,
or whatever) operating at the point of initiation of the behavior. Few determin-
ists would deny that people engage in the activities described above (e.g., that
they consciously mull over behavioral alternatives, arrive at decisions, and act
consistently with those decisions); however, on a determinist account, these activ-
ities would themselves be the inevitable products of antecedent causal forces and
thus themselves links in an unbroken causal chain. While some (e.g., Nahmias,
2011) refer to this position as “compatibilism,” maintaining that it implies a com-
patibility between beliefs in both free will and determinism, it is very difficult,
all behavior remaining an inevitable link in a causal chain, to see this position
as other than a deterministic one. Thus, in the present research, consistent with
McKenna’s (2011, p. 1) assertion that “the (philosophical) literature on the prob-
lem of free will and determinism has come to be dominated by incompatibilists,”
as well as on our reading of Monroe and Malle’s (2010) study of folk conceptions
(e.g., “According to Study 1, the folk concept of free will is defined by the capac-
ity to choose based on one’s desires and free from constraint” [p. 219]), we treat
“free will” and “determinism” as contrasting terms.

Contrasting Beliefs: Biological Reductionism Versus Non-reductionism

Belief in biological reductionism is belief to the effect that human psycho-

logical phenomena (thoughts, motives, consciousness, beliefs, etc.) are not only
supervenient upon (i.e., not only depend upon) a functioning biological organism,
but that these phenemena are in reality nothing over and above biological states
of affairs (Brigandt & Love, 2012; Churchland, 2011, Nagel, 2012). On this view,
what these phenomena “really are” are not such elusive, insubstantial entities as
thoughts, beliefs, and purposes, but tangible, measurable biological states. This
view was well articulated by Nobel laureate Francis Crick when he stated that,
 Bergner & Ramon 601

“Your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense of
personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behavior of a vast
assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules” (1994, p. 213).
The contrasting belief is that these psychological phenomena are not so
reducible. On this view, phenomena such as consciousness, thoughts, beliefs,
and motives, while they require and depend upon physical states, designate real-
ities that cannot be reduced to—that cannot be equated with—just the brain and
other physiological processes transpiring in persons when they are involved in
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these things. For the nonreductionist, these biological processes are necessary
elements in a part-whole structure in which the whole comprises more than just
its biological aspects. Often, proponents of this view are emergentists, adherents
to a position in which “emergent entities (properties or substances) ‘arise’ out
of more fundamental entities and yet are ‘novel’ or ‘irreducible’ with respect to
them” (O’Connor & Wong, 2012). A nonreductionist might claim, for example,
that Einstein’s thoughts having the property of intentionality (“aboutness”), his
longstanding motive to solve the problem of general relativity, and his utiliza-
tion of ideas such as “relativity” and “equivalence” are actual and not illusory or
otherwise unreal states of affairs; however, they are not realities that are either
describable or explicable in terms of the biological states involved in their real-
ization on any given occasion. While the typical research participant would not
be conversant with these details, he or she would exhibit de facto reductionis-
tic beliefs by endorsing propositions alleging that certain phenomena (thoughts,
motives, love, etc.) were at bottom just biological states of affairs.

Hypothesized Correlates of These Beliefs

Predicted associations between our three predictor variables and five impor-
tant dimensions of life experience, as well as some rationale for these predictions,
are the subject of this section.

Hypothesized associations with meaning and satisfaction in life. As noted above,

empirical research and theoretical work support the contention that altruism, the
investment of one person in the well-being of another for that other’s own sake, is
the primary essential element in all types of human love, and this to a degree that
experimental participants, confronted with examples of persons in relationships
who lack such investment, overwhelmingly judge that these persons do not love
the other person at all (Hegi & Bergner, 2010). Thus, non-belief in altruism is
tantamount to non-belief in love itself. Because the pursuit of love, the statuses of
being a lover and a beloved, and ongoing participation in love relationships with
romantic partners, children, parents, and others are some of the foremost sources
of both meaning and satisfaction in life (Bergner, 2000; Stillman, Lambert,
Fincham, & Baumeister, 2011), their absence would seem likely to result in a
considerable lessening of such meaning and satisfaction. On these grounds, we
 602 The Journal of Social Psychology

predict that research participants who believe in psychological egoism—who

believe that all human action is fundamentally self-interested and all seeming
manifestations of altruism illusory—will report finding life less meaningful and
satisfying than participants who believe in the reality of altruism. (Note: We
distinguish in this research between meaning and satisfaction. One can derive
meaning from endeavors that are not very satisfying, such as caring for an aging
parent suffering from dementia. In contrast, one can derive satisfaction from
endeavors not experienced as especially meaningful, such as watching a romantic
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comedy movie.)
We further hypothesize that belief in free will, relative to belief in determin-
ism, will be associated with higher levels of reported meaning and satisfaction in
life. The basis for this is a consideration of what it would be like to view both one-
self and others as entities whose output was deterministically governed. In both
cases, whatever this entity did or said would be viewed as the only thing it could
have done or said. Such phenomena as ones traditionally viewed in terms of “sacri-
ficing for a worthy cause,” “working hard to solve a problem, ” “achieving a solu-
tion, ” and many more, become, on a determinist view, the inevitable outcomes of
causal influences, not ones for which oneself or others are responsible or deserve
any praise or credit. We hypothesize that such a view, relative to one in which such
phenomena are viewed as the voluntary actions of a free agent, will be associated
with a decrease in the meaningfullness and satisfaction derived from life.
Biological reductionism is a species of determinism. Neurons, synapses, and
neurotransmitters, the basic elements in all brain structures, functions, and events,
do not make choices. Action potentials occur—neurons “fire”—if certain physical
conditions obtain, and otherwise not. Thus, all of the hypothesized implications of
a belief in determinism apply point for point to a belief in biological reductionism.

Hypothesized associations with belief in validity of morality. The great majority

of what belongs in the domain of morality has to do with how persons “ought”
to treat other persons. “Thou shalt not” rob, kill, betray, or slander them. “Thou
shalt, ” in contrast, be fair and just in one’s dealings with them, be loyal to them,
and give of one’s time, effort, and resources on their behalf. Further, the com-
mon understanding, both of people in general and of many professional ethicists
(e.g., Fieser, 2009) is that behavior is only moral when done for the purpose of
benefitting others. In the measure that John gives to a charitable cause to secure
the admiration of others, his act is regarded as a prudential and not a moral one.
In the measure that he does so out of compassion for the plight of some dev-
astated population, it is regarded as a moral act. Thus, an intimate connection
exists between morality and there being such a reality as an unselfish motive to
benefit others—ie., altruism. Lacking a belief in the possible existence of such
a motive, as in psychological egoism, morality would logically be viewed as a
sham or an illusion. Nobody does—indeed, nobody could—do something based
on an unselfish willing of another’s good. On this view, morality itself is rendered
 Bergner & Ramon 603

an invalid category, and thereby one not to be accorded any legitimacy or impor-
tance. On these grounds, we predict that those who believe in altruism will assign
higher levels of legitimacy and importance to morality than those who believe in
psychological egoism.
With respect to determinism and biological reductionism, clearly, if there is
no choice, there is no morality. The killer, the Ponzi schemer, the philanthropist
are all doing what causal forces not subject to their control impelled them to do.
Moral categories such as “right” and “wrong” do not apply to their actions any
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more than they do to animals when they prey upon other animals or when they
nurture their young. On these grounds, we predict that beliefs in both determin-
ism and biological reductionism will be associated with lower estimations of the
legitimacy and importance of morality itself.

Hypothesized associations with moral standards. Logically, if as believers in psy-

chological egoism, determinism and biological reductionism, individuals regard
morality as a dubious category of reality, it would not make sense for them to place
much emphasis on holding themselves to high moral standards. Thus, we predict
that believers in these three views will report lower levels of moral standards than
those who believe in altruism, free will, and nonreductionism.

Hypothesized associations with social isolation. For individuals who believe that
everyone is fundamentally (a) a creature of self-interest, (b) a determined entity,
and/or (c) an individual whose every emotion, belief, goal, and decision reduces to
a brain or other biological process, this would seem to be grounds for experiencing
alienation from others and for expressing this in the form of greater social isolation
from them. Thus we predict that higher levels of each of these beliefs will be
associated with higher levels of social isolation.

Previous Research

A search of the literature revealed no previous research on the correlates of

belief in either altruism versus psychological egoism or biological reductionism
versus nonreductionism. However, a number of experimental studies have exam-
ined the effects of belief versus nonbelief in free will. Baumeister et al. (2009)
primed two groups of participants to internalize statements, respectively, of belief
or of disbelief in free will. These investigators found that participants primed to
disbelieve in free will exhibited reduced willingness to help others and greater
aggressive behavior than those primed to believe in free will. Employing a similar
methodology involving the priming of participants’ beliefs, Vohs and Schooler
(2008) found that participants primed to disbelieve in free will exhibited higher
rates of cheating and of overpaying themselves for performance on a cognitive
task than participants primed to believe in free will. Finally, Paulhus and Carey
 604 The Journal of Social Psychology

(2011) found that belief in free will was positively correlated with personality
traits of extraversion and agreeableness, and suggested that these relationships
are consistent with other findings indicating that belief in free will correlates
positively with prosocial behavior.

Hypotheses

Hypotheses are as follows:

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Hypothesis 1 (H1): Belief in altruism will be positively correlated with

a) sense of meaning in life, b) life satisfaction, c) belief in morality as a
legitimate and important dimension of life, and d) level of personal moral
standards; it will be negatively correlated with e) social isolation.
H2: Belief in free will will be positively correlated with a) sense of meaning
in life, b) life satisfaction, c) belief in morality as a legitimate and impor-
tant dimension of life, and d) level of personal moral standards; it will be
negatively correlated with e) social isolation.
H3: Belief in biological reductionism will be negatively correlated with a)
sense of meaning in life, b) life satisfaction, c) belief in morality as a genuine
and important dimension of life, and d) level of personal moral standards; it
will be positively correlated with e) social isolation.
H4: A cluster of beliefs comprising high belief in psychological egoism,
high belief in determinism, and high belief in biological reductionism will
be negatively correlated with a) sense of meaning in life, b) life satisfaction,
c) belief in morality as a legitimate and important dimension of life, and d)
level of personal moral standards; it will be positively correlated with e) social
isolation.

Methods

Participants

Participants were 234 students at a large Midwestern state university.

Of these, 81 (35%) were men, 152 (65%) were women, and one did not reveal
his or her gender. Ages ranged from 18 to 63 years, with a mean of 26.16 (SD =
9.96). One-hundred-forty participants (60%) were between the ages of 18 and 23;
47 (20%) were between the ages of 24 and 30, and 41 (18%) were 31 years of age
or older; 6 participants (3%) did not report their age. Twenty-eight participants
(12%) indicated their class standing as freshmen, 29 (12%) as sophomores, 52
(22%) as juniors, 46 (20%) as seniors, and 78 (33%) as graduate students. With
respect to race and ethnicity, 206 participants (88%) were Caucasian, 8 (3%) were
African American, 4 (2%) were Asian or Pacific Islander, 6 (3%) were Latino, and
6 (3%) were multiracial.
 Bergner & Ramon 605

Measures

For purposes of this research, measures of 8 different variables were required.

These were a) belief in altruism (versus psychological egoism), b), belief in
free will (versus determinism), c) belief in biological reductionism (versus
nonreductionism), d) sense of meaning in life, e) life satisfaction, f) belief in
morality as a valid and important dimension of life, g) level of personal moral
standards, and h) social isolation. The initial effort was to find existing scales
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with established reliability, internal consistency, and validity to measure each vari-
able. However, we were only partially successful in doing so, and in many cases
needed to create new measures. The primary reason for this had to do with find-
ing existing measures that tapped precisely into the variables of interest in this
research. For example, as a measure of belief in free will, we considered use of
Paulhus and Carey’s (2011) FAD-Plus. However, this measure did not contain
any items that captured precisely the conceptions of free will and determinism as
defined above. FAD-Plus items in general (e.g., “People can overcome any obsta-
cles if they truly want to”; “People have complete control over the decisions they
make”) embodied an unrealistic picture of extreme and unrestricted freedom over
ones’s behavior that was inconsistent with the conception under investigation in
the present research. These considerations led to a decision to use existing scales
in their entirety when they captured our constructs precisely, but to develop new
scales when they did not. Finally, as a means of enhancing the confidence with
which results from our newly created measures could be trusted, we generated
Cronbach’s alphas for each, and administered two additional existing scales for
validation purposes (details below).
Items from all of the new scales, as well as the pre-existing scales that
employed the identical response format, were combined into a single measure that
we termed the Personal Beliefs Scale (PBS). In the PBS, items from all of these
subscales were mixed together in a random fashion. All response options were
presented on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly
agree). (See Appendix for a complete listing of scales and items.)

Altruism versus psychological egoism. To measure belief in altruism, the BIA

scale was created. This scale comprised eleven items, five of which were state-
ments endorsing belief in the reality of altruism (e.g., “Some people have a deep
care and concern for the well-being of other people in their lives, such as their
children or their spouses, that is independent of their own self-interest”), while
six others endorsed psychological egoism (e.g., “When people do good for others,
it’s basically to avoid negative consequences such as feeling guilty or suffering
social disapproval”). The scoring of the items endorsing psychological egoism
was reversed in order to obtain one composite score for this scale where higher
scores indicated greater belief in altruism.
To gain some measure of validation for the BIA, we administered the Cynical
Distrust Scale (CDS; Greenglass & Julkunen, 1989), an eight-item measure
 606 The Journal of Social Psychology

designed to capture a more general form of cynicism than psychological ego-

ism. A representative item from the CDS is, “I think most people would lie to get
ahead.” Previous research demonstrated that the CDS has adequate reliability and
validity (Christenson et al., 2004). A highly significant correlation (r = –.60) was
found between the CDS and our newly created BIA scale (the two scales are
scored in opposite directions), providing significant validation for the latter scale.

Free will versus determinism. To evaluate the extent to which participants

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believed, or did not believe, in choice, the Belief in Free Will (BFW) scale was
developed. Sample items from this scale include, “For the most part, people have
control over the decisions they make,” and, “Although people believe that they
have the power to choose their behavior, this is an illusion. Their behavior is deter-
mined” (reverse scored). This scale contained 6 items, with higher scores being
associated with greater belief in free will.

Biological reductionism versus non-reductionism. To measure beliefs regarding

whether or not all human behavior reduces to brain and/or other physiological
processes, the Biological Reductionism (BR) scale was created. Sample items
from this scale include, “Some day, science will demonstrate that everything
we do, think, and feel is explainable in biological terms,” and “Certain human
things—things like love, morality, religion, music and poetry—cannot be fully
explained in terms of brain and other biological factors” (reverse scored). The
BR scale consisted of 5 items, higher scores reflecting greater belief in biological
reductionism.

Meaning in life. To measure the extent to which participants perceived their lives
as having meaning, the Meaning in Life (MIL) scale was created. This scale
consisted of five items, including “I experience a clear sense of meaning in my
life,” and “Human life has no real meaning” (reverse scored), where higher scores
indicated greater felt meaning in life.
An existing measure, a subscale of the Meaning in Life Questionnaire (MLQ;
Steger, Frazier, Oishi, & Kaler, 2006) while not capturing the precise construct of
interest in our research, was nonetheless administered as a validation measure for
the MIL. Internal consistency reliabilities for the scores from this subscale range
from .81 to .86, and test-retest reliability over a one month time period was .70
(Steger et al., 2006). Our validation check revealed a highly significant correlation,
r = .76, between this MLQ subscale and our own MIL scale.

Life satisfaction. An existing measure, the Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS;
Diener, Emmons, Larson, & Griffin, 1985) was used to assess the degree to which
individuals report overall satisfaction with their lives. This scale includes five
items, examples of which are, “In most ways my life is close to my ideal,” and
 Bergner & Ramon 607

“If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing.” The SWLS has
a test-retest reliability of .82 for a 2-month period and a coefficient alpha of
.87 (Diener et al., 1985). The convergent validity of the SWLS has also been
demonstrated through moderate positive correlations with related constructs of
subjective well-being (e.g., self- esteem) and moderate negative correlations with
neuroticism (Diener et al., 1985).

Beliefs about morality. To evaluate the two facets of morality of interest in this
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research, the Beliefs about Morality 1 and 2 (BAM1 and BAM2) scales were cre-
ated. The BAM1 scale evaluated belief in the legitimacy of morality, while the
BAM2 assessed the level of perceived wrongness of a series of behaviors that
are typically considered immoral. As noted previously, belief in the legitimacy of
morality entails maintaining that morality is more than just a matter of arbitrary
non-binding opinion; instead, it has a legitimacy such that it is important to do
what is morally right. Representative items from the BAM1 are, “It is important in
life to do what is morally right,” and “Moral rules are just arbitrary human inven-
tions” (reverse scored). BAM2 items each specify some behavior that is typically
considered immoral such as cheating on an exam, sexually harassing someone,
and having an extramarital affair, each of which is followed by the phrase “is
seriously morally wrong.” An example is, “Cheating on your spouse or commit-
ted romantic partner is seriously morally wrong.” The BAM1 is comprised of
6 items, the BAM2 of 8 items. Higher scores indicate, respectively, greater belief
in the legitimacy and importance of morality, and more exacting personal moral
standards.

Social isolation. An existing measure, the Social Isolation subscale of the Dean
Alienation Scale (DAS, Dean, 1961), was used to measure the degree to which
participants felt separated or disconnected from other people. This scale includes
nine items, examples of which are “Sometimes, I feel all alone in the world,”
and “I don’t get invited out by friends as often as I’d like.” Items were scored on
a five-point, Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly
agree), with higher scores expressing a greater degree of social isolation. A split-
half reliability coefficient of .84 has been demonstrated for this subscale (Dean,
1961).

Procedures

Participants were recruited through an email solicitation sent to all university

students who had indicated at registration that they were available to partici-
pate in research. This solicitation included basic information about the study, an
invitation to take part, and a link to our online survey. Once prospective partic-
ipants clicked on the link, an informed consent page outlined requirements for
 608 The Journal of Social Psychology

participation, the basic purpose of the research, and potential risks and benefits
of participation. This page also detailed rights of participants, ensured anonymity
of responses, and listed the researchers’ contact information. Participants indi-
cated consent to take part in the research by clicking a button at the bottom of
the page, confirming they had read and understood all of the information pro-
vided, and agreed to participate in the study. They were then taken to a page
containing several demographic questions, and subsequently to the survey pages.
There, participants were first presented with the PBS, which included all items
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(scrambled) from the BIA, BFW, BR MIL, SWLS, BAM1, and BAM2 scales.
They were then administered the MIL, Social Isolation Scale, and CDS, each of
which appeared on a separate page. Participants had the option of terminating
their participation at any time by clicking a “cancel” button displayed on each
page. Once they had completed and submitted their responses, they were taken to
a final page containing debriefing information about the study and the researchers’
contact information.

Results

Internal Consistency of New Scales

As Table 1 indicates, Cronbach’s alphas for the newly created scales achieved
acceptable to highly acceptable levels. These were, respectively, .81 for BIA,
.73 for BFW, .77 for BR, .73 for MIL, .81 for BAM1, .84 for BAM2, and .87 for
AFB (a measure combining items from the BIA, BFW, and BR [reversed]).

Results for Hypothesis 1

Table 1 illustrates that, as predicted, belief in altruism (BIA) was significantly

positively correlated with meaning in life (MIL) (r = .47, p = .000), satisfaction
with life (SWLS) (r = .28, p = .000), belief in legitimacy of morality (BAM1)
(r = .56, p = .000), and level of moral standards (BAM2) (r = .30, p = .000). Its
correlation with social isolation (DAS), although in the predicted direction, was
non-significant (r = –.11, p = .104).

Results for Hypothesis 2

Table 1 reveals that, as hypothesized, belief in free will (BFW) exhibited sig-
nificant positive correlations with MIL (r = .34, p = .000), SWLS (r = .17, p =
.008), BAM1 (r = .40, p = .000), and BAM2 (r = .21, p = .001). The correlation
between BFW and DAS was once again in the predicted direction (r = –.11, p =
.109), but not statistically significant.
 Bergner & Ramon 609

TABLE 1. Intercorrelations, Descriptive Statistics, and Reliability

Coefficients for all measures

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

1. BIA −
2. BFW .46∗∗ −
3. BR −.50∗∗ −.38∗∗ −
.47∗∗ .34∗∗ −.46∗∗ −
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4. MIL
5. SWLS .28∗∗ .17∗∗ −.09 .49∗∗ −
6. BAM1 .56∗∗ 40∗∗ −.48∗∗ 50∗∗ .18∗∗ −
7. BAM2 .30∗∗ .21∗∗ −.17∗ .14∗ −.05 .34∗∗ −
8. SRS −.11 −.11 −.12 −.12 −.46∗∗ .09 .20∗∗ −
Mean 4.87 5.04 3.47 5.65 5.03 4.98 5.80 3.17
SD 0.78 0.97 1.27 0.98 1.17 1.11 0.99 0.53
Cronbach’s .81 .73 .77 .73 .84 .81 .84 .68
Alpha

Note. N = 234; BIA = Belief in Altruism/Cynicism; BFW = Belief in Free Will; BR =

Biological Reductionism; MIL = Meaning in Life; SWLS = Satisfaction With Life Scale;
BAM1= Beliefs About Morality facet 1; BAM2 = Beliefs About Morality facet 2; SRS =
Social Relationship Scale (Social Isolation subscale of the Dean Alienation Scale, Dean,
1961). ∗ p < .05; ∗∗ p < .01.

Results for Hypothesis 3

Table 1 indicates that, as predicted, belief in biological reductionism (BR)

was significantly negatively correlated with MIL (r = –.46, p = .000), BAM1 (r
= –.48, p < .000), and BAM2 (r = –.17, p = .011). Its correlations with SWLS
(r = –.09, p = .171) and with DAS (r = –.12, p = .062) did not achieve statistical
significance.

Results for Hypothesis 4

Table 1 reveals highly significant intercorrelations between participants’

scores on belief in altruism, belief in free will, and belief in reductionism. BIA was
significantly correlated with both BFW (r = .46, p = .000) and with BR (r = –.50,
p = .000), while BFW was significantly correlated with BR (r = –.38, p = .000).
These results suggest the existence of two clusters of beliefs comprising, respec-
tively, a) higher levels of belief in altruism, free will, and nonreductionism; and b)
higher levels of belief in psychological egoism, determinism, and reductionism.
Correlational analyses revealed that participants’ combined scores (BIA +
BFW + BR reversed), designated “AFB,” were significantly positively correlated
with meaning in life (r = .54, p = .000), satisfaction with life (r = .24, p =
.000), belief in the legitimacy of morality (r = .61, p = .000), and level of moral
 610 The Journal of Social Psychology

standards (r = .29, p = .000). AFB’s correlation with social isolation was not
significant (r = –.05, p = .476).

Discussion

The overall picture suggested by the foregoing data is one in which what an
individual believes with respect to altruism, free will, and biological reduction-
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ism are all associated with differences both in the quality of their lives and in
their morality. Beliefs in altruism, in free will, and in a cluster of beliefs compris-
ing altruism, free will, and nonreductionism were all strongly associated with a
heightened sense of meaning in life, higher levels of life satisfaction, a belief in
morality as a legitimate and important dimension of life, and higher standards of
personal moral conduct. Belief in biological nonreductionism was strongly asso-
ciated with a heightened sense of meaning in life, a belief in morality’s legitimacy,
and higher moral standards.
With respect to altruism, our data suggest that it may be beneficial to hold the
view that people can be genuinely invested in the well-being of others for those
others’ own sake. In contrast, it may be detrimental to hold the contrasting belief
that people must of necessity always and everywhere be fundamentally motivated
by self-interest. Belief in altruism may also be advantageous for society as a whole
inasmuch as believers in it regard morality, an inherently prosocial enterprise,
as a more important dimension of life and, consistent with this, espouse higher
standards of personal moral conduct.
With respect to belief in free will, and consistent with previous research
(Baumeister et al., 2009; Paulhus & Carey, 2011; Vohs & Schooler, 2008), the
same picture seems to hold. The data suggest that it may be advantageous for per-
sons to believe that choice is not an illusion—i.e., that they and others are capable
of exercising genuine control over their behavior. The data suggest, in contrast,
that it may be nonbeneficial to believe that they and others are determined pawns
of causal forces with no actual control over their behavior.
Finally, with respect to biological reductionism, the trend of our evidence
suggests that it may be beneficial for persons to view important factors in their
own and others’ lives such as their beliefs, decisions, motives, and senses of per-
sonal identity as not reducible to biological states of affairs. It may be salutary to
have the view that these are not, in Crick’s (1994, p. 3) terms, “no more than the
behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules.”

Social Isolation Findings

The primary unexpected finding in the present research was that there were
no significant relationships between our predictor variables and social isolation.
Persons who report greater belief in altruism, free will, and nonreductionism, as
 Bergner & Ramon 611

well as those who exhibit a cluster of beliefs comprising all three, do not report
being any less isolated from other people than those not exhibiting these beliefs.
Taken on its face and in the context of our other data, these findings suggest that,
despite such things as the latter group’s more cynical outlook on the existence
of altruism and the relatively low importance they assign to morality, these indi-
viduals are no more socially isolated from others than those holding the opposite
points of view.
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Use of Newly Created Measures

As discussed previously, the initial effort in this research was to find exist-
ing measures, with established psychometric properities, that captured precisely
our eight variables. However, our search for such existing measures yielded only
two, the SWLS (Diener et al., 1985) and the social isolation subscale of the DAS
(Dean, 1961). Thus, we were forced to create new measures for belief in altru-
ism (versus egoism), belief in free will (versus determinism), belief in biological
reductionism, sense of meaning in life, belief in the legitimacy and importance
of morality, and level of personal moral standards. This situation raises questions
about the adequacy of our newly created measures. In answer to these questions,
several points may be made.
First, the present study was not conceived as a scale validation study.
Nonetheless, we would have preferred to find well-established scales that might
provide evidence for the validity of our newly created measures. However, as
noted, our search of the literature indicated that no adequate criterion measures for
six of our eight constructs currently exist. We did discover two existing measures,
which, although not capturing precisely the constructs of interest in our research,
nonetheless were close enough to be employed as validating measures. In these
two cases, the Meaning in Life Questionnaire (Steger et al., 2006) subscale cor-
related .76 with our own MIL, while the Cynical Distrust Scale (Greenglass &
Julkunen, 1989) correlated in the predicted direction, –-.60, with our own BIA
scale.
Second, our construction of all items was guided primarily by the strict rule
that we adhere as closely as possible to the precise meaning of the constructs
under investigation. Thus, for example, an item in our BFW scale stated that,
“People have the genuine power to choose their behavior–that is, to consider dif-
ferent behavioral alternatives, to select one when they truly could have selected
another, and to do that one thing.” This content presents what amounts to a stan-
dard philosophical (Hoefer, 2010; Hospers, 1997; McKenna, 2011), as well as
“folk” (Monroe & Malle, 2010) conception of the term “free will.” As exempli-
fied by this example, the items in each of our scales were created to have very
high face validity. Items such as the foregoing, endorsed by an individual with
the “strongly believe” option, provide some considerable measure of prima facie
evidence that this person does indeed believe in free will. Thus, while we cannot
 612 The Journal of Social Psychology

provide additional guarantees that certain of our measures are valid, we believe
that our care in this matter provides considerable assurances that we are indeed
measuring what we purport to measure.
Third, we considered conducting an exploratory factor analysis. However, if
this were conducted on the existing item pool, with all items left in the analysis,
our judgment was that it would not achieve the desired purpose of distinguishing
between cases in which items clustered together because they were measures of
a) the same concept, or b) of different concepts, but ones that empirically covar-
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ied to a high degree. A case in point comes from our use of the measure AFB,
in which we combined all of the items from the BIA, BFW, and BR (reversed).
As reported above, the Cronbach’s alpha for AFB was a very high .87. When we
inspect the content of the items from BIA, BFW, and BR, however, it seems highly
implausible to suggest that they are all capturing the same construct. For example,
a representative item from the BFW reads “For the most part, people have con-
trol over the decisions they make,” while one from the BIA reads “Sometimes,
people are capable of putting others’ interests before their own.” The most plau-
sible interpretation, as exemplified by this case, is that the BIA, BFW, and BR are
measuring different concepts, but ones that empirically covary to a high degree.
Fourth and finally, Cronbach’s alphas for our newly created scales revealed
acceptable to highly acceptable levels of internal consistency for all of them.
Thus, while in the future we believe that we need to establish further the psy-
chometric properties of our measures, we nonethless believe that the foregoing
considerations establish some substantial measure of credibility for our results.

Sample Characteristics

The sample for this research was 88% Caucasian and composed in its entirety
of undergraduate and graduate university students. While exhibiting an excellent
range of ages (from 18 to 63 years, with 18% of participants being over the age
of 31), the generalizability of results from this sample to less educated and more
ethnically diverse populations remains to be determined.

Conclusion

The purpose of this research has been to explore some implications for peo-
ples’ lives of holding three contrasting pairs of beliefs. Our findings suggest that
those individuals who believe in altruism, free will, and nonreductionism, relative
to those who hold contrasting beliefs, benefit from greater meaning and satisfac-
tion in life, have a higher regard for the legitimacy and importance of morality,
and adhere to higher standards of personal moral conduct. As noted at the outset,
these beliefs are increasingly under fire in many places in contemporary soci-
ety, and particularly those associated with the dissemination and/or interpretation
of scientific findings (Nagel, 2012; Polt, 2012; Tallis, 2011). This situation exists
 Bergner & Ramon 613

despite the fact that there are many powerful arguments in the literature that, with-
out questioning a single scientific finding of fact, cast serious doubt on the validity
of egoistic, deterministic, and reductionistic positions (Batson, 2002; Brigandt &
Love, 2012; Nagel, 1970, 2012; Tallis, 2011). An important implication of the
present findings, then, is the need for individuals, educators, and society in general
to place far greater emphasis on making these arguments more public and exam-
ining their merits. At stake essentially is a vision of who we are as persons. Are
we, in E. O. Wilson’s phrase, “marvelous robots...wired neuronally with awesome
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precision” (1988, p. 53), and ones “programmed” exclusively for self-beneficial

behavior? Or are we “persons” as traditionally understood, individuals possessed
of the (albeit imperfect) power to determine our own behavior, including at times
behavior whose purpose is to unselfishly advance the well-being of our fellow
persons?

AUTHOR NOTES
Raymond Michael Bergner is affiliated with the Department of Psychology, Illinois
State University. Abby Ramon is affiliated with the Department of Psychology, Illinois
State University.

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Received December 17, 2012

Accepted April 18, 2013
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Appendix

Personal Beliefs Scale (PBS, Unscrambled; “R” denotes reverse scoring)

1: Strongly disagree, 2: Disagree, 3: Slightly disagree, 4: Neither agree nor

disagree, 5: Slightly agree, 6: Agree, 7: Strongly agree

Belief in Altruism Subscale (BIA)

1. Some people have a deep care and concern for the well-being of other peo-
ple in their lives, such as their children or their spouses, that is independent
of their own self-interest.
2. There are some people who seem truly to have a very unselfish devotion
to the welfare of others.
3. Sometimes, people will help other people and not want anything in return.
4. Sometimes, people are capable of putting others’ interests before their
own.
5. People don’t always consider their own needs when helping another.
6. I believe people are basically motivated by self-interest. (R)
7. People give things to others primarily to get things in return. (R)
8. People are basically selfish. (R)
9. Most people watch out for “number one” and little else. (R)
10. When people do good for others, it’s basically to avoid negative conse-
quences such as feeling guilty or suffering social disapproval. (R)
11. Human relationships are basically exchange relationships; that is, they are
basically about giving to another in order to get back from another. (R)

Beliefs About Morality Subscale (BAM1)

12. Nothing’s either right or wrong but thinking makes it so. (R)
13. People’s moral beliefs are entirely subjective, not objective. (R)
14. Moral rules are just arbitrary human inventions. (R)
15. It is important in life to do what is morally right.
16. Doing what is morally right is very important to me.
17. Since you can’t ever prove moral rules objectively, they are subjective and
arbitrary. (R)
 616 The Journal of Social Psychology

Beliefs About Morality Subscale (BAM2)

18. Cheating on a final exam is seriously morally wrong.

19. Revealing an embarassing secret about someone you know is seriously
morally wrong.
20. Shoplifting an item worth $50 is seriously morally wrong.
21. Cheating on your spouse or committed romantic partner is seriously
morally wrong.
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22. Sexually harassing someone is seriously morally wrong.

23. Publicly humiliating someone is seriously morally wrong.
24. Calling someone a racist name is seriously morally wrong.
25. A bank loan officer deliberately making a home loan based on false infor-
mation, and knowing that the loan receiver will not be able to pay off the
loan, is doing something that is seriously morally wrong.

Biological Reductionism Subscale (BR)

26. Some day, science will demonstrate that everything we do, think, and feel
is explainable in biological terms.
27. Certain human things—things like love, morality, religion, music and
poetry—cannot be fully explained in terms of brain and other biological
factors. (R)
28. Quote about a disputed issue: “All the richness of our mental life—all of
our feelings, our emotions, our thoughts, our ambitions, our love life, our
religious sentiments, and even what each of us regards as his own intimate
private self—is simply the activity of these little specks of jelly in your
head, in your brain.”
29. As with other animals, human behavior always follows the laws of nature.
30. Thoughts are essentially nothing more than patterns of neurons firing in
your brain.

Belief in Free Will Subscale (BFW)

31. People’s behavior is completely controlled and determined by its

antecedent conditions—that is, by all the biological, situational, person-
ality, and other causal factors that exist just prior to each behavior. (R)
32. Free will doesn’t really exist. (R)
33. People have the genuine power to choose their behavior—that is, to con-
sider different behavioral alternatives, to select one when they truly could
have selected another one, and to do that one thing.
34. Although people believe that they have the power to choose their behavior,
this is an illusion. Their behavior is determined. (R)
 Bergner & Ramon 617

35. Everything, including human behavior, is completely caused by whatever

happened before it. (R)
36. For the most part, people have control over the decisions they make.

Meaning in Life Subscale (MIL)

37. Hardly anything I’m doing in my life means very much to me. (R)
38. Life seems meaningful to me.
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39. Human life has no real meaning. (R)

40. “Life is a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.”
(Shakespeare character) (R)
41. I experience a clear sense of meaning in my life.

Satisfaction With Life Subscale (SWLS) (Diener et al., 1985)

43. In most ways my life is close to my ideal.

44. The conditions of my life are excellent.
45. I am satisfied with life.
46. So far I have gotten the important things I want in life.
47. If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing.

Social Isolation Subscale of Dean Alienation Scale (DAS; Dean, 1961)

1: Strongly disagree, 2: Disagree, 3: Neutral, 4: Agree, 5: Strongly agree

1. Sometimes I feel all alone in the world.
2. I don’t get invited out by friends as often as I’d like.
3. Most people today seldom feel lonely
4. Real friends are as easy as ever to find.
5. One can always find friends if he shows himself friendly.
6. The world in which we live is basically a friendly place.
7. There are few dependable ties between people any more.
8. People are just naturally friendly and helpful.
9. I don’t get to visit friends as often as I’d really like.

Cynical Distrust Scale (CDS, Greenglass & Julkunen, 1989)

0: Completely disagree, 1: Disagree, 2: Agree, 3: Completely agree

1. I think most people would lie to get ahead.
2. Most people inwardly dislike putting themselves out to help other people.
3. Most people make friends because friends are likely to be useful to them.
4. It is safer to trust nobody.
5. No one cares much what happens to you.
 618 The Journal of Social Psychology

6. Most people are honest chiefly through fear of being caught.

7. I commonly wonder what hidden reasons another person may have for
doing something nice to me.
8. Most people will use somewhat unfair means to gain profit or an advantage
rather than lose it.

Meaning in Life Questionaire (MLQ; Steger, Frazier, Oishi, & Kaler, 2006)
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1: Absolutely untrue, 2: Mostly untrue, 3: Somewhat untrue, 4: Can’t say true or

false, 5: Somewhat true, 6: Mostly true, 7: Absolutely true
1. I understand my life’s meaning.
2. I am looking for something that makes my life feel meaningful.
3. I am always looking to find my life’s purpose.
4. My life has a clear sense of purpose.
5. I have a good sense of what makes my life meaningful.
6. I have discovered a satisfying life purpose.
7. I am always searching for something that makes my life feel significant.
8. I am seeking a purpose or mission for my life.
9. My life has no clear purpose.
10. I am searching for meaning in my life.