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David vs. Senate Election Tribunal
Facts:
Respondent is a foundling. Her Certificate of Live
Birth states that she was found in the Parish Church
of Jaro, on 03 September 1968, at about 9:30
A.M. by Mr. Edgardo Militar. The fact of her
finding was reported to the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar on 06 September 1968 by Mr.
Emiliano Militar, under whose custody she was at
the time of the reporting. Respondent was
registered as Mary Grace Contreras Militar.
Respondent's biological parents were unknown and
to date remain unknown.
When Respondent was five (5) years old, she was
adopted by the couple Ronald Allan Poe (also
known as Fernando Poe, Jr. or FN) and Jesusa
Sonora Poe (also known as Susan Roces) as
evidenced by a Decision dated 13 May 1974 of
the Municipal Trial Court of San Juan, Riza1.
On 13 December 1986, having reached the voting
age of eighteen (18) years, Respondent was
issued a Voter's ID by the Commission on Elections.
She was issued Philippine Passports by the
Ministry/Department of Foreign Affairs on 04
April 1988, 05 April 1993, 19 May 1998, 13
October 2009, 1.9 December 2013, and 18
March 2014.
In 1988, Respondent enrolled at Boston College in
Chestnull Hill, Massachusetts, U.S.A., where she
obtained her Bachelor of its degree in Political
Studies in 1991. On 27 July 1991, she married
Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares, who is a
citizen of both the Philippines and the United
States at the Sanctuario de San Jose Parish at San
Juan City, Metro Manila. Two days later, on 29
July 1991, she joined her husband in United
States.
Respondent became a naturalized American
citizen on 18 October 2001. She was issued USA
Passport No. 17037793 on 19 December 2001.
Respondent came home to the Philippines in 2005
and was issued a Tax Identification Number (TIN)
Constitutional Law Digests
by the Bureau of Internal Revenue on 22 July
2005.
On 07 July 2006, respondent executed an "Oath
of Allegiance" to the Republic of the Philippines,
and three days later, on 10 July 2006, filed with
the Bureau of Immigration a Petition for
Reacquisition of Filipino Citizenship pursuant to R.A.
9225. The said petition was granted by the
Bureau of Immigration in an Order dated 18 July
2006 signed by Associate Commissioner Roy M.
Almoro for Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr.
Between 2006 and 2009, respondent made
several trips to the USA using her USA Passport.
Respondent was appointed Chairperson of the
Movie and Television Review and Classification
Board (MTRCB) on 06 October 2010. Prior to
taking her Oath of Office as MTRCB Chairperson
on 21 October 2010, respondent executed an
"Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the
United States of America and Renunciation of
American Citizenship" on 20 October 2010. The
original copy of the Affidavit was submitted to the
Bureau of Immigration also on 20 October 2010
by her legal counsel, Escudero Marasigan Valiente
& E.H. Villarea1. On 26 October 2010,
respondent assumed office as MTRCB Chairperson.
On 12 July 2011, Respondent executed an
"Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality
of the United States" before Vice-Consul Somer E.
Bessire-Briers. She likewise accomplished on the
same date the "Questionnaire Information for
Determining Possible Loss of U.S. Citizenship'
Respondent's Certificate of Loss of Nationality was
executed by Vice Consul Jason Galian on 09
December 2011 and was approved by the
Overseas Citizen Service, Department of State, on
03 February 2012.
In the 2013 elections, respondent ran for the
position of Senator. Her Certificate of Candidacy
(COC) executed on 27 September 2012 was filed
with the Commission on Elections on 02 October
2012. She was declared senator-elect by the
Commission on Elections on 16 May 2013. To this
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day, respondent is sitting as a member of the
Senate.
On 6 August 2015, Petitioner Rizalito Y. David
("Petitioner") filed before the Tribunal a Petition
for Quo Warranto against Respondent, contesting
her election as Senator of the Republic for failure
to comply with the citizenship and residency
requirements mandated by the 1987 Constitution.
On 11 August 2015, the Tribunal, through
Resolution No. 15-01, required Petitioner David to
correct the formal defects of his petition within a
non-extendible period of three (3) days from
receipt of the said Resolution.'
On 17 August 2015, Petitioner tiled his Amended
Petition. On the same date, Atty. Manuelito R.
Luna, entered his appearance as counsel for
Petitioner.
On 1 August 2015, the Tribunal, through its
Executive Committee, issued Resolution No. 15-02,
directing the Secretary of the Tribunal to issue the
corresponding summons to Respondent, requiring
her to file her ANSWER to the Amended Petition
within a non-extendible period often (10) days
from receipt of the summons.'
On 25 August 2015, pending submission of
Respondent's Answer, Petitioner moved to
subpoena the Bureau of Immigration Record of.
Application of Citizenship Re-Acquisition and
related documents, including the record of travels
and NSO-Kept Birth Certificate of Respondent.
The aforesaid Motion was granted by the
Executive Committee of the Tribunal in Resolution
No. 15-04 dated 26 August 2015. The Secretary
of the Tribunal was directed to issue the
corresponding subpoenas to the respective officials
of the Bureau of Immigration and the National
Statistics Office having official custody of the
documents requested. The subpoenas commanded
them to appear at the Office of the Secretary of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal on 01 September
2.015 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning and to bring
and produce three sets of the documents
enumerated in their respective subpoenas.
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On 1 September 2.015, the representatives of the
Bureau of Immigration and the National Statistics
Office attended the hearing and submitted the
required documents.
On the same date, Respondent filed her Verified
Answer with (1) Prayer for Summary Dismissal; (2)
Motion for Preliminary Hearing on Grounds for
Immediate Dismissal/Affirmative Defenses; (3)
Motion to Cite Petitioner for Direct Contempt of
Court; and (4) Counterclaim for Indirect Contempt
of Court.
The issues having been joined, the Executive
Committee of the Tribunal, in Resolution No. 15-05
dated 2 September 2015, resolved to call the
parties and their respective counsel to a
preliminary conference to be held on 11
September 2015. The Tribunal likewise required
the parties to file not later than 09 September
2015 their respective Preliminary Conference
Brief.
During the Preliminary Conference, Petitioner
agreed to drop the issue of residency on the
ground of prescription.
Thereafter, on 21 September 2015, the Tribunal
heard the parties in Oral Argument, at the
conclusion of which, the parties were required to
submit their respective Memorandum, without
prejudice to the submission of DNA evidence by
Respondent within thirty (30) days from the said
date.
On 21 October 2015, Respondent moved for an
extension of fifteen (15) days or until 05
November 2015 within which to submit DNA test
results. The motion was granted by the Executive
Committee in its Resolution No. 15-08 dated 27
October 2015.
However, on 05 November 2015, Respondent
filed a Manifestation (re: Results of DNA Testing),
stating that none of the tests that Respondent took
provided results that would shed light to the real
identity of her biological parents. While she would
continue her efforts to find personal closure with
respect to this issue and undertook to inform the
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Tribunal should a positive development arise,
Respondent submitted the issue of her natural-born
Filipino citizenship as a foundling for resolution
upon the legal arguments set forth in her
submissions to the Tribunal. In Resolution No. 15-10
dated 06 November 2015; the Tribunal noted the
manifestation and considered the ease submitted
for resolution.
ISSUE: Whether Grace Poe is eligible to sit as a
Senator of the Republic.
ARGUMENTS OF THE PETITIONER: Poe is not
qualified to be a member of the Senate on
account of her not being a natural-born citizen.
1. Poe does not fall under any of the classes
of natural-born citizens enumerated in Sec.
1, Art. IV, 1987 Constitution
a. To be a natural-born citizen, one’s
parents must be Filipino citizens. Poe
cannot claim natural-born status as her
parents are not known and cannot be
presumed as Filipino citizens.
2. The provisions of the 1930 Hague
Convention on Certain Questions Relating
to the Conflict of Nationality Laws and the
1961 UN Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness are not applicable because
the Philippines has yet to accede to both
Conventions.
3. Poe’s adoption did not confer upon her the
status of natural-born citizen. The effect of
the adoption is to confer unto her
legitimate status.
ARGUMENTS OF THE RESPONDENT: Poe asserts
that she is a natural-born citizen and is eligible to
sit as a Senator
1. As early as the 1935 Constitution, it was
always the intention of the framers to
consider foundlings found in the Philippines
as Filipino citizens.
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2. Poe invokes Art. 7 of the UNCRC and Art.
24 of the ICCPR. Both treaties are ratified
by the Philippines.
a. These treaties create an obligation on
the part of the Philippines to recognize
a foundling as its citizen from the time
of the foundling’s birth.
b. Although neither the ICCPR nor the
UNCRC was in force when she was
born in 1968, each may apply
retroactively to the date of her birth.
To rule otherwise would be to
discriminate against foundlings born
before the ratification of these treaties.
3. Poe invokes Art. 15 of the UDHR which
recognizes the right of everyone to a
nationality.
4. Poe invokes Art. 14 of the 1930 Hague
Convention on Conflict of Nationality Laws.
The presumption that a foundling is a
citizen of the State in which she is found is
a generally accepted principle of
international law.
5. Poe invokes Art. 2 of the UN Convention on
Statelessness which expresses a rebuttable
presumption of descent from a citizen,
consistent with jus sanguinis.
6. Finally, Poe argues that she validly
reacquired her natural-born status pursuant
to R.A. No. 9225.
RULING OF THE SET ON POE’S CITIZENSHIP:
1. From the deliberations of the 1934
Constitutional Convention on citizenship,
it was never the intention of the framers
to exclude foundlings from natural-born
citizenship status.
 “Children or people born in a country
of unknown parents are citizens of this
nation” and the only reason that there
was no specific reference to foundlings
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in the 1935 provision was that these
cases “are few and far in between.”
 Evident intent was to adopt the concept
found in the Spanish Code “wherein all
children of unknown parentage born in
Spanish territory are considered
Spaniards, because the presumption is
that a child of unknown parentage is
the son of a Spaniard.”
2. Under Art. 14 of the Hague Convention
of 1930 (on Conflict of Nationality Laws),
a foundling is presumed to have been
born on the territory of the State in which
it was found until the contrary is proved.
 Although the Philippines is not a
signatory to said convention, its
provisions are binding as they form
part of the law of the land pursuant to
the incorporation clause.
 Sr. Roxas in the 1934 Constitutional
Convention remarked “By international
law the principle that children or
people born in a country of unknown
parents are citizens in this nation is
recognized…”
 By referring to this rule in
international law (which was no
other than Art. 14 of the Hague
Convention of 1930), what was
effectively created in the
Constitution itself, was an exception
to the general rule of natural-born
citizenship based on blood descent.
3. Hence, foundlings (children born in the
Philippines with unknown parentage)
were, by birth, accorded natural-born
citizenship by the Constitution.
 “natural-born citizens by legal fiction”
 The framers of the Constitution were
sufficiently empowered to create a
class of natural-born citizens by legal
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fiction, as an exception to the jus
sanguinis rule
 This is evident from Art. 1 (State to
determine who are its nationals)
and Art. 2 (questions on nationality
to be determined by the law of
that State) of the 1930 Hague
Convention
4. Poe validly reacquired her natural-born
Filipino citizenship upon taking her Oath
of Allegiance to the Republic, as required
under Section 3, R.A. No. 9225
 Before assuming her position as MTRCB
Chairman, Poe executed an affidavit
of renunciation of foreign citizenship.
This was sufficient to qualify her for her
appointive position, and later, her
elective office as R.A. No. 9225 did not
require that her Certificate of Loss of
Nationality filed before the U.S.
Embassy be first approved in order
that she may qualify for office.
 Records of the Bureau of Immigration
show that Poe still used her U.S.
passport after having taken her Oath
of Allegiance but not after she has
renounced her U.S. Citizenship.
5. Hence, the petition for quo warranto is
DISMISSED.
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Tañada, Jr. vs. House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal
Facts:
Wigberto Tanada filed twin petitions before the
COMELEC to cancel the COC of Alvin John Tanada
for false representations and to declare him as a
nuisance candidate. They were both candidates
for the position of Congress Representative. A
COMELEC division denied both his petitions, but on
reconsideration, the COMELEC en banc on April
13, 2013 granted to cancel the COC of Alvin John
for false representations. The petition to declare
him as nuisance candidate however was
denied. Wigberto again sought reconsideration of
the denial of his petition on the basis of a newly
discovered evidence. Comes election day and the
name of Alvin John remained in the ballots,
whichafter Angelica Tan was the winning
candidate, and Wigberto only second.
Wigberto filed before the PBOC a petition to
correct manifest mistakes concerning the cancelled
candidacy of Alvin John and a motion to
consolidate Alvin John’s votes with the votes he
garnered. The PBOC denied the motion to
consolidate the votes because Alvin John was not a
nuisance candidate. PBOC then proclaimed
Angelica as the winner.
On May 21, 2013, Wigberto filed a supplemental
petition before the COMELEC to annul the
proclamation of Tan, which was granted and
affirmed by the COMELEC en banc. However,
Angelica had by then taken her oath and assumed
office past noon time of June 30, 2013, thereby
rendering the adverse resolution on her
proclamation moot.
On May 27, 2013, before the SC, Wigberto filed
a certiorari assailing the April 25, 2013 COMELEC
en banc’s ruling declaring Alvin John not a nuisance
candidate and an election protest claiming that
fraud has been perpetrated. The SC, noting that
the proclaimed candidate has already assumed
office, dismissed the election protest and directed
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Wigberto to file the protest before the proper
tribunal which is the HRET. The certiorari was also
dismissed for being filed beyond the 5-day
reglementary period.
Before the HRET, the election protest was dismissed
for being insufficient in form and substance and for
lack of jurisdiction over John Alvin who was not a
member of the House of Representatives.
Issue 1: W/N the votes for Alvin John should be
credited in favor of Wigberto as a result of the
cancellation of Alvin John’s candidacy
Held:
No, the votes cast for Alvin John whose COC was
cancelled are stray votes only. A COC cancelled
on ground of false representations under Sec 78
of the Omnibus Election Code, unlike in being a
nuisance candidate in Sec 69, does not have the
effect of crediting the votes in favor of another
candidate.
Issue 2: W/N the filing of a motion for
reconsideration of the COMELEC en banc’s ruling is
proper
Held:
No, the motion for reconsideration is a
prohibited pleading. Rule 13 Sec 1(d) of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure specifically prohibits
the filing of a motion for reconsideration of an en
banc ruling, resolution, order or decision except in
election offense cases. Consequently, when a
COMELEC en banc ruling become final and
executory, it precludes a party from raising again
in any other forum the nuisance candidacy as an
issue.
Issue 3: W/N Wigberto’s petition for certiorari
of the COMELEC en banc’s ruling was timely
Held:
No, the petition assailing the COMELEC’s en banc
ruling was filed beyond the 5-day period
provided by COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Rule
37, Sec 3 thereof provides that decisions in pre-
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proclamation cases and petitions to deny due
course to or cancel COC, to declare a candidate
as nuisance candidate or to disqualify a
candidate, and to postpone or suspend elections
shall become final and executory after the lapse
of 5 days from their promulgation, unless
restrained by the SC.
The COMELEC en banc promulgated its resolution
on Alvin John’s alleged nuisance candidacy on
April 25 2013. When Wigberto filed his petition
for certiorari before the SC on May 27,2013, the
COMELEC en banc’s resolution was already final
and executory.
Issue 4: W/N the SC has jurisdiction to resolve
issues on the conduct of canvassing after the
proclamation of a winning candidate
Held:
No. The SC no longer has jurisdiction over
questions involving the elections, returns and
qualifications of candidates who have already
assumed their office as members of House of
Representatives. Issues concerning the conduct of
the canvass and the resulting proclamation of
candidates are matters which fall under the scope
of the terms “election” and “returns” and hence,
properly fall under the HRET’s sole jurisdiction.
Issue 5: W/N the HRET has jurisdiction over the
election protest filed by Wigberto regarding the
cancelled candidacy of John Alvin
Held:
No. Article VI, Sec 17 of the 1987 Constitution
and Rule 15 of the 2011 HRET Rules declare that
HRET’s power to judge election contests is limited
to Members of the House of Representatives. Alvin
John is not a Member of the House of
Representatives.
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Guingona Jr. vs. Gonzales
Facts: The mathematical representation of each of
the political parties represented in the Senate for
the Commission on Appointments (CA) is as follows:
LDP—7.5; LP-PDP-LABAN--.5; NPC—2.5; LAKAS-
NUCD—1.5. The LDP majority in the Senate
converted a fractional half membership into a
whole membership of one Senator by adding one-
half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect respondent
Senator Romulo. In so doing, one other party’s
fractional membership was correspondingly
reduced leaving the latter’s representation in the
CA to less than their proportional representation in
the Senate.
Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of Art.
VI, Sec. 18
Held: The respondent’s claim to membership in the
CA by nomination and election of the LDP majority
in the Senate is not in accordance with Sec. 18 of
Art. VI of the Constitution and therefore violating
of the same because it is not in compliance with the
requirement that 12 senators shall be elected on
the basis of proportional representation of the
political parties represented therein. To disturb the
resulting fractional membership of the political
parties in the CA by adding together 2 halves to
make a whole is a breach of the rule on
proportional representation because it will give
the LDP an added member in the CA by utilizing
the fractional membership of the minority political
party, who is deprived of half a representation.
The provision of Sec. 18 on proportional
representation is mandatory in character and does
not leave any discretion to the majority party in
the Senate to disobey or disregard the rule on
proportional representation.
The Constitution does not require that the full
complement of 12 senators be elected to the
membership in the CA before it can discharge its
functions and that it is not mandatory to elect 12
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senators to the CA. The overriding directive of Art.
VI, Sec. 18 is that there must be a proportional
representation of the political parties in the
membership of the CA and that the specification of
12 members to constitute its membership is merely
an indication of the maximum complement
allowable under the Constitution. The act of filling
up the membership thereof cannot disregard the
mandate of proportional representation of the
parties even if it results in fractional membership in
unusual situations. Even if the composition of the CA
is fixed by the Constitution, it can perform its
functions even if not fully constituted, so long as it
has the required quorum.
Constitutional Law Digests
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Bengzon, Jr. vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
FACTS:
PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan against
Benjamin Romualdez, et al for engaging in
devices, schemes and stratagems to unjustly enrich
themselves at the expense of plaintiff and the
Filipino people.
The Senate Minority Floor Leader Enrile delivered
a speech before the Senate on the alleged take-
over personal privilege before the Senate on the
alleged "takeover of SOLOIL Inc," the Flag Ship of
the First Manila Management of Companies or
FMMC by Ricardo Lopa and called upon the
Senate to look into the possible violation of the
law in the case with regard to RA 3019 (Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers [SBRC]) started its
investigation on the matter. Petitioners and Ricardo
Lopa were subpoenaed by the SBRC to appear
before it and testify on what they know regarding
the sale of 36 corporations belonging to Benjamin
Romualdez. Lopa and Bengzon refused to testify,
invoking their rights to due process, and that their
testimony may unduly prejudice the defendants
and petitioners in case before the Sandiganbayan.
SBRC rejected the petitioner's plea to be excused
from testifying and the SBRC continued its
investigation of the matter.
The petitioners filed for prohibition with a prayer
for TRO and/or injunctive relief, claiming that the
SBRC in requiring their attendance and testimony,
acted in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative
purpose.
The Supreme Court intervened upon a motion for
reconsideration filed by one of the defendants of
the civil case.
ISSUES:
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1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over
the case.
2. Whether or not the SBRC's inquiry has valid
legislative purpose.
3. whether or not the civil case of Sandiganbayan
is beyond the power of the SBRC to inquire into.
4. Whether or not the inquiry violates the
petitioners' right to due process.
RULING:
1. Yes.
In Angara vs Electoral Commission, the Constitution
provided for an elaborate system of checks and
balances to secure coordination in the workings of
the various departments of the government. The
Court has provided that the allocation of
constitutional boundaries is a task which the
judiciary must perform under the Constitution.
Moreover, as held in a recent case, "(t)he political
question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to
judicial determination of the rival claims. The
jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has
been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that
obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution,
although said provision by no means does away
with the applicability of the principle in
appropriate cases."
The Court is thus of the considered view that it has
jurisdiction over the present controversy for the
purpose of determining the scope and extent of
the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to
conduct inquiries into private affairs in purported
aid of legislation.
2. No.
The power to conduct formal inquiries or
investigations is specifically provided for in Sec. 1
of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may
refer to the implementation or re-examination of
any law or in connection with any proposed
legislation or the formulation of future legislation.
They may also extend to any and all matters
Constitutional Law Digests
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vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in
the Senate alone.
It appears, therefore, that the contemplated
inquiry by respondent Committee is not really "in
aid of legislation" because it is not related to a
purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since
the aim of the investigation is to find out whether
or not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo
Lopa had violated Section 5 RA No. 3019, the
"Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act", a matter
that appears more within the province of the courts
rather than of the legislature.
3. No.
It cannot be said that the contemplated inquiry on
the subject of the privilege speech of Senator Juan
Ponce Enrile, i.e., the alleged sale of the 36 (or
39) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy"
Romualdez to the Lopa Group is to be conducted
pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212 because,
firstly, Senator Enrile did not indict the PCGG, and,
secondly, neither Mr. Ricardo Lopa nor the herein
petitioners are connected with the government but
are private citizens.
4. Yes.
The Constitution expressly provides that "the rights
of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected.
It should be emphasized that the constitutional
restriction does not call for the banning or
prohibition of investigations where a violation of a
basis rights is claimed. It only requires that in the
course of the proceedings, the right of persons
should be respected.
What the majority opinion mandates is a blanket
prohibition against a witness testifying at all,
simply because he is already facing charges
before the Sandiganbayan. To my mind, the
Constitution allows him to interpose objections
whenever an incriminating question is posed or
when he is compelled to reveal his court defenses,
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but not to refuse to take the witness stand
completely.
Gonzales vs. Macaraig, Jr.
Facts:
On 16 December 1988, Congress passed House
Bill 19186, or the General Appropriations Bill for
the Fiscal Year 1989. As passed, it eliminated or
decreased certain items included in the proposed
budget submitted by the President. Pursuant to the
constitutional provision on the passage of bills,
Congress presented the said Bill to the President
for consideration and approval.
On 29 December 1988, the President signed the
Bill into law, and declared the same to have
become RA 6688. In the process, 7 Special
Provisions and Section 55, a “General Provision,”
were vetoed. On 2 February 1989, the Senate, in
Resolution 381 (“Authorizing and Directing the
Committee on Finance to Bring in the Name of the
Senate of the Philippines the Proper Suit with the
Supreme Court of the Philippines contesting the
Constitutionality of the Veto by the President of
Special and General Provisions, particularly
Section 55, of the General Appropriation Bill of
1989 (H.B. No. 19186) and For Other Purposes”)
was adopted.
On 11 April 1989, the Petition for Prohibition/
Mandamus was filed by Neptali A. Gonzales,
Ernesto M. Maceda, Alberto G. Romulo, Heherson
T. Alvarez, Edgardo J. Angara, Agapito A. Aquino,
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., Ernesto F. Herrera, Jose
D. Lina, Jr., John Osmeña, Vicente T. Paterno, Rene
A. Saguisag, Leticia Ramos-Shahani, Mamintal
Abdul J. Tamano, Wigberto E. Tañada, Jovito R.
Salonga, Orlando S. Mercado, Juan Ponce Enrile,
Joseph Estrada, Sotero Laurel, Aquilino Pimentel,
Jr., Santanina Rasul, Victor Ziga, as members and
ex-officio members of the Committee on Finance of
the Senate and as “substantial taxpayers whose
vital interests may be affected by this case,” with
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a prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and Restraining Order, assailing mainly
the constitutionality or legality of the Presidential
veto of Section 55, and seeking to enjoin Catalino
Macaraig, Jr., Vicente Jayme, Carlos Dominguez,
Fulgencio Factoran, Fiorello Estuar, Lourdes
Quisumbing, Raul Manglapus, Alfredo Bengson,
Jose Concepcion, Luis Santos, Mita Pardo De
Tavera, Rainerio Reyes, Guillermo Carague,
Rosalina Cajucom and Eufemio C. Domingo from
implementing RA 6688. No Restraining Order was
issued by the Supreme Court.
Gonzales et al.’s cause is anchored on the
following grounds: (1) the President’s line-veto
power as regards appropriation bills is limited to
item/s and does not cover provision/s; therefore,
she exceeded her authority when she vetoed
Section 55 (FY ‘89) and Section 16 (FY ‘90) which
are provisions; (2) when the President objects to a
provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot
exercise the item-veto power but should veto the
entire bill; (3) the item-veto power does not carry
with it the power to strike out conditions or
restrictions for that would be legislation, in
violation of the doctrine of separation of powers;
and (4) the power of augmentation in Article VI,
Section 25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution, has to be
provided for by law and, therefore, Congress is
also vested with the prerogative to impose
restrictions on the exercise of that power.
The Solicitor General, as counsel for Macaraig et
al., counters that the issue in the present case is a
political question beyond the power of the
Supreme Court to determine; that Gonzales et al.
had a political remedy, which was to override the
veto; that Section 55 is a “rider” because it is
extraneous to the Appropriations Act and,
therefore, merits the President’s veto; that the
power of the President to augment items in the
appropriations for the executive branches had
already been provided for in the Budget Law,
specifically Sections 44 and 45 of PD 1177, as
amended by RA 6670 (4 August 1988); and that
the President is empowered by the Constitution to
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veto provisions or other “distinct and severable
parts” of an Appropriations Bill.
Issues and Held:
1. Whether or not the President exceeded the
item-veto power accorded by the Constitution or
differently put, has the President the power to veto
provisions of an Appropriations Bill
No. The veto power of the President is expressed
in Article VI, Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution.
Paragraph (1) refers to the general veto power of
the President and if exercised would result in the
veto of the entire bill, as a general rule.
Paragraph (2) is what is referred to as the item-
veto power or the line-veto power. It allows the
exercise of the veto over a particular item or items
in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill. As
specified, the President may not veto less than all
of an item of an Appropriations Bill. In other
words, the power given the executive to
disapprove any item or items in an Appropriations
Bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of
an item and to approve the remaining portion of
the same item. Notwithstanding the elimination in
Article VI, Section 27 (2) of the 1987 Constitution
of any reference to the veto of a provision, the
extent of the President’s veto power as previously
defined by the 1935 Constitution has not changed.
This is because the eliminated proviso merely
pronounces the basic principle that a distinct and
severable part of a bill may be the subject of a
separate veto. The restrictive interpretation urged
by Gonzales et al. that the President may not veto
a provision without vetoing the entire bill not only
disregards the basic principle that a distinct and
severable part of a bill may be the subject of a
separate veto but also overlooks the Constitutional
mandate that any provision in the general
appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some
particular appropriation therein and that any such
provision shall be limited in its operation to the
appropriation to which it relates. In other words, in
the true sense of the term, a provision in an
Appropriations Bill is limited in its operation to
some particular appropriation to which it relates,
and does not relate to the entire bill. The President
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promptly vetoed Section 55 (FY ‘89) and Section
16 (FY ‘90) because they nullify the authority of
the Chief Executive and heads of different
branches of government to augment any item in
the General Appropriations Law for their
respective offices from savings in other items of
their respective appropriations, as guaranteed by
Article VI, Section 25 (5) of the Constitution.
Noteworthy is the fact that the power to augment
from savings lies dormant until authorized by law.
When Sections 55 (FY ‘89) and 16 (FY ‘90)
prohibit the restoration or increase by
augmentation of appropriations disapproved or
reduced by Congress, they impair the constitutional
and statutory authority of the President and other
key officials to augment any item or any
appropriation from savings in the interest of
expediency and efficiency. The exercise of such
authority in respect of disapproved or reduced
items by no means vests in the Executive the power
to rewrite the entire budget, the leeway granted
being delimited to transfers within the department
or branch concerned the sourcing to come only
from savings. More importantly, for such a special
power as that of augmentation from savings, the
same is merely incorporated in the General
Appropriations Bill. An Appropriations Bill is “one
the primary and specific aim of which is to make
appropriation of money from the public treasury”.
It is a legislative authorization of receipts and
expenditures. The power of augmentation from
savings, on the other hand, can by no means be
considered a specific appropriation of money. It is
a non-appropriation item inserted in an
appropriation measure.
2. Whether Section 55 (FY ‘89) and Section 16
(FY ‘90) are provisions, not items, in the
appropriation bill
No. Section 55 (FY ‘89) and Section 16 (FY ‘90)
are not provisions in the budgetary sense of the
term. Article VI, Section 25 (2) of the 1987
Constitution provides: “Sec. 25 (2) No provision or
enactment shall be embraced in the general
appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to
some particular appropriation therein. Any such
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provision or enactment shall be limited in its
operation to the appropriation to which it relates.”
Explicit is the requirement that a provision in the
Appropriations Bill should relate specifically to
some “particular appropriation” therein. The
challenged “provisions” fall short of this
requirement. Firstly, the vetoed “provisions” do not
relate to any particular or distinctive
appropriation. They apply generally to all items
disapproved or reduced by Congress in the
Appropriations Bill. Secondly, the disapproved or
reduced items are nowhere to be found on the
face of the Bill. To discover them, resort will have
to be made to the original recommendations made
by the President and to the source indicated by
the “Legislative Budget Research and Monitoring
Office.” Thirdly, the vetoed Sections are more of
an expression of Congressional policy in respect of
augmentation from savings rather than a
budgetary appropriation. Consequently, Section
55 (FY ‘89) and Section 16 (FY ‘90) although
labeled as “provisions,” are actually inappropriate
provisions that should be treated as items for the
purpose of the President’s veto power.
3. Whether the Legislature’s inclusion of
qualifications, conditions, limitations or restrictions
on expenditure of funds in the Appropriation Bill
was proper
There can be no denying that inherent in the
power of appropriation is the power to specify
how money shall be spent; and that in addition to
distinct “items” of appropriation, the Legislature
may include in Appropriation Bills qualifications,
conditions, limitations or restrictions on expenditure
of funds. Settled also is the rule that the Executive
is not allowed to veto a condition or proviso of an
appropriation while allowing the appropriation
itself to stand. The veto of a condition in an
Appropriations Bill which did not include a veto of
the items to which the condition related was
deemed invalid and without effect whatsoever.
However, for the rule to apply, restrictions should
be such in the real sense of the term, not some
matters which are more properly dealt with in a
separate legislation. Restrictions or conditions in an
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P a g e | 11
Appropriations Bill must exhibit a connection with
money items in a budgetary sense in the schedule
of expenditures. Again, the test is appropriateness.
“It is not enough that a provision be related to the
institution or agency to which funds are
appropriated. Conditions and limitations properly
included in an appropriation bill must exhibit such
a connexity with money items of appropriation
that they logically belong in a schedule of
expenditures . . . the ultimate test is one of
appropriateness.” Tested by these criteria, Section
55 (FY ‘89) and Section 16 (FY ‘90) must also be
held to be inappropriate “conditions.” While they,
particularly, Section 16 (FY ‘90), have been
“artfully drafted” to appear as true conditions or
limitations, they are actually general law measures
more appropriate for substantive and, therefore,
separate legislation. Further, neither of them shows
the necessary connection with a schedule of
expenditures. The reason is that items reduced or
disapproved by Congress would not appear on
the face of the enrolled bill or Appropriations Act
itself. They can only be detected when compared
with the original budgetary submittals of the
President. In fact, Sections 55 (FY ‘89) and 16 (FY
‘90) themselves provide that an item “shall be
deemed to have been disapproved by Congress if
no corresponding appropriation for the specific
purpose is provided in this Act.” Herein, there is no
condition, in the budgetary sense of the term,
attached to an appropriation or item in the
appropriation bill which was struck out. For
obviously, Sections 55 (FY ‘89) and 16 (FY ‘90)
partake more of a curtailment on the power to
augment from savings; in other words, “a general
provision of law, which happens to be put in an
appropriation bill.”
4. Whether the legislature has a remedy when it
believes that the veto powers by the executive
were unconstitutional
Yes. If, indeed, the legislature believed that the
exercise of the veto powers by the executive were
unconstitutional, the remedy laid down by the
Constitution is crystal clear. A Presidential veto
may be overridden by the votes of two-thirds of
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members of Congress (1987 Constitution, Article Argument for executive

VI, Section 27[1]). But Congress made no attempt impoundment: Proponents of impoundment have
to override the Presidential veto. Gonzales et al.’s invoked at least three principal sources of the
argument that the veto is ineffectual so that there authority of the President. Foremost is the authority
is “nothing to override” has lost force and effect to impound given to him either expressly or
with the executive veto having been herein upheld. impliedly by Congress. Second is the executive
There need be no future conflict if the legislative power drawn from the President’s role as
and executive branches of government adhere to Commander-in-Chief. Third is the Faithful Execution
the spirit of the Constitution, each exercising its Clause which ironically is the same provisions
respective powers with due deference to the invoked by petitioners herein.
constitutional responsibilities and functions of the
other. Thereby, the delicate equilibrium of The proponents insist that a faithful execution of
governmental powers remains on even keel. the laws requires that the President desist from
implementing the law if doing so would prejudice
Note: public interest. An example given is when through
efficient and prudent management of a project,
SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a general substantial savings are made. In such a case, it is
appropriations bill matters that should be more sheer folly to expect the President to spend the
properly enacted in separate legislation, and if it entire amount budgeted in the law.
does that, the inappropriate provisions inserted by
it must be treated as “item,” which can be vetoed
by the President in the exercise of his item-veto
power. The SC went one step further and rules that
even assuming arguendo that “provisions” are
beyond the executive power to veto, and Section
55 (FY ‘89) and Section 16 (FY ‘90) were not
“provisions” in the budgetary sense of the term,
they are “inappropriate provisions” that should be
treated as “items” for the purpose of the
President’s veto power.

Note: Executive Impoundment

Definition: This refers to a refusal by the

President, for whatever reason, to spend funds
made available by Congress. It is the failure to
spend or obligate budget authority of any type.

Argument against executive

impoundment: Those who deny to the President
the power to impound argue that once Congress
has set aside the fund for a specific purpose in an
appropriations act, it becomes mandatory on the
part of the President to implement the project and
to spend the money appropriated therefor. The
President has no discretion on the matter, for the
Constitution imposes on him the duty to faithfully
execute the laws.

Constitutional Law Digests Prepared by: 카이


Garcia v. Comelec
Facts:
On May 24, 1993, petitioners filed a petition with
the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul
Pambansang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993
which includes the Municipaloty of Morong as part
of the Subic Special Economic Zone in accord with
the RA No. 7227.
The municipality did not take any action on the
petition within 30 days after its submission; so,
they resorted to their power of initiative under the
Local Government Code of 1991. They solicited
the required number of signatures to repeal the
said resolution.
However, the Vice Mayor, Hon. Edilberto de Leon,
and the Presiding Office of the Sangguniang
Bayan ng Morong wrote a letter dated June 11,
1993 to deny the petition for local initiative
and/or referendum.
On July 6, 1993, the Comelec denied the petition
for local initiative because its subject is “merely a
resolution and not an ordinance.”
Issue:
1. Whether or not the Pambansang Kapasyahan
Blg. 10, Serye 1993 is the proper subject of an
initiative?
2. Whether or not the decision of the Comelec to
deny the petition is set aside?
Held:
1. YES. The petition is granted and the decision of
the Comelec on July 6, 1993 is annulled and set
aside.
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P a g e | 13
The 1987 Constitution installed back the power to
the people regarding legislation because of the
event in February 1986. The new Constitution
became “less trusting of public officials.”
Through initiative, the people were given the
power to amend the Constitution under Sec. 2 Art.
17 which provides “amendments to this Constitution
may likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition of at least 12%
of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at
least 3% of the registered voter therein.”
The Comelec was also empowered to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an initiative and referendum.
On Aug. 4, 1989, the Congress approved RA No.
6735 entitled “An Act Providing for a System of
Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating
Funds Therefor.”
2. YES.
Sec. 32 of Art. 6 provides “ the Congress shall
provide for a system of initiative and referendum,
and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people
can directly propose
and enact laws or approve or reject any act or
law or part thereof passed by the Congress or
local legislative body.
Under Sec. 32(a) of RA No. 6735 it provided the
3 systems of initiative, namely:
1. Initiative on the Constitution – petition to amend
the Constitution
2. Initiative on statutes – petition proposing to
enact a national legislation
3. Initiative on local legislation – petition
proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city,
municipal, or barangay law, resolution or
ordinance
Under its Sec.16(a), it provided the limitations on
local initiatives, which is “the power of local
initiative shall not be exercised more than once a
year.”
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Santiago vs. Guingona
Facts: During the first regular session of the
eleventh Congress, Senator Fernan was declared
the duly elected President of the Senate by a vote
of 20 to 2. Senator Tatad manifested that, with
the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the
only other member of the minority, he was
assuming the position of minority leader. He
explained that those who had voted for Senator
Fernan comprised the majority, while only those
who had voted for him, the losing nominee,
belonged to the minority. Senator Flavier
manifested that the senators belonging to the
Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party numbering 7 and, thus,
also a minority had chosen Senator Guingona as
the minority leader. Thereafter, the majority
leader informed the body that he was in receipt of
a letter signed by the 7 Lakas-NUCD-UMDP
senators, stating that they had elected Senator
Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof,
the Senate President formally recognized Senator
Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate.
Senators Santiago and Tatad filed a petition for
quo warranto, alleging that Senator Guingona
had been usurping, unlawfully holding and
exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a
position that, according to them, rightfully
belonged to Senator Tatad.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over
the petition.
(2) Whether or not there is an actual violation of
the Constitution
Held: Regarding the first issue, jurisdiction over the
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P a g e | 14
subject matter of a case is determined by the
allegations of the complaint or petition, regardless
of whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief
asserted. In light of the allegations of the
petitioners, it is clear that the Court has jurisdiction
over the petition. It is well within the power and
jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed
the Senate or its officials committed a violation of
the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion
in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives.
However, the interpretation proposed by
petitioners finds no clear support from the
Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or
even from practices of the Upper House. The term
“majority,” when referring to a certain number out
of a total or aggregate, it simply means the
number greater than half or more than half of any
total. In effect, while the Constitution mandates that
the President of the Senate must be elected by a
number constituting more than one half of all the
members thereof, it does not provide that the
members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto
constitute the minority, who could thereby elect the
minority leader. No law or regulation states that
the defeated candidate shall automatically
become the minority leader.
While the Constitution is explicit in the manner of
electing a Senate President and a House Speaker,
it is, however, dead silent on the manner of
selecting the other officers in both chambers of
Congress. All that the Charter says under Art. VI,
Sec. 16(1) is that “each House shall choose such
other officers as it may deem necessary.” The
method of choosing who will be such other officers
is merely a derivative of the exercise of the
prerogative conferred by the said constitutional
provision. Therefore, such method must be
prescribed by the Senate itself, not by the Court.
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