G.R. No.

L-21438 September 28, 1966

AIR FRANCE, petitioner,

vs.
RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Lichauco, Picazo and Agcaoili for petitioner.

Bengzon Villegas and Zarraga for respondent R. Carrascoso.

SANCHEZ, J.:

The Court of First Instance of Manila 1 sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso
P25,000.00 by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; P393.20 representing
the difference in fare between first class and tourist class for the portion of the trip Bangkok-
Rome, these various amounts with interest at the legal rate, from the date of the filing of the
complaint until paid; plus P3,000.00 for attorneys' fees; and the costs of suit.

On appeal,2 the Court of Appeals slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane
ticket from P393.20 to P383.10, and voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all other respects",
with costs against petitioner.

The case is now before us for review on certiorari.

The facts declared by the Court of Appeals as " fully supported by the evidence of record", are:

Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left
Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958.

On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine
Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to
Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the
Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he
was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a
"white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to
vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told
defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a commotion
ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, "many of the Filipino passengers got
nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot
discussion with the white man [manager], they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and
pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man" (Transcript, p. 12, Hearing of
May 26, 1959); and plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane.3

1. The trust of the relief petitioner now seeks is that we review "all the findings" 4 of respondent
Court of Appeals. Petitioner charges that respondent court failed to make complete findings of
fact on all the issues properly laid before it. We are asked to consider facts favorable to
petitioner, and then, to overturn the appellate court's decision.

Coming into focus is the constitutional mandate that "No decision shall be rendered by any court
of record without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based". 5 This is echoed in the statutory demand that a judgment determining the merits of the
case shall state "clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based"; 6 and that
"Every decision of the Court of Appeals shall contain complete findings of fact on all issues
properly raised before it". 7

A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity. It is open to direct attack. 8 The law,
however, solely insists that a decision state the "essential ultimate facts" upon which the court's
conclusion is drawn. 9 A court of justice is not hidebound to write in its decision every bit and
piece of evidence 10 presented by one party and the other upon the issues raised. Neither is it to
be burdened with the obligation "to specify in the sentence the facts" which a party "considered
as proved". 11 This is but a part of the mental process from which the Court draws the essential
ultimate facts. A decision is not to be so clogged with details such that prolixity, if not confusion,
may result. So long as the decision of the Court of Appeals contains the necessary facts to
warrant its conclusions, it is no error for said court to withhold therefrom "any specific finding of
facts with respect to the evidence for the defense". Because as this Court well observed, "There
is no law that so requires". 12 Indeed, "the mere failure to specify (in the decision) the contentions
of the appellant and the reasons for refusing to believe them is not sufficient to hold the same
contrary to the requirements of the provisions of law and the Constitution". It is in this setting
that in Manigque, it was held that the mere fact that the findings "were based entirely on the
evidence for the prosecution without taking into consideration or even mentioning the appellant's
side in the controversy as shown by his own testimony", would not vitiate the judgment. 13 If the
court did not recite in the decision the testimony of each witness for, or each item of evidence
presented by, the defeated party, it does not mean that the court has overlooked such testimony
or such item of evidence. 14 At any rate, the legal presumptions are that official duty has been
regularly performed, and that all the matters within an issue in a case were laid before the court
and passed upon by it. 15

Findings of fact, which the Court of Appeals is required to make, maybe defined as "the written
statement of the ultimate facts as found by the court ... and essential to support the decision and
judgment rendered thereon". 16 They consist of the court's "conclusions" with respect to the
determinative facts in issue". 17 A question of law, upon the other hand, has been declared as
"one which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by
the parties." 18

2. By statute, "only questions of law may be raised" in an appeal by certiorari from a judgment of
the Court of Appeals. 19 That judgment is conclusive as to the facts. It is not appropriately the
business of this Court to alter the facts or to review the questions of fact. 20

With these guideposts, we now face the problem of whether the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals support its judgment.
3. Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims?

It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to and received from petitioner a
first class ticket. But petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent the true and complete
intent and agreement of the parties; that said respondent knew that he did not have confirmed
reservations for first class on any specific flight, although he had tourist class protection; that,
accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class
ride, but that such would depend upon the availability of first class seats.

These are matters which petitioner has thoroughly presented and discussed in its brief before the
Court of Appeals under its third assignment of error, which reads: "The trial court erred in
finding that plaintiff had confirmed reservations for, and a right to, first class seats on the
"definite" segments of his journey, particularly that from Saigon to Beirut". 21

And, the Court of Appeals disposed of this contention thus:

Defendant seems to capitalize on the argument that the issuance of a first-class ticket was
no guarantee that the passenger to whom the same had been issued, would be
accommodated in the first-class compartment, for as in the case of plaintiff he had yet to
make arrangements upon arrival at every station for the necessary first-class reservation.
We are not impressed by such a reasoning. We cannot understand how a reputable firm
like defendant airplane company could have the indiscretion to give out tickets it never
meant to honor at all. It received the corresponding amount in payment of first-class
tickets and yet it allowed the passenger to be at the mercy of its employees. It is more in
keeping with the ordinary course of business that the company should know whether or
riot the tickets it issues are to be honored or not.22

Not that the Court of Appeals is alone. The trial court similarly disposed of petitioner's
contention, thus:

On the fact that plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "First class" ticket, there can be no question.
Apart from his testimony, see plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-1", "B", "B-1," "B-2", "C" and "C-1",
and defendant's own witness, Rafael Altonaga, confirmed plaintiff's testimony and testified as
follows:

Q. In these tickets there are marks "O.K." From what you know, what does this OK
mean?

A. That the space is confirmed.

Q. Confirmed for first class?

A. Yes, "first class". (Transcript, p. 169)

xxx xxx xxx

Defendant tried to prove by the testimony of its witnesses Luis Zaldariaga and Rafael Altonaga
that although plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "first class" airplane ticket, the ticket was
subject to confirmation in Hongkong. The court cannot give credit to the testimony of said
witnesses. Oral evidence cannot prevail over written evidence, and plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-
l", "B", "B-l", "C" and "C-1" belie the testimony of said witnesses, and clearly show that the
plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a first class ticket without any reservation whatever.

Furthermore, as hereinabove shown, defendant's own witness Rafael Altonaga testified that the
reservation for a "first class" accommodation for the plaintiff was confirmed. The court cannot
believe that after such confirmation defendant had a verbal understanding with plaintiff that the
"first class" ticket issued to him by defendant would be subject to confirmation in Hongkong. 23

We have heretofore adverted to the fact that except for a slight difference of a few pesos in the
amount refunded on Carrascoso's ticket, the decision of the Court of First Instance was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals in all other respects. We hold the view that such a judgment of
affirmance has merged the judgment of the lower court. 24 Implicit in that affirmance is a
determination by the Court of Appeals that the proceeding in the Court of First Instance was free
from prejudicial error and "all questions raised by the assignments of error and all questions that
might have been raised are to be regarded as finally adjudicated against the appellant". So also,
the judgment affirmed "must be regarded as free from all error". 25 We reached this policy
construction because nothing in the decision of the Court of Appeals on this point would suggest
that its findings of fact are in any way at war with those of the trial court. Nor was said
affirmance by the Court of Appeals upon a ground or grounds different from those which were
made the basis of the conclusions of the trial court. 26

If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class seat,
notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed, then an air
passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline. What security then can a passenger
have? It will always be an easy matter for an airline aided by its employees, to strike out the very
stipulations in the ticket, and say that there was a verbal agreement to the contrary. What if the
passenger had a schedule to fulfill? We have long learned that, as a rule, a written document
speaks a uniform language; that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve
stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued is
desirable. Such is the case here. The lower courts refused to believe the oral evidence intended to
defeat the covenants in the ticket.

The foregoing are the considerations which point to the conclusion that there are facts upon
which the Court of Appeals predicated the finding that respondent Carrascoso had a first class
ticket and was entitled to a first class seat at Bangkok, which is a stopover in the Saigon to Beirut
leg of the flight. 27 We perceive no "welter of distortions by the Court of Appeals of petitioner's
statement of its position", as charged by petitioner. 28 Nor do we subscribe to petitioner's
accusation that respondent Carrascoso "surreptitiously took a first class seat to provoke an issue".
29
And this because, as petitioner states, Carrascoso went to see the Manager at his office in
Bangkok "to confirm my seat and because from Saigon I was told again to see the Manager". 30
Why, then, was he allowed to take a first class seat in the plane at Bangkok, if he had no seat?
Or, if another had a better right to the seat?
4. Petitioner assails respondent court's award of moral damages. Petitioner's trenchant claim is
that Carrascoso's action is planted upon breach of contract; that to authorize an award for moral
damages there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith;31 and that the decision of the Court of
Appeals fails to make a finding of bad faith. The pivotal allegations in the complaint bearing on
this issue are:

3. That ... plaintiff entered into a contract of air carriage with the Philippine Air Lines for
a valuable consideration, the latter acting as general agents for and in behalf of the
defendant, under which said contract, plaintiff was entitled to, as defendant agreed to
furnish plaintiff, First Class passage on defendant's plane during the entire duration of
plaintiff's tour of Europe with Hongkong as starting point up to and until plaintiff's return
trip to Manila, ... .

4. That, during the first two legs of the trip from Hongkong to Saigon and from Saigon to
Bangkok, defendant furnished to the plaintiff First Class accommodation but only after
protestations, arguments and/or insistence were made by the plaintiff with defendant's
employees.

5. That finally, defendant failed to provide First Class passage, but instead furnished
plaintiff only Tourist Class accommodations from Bangkok to Teheran and/or
Casablanca, ... the plaintiff has been compelled by defendant's employees to leave the
First Class accommodation berths at Bangkok after he was already seated.

6. That consequently, the plaintiff, desiring no repetition of the inconvenience and

embarrassments brought by defendant's breach of contract was forced to take a Pan
American World Airways plane on his return trip from Madrid to Manila.32

xxx xxx xxx

2. That likewise, as a result of defendant's failure to furnish First Class accommodations

aforesaid, plaintiff suffered inconveniences, embarrassments, and humiliations, thereby causing
plaintiff mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, social humiliation, and the like
injury, resulting in moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00. 33

xxx xxx xxx

The foregoing, in our opinion, substantially aver: First, That there was a contract to furnish
plaintiff a first class passage covering, amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second, That
said contract was breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok;
and Third, that there was bad faith when petitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his
first class accommodation berth "after he was already, seated" and to take a seat in the tourist
class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby
causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting
in moral damages. It is true that there is no specific mention of the term bad faith in the
complaint. But, the inference of bad faith is there, it may be drawn from the facts and
circumstances set forth therein. 34 The contract was averred to establish the relation between the
parties. But the stress of the action is put on wrongful expulsion.

Quite apart from the foregoing is that (a) right the start of the trial, respondent's counsel placed
petitioner on guard on what Carrascoso intended to prove: That while sitting in the plane in
Bangkok, Carrascoso was ousted by petitioner's manager who gave his seat to a white man; 35
and (b) evidence of bad faith in the fulfillment of the contract was presented without objection on
the part of the petitioner. It is, therefore, unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is
sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an award for moral damages. Deficiency in the
complaint, if any, was cured by the evidence. An amendment thereof to conform to the evidence
is not even required. 36 On the question of bad faith, the Court of Appeals declared:

That the plaintiff was forced out of his seat in the first class compartment of the plane
belonging to the defendant Air France while at Bangkok, and was transferred to the
tourist class not only without his consent but against his will, has been sufficiently
established by plaintiff in his testimony before the court, corroborated by the
corresponding entry made by the purser of the plane in his notebook which notation reads
as follows:

"First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and
that the captain refused to intervene",

and by the testimony of an eye-witness, Ernesto G. Cuento, who was a co-passenger. The
captain of the plane who was asked by the manager of defendant company at Bangkok to
intervene even refused to do so. It is noteworthy that no one on behalf of defendant ever
contradicted or denied this evidence for the plaintiff. It could have been easy for
defendant to present its manager at Bangkok to testify at the trial of the case, or yet to
secure his disposition; but defendant did neither. 37

The Court of appeals further stated —

Neither is there evidence as to whether or not a prior reservation was made by the white
man. Hence, if the employees of the defendant at Bangkok sold a first-class ticket to him
when all the seats had already been taken, surely the plaintiff should not have been
picked out as the one to suffer the consequences and to be subjected to the humiliation
and indignity of being ejected from his seat in the presence of others. Instead of
explaining to the white man the improvidence committed by defendant's employees, the
manager adopted the more drastic step of ousting the plaintiff who was then safely
ensconsced in his rightful seat. We are strengthened in our belief that this probably was
what happened there, by the testimony of defendant's witness Rafael Altonaga who, when
asked to explain the meaning of the letters "O.K." appearing on the tickets of plaintiff,
said "that the space is confirmed for first class. Likewise, Zenaida Faustino, another
witness for defendant, who was the chief of the Reservation Office of defendant, testified
as follows:
 "Q How does the person in the ticket-issuing office know what reservation the
passenger has arranged with you?

A They call us up by phone and ask for the confirmation." (t.s.n., p. 247, June 19,
1959)

In this connection, we quote with approval what the trial Judge has said on this point:

Why did the, using the words of witness Ernesto G. Cuento, "white man" have a
"better right" to the seat occupied by Mr. Carrascoso? The record is silent. The
defendant airline did not prove "any better", nay, any right on the part of the
"white man" to the "First class" seat that the plaintiff was occupying and for
which he paid and was issued a corresponding "first class" ticket.

If there was a justified reason for the action of the defendant's Manager in
Bangkok, the defendant could have easily proven it by having taken the testimony
of the said Manager by deposition, but defendant did not do so; the presumption is
that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced [Sec. 69, par (e),
Rules of Court]; and, under the circumstances, the Court is constrained to find, as
it does find, that the Manager of the defendant airline in Bangkok not merely
asked but threatened the plaintiff to throw him out of the plane if he did not give
up his "first class" seat because the said Manager wanted to accommodate, using
the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, the "white man".38

It is really correct to say that the Court of Appeals in the quoted portion first transcribed
did not use the term "bad faith". But can it be doubted that the recital of facts therein
points to bad faith? The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right
to a first class seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from his
seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist class compartment -
just to give way to another passenger whose right thereto has not been established.
Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed a meaning different
from what is understood in law. For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind
affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or will or
for ulterior purpose." 39

And if the foregoing were not yet sufficient, there is the express finding of bad faith in
the judgment of the Court of First Instance, thus:

The evidence shows that the defendant violated its contract of transportation with
plaintiff in bad faith, with the aggravating circumstances that defendant's Manager
in Bangkok went to the extent of threatening the plaintiff in the presence of many
passengers to have him thrown out of the airplane to give the "first class" seat that
he was occupying to, again using the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, a
"white man" whom he (defendant's Manager) wished to accommodate, and the
defendant has not proven that this "white man" had any "better right" to occupy
 the "first class" seat that the plaintiff was occupying, duly paid for, and for which
the corresponding "first class" ticket was issued by the defendant to him.40

5. The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not be essayed. It
is well settled in law. 41 For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his
employer, must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:

ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.

In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept; and, we held that upon the
provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable. 42

6. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other
contractual relation. 43 And this, because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the
public. Its business is mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts
and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with
a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for
an action for damages.

Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the
carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to
be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such
employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a
passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. 44

Thus, "Where a steamship company 45 had accepted a passenger's check, it was a breach of
contract and a tort, giving a right of action for its agent in the presence of third persons to falsely
notify her that the check was worthless and demand payment under threat of ejection, though the
language used was not insulting and she was not ejected." 46 And this, because, although the
relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature" nevertheless "the act
that breaks the contract may be also a tort". 47 And in another case, "Where a passenger on a
railroad train, when the conductor came to collect his fare tendered him the cash fare to a point
where the train was scheduled not to stop, and told him that as soon as the train reached such
point he would pay the cash fare from that point to destination, there was nothing in the conduct
of the passenger which justified the conductor in using insulting language to him, as by calling
him a lunatic," 48 and the Supreme Court of South Carolina there held the carrier liable for the
mental suffering of said passenger.1awphîl.nèt

Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's
action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty
by the petitioner air carrier — a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.

7. Petitioner draws our attention to respondent Carrascoso's testimony, thus —

 Q You mentioned about an attendant. Who is that attendant and purser?

A When we left already — that was already in the trip — I could not help it. So one of
the flight attendants approached me and requested from me my ticket and I said, What
for? and she said, "We will note that you transferred to the tourist class". I said, "Nothing
of that kind. That is tantamount to accepting my transfer." And I also said, "You are not
going to note anything there because I am protesting to this transfer".

Q Was she able to note it?

A No, because I did not give my ticket.

Q About that purser?

A Well, the seats there are so close that you feel uncomfortable and you don't have
enough leg room, I stood up and I went to the pantry that was next to me and the purser
was there. He told me, "I have recorded the incident in my notebook." He read it and
translated it to me — because it was recorded in French — "First class passenger was
forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene."

Mr. VALTE —

I move to strike out the last part of the testimony of the witness because the best evidence
would be the notes. Your Honor.

COURT —

I will allow that as part of his testimony. 49

Petitioner charges that the finding of the Court of Appeals that the purser made an entry in his
notebook reading "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and
that the captain refused to intervene" is predicated upon evidence [Carrascoso's testimony above]
which is incompetent. We do not think so. The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster
incident. Testimony on the entry does not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule.
Such testimony is admissible. 49a

Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the dialogue happened, the impact of
the startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet
died down. Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. 50 For,
they grow "out of the nervous excitement and mental and physical condition of the declarant". 51
The utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and related to
the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed. 52 It thus
escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.

At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines. And, by an employee of petitioner. It
would have been an easy matter for petitioner to have contradicted Carrascoso's testimony. If it
were really true that no such entry was made, the deposition of the purser could have cleared up
the matter.

We, therefore, hold that the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso is admissible in evidence.

8. Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the court ample power to grant
exemplary damages — in contracts and quasi- contracts. The only condition is that defendant
should have "acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." 53 The
manner of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into this legal precept.
And this, in addition to moral damages.54

9. The right to attorney's fees is fully established. The grant of exemplary damages justifies a
similar judgment for attorneys' fees. The least that can be said is that the courts below felt that it
is but just and equitable that attorneys' fees be given. 55 We do not intend to break faith with the
tradition that discretion well exercised — as it was here — should not be disturbed.

10. Questioned as excessive are the amounts decreed by both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, thus: P25,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00, by way of exemplary damages, and
P3,000.00 as attorneys' fees. The task of fixing these amounts is primarily with the trial court. 56
The Court of Appeals did not interfere with the same. The dictates of good sense suggest that we
give our imprimatur thereto. Because, the facts and circumstances point to the reasonableness
thereof.57

On balance, we say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not suffer from reversible
error. We accordingly vote to affirm the same. Costs against petitioner. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barre

[G.R. No. 145804. February 6, 2003]

LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN, petitioners, vs. MARJORIE
NAVIDAD, Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD & PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY,
respondents.

DECISION

VITUG, J.:

The case before the Court is an appeal from the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals,
promulgated on 27 April 2000 and 10 October 2000, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 60720,
entitled Marjorie Navidad and Heirs of the Late Nicanor Navidad vs. Rodolfo Roman, et. al.,
which has modified the decision of 11 August 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 266,
Pasig City, exonerating Prudent Security Agency (Prudent) from liability and finding Light Rail
Transit Authority (LRTA) and Rodolfo Roman liable for damages on account of the death of
Nicanor Navidad.
On 14 October 1993, about half an hour past seven oclock in the evening, Nicanor Navidad, then
drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a token (representing payment of the
fare). While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the
security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad. A misunderstanding or an altercation
between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. No evidence, however, was adduced to
indicate how the fight started or who, between the two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad
later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by
petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was
killed instantaneously.

On 08 December 1994, the widow of Nicanor, herein respondent Marjorie Navidad, along with
her children, filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the
LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death of her
husband. LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against
Escartin and Prudent. Prudent, in its answer, denied liability and averred that it had exercised due
diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards.

The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin, instead of
presenting evidence, filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin
was negligent in his assigned task. On 11 August 1998, the trial court rendered its decision; it
adjudged:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants
Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordering the latter to pay jointly and severally the
plaintiffs the following:

a) 1) Actual damages of P44,830.00;

2) Compensatory damages of P443,520.00;

3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P50,000.00;

b) Moral damages of P50,000.00;

c) Attorneys fees of P20,000;

d) Costs of suit.

The complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman are dismissed for lack of merit.

The compulsory counterclaim of LRTA and Roman are likewise dismissed.1[1]

Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 27 August 2000, the appellate court promulgated
its now assailed decision exonerating Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad
and, instead, holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable thusly:

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is hereby MODIFIED, by exonerating the appellants

from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad, Jr. Instead, appellees Rodolfo Roman and
the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) are held liable for his death and are hereby directed to
pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs-appellees, the following amounts:

a) P44,830.00 as actual damages;

b) P50,000.00 as nominal damages;

c) P50,000.00 as moral damages;

d) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the deceased; and

e) P20,000.00 as and for attorneys fees.2[2]

The appellate court ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the
train, a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place
where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token
therefor. In exempting Prudent from liability, the court stressed that there was nothing to link the
security agency to the death of Navidad. It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin
inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the evidence merely established the fact of death of
Navidad by reason of his having been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and
operated at the time by Roman. The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present
expert evidence to establish the fact that the application of emergency brakes could not have
stopped the train.

The appellate court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10 October
2000.

In their present recourse, petitioners recite alleged errors on the part of the appellate court; viz:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED BY DISREGARDING THE

FINDINGS OF FACTS BY THE TRIAL COURT

II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
PETITIONERS ARE LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD, JR.

III.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT

RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA.3[3]

Petitioners would contend that the appellate court ignored the evidence and the factual findings
of the trial court by holding them liable on the basis of a sweeping conclusion that the
presumption of negligence on the part of a common carrier was not overcome. Petitioners would
insist that Escartins assault upon Navidad, which caused the latter to fall on the tracks, was an act
of a stranger that could not have been foreseen or prevented. The LRTA would add that the
appellate courts conclusion on the existence of an employer-employee relationship between
Roman and LRTA lacked basis because Roman himself had testified being an employee of
Metro Transit and not of the LRTA.

Respondents, supporting the decision of the appellate court, contended that a contract of carriage
was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the
premises of the latter, entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual
relation, and that the appellate court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of
Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier.

Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its business and for
reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty of exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the
safety of passengers.4[4] The Civil Code, governing the liability of a common carrier for death of
or injury to its passengers, provides:

Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for
all the circumstances.

Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755.
Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the
negligence or willful acts of the formers employees, although such employees may have acted
beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.

This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees.

Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of
the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carriers
employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have
prevented or stopped the act or omission.

The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances.5[5] Such duty of a common carrier to
provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for so
long as the passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to the
contract of carriage.6[6] The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or
injury to passengers (a) through the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or b) on account
of wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the common carriers
employees through the exercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or
omission.7[7] In case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been
negligent, and8[8] by simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish
the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to
prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure.9[9] In the absence of
satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the accident occurred, which petitioners, according
to the appellate court, have failed to show, the presumption would be that it has been at fault,10[10]
an exception from the general rule that negligence must be proved.11[11]

The foundation of LRTAs liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the
victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high
diligence required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety
of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an
outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not
relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage.

Should Prudent be made likewise liable? If at all, that liability could only be for tort under the
provisions of Article 217612[12] and related provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180,13[13] of
the Civil Code. The premise, however, for the employers liability is negligence or fault on the
part of the employee. Once such fault is established, the employer can then be made liable on the
basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris
families in the selection and supervision of its employees. The liability is primary and can only
be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee, a factual
matter that has not been shown. Absent such a showing, one might ask further, how then must
the liability of the common carrier, on the one hand, and an independent contractor, on the other
hand, be described? It would be solidary. A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and
when the same act or omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other
in culpa aquiliana, Article 219414[14] of the Civil Code can well apply.15[15] In fine, a liability for
tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract.16[16] Stated
differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the
source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between the parties, the contract can
be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.17[17]

Regrettably for LRT, as well as perhaps the surviving spouse and heirs of the late Nicanor
Navidad, this Court is concluded by the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that there is
nothing to link (Prudent) to the death of Nicanor (Navidad), for the reason that the negligence of
its employee, Escartin, has not been duly proven x x x. This finding of the appellate court is not
without substantial justification in our own review of the records of the case.

There being, similarly, no showing that petitioner Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any
culpable act or omission, he must also be absolved from liability. Needless to say, the contractual
tie between the LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation between the latter and Roman;
thus, Roman can be made liable only for his own fault or negligence.

The award of nominal damages in addition to actual damages is untenable. Nominal damages are
adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the
defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff
for any loss suffered by him.18[18] It is an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist
with compensatory damages.19[19]

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the appellate court is AFFIRMED with

MODIFICATION but only in that (a) the award of nominal damages is DELETED and (b)
petitioner Rodolfo Roman is absolved from liability. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 147791 September 8, 2006

CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,

petitioner,
vs.
REBECCA G. ESTRELLA, RACHEL E. FLETCHER, PHILIPPINE PHOENIX
SURETY & INSURANCE INC., BATANGAS LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS CO., and
WILFREDO DATINGUINOO, respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review assails the March 29, 2001 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 46896, which affirmed with modification the February 9, 1993 Decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 13, in Civil Case No. R-82-2137, finding Batangas
Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. (BLTB) and Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines
(CDCP) liable for damages.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On December 29, 1978, respondents Rebecca G. Estrella and her granddaughter, Rachel E.
Fletcher, boarded in San Pablo City, a BLTB bus bound for Pasay City. However, they never
reached their destination because their bus was rammed from behind by a tractor-truck of CDCP
in the South Expressway. The strong impact pushed forward their seats and pinned their knees to
the seats in front of them. They regained consciousness only when rescuers created a hole in the
bus and extricated their legs from under the seats. They were brought to the Makati Medical
Center where the doctors diagnosed their injuries to be as follows:

Medical Certificate of Rebecca Estrella

Fracture, left tibia mid 3rd

Lacerated wound, chin
Contusions with abrasions, left lower leg
Fracture, 6th and 7th ribs, right3

Medical Certificate of Rachel Fletcher

Extensive lacerated wounds, right leg posterior aspect popliteal area

and antero-lateral aspect mid lower leg with severance of muscles.
Partial amputation BK left leg with severance of gastro-soleus and
antero-lateral compartment of lower leg.
Fracture, open comminuted, both tibial4

Thereafter, respondents filed a Complaint5 for damages against CDCP, BLTB, Espiridion
Payunan, Jr. and Wilfredo Datinguinoo before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 13.
They alleged (1) that Payunan, Jr. and Datinguinoo, who were the drivers of CDCP and BLTB
buses, respectively, were negligent and did not obey traffic laws; (2) that BLTB and CDCP did
not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their
employees; (3) that BLTB allowed its bus to operate knowing that it lacked proper maintenance
thus exposing its passengers to grave danger; (4) that they suffered actual damages amounting to
P250,000.00 for Estrella and P300,000.00 for Fletcher; (5) that they suffered physical
discomfort, serious anxiety, fright and mental anguish, besmirched reputation and wounded
feelings, moral shock, and lifelong social humiliation; (6) that defendants failed to act with
justice, give respondents their due, observe honesty and good faith which entitles them to claim
for exemplary damage; and (7) that they are entitled to a reasonable amount of attorney's fees
and litigation expenses.

CDCP filed its Answer6 which was later amended to include a third-party complaint against
Philippine Phoenix Surety and Insurance, Inc. (Phoenix).7

On February 9, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision finding CDCP and BLTB and their
employees liable for damages, the dispositive portion of which, states:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered:

In the Complaint –

1. In favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants BLTB, Wilfredo Datinguinoo,
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (now PNCC) and
Espiridion Payunan, Jr., ordering said defendants, jointly and severally to pay the
plaintiffs the sum of P79,254.43 as actual damages and to pay the sum of P10,000.00 as
attorney's fees or a total of P89,254.43;

2. In addition, defendant Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines

and defendant Espiridion Payunan, Jr., shall pay the plaintiffs the amount of Fifty
Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos to plaintiff Rachel Fletcher and Twenty Five Thousand
(P25,000.00) Pesos to plaintiff Rebecca Estrella;

3. On the counterclaim of BLTB Co. and Wilfredo Datinguinoo –

Dismissing the counterclaim;

4. On the crossclaim against Construction and Development Corporation of the

Philippines (now PNCC) and Espiridion Payunan, Jr. –

Dismissing the crossclaim;

5. On the counterclaim of Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines

(now PNCC) –

Dismissing the counterclaim;

6. On the crossclaim against BLTB –

Dismissing the crossclaim;

 7. On the Third Party Complaint by Construction and Development Corporation of the
Philippines against Philippine Phoenix Surety and Insurance, Incorporated –

Dismissing the Third Party Complaint.

SO ORDERED.8

The trial court held that BLTB, as a common carrier, was bound to observe extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the safety of its passengers. It must carry the passengers safely as
far as human care and foresight provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
with a due regard for all the circumstances. Thus, where a passenger dies or is injured, the carrier
is presumed to have been at fault or has acted negligently. BLTB's inability to carry respondents
to their destination gave rise to an action for breach of contract of carriage while its failure to
rebut the presumption of negligence made it liable to respondents for the breach.9

Regarding CDCP, the trial court found that the tractor-truck it owned bumped the BLTB bus
from behind. Evidence showed that CDCP's driver was reckless and driving very fast at the time
of the incident. The gross negligence of its driver raised the presumption that CDCP was
negligent either in the selection or in the supervision of its employees which it failed to rebut
thus making it and its driver liable to respondents.10

Unsatisfied with the award of damages and attorney's fees by the trial court, respondents moved
that the decision be reconsidered but was denied. Respondents elevated the case11 to the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the decision of the trial court but modified the amount of damages, the
dispositive portion of which provides:

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated October 7, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 13, Manila is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATION:

1. The interest of six (6) percent per annum on the actual damages of P79,354.43 should
commence to run from the time the judicial demand was made or from the filing of the
complaint on February 4, 1980;

2. Thirty (30) percent of the total amount recovered is hereby awarded as attorney's fees;

3. Defendants-appellants Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines

(now PNCC) and Espiridion Payunan, Jr. are ordered to pay plaintiff-appellants Rebecca
Estrella and Rachel Fletcher the amount of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) each as
exemplary damages and P80,000.00 by way of moral damages to Rachel Fletcher.

SO ORDERED.12

The Court of Appeals held that the actual or compensatory damage sought by respondents for the
injuries they sustained in the form of hospital bills were already liquidated and were ascertained.
Accordingly, the 6% interest per annum should commence to run from the time the judicial
demand was made or from the filing of the complaint and not from the date of judgment. The
Court of Appeals also awarded attorney's fees equivalent to 30% of the total amount recovered
based on the retainer agreement of the parties. The appellate court also held that respondents are
entitled to exemplary and moral damages. Finally, it affirmed the ruling of the trial court that the
claim of CDCP against Phoenix had already prescribed.

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT

HOLDING RESPONDENTS BLTB AND/OR ITS DRIVER WILFREDO
DATINGUINOO SOLELY LIABLE FOR THE DAMAGES SUSTAINED BY HEREIN
RESPONDENTS FLETCHER AND ESTRELLA.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN

AWARDING EXCESSIVE OR UNFOUNDED DAMAGES, ATTORNEY'S FEES
AND LEGAL INTEREST TO RESPONDENTS FLETCHER AND ESTRELLA.

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT

HOLDING RESPONDENT PHOENIX LIABLE UNDER ITS INSURANCE POLICY
ON THE GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION.

The issues for resolution are as follows: (1) whether BLTB and its driver Wilfredo Datinguinoo
are solely liable for the damages sustained by respondents; (2) whether the damages, attorney's
fees and legal interest awarded by the CA are excessive and unfounded; (3) whether CDCP can
recover under its insurance policy from Phoenix.

Petitioner contends that since it was made solidarily liable with BLTB for actual damages and
attorney's fees in paragraph 1 of the trial court's decision, then it should no longer be held liable
to pay the amounts stated in paragraph 2 of the same decision. Petitioner claims that the liability
for actual damages and attorney's fees is based on culpa contractual, thus, only BLTB should be
held liable. As regards paragraph 2 of the trial court's decision, petitioner claims that it is
ambiguous and arbitrary because the dispositive portion did not state the basis and nature of such
award.

Respondents, on the other hand, argue that petitioner is also at fault, hence, it was properly
joined as a party. There may be an action arising out of one incident where questions of fact are
common to all. Thus, the cause of action based on culpa aquiliana in the civil suit they filed
against it was valid.

The petition lacks merit.

The case filed by respondents against petitioner is an action for culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.13 In this regard, Article 2180 provides that the obligation
imposed by Article 2176 is demandable for the acts or omissions of those persons for whom one
is responsible. Consequently, an action based on quasi-delict may be instituted against the
employer for an employee's act or omission. The liability for the negligent conduct of the
subordinate is direct and primary, but is subject to the defense of due diligence in the selection
and supervision of the employee.14 In the instant case, the trial court found that petitioner failed
to prove that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of Payunan, Jr.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals found petitioner solidarily liable with BLTB for the
actual damages suffered by respondents because of the injuries they sustained. It was established
that Payunan, Jr. was driving recklessly because of the skid marks as shown in the sketch of the
police investigator.

It is well-settled in Fabre, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,15 that the owner of the other vehicle which
collided with a common carrier is solidarily liable to the injured passenger of the same. We held,
thus:

The same rule of liability was applied in situations where the negligence of the driver of
the bus on which plaintiff was riding concurred with the negligence of a third party who
was the driver of another vehicle, thus causing an accident. In Anuran v. Buño, Batangas
Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, and Metro Manila Transit
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the bus company, its driver, the operator of the
other vehicle and the driver of the vehicle were jointly and severally held liable to
the injured passenger or the latter's heirs. The basis of this allocation of liability was
explained in Viluan v. Court of Appeals, thus:

Nor should it make any difference that the liability of petitioner [bus owner] springs
from contract while that of respondents [owner and driver of other vehicle] arises
from quasi-delict. As early as 1913, we already ruled in Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez, 56 Phil.
177, that in case of injury to a passenger due to the negligence of the driver of the bus on
which he was riding and of the driver of another vehicle, the drivers as well as the owners
of the two vehicles are jointly and severally liable for damages. x x x

xxxx

As in the case of BLTB, private respondents in this case and her co-plaintiffs did not stake
out their claim against the carrier and the driver exclusively on one theory, much less on
that of breach of contract alone. After all, it was permitted for them to allege
alternative causes of action and join as many parties as may be liable on such causes
of action so long as private respondent and her co-plaintiffs do not recover twice for
the same injury. What is clear from the cases is the intent of the plaintiff there to recover
from both the carrier and the driver, thus justifying the holding that the carrier and the
driver were jointly and severally liable because their separate and distinct acts concurred
to produce the same injury.16 (Emphasis supplied)
In a "joint" obligation, each obligor answers only for a part of the whole liability; in a "solidary"
or "joint and several" obligation, the relationship between the active and the passive subjects is
so close that each of them must comply with or demand the fulfillment of the whole obligation.
In Lafarge Cement v. Continental Cement Corporation,17 we reiterated that joint tort feasors are
jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. Citing Worcester v. Ocampo,18 we
held that:

x x x The difficulty in the contention of the appellants is that they fail to recognize that
the basis of the present action is tort. They fail to recognize the universal doctrine that
each joint tort feasor is not only individually liable for the tort in which he participates,
but is also jointly liable with his tort feasors. x x x

It may be stated as a general rule that joint tort feasors are all the persons who command,
instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the
commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit. They
are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as if they had
performed the wrongful act themselves. x x x

Joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. The
persons injured may sue all of them or any number less than all. Each is liable for the
whole damages caused by all, and all together are jointly liable for the whole damage. It
is no defense for one sued alone, that the others who participated in the wrongful act are
not joined with him as defendants; nor is it any excuse for him that his participation in the
tort was insignificant as compared to that of the others. x x x

Joint tort feasors are not liable pro rata. The damages can not be apportioned among
them, except among themselves. They cannot insist upon an apportionment, for the
purpose of each paying an aliquot part. They are jointly and severally liable for the whole
amount. x x x

A payment in full for the damage done, by one of the joint tort feasors, of course satisfies
any claim which might exist against the others. There can be but satisfaction. The release
of one of the joint tort feasors by agreement generally operates to discharge all. x x x

Of course the court during trial may find that some of the alleged tort feasors are liable
and that others are not liable. The courts may release some for lack of evidence while
condemning others of the alleged tort feasors. And this is true even though they are
charged jointly and severally.19

Petitioner's claim that paragraph 2 of the dispositive portion of the trial court's decision is
ambiguous and arbitrary and also entitles respondents to recover twice is without basis. In the
body of the trial court's decision, it was clearly stated that petitioner and its driver Payunan, Jr.,
are jointly and solidarily liable for moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 to respondent
Fletcher and P25,000.00 to respondent Estrella.20 Moreover, there could be no double recovery
because the award in paragraph 2 is for moral damages while the award in paragraph 1 is for
actual damages and attorney's fees.
Petitioner next claims that the damages, attorney's fees, and legal interest awarded by the Court
of Appeals are excessive.

Moral damages may be recovered in quasi-delicts causing physical injuries.21 The award of
moral damages in favor of Fletcher and Estrella in the amount of P80,000.00 must be reduced
since prevailing jurisprudence fixed the same at P50,000.00.22 While moral damages are not
intended to enrich the plaintiff at the expense of the defendant, the award should nonetheless be
commensurate to the suffering inflicted.23

The Court of Appeals correctly awarded respondents exemplary damages in the amount of
P20,000.00 each. Exemplary damages may be awarded in addition to moral and compensatory
damages.24 Article 2231 of the Civil Code also states that in quasi-delicts, exemplary damages
may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.25 In this case, petitioner's driver
was driving recklessly at the time its truck rammed the BLTB bus. Petitioner, who has direct and
primary liability for the negligent conduct of its subordinates, was also found negligent in the
selection and supervision of its employees. In Del Rosario v. Court of Appeals,26 we held, thus:

ART. 2229 of the Civil Code also provides that such damages may be imposed, by way
of example or correction for the public good. While exemplary damages cannot be
recovered as a matter of right, they need not be proved, although plaintiff must show that
he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may
consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded.
Exemplary Damages are imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish another but to
serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions.

Regarding attorney's fees, we held in Traders Royal Bank Employees Union-Independent v.

National Labor Relations Commission,27 that:

There are two commonly accepted concepts of attorney's fees, the so-called ordinary and
extraordinary. In its ordinary concept, an attorney's fee is the reasonable compensation
paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has rendered to the latter. The basis
of this compensation is the fact of his employment by and his agreement with the client.

In its extraordinary concept, an attorney's fee is an indemnity for damages ordered

by the court to be paid by the losing party in a litigation. The basis of this is any of
the cases provided by law where such award can be made, such as those authorized in
Article 2208, Civil Code, and is payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless they
have agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional compensation
or as part thereof.28 (Emphasis supplied)

In the instant case, the Court of Appeals correctly awarded attorney's fees and other expenses of
litigation as they may be recovered as actual or compensatory damages when exemplary
damages are awarded; when the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to
satisfy the plaintiff's valid, just and demandable claim; and in any other case where the court
deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.29
Regarding the imposition of legal interest at the rate of 6% from the time of the filing of the
complaint, we held in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,30 that when an
obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is
breached, the contravenor can be held liable for payment of interest in the concept of actual and
compensatory damages,31 subject to the following rules, to wit –

1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money,
i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been
stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the
time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be
12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand
under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.

2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an

interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court
at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated
claims or damages except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable
certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the
interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially
(Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at
the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the
judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be
deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of
legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.

3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and
executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or
paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction,
this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of
credit.32 (Emphasis supplied)

Accordingly, the legal interest of 6% shall begin to run on February 9, 1993 when the trial court
rendered judgment and not on February 4, 1980 when the complaint was filed. This is because at
the time of the filing of the complaint, the amount of the damages to which plaintiffs may be
entitled remains unliquidated and unknown, until it is definitely ascertained, assessed and
determined by the court and only upon presentation of proof thereon.33 From the time the
judgment becomes final and executory, the interest rate shall be 12% until its satisfaction.

Anent the last issue of whether petitioner can recover under its insurance policy from Phoenix,
we affirm the findings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, thus:

As regards the liability of Phoenix, the court a quo correctly ruled that defendant-
appellant CDCP's claim against Phoenix already prescribed pursuant to Section 384 of
P.D. 612, as amended, which provides:
 Any person having any claim upon the policy issued pursuant to this chapter shall,
without any unnecessary delay, present to the insurance company concerned a
written notice of claim setting forth the nature, extent and duration of the injuries
sustained as certified by a duly licensed physician. Notice of claim must be filed
within six months from date of the accident, otherwise, the claim shall be deemed
waived. Action or suit for recovery of damage due to loss or injury must be
brought in proper cases, with the Commissioner or Courts within one year from
denial of the claim, otherwise, the claimant's right of action shall prescribe. (As
amended by PD 1814, BP 874.)34

The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. A written notice of claim must be filed
within six months from the date of the accident. Since petitioner never made any claim within six
months from the date of the accident, its claim has already prescribed.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 46896 dated March 29, 2001, which modified the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 13, in Civil Case No. R-82-2137, is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATIONS that petitioner is held jointly and severally liable to pay (1) actual damages
in the amount of P79,354.43; (2) moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 each for Rachel
Fletcher and Rebecca Estrella; (3) exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00 each for
Rebecca Estrella and Rachel Fletcher; and (4) thirty percent (30%) of the total amount recovered
as attorney's fees. The total amount adjudged shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from
the date of judgment of the trial court until finality of this judgment. From the time this Decision
becomes final and executory and the judgment amount remains unsatisfied, the same shall earn
interest at the rate of 12% per annum until its satisfaction.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, C.J., Chairperson, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., Chico-Nazario, J.J., concur.

G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977

PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of

Agapito Elcano, deceased, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said
minor, defendants-appellees.

Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.

Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.

BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated January 29,
1965 in Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing,
upon motion to dismiss of defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of
damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence,
and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting
subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito
Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the
ground that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with
mistake."

Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:

1. The present action is not only against but a violation of section 1, Rule
107, which is now Rule III, of the Revised Rules of Court;

2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or in

res-adjudicata;

3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill,

because he was relieved as guardian of the other defendant through
emancipation by marriage.

(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])

was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for reconsideration of the
defendants of such denial, reiterating the above grounds that the following order was
issued:

Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants on

January 14, 1965 and after thoroughly examining the arguments therein
contained, the Court finds the same to be meritorious and well-founded.

WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is hereby

reconsidered by ordering the dismissal of the above entitled case.

SO ORDERED.

Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40, Record [p. 21, Record
on Appeal.)

Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Elcano, are presenting for
Our resolution the following assignment of errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY

UPHOLDING THE CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS THAT -
 I

THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A

VIOLATION OF SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW RULE 111, OF THE
REVISED RULES OF COURT, AND THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111,
RULES OF COURT IS APPLICABLE;

II

THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW

FINAL OR RES-ADJUDICTA;

III

THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF

THE CIVIL CODE, ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE; and

IV

THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST

DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL BECAUSE HE WAS RELIEVED AS
GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER DEFENDANT THROUGH EMANCIPATION
BY MARRIAGE. (page 4, Record.)

It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants, defendant-
appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court
of First Instance of Quezon City. After due trial, he was acquitted on the ground that his
act was not criminal because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."
Parenthetically, none of the parties has favored Us with a copy of the decision of
acquittal, presumably because appellants do not dispute that such indeed was the basis
stated in the court's decision. And so, when appellants filed their complaint against
appellees Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the death of their son,
the appellees filed the motion to dismiss above-referred to.

As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive issues presented
for Our resolution are:

1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the
criminal case wherein the action for civil liability, was not reversed?

2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied against Atty.
Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained
of. Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting subsistenee from his father, was
already legally married?
The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and further
clarification of the dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of
obligation which was firmly established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil.
607. In that case, this Court postulated, on the basis of a scholarly dissertation by
Justice Bocobo on the nature of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa criminal or delito and
mere culpa or fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain,
the works of recognized civilians, and earlier jurisprudence of our own, that the same
given act can result in civil liability not only under the Penal Code but also under the
Civil Code. Thus, the opinion holds:

The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act
machinist. come under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that
case, the action of the agent killeth unjustified and fraudulent and
therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was
held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the
Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and not the
employee who was being sued. (pp. 615-616, 73 Phil.). 1

It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a
criminal case because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by
the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a
proper subject matter either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising
from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence
under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of
a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly
recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been
prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he
could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.) 2

It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902
of the Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have been criminally
prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but also made civilly
liable because of his criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded damages in
an independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. (p.
618, 73 Phil.) 3

The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to
dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little
understood, in the past, it might not he inappropriate to indicate their foundations.

Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple
negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to
fault or negligence not punished by law, accordingly to the literal import of article 1093 of
the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and
application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property- through any
degree of negligence - even the slightest - would have to be Idemnified only through the
principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would
remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any
intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the
interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit
that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render
almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development as
 culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to
1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.

Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make
the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which
can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of
evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil
action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise. there would be many
instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)

Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the
Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of
spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and efficacy of
the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek damages
only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is
another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this
habitual method is allowed by, our laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically useless
and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or
culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual
course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the harms done by such practice
and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et
seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict
or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be
diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for the
better safeguarding or private rights because it realtor, an ancient and additional remedy,
and for the further reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the issues,
limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party
wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress. (p.
621, 73 Phil.)

Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the foregoing excerpts from the
opinion in Garcia that the concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil Code therein referred to
contemplate only acts of negligence and not intentional voluntary acts - deeper reflection would reveal
that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that in fact it actually extends to fault or
culpa. This can be seen in the reference made therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of
February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a negligent act. Indeed, Article
1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force here at the time of Garcia, provided textually that obligations
"which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence, not punishable by law, intervene
shall be the subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it is precisely
the underline qualification, "not punishable by law", that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an
ultimo construction or interpretation of the letter of the law that "killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth lift-
hence, the ruling that "(W)e will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost
lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-
delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code." And so,
because Justice Bacobo was Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the original text of the new
Civil Code, it is to be noted that the said Code, which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer
uses the term, 11 not punishable by law," thereby making it clear that the concept of culpa aquiliana
includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or matter.
Thus, the corresponding provisions to said Article 1093 in the new code, which is Article 1162, simply
says, "Obligations derived from quasi-delicto shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII
of this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 of the
new code provides:
 ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.
But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant.

According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at first sight startling,
is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The
former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient
origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such
distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained
by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by
Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an
accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent
civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or
'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery.", (Report of the Code) Commission, p. 162.)

Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence, the same
argument of Justice Bacobo about construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth lift- rather than that
which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And
considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code definitely establishes
the separability and independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in character (under Articles
29 to 32) from the civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same
separability, it is "more congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice, and more in harmony with
modern progress"- to borrow the felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific Co., 7
Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligencia covers not only
acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or
negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not
he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if
he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other
words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil
liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act
considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not estinguished even by a declaration in the
criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused.
Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent
acts which may be punishable by law.4

It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability
for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.

Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's emancipation by marriage on the possible
civil liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the conclusion of appellees that
Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot be upheld.

While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil
Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is,
however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or
absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority
over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but
he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or
mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or
guardian."
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of
his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company." In the
instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and getting
subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still
subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.

It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary liability of
presuncion with their offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to supervise
their minor children in order to prevent them from causing damage to third persons. 5 On the other hand,
the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not,
nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not
carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. (See
Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise
stated, the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child,
while still a minor, does not give answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering
of real property which cannot be done by their minor married child without their consent. (Art. 399;
Manresa, supra.)

Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by
marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of
equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is ordered to proceed in
accordance with the foregoing opinion. Costs against appellees.

Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, and Martin, JJ., concur.

Concepcion Jr., J, is on leave.

Martin, J, was designated to sit in the Second Division

G.R. No. 108017 April 3, 1995

MARIA BENITA A. DULAY, in her own behalf and in behalf of the minor children KRIZTEEN ELIZABETH, BEVERLY MARIE and
NAPOLEON II, all surnamed DULAY, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, Former Eighth Division, HON. TEODORO P. REGINO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court National Capital Region, Quezon City, Br. 84, SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY CO., INC., and
SUPERGUARD SECURITY CORPORATION, respondents.

BIDIN, J.:

This petition for certiorari prays for the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 29, 1991 in CA-G.R. CV No. 24646
which affirmed the order of the Regional Trial Court dismissing Civil Case No. Q-89-1751, and its resolution dated November 17, 1991
denying herein, petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred at the "Big Bang Sa Alabang," Alabang
Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon
Dulay.
Herein petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own behalf and in behalf of her minor children, filed
on February 8, 1989 an action for damages against Benigno Torzuela and herein private respondents Safeguard Investigation and Security
Co., Inc., ("SAFEGUARD") and/or Superguard Security Corp. ("SUPERGUARD"), alleged employers of defendant Torzuela. The complaint,
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 among others alleges the following:

1. . . .

Defendants SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY CO., INC., (Defendant Safeguard) and SUPERGUARD
SECURITY CORPORATION (Defendant Superguard) are corporations duly organized and existing in accordance with
Philippine laws, with offices at 10th Floor, Manufacturers Building, Inc., Plaza Santa Cruz, Manila. They are impleaded
as alternative defendants for, while the former appears to be the employer of defendant BENIGNO TORZUELA
(defendant TORZUELA), the latter impliedly acknowledged responsibility for the acts of defendant TORZUELA by
extending its sympathies to plaintiffs.

Defendant BENIGNO TORZUELA is of legal age, an employee of defendant SAFEGUARD and/or defendant
SUPERGUARD and, at the time of the incident complained of, was under their control and supervision. . . .

3. On December 7, 1988 at around 8:00 a.m., defendant TORZUELA, while he was on duty as security guard at the
"Big Bang sa Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila shot and killed NAPOLEON V. DULAY with a .38
caliber revolver belonging to defendant SAFEGUARD, and/or SUPERGUARD (per Police Report dated January 7,
1989, copy attached as Annex A);

4. The incident resulting in the death of NAPOLEON V. DULAY was due to the concurring negligence of the
defendants. Defendant TORZUELA'S wanton and reckless discharge of the firearm issued to him by defendant
SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD was the immediate and proximate cause of the injury, while the negligence of
defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD consists in its having failed to exercise the diligence of a good father
of a family in the supervision and control of its employee to avoid the injury.

xxx xxx xxx

(Rollo, pp. 117-118)

Petitioners prayed for actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. The said Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 was
raffled to Branch 84 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, presided by respondent Judge Teodoro Regino.

On March 2, 1989, private respondent SUPERGUARD filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint does not state a valid
cause of action. SUPERGUARD claimed that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and that since the alleged
act of shooting was committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
which states:

Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. — Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.

Respondent SUPERGUARD further alleged that a complaint for damages based on negligence under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code,
such as the one filed by petitioners, cannot lie, since the civil liability under Article 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code. In addition, the private respondent argued that petitioners' filing of the complaint is premature considering that the
conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the employer's subsidiary liability (Rollo, p. 55-59).

Respondent SAFEGUARD also filed a motion praying that it be excluded as defendant on the ground that defendant Torzuela is not one of
its employees (Rollo, p. 96).

Petitioners opposed both motions, stating that their cause of action against the private respondents is based on their liability under Article
2180 of the New Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom one is responsible.

xxx xxx xxx

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or an industry.

xxx xxx xxx

 (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners contended that a suit against alternative defendants is allowed under Rule 3, Section 13 of the Rules of Court. Therefore, the
inclusion of private respondents as alternative defendants in the complaint is justified by the following: the Initial Investigation Report
prepared by Pat. Mario Tubon showing that Torzuela is an employee of SAFEGUARD; and through overt acts, SUPERGUARD extended its
sympathies to petitioners (Rollo, pp. 64 and 98).

Meanwhile, an Information dated March 21, 1989 charging Benigno Torzuela with homicide was filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati and was docketed as Criminal Case No. 89-1896.

On April 13, 1989, respondent Judge Regino issued an order granting SUPERGUARD'S motion to dismiss and SAFEGUARD'S motion for
exclusion as defendant. The respondent judge held that the complaint did not state facts necessary or sufficient to constitute a quasi-delict
since it does not mention any negligence on the part of Torzuela in shooting Napoleon Dulay or that the same was done in the performance
of his duties. Respondent judge ruled that mere allegations of the concurring negligence of the defendants (private respondents herein)
without stating the facts showing such negligence are mere conclusions of law (Rollo, p. 106). Respondent judge also declared that the
complaint was one for damages founded on crimes punishable under Articles 100 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code as distinguished from
those arising from, quasi-delict. The dispositive portion of the order dated April 13, 1989 states:

WHEREFORE, this Court holds that in view of the material and ultimate facts alleged in the verified complaint and in
accordance with the applicable law on the matter as well as precedents laid down by the Supreme Court, the complaint
against the alternative defendants Superguard Security Corporation and Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc.,
must be and (sic) it is hereby dismissed. (Rollo, p. 110)

The above order was affirmed by the respondent court and petitioners' motion for reconsideration thereof was denied.

Petitioners take exception to the assailed decision and insist that quasi-delicts are not limited to acts of negligence but also cover acts that
are intentional and voluntary, citing Andamo v. IAC (191 SCRA 195 [1990]). Thus, petitioners insist that Torzuela' s act of shooting Napoleon
Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict actionable under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code.

Petitioners further contend that under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, private respondents are primarily liable for their negligence either in
the selection or supervision of their employees. This liability is independent of the employee's own liability for fault or negligence and is
distinct from the subsidiary civil liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The civil action against the employer may therefore
proceed independently of the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111 Section 3 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners submit that the question of
whether Torzuela is an employee of respondent SUPERGUARD or SAFEGUARD would be better resolved after trial.

Moreover, petitioners argue that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay is also actionable under Article 33 of the New Civil Code, to wit:

Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. (Emphasis supplied)

In the same vein, petitioners cite Section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which provides:

Rule 111. . . . .

Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently — In the cases provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action which has been reserved may be brought by the offended
party, shall proceed independently of the criminal action, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
(Emphasis supplied)

The term "physical injuries" under Article 33 has been held to include consummated, frustrated and attempted homicide. Thus, petitioners
maintain that Torzuela's prior conviction is unnecessary since the civil action can proceed independently of the criminal action. On the other
hand, it is the private respondents' argument that since the act was not committed with negligence, the petitioners have no cause of action
under Articles 2116 and 2177 of the New Civil Code. The civil action contemplated in Article 2177 is not applicable to acts committed with
deliberate intent, but only applies to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. Torzuela's act of shooting Atty. Dulay to
death, aside from being purely personal, was done with deliberate intent and could not have been part of his duties as security guard. And
since Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers only: acts done within the scope of the employee's assigned tasks, the private respondents
cannot be held liable for damages.

We find for petitioners.

It is undisputed that Benigno Torzuela is being prosecuted for homicide for the fatal shooting of Napoleon Dulay. Rule 111 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure provides:
 Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of
civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action , reserves his
right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33,
34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused. (Emphasis
supplied)

It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil action before the prosecution in the criminal action presents evidence is even far better
than a compliance with the requirement of express reservation (Yakult Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 357 [1990]). This is
precisely what the petitioners opted to do in this case. However, the private respondents opposed the civil action on the ground that the
same is founded on a delict and not on a quasi-delict as the shooting was not attended by negligence. What is in dispute therefore is the
nature of the petitioner's cause of action.

The nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action (Republic v. Estenzo,
158 SCRA 282 [1988]). The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it is to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the
action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief. (De Tavera v. Philippine
Tuberculosis Society, 112 SCRA 243 [1982]). An examination of the complaint in the present case would show that the plaintiffs, petitioners
herein, are invoking their right to recover damages against the private respondents for their vicarious responsibility for the injury caused by
Benigno Torzuela's act of shooting and killing Napoleon Dulay, as stated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the complaint.

Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called
a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or
omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but
also acts which are voluntary and intentional. As far back as the definitive case of Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA 98 [1977]), this Court already held
that:

. . . Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts
criminal in character; whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action against the
offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would
be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In
other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability
founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as quasi-delict
only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has
not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that
culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law. (Emphasis supplied)

The same doctrine was echoed in the case of Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court (191 SCRA 195 [1990]), wherein the Court held:

Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts criminal in character, whether intentional
and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is
prosecuted or found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually also
charged criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger
award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. [citing Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472] (Emphasis
supplied)

Private respondents submit that the word "intentional" in the Andamo case is inaccurate obiter, and should be read as "voluntary" since intent
cannot be coupled with negligence as defined by Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. In the absence of more substantial reasons, this
Court will not disturb the above doctrine on the coverage of Article 2176.

Private respondents further aver that Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to injuries intentionally committed pursuant to the ruling in
Marcia v. CA (120 SCRA 193 [1983]), and that the actions for damages allowed thereunder are ex-delicto. However, the term "physical
injuries" in Article 33 has already been construed to include bodily injuries causing death (Capuno v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the
Philippines, 121 Phil. 638 [1965); Carandang v. Santiago, 97 Phil. 94 [1955]). It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised
Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide (Madeja v. Caro, 126 SCRA 293
[1983]). Although in the Marcia case (supra), it was held that no independent civil action may be filed under Article 33 where the crime is the
result of criminal negligence, it must be noted however, that Torzuela, the accused in the case at bar, is charged with homicide, not with
reckless imprudence, whereas the defendant in Marcia was charged with reckless imprudence. Therefore, in this case, a civil action based
on Article 33 lies.
Private respondents also contend that their liability is subsidiary under the Revised Penal Code; and that they are not liable for Torzuela's act
which is beyond the scope of his duties as a security guard. It having been established that the instant action is not ex-delicto, petitioners
may proceed directly against Torzuela and the private respondents. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code as aforequoted, when an injury
is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master
or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both (Layugan v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 167 SCRA 363 [1988]). The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon
prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee (Kapalaran Bus Lines v. Coronado,
176 SCRA 792 [1989]). Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of
a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.

Since Article 2176 covers not only acts of negligence but also acts which are intentional and voluntary, it was therefore erroneous on the part
of the trial court to dismiss petitioner's complaint simply because it failed to make allegations of attendant negligence attributable to private
respondents.

With respect to the issue of whether the complaint at hand states a sufficient cause of action, the general rule is that the allegations in a
complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendants if, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid
judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer therein. A cause of action exist if the following elements are present, namely: (1) a
right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named
defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff
or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages
(Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, 210 SCRA 33 [1992]); Development Bank of the Philippines v. Pundogar, 218 SCRA 118 [1993])

This Court finds, under the foregoing premises, that the complaint sufficiently alleged an actionable breach on the part of the defendant
Torzuela and respondents SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD. It is enough that the complaint alleged that Benigno Torzuela shot
Napoleon Dulay resulting in the latter's death; that the shooting occurred while Torzuela was on duty; and that either SUPERGUARD and/or
SAFEGUARD was Torzuela's employer and responsible for his acts. This does not operate however, to establish that the defendants below
are liable. Whether or not the shooting was actually reckless and wanton or attended by negligence and whether it was actually done within
the scope of Torzuela's duties; whether the private respondents SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD failed to exercise the diligence of a
good father of a family; and whether the defendants are actually liable, are questions which can be better resolved after trial on the merits
where each party can present evidence to prove their respective allegations and defenses. In determining whether the allegations of a
complaint are sufficient to support a cause of action, it must be borne in mind that the complaint does not have to establish or allege the facts
proving the existence of a cause of action at the outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the case (Del Bros Hotel
Corporation v. CA, supra). If the allegations in a complaint can furnish a sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same
should not be dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be assessed by the defendants (Rava Dev't. Corp. v. CA, 211 SCRA 152
[1992] citing Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 663 [1991]). To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of
cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated, is
ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain (Azur v. Provincial Board, 27 SCRA 50 [1969]). Since the petitioners clearly sustained an injury to their
rights under the law, it would be more just to allow them to present evidence of such injury.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals as well as the Order
of the Regional Trial Court dated April 13, 1989 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 is remanded to the
Regional Trial Court for trial on the merits. This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990

NATIVIDAD V. ANDAMO and EMMANUEL R. ANDAMO, petitioners,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (First Civil Cases Division) and
MISSIONARIES OF OUR LADY OF LA SALETTE, INC., respondents.

Lope E. Adriano for petitioners.

Padilla Law Office for private respondent.

FERNAN, C.J.:
The pivotal issue in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is whether a
corporation, which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors and
contrivances within its land, thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent
land, can be held civilly liable for damages under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil
Code on quasi-delicts such that the resulting civil case can proceed independently of
the criminal case.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land
situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent,
Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation.

Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an

artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land,
caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away
costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and
stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction.

In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action, docketed as Criminal Case No. TG-
907-82, before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 4 (Tagaytay City), against
Efren Musngi, Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin, officers and directors of herein
respondent corporation, for destruction by means of inundation under Article 324 of the
Revised Penal Code.

Subsequently, on February 22, 1983, petitioners filed another action against respondent
corporation, this time a civil case, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-748, for damages with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction before the same court. 1

On March 11, 1983, respondent corporation filed its answer to the complaint and
opposition to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Hearings were conducted
including ocular inspections on the land. However, on April 26, 1984, the trial court,
acting on respondent corporation's motion to dismiss or suspend the civil action, issued
an order suspending further hearings in Civil Case No, TG-748 until after judgment in
the related Criminal Case No. TG-907-82.

Resolving respondent corporation's motion to dismiss filed on June 22, 1984, the trial
court issued on August 27, 1984 the disputed order dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748
for lack of jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil case
was still unresolved. Said order was anchored on the provision of Section 3 (a), Rule III
of the Rules of Court which provides that "criminal and civil actions arising from the
same offense may be instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been
commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered
in the criminal action." 2

Petitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate Appellate Court. 3

On February 17, 1986, respondent Appellate Court, First Civil Cases Division,
promulgated a decision 4 affirming the questioned order of the trial court. 5 A motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by the Appellate Court in its resolution
dated May 19, 1986. 6

Directly at issue is the propriety of the dismissal of Civil Case No. TG-748 in accordance
with Section 3 (a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners contend that the trial
court and the Appellate Court erred in dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 since it is
predicated on a quasi-delict. Petitioners have raised a valid point.

It is axiomatic that the nature of an action filed in court is determined by the facts
alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action. 7 The purpose of an action
or suit and the law to govern it, including the period of prescription, is to be determined
not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by
the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief. 8 The nature of an action is not
necessarily determined or controlled by its title or heading but the body of the pleading
or complaint itself. To avoid possible denial of substantial justice due to legal
technicalities, pleadings as well as remedial laws should be liberally construed so that
the litigants may have ample opportunity to prove their respective claims. 9

Quoted hereunder are the pertinent portions of petitioners' complaint in Civil Case No.
TG-748:

4) That within defendant's land, likewise located at Biga (Biluso), Silang,

Cavite, adjacent on the right side of the aforesaid land of plaintiffs,
defendant constructed waterpaths starting from the middle-right portion
thereof leading to a big hole or opening, also constructed by defendant,
thru the lower portion of its concrete hollow-blocks fence situated on the
right side of its cemented gate fronting the provincial highway, and
connected by defendant to a man height inter-connected cement culverts
which were also constructed and lain by defendant cross-wise beneath the
tip of the said cemented gate, the left-end of the said inter-connected
culverts again connected by defendant to a big hole or opening thru the
lower portion of the same concrete hollowblocks fence on the left side of
the said cemented gate, which hole or opening is likewise connected by
defendant to the cemented mouth of a big canal, also constructed by
defendant, which runs northward towards a big hole or opening which was
also built by defendant thru the lower portion of its concrete hollow-blocks
fence which separates the land of plaintiffs from that of defendant (and
which serves as the exit-point of the floodwater coming from the land of
defendant, and at the same time, the entrance-point of the same
floodwater to the land of plaintiffs, year after year, during rainy or stormy
seasons.

5) That moreover, on the middle-left portion of its land just beside the land
of plaintiffs, defendant also constructed an artificial lake, the base of which
 is soil, which utilizes the water being channeled thereto from its water
system thru inter-connected galvanized iron pipes (No. 2) and
complimented by rain water during rainy or stormy seasons, so much so
that the water below it seeps into, and the excess water above it
inundates, portions of the adjoining land of plaintiffs.

6) That as a result of the inundation brought about by defendant's

aforementioned water conductors, contrivances and manipulators, a
young man was drowned to death, while herein plaintiffs suffered and will
continue to suffer, as follows:

a) Portions of the land of plaintiffs were eroded and

converted to deep, wide and long canals, such that the same
can no longer be planted to any crop or plant.

b) Costly fences constructed by plaintiffs were, on several

occasions, washed away.

c) During rainy and stormy seasons the lives of plaintiffs and

their laborers are always in danger.

d) Plants and other improvements on other portions of the

land of plaintiffs are exposed to destruction. ... 10

A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one
under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a
quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or
negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond;
and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the
defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. 11

Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent
corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an
assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the
damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence
which may be the basis for the recovery of damages.

In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio, 12 the Court applied Article 1902, now Article 2176
of the Civil Code and held that "any person who without due authority constructs a bank
or dike, stopping the flow or communication between a creek or a lake and a river,
thereby causing loss and damages to a third party who, like the rest of the residents, is
entitled to the use and enjoyment of the stream or lake, shall be liable to the payment of
an indemnity for loss and damages to the injured party.

While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the
property subject of the instant case is privately owned, the fact remains that petitioners'
complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain
damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation.
Indeed, the recitals of the complaint, the alleged presence of damage to the petitioners,
the act or omission of respondent corporation supposedly constituting fault or
negligence, and the causal connection between the act and the damage, with no pre-
existing contractual obligation between the parties make a clear case of a quasi delict or
culpa aquiliana.

It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of
the Civil Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a
manner as to injure the rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON
LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which
require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe
upon the rights and interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to
build structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained
using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and
can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or
damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification
for the injury or damage suffered.

Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage caused by
his act or omission constituting fault or negligence, thus:

Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,

there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this chapter.

Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts "not
punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary
or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal
act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided
that the offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also
criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two
cases vary. 13

The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which states:

Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding

article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
According to the Report of the Code Commission "the foregoing provision though at first
sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of
criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter
is a distinct and independent negligence, which is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of
ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from
criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extra-
contractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decisions of the Supreme Court of
Spain ... 14

In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, 15 this Court held that a quasi-delict or
culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all
its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime —
a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility
for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may
produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for
quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal or
conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of course, in
the event of an acquittal where the court has declared that the fact from which the civil
action arose did not exist, in which case the extinction of the criminal liability would carry
with it the extinction of the civil liability.

In Azucena vs. Potenciano, 16 the Court declared that in quasi-delicts, "(t)he civil action
is entirely independent of the criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil
Code. There can be no logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil action
contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution — whether it
be conviction or acquittal — would render meaningless the independent character of the
civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31, that his action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter."

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated February 17, 1986 of the then Intermediate
Appellate Court affirming the order of dismissal of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite,
Branch 18 (Tagaytay City) dated August 17, 1984 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The trial court is ordered to reinstate Civil Case No. TG-748 entitled "Natividad
V. Andamo and Emmanuel R. Andamo vs. Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette Inc."
and to proceed with the hearing of the case with dispatch. This decision is immediately
executory. Costs against respondent corporation.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr. and Bidin, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

G.R. No. L-4977 March 22, 1910

DAVID TAYLOR, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
THE MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIGHT COMPANY, defendant-appellant.

W. H. Lawrence, for appellant.

W. L. Wright, for appellee.

CARSON, J.:

An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other injuries, instituted by David
Taylor, a minor, by his father, his nearest relative.

The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street railway and an electric
light system in the city of Manila. Its power plant is situated at the eastern end of a small island
in the Pasig River within the city of Manila, known as the Isla del Provisor. The power plant may
be reached by boat or by crossing a footbridge, impassable for vehicles, at the westerly end of
the island.

The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the time when he received the injuries complained of, 15
years of age, the son of a mechanical engineer, more mature than the average boy of his age, and
having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics.

On the 30th of September, 1905, plaintiff, with a boy named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of
age, crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose of visiting one Murphy, an
employee of the defendant, who and promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine.
Finding on inquiry that Mr. Murphy was not in his quarters, the boys, impelled apparently by
youthful curiosity and perhaps by the unusual interest which both seem to have taken in
machinery, spent some time in wandering about the company's premises. The visit was made on
a Sunday afternoon, and it does not appear that they saw or spoke to anyone after leaving the
power house where they had asked for Mr. Murphy.

After watching the operation of the travelling crane used in handling the defendant's coal, they
walked across the open space in the neighborhood of the place where the company dumped in
the cinders and ashes from its furnaces. Here they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating
caps scattered on the ground. These caps are approximately of the size and appearance of small
pistol cartridges and each has attached to it two long thin wires by means of which it may be
discharged by the use of electricity. They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting
charges of dynamite, and have in themselves a considerable explosive power. After some
discussion as to the ownership of the caps, and their right to take them, the boys picked up all
they could find, hung them on stick, of which each took end, and carried them home. After
crossing the footbridge, they met a little girl named Jessie Adrian, less than 9 years old, and all
three went to the home of the boy Manuel. The boys then made a series of experiments with the
caps. They trust the ends of the wires into an electric light socket and obtained no result. They
next tried to break the cap with a stone and failed. Manuel looked for a hammer, but could not
find one. Then they opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a
yellowish substance they got matches, and David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted
match to the contents. An explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all three.
Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting a match to the contents of the cap, became
frightened and started to run away, received a slight cut in the neck. Manuel had his hand burned
and wounded, and David was struck in the face by several particles of the metal capsule, one of
which injured his right eye to such an extent as to the necessitate its removal by the surgeons
who were called in to care for his wounds.

The evidence does definitely and conclusively disclose how the caps came to be on the
defendant's premises, nor how long they had been there when the boys found them. It appears,
however, that some months before the accident, during the construction of the defendant's plant,
detonating caps of the same size and kind as those found by the boys were used in sinking a well
at the power plant near the place where the caps were found; and it also appears that at or about
the time when these caps were found, similarly caps were in use in the construction of an
extension of defendant's street car line to Fort William McKinley. The caps when found
appeared to the boys who picked them up to have been lying for a considerable time, and from
the place where they were found would seem to have been discarded as detective or worthless
and fit only to be thrown upon the rubbish heap.

No measures seems to have been adopted by the defendant company to prohibit or prevent
visitors from entering and walking about its premises unattended, when they felt disposed so to
do. As admitted in defendant counsel's brief, "it is undoubtedly true that children in their play
sometimes crossed the foot bridge to the islands;" and, we may add, roamed about at will on the
uninclosed premises of the defendant, in the neighborhood of the place where the caps were
found. There is evidence that any effort ever was made to forbid these children from visiting the
defendant company's premises, although it must be assumed that the company or its employees
were aware of the fact that they not infrequently did so.

Two years before the accident, plaintiff spent four months at sea, as a cabin boy on one of the
interisland transports. Later he took up work in his father's office, learning mechanical drawing
and mechanical engineering. About a month after his accident he obtained employment as a
mechanical draftsman and continued in that employment for six months at a salary of P2.50 a
day; and it appears that he was a boy of more than average intelligence, taller and more mature
both mentally and physically than most boys of fifteen.

The facts set out in the foregoing statement are to our mind fully and conclusively established by
the evidence of record, and are substantially admitted by counsel. The only questions of fact
which are seriously disputed are plaintiff's allegations that the caps which were found by plaintiff
on defendant company's premises were the property of the defendant, or that they had come from
its possession and control, and that the company or some of its employees left them exposed on
its premises at the point where they were found.

The evidence in support of these allegations is meager, and the defendant company, apparently
relying on the rule of law which places the burden of proof of such allegations upon the plaintiff,
offered no evidence in rebuttal, and insists that plaintiff failed in his proof. We think, however,
that plaintiff's evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding in accord with his allegations in this
regard.
It was proven that caps, similar to those found by plaintiff, were used, more or less extensively,
on the McKinley extension of the defendant company's track; that some of these caps were used
in blasting a well on the company's premises a few months before the accident; that not far from
the place where the caps were found the company has a storehouse for the materials, supplies
and so forth, used by it in its operations as a street railway and a purveyor of electric light; and
that the place, in the neighborhood of which the caps were found, was being used by the
company as a sort of dumping ground for ashes and cinders. Fulminating caps or detonators for
the discharge by electricity of blasting charges by dynamite are not articles in common use by
the average citizen, and under all the circumstances, and in the absence of all evidence to the
contrary, we think that the discovery of twenty or thirty of these caps at the place where they
were found by the plaintiff on defendant's premises fairly justifies the inference that the
defendant company was either the owner of the caps in question or had the caps under its
possession and control. We think also that the evidence tends to disclose that these caps or
detonators were willfully and knowingly thrown by the company or its employees at the spot
where they were found, with the expectation that they would be buried out of the sight by the
ashes which it was engaged in dumping in that neighborhood, they being old and perhaps
defective; and, however this may be, we are satisfied that the evidence is sufficient to sustain a
finding that the company or some of its employees either willfully or through an oversight left
them exposed at a point on its premises which the general public, including children at play,
where not prohibited from visiting, and over which the company knew or ought to have known
that young boys were likely to roam about in pastime or in play.

Counsel for appellant endeavors to weaken or destroy the probative value of the facts on which
these conclusions are based by intimidating or rather assuming that the blasting work on the
company's well and on its McKinley extension was done by contractors. It was conclusively
proven, however, that while the workman employed in blasting the well was regularly employed
by J. G. White and Co., a firm of contractors, he did the work on the well directly and
immediately under the supervision and control of one of defendant company's foremen, and there
is no proof whatever in the record that the blasting on the McKinley extension was done by
independent contractors. Only one witness testified upon this point, and while he stated that he
understood that a part of this work was done by contract, he could not say so of his own
knowledge, and knew nothing of the terms and conditions of the alleged contract, or of the
relations of the alleged contractor to the defendant company. The fact having been proven that
detonating caps were more or less extensively employed on work done by the defendant
company's directions and on its behalf, we think that the company should have introduced the
necessary evidence to support its contention if it wished to avoid the not unreasonable inference
that it was the owner of the material used in these operations and that it was responsible for
tortious or negligent acts of the agents employed therein, on the ground that this work had been
intrusted to independent contractors as to whose acts the maxim respondent superior should not
be applied. If the company did not in fact own or make use of caps such as those found on its
premises, as intimated by counsel, it was a very simple matter for it to prove that fact, and in the
absence of such proof we think that the other evidence in the record sufficiently establishes the
contrary, and justifies the court in drawing the reasonable inference that the caps found on its
premises were its property, and were left where they were found by the company or some of its
employees.
Plaintiff appears to have rested his case, as did the trial judge his decision in plaintiff's favor,
upon the provisions of article 1089 of the Civil Code read together with articles 1902, 1903, and
1908 of that code.

ART. 1089 Obligations are created by law, by contracts, by quasi-contracts, and illicit
acts and omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs.

ART. 1902 A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is
fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.

ART. 1903 The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable, not only for
personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom they should be
responsible.

The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable for the damages caused by
the minors who live with them.

xxx xxx xxx

Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for damages

caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be
employed or on account of their duties.

xxx xxx xxx

The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein
prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the
damage.

ART. 1908 The owners shall also be liable for the damage caused —

1 By the explosion of machines which may not have been cared for with due diligence,
and for kindling of explosive substances which may not have been placed in a safe and
proper place.

Counsel for the defendant and appellant rests his appeal strictly upon his contention that the facts
proven at the trial do not established the liability of the defendant company under the provisions
of these articles, and since we agree with this view of the case, it is not necessary for us to
consider the various questions as to form and the right of action (analogous to those raised in the
case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. Rep., 359), which would, perhaps, be
involved in a decision affirming the judgment of the court below.

We agree with counsel for appellant that under the Civil Code, as under the generally accepted
doctrine in the United States, the plaintiff in an action such as that under consideration, in order
to establish his right to a recovery, must establish by competent evidence:
 (1) Damages to the plaintiff.

(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for
whose acts it must respond, was guilty.

(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.

These proposition are, of course, elementary, and do not admit of discussion, the real difficulty
arising in the application of these principles to the particular facts developed in the case under
consideration.

It is clear that the accident could not have happened and not the fulminating caps been left
exposed at the point where they were found, or if their owner had exercised due care in keeping
them in an appropriate place; but it is equally clear that plaintiff would not have been injured had
he not, for his own pleasure and convenience, entered upon the defendant's premises, and strolled
around thereon without the express permission of the defendant, and had he not picked up and
carried away the property of the defendant which he found on its premises, and had he not
thereafter deliberately cut open one of the caps and applied a match to its contents.

But counsel for plaintiff contends that because of plaintiff's youth and inexperience, his entry
upon defendant company's premises, and the intervention of his action between the negligent act
of defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the accident which resulted in his
injury should not be held to have contributed in any wise to the accident, which should be
deemed to be the direct result of defendant's negligence in leaving the caps exposed at the place
where they were found by the plaintiff, and this latter the proximate cause of the accident which
occasioned the injuries sustained by him.

In support of his contention, counsel for plaintiff relies on the doctrine laid down in many of the
courts of last resort in the United States in the cases known as the "Torpedo" and "Turntable"
cases, and the cases based thereon.

In a typical cases, the question involved has been whether a railroad company is liable for an
injury received by an infant of tender years, who from mere idle curiosity, or for the purposes of
amusement, enters upon the railroad company's premises, at a place where the railroad company
knew, or had good reason to suppose, children would be likely to come, and there found
explosive signal torpedoes left unexposed by the railroad company's employees, one of which
when carried away by the visitor, exploded and injured him; or where such infant found upon the
premises a dangerous machine, such as a turntable, left in such condition as to make it probable
that children in playing with it would be exposed to accident or injury therefrom and where the
infant did in fact suffer injury in playing with such machine.

In these, and in great variety of similar cases, the great weight of authority holds the owner of the
premises liable.

As laid down in Railroad Co. vs. Stout (17 Wall. (84 U. S.), 657), wherein the principal question
was whether a railroad company was liable for in injury received by an infant while upon its
premises, from idle curiosity, or for purposes of amusement, if such injury was, under
circumstances, attributable to the negligence of the company), the principles on which these
cases turn are that "while a railroad company is not bound to the same degree of care in regard to
mere strangers who are unlawfully upon its premises that it owes to passengers conveyed by it, it
is not exempt from responsibility to such strangers for injuries arising from its negligence or
from its tortious acts;" and that "the conduct of an infant of tender years is not to be judged by
the same rule which governs that of adult. While it is the general rule in regard to an adult that to
entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of another he
must himself have been free from fault, such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years.
The care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only, and this
is to be determined in each case by the circumstances of the case."

The doctrine of the case of Railroad Company vs. Stout was vigorously controverted and sharply
criticized in several state courts, and the supreme court of Michigan in the case of Ryan vs.
Towar (128 Mich., 463) formally repudiated and disapproved the doctrine of the Turntable cases,
especially that laid down in Railroad Company vs. Stout, in a very able decision wherein it held,
in the language of the syllabus: (1) That the owner of the land is not liable to trespassers thereon
for injuries sustained by them, not due to his wanton or willful acts; (2) that no exception to this
rule exists in favor of children who are injured by dangerous machinery naturally calculated to
attract them to the premises; (3) that an invitation or license to cross the premises of another can
not be predicated on the mere fact that no steps have been taken to interfere with such practice;
(4) that there is no difference between children and adults as to the circumstances that will
warrant the inference of an invitation or a license to enter upon another's premises.

Similar criticisms of the opinion in the case of Railroad Company vs. Stout were indulged in by
the courts in Connecticut and Massachusetts. (Nolan vs. Railroad Co., 53 Conn., 461; 154 Mass.,
349). And the doctrine has been questioned in Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, and
perhaps in other States.

On the other hand, many if not most of the courts of last resort in the United States, citing and
approving the doctrine laid down in England in the leading case of Lynch vs. Nurding (1 Q. B.,
29, 35, 36), lay down the rule in these cases in accord with that announced in the Railroad
Company vs. Stout (supra), and the Supreme Court of the United States, in a unanimous opinion
delivered by Justice Harlan in the case of Union Pacific Railway Co. vs. McDonal and
reconsidered the doctrine laid down in Railroad Co. vs. Stout, and after an exhaustive and critical
analysis and review of many of the adjudged cases, both English and American, formally
declared that it adhered "to the principles announced in the case of Railroad Co. vs. Stout."

In the case of Union Pacific Railway Co. vs. MacDonald (supra) the facts were as follows: The
plaintiff, a boy 12 years of age, out of curiosity and for his own pleasure, entered upon and
visited the defendant's premises, without defendant's express permission or invitation, and while
there, was by accident injured by falling into a burning slack pile of whose existence he had no
knowledge, but which had been left by defendant on its premises without any fence around it or
anything to give warning of its dangerous condition, although defendant knew or had reason the
interest or curiosity of passers-by. On these facts the court held that the plaintiff could not be
regarded as a mere trespasser, for whose safety and protection while on the premises in question,
against the unseen danger referred to, the defendant was under no obligation to make provision.

We quote at length from the discussion by the court of the application of the principles involved
to the facts in that case, because what is said there is strikingly applicable in the case at bar, and
would seem to dispose of defendant's contention that, the plaintiff in this case being a trespasser,
the defendant company owed him no duty, and in no case could be held liable for injuries which
would not have resulted but for the entry of plaintiff on defendant's premises.

We adhere to the principles announced in Railroad Co. vs. Stout (supra). Applied to the
case now before us, they require us to hold that the defendant was guilty of negligence in
leaving unguarded the slack pile, made by it in the vicinity of its depot building. It could
have forbidden all persons from coming to its coal mine for purposes merely of curiosity
and pleasure. But it did not do so. On the contrary, it permitted all, without regard to age,
to visit its mine, and witness its operation. It knew that the usual approach to the mine
was by a narrow path skirting its slack pit, close to its depot building, at which the people
of the village, old and young, would often assemble. It knew that children were in the
habit of frequenting that locality and playing around the shaft house in the immediate
vicinity of the slack pit. The slightest regard for the safety of these children would have
suggested that they were in danger from being so near a pit, beneath the surface of which
was concealed (except when snow, wind, or rain prevailed) a mass of burning coals into
which a child might accidentally fall and be burned to death. Under all the circumstances,
the railroad company ought not to be heard to say that the plaintiff, a mere lad, moved by
curiosity to see the mine, in the vicinity of the slack pit, was a trespasser, to whom it
owed no duty, or for whose protection it was under no obligation to make provisions.

In Townsend vs. Wathen (9 East, 277, 281) it was held that if a man dangerous traps,
baited with flesh, in his own ground, so near to a highway, or to the premises of another,
that dogs passing along the highway, or kept in his neighbors premises, would probably
be attracted by their instinct into the traps, and in consequence of such act his neighbor's
dogs be so attracted and thereby injured, an action on the case would lie. "What
difference," said Lord Ellenborough, C.J., "is there in reason between drawing the animal
into the trap by means of his instinct which he can not resist, and putting him there by
manual force?" What difference, in reason we may observe in this case, is there between
an express license to the children of this village to visit the defendant's coal mine, in the
vicinity of its slack pile, and an implied license, resulting from the habit of the defendant
to permit them, without objection or warning, to do so at will, for purposes of curiosity or
pleasure? Referring it the case of Townsend vs. Wathen, Judge Thompson, in his work on
the Law of Negligence, volume 1, page 305, note, well says: "It would be a barbarous
rule of law that would make the owner of land liable for setting a trap thereon, baited
with stinking meat, so that his neighbor's dog attracted by his natural instinct, might run
into it and be killed, and which would exempt him from liability for the consequence of
leaving exposed and unguarded on his land a dangerous machine, so that his neighbor's
child attracted to it and tempted to intermeddle with it by instincts equally strong, might
thereby be killed or maimed for life."
Chief Justice Cooley, voicing the opinion of the supreme court of Michigan, in the case of
Powers vs. Harlow (53 Mich., 507), said that (p. 515):

Children, wherever they go, must be expected to act upon childlike instincts and
impulses; and others who are chargeable with a duty of care and caution toward them
must calculate upon this, and take precautions accordingly. If they leave exposed to the
observation of children anything which would be tempting to them, and which they in
their immature judgment might naturally suppose they were at liberty to handle or play
with, they should expect that liberty to be taken.

And the same eminent jurist in his treatise or torts, alluding to the doctrine of implied invitation
to visit the premises of another, says:

In the case of young children, and other persons not fully sui juris, an implied license
might sometimes arise when it would not on behalf of others. Thus leaving a tempting
thing for children to play with exposed, where they would be likely to gather for that
purpose, may be equivalent to an invitation to them to make use of it; and, perhaps, if one
were to throw away upon his premises, near the common way, things tempting to
children, the same implication should arise. (Chap. 10, p. 303.)

The reasoning which led the Supreme Court of the United States to its conclusion in the cases of
Railroad Co. vs. Stout (supra) and Union Pacific Railroad Co. vs. McDonald (supra) is not less
cogent and convincing in this jurisdiction than in that wherein those cases originated. Children
here are actuated by similar childish instincts and impulses. Drawn by curiosity and impelled by
the restless spirit of youth, boys here as well as there will usually be found whenever the public
is permitted to congregate. The movement of machinery, and indeed anything which arouses the
attention of the young and inquiring mind, will draw them to the neighborhood as inevitably as
does the magnet draw the iron which comes within the range of its magnetic influence. The
owners of premises, therefore, whereon things attractive to children are exposed, or upon which
the public are expressly or impliedly permitted to enter or upon which the owner knows or ought
to know children are likely to roam about for pastime and in play, " must calculate upon this, and
take precautions accordingly." In such cases the owner of the premises can not be heard to say
that because the child has entered upon his premises without his express permission he is a
trespasser to whom the owner owes no duty or obligation whatever. The owner's failure to take
reasonable precautions to prevent the child from entering his premises at a place where he knows
or ought to know that children are accustomed to roam about of to which their childish instincts
and impulses are likely to attract them is at least equivalent to an implied license to enter, and
where the child does enter under such conditions the owner's failure to take reasonable
precautions to guard the child against injury from unknown or unseen dangers, placed upon such
premises by the owner, is clearly a breach of duty, responsible, if the child is actually injured,
without other fault on its part than that it had entered on the premises of a stranger without his
express invitation or permission. To hold otherwise would be expose all the children in the
community to unknown perils and unnecessary danger at the whim of the owners or occupants of
land upon which they might naturally and reasonably be expected to enter.
This conclusion is founded on reason, justice, and necessity, and neither is contention that a man
has a right to do what will with his own property or that children should be kept under the care of
their parents or guardians, so as to prevent their entering on the premises of others is of sufficient
weight to put in doubt. In this jurisdiction as well as in the United States all private property is
acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to injure the equal rights
and interests of the community (see U. S. vs. Toribio,1 No. 5060, decided January 26, 1910), and
except as to infants of very tender years it would be absurd and unreasonable in a community
organized as is that in which we lived to hold that parents or guardian are guilty of negligence or
imprudence in every case wherein they permit growing boys and girls to leave the parental roof
unattended, even if in the event of accident to the child the negligence of the parent could in any
event be imputed to the child so as to deprive it a right to recover in such cases — a point which
we neither discuss nor decide.

But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's property without defendant's
express invitation or permission would not have relieved defendant from responsibility for
injuries incurred there by plaintiff, without other fault on his part, if such injury were attributable
to the negligence of the defendant, we are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case
the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the
proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly
speaking, "attributable to the negligence of the defendant," and, on the other hand, we are
satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting match to its contents
was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff,
and that the defendant, therefore is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred.

Plaintiff contends, upon the authority of the Turntable and Torpedo cases, that because of
plaintiff's youth the intervention of his action between the negligent act of the defendant in
leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the explosion which resulted in his injury should
not be held to have contributed in any wise to the accident; and it is because we can not agree
with this proposition, although we accept the doctrine of the Turntable and Torpedo cases, that
we have thought proper to discuss and to consider that doctrine at length in this decision. As was
said in case of Railroad Co. vs. Stout (supra), "While it is the general rule in regard to an adult
that to entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of
another he must himself have been free from fault, such is not the rule in regard to an infant of
tender years. The care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity
only, and this is to be determined in each case by the circumstances of the case." As we think we
have shown, under the reasoning on which rests the doctrine of the Turntable and Torpedo cases,
no fault which would relieve defendant of responsibility for injuries resulting from its negligence
can be attributed to the plaintiff, a well-grown boy of 15 years of age, because of his entry upon
defendant's uninclosed premises without express permission or invitation' but it is wholly
different question whether such youth can be said to have been free from fault when he willfully
and deliberately cut open the detonating cap, and placed a match to the contents, knowing, as he
undoubtedly did, that his action would result in an explosion. On this point, which must be
determined by "the particular circumstances of this case," the doctrine laid down in the Turntable
and Torpedo cases lends us no direct aid, although it is worthy of observation that in all of the
"Torpedo" and analogous cases which our attention has been directed, the record discloses that
the plaintiffs, in whose favor judgments have been affirmed, were of such tender years that they
were held not to have the capacity to understand the nature or character of the explosive
instruments which fell into their hands.

In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15, more mature
both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy;
was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred;
and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care of
himself. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that, despite his denials on the witness
stand, he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was amusing himself. The
series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion, as described by the
little girl who was present, admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the
use of electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final
success of his endeavors brought about by the application of a match to the contents of the caps,
show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that he had
reason to anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous, in view of the fact that the little girl, 9
years of age, who was within him at the time when he put the match to the contents of the cap,
became frightened and ran away.

True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the explosion
which might be expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap, and of course he did not
anticipate the resultant injuries which he incurred; but he well knew that a more or less
dangerous explosion might be expected from his act, and yet he willfully, recklessly, and
knowingly produced the explosion. It would be going far to say that "according to his maturity
and capacity" he exercised such and "care and caution" as might reasonably be required of him,
or that defendant or anyone else should be held civilly responsible for injuries incurred by him
under such circumstances.

The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the necessary capacity to
understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of his own acts, so as to make it
negligence on his part to fail to exercise due care and precaution in the commission of such acts;
and indeed it would be impracticable and perhaps impossible so to do, for in the very nature of
things the question of negligence necessarily depends on the ability of the minor to understand
the character of his own acts and their consequences; and the age at which a minor can be said to
have such ability will necessarily depends of his own acts and their consequences; and at the age
at which a minor can be said to have such ability will necessarily vary in accordance with the
varying nature of the infinite variety of acts which may be done by him. But some idea of the
presumed capacity of infants under the laws in force in these Islands may be gathered from an
examination of the varying ages fixed by our laws at which minors are conclusively presumed to
be capable of exercising certain rights and incurring certain responsibilities, though it can not be
said that these provisions of law are of much practical assistance in cases such as that at bar,
except so far as they illustrate the rule that the capacity of a minor to become responsible for his
own acts varies with the varying circumstances of each case. Under the provisions of the Penal
Code a minor over fifteen years of age is presumed to be capable of committing a crime and is to
held criminally responsible therefore, although the fact that he is less than eighteen years of age
will be taken into consideration as an extenuating circumstance (Penal Code, arts. 8 and 9). At 10
years of age a child may, under certain circumstances, choose which parent it prefers to live with
(Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 771). At 14 may petition for the appointment of a guardian (Id.,
sec. 551), and may consent or refuse to be adopted (Id., sec. 765). And males of 14 and females
of 12 are capable of contracting a legal marriage (Civil Code, art. 83; G. O., No. 68, sec. 1).

We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and understanding to be
sensible of the danger to which he exposed himself when he put the match to the contents of the
cap; that he was sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to understand
and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoided
the injury which resulted from his own deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him must
be held to have been the direct and immediate result of his own willful and reckless act, so that
while it may be true that these injuries would not have been incurred but for the negligence act of
the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was
the proximate and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury.

The rule of the Roman law was: Quod quis ex culpa sua damnum sentit, non intelligitur sentire.
(Digest, book 50, tit. 17 rule 203.)

The Patidas contain the following provisions:

The just thing is that a man should suffer the damage which comes to him through his
own fault, and that he can not demand reparation therefor from another. (Law 25, tit. 5,
Partida 3.)

And they even said that when a man received an injury through his own acts the
grievance should be against himself and not against another. (Law 2, tit. 7, Partida 2.)

According to ancient sages, when a man received an injury through his own acts the
grievance should be against himself and not against another. (Law 2, tit. 7 Partida 2.)

And while there does not appear to be anything in the Civil Code which expressly lays down the
law touching contributory negligence in this jurisdiction, nevertheless, the interpretation placed
upon its provisions by the supreme court of Spain, and by this court in the case of Rakes vs.
Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. Rep., 359), clearly deny to the plaintiff in the case at bar
the right to recover damages from the defendant, in whole or in part, for the injuries sustained by
him.

The judgment of the supreme court of Spain of the 7th of March, 1902 (93 Jurisprudencia Civil,
391), is directly in point. In that case the court said:

According to the doctrine expressed in article 1902 of the Civil Code, fault or negligence
is a source of obligation when between such negligence and the injury there exists the
relation of cause and effect; but if the injury produced should not be the result of acts or
omissions of a third party, the latter has no obligation to repair the same, although such
acts or omission were imprudent or unlawful, and much less when it is shown that the
immediate cause of the injury was the negligence of the injured party himself.
The same court, in its decision of June 12, 1900, said that "the existence of the alleged fault or
negligence is not sufficient without proof that it, and no other cause, gave rise to the damage."

See also judgment of October 21, 1903.

To similar effect Scaevola, the learned Spanish writer, writing under that title in his
Jurisprudencia del Codigo Civil (1902 Anuario, p. 455), commenting on the decision of
March 7, 1902 of the Civil Code, fault or negligence gives rise to an obligation when
between it and the damage there exists the relation of cause and effect; but if the damage
caused does not arise from the acts or omissions of a third person, there is no obligation
to make good upon the latter, even though such acts or omissions be imprudent or illegal,
and much less so when it is shown that the immediate cause of the damage has been the
recklessness of the injured party himself.

And again —

In accordance with the fundamental principle of proof, that the burden thereof is upon the
plaintiff, it is apparent that it is duty of him who shall claim damages to establish their
existence. The decisions of April 9, 1896, and March 18, July, and September 27, 1898,
have especially supported the principle, the first setting forth in detail the necessary
points of the proof, which are two: An act or omission on the part of the person who is to
be charged with the liability, and the production of the damage by said act or omission.

This includes, by inference, the establishment of a relation of cause or effect between the
act or omission and the damage; the latter must be the direct result of one of the first two.
As the decision of March 22, 1881, said, it is necessary that the damages result
immediately and directly from an act performed culpably and wrongfully; "necessarily
presupposing a legal ground for imputability." (Decision of October 29, 1887.)

Negligence is not presumed, but must be proven by him who alleges it. (Scavoela,
Jurisprudencia del Codigo Civil, vol. 6, pp. 551-552.)

(Cf. decisions of supreme court of Spain of June 12, 1900, and June 23, 1900.)

Finally we think the doctrine in this jurisdiction applicable to the case at bar was definitely
settled in this court in the maturely considered case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co.
(supra), wherein we held that while "There are many cases (personal injury cases) was
exonerated," on the ground that "the negligence of the plaintiff was the immediate cause of the
casualty" (decisions of the 15th of January, the 19th of February, and the 7th of March, 1902,
stated in Alcubilla's Index of that year); none of the cases decided by the supreme court of Spain
"define the effect to be given the negligence of its causes, though not the principal one, and we
are left to seek the theory of the civil law in the practice of other countries;" and in such cases we
declared that law in this jurisdiction to require the application of "the principle of proportional
damages," but expressly and definitely denied the right of recovery when the acts of the injured
party were the immediate causes of the accident.
The doctrine as laid down in that case is as follows:

Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured party shall be
considered immediate causes of the accident. The test is simple. Distinction must be
made between the accident and the injury, between the event itself, without which there
could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent
of it, but contributing to his own proper hurt. For instance, the cause of the accident under
review was the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it. This produces
the event giving occasion for damages—that is, the sinking of the track and the sliding of
the iron rails. To this event, the act of the plaintiff in walking by the side of the car did
not contribute, although it was an element of the damage which came to himself. Had the
crosspiece been out of place wholly or partly through his act or omission of duty, that
would have been one of the determining causes of the event or accident, for which he
would have been responsible. Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of
its determining factors, he can not recover. Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he
contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the amount that the defendant
responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable
equivalent for his own imprudence.

We think it is quite clear that under the doctrine thus stated, the immediate cause of the
explosion, the accident which resulted in plaintiff's injury, was in his own act in putting a match
to the contents of the cap, and that having "contributed to the principal occurrence, as one of its
determining factors, he can not recover."

We have not deemed it necessary to examine the effect of plaintiff's action in picking up upon
defendant's premises the detonating caps, the property of defendant, and carrying the relation of
cause and effect between the negligent act or omission of the defendant in leaving the caps
exposed on its premises and the injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff by the explosion of one of
these caps. Under the doctrine of the Torpedo cases, such action on the part of an infant of very
tender years would have no effect in relieving defendant of responsibility, but whether in view of
the well-known fact admitted in defendant's brief that "boys are snappers-up of unconsidered
trifles," a youth of the age and maturity of plaintiff should be deemed without fault in picking up
the caps in question under all the circumstances of this case, we neither discuss nor decide.

Twenty days after the date of this decision let judgment be entered reversing the judgment of the
court below, without costs to either party in this instance, and ten days thereafter let the record be
returned to the court wherein it originated, where the judgment will be entered in favor of the
defendant for the costs in first instance and the complaint dismissed without day. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres and Moreland, JJ., concur.

Johnson, J., concurs in the result.

ROBIN CARIO PADILLA @ ROBINHOOD PADILLA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS

and PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION
FRANCISCO, J.:

On October 26, 1992, high-powered firearms with live ammunitions were found in the
possession of petitioner Robin Padilla @ Robinhood Padilla, i.e.:

"(1) One .357 Caliber revolver, Smith and Wesson, SN-32919 with six (6) live
ammunitions;
"(2) One M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120 with four (4) long and one (1)
short magazine with ammunitions;
"(3) One .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A 35723 Y with clip and eight (8) ammunitions;
and
"(4) Six additional live double action ammunitions of .38 caliber revolver.”

Petitioner was correspondingly charged on December 3, 1992, before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Angeles City with illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions under P.D. 1866 thru
the following Information:

"That on or about the 26th day of October, 1992, in the City of Angeles, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his
custody and control one (1) M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120 with four (4)
long and one (1) short magazines with ammunitions, one (1) .357 caliber revolver Smith
and Wesson, SN-32919 with six (6) live ammunitions and one (1) .380 Pietro Beretta,
SN-A35723Y with clip and eight (8) ammunitions, without having the necessary
authority and permit to carry and possess the same.
ALL CONTRARY TO LAW.”

The lower court then ordered the arrest of petitioner, but granted his application for bail. During
the arraignment on January 20, 1993, a plea of not guilty was entered for petitioner after he
refused, upon advice of counsel, to make any plea. Petitioner waived in writing his right to be
present in any and all stages of the case.

After trial, Angeles City RTC Judge David Rosete rendered judgment dated April 25, 1994
convicting petitioner of the crime charged and sentenced him to an "indeterminate penalty from
17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum, to 21 years of reclusion
perpetua, as maximum”. Petitioner filed his notice of appeal on April 28, 1994. Pending the
appeal in the respondent Court of Appeals, the Solicitor-General, convinced that the conviction
shows strong evidence of guilt, filed on December 2, 1994 a motion to cancel petitioner's bail
bond. The resolution of this motion was incorporated in the now assailed respondent court's
decision sustaining petitioner's conviction, the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, the foregoing circumstances considered, the appealed decision is

hereby AFFIRMED, and furthermore, the P200,000.00 bailbond posted by accused-
appellant for his provisional liberty, FGU Insurance Corporation Bond No. JCR (2)
 6523, is hereby cancelled. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Angeles City, is
directed to issue the Order of Arrest of accused-appellant and thereafter his transmittal
to the National Bureau of Prisons thru the Philippine National Police where the said
accused-appellant shall remain under confinement pending resolution of his appeal,
should he appeal to the Supreme Court. This shall be immediately executory. The
Regional Trial Court is further directed to submit a report of compliance herewith.

SO ORDERED.”

Petitioner received a copy of this decision on July 26, 1995. On August 9, 1995 he filed a
"motion for reconsideration (and to recall the warrant of arrest)" but the same was denied by
respondent court in its September 20, 1995 Resolution, copy of which was received by petitioner
on September 27, 1995. The next day, September 28, petitioner filed the instant petition for
review on certiorari with application for bail followed by two "supplemental petitions" filed by
different counsels, a "second supplemental petition” and an urgent motion for the separate
resolution of his application for bail. Again, the Solicitor-General sought the denial of the
application for bail, to which the Court agreed in a Resolution promulgated on July 31, 1996.
The Court also granted the Solicitor-General's motion to file a consolidated comment on the
petitions and thereafter required the petitioner to file his reply. However, after his vigorous
resistance and success on the intramural of bail (both in the respondent court and this Court) and
thorough exposition of petitioner's guilt in his 55-page Brief in the respondent court, the
Solicitor-General now makes a complete turnabout by filing a "Manifestation In Lieu Of
Comment" praying for petitioner's acquittal.

The People's detailed narration of facts, well-supported by evidence on record and given
credence by respondent court, is as follows:

"At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of October 26, 1992, Enrique Manarang and his
compadre Danny Perez were inside the Manukan sa Highway Restaurant in Sto. Kristo,
Angeles City where they took shelter from the heavy downpour (pp. 5-6, TSN, February
15, 1993) that had interrupted their ride on motorcycles (pp. 5-6, ibid.) along McArthur
Highway (ibid). While inside the restaurant, Manarang noticed a vehicle, a Mitsubishi
Pajero, running fast down the highway prompting him to remark that the vehicle might
get into an accident considering the inclement weather. (p. 7, Ibid) In the local
vernacular, he said thus: 'Ka bilis na, mumuran pa naman pota makaaksidente ya.' (p. 7,
ibid). True enough, immediately after the vehicle had passed the restaurant, Manarang
and Perez heard a screeching sound produced by the sudden and hard braking of a
vehicle running very fast (pp. 7-8, ibid) followed by a sickening sound of the vehicle
hitting something (p. 8, ibid). Danny Cruz, quite sure of what had happened, remarked
'oy ta na' signifying that Manarang had been right in his observation (pp. 8-9, ibid).
"Manarang and Cruz went out to investigate and immediately saw the vehicle
occupying the edge or shoulder of the highway giving it a slight tilt to its side (pp. 9-10,
ibid). Manarang, being a member of both the Spectrum, a civic group and the Barangay
Disaster Coordinating Council, decided to report the incident to the Philippine National
Police of Angeles City (p. 10, ibid). He took out his radio and called the Viper, the radio
controller of the Philippine National Police of Angeles City (p. 10, ibid). By the time
Manarang completed the call, the vehicle had started to leave the place of the accident
taking the general direction to the north (p. 11, ibid).
"Manarang went to the location of the accident and found out that the vehicle had hit
somebody (p. 11, ibid).
"He asked Cruz to look after the victim while he went back to the restaurant, rode on his
motorcycle and chased the vehicle (p. 11 ibid). During the chase he was able to make
out the plate number of the vehicle as PMA 777 (p. 33, TSN, February 15, 1993). He
called the Viper through the radio once again (p. 34, ibid) reporting that a vehicle
heading north with plate number PMA 777 was involved in a hit and run accident (p.
20, TSN, June 8, 1993). The Viper, in the person of SPO2 Ruby Buan, upon receipt of
the second radio call flashed the message to all units of PNP Angeles City with the
order to apprehend the vehicle (p. 20, ibid). One of the units of the PNP Angeles City
reached by the alarm was its Patrol Division at Jake Gonzales Street near the Traffic
Division (pp. 5-7, TSN, February 23, 1993). SPO2 Juan C. Borja III and SPO2 Emerlito
Miranda immediately borded a mobile patrol vehicle (Mobile No. 3) and positioned
themselves near the south approach of Abacan bridge since it was the only passable way
going to the north (pp. 8-9, ibid). It took them about ten (10) seconds to cover the
distance between their office and the Abacan bridge (p. 9, ibid).
"Another PNP mobile patrol vehicle that responded to the flash message from SPO2
Buan was Mobile No. 7 of the Pulongmaragal Detachment which was then conducting
patrol along Don Juico Avenue (pp. 8-9, TSN, March 8, 1993). On board were SPO
Ruben Mercado and SPO3 Tan and SPO2 Odejar (p. 8, ibid). SPO Ruben Mercado
immediately told SPO3 Tan to proceed to the MacArthur Highway to intercept the
vehicle with plate number PMA 777 (p. 10, ibid).
"In the meantime, Manarang continued to chase the vehicle which figured in the hit and
run incident, even passing through a flooded portion of the MacArthur Highway two (2)
feet deep in front of the Iglesia ni Kristo church but he could not catch up with the same
vehicle (pp. 11-12, February 15, 1993). When he saw that the car he was chasing went
towards Magalang, he proceeded to Abacan bridge because he knew Pulongmaragal
was not passable (pp. 12-14, ibid). When he reached the Abacan bridge, he found
Mobile No. 3 and SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda watching all vehicles coming their
way (p. 10, TSN, February 23, 1993). He approached them and informed them that
there was a hit and run incident (p. 10, ibid). Upon learning that the two police officers
already knew about the incident, Manarang went back to where he came from (pp. 10-
11; ibid). When Manarang was in front of Tina's Restaurant, he saw the vehicle that had
figured in the hit and run incident emerging from the corner adjoining Tina's Restaurant
(p. 15, TSN, February 15, 1993). He saw that the license plate hanging in front of the
vehicle bore the identifying number PMA 777 and he followed it (p. 15, ibid) towards
the Abacan bridge.
"Soon the vehicle was within sight of SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda of Mobile No. 3
(p. 10, TSN, February 23, 1993). When the vehicle was about twelve (12) meters away
from their position, the two police officers boarded their Mobile car, switched on the
engine, operated the siren and strobe light and drove out to intercept the vehicle (p. 11,
ibid). They cut into the path of the vehicle forcing it to stop (p. 11, ibid).
"SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda alighted from Mobile No. 3 (P. 12, TSN, February 23,
1993). SPO2 Miranda went to the vehicle with plate number PMA 777 and instructed its
driver to alight (p. 12, ibid). The driver rolled down the window and put his head out
while raising both his hands. They recognized the driver as Robin C. Padilla, appellant
in this case (p. 13, ibid). There was no one else with him inside the vehicle (p. 24). At
that moment, Borja noticed that Manarang arrived and stopped his motorcycle behind
the vehicle of appellant (p. 14, ibid). SPO2 Miranda told appellant to alight to which
appellant complied. Appellant was wearing a short leather jacket (p. 16, TSN, March 8,
1993) such that when he alighted with both his hands raised, a gun (Exhibit 'C') tucked
on the left side of his waist was revealed (p. 15, TSN, February 23, 1993), its butt
protruding (p. 15, ibid). SPO2 Borja made the move to confiscate the gun but appellant
held the former's hand alleging that the gun was covered by legal papers (p. 16, ibid).
SPO2 Borja, however, insisted that if the gun really was covered by legal papers, it
would have to be shown in the office (p. 16, ibid). After disarming appellant, SPO2
Borja told him about the hit and run incident which was angrily denied by appellant (p.
17, ibid). By that time, a crowd had formed at the place (p. 19, ibid). SPO2 Borja
checked the cylinder of the gun and find six (6) live bullets inside (p. 20, ibid).
"While SPO2 Borja and appellant were arguing, Mobile No. 7 with SPO Ruben
Mercado, SPO3 Tan and SPO2 Odejar on board arrived (pp. 11-12, TSN, March 8,
1993). As the most senior police officer in the group, SPO Mercado took over the
matter and informed appellant that he was being arrested for the hit and run incident (p.
13, ibid). He pointed out to appellant the fact that the plate number of his vehicle was
dangling and the railing and the hood were dented (p. 12, ibid). Appellant, however,
arrogantly denied his misdeed and, instead, played with the crowd by holding their
hands with one hand and pointing to SPO3 Borja with his right hand saying 'iyan,
kinuha ang baril ko' (pp. 13-15, ibid). Because appellant's jacket was short, his gesture
exposed a long magazine of an armalite rifle tucked in appellant's back right pocket (p.
16, ibid). SPO Mercado saw this and so when appellant turned around as he was
talking and proceeding to his vehicle, Mercado confiscated the magazine from appellant
(pp. 16-17, ibid). Suspecting that appellant could also be carrying a rifle inside the
vehicle since he had a magazine, SPO2 Mercado prevented appellant from going back
to his vehicle by opening himself the door of appellant's vehicle (16-17, ibid). He saw a
baby armalite rifle (Exhibit D) lying horizontally at the front by the driver's seat. It had
a long magazine filled with live bullets in a semi-automatic mode (pp. 17-21, ibid). He
asked appellant for the papers covering the rifle and appellant answered angrily that
they were at his home (pp. 26-27, ibid). SPO Mercado modified the arrest of appellant
by including as its ground illegal possession of firearms (p. 28, ibid). SPO Mercado
then read to appellant his constitutional rights (pp. 28-29, ibid).
"The police officers brought appellant to the Traffic Division at Jake Gonzales
Boulevard (pp. 31-32, ibid) where appellant voluntarily surrendered a third firearm, a
pietro berreta pistol (Exhibit 'L') with a single round in its chamber and a magazine (pp.
33-35, ibid) loaded with seven (7) other live bullets. Appellant also voluntarily
surrendered a black bag containing two additional long magazines and one short
magazine (Exhibits M, N, and O, pp. 36-37, ibid). After appellant had been interrogated
by the Chief of the Traffic Division, he was transferred to the Police Investigation
 Division at Sto. Rosario Street beside the City Hall Building where he and the firearms
and ammunitions were turned over to SPO2 Rene Jesus Gregorio (pp. 5-10, TSN, July
13, 1993). During the investigation, appellant admitted possession of the firearms
stating that he used them for shooting (p. 14, ibid). He was not able to produce any
permit to carry or memorandum receipt to cover the three firearms (pp. 16-18, TSN,
January 25, 1994).
"On November 28, 1992, a certification (Exhibit 'F') was issued by Captain, Senior
Inspector Mario Espino, PNP, Chief, Record Branch of the Firearms and Explosives
Office (pp. 7-8, TSN, March 4, 1993). The Certification stated that the three firearms
confiscated from appellant, an M-16 Baby armalite rifle SN-RP 131280, a .357 caliber
revolver Smith and Wesson SN 32919 and a .380 Pietro Beretta SN-A35720, were not
registered in the name of Robin C. Padilla (p. 6, ibid). A second Certification dated
December 11, 1992 issued by Captain Espino stated that the three firearms were not
also registered in the name of Robinhood C. Padilla (p. 10, ibid)."

Petitioner's defenses are as follows: (1) that his arrest was illegal and consequently, the firearms
and ammunitions taken in the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary
rule; (2) that he is a confidential agent authorized, under a Mission Order and Memorandum
Receipt, to carry the subject firearms; and (3) that the penalty for simple illegal possession
constitutes excessive and cruel punishment proscribed by the 1987 Constitution.

After a careful review of the records of this case, the Court is convinced that petitioner's guilt of
the crime charged stands on terra firma, notwithstanding the Solicitor-General's change of heart.

Anent the first defense, petitioner questions the legality of his arrest. There is no dispute that no
warrant was issued for the arrest of petitioner, but that per se did not make his apprehension at
the Abacan bridge illegal.

Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in the following instances:

"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.

Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested (i) after he has committed or while he is
actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (ii) in the presence of the
arresting officer or private person. Both elements concurred here, as it has been established that
petitioner's vehicle figured in a hit and run - an offense committed in the "presence" of
Manarang, a private person, who then sought to arrest petitioner. It must be stressed at this point
that "presence" does not only require that the arresting person sees the offense, but also when he
"hears the disturbance created thereby AND proceeds at once to the scene." As testified to by
Manarang, he heard the screeching of tires followed by a thud, saw the sideswiped victim (balut
vendor), reported the incident to the police and thereafter gave chase to the erring Pajero vehicle
using his motorcycle in order to apprehend its driver. After having sent a radio report to the PNP
for assistance, Manarang proceeded to the Abacan bridge where he found responding policemen
SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda already positioned near the bridge who effected the actual arrest
of petitioner.

Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing that the policemen
who actually arrested him were not at the scene of the hit and run. We beg to disagree. That
Manarang decided to seek the aid of the policemen (who admittedly were nowhere in the vicinity
of the hit and run) in effecting petitioner's arrest, did not in any way affect the propriety of the
apprehension. It was in fact the most prudent action Manarang could have taken rather than
collaring petitioner by himself, inasmuch as policemen are unquestionably better trained and
well-equipped in effecting an arrest of a suspect (like herein petitioner) who , in all probability,
could have put up a degree of resistance which an untrained civilian may not be able to contain
without endangering his own life. Moreover, it is a reality that curbing lawlessness gains more
success when law enforcers function in collaboration with private citizens. It is precisely through
this cooperation, that the offense herein involved fortunately did not become an additional entry
to the long list of unreported and unsolved crimes.

It is appropriate to state at this juncture that a suspect, like petitioner herein, cannot defeat the
arrest which has been set in motion in a public place for want of a warrant as the police was
confronted by an urgent need to render aid or take action. The exigent circumstances of - hot
pursuit, a fleeing suspect, a moving vehicle, the public place and the raining nighttime - all
created a situation in which speed is essential and delay improvident. The Court acknowledges
police authority to make the forcible stop since they had more than mere "reasonable and
articulable" suspicion that the occupant of the vehicle has been engaged in criminal activity.
Moreover, when caught in flagrante delicto with possession of an unlicensed firearm (Smith &
Wesson) and ammunition (M-16 magazine), petitioner's warrantless arrest was proper as he was
again actually committing another offense (illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions) and
this time in the presence of a peace officer.

Besides, the policemen's warrantless arrest of petitioner could likewise be justified under
paragraph (b) as he had in fact just committed an offense. There was no supervening event or a
considerable lapse of time between the hit and run and the actual apprehension. Moreover, after
having stationed themselves at the Abacan bridge in response to Manarang's report, the
policemen saw for themselves the fast approaching Pajero of petitioner, its dangling plate
number (PMA 777 as reported by Manarang), and the dented hood and railings thereof. These
formed part of the arresting police officer's personal knowledge of the facts indicating that
petitioner's Pajero was indeed the vehicle involved in the hit and run incident. Verily then, the
arresting police officers acted upon verified personal knowledge and not on unreliable hearsay
information.
Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection, defect or irregularity
attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea. Petitioner's belated
challenge thereto aside from his failure to quash the information, his participation in the trial and
by presenting his evidence, placed him in estoppel to assail the legality of his arrest. Likewise,
by applying for bail, petitioner patently waived such irregularities and defects.

We now go to the firearms and ammunitions seized from petitioner without a search warrant, the
admissibility in evidence of which, we uphold.

The five (5) well-settled instances when a warrantless search and seizure of property is valid, are
as follows:

1. warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12,

Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view", the elements of which are:
(a). a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in
which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b). the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had
the right to be where they are;
(c). the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d). "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further
search.
3. search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's
inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in
public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to
probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity.

4. consented warrantless search, and

5. customs search.

In conformity with respondent court's observation, it indeed appears that the authorities stumbled
upon petitioner's firearms and ammunitions without even undertaking any active search which,
as it is commonly understood, is a prying into hidden places for that which is concealed. The
seizure of the Smith & Wesson revolver and an M-16 rifle magazine was justified for they came
within "plain view" of the policemen who inadvertently discovered the revolver and magazine
tucked in petitioner's waist and back pocket respectively, when he raised his hands after alighting
from his Pajero. The same justification applies to the confiscation of the M-16 armalite rifle
which was immediately apparent to the policemen as they took a casual glance at the Pajero and
saw said rifle lying horizontally near the driver's seat. Thus it has been held that:

"(W)hen in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal offense, the . . .

police officers should happen to discover a criminal offense being committed by any
 person, they are not precluded from performing their duties as police officers for the
apprehension of the guilty person and the taking of the corpus delicti."
"Objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertently found in plain view are
subject to seizure even without a warrant."

With respect to the Berreta pistol and a black bag containing assorted magazines, petitioner
voluntarily surrendered them to the police. This latter gesture of petitioner indicated a waiver of
his right against the alleged search and seizure, and that his failure to quash the information
estopped him from assailing any purported defect.

Even assuming that the firearms and ammunitions were products of an active search done by the
authorities on the person and vehicle of petitioner, their seizure without a search warrant
nonetheless can still be justified under a search incidental to a lawful arrest (first instance). Once
the lawful arrest was effected, the police may undertake a protective search of the passenger
compartment and containers in the vehicle which are within petitioner's grabbing distance
regardless of the nature of the offense. This satisfied the two-tiered test of an incidental search:
(i) the item to be searched (vehicle) was within the arrestee's custody or area of immediate
control and (ii) the search was contemporaneous with the arrest.The products of that search are
admissible evidence not excluded by the exclusionary rule. Another justification is a search of a
moving vehicle (third instance). In connection therewith, a warrantless search is constitutionally
permissible when, as in this case, the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable
cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law-offender (like herein
petitioner with respect to the hit and run) or the contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been
instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of some criminal offense.

Anent his second defense, petitioner contends that he could not be convicted of violating P.D.
1866 because he is an appointed civilian agent authorized to possess and carry the subject
firearms and ammunition as evidenced by a Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt duly
issued by PNP Supt. Rodialo Gumtang, the deputy commander of Task Force Aguila, Lianga,
Surigao del Sur. The contention lacks merit.

In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two requisites must be established, viz.: (1) the
existence of the subject firearm and, (2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the
firearm does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess. The first element is beyond
dispute as the subject firearms and ammunitions were seized from petitioner's possession via a
valid warrantless search, identified and offered in evidence during trial. As to the second
element, the same was convincingly proven by the prosecution. Indeed, petitioner's purported
Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt are inferior in the face of the more formidable
evidence for the prosecution as our meticulous review of the records reveals that the Mission
Order and Memorandum Receipt were mere afterthoughts contrived and issued under suspicious
circumstances. On this score, we lift from respondent court's incisive observation. Thus:

"Appellant's contention is predicated on the assumption that the Memorandum Receipts

and Mission Order were issued before the subject firearms were seized and confiscated
from him by the police officers in Angeles City. That is not so. The evidence adduced
 indicate that the Memorandum Receipts and Mission Order were prepared and executed
long after appellant had been apprehended on October 26, 1992.
"Appellant, when apprehended, could not show any document as proof of his authority
to possess and carry the subject firearms. During the preliminary investigation of the
charge against him for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions he could not,
despite the ample time given him, present any proper document showing his authority.
If he had, in actuality, the Memorandum Receipts and Missions Order, he could have
produced those documents easily, if not at the time of apprehension, at least during the
preliminary investigation. But neither appellant nor his counsel inform the prosecutor
that appellant is authorized to possess and carry the subject firearms under
Memorandum Receipt and Mission Order. At the initial presentation of his evidence in
court, appellant could have produced these documents to belie the charged against him.
Appellant did not. He did not even take the witness stand to explain his possession of
the subject firearms.
"Even in appellant's Demurrer to Evidence filed after the prosecution rested contain no
allegation of a Memorandum Receipts and Mission Order authorizing appellant to
possess and carry the subject firearms.
"At the initial presentation of appellant's evidence, the witness cited was one James
Neneng to whom a subpoena was issued. Superintendent Gumtang was not even
mentioned. James Neneng appeared in court but was not presented by the defense.
Subsequent hearings were reset until the defense found Superintendent Gumtang who
appeared in court without subpoena on January 13, 1994."

The Court is baffled why petitioner failed to produce and present the Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt if they were really issued and existing before his apprehension.
Petitioner's alternative excuses that the subject firearms were intended for theatrical purposes, or
that they were owned by the Presidential Security Group, or that his Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt were left at home, further compound their irregularity. As to be
reasonably expected, an accused claiming innocence, like herein petitioner, would grab the
earliest opportunity to present the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt in question and save
himself from the long and agonizing public trial and spare him from proffering inconsistent
excuses. In fact, the Mission Order itself, as well as the Letter-Directive of the AFP Chief of
Staff, is explicit in providing that:

"VIII. c. When a Mission Order is requested for verification by enforcement

units/personnels such as PNP, Military Brigade and other Military Police Units of
AFP, the Mission Order should be shown without resentment to avoid
embarrassment and/or misunderstanding.
"IX. d. Implicit to this Mission Order is the injunction that the confidential
instruction will be carried out through all legal means and do not cover an
actuation in violation of laws. In the latter event, this Mission Order is rendered
inoperative in respect to such violation."

which directive petitioner failed to heed without cogent explanation.

The authenticity and validity of the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt, moreover, were
ably controverted. Witness for the prosecution Police Supt. Durendes denied under oath his
signature on the dorsal side of the Mission Order and declared further that he did not authorize
anyone to sign in his behalf. His surname thereon, we note, was glaringly misspelled as
"Durembes." In addition, only Unit Commanders and Chief of Offices have the authority to issue
Mission Orders and Memorandum Receipts under the Guidelines on the Issuance of MOs, MRs,
& PCFORs. PNP Supt. Rodialo Gumtang who issued petitioner's Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt is neither a Unit Commander nor the Chief of Office, but a mere deputy
commander. Having emanated from an unauthorized source, petitioner's Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt are infirm and lacking in force and effect. Besides, the Mission Order
covers "Recom 1-12-Baguio City," areas outside Supt. Gumtang's area of responsibility thereby
needing prior approval "by next higher Headquarters"which is absent in this case. The
Memorandum Receipt is also unsupported by a certification as required by the March 5, 1988
Memorandum of the Secretary of Defense which pertinently provides that:

"No memorandum receipt shall be issued for a CCS firearms without corresponding
certification from the corresponding Responsible Supply Officer of the appropriate
AFP unit that such firearm has been officially taken up in that units property book,
and that report of such action has been reported to higher AFP authority."

Had petitioner's Memorandum Receipt been authentic, we see no reason why he cannot present
the corresponding certification as well.

What is even more peculiar is that petitioner's name, as certified to by the Director for Personnel
of the PNP, does not even appear in the Plantilla of Non-Uniform Personnel or in the list of
Civilian Agents or Employees of the PNP which could justify the issuance of a Mission Order, a
fact admitted by petitioner's counsel. The implementing rules of P.D. 1866 issued by the then
PC-INP Chief and Director-General Lt. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos are clear and unambiguous, thus:

"No Mission Order shall be issued to any civilian agent authorizing the same to
carry firearms outside residence unless he/she is included in the regular plantilla of
the government agency involved in law enforcement and is receiving regular
compensation for the services he/she is rendering in the agency. Further, the civilian
agent must be included in a specific law enforcement/police/intelligence project
proposal or special project which specifically required the use of firearms(s) to insure its
accomplishment and that the project is duly approved at the PC Regional Command
level or its equivalent level in other major services of the AFP, INP and NBI, or at
higher levels of command."

Circular No. 1, dated January 6, 1986, of the then Ministry of Justice likewise provides as
follows:

"If mission orders are issued to civilians (not members of the uniformed service), they
must be civilian agents included in the regular plantilla of the government agency
involved in law enforcement and are receiving regular compensation for the service they
are rendering."
That petitioner's Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were fabricated pieces of evidence is
accentuated all the more by the testimony and certification of the Chief of the Records Branch of
the firearms and Explosives Office of the PNP declaring that petitioner's confiscated firearms are
not licensed or registered in the name of the petitioner. Thus:

"Q. In all these files that you have just mentioned Mr. Witness, what did you find, if any?

"A. I found that a certain Robin C. Padilla is a licensed registered owner of one 9 mm pistol,
Smith and Wesson with Serial No. TCT 8214 and the following firearms being asked whether
it is registered or not, I did not find any records, the M-16 and the caliber .357 and the
caliber .380 but there is a firearm with the same serial number which is the same as that
licensed and/or registered in the name of one Albert Villanueva Fallorina.

"Q. So in short, the only licensed firearms in the name of accused Robin C. Padilla is a
pistol, Smith and Wesson, caliber 9 mm with Serial No. TCT 8214?

"A. Yes, sir.

"Q. And the firearms that were the subject of this case are not listed in the names of the
accused in this case?

"A. Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

And the certification which provides as follows:

Republic of the Philippines

Department of the Interior and Local Government
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES OFFICE
Camp Crame, Quezon City

"PNPFEO5 28 November 1992

"C E R T I F I C A T I O N

"TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

"THIS IS TO CERTIFY that Robin C. Padilla of 59 Labo St., Quezon City is a

licensed/registered holder of Pistol Smith and Wesson Cal 9mm with serial number TCT8214
covered by License No. RL M76C4476687.

"Further certify that the following firearms are not registered with this Office per
verification from available records on file this Office as of this date:
M16 Baby Armalite SN-RP131120
Revolver Cal 357 SN-3219
Pistol Cal 380 Pietro Beretta SN-35723

"However, we have on file one Pistol Cal 380, Beretta with serial number 35723Y,
licensed/registered to one Albert Villanueva Fallorina of 29 San Juan St., Capitol Pasig, MM
under Re-Registered License.

"This certification is issued pursuant to Subpoena from City of Angeles.

"FOR THE CHIEF, FEO:

(Sgd.)

JOSE MARIO M. ESPINO

Sr. Inspector, PNP
Chief, Records Branch"

In several occasions, the Court has ruled that either the testimony of a representative of, or
a certification from, the PNP Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) attesting that a person is not
a licensee of any firearm would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of
illegal possession of firearm. In People vs. Tobias, we reiterated that such certification is
sufficient to show that a person has in fact no license. From the foregoing discussion, the fact
that petitioner does not have the license or permit to possess was overwhelmingly proven by the
prosecution. The certification may even be dispensed with in the light of the evidence that an M-
16 rifle and any short firearm higher than a .38 caliber pistol, akin to the confiscated firearms,
cannot be licensed to a civilian, as in the case of petitioner. The Court, therefore, entertains no
doubt in affirming petitioner's conviction especially as we find no plausible reason, and none was
presented, to depart from the factual findings of both the trial court and respondent court which,
as a rule, are accorded by the Court with respect and finality.

Anent his third defense, petitioner faults respondent court "in applying P.D. 1866 in a
democratic ambience (sic) and a non-subversive context" and adds that respondent court should
have applied instead the previous laws on illegal possession of firearms since the reason for the
penalty imposed under P.D. 1866 no longer exists. He stresses that the penalty of 17 years and 4
months to 21 years for simple illegal possession of firearm is cruel and excessive in
contravention of the Constitution.

The contentions do not merit serious consideration. The trial court and the respondent court are
bound to apply the governing law at the time of appellant's commission of the offense for it is a
rule that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones. Indeed, it is the duty of judicial officers to
respect and apply the law as it stands. And until its repeal, respondent court can not be faulted for
applying P.D. 1866 which abrogated the previous statutes adverted to by petitioner.

Equally lacking in merit is appellant's allegation that the penalty for simple illegal possession is
unconstitutional. The penalty for simple possession of firearm, it should be stressed, ranges from
reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua contrary to appellant's erroneous averment.
The severity of a penalty does not ipso facto make the same cruel and excessive.

"It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be
obnoxious to the Constitution. 'The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe
does not make it cruel and unusual.' (24 C.J.S., 1187-1188). Expressed in other terms, it has been
held that to come under the ban, the punishment must be 'flagrantly and plainly oppressive',
'wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the
community' "

It is well-settled that as far as the constitutional prohibition goes, it is not so much the extent as
the nature of the punishment that determines whether it is, or is not, cruel and unusual and that
sentences of imprisonment, though perceived to be harsh, are not cruel or unusual if within
statutory limits

Moreover, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The burden of proving
the invalidity of the statute in question lies with the appellant which burden, we note, was not
convincingly discharged. To justify nullification of the law, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication as in this
case. In fact, the constitutionality of P.D. 1866 has been upheld twice by this Court. Just recently,
the Court declared that "the pertinent laws on illegal possession of firearms [are not] contrary to
any provision of the Constitution. . ." Appellant's grievance on the wisdom of the prescribed
penalty should not be addressed to us. Courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or
morality of laws. That question falls exclusively within the province of Congress which enacts
them and the Chief Executive who approves or vetoes them. The only function of the courts, we
reiterate, is to interpret and apply the laws.

With respect to the penalty imposed by the trial court as affirmed by respondent court (17 years 4
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to 21 years of reclusion perpetua, as
maximum), we reduce the same in line with the fairly recent case of People v. Lian where the
Court en banc provided that the indeterminate penalty imposable for simple illegal possession of
firearm, without any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, should be within the range of ten
(10) years and one (1) day to twelve years (12) of prision mayor, as minimum, to eighteen (18)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) of reclusion temporal, as maximum. This
is discernible from the following explanation by the Court:

"In the case at bar, no mitigating or aggravating circumstances have been alleged or proved, In
accordance with the doctrine regarding special laws explained in People v. Simon although
Presidential Decree No. 1866 is a special law, the penalties therein were taken from the Revised
Penal Code, hence the rules in said Code for graduating by degrees or determining the proper
period should be applied. Consequently, the penalty for the offense of simple illegal possession
of firearm is the medium period of the complex penalty in said Section 1, that is, 18 years, 8
months and 1 day to 20 years.

"This penalty, being that which is to be actually imposed in accordance with the rules therefor
and not merely imposable as a general prescription under the law, shall be the maximum of the
range of the indeterminate sentence. The minimum thereof shall be taken, as aforesaid, from any
period of the penalty next lower in degree, which is, prision mayor in its maximum period to
reclusion temporal in its medium period.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining

petitioner's conviction by the lower court of the crime of simple illegal possession of firearms
and ammunitions is AFFIRMED EXCEPT that petitioner's indeterminate penalty is MODIFIED
to ten (10) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day, as maximum.

SO ORDERED