CONVERSION; DISTINGUISHED FROM RECLASSIFICATION;

AUTHORITY OF DAR TO APPROVE CONVERSION OF AGRICULTURAL

LANDS COVERED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6657 TO
NON-AGRICULTURAL USES HAS NOT BEEN PIERCED BY THE PASSAGE
OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE

Jose Luis Ros, Andoni F. Aboitiz, Xavier Aboitiz, Roberto E. Aboitiz, Enrique
Aboitiz, Matthias G. Mendezona, Cebu Industrial Park Developers, Inc. and FBM
Aboitiz Marine, Inc. vs. DAR, Hon. Ernesto Garilao, in his capacity as DAR
Secretary, and Dir. Jose Llames, in his capacity as Director of DAR-Regional 7
G.R. No. 132477 (August 31, 2005)

Facts: The case stems from a denial of the application for conversion before the
Regional Office of DAR Region 7 disallowing the application for conversion filed
by petitioners, owners/developers of several parcels of land located in Arpili,
Balamban, Cebu. The application was based on Municipal Ordinance No. 101
passed by the Mun. Council of Balamban, Cebu which reclassified such lands as
industrial lands. Said ordinance was approved by the Provincial Board of Cebu on
April 3, 1995. Because of such disapproval, Petitioners filed with the RTC of
Toledo City a complaint for Injunction with application of TRO and a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction. RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction ruling
that it is DAR which has jurisdiction citing Section 20 of the Local Government
Code. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, the Trial Court denied the
same. Hence, Petitioners filed before the Supreme Court a Petition for Certiorari
with application for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction. The Supreme Court referred the petition to the Court of Appeals thru a
Resolution dated 11 November 1996. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of
the said Resolution but the same was denied thru Resolution dated 27 January
1997. The Court of Appeals ordered the Public Respondents to file their comments
on the Petition. Two sets of comments from Public respondents, one from DAR
Provincial Office and another from the Office of the Solicitor General, were
submitted, to which petitioners filed their Consolidated Reply. Court of Appeals
rendered a decision affirming the Order of Dismissal issued by the RTC.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated 30
January 1998. Petitioners claim that local grants have the power to reclassify
portions of their agricultural lands, subject to the conditions set forth in Section 20
of the Local Government Code that if agricultural lands sought to be reclassified
by the local government is one which has already been brought under the coverage
of the CARL and/or which has been distributed to ARBs, then such reclassification
must be confirmed by the DAR pursuant to its authority under Section 65 of the
CARL, in order for the reclassification to become effective, that if the land sought
to be reclassified is not covered by CARL and not distributed to ARBs, then no
confirmation from DAR is necessary.

Issues: Whether or not the reclassification of the subject lands to industrial use by
the Municipality of Balamban, Cebu pursuant to its authority under Section 20 (a)
of Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 (the "LGC") has
the effect of taking such lands out of coverage of the CARL and beyond the
jurisdiction of the DAR? Whether or not the Complaint for Injunction may be
dismissed under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction? Whether or not the
Complaint for Injunction is an appropriate remedy against the order of the DAR
enjoining development works on the subject lands? Whether or not the Regional
Trial Court of Toledo City had authority to issue a writ of injunction against the
DAR?

Held: The petition lacks merit. After the passage of R.A. No. 6657, agricultural
lands, through reclassification, have to go through the process of conversion,
jurisdiction over which is vested in the DAR. However, agricultural lands already
reclassified before the effectivity of R.A. No. 6657 are exempted from conversion.
Reclassification of lands does not suffice. In Alarcon vs. CA (405 SCRA 440) it
was ruled that conversion is different from reclassification. Conversion is the act of
changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other use as
approved by DAR. Reclassification is the act of specifying how agricultural lands
shall be utilized, for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial,
commercial, as embodied in the land use plan, subject to the requirements and
procedure for land use conversion. R.A. No. 6657 took effect on 15 June 1988 and
Municipal Ordinance No. 101, which reclassified the subject land, was passed on
25 March 1992, and the Provincial Ordinance No. 95-8 of the Provincial Board of
Cebu, which adopted Municipal Ordinance No. 101 was passed on 03 April 1995,
long after R.A. No. 6657 has taken effect. To further clarify any doubt on its
authority, DAR issued Administrative Order No. 12 dated October 1994 which
provides for the consolidated and revised rules and procedures governing
conversion of agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses. The authority of DAR to
approve conversions of agricultural lands covered by Republic Act No. 6657 to
non-agricultural uses has not been pierced by the passage of the Local Government
Code. The code explicitly provides that nothing in this section shall be construed as
repealing or modifying in any manner the provisions of Republic Act No. 6657. It
being settled that jurisdiction over conversion of land is vested in the DAR, the
complaint for injunction was correctly dismissed by the trial and appellate courts
under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. This Court, in Bautista v. Mag-isa vda.
de Villena, found occasion to reiterate the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The
doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from resolving a controversy
over which jurisdiction has initially been lodged with an administrative body of
special competence. For agrarian reform case, jurisdiction is vested in the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR); more specifically, in the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). Injunction is not the appropriate
remedy against the order of the DAR enjoining petitions in developing the subject
land. Section 68 of R.A. No. 6657 provides: "Section 68. Immunity of Government
Agencies from Undue Interference. — No injunction, restraining order, prohibition
or mandamus shall be issued by the lower courts against the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR), the Department of Agriculture (DAR), the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and the Department of Justice (DOJ)
in their implementation of the program."

JURISDICTION IN DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION Land Bank

of the Philippines vs. Hon. Eli G. C. Natividad G.R. No. 127198 (May 16, 2005)
85 | P a g e

Facts: On May 14, 1993, private respondents filed a petition before the trial court
for the determination of just compensation for their agricultural lands situated in
Arayat, Pampanga, which were acquired by the government pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 27 (PD 27). The petition named as respondents the DAR
and Land Bank. With leave of court, the petition was amended to implead as
co-respondents the registered tenants of the land. After trial, the court rendered the
assailed Decision the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, judgment
is hereby rendered in favor of petitioners and against respondents, ordering
respondents, particularly, respondents Department of Agrarian Reform and the
Land Bank of the Philippines, to pay these lands owned by petitioners and which
are the subject of acquisition by the State under its land reform program, the
amount of THIRTY PESOS (P30.00) per square meter, as the just compensation
due for payment for same lands of petitioners located at San Vicente (or Camba),
Arayat, Pampanga. DAR and Land Bank filed separate motions for
reconsideration which were denied by the trial court in its Order dated July 30,
1996 for being pro forma as the same did not contain a notice of hearing. Thus, the
prescriptive period for filing an appeal was not tolled. Land Bank consequently
failed to file a timely appeal and the assailed Decision became final and executory.
Land Bank then filed a Petition for Relief from Order Dated 30 July 1996, citing
excusable negligence as its ground for relief. Attached to the petition for relief
were two affidavits of merit claiming that the failure to include in the motion for
reconsideration a notice of hearing was due to accident and/or mistake. The
affidavit of Land Bank's counsel of record notably states that "he simply scanned
and signed the Motion for Reconsideration for Agrarian Case No. 2005, Regional
Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 48, not knowing, or unmindful that it had no
notice of hearing" due to his heavy workload. The trial court, in its Order of
November 18, 1996, denied the petition for relief because Land Bank lost a remedy
in law due to its own negligence. In the instant petition for review, Land Bank
argues that the failure of its counsel to include a notice of hearing due to pressure
of work constitutes excusable negligence and does not make the motion for
reconsideration pro forma considering its allegedly meritorious defenses. Hence,
the denial of its petition for relief from judgment was erroneous. According to
Land Bank, private respondents should have sought the reconsideration of the
DAR's valuation of their properties. Private respondents thus failed to exhaust
administrative remedies when they filed a petition for the determination of just
compensation directly with the trial court. Land Bank also insists that the trial court
erred in declaring that PD 27 and Executive Order No. 228 (EO 228) are mere
guidelines in the determination of just compensation, and in relying on private
respondents' evidence of the valuation of the properties at the time of possession in
1993 and not on Land Bank's evidence of the value thereof as of the time of
acquisition in 1972.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in taking cognizance of the case as the
determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the Court of Justice?

Held:
In Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals, we declared that there is nothing
contradictory between the DAR's primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian reform, which includes the determination
of questions of just compensation, and the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
regional trial courts over all petitions for the determination of just compensation.
The first refers to administrative proceedings, while the second refers to judicial
proceedings. In accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary
jurisdiction is vested in the DAR to determine in a preliminary manner the just
compensation for the lands taken under the agrarian reform program, but such
determination is subject to challenge before the courts. The resolution of just
compensation cases for the taking of lands under agrarian reform is, after all,
essentially a judicial function. Thus, the trial did not err in taking cognizance of
the case as the determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the
courts of justice. It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation
based on the guideline provided by PD 27 and EO 228 considering the DAR's
failure to determine the just compensation for a considerable length of time. That
just compensation should be determined in accordance with RA 6657, and not PD
27 or EO 228, is especially imperative considering that just compensation should
be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample. In this case, the
trial court arrived at the just compensation due private respondents for their
property, taking into account its nature as irrigated land, location along the
highway, market value, assessor's value and the volume and value of its produce.
This Court is convinced that the trial court correctly determined the amount of just
compensation due private respondents in accordance with, and guided by, RA 6657
and existing jurisprudence.

EXEMPTION, PROPERTIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS) LEASED AND USED NOT FOR
EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES ARE NOT EXEMPT FROM CARP COVERAGE

DAR as represented by its Secretary, Roberto M. Pagdanganan vs. DECS

G.R. No. 158228 (April 27, 2004)

Facts: The subject of this controversy are Lot Nos. 2509 and 871-D of Hacienda
Fe, Escalante, Negros Occidental with an area of 189.2462 hectares. The lands
were donated by the late Esteban Jalandoni to respondent DECS on October 21,
1921 and consequently transferred to DECS under TCT No. 167175. DECS in
turn, leased the subject landholdings to Anglo Agricultural Corporation for 10
agricultural crop years or from 1984-1985 to 1993-1994. Subsequently, the lease
was renewed for another 10 years from 1995-1996 until 2004-2005. On June 10,
1993, Eugenio Alpar and several others, claiming to be permanent and regular
farmworkers therein filed a petition for Compulsory Coverage. A "Notice of
Coverage" was issued with the approval of the Regional Director. DECS appealed
to the Secretary of DAR who in turn affirmed the Order of the Regional Director.
DECS filed a petition for review with the CA to set aside the Decision of the DAR
Secretary. However, the CA affirmed the aforementioned Decision. Hence, this
Appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the properties (owned by DECS) are exempt from the
coverage of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL)

Held: Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the types of land which are
exempted from the coverage of CARP as well as the purposes of their exemption,
viz.: c) Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for
national defense, school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations
operated by public or private schools for educational purposes, x x x x x x shall be
exempt from the coverage of this Act Clearly, a reading of the paragraph shows
that, in order to be exempt from the coverage: 1) the land must be "actually,
directly, and exclusively used and found to be necessary" and 2) the purpose is "for
school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by public
or private schools for educational purposes." The importance of the phrase
"actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary" cannot be
understated, as what respondent DECS would want us to do by not taking words in
their literal and technical definitions. The words of the law are clear and
unambiguous. Thus, the "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory
construction is applicable in this case. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain
and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. The ruling in Central Mindanao University vs. DAR
Adjudication Board is inapplicable in the case at bar. First, in the CMU case, the
land involved is not alienable and disposable land of the public domain because it
was specifically reserved by the late President Carlos P. Garcia for the use of
Mindanao Agricultural College (CMU) under Proclamation No. 476. Second, x x x
x x "The retention of the land was found to be necessary for the present and future
educational needs of CMU. On the other hand, the lands in this case were not
actually and exclusively utilized as school sites and campuses, as they were leased
to Anglo Agricultural Corporation, not for educational purposes but for the
furtherance of its business. Also, as conceded by respondent DECS, it was the
income from the contract of lease and not the subject lands that was directly used
for the repairs and renovations of the schools in the locality."

ORDERS, INSTRUCTIONS, RULES AND REGULATIONS SHALL BE

EXCLUSIVELY COGNIZABLE BY THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN
REFORM

Hon. Antonio M. Nuesa in his capacity as the Regional Director of DAR Region
III and Restituto Rivera vs. Hon. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 132048 (March 6,
2002)

Facts: On May 25, 1972, the then Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued an "Order
of Award" in favor of Jose Verdillo over two (2) parcels of agricultural land, Lots
1932 and 1904 of the Buena Vista Estate, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, covering 14,496
and 19,808 square meters on condition which substantially states that within a
period of six (6) months the awardee shall personally cultivate or otherwise
develop at least one fourth of the area, occupy and construct his/her house in case
of residential lot and pay at least the first installment xxxx failure on his/her part to
comply with this requirement shall be sufficient cause for cancellation of this
Order. On August 26, 1993, or after twenty-one years, private respondent (Jose
Verdillo) filed with the Regional Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform for
the purchase of said lots claiming that he had complied with the conditions of the
said Order. Restituto Rivera, herein petitioner, filed a letter protest against private
respondent claiming that he is the one in possession of the land and cultivating the
same. A representative of the DAR Regional Office undertook an investigation on
the conflicting claims and found that the subject landholdings were in the
possession/cultivation of other persons other than Jose Verdillo and that it was
crystal clear that Jose Verdillo had culpably violated the terms and conditions of
the Order of Award. On the basis of such, DAR Regional Director Antonio Nuesa
promulgated an Order canceling the Order of Award in favor of Jose Verdillo,
declaring the lots vacant and open for disposition and allowing the processing of
Restituto Rivera's application to purchase the said lots. Aggrieved, private
respondent then filed a Petition with the PARAD. Petitioners countered by filing a
Motion to Dismiss the Petition instead of an Answer on the ground that the proper
remedy in the case at bar is to file an Appeal to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
under DAR Memorandum Circular No. 5-87 and not by a petition with the
DARAB. The PARAD chose to render a decision on the merits, denied the Motion
to Dismiss the Petition and reversed the Order of the Regional Director. Petitioner
Rivera filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied. He then interposed an
appeal with the DARAB but the Board affirmed the Decision of the PARAD.
Petitioners then filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals but it was
denied due course and was ordered dismissed. Hence, this petition for review.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying petitioners' claims
that in this case, the Board (DARAB) acted in grave abuse of discretion tantamount
to lack or excess of jurisdiction?

Held: We agree with petitioners that respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding
that the DARAB and its officials have not committed grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to excess or lack of jurisdiction in this case. P.D. 946 provides that
matters involving the administrative implementation of the transfer of the land to
the tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27 and amendatory and related decrees, orders,
instructions, rules and regulations, shall be exclusively cognizable by the Secretary
of Agrarian Reform, including: . . . (5) issuance, recall or cancellation of
certificates of land transfer in cases outside the purview of P.D. No. 816. The
revocation by the Regional Director of DAR of the earlier Order of Award by the
Secretary of Agriculture falls under the administrative functions of the DAR. The
DARAB and its provincial adjudicator or board of adjudicators acted erroneously
and with grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of the case, then
overturning the decision of the DAR Regional Director and deciding the case on
the merits without affording the petitioner opportunity to present his case. As held
by this Court in Centeno vs. Centeno, "the DAR is vested with the primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have the
exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of the agrarian
reform program." The DARAB has primary, original and appellate jurisdiction "to
determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or
incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program under R.A. 6657, E.O. Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, R.A. No. 3844 as
amended by R.A. No. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their
implementing rules and regulations." Under Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 6657 (CARP
Law), "agrarian dispute" is defined to include "(d) . . . any controversy relating to
tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise over
lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers
associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.
It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this
Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to
farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary,
landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee." In the case at bar, petitioner and
private respondent had no tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian relations whatsoever
that could have brought this controversy between them within the ambit of the
abovecited provision. Consequently, the DARAB had no jurisdiction over the
controversy and should not have taken cognizance of private respondent's petition
in the first place. While it bears emphasizing that findings of administrative
agencies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to
specific matters are accorded not only respect but even finality by the courts, due
care should be taken that administrative actions are not done without regard to the
jurisdictional boundaries set by the enabling law for each agency. In this case,
respondent DARAB officials and boards, provincial and central, had overstepped
their legal boundaries in taking cognizance of the controversy between petitioner
Rivera and private respondent Verdillo as to who should be awarded Lots 1932 and
1904 of the Buenavista Estate. Respondent appellate court erred in sustaining
DARAB's unjustified action taken with grave abuse of discretion resulting in lack
or excess of its jurisdiction.

BENEFICIARIES UNDER CARP, THE IDENTIFICATION AND SELECTION

OF CARP BENEFICIARIES ARE MATTERS INVOLVING THE
ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CARP, A MATTER
EXCLUSIVELY COGNIZABLE BY THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM AND BEYOND THE
JURISDICTION OF THE DARAB
50 | P a g e Lolihala Saberon Lercana vs. Porferio Jalandoni, et al.
G.R. No. 132286 (February 1, 2002)

Facts: Gregorio Pajuelas, grandfather of petitioner Lolihala S. Lercana, was the

owner of an agricultural land with an estimated area of nineteen (19) hectares,
located in Barangay Salug, Siaton, Negros Oriental. It was mortgaged by Lolihala's
mother, Bruna Saberon, and was redeemed by Rodolfo Aspilla, who planted
sugarcane and hired respondent Porferio Jalandoni, among other laborers, to work
on the land. In 1976, Aspilla's sugarcane production failed. Aspilla then appointed
Jalandoni as overseer and authorized him to install the other respondents as
tenant-tillers who devoted the property to corn production. Respondents gave
Aspilla, through Jalandoni, the owner's shares of the corn products in "tercio"
basis, in favor of the tenants. Jalandoni also gave to Aspilla the owner's share from
the copra produce on the same "tercio" basis. Aside from corn, respondents planted
auxiliary crops like cassava and other vegetables. On August 21, 1972, Aspilla
mortgaged the subject property to the Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB) as security
for a loan. Because Aspilla failed to redeem the mortgage, it was foreclosed on
October 25, 1978. On June 26, 1980, the title covering the property was
consolidated under TCT No. HT-1906 in the name of PVB. Not knowing about
the ownership transfer, respondents continued to give to Aspilla his share of the
harvest until 1984, when Aspilla led for Kuwait. Thereafter, the share was given to
Aspilla's children, who visited the property every harvest rime. In August 1989,
petitioner appeared, claimed ownership of the land for allegedly having bought it
from PVB and demanded from each of the respondents the owner's share of the
land produce. Not satisfied, petitioner and her relatives eventually took over and
cultivated the land. Respondents as plaintiffs below were constrained to file a
complaint for reinstatement and damages against petitioner before the PARAD,
Negros Oriental. However, the case was dismissed. Respondents appealed to the
DARAB which reversed and set aside the decision of the PARAD. The gist of the
Decision by the Board is that the disputed property has been offered to the DAR
through CARP through the VOS scheme. As such, it was not true that petitioner
acquired ownership thereof. Further, that application papers for potential CARP
beneficiaries have been processed since September 19, 1989. Petitioner filed a
Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. However, the Appellate Court
resolved the issue in favor of the respondents. It rendered a modified decision
affirming the decision of the DARAB but deleting the award of P20,000 as
exemplary damages. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied.
Hence, this petition.
Issues:
The issues concern (1) the occupation and tillage over the eastern portion of the
land by petitioner and her relatives; and (2) their qualification as beneficiaries
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.

Held:
On the first issue, regarding respondents' tenancy, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the DARAB's finding that respondents were the actual occupants and tillers of the
entire subject landholding. This finding, according to petitioner, is in complete
variance with the PARAD's finding that respondents were not tenants nor
agricultural lessees on the disputed property. Petitioner asserts that she and her
relatives have always remained on the one-half eastern portion of the land,
cultivating the same peacefully, openly and uninterruptedly, before and after the
western portion was mortgaged. This, according to petitioner, is supported by
Jalandoni's testimony that in 1976, when Aspilla gave Jalandoni the authority to
install tenants, Jalandoni occupied three (3) hectares while Mahinay, Mayorga and
Ege, the other installed tenants, occupied one hectare each. This means that Aspilla
occupied a total area of only 6 hectares, confirming petitioner's contention that
only one-half of the entire subject landholding was mortgaged. Petitioner adds that
respondents' submissive acceptance, when told by petitioner that she had become
the owner of the land, was a manifestation of respondents' own doubt on their
status. Lastly, DARAB Sheriff Edwin L. Badon, who also actually conducted an
ocular inspection of the property, declared that an estimated area of 8 hectares,
which formed part of the entire 19 hectare-landholding, was under the tillage of
Lolihala and relatives. All these substantially prove, said petitioner, that she and
her relatives had remained on the eastern portion of the property. Coming now to
the present controversy, in our view, the finding of the appellate court, affirming
the DARAB's own findings, that respondents are the tenants of the entire property
in question, is supported by the evidence on record. The testimony of Galoy Ezoy,
petitioner's own witness and a neighbor of the Pajuelas, shows that the disputed
property was originally owned by Gregorio Pajuelas and later on by Dodong
Aspilla. Aspilla then appointed Porferio Jalandoni and company to work on the
land. Ezoy further testified that petitioner and her relatives started to work on the
land only when the case was filed. His testimony was not refuted by petitioner.
Furthermore, the certifications of the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee
(BARC) Chairman and Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Barangay Salag,
Siaton, Negros Oriental, state that petitioner and her relatives were not the actual
occupants and tillers on the subject landholding, and that they only took over the
property in 1990 when they entered and occupied it by force and threats. These
certifications carry the presumption of regularity in their issuance, but petitioner
did not show any evidence to overcome that presumption. Also, the certification of
DARAB Sheriff Edwin L. Badon cited by petitioner to contradict the abovecited
two certifications, merely attest to the actual cultivation and occupation of
petitioner and her relatives at the time of the pendency of the case at the DARAB,
but not of the time when they actually started cultivating the land. Said certification
did not concern, much less corroborate, petitioner's allegation that she and her
relatives have always remained in the eastern portion of the property, even after the
mortgage. Thus, we conclude that the Court of Appeals' finding, adopting that of
the DARAB, was sufficiently supported by evidence on record. On the second
issue tendered by the petition, it appears to us that the proper administrative official
must resolve first the question of beneficiaries under CARP. The Court of Appeals,
in adopting the findings of the DARAB, did not declare respondents as
beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) in
relation to the disputed landholding. The DARAB, in the dispositive portion of its
decision, left to the concerned DAR Offices the determination of who are or should
be the CARP beneficiaries. At this juncture, petitioner ought to be reminded that
the identification and selection of CARP beneficiaries are matters involving strictly
the administrative implementation of the CARP, a matter exclusively cognizable
by the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, and beyond the
jurisdiction of the DARAB.

JURISDICTION OF THE DARAB, THE TRIAL COURT CANNOT ADJUDGE

CIVIL MATTERS THAT RELATE TO THE AGRARIAN RELATIONSHIP OF
THE PARTIES. THESE ARE MATTERS BEYOND ITS COMPETENCE AND
JURISDICTION AND ARE EXCLUSIVELY COGNIZABLE BY THE DARAB

Leonarda L. Monsanto vs. Jesus and Teresita Zerna and the Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 142501 (December 7, 2001)

Held:
The filing of a criminal case carries with it the civil liability arising from the
offense. However, the trial court cannot adjudge civil matters that are beyond its
competence and powers. Thus, while a court may have authority to pass upon the
criminal liability of the accused, it cannot make any civil awards that relate to the
agrarian relationship of the parties because this matter is beyond its jurisdiction. In
the present case, the RTC had jurisdiction to decide the criminal case against
private respondents; however, it acted beyond its jurisdiction when it effectively
ruled on the agricultural tenancy relationship between the parties. Private
respondents had raised before it the issue of tenancy by way of defense, and
apparently interwoven with the agrarian dispute, were the acts complained of by
petitioner: the harvesting of the coconuts, their conversion into copra and, later, the
sale thereof. Thus, the RTC should have confined itself to the determination of
whether private respondents were guilty of qualified theft, instead of automatically
awarding the proceeds of the copra sale to petitioner. Such matter, being an
offshoot of the agrarian dispute between the parties, is cognizable exclusively by
the DARAB

JURISDICTION OF THE DARAB IS LIMITED TO CASES INVOLVING

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PARTIES
44 | P a g e

Rodrigo Almuete and Ana Almuete vs. Marcelo Andres and The Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 122276 (November 20, 2001)

Facts: Petitioner Rodrigo Almuete was awarded a 72,587 square meter parcel of
land located at San Vicente, Angadanan, Isabela by the then National Resettlement
and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) on March 25, 1957. Since then,
Almuete and his family farmed the subject property peacefully and exclusively.
However, unknown to petitioner, an Agrarian Reform Technologist by the name of
Leticia Gragasin on August 17, 1979 filed false reports making it appear that
Almuete has waived his right as awardee and made it appear that one Marcelo
Andres was the actual occupant of the land from 1967 to date. Said Gragasin
further recommended that the award in favor of petitioner Almuete be cancelled
and the land be awarded to respondent Marcelo. Consequently, DAR issued OCT
No. P-52521 in the name of respondent who, in turn, accompanied by ten persons
armed with bolos, immediately entered the subject property claiming exclusive
right of ownership and possession. Almuete complained to the DAR and wasted no
time in filing an action for reconveyance and recovery of possession against
Marcelo Andres with the RTC of Cauayan, Isabela, Br. 20 docketed as Civil Case
No. Br-20-530. The Trial Court rendered a Decision in favor of Almuete which
became final and executory upon Marcelo Andres's failure to appeal. The latter
filed a petition for certiorari to prevent the implementation of the writ of execution
which was entertained by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this Petition.

Issue:
Who between the petitioner and the respondent has a better right to the subject
property considering that both of them are awardees of the same property?

Held:
No juridical tie of landowner and tenant was alleged between petitioners and
respondent, let alone that which would so characterize the relationship as an
agrarian dispute. In fact, petitioner and respondent were contending parties for the
ownership of the same parcel of land. Rule II, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of
Procedure of the DARAB, provides: "Section 1. Primary, Original and Appellate
Jurisdiction. — The Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board shall have primary
jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian
disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under Republic
Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844
as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian laws and
their implementing rules and regulations. "Agrarian dispute" is defined under
Section 3(d) of Republic Act No 6657, as: "(d) Agrarian Dispute refers to any
controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy,
stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes
concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such
tenurial arrangements.

It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this

Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to
farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary,
landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee." From the foregoing, it is clear that the
jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited to cases involving a tenancy relationship
between the parties. The following elements are indispensable to establish a
tenancy relationship: (1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee; (2) The subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;
(3) There is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) The purpose of the
relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) There is personal
cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) The harvest is
shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. The Court of
Appeals, therefore, gravely erred when it granted the petition for certiorari and held
that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action between
petitioners and respondent. The action filed by petitioners was cognizable by the
regular courts. Consequently, the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela was
competent to try and decide Civil Case No. 20-530. Its decision was, thus, valid
and can no longer be disturbed, after having attained finality. Nothing more can be
done with the decision except to enforce it.

CARP COVERAGE, IN COMPLIANCE WITH DUE PROCESS, TWO

NOTICES ARE REQUIRED: FIRST, THE NOTICE OF COVERAGE AND
LETTER OF INVITATION TO A PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE AND,
SECOND, THE NOTICE OF ACQUISITION TO BE SENT TO THE
LANDOWNER EXEMPTION, MORE THAN THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE
SUBJECT LAND AS PARK IS THAT SAID LAND FORMS A VITAL PART
OF A WATERSHED AREA AND HAS SLOPES OF 18% AND OVER WHICH
ARE EXEMPT UNDER SECTION 10 OF R.A. NO. 6657

Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al.

G.R. No. 112526 (October 12, 2001)
41 | P a g e

Facts:
Petitioner Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation (hereafter, SRRDC) was the
registered owner of two parcels of land situated at Barangay Casile, Cabuyao,
Laguna covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 81949 and 84891 with
a total area of 254.6 hectares. According to petitioner, the parcels of land are
watersheds which provide clean potable water to the Canlubang Community and
ninety (90) light industries located in the area. Petitioner alleged that respondents
usurped its rights over the property, thereby destroying the ecosystem.
Respondents filed a civil case with the RTC of Laguna seeking an easement of a
right of way to and from Barangay Casile. Petitioner countered by seeking the
ejectment of the respondents and filed separate complaints for forcible entry
against the respondents before the Municipal Trial Court, Cabuyao, Laguna. After
the filing of the ejectment cases, respondents petitioned the DAR for the
compulsory acquisition of the SRRDC property under CARP. Eventually, after a
long and arduous process, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, Miriam Defensor
Santiago sent two (2) notices of acquisition to petitioner and placed the properties
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program despite the protest made by
SRRDC that the property was not appropriate for agricultural purposes. The area
being rugged in terrain with slopes of 18% or over and that the occupants of the
land were squatters not entitled to any land as beneficiaries. SRRDC further
averred that the properties were exempt from CARP coverage because it had been
classified as watershed area and were the subject of a pending petition for land
conversion. Later, the case was referred to the DARAB for summary land
valuation. In the meantime, on January 20, 1992, the RTC of Laguna, Branch 24
rendered a Decision finding that the private respondents illegally entered the
SRRDC property and ordered them evicted. On July 11, 1991, DAR Secretary
Benjamin T. Leong issued a Memorandum directing the Land Bank of the
Philippines to open a trust account in favor of SRRDC for P5,637,965.55 as
valuation for the SRRDC property. On December 19, 1991, DARAB promulgated
its Decision which, among others, dismissed the petitioner's protest against
compulsory coverage for lack of merit, ordered the Land Bank of the Philippines to
pay SRRDC the amount of P7,841,997.64 for the landholdings covered by the two
titles and ordered the DAR through the MARO to take immediate possession of the
landholding after transfer of the titles in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines for the immediate issuance of Emancipation Patents to
farmer-beneficiaries. On January 20, 1992, the RTC of Laguna, Branch 24
rendered a Decision in Civil Case No. B-2333 ruling that private respondents were
builders in bad faith. On February 6, 1992, petitioner filed with the Court of
Appeals, a petition for review of the DARAB decision. The CA promulgated a
decision affirming the Decision of the DARAB. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the property in question is covered by CARP considering that it
forms part of a watershed area and has slopes of 18% and over

Held:
First, under Republic Act No. 6657, there are two modes of acquisition of private
land, Compulsory and Voluntary. In compulsory acquisition of private lands, the
landholding, the landowners and farmer beneficiaries must first be identified. After
identification, the DAR shall send a notice of
42 | P a g e
acquisition to the landowner, by personal delivery or registered mail, and post it in
a conspicuous place in the municipal building and barangay hall of the place where
the property is located. Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the notice of
acquisition, the landowner, his administrator or representative shall inform the
DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the offer. If the landowner accepts, he
executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the government and surrenders
the certificate of title. Within thirty (30) days from the execution of the deed of
transfer, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) pays the owner the purchase
price. If the landowner rejects the DAR's offer or fails to make a reply, the DAR
conducts summary administrative proceedings to determine just compensation for
the land. The landowner, the LBP representative and other interested parties may
submit evidence on just compensation within fifteen days from notice. Within
thirty days from submission, the DAR shall decide the case and inform the owner
of its decision and the amount of just compensation. The DAR has made
compulsory acquisition the priority mode of land acquisition to hasten the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Under
Sec. 16 of the CARL, the first step in compulsory acquisition is the identification
of the land, the landowners and the farmer beneficiaries. However, the law is silent
on how the identification process shall be made. To fill this gap, on July 26, 1989,
the DAR issued Administrative Order No. 12, series of 1989, which set the
operating procedure in the identification of such lands. Administrative Order No.
12, Series of 1989 requires that the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO)
keep an updated master list of all agricultural lands under the CARP in his area of
responsibility containing all the required information. The MARO prepares a
Compulsory Acquisition Case Folder (CACF) for each title covered by CARP. The
MARO then sends the landowner a "Notice of Coverage" and a "letter of
invitation" to a "conference/meeting" over the land covered by the CACF. He also
sends invitations to the prospective farmer-beneficiaries, the representatives of the
Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC), the Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP) and other interested parties to discuss the inputs to the valuation of the
property and solicit views, suggestions, objections or agreements of the parties. At
the meeting, the landowner is asked to indicate his retention area. For a valid
implementation of the CARP Program, two notices are required: (1) the notice of
coverage and letter of invitation to a preliminary conference sent to the landowner,
the representative of the BARC, LBP, farmer-beneficiaries and other interested
parties pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 12, series of 1989; and (2) the notice of
acquisition sent to the landowner under Section 16 of the CARL. The importance
of the first notice, that is, the notice of coverage and the letter of invitation to a
conference, and its actual conduct cannot be understated. They are steps designed
to comply with the requirements of administrative due process. The
implementation of the CARL is an exercise of the State's police power and the
power of eminent domain. To the extent that the CARL prescribes retention limits
to the landowners, there is an exercise of police power for the regulation of private
property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such
regulation, the owners are deprived of lands they own in excess of the maximum
area allowed, there is also a taking under the power of eminent domain. The taking
contemplated is not a mere limitation on the use of the land. What is required is the
surrender of the title to and physical possession of the excess and all beneficial
rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. In the case at bar,
DAR has executed the taking of the property in question. However, payment of
just compensation was not in accordance with the procedural requirement. The law
required payment in cash or LBP bonds, not by trust accounts as was done by
DAR. In Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, we held that "The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the
transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt of
the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the
43 | P a g e
DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until
then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is
contemplated either." Watersheds may be defined as "an area drained by a river
and its tributaries and enclosed by a boundary or divide which separates it from
adjacent watersheds." Watersheds generally are outside the commerce of man, so
why was the Casile property titled in the name of SRRDC? The answer is simple.
At the time of the titling, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
had not declared the property as watershed area. The parcels of land in Barangay
Casile were declared as "PARK" by a Zoning Ordinance adopted by the
municipality of Cabuyao in 1979, as certified by the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board. On January 5, 1994, the Sangguniang Bayan of Cabuyao,
Laguna issued Resolution 26 voiding the Zoning classification of the lands at
Barangay Casile as Park and declaring that the land was now classified as
agricultural land. The authority of the municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna to issue
zoning classification is an exercise of its police power, not the power of eminent
domain. "A zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal legislation
which logically arranges, prescribes, defines and apportions a given political
subdivision into specific land uses as present and future projection of needs." In
Natalia Realty, Inc. vs. Department of Agrarian Reform, we held that lands
classified as non-agricultural prior to the effectivity of the CARL, may not be
compulsorily acquired for distribution to farmer beneficiaries. However, more
than the classification of the subject land as PARK is the fact that subsequent
studies and survey showed that the parcels of land in question form a vital part of a
watershed area. The definition does not exactly depict the complexities of a
watershed. The most important product of a watershed is water which is one of the
most important human necessity. The protection of watersheds ensures an adequate
supply of water for future generations and the control of flashfloods that not only
damage property but cause loss of lives. Protection of watersheds is an
"intergenerational responsibility" that needs to be answered now. Another factor
that needs to be mentioned is the fact that during the DARAB hearing, petitioner
presented proof that the Casile property has slopes of 18% and over, which
exempted the land from the coverage of CARL. R.A. No. 6657, Section 10,
provides: "Section 10. Exemptions and Exclusions. — Lands actually, directly and
exclusively used and found to be necessary for parks, wildlife, forest reserves,
reforestation, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds, watersheds and mangroves,
national defense, school sites and campuses including experimental farm stations
operated by public or private schools for educational purposes, seeds and seedlings
research and pilot production centers, church sites and convents appurtenant
thereto, communal burial grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies and penal farms
actually worked by the inmates, government and private research and quarantine
centers, and all lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope and over, except those
already developed shall be exempt from coverage of this Act." Hence, during the
hearing at DARAB, there was proof showing that the disputed parcels of land may
be excluded from the compulsory acquisition coverage of CARP because of its
very high slopes. To resolve the issue as to the nature of the parcels of land
involved in the case at bar, the Court directs the DARAB to conduct a
re-evaluation of the issue.