RULE 16: MOTION TO DISMISS
No motion to dismiss allowed
G.R. No. 192951 November 14, 2012
ALDERSGATE COLLEGE, INC., et.al, Petitioners,
vs.
JUNIFEN F. GAUUAN, et.al, Respondents,
-and-
ALDERSGATE COLLEGE, INC., DR. WILLIE A. DAMASCO, et.al, Respondents-
Intervenors.
Petition: This petition for review assails the Resolution and Order of the RTC
which granted the Motion to Withdraw and/or to Dismiss Case filed by the
respondents-intervenors
Facts:
Petitioners Aldersgate College, Inc., et.al, filed a case against the respondents
before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). When the SEC was
reorganized, the case was transferred to the RTC of Nueva Vizcaya for further
proceedings. Pre-trial thereafter ensued and a Pre-Trial Order was issued
enumerating the following issues, among others: (a) whether respondents
Gauuan, Villaluz, Arreola and the banks, are jointly and severally liable to
indemnify the school for all sums of money withdrawn, disbursed, paid,
diverted and unaccounted for without the approval and counter-signature of
the chairman; (b)whether respondents are liable for damages.
In a motion , respondents sought the dismissal of the complaint or the issuance
of a summary judgment dismissing the case. The RTC denied the motion on the
ground that there are several issues raised which would still need the
presentation of evidence to determine the rights of the parties. A few years
later, respondents-intervenors filed a Motion to Withdraw and/or to Dismiss
Case, alleging that the case was instituted without any board resolution
authorizing its filing and that the incumbent members of the Board of Trustees
of petitioner Aldersgate College, Inc. had recently passed a resolution which
sought the dismissal and/or withdrawal of the case.
The RTC granted the motion and dismissed the case on the basis of the
Resolution passed by the members of the Board of Trustees of petitioner
Aldersgate College recommending the dismissal of the case. Petitioners' motion
for reconsideration was denied by the RTC. Hence the instant petition.
Issue: whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing the case.
Ruling: Yes.
In an ordinary civil action, a motion to dismiss must generally be filed "within
the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint" and on the grounds
enumerated in Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. The rule is, however,
different with respect to intra-corporate controversies. Under Section 8, Rule 1
of the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies, a motion to
dismiss is a prohibited pleading.
As this case involves an intra-corporate dispute, the motion to dismiss is
undeniably a prohibited pleading. Moreover, the Court finds no justification
for the dismissal of the case based on the mere issuance of a board resolution by
the incumbent members of the Board of Trustees of petitioner corporation
recommending its dismissal, especially considering the various issues raised by
the parties before the court a quo. Hence, the RTC should not have entertained,
let alone have granted the subject motion to dismiss.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed March 30, 2010 Resolution
and June 29, 2010 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Nueva Vizcaya
in SEC Case No. 3972 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The RTC is DIRECTED to
proceed with the trial and to decide the case with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
RULE 17: DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS
G.R. No. 210252 June 16, 2014
VILMA QUINTOS, FLORENCIA I. DANCEL and CATALINO L.
IBARRA, Petitioners,
vs.
PELAGIA I. NICOLAS, NOLI L. IBARRA, et.al, Respondents.
Petition: Petition for Review on Certiorari filed under Rule 45
Facts:
Petitioners Vilma Quintos, Florencia Dancel, and Catalino Ibarra, and
respondents Pelagia Nicolas, Noli Ibarra, Santiago Ibarra, Pedro Ibarra, David
Ibarra, Gilberto Ibarra, and the late Augusto Ibarra are siblings. Their parents
were the owners of the subject property covered by TCT No. 318717. Their
parents had already passed away, leaving to their 10 children ownership over
the subject property. Subsequently, respondent siblings brought an action for
partition against petitioners before the RTC of Camiling, Tarlac. However, the
trial court dismissed the case for failure of the parties to appear despite due
notice. The ruling of the trial court became final.
Having failed to secure a favorable decision for partition, respondent siblings
instead resorted to executing a Deed of Adjudication to transfer the property in
favor of the ten 10 siblings. As a result, TCT No. 318717 was cancelled and in
lieu thereof, TCT No. 390484 was issued in its place in the names of the ten 10
heirs of the Ibarra spouses. Subsequently, respondent siblings sold their 7/10
undivided share over the property in favor of their co-respondents, the spouses
Recto and Rosemarie Candelario. TCT No. 434304 was issued in the name of the
Candelarios, covering the 7/10portion.
Petitioners filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages against
respondents denying any participation in the execution of the aforementioned
Deed of Adjudication and the Agreement of Subdivision. Respondents countered
that petitioners’ cause of action was already barred by estoppel when
petitioners offered to buy the 7/10 undivided share of the respondent siblings.
They point out that this is an admission on the part of petitioners that the
property is not entirely theirs. Respondents also sought, by way of
counterclaim, the partition of the property.
The quieting of title case was eventually raffled to the same trial court that
dismissed respondent’s action for partition. During pre-trial, respondents,
admitted that petitioners did not participate in the Deed of Adjudication and
that the Agreement of Subdivision was falsified. Despite the admissions of
respondents, however, the RTC dismissed petitioners’ complaint. Finding that
respondent siblings were entitled to their respective shares in the property as
co-heirs of petitioners, the subsequent transfer of their interest in favor of
respondent spouses Candelario was then upheld by the trial court.
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed the trial court’s Decision to the CA, pleading
that the partition should no longer be allowed since it is already barred by res
judicata, respondent siblings having already filed a case for partition that was
dismissed with finality. The CA denied the appeal. Petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration was denied. Hence, the instant petition.
Issue: whether the CA erred when it neglected to rule on petitioners’ contention
that the counterclaim for partition is also barred by prior judgment, which, if
properly considered, would justify the dismissal of the counterclaim.
Ruling: No. The counterclaim for partition is not barred by prior judgment
This brings us to the issue of partition as raised by respondents in their
counterclaim. In their answer to the counterclaim, petitioners countered that
the action for partition has already been barred by res judicata.
There is res judicata when the following requisites are present: (1) the formal
judgment or order must be final; (2) it must be a judgment or order on the
merits, that is, it was rendered after a consideration of the evidence or
stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case; (3) it must have
been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of
parties, of subject matter and of cause of action.
In the case at bar, respondent siblings admit that they filed an action for
partition docketed as Civil Case No. 02-52, which the RTC dismissed through an
Order dated March 22, 2004 for the failure of the parties to attend the
scheduled hearings. Respondents likewise admitted that since they no longer
appealed the dismissal, the ruling attained finality. Moreover, it cannot be
disputed that the subject property in Civil Case No. 02-52 and in the present
controversy are one and the same, and that in both cases, respondents raise the
same action for partition. And lastly, although respondent spouses Candelario
were not party-litigants in the earlier case for partition, there is identity of
parties not only when the parties in the case are the same, but also between
those in privity with them, such as between their successors-in-interest.
With all the other elements present, what is left to be determined now is
whether or not the dismissal of Civil case No. 02-52 operated as a dismissal on
the merits that would complete the requirements of res judicata.
In advancing their claim, petitioners cite Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court, to
wit:
Section 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. — If, for no justifiable cause, the
plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on
the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or
to comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be
dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court’s own motion,
without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in
the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an
adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court.
The afore-quoted provision enumerates the instances when a complaint may be
dismissed due to the plaintiff's fault: (1) if he fails to appear on the date for the
presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint; (2) if he fails to prosecute
his action for an unreasonable length of time; or (3) if he fails to comply with
the Rules or any order of the court. The dismissal of a case for failure to
prosecute has the effect of adjudication on the merits, and is necessarily
understood to be with prejudice to the filing of another action, unless otherwise
provided in the order of dismissal. Stated differently, the general rule is that
dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute is to be regarded as an adjudication
on the merits and with prejudice to the filing of another action, and the only
exception is when the order of dismissal expressly contains a qualification that
the dismissal is without prejudice. In the case at bar, petitioners claim that the
Order does not in any language say that the dismissal is without prejudice and,
thus, the requirement that the dismissal be on the merits is present.
Truly, We have had the occasion to rule that dismissal with prejudice under the
above-cited rule amply satisfies one of the elements of res judicata. It is, thus,
understandable why petitioners would allege res judicata to bolster their claim.
However, dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court
cannot defeat the right of a co-owner to ask for partition at any time, provided
that there is no actual adjudication of ownership of shares yet. Pertinent hereto
is Article 494 of the Civil Code, which reads:
Article 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each
co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common,
insofar as his share is concerned.
Between dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 and the right granted to
co-owners under Art. 494 of the Civil Code, the latter must prevail. To construe
otherwise would diminish the substantive right of a co-owner through the
promulgation of procedural rules. Such a construction is not sanctioned by the
principle, which is too well settled to require citation, that a substantive law
cannot be amended by a procedural rule.28 This further finds support in Art. 496
of the New Civil Code, viz:
Article 496.Partition may be made by agreement between the parties or by
judicial proceedings.1âwphi1 Partition shall be governed by the Rules of Court
insofar as they are consistent with this Code.
Thus, for the Rules to be consistent with statutory provisions, We hold that Art.
494, as cited, is an exception to Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court to the effect
that even if the order of dismissal for failure to prosecute is silent on whether or
not it is with prejudice, it shall be deemed to be without prejudice.
This is not to say, however, that the action for partition will never be barred by
res judicata. There can still be res judicata in partition cases concerning the
same parties and the same subject matter once the respective shares of the co-
owners have been determined with finality by a competent court with
jurisdiction or if the court determines that partition is improper for co-
ownership does not or no longer exists.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby PARTLY GRANTED.
The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
98919 dated July 8, 2013 and November 22, 2013, respectively, are hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The case is hereby REMANDED to the RTC,
Branch 68 in Camiling, Tarlac for purposes of partitioning the subject property
in accordance with Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-58986 April 17, 1989
DANTE Y. GO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FERNANDO CRUZ, Judge, etc., CITY SHERIFF OF CALOOCAN CITY, and
CALIFORNIA MANUFACTURING CO., INC., respondents.
Facts:
On October 26, 1981, California Manufacturing Co., Inc. brought an action in the
Court of First Instance of Manila against Dante Go, accusing him of unfair
competition. The gravamen of California's complaint was that Dante Go, was
selling his products in the open market under the brand name, "Great Italian," in
packages which were in colourable and deceitful limitation of California's
containers bearing its own brand, "Royal." Its complaint contained an
application for preliminary injunction commanding Dante Go to immediately
cease and desist from the further manufacture, sale and distribution of said
products, and to retrieve those already being offered for sale.
About two weeks later, however, California filed a notice of dismissal with the
Court. Four days afterwards, or on November 16, 1981, California received by
registered mail a copy of Dante Go's answer with counterclaim dated November
6, 1981, which had been filed with the Court on November 9, 1981. A fire broke
out at the Manila City Hall destroying the records of cases therein kept,
including that filed by California against Dante Go. California filed another
complaint asserting the same cause of action against Dante Go, this time with
the CFI at Caloocan City presided over by Judge Fernando A. Cruz.
Judge Cruz issued an ex parte restraining order against Dante Go. On the
following day, Dante Go filed the present petition for certiorari, etc. with this
Court praying for its nullification and perpetual inhibition alleging that the case
filed against him by California in the Manila Court remained pending despite
California's notice of dismissal. According to him, since he had already filed his
answer to the complaint before California sought dismissal of the action three
(3) days afterwards, such dismissal was no longer a matter of right and could no
longer be effected by mere notice in accordance with Section 1, Rule 17 of the
Rules of Court, but only on plaintiff s motion, and by order of the Court; hence,
the Caloocan Court acted without jurisdiction over the second action based on
the same cause.
Issue: Whether that the case filed against Dante Go by California in the Manila
Court remained pending despite California's notice of dismissal
Ruling: No.
The petitioner is in error. What marks the loss by a plaintiff of the right to
cause dismissal of the action by mere notice is not the filing of the
defendant's answer with the Court (either personally or by mail) but
the service on the plaintiff of said answer or of a motion for summary
judgment. This is the plain and explicit message of the Rules. "The filing of
pleadings, appearances, motions, notices, orders and other papers with the
court," according to Section 1, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, means the delivery
thereof to the clerk of the court either personally or by registered mail. Service,
on the other hand, signifies delivery of the pleading or other paper to the parties
affected thereby through their counsel of record, unless delivery to the party
himself is ordered by the court, by any of the modes set forth in the Rules, i.e.,
by personal service, service by mail, or substituted service.
Here, California filed its notice of dismissal of its action in the Manila Court after
the filing of Dante Go's answer but before service thereof. Thus having acted well
within the letter and contemplation of the afore-quoted Section 1 of Rule 17 of
the Rules of Court, its notice ipso facto brought about the dismissal of the action
then pending in the Manila Court, without need of any order or other action by
the Presiding Judge. The dismissal was effected without regard to whatever
reasons or motives California might have had for bringing it about, and was, as
the same Section 1, Rule 17 points out, "without prejudice," the contrary not
being otherwise "stated in the notice" and it being the first time the action was
being so dismissed.
There was therefore no legal obstacle to the institution of the second action in
the Caloocan Court of First Instance based on the same claim. The filing of the
complaint invested it with jurisdiction of the subject matter or nature of the
action.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against petitioner. The
temporary restraining order of December 11, 1981, and the amendatory
Resolution of April 14, 1982 are SET ASIDE.
G.R. No. 55336 May 4, 1989
BENJAMIN VALLANGCA, RODOLFO VALLANGCA and ALFREDO
VALLANGCA, petitioners
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and NAZARIO RABANES, respondents.
Petition: Petition for Review on Certiorari
Facts:
The agricultural land in dispute is the property of Ana Bilena, then married to
Fortunato Vallangca with whom she had three (3) children, namely, Benjamin,
Rodolfo and Alfredo, all surnamed Vallangca who are the petitioners herein.
Upon Fortunato Vallangca's death, his widow Ana Billena, together with her
eldest son Benjamin, mortgaged the land in dispute to her cousin Nazario
Rabanes (private respondent herein). The agreement was not reduced to
writing. At the time of said mortgage of the land to Nazario Rabanes, the land
was already mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank.
Nazario Rabanes made Bilena sign a document which Rabanes represented as a
mortgage contract. Billena, being an illiterate and trusting in her cousin Rabanes
affixed her signature on the document. In that same year, Billena was informed
by a cousin of Rabanes that the alleged mortgage contract which she had signed
was actually a deed of absolute sale. Ana Billena and her son Benjamin, went to
Rabanes' place for the purpose of redeeming the land and actually tendered to
him the loan amount. However, Rabanes told them that the land could no longer
be redeemed.
Since Ana Billena and her three (3) sons were in possession and actual
cultivation of the land in question, Rabanes filed against them an injunction suit
before the CFI of Cagayan. At the pretrial of said injunction suit, plaintiff
Rabanes was advised by the trial court that injunction was not the proper cause
of action, because injunction was merely an ancillary or provisional remedy to a
main action. Another complaint entitled "Recovery of Possession" was lodged
by Rabanes before the same court against the same defendants in the action for
injunction. Two days later, the action for injunction was ordered dismissed by
the trial court.
Respondent Nazario Rabanes (later substituted by his heirs) had another
version of the events. According to him, Ana Billena knowingly signed a deed of
absolute sale in his favor and from then on, his tenants cultivated the land, until
they were driven out by the three sons of Ana Billena.
CFI of Cagayan, rendered judgment declaring Rabanes as the rightful owner of
the land and ordered the petitioners to vacate the same. The defendants
appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court rendered judgment,
affirming in toto the trial court's judgment. Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether the dismissal of the suit for injunction filed by Rabanes was
made without prejudice
Ruling: Yes.
Petitioners, invoking the rule on "res judicata contend that the dismissal of the
"Injunction" case filed against them, barred the filing by Rabanes against them
of the second action for "Recovery of Possession." The heirs of private
respondent Rabanes in turn aver, among others, that the Court of Appeals was
correct in finding petitioners' reliance on res judicata as untenable. We sustain
the Rabanes heirs on this point.
When the issue of res judicata is raised, at least two (2) actions before a
competent court are necessarily involved; one, still pending and the other,
already decided with finality. It is the final judgment that ends the controversy
and precludes a relitigation of the same causes of action.
The ruling of the Court of Appeals is correct when it held that the defense of res
judicata was unavailing to the petitioners, because the prior injunction suit
against them, which was dismissed, was merely an ancillary and not a main
action.
Petitioners would also like to impress that the dismissal order in the injunction
suit, not having been made without prejudice, bars the second action for
recovery of possession. Under Sec. 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court which
provides:
Sec. 2. Dismissal by order of the court.--Except as provided in the preceding
section, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiffs instance save upon
order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems
proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service
upon him of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed
against the defendant's objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending
for independent adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise specified in the
order, a dismissal under this paragraph shall be without prejudice.
A dismissal order is generally deemed to be without prejudice to the filing of
another action. The only instance when dismissal of an action is with prejudice
is, when the order itself so states. Stated differently, when the court issues, upon
the plaintiff's instance, a dismissal order that is silent as to whether it is
with or without prejudice, such as in the case at bar, the presumption is,
that it is without prejudice. The cases cited by petitioners to support their
contention cannot be made to apply here as they deal with dismissal orders
issued as a result of plaintiff's failure to prosecute, and are covered by Section 3,
and not Section 2, Rule 17 which provides:
Sec. 3. Failure to prosecute. — If plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial, or
to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with
these rules or any order of the court, the action may be dismissed upon motion
of the defendant or upon the court's own motion. This dismissal shall have the
effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise provided by court.
Dismissals of actions (under Section 3) which do not expressly state whether
they are with or without prejudice are held to be with prejudice or on the
merits.
(However, it was found out that the sale between Bilena and Rabens is a sale
with pacto de retro wherein title of the vendees Rabanes to the property was to
become absolute and irrevocable only upon the failure of Bilena or her heirs to
repurchase the same within 5 years. As earlier stated, Billena exercised her
right to repurchase the land and her heirs are up to the present time in actual
and physical possession of the land. With these as premises, it can be said that
Rabanes' title to the property remains to this date revocable and
unconsolidated.)
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
61133-R is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners may redeem the property
covered by TCT No. 1005 upon the return of the amount of Eight Hundred Pesos
(P800.00) to private respondents, with interest at the rate of twelve percent
(12%) per annum from 1 January 1962 until fully paid.
G.R. No. 134171 November 18, 1998
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY and ARTURO C. LOMIBAO, petitioners,
vs.
RICHARD J. GORDON, ANACLETO M. DIAS, and ORLANDO E.
MENDIOLA, respondents.
Petition: This is a petition to declare respondents in contempt of court.
Facts:
The case was filed before this Court because of respondent Gordon's
apprehension that he would be removed and replaced as chairman of the Subic
Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) upon the change of administration from
President Ramos to President Estrada. The petition was for prohibition to
prevent Gordon's ouster as chairman of the SBMA on the ground that he had a
fixed term of office of six years which would not expire until February 10, 2004.
As respondent Gordon apprehended, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada
cancelled the appointment of the former as Chairman of the SBMA.
Instead of pressing his motion for a temporary restraining order, respondent
Gordon filed a Notice of Withdrawal of his Petition. This was done at 9:21 in the
morning. At 11:30 A.M. of that same day, he filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition in the RTC of Olongapo City.
The filing of the case in the Olongapo court gave rise to the present petition to
declare respondents in contempt of court filed by Executive Secretary Ronaldo
Zamora and Arturo C. Lomibao. The petition is filed against respondents
Richard Gordon and his counsel, the latter having filed the case in the Olongapo
City RTC after filing a notice of withdraw the case pending in this Court.
Petitioners charge that "the act of respondents in filing two (2) petitions
involving the same issues before this Court and the Regional Trial Court at
Olongapo City, both pending, constitutes forum-shopping and contempt of
court."
In its resolution, this Court granted respondents' prayer for leave to withdraw
their petition, without prejudice to the disposition of the present petition for
contempt.
Respondents deny the charge against them. They contend that they in fact
complied with the Rules of Court by disclosing in the certification of non-forum
shopping attached to their petition for certiorari and prohibition before the RTC
of Olongapo City, the existence and subsequent withdrawal of their petition for
prohibition before this Court.
Issue: Whether the act of respondents in filing two petitions involving the same
issues before this Court and the RTC, both pending, constitutes forum-shopping
and contempt of court
Ruling: No.
We find for respondents.
Forum-shopping consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for
the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose
of obtaining a favorable judgment. In the case at bar, although respondent
Richard J. Gordon filed a petition for prohibition before this Court and, after two
days, filed substantially the same petition before the Regional Trial Court of
Olongapo City, the fact remains that (1) before filing his petition in the Olongapo
court he first filed a notice of withdrawal of his petition which this Court later
granted and (2) he withdrew his petition in this Court so that it may be filed in
the proper court where it can be ventilated on its merits.
No adverse decision had been rendered by this Court against respondent
Gordon for which reason he thought it proper to institute the second action in
the trial court. The situation he found himself in is similar to that in which a
party, after filing a suit, realizes he made a mistake because the court in which
he has brought the case has no jurisdiction. He, therefore, withdraws his action
and refiles it in the proper forum. For, indeed, the policy of this Court respecting
the hierarchy of courts and consequently prohibiting the filing of a petition in
this Court in view of the concurrent jurisdiction with the lower courts has been
consistently observed in the absence of any compelling reason for departing
from such policy. It is clear from respondents' actions and explanation that they
had no intention of disregarding court processes
WHEREFORE, the petition for contempt is DISMISSED.
G.R. No. 202597 February 8, 2017
SPOUSES SERGIO C. PASCUAL and EMMA SERVILLION PASCUAL, Petitioners
vs.
FIRST CONSOLIDATED RURAL BANK (BOHOL), INC., ROBINSONS LAND
CORPORATION and ATTY. ANTONIO P. ESPINOSA, Register of Deeds,
Butuan City, Respondents
DECISION
Petition: Petition for review on certiorari
Facts:
The petitioners filed a petition for annulment of judgment in the CA in order to
nullify and set aside the decision rendered in Special Proceedings Case No. 4577
by the RTC in Butuan City ordering the cancellation of their notice of lis
pendens recorded in TCT No. RT-42190 of the Register of Deeds of Butuan City.
After the responsive pleadings to the petition were filed, the CA scheduled the
preliminary conference, and ordered the parties to file their respective pre-trial
briefs. Instead of filing their pre-trial brief, the petitioners filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment and a Motion to Hold Pre-Trial in Abeyance. At the scheduled
preliminary conference, the petitioners and their counsel did not appear.
The CA promulgated the first assailed resolution dismissing the petition for
annulment of judgment stating that the filing of pre-trial brief is mandatory,
whereby the failure to do the same would mean dismissal of the action with
prejudice. CA also stated that it is only at the pre-trial that the rules allow the
courts to render judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment. In addition,
CA emphasized that it is not for the petitioners to arrogate whether or not pre-
trial may be suspended or dispensed with, or that their motions be resolved
first, as the same are discretionary upon the court taking cognizance of the
petition.
Aggrieved, the petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration which the CA
for being filed out of time. Hence, this appeal by petition for review
on certiorari.
Issue: Whether the petitioners can validly insist that the CA should have first
resolved their Motion for Summary Judgment before holding the pre-trial

Ruling: No.
We deny the petition for review for its lack of merit.
Although motions for summary judgment can be filed before the pre-trial,
their non-resolution prior to the pre-trial should not prevent the holding
of the pre-trial
We consider it erroneous on the part of the CA to declare that "it is only at the
pre-trial that the rules allow the courts to render judgment on the pleadings and
summary judgment, as provided by Section 2(g) of Rule 18 of the Rules of
Court." The filing of the motion for summary judgment may be done prior to the
pre-trial. Section 1, Rule 3 5 of the Rules of Court permits a party seeking to
recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or seeking declaratory relief
to file the motion for a summary judgment upon all or any part thereof in his
favor (and its supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions) "at any time
after the pleading in answer thereto has been served;" while Section 2 of Rule 35
instructs that a party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is
asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may file the motion for summary
judgment (and its supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions) upon all or
any part thereof "at any time." As such, the petitioners properly filed their
motion for summary judgment prior to the pre-trial (assuming that they
thereby complied with the requirement of supporting affidavits, depositions or
admissions).
The CA could have misconceived the text of Section 2(g), Rule 18 of the Rules of
Court, to wit:
Section 2. Nature and purpose. - The pre-trial is mandatory. The court
shall consider:
x x xx
(g) The propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or summary
judgment, or of dismissing the action should a valid ground therefor be
found to exist;
x x xx
pleadings or summary judgment. In the case of the motion for summary
judgment, the adverse party is entitled to counter the motion.
Even so, the petitioners cannot validly insist that the CA should have first
resolved their Motion for Summary Judgment before holding the pre-trial.
They could not use the inaction on their motion to justify their nonappearance
with their counsel at the pre-trial, as well as their inability to file their pre-trial
brief. In that regard, their appearance at the pre-trial with their counsel was
mandatory.
The petitioners argue that their non-appearance was not mandatory, positing
that Section 2(g), Rule 18 of the Rules of Court had been amended by
Administrative Circular No. 3-99 and A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC issued on July 13,
2004 but effective on August 16, 2004. The petitioners' argument was
unwarranted.
A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC (Guidelines to be Observed by Trial Court Judges and Clerks
of Court in the Conduct of Pre-Trial and Use of Deposition-Discovery Measures) -
similarly underscored the mandatory character of the pre-trial, and reiterated
under its heading Pre-Trial in civil cases that, among others, the trial court could
then determine "the propriety of rendering a summary judgment dismissing the
case based on the disclosures made at the pre-trial or a judgment based on the
pleadings, evidence identified and admissions made during pre-trial." As such,
they could have urged the trial court to resolve their pending Motion for
Summary Judgment during the pre-trial.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the assailed resolutions of the Court of
Appeals promulgated in CA-G.R. SP No. 04020-MIN; and ORDERS the
petitioners to pay the costs of suit.

To be clear, the rule only spells out that unless the motion for such judgment
has earlier been filed the pre-trial may be the occasion in which the court
considers the propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings or summary
judgment. If no such motion was earlier filed, the pre-trial judge may then
indicate to the proper party to initiate the rendition of such judgment by filing
the necessary motion. Indeed, such motion is required by either Rule 34
(Judgment on the Pleadings) or Rule 35 (Summary Judgment) of the Rules of
Court. The pre-trial judge cannot motu proprio render the judgment on the