JIMENEZ vs.

CABANGBANG CASE (1966)

This is an action of Jimenez to recover damages for the publication of the alleged libelous open
letter of Cabangbang dated November 14, 1958.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Jimenez filed an action to recover damages for the said publication of an alleged open letter of
Cabangbang to the President dated November 14, 1958.

Jimenez argued in his petition that the alleged libellous open letter was published in several
newspapers of general circulation here in the Philippines. He pointed out that the publication
was intended to impeach his reputation and to subject him to public contempt and ridicule.

Cabangbang, on the other hand, contended that the said open letter was not libellous, or even if
it was libellous, such open letter falls within the privileged communication accorded to him by
the Constitution for he was a member of the House of Representatives and a Chairman of
Committee on National Defense; thus, he will not be liable for damages.

The issue raised in this case was whether or not the publication of the questioned open letter of
Cabangbang to the President is a privileged communication

Section 6 of Article 6 of the 1935 Constitution, which is the governing law at that time, states
that the senators or members of house of representatives shall in all cases, except for treason,
felony and breach of peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of
the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same, and for any speech or debate
therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place.

For the case at bar, since the said open letter of Cabangbang did not fall within the purview of
any speech and debate in the Congress, and the said open letter to the president was made
when the Congress was not in session, and the act of publication of such open letter does not
fall within Cabangbang’s official duty as a member of the House of Representatives, hence,
such open letter in question was not a privileged communication for it did not met the requisites
in order for it to be considered as a privileged communication
PUYAT v. DE GUZMAN CASE (1982)

This case is in relation to the appearance in a court of an incumbent Assemblyman pursuant to Section
11, Article 8 of the 1973 Constitution.

The facts of the case are as follows:

On May 14, 1979, private corporation International Pipe Industries Association (IPI) held an election of
directors, and Puyat and his group won. The Acero group contested the win of the Puyat group claiming
that the stockholders’ votes had not been properly counted. They filed a quo warranto case before the
SEC.

Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Pambansa, orally entered his appearance as
counsel for Acero which the Puyat Group objected by reason of the prohibition indicated in Art. VIII, Sec.
11 of the 1973 Constitution Fernandez then stopped his appearance as counsel for the Acero Group.

However, unknown to the Puyat Group, Fernandez had already purchased 10 shares for Php 200 from
one of the members of the Acero group two weeks prior to their case being called. As soon as Fernandez
received a notarized deed of sale for his purchase, Fernandez filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention. As
owner of the 10 shares, he claimed legal interest in the matter for litigation.

In July, 1979, SEC granted Fernandez’ motion to intervene on the basis of his ownership of the 10 shares

The issue in this case was whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez may intervene in the SEC Case
without violating the provisions of Section 11, Article 8 of the 1973 Constitution

Sect.11, Art8 of the 1973 Constitution, which is the governing law at that time, provides for the
prohibition of any member f the Batasang Pambansa to appear as a counsel before any court wherein
the Government, or any of its subdivision, agency or instrumentality is the adverse party. Furthermore,
it also provides the prohibition of any of the member of Batasang Pambansa to be interested financially,
either directly or indirectly, to any contract, franchise or special privilege granted by the Government
during his term of office.

For the case at bar, ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot
be said to be appearing as counsel. He is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is joining the
cause of the Acero Group. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of
ten (10) shares of IPI in respect of the matter in litigation and not for the protection of the said group.

BUT

Fernandez’ shares are only 10 out of 262,843 outstanding shares which he acquired after a failed
attempt to represent the Acero Group. There has been an indirect "appearance as counsel before ... an
administrative body which is the SEC" and, the Court ruled that such intervention of Fernandez is a
circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition reflected in Sec 11, art 8 of the 1973 constitution. The
"intervention" was only a workaround to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other
capacity.