Republic v PLDT
Facts:
PLDT and RCA Communications Inc (which is not a party to this
case but has contractual relations with e parties) entered into an
agreement where telephone messages, coming from the US and
received by RCA's domestic station could automatically be
transferred to the lines of PLDT and vice versa.
The Bureau of Telecommunications set up its own Government
Telephone System (GTS) by renting the trunk lines of PLDT to
enable government offices to call private parties. One of the many
rules prohibits the use of the service for his private use.
Republic of the Philippines entered into an agreement with RCA for
a joint overseas telephone service where the Bureau would convey
radio-telephone overseas calls received by the RCA's station to and
from local residents.
PLDT complained that the Bureau was violating the conditions for
using the trunk lines not only for the use of government offices but
even to serve private persons or the general public. PLDT gave a
notice that if violations were not stopped, PLDT would sever the
connections -which PLDT did.
Republic sued PLDT commanding PLDT to execute a contract,
through the Bureau, for the use of the facilities of defendant's
telephone system throughout the Philippines under such terms and
conditions as the court finds it reasonable.
Issue:
Whether or not Republic can command PLDT to execute the
contract.
Held:
No. The Bureau was created in pursuance of a state policy
reorganizing the government offices to meet the exigencies
attendant upon the establishment of a free Gov't of the Phil.
When the Bureau subscribed to the trunk lines, defendant knew or
should have known that their use by the subscriber was more or less
public and all embracing in nature.
The acceptance by the defendant of the payment of rentals, despite 2. The entry must be for more than a momentary period;
its knowledge that the plaintiff had extended the use of the trunk 3. It must be under warrant or color of authorities;
lines to commercial purposes, implies assent by the defendant to 4. The property must be devoted for public use or otherwise
such extended use. Since this relationship has been maintained for informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and
a long time and the public has patronized both telephone systems, 5. The utilization of the property for public use must be such a way
and their interconnection is to the public convenience, it is too late as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the
for the defendant to claim misuse of its facilities, and it is not now property.
at liberty to unilaterally sever the physical connection of the trunk
lines.
To uphold PLDT's contention is to subordinate the needs of the cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the republic
general public.
PEOPLE VS. FAJARDO [104 Phil 443; G.R. No. L-12172; 29 Aug
1958]
Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: The municipal council of baao, camarines sur stating among
others that construction of a building, which will destroy the view of
the plaza, shall not be allowed and therefore be destroyed at the
expense of the owner, enacted an ordinance. Herein appellant filed
a written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit
to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel
of land registered in Fajardo's name, located along the national
highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek. The
request was denied, for the reason among others that the proposed
building would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza.
Defendants reiterated their request for a building permit, but again
the mayor turned down the request. Whereupon, appellants
proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit,
because they needed a place of residence very badly, their former
house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had
been living on leased property. Thereafter, defendants were charged
in violation of the ordinance and subsequently convicted. Hence this
appeal.
Issue: Whether or Not the ordinance is a valid exercise of police
power.
Held: No. It is not a valid exercise of police power. The ordinance is
unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently
deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it
oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of
appellant’s property without just compensation. We do not overlook
that the modern tendency is to regard the beautification of
neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and happiness of
residents.
As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on
appellants' land, regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned
under the ordinance in question, because it would interfere with the
view of the public plaza from the highway. The appellants would, in
effect, be constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for
the obvious purpose for which it is best suited, being urban in
character. To legally achieve that result, the municipality must give
appellants just compensation and an opportunity to be heard.
Republic of the Philippines vs. Vda. De Castellvi (G.R. No. L-20620)
- Digest
Facts:
In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), entered into a lease agreement over a land in Pampanga with
Castellvi on a year-to-year basis. When Castellvi gave notice to
terminate the lease in 1956, the AFP refused because of the
permanent installations and other facilities worth almost
P500,000.00 that were erected and already established on the
property. She then instituted an ejectment proceeding against the
AFP. In 1959, however, the republic commenced the expropriation
proceedings for the land in question.
Issue: Whether or not the compensation should be determined as of
1947 or 1959.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the taking should not be reckoned as
of 1947, and that just compensation should not be determined on the
basis of the value of the property that year .
The requisites for taking are:
1. The expropriator must enter a private property;
Only requisites 1, 3 and 4 are present. It is clear, therefore, that the
“taking” of Castellvi’s property for purposes of eminent domain
commenced to occupy the property as lessee thereof.
Requisite number 2 is not present according to the Supreme Court,
“momentary” when applied to possession or occupancy of real
property should be construed to mean “a limited period” -- not
indefinite or permanent. The aforecited lease contract was for a
period of one year, renewable from year to year. The entry on the
property, under the lease, is temporary, and considered transitory.
The fact that the Republic, through AFP, constructed some
installations of a permanent nature does not alter the fact that the
entry into the lant was transitory, or intended to last a year,
although renewable from year to year by consent of the owner of the
land. By express provision of the lease agreement the republic, as
lessee, undertook to return the premises in substantially the same
condition as at the time the property was first occupied by the AFP.
It is claimed that the intention of the lessee was to occupy the land
permanently, as may be inferred from the construction of
permanent improvements. But this “intention” cannot prevail over
the clear and express terms of the lease contract.
The 5th requirement is also lacking. In the instant case the entry of
the Republic into the property and its utilization of the same for
public use did not oust Castellvi and deprive her of all beneficial
enjoyment of the property. Cstellvi remained as owner, and was
continuously recognized as owner by the Republic, as shown by the
renewal of the lease contract from year to year, and by the provision
in the lease contract whereby the Republic undertook to return the
property to Castellvi when the lease was terminated. Neither was
Castellvi deprived of all the beneficial enjoyment of the property,
because the Republic was bound to pay, and had been paing,
Castellvi the agreed monthly rentals until the time when it filed the
complaint for eminent domain on June 26, 1959.
It is clear, therefore, that the “taking” of Castellvi’s property for
purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken
place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy the property
as lessee thereof, and that the just compensation to be paid for the
Castellvi’s property should not be determined on the basis of the
value of the property as of that year. The lower court did not commit
an error when it held that the “taking” of the property under
expropriation commenced with the filing of the complaint in this
case.
Under Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, “just compensation” is
to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. The
Supreme Court has ruled that when the taking of the property
sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the
expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of
the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.
Amigable v. Cuenca (Consti1)
Doctrine: equity
Date: February 29, 1972
Ponente: Justice Makalintal
Facts:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu in its Civil Case No. R-5977, dismissing the plaintiff's
complaint.
Victoria Amigable, the appellant herein, is the registered owner of
Lot No. 639 of the Banilad Estate in Cebu City
At the back of her Transfer Certificate of Title (1924), there was no
annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in the
property.
Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used
a portion of said lot, with an area of 6,167 square meters, for the
construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues.
On March 27, 1958 Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the
Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had
been appropriated by the government. The claim was indorsed to
the Auditor General, who disallowed it in his 9th Indorsement dated
December 9, 1958. A copy of said indorsement was transmitted to
Amigable's counsel by the Office of the President on January 7,
1959.
On February 6, 1959 Amigable filed in the court a quo a complaint,
which was later amended on April 17, 1959 upon motion of the
defendants, against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas
Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for the
recovery of ownership and possession of the 6,167 square meters of
land traversed by the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. She also sought
the payment of compensatory damages in the sum of P50,000.00 for
the illegal occupation of her land, moral damages in the sum of
P25,000.00, attorney's fees in the sum of P5,000.00 and the costs of
the suit.
On July 29, 1959 said court rendered its decision holding that it had
no jurisdiction over the plaintiff's cause of action for the recovery of
possession and ownership of the portion of her lot in question on the
ground that the government cannot be sued without its consent;
that it had neither original nor appellate jurisdiction to hear, try
and decide plaintiff's claim for compensatory damages in the sum of
P50,000.00, the same being a money claim against the government;
and that the claim for moral damages had long prescribed, nor did
it have jurisdiction over said claim because the government had not
given its consent to be sued. Accordingly, the complaint was
dismissed.
Unable to secure a reconsideration, the Amigable appealed to the
Court of Appeals, which subsequently certified the case to Us, there
being no question of fact involved.
Issue/s:
WON the Amigable may properly sue the government under the
facts of the case
Held: the government is NOT immune to the suit.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and
the case remanded to the court a quo for the determination of
compensation, including attorney's fees, to which the appellant is
entitled as above indicated. No pronouncement as to costs.
Ratio:
Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu: where the
government takes away property from a private landowner for
public use without going through the legal process of expropriation
or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit
against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of
governmental immunity from suit without its consent
Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears
at the back of her certificate of title and that she has not executed
any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government,
the appellant remains the owner of the whole lot.
As registered owner, she could bring an action to recover possession
of the portion of land in question at any time because possession is
one of the attributes of ownership.
However, since restoration of possession of said portion by the
government is neither convenient nor feasible at this time because
it is now and has been used for road purposes, the only relief
available is for the government to make due compensation which it
could and should have done years ago. To determine the due
compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or value
thereof at the time of the taking
the plaintiff is entitled thereto in the form of legal interest on the
price of the land from the time it was taken up to the time that
payment is made by the government.
the government should pay for attorney's fees, the amount of which
should be fixed by the trial court after hearing.
Philippine Press Institute vs COMELEC GR 119694 22 May 1995
Facts: COMELEC promulgated Resolution No 2772 directing
newspapers to provide free print space of not less than ½ page for
use as “Comelec Space” from 06March1995 to 06May1995.
COMELEC Commisssioner sent letters to publishers informing
them of the same. PPI seek to declare the resolution
unconstitutional and void on the ground of taking private property
w/o just compensation. TRO was enforced. SocGen argues that even
if the questioned Resolution and its implementing letter directives
are viewed as mandatory, the same would nevertheless be valid as
an exercise of the police power of the State. COMELEC Chair stated
that they will clarify the resolution that the letter was intended to
solicit and not to compel. Resolution No. 2772-A was promulgated.
Issue: Whether or not Resolution 2772 is void on the ground of
deprivation of use w/o compensation of newspaper?
Decision: To compel print media companies to donate “Comelec-
space” amounts to “taking” of private personal property for public
use. The extent of the taking or deprivation is not insubstantial
measured by the advertising rates ordinarily charged by newspaper
publishers whether in cities or in non-urban areas.
The taking of print space here sought to be effected may first be
appraised under the rubric of expropriation of private personal
property for public use. The threshold requisites for a lawful taking
of private property for public use need to be examined here: one is
the necessity for the taking; another is the legal authority to effect
the taking. The element of necessity for the taking has not been
shown by respondent Comelec. It has not been suggested that the
members of PPI are unwilling to sell print space at their normal
rates to Comelec for election purposes. It has not been suggested
that Comelec has been granted the power of eminent domain either
by the Constitution or by the legislative authority. A reasonable
relationship between that power and the enforcement and
administration of election laws by Comelec must be shown.
The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized
by the Constitution, but not without payment of “just
compensation.”
Sumulong v Hon. Guerrero and the NHA (GR L-48685; 1987)
Cortes, J.
Facts
• On December 5, 1977 the National Housing Authority
(NIIA) filed a complaint for expropriation of parcels of land covering
approximately twenty five (25) hectares, (in Antipolo, Rizal)
including the lots of petitioners Lorenzo Sumulong and Emilia
Vidanes-Balaoing with an area of 6,667 square meters and 3,333
square meters respectively.
• The land sought to be expropriated were valued by the
NHA at one peso (P1.00) per square meter adopting the market
value fixed by the provincial assessor in accordance with
presidential decrees prescribing the valuation of property in
expropriation proceedings
• Together with the complaint was a motion for immediate welfare. The public character of housing measures does not change
possession of the properties. The NHA deposited the amount of because units in housing projects cannot be occupied by all but only
P158,980.00 with the Philippine National Bank, representing the by those who satisfy prescribed qualifications. A beginning has to be
"total market value" of the subject twenty five hectares of land, made, for it is not possible to provide housing for are who need it,
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1224 which defines "the policy all at once.
on the expropriation of private property for socialized housing upon • Petitioners further contend that Pres. Decree 1224, as
payment of just compensation." amended, would allow the taking of "any private land" regardless of
• Respondent Judge issued a writ of possession the size and no matter how small the area of the land to be
• Petitioners challenge the orders of respondent Judge and expropriated. (In effect: there are larger lands owned by only a few
assailing the constitutionality of Pres. Decree No. 1224, as amended landlords, why not take theirs first?)
o The order was issued without notice and without hearing o JM Tuason v Land Tenure Admin: he propriety of
o Pres. Decree l224, as amended, is unconstitutional for exercising the power of eminent domain under Article XIII, section
being violative of the due process clause, specifically 4 of our Constitution cannot be determined on a purely quantitative
The Decree would allow the taking of property regardless or area basis.
of size and no matter how small the area to be expropriated; o Departed from the ruling in Guido vs. Rural Progress
Socialized housing" for the purpose of condemnation Administration which held that the test to be applied for a valid
proceeding, as defined in said Decree, is not really for a public expropriation of private lands was the area of the land and not the
purpose; number of people who stood to be benefited. Since then "there has
The Decree violates procedural due process as it allows evolved a clear pattern of adherence to the "number of people to be
immediate taking of possession, control and disposition of property benefited test"
without giving the owner his day in court;
The Decree would allow the taking of private property upon Just compensation
payment of unjust and unfair valuations arbitrarily fixed by • PD 1224 unconstitutional as it allows the taking of private
government assessors; property upon payment of unjust and unfair valuations arbitrarily
The Decree would deprive the courts of their judicial fixed by government assessors
discretion to determine what would be the "just compensation" in • Already ruled upon by this Court in the case of Ignacio vs.
each and every raise of expropriation. Guerrero which, incidentally, arose from the same expropriation
complaint that led to this instant petition
Issue • The provisions on just compensation found in Presidential
• Is “socialized housing” as defined in PD 1224 not public use Decree Nos. 1224, 1259 and 1313 are the same provisions found in
since it will benefit only a handful of people? NO. It is within the Presidential Decree Nos. 76, 464, 794 and 1533 which were declared
definition of public use unconstitutional in Export Processing Zone All thirty vs. Dulay
• Does PD 1224 allow the taking of private property upon o Just compensation means the value of the property at the
payment of unjust and unfair valuations arbitrarily fixed by time of the taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss
government assessors, depriving the courts of their judicial sustained. ALL the facts as to the condition of the property and its
discretion to determine what would be "just compensation"? YES. surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, should be
Unconstitutional. considered
• Is PD 1224 violative of procedural due process as it allows o Tax values can serve as guides but cannot be absolute
immediate taking of possession, control and disposition of property substitutes for just compensation
without giving the owner his day in court? YES. Unconstitutional
Due Process
Judgment • Pres. Decree 1224, as amended, violates procedural due
• Writ of possession annulled. Case remanded to the court of process as it allows immediate taking of possession, control and
origin for further proceedings to determine the compensation the disposition of property without giving the owner his day in court
petitioners are entitled to be paid • has also been ruled upon in the Export Processing Zone
Authority case
Ratio o It is violative of due process to deny to the owner the
opportunity to prove that the valuation in the tax documents is
Public Use unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to basic concepts of justice and
• "Socialized housing" is defined by PD 1224 as, "the fairness to allow the haphazard work of minor bureaucrat or clerk
construction of dwelling units for the middle and lower class to absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court promulgated only
members of our society, including the construction of the supporting after expert commissioners have actually viewed the property
infrastructure and other facilities" • Before a writ of possession is issued by the Court in
• The "public use" requirement for a and exercise of the expropriation proceedings, the following requisites must be met:
power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept o (1) There must be a Complaint for expropriation sufficient
o “There was a time when it was felt that a literal meaning in form and in substance;
should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is o (2) A provisional determination of just compensation for the
undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets properties sought to be expropriated must be made by the trial court
or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not on the basis of judicial (not legislative or executive) discretion; and
anymore. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the o (3) The deposit requirement under Section 2, Rule 67 must
power of eminent domain comes into play… It is accurate to state be complied with.
then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the
general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use” Manosca v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106440, January 29, 1996
• To the literal import of the term signifying strict use or Fact: Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos
employment by the public has been added the broader notion of Street, Calzada, Taguig. Metro Manila, with an area of about four
indirect public benefit or advantage. hundred ninety-two (492) square meters. When the parcel was
• urban renewal or redevelopment and the construction of ascertained by the NHI to have been the birthsite of Felix Y.
low-cost housing is recognized as a public purpose, not only because Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1,
of the expanded concept of public use but also because of specific Series of 1986, pursuant to Section 42 of Presidential Decree No.
provisions in the (1973) Constitution 260, declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. The
o The state shall by law, and for the common good, resolution was approved by the Minister of Education, Culture and
undertake, in cooperation with the private sector, a continuing Sports At the same time, respondent Republic filed an urgent
program of urban land reform and housing which will make motion for the issuance of an order to permit it to take immediate
available at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to possession of the property. The motion was opposed by petitioners.
underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and After a hearing, the trial court issued an order fixing the provisional
resettlement areas. It shall also promote adequate employment market and assessed values of the property and authorizing the
opportunities to such citizens. In the implementation of such Republic to take over the property once the required sum would
program the State shall respect the rights of small property owners. have been deposited with the Municipal Treasurer of Taguig, Metro
(Art. XIII, sec. 9) Manila.
• Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a
matter of state concern since it directly and significantly affects Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that
public health, safety, the environment and in sum, the general the intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and,
incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public
funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia
ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of the
Constitution. Petitioners sought, in the meanwhile, a suspension in
the implementation of the 03rd August 1989 order of the trial court.
On 15 February 1990, following the filing by respondent Republic of
its reply to petitioners’ motion seeking the dismissal of the case, the
trial court issued its denial of said motion to dismiss.6 Five (5) days
later, or on 20 February 1990,7 another order was issued by the trial
court, declaring moot and academic the motion for reconsideration
and/or suspension of the order of 03 August 1989 with the rejection
of petitioners’ motion to dismiss. Petitioners’ motion for the
reconsideration of the 20th February 1990 order was likewise
denied by the trial court in its 16th April 1991 order. Petitioners
then lodged a petition with the Court of Appeals which the appellate
court dismissed for failure to show any grave abuse of discretion or
lack of jurisdictional competence on the part of the trial court. A
motion for the reconsideration of the decision was denied
subsequently by appellate court.
Issue: Whether the expropriation was not for a public purpose and,
incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public
funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia
ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of Section
29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution.
Held: No, Public Use. Eminent domain. The constitutional and
statutory basis for taking property by eminent domain. For
condemnation purposes, “public use” is one which confers same
benefit or advantage to the public; it is not confined to actual use by
public. It is measured in terms of right of public to use proposed
facilities for which condemnation is sought and, as long as public
has right of use, whether exercised by one or many members of
public, a “public advantage” or “public benefit” accrues sufficient to
constitute a public use. The idea that “public use” is strictly limited
to clear cases of “use by the public” has long been discarded.
EPZA VS. DULAY [148 SCRA 305; G.R. No. L-59603; 29 Apr 1987]
Facts: The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is
where the Mactan Export Processing Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is
to be constructed. Private respondent San Antonio Development
Corporation (San Antonio, for brevity), in which these lands are
registered under, claimed that the lands were expropriated to the
government without them reaching the agreement as to the
compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay then issued an order for the
appointment of the commissioners to determine the just compensation.
It was later found out that the payment of the government to San
Antonio would be P15 per square meter, which was objected to by the
latter contending that under PD 1533, the basis of just compensation
shall be fair and according to the fair market value declared by the
owner of the property sought to be expropriated, or by the assessor,
whichever is lower. Such objection and the subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration were denied and hearing was set for the reception of
the commissioner’s report. EPZA then filed this petition for certiorari
and mandamus enjoining the respondent from further hearing the case.
Issue: Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of
determining just compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of
just compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.
The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes
impermissible encroachment to judicial prerogatives. It tends to render
the courts inutile in a matter in which under the Constitution is reserved
to it for financial determination. The valuation in the decree may only
serve as guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just
compensation, but it may not substitute the court’s own judgment as to
what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The
determination of just compensation is a judicial function. The executive
department or the legislature may make the initial determination but
when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that
the private party may not be taken for public use without just
compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that
its own determination shall prevail over the court’s findings. Much less
can the courts be precluded from looking into the justness of the
decreed compensation.
My version: ☺
EPZA VS. DULAY [148 SCRA 305; G.R. No. L-59603; 29 Apr 1987]
On January 15, 1979, the President of the Philippines, issued
Proclamation No. 1811, reserving a parcel of land of the public
domain in the City of Lapu-Lapu, Cebu for the establishment of an
export processing zone by petitioner Export Processing Zone
Authority (EPZA). The proclamation included, among others, four
(4) parcels of land owned and registered in the name of the private
respondent. The petitioner offered to purchase the parcels of land
from the respondent in accordance with the valuation set forth in
Section 92, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 464, as amended. The
parties failed to reach an agreement regarding the sale of the
property.
PD No 464:
"Section 92. Basis for payment of just compensation in
expropriation proceedings. In determining just
compensation which private property is acquired by the
government for public use, the basis shall be the market
value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone
having legal interest in the property, or such market value
as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower."
The petitioner filed with the then Court of First Instance a
complaint for expropriation with a prayer for the issuance of a writ
of possession against the private respondent, to expropriate the
aforesaid parcels of land. On October 21, 1980, the respondent judge
issued a writ of possession authorizing the petitioner to take
immediate possession of the premises.
On February 17, 1981, the respondent judge declared the petitioner
as having the lawful right to take the properties sought to be
condemned, upon the payment of just compensation to be
determined as of the filing of the complaint. The respondent judge
also appointed certain persons as commissioners to ascertain and
report to the court the just compensation for the properties sought
to be expropriated.
The three commissioners submitted their consolidated report
recommending the amount of P15.00 per square meter as the fair
and reasonable value of just compensation for the properties.
On July 29, 1981, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
and Objection to Commissioner's Report on the grounds that P.D.
No. 1533 has superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court on the ascertainment of just compensation through
commissioners; and that the compensation must not exceed the
maximum amount set by P.D. No. 1533.
PD 1533:
"Section 1. In determining just compensation for private
property acquired through eminent domain proceedings,
the compensation to be paid shall not exceed the value
declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having
legal interest in the property or determined by the assessor,
pursuant to the Real Property Tax Code, whichever value
is lower, prior to the recommendation or decision of the
appropriate Government office to acquire the property."
Section 5 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court:
Section 5. Ascertainment of compensation. — Upon the
rendition of the order of expropriation, the court shall
appoint not more than three (3) competent and
disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and
report to the court the just compensation for the property
sought to be taken. The order of appointment shall
designate the time and place of the first session of the
hearing to be held by the commissioners and specify the
time within which their report shall be submitted to the
court.
On November 14, 1981, the trial court denied the petitioner's motion
for reconsideration.
On February 1982, the petitioner filed this petition enjoining the
trial court from enforcing the order and from further proceeding
with the hearing of the expropriation case.
Petitioner maintains that P.D. No. 1533 is the applicable law herein,
the basis of just compensation shall be the fair and current market
value declared by the owner of the property sought to be
expropriated or such market value as determined by the assessor,
whichever is lower. Therefore, there is no more need to appoint
commissioners as prescribed by Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of
Court and for said commissioners to consider other highly variable
factors in order to determine just compensation. The petitioner
further maintains that P.D. No. 1533 has vested on the assessors
and the property owners themselves the power or duty to fix the
market value of the properties and that said property owners are
given the full opportunity to be heard before the Local Board of
Assessment Appeals and the Central Board of Assessment Appeals.
Thus, the vesting on the assessor or the property owner of the right
to determine the just compensation in expropriation proceedings,
with appropriate procedure for appeal to higher administrative
boards, is valid and constitutional.
Issue: Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of
determining just compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.
Held: The mode of determination of just compensation in PD 1533
is unconstitutional.
The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited
decrees constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial
prerogatives. It tends to render this Court inutile in a matter which
under the Constitution is reserved to it for final determination. We
are convinced and so rule that the trial court correctly stated that
the valuation in the decree may only serve as a guiding principle or
one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not
substitute the court's own judgment as to what amount should be
awarded and how to arrive at such amount. A return to the earlier
well-established doctrine, to our mind, is more in keeping with the
principle that the judiciary should live up to its mission "by
vitalizing and not denigrating constitutional rights."
Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of
the taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained.
All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings,
its improvements and capabilities, should be considered.
The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases
is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature
may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a
violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property
may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no
statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own
determination shall prevail over the court's findings. Much less can
the courts be precluded from looking into the "just-ness" of the
decreed compensation.
We, therefore, hold that P.D. No. 1533, which eliminates the court's
discretion to appoint commissioners pursuant to Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court, is unconstitutional and void. To hold otherwise
would be to undermine the very purpose why this Court exists in
the first place.
Province of Camarines Sur v. CA G.R. No. 103125 May 17, 1993
FACTS:
Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) of Camarines Sur passed
Resolution 129 authorizing the province to expropriate property in
order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-agricultural
crops and housing project for the government employees. By virtue
of the resolution, Cam Sur filed two separate cases for expropriation
and a motion for the issuance of writ of possession against San
Joaquins, the private respondents.
The San Joaquins moved to dismiss complaints on the ground of
inadequacy of the price offered and a motion for relief. The RTC
denied the motions and authorized Cam Sur to take possession of
the property. In their petition before the Court of Appeals, private
respondents ask the CA to declare Resolution 129 null and void,
dismiss the expropriation complaints, and set aside the authority
granted to Cam Sur to take possession of property. Province of Cam
Sur claimed that it has authority to initiate expropriation
proceedings under the Local Government Code and that the
expropriations are for a public purpose. Asked by the CA, Solicitor
General stated that there is no need for the approval of the
President for the province to expropriate properties, however,
approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is needed to
convert the property from agricultural to non-agricultural (housing
purpose).
CA set aside the decision of the trial court suspending the possession
and expropriation of the property until the province has acquired
the approval of DAR, hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the resolution is valid, i.e. the expropriation is for a
public purpose or public use.
Ruling:
The expropriation is for a public purpose, hence the resolution is
authorized and valid.
When the Court of Appeals ordered the suspension of the
proceedings until the Province of Camarines Sur shall have
obtained the authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to
change the classification of the lands sought to be expropriated from
agricultural to non-agricultural use, it assumed that the resolution
is valid and that the expropriation is for a public purpose or public
use.
There has been a shift from the literal to a broader interpretation of
"public purpose" or "public use" for which the power of eminent
domain may be exercised. The old concept was that the condemned
property must actually be used by the general public (e.g. roads,
bridges, public plazas, etc.) before the taking thereof could satisfy
the constitutional requirement of "public use". Under the new
concept, "public use" means public advantage, convenience or
benefit, which tends to contribute to the general welfare and the
prosperity of the whole community, like a resort complex for tourists
or housing project.
The expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned
resolution is for a public purpose. The establishment of a pilot
development center would inure to the direct benefit and advantage
of the people of the Province of Camarines Sur. Once operational,
the center would make available to the community invaluable
information and technology on agriculture, fishery and the cottage
industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers, fishermen and
craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing project also satisfies the
public purpose requirement of the Constitution. As held in
Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461, "Housing is a basic human
need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it
directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the
environment and in sum the general welfare."
MUNICIPALITY OF PARANAQUE VS V.M. REALTY CORP.
(1998)
25 Jan 2018
MUNICIPALITY OF PARAÑAQUE vs.V.M. REALTY
CORPORATION
[G.R. No. 127820; July 20, 1998] Constitutional Law| Eminent
Domain| Expropriation| Ordinance| LGU
FACTS:
The Municipality of Parañaque filed an expropriation case against
Private Respondent V.M. Realty Corporation over two parcels of
land pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution. The expropriation
was allegedly “for the purpose of alleviating the living conditions of
the underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless through a
socialized housing project.” Petitioner, pursuant to the resolution
made an offer to enter into a negotiated sale of the property with
private respondent, which the latter did not accept.
Private respondent, on the other hand, filed its Answer alleging that
(a) the complaint of petitioner was filed pursuant to a resolution and
not to an ordinance as required by the Local Government Code; and
(b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res
judicata.
ISSUES:
Whether a resolution has the same force and effect of an ordinance
for expropriation case.
Whether Res Judicata can bar the right of the State or its agent to
expropriate private property.
HELD:
First Issue: Resolution Different from an Ordinance
A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance
is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or
opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance
possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is
temporary in nature. An LGU may exercise the power to expropriate
private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to
the latter’s control and restraints. Thus, the following essential
requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of
eminent domain:
An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council;
The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or
welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless;
There is payment of just compensation;
A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of
the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not
accepted.
Second Issue: Eminent Domain Not Barred by Res Judicata
The Court holds that the principle of res judicata cannot bar the
right of the State or its agent to expropriate private property. The
very nature of eminent domain, as an inherent power of the State, property is taken for public use. Accordingly, Section 9, Article III,
dictates that the right to exercise the power be absolute and of our Constitution mandates: "Private property shall not be taken
unfettered even by a prior judgment or res judicata. for public use without just compensation." The Republic disregarded
the foregoing provision when it failed and refused to pay
REPUBLIC vs. LIM (GR no. 161656) - Digest respondent’s predecessors-in-interest the just compensation for Lots
FACTS: 932 and 939.
In 1938, the Republic instituted a special civil action for
expropriation of a land in Lahug, Cebu City for the purpose of The Court of Appeals is correct in saying that Republic’s delay is
establishing a military reservation for the Philippine Army. The contrary to the rules of fair play. In jurisdictions similar to ours,
said lots were registered in the name of Gervasia and Eulalia where an entry to the expropriated property precedes the payment
Denzon. The Republic deposited P9,500 in the PNB then took of compensation, it has been held that if the compensation is not
possession of the lots. Thereafter, on May 1940, the CFI rendered paid in a reasonable time, the party may be treated as a trespasser
its Decision ordering the Republic to pay the Denzons the sum of ab initio.
P4,062.10 as just compensation. The Denzons appealed to the CA
but it was dismissed on March 11, 1948. An entry of judgment was As early as May 19, 1966, in Valdehueza, this Court mandated the
made on April 5, 1948. Republic to pay respondent’s predecessors-in- interest the sum of
P16,248.40 as "reasonable market value of the two lots in question."
In 1950, one of the heirs of the Denzons, filed with the National Unfortunately, it did not comply
Airports Corporation a claim for rentals for the two lots, but it and allowed several decades to pass without obeying this Court’s
"denied knowledge of the matter." On September 6, 1961, Lt. Cabal mandate. It is tantamount to confiscation of private property. While
rejected the claim but expressed willingness to pay the appraised it is true that all private properties are subject to the need of
value of the lots within a reasonable time. government, and the government may take them whenever the
necessity or the exigency of the occasion demands, however from the
For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, on September 20, 1961, taking of private property by the government under the power of
the Denzons· successors-in-interest,Valdehueza and Panerio, filed eminent domain, there arises an implied promise to compensate the
with the same CFI an action for recovery of possession with owner for his loss.
damages against the Republic and AFP officers in possession of the There is a recognized rule that title to the property expropriated
property. shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full
payment of the just compensation. So, how could the Republic
On November 1961, Titles of the said lots were issued in the names acquire ownership over Lot 932 when it has not paid its owner the
of Valdehueza and Panerio with the annotation "subject to the just compensation, required by law, for more than 50 years? Clearly,
priority of the National Airports Corporation to acquire said parcels without full payment of just compensation, there can be no transfer
of land, Lots 932 and939 upon previous payment of a reasonable of title from the landowner to the expropriator.
market value".
SC ruled in earlier cases that expropriation of lands consists of two
On July 1962, the CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of stages. First is concerned with the determination of the authority of
Valdehueza and Panerio, holding that they are the owners and have the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the
retained their right as such over lots because of the Republic·s propriety of its exercise. The second is concerned with the
failure to pay the amount of P4,062.10,adjudged in the determination by the court of "the just compensation for the
expropriation proceedings. However, in view of the annotation on property sought to be taken." It is only upon the completion of these
their land titles, they were ordered to execute a deed of sale in favor two stages that expropriation is said to have been completed In
of the Republic. Republic v. Salem Investment Corporation, we ruled that, "the
process is not completed until payment of just compensation." Thus,
They appealed the CFI·s decision to the SC. The latter held that here, the failure of the Republic to pay respondent and his
Valdehueza and Panerio are still the registered owners of Lots 932 predecessors-in-interest for a period of 57 years rendered the
and 939, there having been no payment of just compensation by the expropriation process incomplete.
Republic. SC still ruled that they are not entitled to recover
possession of the lots but may only demand the payment of their fair Thus, SC ruled that the special circumstances prevailing in this case
market value. entitle respondent to recover possession of the expropriated lot from
the Republic.
Meanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to
Vicente Lim, herein respondent, as security for their loans. For their While the prevailing doctrine is that "the non-payment of just
failure to pay Lim despite demand, he had the mortgage foreclosed compensation does not entitle the private landowner to recover
in 1976. The lot title was issued in his name. possession of the expropriated lots, however, in cases where the
government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years
On 1992, respondent Lim filed a complaint for quieting of title with from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings,
the RTC against the petitioners herein. On 2001, the RTC rendered the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of
a decision in favor of Lim, declaring that he is the absolute and their property. After all, it is the duty of the government, whenever
exclusive owner of the lot with all the rights of an absolute owner it takes property from private persons against their will, to facilitate
including the right to possession. Petitioners elevated the case to the payment of just compensation. In Cosculluela v. Court of
the CA. In its Decision dated September 18, 2003, it sustained the Appeals, we defined just compensation as not only the correct
RTC Decision saying: ´... This is contrary to the rules of fair play determination of the amount to be paid to the property owner but
because the concept of just compensation embraces not only the also the payment of the property within a reasonable time. Without
correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just."
land,but also the payment for the land within a reasonable time
from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be Silvestre M. Punzalan et.al. Vs. Municipal Board of the City of
considered "just"...” Manila
Facts
Petitioner, through the OSG, filed with the SC a petition for review -This case is filed in the CFI of Manila by 2 lawyers, medical
alleging that they remain as the owner of Lot 932. practitioner, CPA, dental surgeon and pharmacist.
-They filed this in their and other professional's behalf.
ISSUE: -The object of the suit is their aim to nullify Ordinance No. 3398 of
Whether the Republic has retained ownership of Lot 932 despite its City of Manila, the charter authorizing it and the refund of the taxes
failure to pay respondent’s predecessors-in-interest the just they paid unr protest.
compensation therefor pursuant to the judgment of the CFI -Ordinance No. 3398 was approved by the municipal board of the
rendered as early as May 14, 1940. City of Manila on July 25, 1950. It imposes municipal occupation
tax on persons exercising various professions in the city and
HELD: penalizes its non payment Note:penalty is fine and/or imprisonment
One of the basic principles enshrined in our Constitution is that no of not more than 6 mo)
person shall be deprived of his private property without due process -Tax amount should not exceed P50/annum.
of law; and in expropriation cases, an essential element of due -After the said professionals paid their occupation tax under Section
process is that there must be just compensation whenever private 201 of the National Internal Revenue Code, they paid the tax in the
said ordinance under protest.
-Lower court upheld the validity of law authorizing it but nullify the
ordinance because penalty in the said ordinance has no legal basis.
Issue
Whether or not the ruling of lower court is correct.
Held
-Yes, the lower court erred in saying that the imposing ordinance
must be nullified because penalty in said ordinance has no legal
basis.
-Manila Charter Sec 18 provides that penalties for violation of
ordinances shall not exceed P2000.00 fine or 6 mo. imprisonment or
both for one single offense.
-As to the professionals' claim that the ordinance is unjust and
oppressive because it creates discrimination within a class in the
sense that the professionals with Manila offices pay more taxes, SC
ruled that:
1. Since Manila is the seat of the National Government and with a
population and voluminous amount of trade compared to other
Philippine city or municipality, it can be assumed that it offers a
more lucrative field for professionals. Therefore, it is only fair that
professionals in Manila shall pay higher occupation tax.
2. The contention of the professionals that professionals with Manila
offices have to pay tax but outsiders who have no office in the city
but practice their profession are subject to tax is not found in the
Ordinance.
3. Finally, this case cannot be tantamount to double taxation since
the first tax was imposed by the State while the second tax was
imposed by a city.
Ruling
Judgment is reversed. Ordinance No. 3398 is valid. Costs against
the professionals who were the plaintiffs-appellants in this case.
PASCUAL vs. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS
110 PHIL 331
GR No. L-10405, December 29, 1960
"A law appropriating the public revenue is invalid if the public
advantage or benefit, derived from such expenditure, is merely
incidental in the promotion of a particular enterprise."
FACTS: Governor Wenceslao Pascual of Rizal instituted this action
for declaratory relief, with injunction, upon the ground that RA No.
920, which apropriates funds for public works particularly for the
construction and improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals. Some
of the feeder roads, however, as alleged and as contained in the
tracings attached to the petition, were nothing but projected and
planned subdivision roads, not yet constructed within the Antonio
Subdivision, belonging to private respondent Zulueta, situated at
Pasig, Rizal; and which projected feeder roads do not connect any
government property or any important premises to the main
highway. The respondents' contention is that there is public purpose
because people living in the subdivision will directly be benefitted
from the construction of the roads, and the government also gains
from the donation of the land supposed to be occupied by the streets,
made by its owner to the government.
ISSUE: Should incidental gains by the public be considered "public
purpose" for the purpose of justifying an expenditure of the
government?
HELD: No. It is a general rule that the legislature is without power
to appropriate public revenue for anything but a public purpose. It
is the essential character of the direct object of the expenditure
which must determine its validity as justifying a tax, and not the
magnitude of the interest to be affected nor the degree to which the
general advantage of the community, and thus the public welfare,
may be ultimately benefited by their promotion. Incidental to the
public or to the state, which results from the promotion of private
interest and the prosperity of private enterprises or business, does
not justify their aid by the use public money.
The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of
public funds is whether the statute is designed to promote the public
interest, as opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of
individuals, although each advantage to individuals might
incidentally serve the public.
Lladoc vs Commisioner of Internal Revenue (1965)
February 15, 2013 markerwins Tax Law
Facts: In 1957, the MB Estate Inc. of Bacolod City donated P10,000
in cash to the parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental; the
amount spent for the construction of a new Catholic Church in the
locality,m as intended. In1958, MB Estate filed the donor’s gift tax
return. In 1960, the Commissioner issued an assessment for donee’s
gift tax against the parish. The priest lodged a protest to the
assessment and requested the withdrawal thereof.
Issue: Whether the Catholic Parish is tax exempt.
Held: The phrase “exempt from taxation” should not be interpreted
to mean exemption from all kinds of taxes. The exemption is only
from the payment of taxes assessed on such properties as property
taxes as contradistinguished from excise taxes. A donee’s gift tax is
not a property tax but an excise tax imposed on the transfer of
property by way of gift inter vivos. It does not rest upon general
ownership, but an excise upon the use made of the properties, upon
the exercise of the privilege of receiving the properties. The
imposition of such excise tax on property used for religious purpose
do not constitute an impairment of the Constitution.
The tax exemption of the parish, thus, does not extend to excise
taxes.
Sison v Ancheta G.R. No. L-59431. July 25, 1984. C. J. Fernando
Declaratory Relief
Facts:
Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of Section 1 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 135. It amended
Section 21 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977, which
provides for rates of tax on citizens or residents on (a) taxable
compensation income, (b) taxable net income, (c) royalties, prizes,
and other winnings, (d) interest from bank deposits and yield or any
other monetary benefit from deposit substitutes and from trust fund
and similar arrangements, (e) dividends and share of individual
partner in the net profits of taxable partnership, (f) adjusted gross
income.
Petitioner as taxpayer alleged that "he would be unduly
discriminated against by the imposition of higher rates of tax upon
his income arising from the exercise of his profession vis-a-vis those
which are imposed upon fixed income or salaried individual
taxpayers." He characterizes the above section as arbitrary
amounting to class legislation, oppressive and capricious in
character.
For petitioner, therefore, there is a transgression of both the equal
protection and due process clauses of the Constitution as well as of
the rule requiring uniformity in taxation.
The OSG prayed for dismissal of the petition due to lack of merit.
Issue: Whether the imposition of a higher tax rate on taxable net
income derived from business or profession than on compensation is
constitutionally infirm.
(WON there is a transgression of both the equal protection and due
process clauses of the Constitution as well as of the rule requiring
uniformity in taxation)
Held: No. Petition dismissed
Ratio:
The need for more revenues is rationalized by the government's role
to fill the gap not done by public enterprise in order to meet the
needs of the times. It is better equipped to administer for the public
welfare.
The power to tax, an inherent prerogative, has to be availed of to
assure the performance of vital state functions. It is the source of
the bulk of public funds.
The power to tax is an attribute of sovereignty and the strongest
power of the government. There are restrictions, however, diversely
affecting as it does property rights, both the due process and equal
protection clauses may properly be invoked, as petitioner does, to
invalidate in appropriate cases a revenue measure. If it were
otherwise, taxation would be a destructive power.
The petitioner failed to prove that the statute ran counter to the
Constitution. He used arbitrariness as basis without a factual
foundation. This is merely to adhere to the authoritative doctrine
that where the due process and equal protection clauses are
invoked, considering that they are not fixed rules but rather broad
standards, there is a need for proof of such persuasive character as Taxpayers who are recipients of compensation income are set apart
would lead to such a conclusion. as a class.

It is undoubted that the due process clause may be invoked where a On the other hand, in the case of professionals in the practice of
taxing statute is so arbitrary that it finds no support in the their calling and businessmen, there is no uniformity in the costs or
Constitution. An obvious example is where it can be shown to expenses necessary to produce their income. It would not be just
amount to the confiscation of property. That would be a clear abuse then to disregard the disparities by giving all of them zero deduction
of power. and indiscriminately impose on all alike the same tax rates on the
basis of gross income.
It has also been held that where the assailed tax measure is beyond
the jurisdiction of the state, or is not for a public purpose, or, in case There was a lack of a factual foundation, the forcer of doctrines on
of a retroactive statute is so harsh and unreasonable, it is subject to due process and equal protection, and he reasonableness of the
attack on due process grounds. distinction between compensation and taxable net income of
professionals and businessmen not being a dubious classification.
For equal protection, the applicable standard to determine whether
this was denied in the exercise of police power or eminent domain Abra Valley College vs Aquino (G.R. No. L-39086)
was the presence of the purpose of hostility or unreasonable Posted: July 25, 2011 in Case Digests
discrimination. 0
FACTS: Petitioner, an educational corporation and institution of
It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all higher learning duly incorporated with the Securities and Exchange
persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be Commission in 1948, filed a complaint to annul and declare void the
treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both “Notice of Seizure’ and the “Notice of Sale” of its lot and building
in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism located at Bangued, Abra, for non-payment of real estate taxes and
and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that penalties amounting to P5,140.31. Said “Notice of Seizure” by
equal protection and security shall be given to every person under respondents Municipal Treasurer and Provincial Treasurer,
circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If law be looks defendants below, was issued for the satisfaction of the said taxes
upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class thereon.
should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on
some in the group equally binding on the rest. The parties entered into a stipulation of facts adopted and embodied
by the trial court in its questioned decision. The trial court ruled for
The equal protection clause is, of course, inspired by the noble the government, holding that the second floor of the building is
concept of approximating the ideal of the laws's benefits being being used by the director for residential purposes and that the
available to all and the affairs of men being governed by that serene ground floor used and rented by Northern Marketing Corporation,
and impartial uniformity, which is of the very essence of the idea of a commercial establishment, and thus the property is not being used
law. exclusively for educational purposes. Instead of perfecting an
appeal, petitioner availed of the instant petition for review on
The equality at which the 'equal protection' clause aims is not a certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction before the
disembodied equality. The Fourteenth Amendment enjoins 'the Supreme Court, by filing said petition on 17 August 1974.
equal protection of the laws,' and laws are not abstract propositions.
They do not relate to abstract units A, B and C, but are expressions ISSUE: Whether or not the lot and building are used exclusively for
of policy arising out of specific difficulties, addressed to the educational purposes.
attainment of specific ends by the use of specific remedies. The
Constitution does not require things which are different in fact or HELD: Section 22, paragraph 3, Article VI, of the then 1935
opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same. Philippine Constitution, expressly grants exemption from realty
taxes for cemeteries, churches and parsonages or convents
Lutz v Araneta- it is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements
to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held used exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes.ﾝ
that 'inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular Reasonable emphasis has always been made that the exemption
class for taxation, or exemption infringe no constitutional extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably
limitation. necessary for the accomplishment of the main purposes. The use of
the school building or lot for commercial purposes is neither
Petitioner- kindred concept of uniformity- Court- Philippine Trust contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence. In the case at bar, the
Company- The rule of uniformity does not call for perfect uniformity lease of the first floor of the building to the Northern Marketing
or perfect equality, because this is hardly attainable Corporation cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered
incidental to the purpose of education. The test of exemption from
Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles taxation is the use of the property for purposes mentioned in the
or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at the same Constitution.
rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and
natural classifications for purposes of taxation The decision of the CFI Abra (Branch I) is affirmed subject to the
modification that half of the assessed tax be returned to the
There is quite a similarity then to the standard of equal protection petitioner. The modification is derived from the fact that the ground
for all that is required is that the tax "applies equally to all persons, floor is being used for commercial purposes (leased) and the second
firms and corporations placed in similar situation" floor being used as incidental to education (residence of the
director).
There was a difference between a tax rate and a tax base. There is
no legal objection to a broader tax base or taxable income by CITY OF MANILA vs. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES,
eliminating all deductible items and at the same time reducing the INC
applicable tax rate. FACTS:
Respondent paid the local business tax only as a manufacturers as
The discernible basis of classification is the susceptibility of the it was expressly exempted from the business tax under a different
income to the application of generalized rules removing all section and which applied to businesses subject to excise, VAT or
deductible items for all taxpayers within the class and fixing a set percentage tax under the Tax Code. The City of Manila
of reduced tax rates to be applied to all of them. As there is subsequently amended the ordinance by deleting the provision
practically no overhead expense, these taxpayers are not entitled to exempting businesses under the latter section if they have already
make deductions for income tax purposes because they are in the paid taxes under a different section in the ordinance. This amending
same situation more or less. ordinance was later declared by the Supreme Court null and void.1

1
Tax Ordinances No. 7988 and No. 8011 were later declared by the
Court null and void in Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. City of
Manila[8] (Coca-Cola case) for the following reasons: (1) Tax
Ordinance No. 7988 was enacted in contravention of the provisions
of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 and its implementing
rules and regulations; and (2) Tax Ordinance No. 8011 could not cure
the defects of Tax Ordinance No. 7988, which did not legally exist.

However, before the Court could declare Tax Ordinance No. 7988
and Tax Ordinance No. 8011 null and void, petitioner City of Manila
assessed respondent on the basis of Section 21 of Tax Ordinance No.
7794, as amended by the aforementioned tax ordinances, for
deficiency local business taxes, penalties, and interest, in the total
amount of P18,583,932.04, for the third and fourth quarters of the
year 2000. Respondent filed a protest with petitioner Toledo on the
ground that the said assessment amounted to double taxation, as
respondent was taxed twice, i.e., under Sections 14 and 21 of Tax
Ordinance No. 7794, as amended by Tax Ordinances No. 7988 and
No. 8011. Petitioner Toledo did not respond to the protest of
respondent, hence respondent filed case with RTC.
RTC decided in favor of Respondent and the decision was received
by Petitioner on April 20, 2007. On May 4, 2007, Petitioner filed
with the CTA a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for
Review asking for a 15-day extension or until May 20, 2007 within
which to file its Petition. A second Motion for Extension was filed on
May 18, 2007, this time asking for a 10-day extension to file the
Petition. On 24 May 2007, however, the CTA First Division already
issued a Resolution dismissing C.T.A. AC No. 31 for failure of
petitioners to timely file their Petition for Review on 20 May 2007.
Unaware of the 24 May 2007 Resolution of the CTA First Division,
petitioners filed their Petition for Review therewith on 30 May 2007
via registered mail. On 8 June 2007, the CTA First Division issued
another Resolution, reiterating the dismissal of the Petition for
Review of petitioners. The CTA en banc rendered its Decision on 18
January 2008, dismissing the Petition for Review of petitioners and
affirming the Resolutions
ISSUES:
(1) Has Petitioner’s the right to appeal with the CTA lapsed?
(2) Does the enforcement of the latter section of the tax ordinance
constitute double taxation?
HELD:
(1) NO. Petitioner complied with the reglementary period for filing
the petition.
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9282 provides:
SEC. 11. Who May Appeal; Mode of Appeal; Effect of Appeal. Any
party adversely affected by a decision, ruling or inaction of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Commissioner of Customs,
the Secretary of Finance, the Secretary of Trade and Industry or the
Secretary of Agriculture or the Central Board of Assessment
Appeals or the Regional Trial Courts may file an Appeal with the
CTA within thirty (30) days after the receipt of such decision or
ruling or after the expiration of the period fixed by law for action as
referred to in Section 7(a)(2) herein.
Appeal shall be made by filing a petition for review under a
procedure analogous to that provided for under Rule 42 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure with the CTA within thirty (30) days from
the receipt of the decision or ruling or in the case of inaction as
herein provided, from the expiration of the period fixed by law to act
thereon. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 3(a), Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of the CTA states:
SEC 3. Who may appeal; period to file petition. (a) A party adversely
affected by a decision, ruling or the inaction of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue on disputed assessments or claims for refund of
internal revenue taxes, or by a decision or ruling of the
Commissioner of Customs, the Secretary of Finance, the Secretary
of Trade and Industry, the Secretary of Agriculture, or a Regional
Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction may appeal to
the Court by petition for review filed within thirty days after receipt
of a copy of such decision or ruling, or expiration of the period fixed
by law for the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to act on the
disputed assessments. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is crystal clear from the afore-quoted provisions that to appeal an
adverse decision or ruling of the RTC to the CTA, the taxpayer must
file a Petition for Review with the CTA within 30 days from receipt
of said adverse decision or ruling of the RTC. Following by analogy
Section 1, Rule 42 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the 30-
day original period for filing a Petition for Review with the CTA
under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9282, as implemented by
Section 3(a), Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of the CTA, may be
extended for a period of 15 days. No further extension shall be
allowed thereafter, except only for the most compelling reasons, in
which case the extended period shall not exceed 15 days.
From April 20, 2007, Petitioner had 30 days, or until May 20, 2007,
within which to file their Petition for Review with the CTA. The
Motion for Extension filed by the petitioners on May 18, 2007, prior
to the lapse of the 30-day period on 20 May 2007, in which they
prayed for another extended period of 10 days, or until 30 May 2007,
to file their Petition for Review was, in reality, only the first Motion
for Extension of petitioners. Thus, when Petitioner filed their
Petition via registered mail their Petition for Review on 30 May
2007, they were able to comply with the period for filing such a
petition.
The Motion for Extension filed by the petitioners on 18 May 2007,
prior to the lapse of the 30-day reglementary period on 20 May 2007,
in which they prayed for another extended period of 10 days, or until
30 May 2007, to file their Petition for Review was, in reality, only
the first Motion for Extension of petitioners. The CTA First Division
should have granted the same, as it was sanctioned by the rules of
procedure. In fact, petitioners were only praying for a 10-day
extension, five days less than the 15-day extended period allowed by
the rules. Thus, when petitioners filed via registered mail their
Petition for Review in C.T.A. AC No. 31 on 30 May 2007, they were
able to comply with the reglementary period for filing such a
petition.
Nevertheless, there were other reasons for which the CTA First
Division dismissed the Petition for Review of petitioners in C.T.A.
AC No. 31; i.e., petitioners failed to conform to Section 4 of Rule 5,
and Section 2 of Rule 6 of the Revised Rules of the CTA. The Court
sustains the CTA First Division in this regard. As found by the CTA
First Division and affirmed by the CTA en banc, the Petition for
Review filed by petitioners via registered mail on 30 May 2007
consisted only of one copy and all the attachments thereto, including
the Decision dated 14 July 2006; and that the assailed Orders dated
16 November 2006 and 4 April 2007 of the RTC in Civil Case No.
03-107088 were mere machine copies. Evidently, petitioners did not
comply at all with the requirements set forth under Section 4, Rule
5; or with Section 2, Rule 6 of the Revised Rules of the CTA.
(2) YES. There is indeed double taxation if respondent is subjected
to the taxes under both Sections 14 and 21 of the tax ordinance since
these are being imposed: (1) on the same subject matter — the
privilege of doing business in the City of Manila; (2) for the same
purpose — to make persons conducting business within the City of
Manila contribute to city revenues; (3) by the same taxing authority
— petitioner City of Manila; (4) within the same taxing jurisdiction
— within the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Manila; (5) for the
same taxing periods — per calendar year; and (6) of the same kind
or character — a local business tax imposed on gross sales or
receipts of the business.
Contrary to the assertions of petitioners, the Coca-Cola case is
indeed applicable to the instant case. The pivotal issue raised
therein was whether Tax Ordinance No. 7988 and Tax Ordinance
No. 8011 were null and void, which this Court resolved in the
affirmative. Tax Ordinance No. 7988 was declared by the Secretary
of the Department of Justice (DOJ) as null and void and without
legal effect due to the failure of herein petitioner City of Manila to
satisfy the requirement under the law that said ordinance be
published for three consecutive days. Petitioner City of Manila
never appealed said declaration of the DOJ Secretary; thus, it
attained finality after the lapse of the period for appeal of the same.
The passage of Tax Ordinance No. 8011, amending Tax Ordinance
No. 7988, did not cure the defects of the latter, which, in any way,
did not legally exist.
By virtue of the Coca-Cola case, Tax Ordinance No. 7988 and Tax
Ordinance No. 8011 are null and void and without any legal effect.
Therefore, respondent cannot be taxed and assessed under the
amendatory laws--Tax Ordinance No. 7988 and Tax Ordinance No.
8011.
Petitioner contends that Section 14 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794
imposes local business tax on manufacturers, etc. of liquors, distilled
spirits, wines, and any other article of commerce, pursuant to
Section 143(a) of the LGC. On the other hand, the local business tax
under Section 21 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794 is imposed upon
persons selling goods and services in the course of trade or business,
and those importing goods for business or otherwise, who, pursuant
to Section 143(h) of the LGC, are subject to excise tax, value-added
tax (VAT), or percentage tax under the National Internal Revenue
Code (NIRC). Thus, there can be no double taxation when
respondent is being taxed under both Sections 14 and 21 of Tax
Ordinance No. 7794, for under the first, it is being taxed as a
manufacturer; while under the second, it is being taxed as a person
selling goods in the course of trade or business subject to excise,
VAT, or percentage tax.
The distinction petitioners attempt to make between the taxes
under Sections 14 and 21 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794 is specious.
The Court revisits Section 143 of the LGC, the very source of the
power of municipalities and cities to impose a local business tax, and
to which any local business tax imposed by petitioner City of Manila
must conform. It is apparent from a perusal thereof that when a
municipality or city has already imposed a business tax on
manufacturers, etc. of liquors, distilled spirits, wines, and any other
article of commerce, pursuant to Section 143(a) of the LGC, said
municipality or city may no longer subject the same manufacturers,
etc. to a business tax under Section 143(h) of the same Code. Section
143(h) may be imposed only on businesses that are subject to excise
tax, VAT, or percentage tax under the NIRC, and that are not
otherwise specified in preceding paragraphs. In the same way,
businesses such as respondents, already subject to a local business
tax under Section 14 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794 [which is based on
Section 143(a) of the LGC], can no longer be made liable for local
business tax under Section 21 of the same Tax Ordinance [which is
based on Section 143(h) of the LGC].
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for
Review on Certiorari is hereby DENIED. No costs.
PHIL. PHOSPHATE FERTILIZER CORP. VS. TORRES [231 SCRA
335; G.R. NO.98050; 17 MAR 1994]
Sunday, February 01, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Philphos Movement for Progress, Inc. (PMPI for brevity),
filed with the Department of Labor and Employment a petition for
certification election among the supervisory employees of petitioner,
alleging that as a supervisory union duly registered with the
Department of Labor and Employment it was seeking to represent
the supervisory employees of Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer
Corporation. Mediator-Arbiter Rodolfo S. Milado issued an order
directing the holding of a certification election among the
supervisory employees of petitioner, excluding therefrom the
superintendents and the professional and technical employees.
However, the PMPI filed an amended petition with the Mediator-
Arbiter wherein it sought to represent not only the supervisory
employees of petitioner but also its professional/technical and
confidential employees. The parties therein agreed to submit their
respective position papers and to consider the amended petition
submitted for decision on the basis thereof and related documents.
Mediator-Arbiter Milado issued an order granting the petition and
directing the holding of a certification election among the
"supervisory, professional (engineers, analysts, mechanics,
accountants, nurses, midwives, etc.), technical, and confidential
employees. PHILPHOS appealed the order to the Secretary of Labor
and Employment who rendered a decision through Undersecretary
Bienvenido Laguesma dismissing the appeal. PHILPHOS moved for
reconsideration but the same was denied; hence, the instant petition
alleging denial of due process on the part of the DOLE to which the
mediator-arbiter was under.
Issue: Whether or Not there was denial of due process.
Held: There was no denial of due process. The essence of due process
is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity
to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of
petitioner PHILPHOS agreed to file its position paper with the
Mediator-Arbiter and to consider the case submitted for decision on
the basis of the position papers filed by the parties, there was
sufficient compliance with the requirement of due process, as
petitioner was afforded reasonable opportunity to present its side.
Moreover, petitioner could have, if it so desired, insisted on a
hearing to confront and examine the witnesses of the other party.
But it did not; instead it opted to submit its position paper with the
Mediator-Arbiter. Besides, petitioner had all the opportunity to
ventilate its arguments in its appeal to the Secretary of Labor.
Alonte v. Savellano G.R. No. 131652
Mar. 9, 1998
Facts:
These are 2 separate petitions that assail the decision of
Judge Maximo Savellano Jr. finding the petitioners Mayor Bayani
Alonte of Biñan, Laguna and Buenaventura Concepcion guilty of the
crime of rape.
Petitioner Alonte was accused of raping Ms. Juvie-lyn
Punongbayan who was a minor at the time. Concepcion was accused
as an accomplice who brought the victim to the rest house of Alonte.
Juvie-lyn, with the assistance of her counsel requested that
there be a change in venue because she, her family, and ever her
counsel had been harassed and threatened during the pendency of
the proceedings.
Suddenly, during the pendency of the petition for change of
venue, Juvie-lyn, assisted by counsel, executed an affidavit of
desistance in which she requests that her complaint for rape and
child abuse be withdrawn.
The Supreme Court granted the change of venue and the
case fell into the hands of respondent judge in Manila RTC branch
53. Respondent judge issued warrants of arrest against petitioners.
Both parties waived pre trial and so the case was to be decided on
the merits. Respondent Judge allowed only the prosecution to
present evidence relative only to the question of voluntariness and
the validity of the affidavit of desistance to which they established
that it was given freely and voluntarily.
Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the case but respondent said
that the case was already submitted for decision. Finally,
respondent judge promulgated the decision in absentia (both
accused were unable to attend due to different reasons Alonte –
hypertension, Concepcion – not notified) to which he declared them
both guilty.
Petitioners contend that their right to due process was violated
because the order of trial was not followed and the petitioners were
not given the opportunity to cross-examine the affiants.
Respondent contends that each of the accused were represented by
counsel of choice and none of them said that they wanted to cross-
examine the victim when she testified. The opportunity was
missed/not used hence waived. The rule of case law is that the right
to cross-examine is a personal one and may be waived.
Issue:
Whether or not due process was violated by not following
the order of trial according to Sec. 3 Rule 119 of the Rules of Court
and not allowing petitioners to cross-examine the witness. Also,
whether or not a case may be dismissed based off an affidavit of
desistance.
Ruling:
Petition is meritorious. The decision of respondent judge is
declared null and void for failure of due process. Due process in
criminal proceedings require that: 1.) court trying the case is
properly clothed with judicial power to hear the case; 2.) jurisdiction
is lawfully acquired by it over the accused; 3.) accused is given the
opportunity to be heard; and 4.) judgment is rendered only upon
lawful hearing. These are mandatory and indispensable.
The Solicitor General has aptly discerned a few of the deviations
from what otherwise should have been the regular course of trial:
(1) Petitioners have not been directed to present evidence to prove
their defenses nor have dates therefor been scheduled for the
purpose; (2) the parties have not been given the opportunity to
present rebutting evidence nor have dates been set by respondent
Judge for the purpose; and (3) petitioners have not admitted the act
charged in the Information so as to justify any modification in the
order of trial. There can be no short-cut to the legal process, and
there can be no excuse for not affording an accused his full day in
court. Due process, rightly occupying the first and foremost place of
honor in our Bill of Rights, is an enshrined and invaluable right that
cannot be denied even to the most undeserving.
Respondent’s contention that petitioners have waived their right to
cross-examine is not proper. The existence of a waiver must be
properly demonstrated. The standard of waiver requires that it “not
only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent and done
with sufficient awareness of the consequences.” Mere silence of the
holder should not be construed as a waiver of right.
Additional - Sec. 3 Rule 119 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 3. Order of trial. — The trial shall proceed in the following
order:
(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge and,
in the proper case, the civil liability.
(b) The accused may present evidence to prove his defense, and
damages, if any, arising from the issuance of any provisional remedy
in the case.
(c) The parties may then respectively present rebutting evidence
only, unless the court, in furtherance of justice, permits them to
present additional evidence bearing upon the main issue.
(d) Upon admission of the evidence, the case shall be deemed
submitted for decision unless the court directs the parties to argue
orally or to submit memoranda.
(e) However, when the accused admits the act or omission charged
in the complaint or information but interposes a lawful defense, the
order of trial may be modified accordingly.
ANIAG VS. COMELEC [237 SCRA 194; G.R. NO. 104961; 7 OCT
1994]
Sunday, February 01, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: In preparation for the synchronized national and local
elections, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2323, “Gun Ban”,
promulgating rules and regulations on bearing, carrying and
transporting of firearm or other deadly weapons on security
personnel or bodyguards, on bearing arms by members of security
agencies or police organizations, and organization or maintenance
of reaction forces during the election period. COMELEC also issued
Resolution No. 2327 providing for the summary disqualification of
candidates engaged in gunrunning, using and transporting of
firearms, organizing special strike forces, and establishing spot
checkpoints. Pursuant to the “Gun Ban”, Mr. Serrapio Taccad,
Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives, wrote petitioner
for the return of the two firearms issued to him by the House of
Representatives. Petitioner then instructed his driver, Arellano, to
pick up the firearms from petitioner’s house and return them to
Congress. The PNP set up a checkpoint. When the car driven by
Arellano approached the checkpoint, the PNP searched the car and
found the firearms. Arellano was apprehended and detained. He
then explained the order of petitioner. Petitioner also explained that
Arellano was only complying with the firearms ban, and that he was
not a security officer or a bodyguard. Later, COMELEC issued
Resolution No.92-0829 directing the filing of information against
petitioner and Arellano for violation of the Omnibus Election Code,
and for petitioner to show cause why he should not be disqualified
from running for an elective position. Petitioner then questions the
constitutionality of Resolution No. 2327. He argues that
“gunrunning, using or transporting firearms or similar weapons”
and other acts mentioned in the resolution are not within the
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus, according to
petitioner, Resolution No. 2327 is unconstitutional. The issue on the
disqualification of petitioner from running in the elections was
rendered moot when he lost his bid for a seat in Congress in the
elections.
Issue: Whether or Not petitioner can be validly prosecuted for
instructing his driver to return the firearms issued to him on the
basis of the evidence gathered from the warrant less search of his
car
Held: A valid search must be authorized by a search warrant issued
by an appropriate authority. However, a warrantless search is not
violative of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is neither
searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the
inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual search. In the
case at bar, the guns were not tucked in Arellano’s waist nor placed
within his reach, as they were neatly packed in gun cases and placed
inside a bag at the back of the car. Given these circumstances, the
PNP could not have thoroughly searched the car lawfully as well as
the package without violating the constitutional injunction. Absent
any justifying circumstance specifically pointing to the culpability
of petitioner and Arellano, the search could not have been valid.
Consequently, the firearms obtained from the warrantless search
cannot be admitted for any purpose in any proceeding. It was also
shown in the facts that the PNP had not informed the public of the
purpose of setting up the checkpoint. Petitioner was also not among
those charged by the PNP with violation of the Omnibus Election
Code. He was not informed by the City Prosecutor that he was a
respondent in the preliminary investigation. Such constituted a
violation of his right to due process. Hence, it cannot be contended
that petitioner was fully given the opportunity to meet the
accusation against him as he was not informed that he was himself
a respondent in the case. Thus, the warrantless search conducted by
the PNP is declared illegal and the firearms seized during the
search cannot be used as evidence in any proceeding against the
petitioner. Resolution No. 92-0829 is unconstitutional, and
therefore, set aside.
Sps. Romualdez v. COMELEC
SPOUSES CARLOS S. ROMUALDEZ and ERLINDA R.
ROMUALDEZ, petitioners, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and DENNIS GARAY, respondents.
G.R. No. 167011 April 30, 2008
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Facts:
Garay and Apostol filed a complaint against Sps.
Romualdez for violation of the OEC and RA 8189 or Voter’s
Registration Act of 1996 for making false information as to their
residence in their applications as new voters in Burauen, Leyte.
The Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a
preliminary investigation be conducted by the COMELEC, and if
the evidence so warrants, the corresponding Information against
petitioners be filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the
prosecution of the same.
Sps. Romualdez contend that they intend to reside in
Burauen, Leyte since 1989. On May 2000, they took actual residence
in Burauen by leasing for 5 years the house of Renomeron.
The Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary
investigation be conducted by the COMELEC, and if the evidence so
warrants, the corresponding Information against petitioners be filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the prosecution of the
same.
Issue: WON due process was violated.
Held: No.
First, the Complaint-Affidavit filed by private respondent with the
COMELEC is couched in a language which embraces the allegations
necessary to support the charge for violation of Section 10(g) and (j),
in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189.
Petitioners cannot be said to have been denied due process on the
claim that the election offenses charged against them by private
respondent are entirely different from those for which they stand to
be accused of before the RTC, as charged by the COMELEC. In the
first place, there appears to be no incongruity between the charges
as contained in the Complaint-Affidavit and the Informations filed
before the RTC, notwithstanding the denomination by private
respondent of the alleged violations to be covered by Section
261(y)(2) and Section 261(y)(5) of the Omnibus Election Code and
Section 12 of Republic Act No. 8189. Evidently, the Informations
directed to be filed by the COMELEC against petitioners, and which
were, in fact, filed with the RTC, were based on the same set of facts
as originally alleged in the private respondent’s Complaint-
Affidavit.
In Lacson, we underscored the elementary rule that the jurisdiction
of a court is determined by the allegations in the Complaint or
Information, and not by the evidence presented by the parties at the
trial. Indeed, in Lacson, we articulated that the real nature of the
criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of
the Information nor from the specification of the provision of law
alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by
the actual recital of facts in the Complaint or Information.
Petitioners’ reliance on Lacson, however, does not support their
claim of lack of due process because, as we have said, the charges
contained in private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit and the
charges as directed by the COMELEC to be filed are based on the
same set of facts. In fact, the nature of the criminal charges in
private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit and that of the charges
contained in the Informations filed with the RTC, pursuant to the
COMELEC Resolution En Banc are the same, such that, petitioners
cannot claim that they were not able to refute or submit
documentary evidence against the charges that the COMELEC filed
with the RTC. Petitioners were afforded due process because they
were granted the opportunity to refute the allegations in private
respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit. On 2 April 2001, in opposition to
the Complaint-Affidavit, petitioners filed a Joint Counter-Affidavit
with Motion to Dismiss with the Law Department of the
COMELEC. They similarly filed a Memorandum before the said
body. Finding that due process was not dispensed with under the
circumstances in the case at bar, we agree with the stance of the
Office of the Solicitor General that petitioners were reasonably
apprised of the nature and description of the charges against them.
It likewise bears stressing that preliminary investigations were
conducted whereby petitioners were informed of the complaint and
of the evidence submitted against them. They were given the
opportunity to adduce controverting evidence for their defense. In
all these stages, petitioners actively participated.
Philcomsat vs. Alcuaz 180 SCRA 218 (1989) G.R. No. 84818,
December 18, 1989
Fact: The petition seeks to annul and set aside an Order 1 issued by
respondent Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of the NTC which
directs the provisional reduction of the rates which may be charged
by petitioner for certain specified lines of its services by fifteen
percent (15%) with the reservation to make further reductions later,
for being violative of the constitutional prohibition against undue
delegation of legislative power and a denial of procedural, as well as
substantive, due process of law. Petitioner was exempt from the
jurisdiction of the then Public Service Commission, now respondent
NTC. However, pursuant to Executive Order No. 196 placed under
the jurisdiction, control and regulation of respondent NTC,
including all its facilities and services and the fixing of rates.
Implementing said Executive Order No. 196, respondents required
petitioner to apply for the requisite certificate of public convenience
and necessity covering its facilities and the services it renders, as
well as the corresponding authority to charge rates therefor.
petitioner filed with respondent NTC an application for authority to
continue operating and maintaining the same facilities it has been
continuously operating and maintaining since 1967, to continue
providing the international satellite communications services it has
likewise been providing since 1967, and to charge the current rates
applied for in rendering such services. Pending hearing, it also
applied for a provisional authority so that it can continue to operate
and maintain the above mentioned facilities, provide the services
and charge therefor the aforesaid rates therein applied for.
petitioner was granted a provisional authority which was valid for
six (6) months which was extended 3 times, but the last extension
directed the petitioner to charge modified reduced rates through a
reduction of fifteen percent (15%) on the present authorized rates.
Hence this petition.adrianantazo.wordpress.com
Issue: whether the Respondent violates procedural due process for
having been issued without prior notice and hearing in exercising
its power to fix the rate of the
Petitioner?adrianantazo.wordpress.com
Held: Yes, the respondent violated the procedural due process. if the
authorities that where the function of the administrative body is
legislative, notice of hearing is not required by due process of law,
Aside from statute, the necessity of notice and hearing in an
administrative proceeding depends on the character of the
proceeding and the circumstances involved. In so far as
generalization is possible in view of the great variety of
administrative proceedings, it may be stated as a general rule that
notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of administrative
action where the administrative body acts in the exercise of
executive, administrative, or legislative functions; but where a
public administrative body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial
matter, and its acts are particular and immediate rather than
general and prospective, the person whose rights or property may
be affected by the action is entitled to notice and hearing.adria
G.R. NO. L-46496 FEBRUARY 27, 1940
ANG TIBAY, REPRESENTED BY TORIBIO TEODORO,
MANAGER AND PROPIETOR, AND
NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, PETITIONERS, VS.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND NATIONAL
LABOR UNION, INC., RESPONDENTS.
69 Phil. 635 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Due Process in
Administrative Bodies
Facts:
Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company
which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of
leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a number of his employees.
However, the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the
validity of said lay off as it averred that the said employees laid off
were members of NLU while no members of the rival labor union
National Workers Brotherhood (NWB) were laid off. NLU claims
that NWB is a company dominated union and Toribio was merely
busting NLU.
The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where
Toribio and NWB won. Eventually, NLU went to the Supreme Court
invoking its right for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence. The Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The Solicitor
General, arguing for the CIR, filed a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled to a new
trial.
HELD:
Yes. The records show that the newly discovered evidence or
documents obtained by NLU, which they attached to their petition
with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to them at the time of the
trial that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be
expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court
of Industrial Relations. Further, the attached documents and
exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their
admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of
the judgment rendered (said newly obtained records include books
of business/inventory accounts by Ang Tibay which were not
previously accessible but already existing).
The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR,
although not strictly bound by the Rules of Court must also make
sure that they comply to the requirements of due process. For
administrative bodies, due process can be complied with by
observing the following:
The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence
in support thereof.
Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case
and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he
asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide
right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded,
namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision
with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when
directly attached.
Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or
conclusion but the evidence must be “substantial.” Substantial
evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.
The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected.
The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on
its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision.
The administrative body should, in all controversial questions,
render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons
for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is
inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
G.R. No. 99327 May 27, 1993
ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY vs. CAPULONG
ROMERO, J.:
FACTS:
This is a case in which the right of a University to refuse admittance to its
students is challenged. An initiation rites, as a requisite to membership of a
certain fraternity organization in the Ateneo Law School, Aquila Legis, caused
the death of one Leonardo "Lennie" H. Villa, inflicting serious physical
injuries and the hospitalization of Beinvenido Marques, all freshmen students
of the petitioner university. Then thru notices, petitioner Dean Cynthia del
Castillo created a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating
Committee tasked to investigate the circumstances surrounding the death and
subsequently a Disciplinary Board to ascertain if the respondent students
violated Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue entitled Discipline. After
evaluation of the circumstances, the written statements and answers and
testimonies, the Board found the respondent students guilty of violating the
said Rule, specifically guilty of hazing, either by active participation or by
acquiescence (part and parcel of the integral process of hazing). However, 11
Petitioner Dean del Castillo waived her prerogative to review the decision of
the Board and left to the President of the University the decision of whether to
expel respondents or not. Consequently,petitioner Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, as
President of the Ateneo de Manila University, accepted the factual findings of
the Board, thus imposed the penalty of dismissal on all respondent students
(principle that "where two or more persons act together in the commission of 178552 C
a crime, whether they act through the physical volition of one or of all, Atty. Soliman Santos, Jr.
ta
proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose will contributes to GR No.
the wrongdoing is responsible for the whole., offense of the respondents can KMU, NAFLU-KMU, CTUHR c
178554
be characterized as grave and serious, subversive of the goals of Christian BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE,
education and contrary to civilized behavior.") KADAMAY, SCW, LFS, PAMALAKAYA, ACT, HEAD,
GR No. Guingona, Jr., Lumbera, Constantino, Jr., Sr.
In a resolution, however, Abas and Mendoza, respondent students, were 178581 Manansan, OSB, Dean Paz, Atty. Lichauco, Ret. Col.
excluded from the coverage since neither had submitted their case to the Board, Cunanan, Siguion-Reyna, Dr. Pagaduan-Araullo,
and an investigation of the two will be set. In response, the respondent students Reyes, Ramos, De Jesus, Baua, Casambre
filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for GR No.
SELDA, EMJP, PCPR
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction 14 alleging that they 178890
were currently enrolled as students for the second semester of school year GR No. IBP, CODAL, Senator Madrigal, Osmena III, and
1990-91. Unless a temporary restraining order is issued, they would be 179157 Tañada
prevented from taking their examinations. The petition principally centered on GR. No. BAYAN-ST, other reg’l chapters and orgs mostly based
the alleged lack of due process in their dismissal. On the same day, Judge 179461 in Southern Tagalog
Madayag issued a temporary restraining order the enjoining petitioners from
dismissing respondent students and stopping the former from conducting Respondents:
hearings relative to the hazing incident. A day after the lapsing of the TRO,  Anti-Terrorism Council, composed of:
petitioner Dean del Castillo created Special Board tasked to investigate the o Chairperson Eduardo Ermita
charges of hazing against respondent students Abas and Mendoza.Respondent o Vice-Chair Raul Gonzales
students reacted immediately by filing a Supplemental Petition of certiorari, o Acting Defense Secretary Alberto
prohibition and mandamus with prayer for a temporary restraining order and Romulo
preliminary injunction, to include the aforesaid members of the Special Board, o National Security Adviser Norberto
as additional respondents to the original petition. The respondent Judge Gonzales
granted their prayer. Respondent Judge ordered petitioners to reinstate o DILG Secretary Ronaldo Puno
respondent students. Simultaneously, the court ordered petitioners to conduct o Finance Secretary MargaritoTeves
special examinations in lieu of the final examinations which allegedly the  AFP Chief of Staff General HermogenesEsperon
students were not allowed to take, and enjoined them to maintain the status  PNP Chief General Oscar Calderon
quo with regard to the cases of Adel Abas and Zosimo Mendoza pending final
 PGMA
determination of the issue of the instant case. Hence, this special civil action
 Support agencies of the Anti-Terrorism Council,
of certiorari under Rule 65 with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
namely:
restraining order enjoining the enforcement of the May 17, 1991 order of
o National Intelligence Coordinating
respondent judge
Agency
o NBI
ISSUE: o Bureau of Immigration
o Office of Civil Defense
1)
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT STUDENTS WERE o Intelligence Service of the AFP
DENIED DUE PROCESS? o Anti-Money Laundering Center
o Philippine Center on Transnational Crime
o PNP intelligence and investigative
HELD:1) NO. Corollary to their contention of denials of due process is their elements
25
argument that it is Ang Tibay case and not the Guzman case which is
applicable in the case at bar. Though both cases essentially deal with the FACTS:
requirements of due process, the Guzman case is more apropos to the instant
 This case consists of 6 petitions challenging the
case, since the latter deals specifically with the minimum standards to be
constitutionality of RA 9372, “An Act to Secure the State and
satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions,
Protect our People from Terrorism,” aka Human Security Act
such as petitioner university herein, thus:
of 2007.
 Petitioner-organizations assert locus standion the basis of
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature being suspected “communist fronts” by the government,
and cause of any accusation against them; (2) that they whereas individual petitioners invoke the “transcendental
shall have the right to answer the charges against them importance” doctrine and their status as citizens and
with the assistance of counsel, if desired: (3) they shall be taxpayers.
informed of the evidence against them (4) they shall have  KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA, EMJP, and
the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) PCR allege they have been subjected to “close security
the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating surveillance by state security forces,” their members
committee or official designated by the school authorities followed by “suspicious persons” and “vehicles with dark
to hear and decide the case. 26 windshields,” and their offices monitored by “men with
military build.” They likewise claim they have been branded
- Requirements are met. Respondent students were notified and required to as “enemies of the State.”
submit written statements, and such notices and letters were addressed  BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE,
individually to them. Such notices and letters clearly show that respondent KADAMAY, SCW, LFS, Anakbayan, PAMALAKAYA, ACT,
students were given ample opportunity to adduce evidence in their behalf and Migrante, HEAD, and Agham would like the Court to take
to answer the charges leveled against them. The requisite assistance of counsel judicial notice of respondents’ alleged action of tagging them
was met when, from the very start of the investigations before the Joint as militant organizations fronting for the CPP and NPA. They
Administration Faculty-Student Committee, the law firm of Gonzales Batiler claim such tagging is tantamount to the effects of
and Bilog and Associates put in its appearance and filed pleadings in behalf of proscription without following the procedure under the law.
respondent students.  Meanwhile, IBP and CODAL base their claim of locus standi
on their sworn duty to uphold the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED; the order of respondent  Petitioners claim that RA 9372 is vague and broad, in that
Judge dated May 17, 1991 reinstating respondents students into petitioner terms like “widespread and extraordinary fear and panic
university is hereby REVERSED. The resolution of petitioner Joaquin Bernas among the populace” and “coerce the government to give in
S. J., then President of Ateneo de Manila University dated March 1991, is to an unlawful demand” are nebulous, leaving law
REINSTATED and the decision of the Special Board DISMISSING enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the
respondent students ADEL ABAS and ZOSIMO MENDOZA dated May 20, prohibited acts.
1991 is hereby AFFIRMED.
ISSUES:
Title: Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti- 1. WON petitioners’ resort to certiorari is proper NO.
Terrorism Council 2. WON petitioners have locus standiNO.
SCRA Citation: 632 SCRA 146 3. WON the Court can take judicial notice of the alleged
Date Promulgated: October 5, 2010 “tagging” NO.
4. WON petitioners can invoke the “transcendental importance”
Petitioners: This is a consolidation of 6 petitions, thus: doctrine NO.
GR No. Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. NGO certiorari and
 5. WON petitioners can be conferred locus standi as they are
taxpayers and citizens NO.
6. WON petitioners were able to present an actual case or
controversy NO.
7. WON RA 9372 is vague and broad in defining the crime of
terrorism NO.
8. WON a penal statute may be assailed for being vague as
applied to petitioners NO.
9. WON there is merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates
speech so as to permit a facial analysis of its validity NO.
HELD AND RATIO:
1. Petition for certiorari is improper.
a. Certiorari does not lie against respondents who do
not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court states that
petition for certiorari applies when any tribunal,
board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
b. Petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of
particularity how respondents acted without or in
excess of their respective jurisdictions, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
c. The power of judicial review has 4 requisites:
i. There must be an actual case or
controversy.
ii. Petitioners must possess locus standi.
iii. Question of constitutionality must be raised
at the earliest opportunity.
iv. The issue of constitutionality must be the
lismota of the case.
The present case lacks the 1st 2 requisites, which are the
most essential.
2. Petitioners lack locus standi.
a. Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure concrete adverseness.
b. In Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The
Executive Secretary,locus standihas been defined
as that requiring:
i. That the person assailing must have a
direct and personal interest AND
ii. That the person sustained or is in
immediate danger of sustaining some
direct inquiry as a result of the act
being challenged.
c. For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a
constitutional question, he must show that:
i. He has personally suffered some actual or
threatened injury;
ii. The injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; AND
iii. The injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable action.
d. RA 9372 is a penal statute. While Chavez v. PCGG
holds that transcendental public importance
dispenses with the requirement that petitioner has
experienced or is in actual danger of suffering direct
and personal injury, cases involving the
constitutionality of penal legislation belong to an
altogether different genus of constitutional litigation.
Such necessitates closer judicial scrutiny of locus
standi.
e. The mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule
of law does no, however, suffice to clothe the IBP or
any of its members with standing. They failed to
sufficiently demonstrate how its mandate under the
assailed statute revolts against its constitutional
rights and duties.
f. Former Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo Madrigal who
claims to have been the subject of “political
surveillance” also lacks locus standi. The same is
true for WigbertoTañada and Osmeña III, who cite
their being a human rights advocate and an
oppositor, respectively. No concrete injury has been
pinpointed, hence, no locus standi.
3. Court cannot take judicial notice of the alleged
“tagging.”
a. Matters of judicial notice have 3 material requisites:
i. matter must be one of common and
general knowledge
ii. must be well and authoritatively settled,
not doubtful or uncertain or capable of
accurate and ready determination
iii. known to be within thelimits of the
jurisdiction of the court
b. The principal guide in determining what facts may
be assumed to be judicially known is that of
notoriety. It can be said that judicial notice is
limited to facts evidenced by public records and
facts of general notoriety. Hence, it can be said that
judicial notice is limited to: (1) facts evidenced by
public records and (2) facts of general notoriety.
c. A court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which,
in part, is dependent on the existence or non-
existence of a fact of which the Court has no
constructive knowledge.
d. Petitioners’ apprehension is insufficient to
substantiate their plea. That no specific charge or
proscription under RA 9371 has been filed against
them, 3 years after its effectivity, belies any claim of
imminence of their perceived threat emanating from
the so-called tagging. They fail to particularize how
the implementation of specific provisions of RA
9372 would result in direct injury to their
organization and members.
e. Notwithstanding the statement of Ermita and
Gonzales that the Arroyo administration will adopt
the US and EU classification of CPP and NPA as
terrorist organizations, there is yet to be filed before
the courts an application to declare the CPP and
NPA organizations as domestic terrorist or outlawed
organization under RA 9372.
4. In Kilosbayan v. Guingona,to invoke the transcendental
doctrine, the following are the determinants:
a. The character of the funds or other assets involved
in the case
b. The presence of a clear case of disregard of a
constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public
respondent agency or instrumentality of the
government;
c. The lack of any other party with a more direct and
specific interest in the questions being raised
In the case at bar, there are other partiesnot before the
Court withdirect and specific interests in the questions
being raised.
5. Petitioners cannot be conferred upon them as taxpayers
and citizens.
a. A taxpayer suit is proper only when there is an
exercise of the spending or taxing power of
Congress, whereas citizen standing must rest on
direct and personal interest in the proceeding.
b. RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even
provide for any appropriation from Congress for its
implementation, while none of the individual
petitioner-citizens has alleged any direct and
personal interest in the implementation of the law.
c. Generalized interest, albeit accompanied by the
assertion of a public right, do not establish locus
standi. Evidence of a direct and personal interest is
key.
6. Petitioners fail to present an actual case or controversy.
None of them faces any charge under RA 9372.
a. Judicial power operates only when there is an
actual case or controversy. An actual case or
controversy means an existing case or controversy
that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not
conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the
court would amount to an advisory opinion.
b. Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic
questions to satisfy scholarly interest. The
pleadings must show:
i. an active antagonistic assertion of a legal
right and
ii. a denial thereof
c. However, a reasonable certainty of the occurrence
of a perceived threat to any constitutional interest
suffices to provide a basis for mounting a
constitutional challenge. This, however, is qualified
by the presence of sufficient facts.
d. Prevailing American jurisprudence allows
adjudication on the merits when an anticipatory
petition clearly shows that the challenged
prohibition forbids the conduct or activity that a
petitioner seeks to do, as there would be a
justiciable controversy. However, in the case at bar,
the petitioners have failed to show that the
challenged provisions of RA 9372 forbid
constitutionally protected conduct or activity. No
 demonstrable threat has been established, much
less a real and existing one.
e. Petitioners have yet to show any connection
between the purported “surveillance” and the
implementation of RA 9372. Petitioners obscure
allegations of sporadic “surveillance” and
supposedly being tagged as “communist fronts” in
no way approximate a credible threat of
prosecution. From these allegations, the Court is
being lured to render an advisory opinion, which is
not its function. If the case is merely theorized, it
lies beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.
Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real
events.
7. The doctrines of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth
find no application in the present case since these
doctrines apply only to free speech cases and that RA
9372 regulates conduct, not speech.
a. Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan: The overbreadth
and the vagueness doctrines have special
application only to free speech cases, and are not
appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes.
b. Romualdez v. COMELEC:A facial invalidation of
criminal statutes is not appropriate, but the Court
nonetheless proceeded to conduct a vagueness
analysis, and concluded that the therein subject
election offense under the Voter’s Registration Act
of 1996, with which the therein petitioners were
charged, is couched in precise language.
c. The aforementioned cases rely heavily on Justice
Mendoza’s Separate Opinion in the Estrada case:
Allegations that a penal statute is vague and
overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague
statute and to one, which is overbroad because of
possible chilling effect upon protected speech.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes.
Criminal statutes have general in terrorem
effect. If facial challenge is allowed, the State may
well be prevented from enacting laws against
socially harmful conduct. Overbreadth and
vagueness doctrines then have special application
only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing
the validity of penal statutes.
8. Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being
vague as applied to petitioners, a limited vagueness
analysis of the definition of “terrorism” in RA 9372 is
legally impossible absent an actual or imminent
chargeagainst them.
a. The doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of
overbreadth do not operate on the same plane.
i. A statute or acts suffers from the defect of
vagueness when:
1. It lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as
to its application. It is repugnant
to the Constitution in 2 ways:
a. Violates due process for
failure to accord fair
notice of conduct to
avoid
b. Leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in
carrying out its
provisions and becomes
an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.
ii. The overbreadth doctrine decrees that a
governmental purpose to control or
prevent activities constitutionally subject to
state regulations may not be achieved by
means, which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms.
b. A “facial” challenge is likewise different from an
“as applied” challenge.
i. “As applied” challenge considers only
extant facts affecting real litigants.
ii. “Facial” challenge is an examination of the
entire law, pinpointing its flaws and
defects, not only on the basis of its actual
operation to the parties, but also on the
assumption or prediction that its very
existence may cause others not before the
court to refrain from constitutionally
protected speech or activities.
1. Under no case may ordinary
penal statutes be subjected to a
facial challenge. If facial
challenge to a penal statute is
permitted, the prosecution of
crimes may be hampered. No
prosecution would be possible.
9. There is no merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates
speech so as to permit a facial analysis of its validity.
a. Section 3 of RA 9372 provides the following
elements of the crime of terrorism:
i. Offender commits an act punishable under
RPC and the enumerated special penal
laws;
ii. Commission of the predicate crime sows
and creates a condition of widespread and
extraordinary fear and panic among the
populace;
iii. The offender is actuated by the desire to
coerce the government to give in to an
unlawful demand.
b. Petitioners contend that the element of “unlawful
demand” in the definition of terrorism must
necessarily be transmitted through some form of
expression protected by the free speech clause.
The argument does not persuade. What RA 9372
seeks to penalize is conduct, not speech.
c. Petitioners’ notion on the transmission of message
is entirely inaccurate, as it unduly focuses on just
one particle of an element of the crime. Almost
every commission of a crime entails some mincing
of words on the part of offender. Utterances not
elemental but inevitably incidental to the doing
of the criminal conduct alter neither the intent of
the law to punish socially harmful conduct nor
the essence of the whole act as conduct and not
speech.
Concurring opinion of Justice Abad:
- He concurs with the majority opinion, but he says he needs to
emphasize that the grounds for dismissal in this case are more
procedural than substantive. Hence, when an actual controversy arises
and when it becomes ripe for adjudication, the specific questions raised
here may be raised again.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG
& SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
JOSE O. VERA, Judge . of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
and MARIANO CU UNJIENG, respondents.
Facts:
Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He
filed for reconsideration and four motions for new trial but all were
denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court and the Supreme
Court remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While
awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is
innocent of the crime he was convicted of. The Judge of the Manila
CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO
denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request
by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City
Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu
Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No.
4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial
boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted
person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a
city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only
provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is
unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides
equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion
to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of
power. Further, the said probation law may be an encroachment of
the power of the executive to provide pardon because providing
probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.

Issues:
Whether or not Act No. 4221 constituted an undue delegation of
legislative power
Whether or not the said act denies the equal protection of the laws
Discussions:
An act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does
not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the
administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the
discretionary powers delegated to it. The probation Act does not, by
the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial
boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary
power. What is granted, as mentioned by Justice Cardozo in the
recent case of Schecter, supra, is a “roving commission” which
enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By
section 11 if the Act, the legislature does not seemingly on its own
authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces
but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various provincial
boards to determine.
The equal protection of laws is a pledge of the protection of equal
laws. The classification of equal protection, to be reasonable, must
be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it
must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited
to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member
of the class.
Rulings:
The Court concludes that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an
improper and unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the
provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void.
There is no set standard provided by Congress on how provincial
boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The
provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of
the constitution and the doctrine of the non delegation of power.
Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the constitution.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as
follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the
respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a
probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for
provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the
Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the
Probation Office.
The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for
themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their
provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the
Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial
boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied
in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the
needed amount for the salary of a probation officer.
It is also contended that the Probation Act violates the provisions of
our Bill of Rights which prohibits the denial to any person of the
equal protection of the laws. The resultant inequality may be said
to flow from the unwarranted delegation of legislative power,
although perhaps this is not necessarily the result in every case.
Adopting the example given by one of the counsel for the petitioners
in the course of his oral argument, one province may appropriate
the necessary fund to defray the salary of a probation officer, while
another province may refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the
Probation Act would be in operation in the former province but not
in the latter. This means that a person otherwise coming within the
purview of the law would be liable to enjoy the benefits of probation
in one province while another person similarly situated in another
province would be denied those same benefits. This is obnoxious
discrimination. Contrariwise, it is also possible for all the provincial
boards to appropriate the necessary funds for the salaries of the
probation officers in their respective provinces, in which case no
inequality would result for the obvious reason that probation would
be in operation in each and every province by the affirmative action
of appropriation by all the provincial boards.
Villegas vs Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho (1978)
February 15, 2013 markerwins Tax Law
Facts: The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 6537
requiring aliens (except those employed in the diplomatic and
consular missions of foreign countries, in technical assistance
programs of the government and another country, and members of
religious orders or congregations) to procure the requisite mayor’s
permit so as to be employed or engage in trade in the City of Manila.
The permit fee is P50, and the penalty for the violation of the
ordinance is 3 to 6 months imprisonment or a fine of P100 to P200,
or both.
Issue: Whether the ordinance imposes a regulatory fee or a tax.
Held: The ordinance’s purpose is clearly to raise money under the
guise of regulation by exacting P50 from aliens who have been
cleared for employment. The amount is unreasonable and excessive
because it fails to consider difference in situation among aliens
required to pay it, i.e. being casual, permanent, part-time, rank-
and-file or executive.
[ The Ordinance was declared invalid as it is arbitrary, oppressive
and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus
deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore
violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution. Further, the ordinance does not lay down any criterion
or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion, thus
conferring upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted powers. ]
PEOPLE V. CAYAT (1939) |EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE
February 5, 2017
G.R. No. L-45987, 68 Phil 12, May 5, 1939
DOCTRINE: Protection of laws is not violated by a legislation based on
reasonable classification. The classification to be reasonable, (1) must rest
on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; (4) must apply equally to
all members of the same class.
FACTS:
1. Respondent Cayat, native of Baguio, Benguet and a member of the
non-Christian tribe was found guilty of violating sections 2 and 3 of
Act No. 1639 for possessing an intoxicating liquor (one bottle of gin)
which is not a native wine.
2. Section 2 of the said act prohibits any native of the Philippines who is
a member of the non-Christian tribe to buy, receive and possess any
intoxicating liquor other than their so-called native wines.
Consequently, Section 3 thereof provides for its punishment.
3. Cayat challenges the constitutionality of Act No. 1639 on the grounds
that it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws,
violative of the due process and it is an improper exercise of police
power.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Act No. 1639 violates the equal protection clause?
RULING:
 No, the Act No. 1639 is not violative of the equal protection
clause.
 Equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on
reasonable classifications. The classification to be reasonable, (1)
must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions
only; (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
 Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. On the first requisite, the
classification rests on real and substantial distinctions. The non-
Christian tribes refer not to the religious belief, but in a way to the
geographical and more directly to the natives of the Philippines of a
low grade of civilization. Second, Act No. 1639 was designed to
insure peace and order among the non-Christian tribes. The
experience of the past and the lower court observed that the use of
highly intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes often resulted
in lawlessness and crimes, which hamper the efforts of the
Government to raise their standard of life and civilization. Third, the
said act is intended to apply for all times as long as the conditions
exist. Legislature understood that civilization of a people is a slow
process and that hand in hand with it must go measures of protection
and security. Fourth, the act applies equally to all members of same
class.
Dumlao, Igot and Salapantan vs. COMELEC
Facts: Patricio Dumlao is the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has
retired from his office and he has been receiving retirement benefits. He filed
for re-election to the same office for the January 30, 1980 local elections.
Meanwhile, Romeo Igot, is a taxpayer, a qualified voter and a member of the
Bar who, as such, has taken his oath to support the Constitution and obey the
laws of the land. Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., is also a taxpayer, a qualified voter,
and a resident of San Miguel, Iloilo.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 was passed (paragraph 4 thereof) providing
disqualification for the likes of Dumlao:
Sec. 4. Special Disqualification in addition to violation of section 10
of Art. XI I-C of the Constitution and disqualification mentioned in
existing laws, which are hereby declared as disqualification for any
of the elective officials enumerated in section 1 hereof.
Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has
received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled
under the law, and who shall have been 6,5 years of age at the
commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected
shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from
which he has retired. (Emphasis supplied)
Dumlao assailed the B.P. averring that it is based on purely arbitrary grounds
and therefore class legislation. Hence, he claims it is unconstitutional.
His petition was joined by Atty. Igot and Salapantan Jr. However, these two
have different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayer’s
suit assailing the other provisions of B.P. 52 regarding:
 Sec. 7: Term of office of the elected officials (6 years)
 Sec. 6: Length of the campaign (To be fixed by COMELEC in
accordance with Art. XII-C, Sec. 6 of Constitution; Dec. 29 1979 –
Jan. 28, 1980)
 Sec. 4: Provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for
public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after
preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from
office.
In general, Dumlao invoked equal protection in the eye of the law.
Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection of law
Ruling: NO.
Procedural Aspect: The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for
this case would never have been merged. Dumlao’s cause is different from
Igot’s. They have separate issues. Further, this case does not meet all the
requisites so that it’d be eligible for judicial review. There are standards that
have to be followed in the exercise of the function of judicial review, namely:
1. the existence of an appropriate case;
2. an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the
constitutional question;
3. the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity;
4. the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order
to decide the case. In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met. The
SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for
crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints
against them and after preliminary investigation would already
disqualify them from office as null and void.
Substantive Aspect: Petitioner Dumlao's contention that section 4 of BP Blg.
52 is discriminatory against him personally is disproven by the fact that several
petitions for the disqualification of other candidates for local positions based
on the challenged provision have already been filed with the COMELEC (as
listed in p. 15, respondent's Comment).
The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the safer guard of
equal protection is neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal
protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are
based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and
regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service,
employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from
younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory
retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
In the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a
provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from
running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the
challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance. The
tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is
emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared
himself tired and unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by
virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again. It is for this very
reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the challenged
provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal protection neither does it
permit of such denial.
The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is
proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That
constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification based
upon substantial distinctions, where the classification is germane to the
purpose of the law and applies to all Chose belonging to the same class.
There is an additional consideration. Absent herein is a showing of the clear
invalidity of the questioned provision. Well accepted is the rule that to justify
the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal breach. Courts are practically
unanimous in the pronouncement that laws shall not be declared invalid unless
the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt
G.R. No. 113811 October 7, 1994
Ishmael Himagan, petitioner
vs People of the Philippines and Hon. Judge Hilario Mapayo, respondents
Ponente: Kapunan
Facts:
Himagan is policeman assigned with the medical company of the PNP
Regional Headquarters as Camp Catitigan, Davao City, and was
implicated in the killing of Benjamin Machitar Jr., and the attempted
murder of Bernabe Machitar. After the infromations were filed, RTC
Davao issued as order suspending petitioner until the termination of the
case.
October 11, 1993, Himagan filed a motion to lift the order for his
suspension relying on the Civil service Decree that his suspension should
be limited to 90 days. But respondent Judge denied the motion pointing
out under section 47 of RA 6975, the accused shall be suspended from
office until his case is terminated. The motion for reconsideration of the
order was denied also, hence this certiorari and mandamus to set aside
the orders of respondent Judge.
Held:
First. The language of the first sentence of Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 is clear,
plain and free from ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than that the
suspension from office of the member of the PNP charged with grave
offense where the penalty is six years and one day or more shall last
until the termination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted before
the termination of the case. The second sentence of the same Section
providing that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from
arraignment does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can
stand independently of each other. The first refers to the period of
suspension. The second deals with the time frame within which the trial
should be finished.
Second. Petitioner misapplies Sec. 42 of PD 807. A meticulous reading of
the section clearly shows that it refers to the lifting of preventive
suspension in pending administrative investigation, not in criminal
cases, as here. In the instant case. Petitioner is charged with murder
under the Revised Penal Code and it is undisputed that he falls squarely
under Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 which categorically states that his suspension
shall last until the case is terminated.
The foregoing discussions reveal the legislative intent to place on
preventive suspension a member of the PNP charged with grave felonies
where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six years of imprisonment
and which suspension continues until the case against him is terminated.
The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the
other classes of persons charged criminally or administratively insofar
as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is
that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be
used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly
brought out in the legislative discussions.
The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It
is intended to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on
inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, the
equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality. It merely
requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances
and conditions both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced. Thus, the equal protection clause does not absolutely forbid
classifications, such as the one which exists in the instant case. If the
classification is based on real and substantial differences; is germane to
the purpose of the law; applies to all members of the same
class; and applies to current as well as future conditions, the
classification may not be impugned as violating the Constitution's equal
protection guarantee. A distinction based on real and reasonable
considerations related to a proper legislative purpose such as that which
exists here is neither unreasonable, capricious nor unfounded.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Case Digest #2-2 | GR No. 189698 | Quinto and Tolentino vs COMELEC
FACTS:
The court declared as unconstitutional the second provisio in the third
paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code
and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679 that they violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
BACKGROUND:
Dec 1, 2009 The Court declared the second provisio in the third
paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code
and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679 as unconstitutional.

Dec 14, 2009 COMELEC filed the motion for reconsideration.
The second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66
of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution
8679: “Any person holding a public appointive office or position,
including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and
officers and employees in GOCCs shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his office upon filling of his certificate of candidacy“
ISSUE:
Whether or not the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of
RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC
Resolution 8679, violate the equal protection clause of the constitution.
HELD:
The Court reversed their previous decision and declared the second
provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679 as
constitutional.
RULING:
These laws and regulations implement Sec 2 Art IX-B of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits civil service officers and employees from
engaging in any electioneering or partisan political campaign.
The intention to impose a strict limitation on the participation of civil
service officers and employees in partisan political campaign is
unmistakable.
The equal protection of the law clause in the constitution is not absolute,
but is subject to reasonable classification if the groupings are
characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one
class may be treated and regulated different from the other.
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and
individual or class privelege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which
is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within
which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike under
like circumstances and conditions both as to priveleges conferred and
liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not enfringed by
legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified
class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class and reasonable
ground exists for making a distinction between those who fall within
such class and those who do not.
Substantial distinctions clearly exists between elective officials and
appointive officials. Elective officials occupy their office by virtue of the
mandate of the electorate. Appointive officials hold their office by virtue
of their designation by an appointing authority.
BIRAOGO VS PTC
FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission
of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with
the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption
committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-
principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous
administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the
President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an
investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot
adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes
between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess
evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may
have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt,
much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot
determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the
filing of an information in our courts of law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin
the PTC from performing its functions. They argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of
the Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its
operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the
Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the
delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office
of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not
include the power to create an entirely new public office which was
hitherto inexistent like the “Truth Commission.”
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it
vested the “Truth Commission” with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if
not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under
the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative
Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets
for investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous
administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it
excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who may
be indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners
and argued that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the
President’s executive power and power of control necessarily include
the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are
faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No.
9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or
form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds
because there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already
appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions
of the Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not
a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or
erode the latter’s jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause
because it was validly created for laudable purposes.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and
question E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by
usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for
public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there
must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to
question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis
mota of the case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the
Congress as a body to which they belong as members. To the extent the
powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member
thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of
the powers of that institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers
and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate.
Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action
which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in
danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the
implementation of E. O. No. 1.
Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question.” In private suits, standing is governed by the “real-parties-in
interest” rule. It provides that “every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest.” Real-party-in interest
is “the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.”

Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the
plaintiff who asserts a “public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal
official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He has to
show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make out a
sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing
of relief as a “citizen” or “taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain direct injury as a result.” The Court, however, finds reason in
Biraogo’s assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental
importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are
constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this
Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are
faithfully executed. The powers of the President are not limited to those
specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of
the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is
the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious
need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully
executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is
to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know
so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his
duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of
existing funds already appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part
of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is
no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the
commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the
Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the
commission. The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be
subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no
impropriety in the funding.
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their
respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission
will complement those of the two offices. The function of determining
probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the
courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTC’s power to
investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide
the President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution
and enforcement of the laws of the land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive
Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection
clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987
Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly
situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal
protection clause is to secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction
against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by
the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the
state’s duly constituted authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Equal protection clause permits classification. Such
classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness.
The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all
members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the
class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and
obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal
protection clause. The clear mandate of truth commission is to
investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft
and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to
single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of
past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past
administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the
equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating
differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle
for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences do
not make for a valid classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must,
at least, have the authority to investigate all past administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to
which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all
private rights determined and all public authority administered. Laws
that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for
being unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is
hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the
equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Almonte v. Vasquez
Facts:
This is a case wherein respondent Ombudsman, requires petitioners
Nerio Rogado and Elisa Rivera, as chief accountant and record custodian,
respectively, of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau
(EIIB) to produce "all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for
the year 1988" and all evidence such as vouchers from enforcing his
orders.
Petitioner Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the EIIB, while Perez
is Chief of the EIIB's Budget and Fiscal Management Division. The
subpoena duces tecum was issued by the Ombudsman in connection
with his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that funds
representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had been
illegally disbursed. The letter, purporting to have been written by an
employee of the EIIB and a concerned citizen, was addressed to the
Secretary of Finance, with copies furnished several government offices,
including the Office of the Ombudsman.
May be erased: [The letter reads in pertinent parts: that the EIIB has a
syndicate headed by the Chief of Budget Division who is manipulating
funds and also the brain of the so called "ghost agents" or the
"Emergency Intelligence Agents" (EIA); that when the agency had salary
differential last Oct '88 all money for the whole plantilla were released
and from that alone, Millions were saved and converted to ghost agents
of EIA; Almost all EIIB agents collects payroll from the big time smuggler
syndicate monthly and brokers every week for them not to be
apprehended.]
In his comment on the letter-complaint, petitioner Almonte denied all
the allegations written on the anonymous letter. Petitioners move to
quash the subpoena and the subpoena duces tecum but was denied.
Disclosure of the documents in question is resisted with the claim of
privilege of an agency of the government on the ground that "knowledge
of EIIB's documents relative to its Personal Services Funds and its
plantilla . . . will necessarily [lead to] knowledge of its operations,
movements, targets, strategies, and tactics and the whole of its being"
and this could "destroy the EIIB."
Issue:
Whether petitioners can be ordered to produce documents relating to
personal services and salary vouchers of EIIB employees on the plea that
such documents are classified without violating their equal protection of
laws.
Held:
YES. At common law a governmental privilege against disclosure is
recognized with respect to state secrets bearing on military, diplomatic
and similar matters and in addition, privilege to withhold the identity of
persons who furnish information of violation of laws. In the case at bar,
there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by
the production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. Indeed,
EIIB's function is the gathering and evaluation of intelligence reports
and information regarding "illegal activities affecting the national
economy, such as, but not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax
evasion, dollar salting." Consequently, while in cases which involve state
secrets it may be sufficient to determine from the circumstances of the
case that there is reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will
expose military matters without compelling production, no similar
excuse can be made for a privilege resting on other considerations.
The Ombudsman is investigating a complaint that several items in the
EIIB were filled by fictitious persons and that the allotments for these
items in 1988 were used for illegal purposes. The plantilla and other
personnel records are relevant to his investigation as the designated
“protectors of the people” of the Constitution.
Nor is there violation of petitioners' right to the equal protection of the
laws. Petitioners complain that "in all forum and tribunals . . . the
aggrieved parties . . . can only hale respondents via their verified
complaints or sworn statements with their identities fully disclosed,"
while in proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman anonymous
letters suffice to start an investigation. In the first place, there can be no
objection to this procedure because it is provided in the Constitution
itself. In the second place, it is apparent that in permitting the filing of
complaints "in any form and in a manner," the framers of the
Constitution took into account the well-known reticence of the people
which keep them from complaining against official wrongdoings. As this
Court had occasion to point out, the Office of the Ombudsman is different
from the other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the
government because those subject to its jurisdiction are public officials
who, through official pressure and influence, can quash, delay or dismiss
investigations held against them. On the other hand complainants are
more often than not poor and simple folk who cannot afford to hire
lawyers.

Finally, it is contended that the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum

would violate petitioners' right against self-incrimination. It is enough to
state that the documents required to be produced in this case are public
records and those to whom the subpoena duces tecum is directed are
government officials in whose possession or custody the documents are.
Moreover, if, as petitioners claim the disbursement by the EII of funds
for personal service has already been cleared by the COA, there is no
reason why they should object to the examination of the documents by
respondent Ombudsman.

Ormoc Sugar Co, Vs Treasurer of Ormoc City

FACTS:
The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4, imposing
"on any and all productions of sugar milled at petitioner's, municipal tax
of 1% per export sale. Petitioner paid but were under protest.

Petitioner filed before the CFI contending that the ordinance is

unconstitutional for being in violation of the equal protection clause and
the rule of uniformity of taxation, aside from being an export tax
forbidden under Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code. It
further alleged that the tax is neither a production nor a license tax
which Ormoc City its charter and under Section 2 of Republic Act 2264,
or the Local Autonomy Act, is authorized to impose; that it also violates
RA 2264 because the tax is on both the sale and export of sugar.

ISSUE: Whether the ordinance is valid.

RULING:

NO. The SC held that it violates the equal protection clause for it taxes
only sugar produced and exported by petitioner and none other. Even
though petitioner, at the time of the enactment of the ordinance, was the
only sugar central in Ormoc, the classification should have been in terms
applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not
be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established
sugar central, of the same class as petitioner, for the coverage of the tax.

Though, petitioner can be refunded, they are not entitled to interest

because the taxes were not arbitrarily collected as the ordinance
provided a sufficient basis to preclude arbitrariness, the same being then
presumed constitutional until declared otherwise.