(Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology) Jennifer Shore - The Welfare State and The Democratic Citizen-Springer International Publishing - Palgrave Macmillan (2019) PDF

Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology
The Welfare State and

the Democratic Citizen
How Social Policies Shape Political Equality
Jennifer Shore
Series Editors
Carlo Ruzza
Department of Sociology and Social Research
University of Trento
Trento, Italy
Hans-Jörg Trenz
Department of Media, Cognition & Communication
University of Copenhagen
Copenhagen, Denmark
Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology addresses contemporary
themes in the field of Political Sociology. Over recent years, attention has
turned increasingly to processes of Europeanization and globalization
and the social and political spaces that are opened by them. These pro-
cesses comprise both institutional-constitutional change and new dynam-
ics of social transnationalism. Europeanization and globalization are also
about changing power relations as they affect people’s lives, social net-
works and forms of mobility. The Palgrave Studies in European Political
Sociology series addresses linkages between regulation, institution build-
ing and the full range of societal repercussions at local, regional, national,
European and global level, and will sharpen understanding of changing
patterns of attitudes and behaviours of individuals and groups, the politi-
cal use of new rights and opportunities by citizens, new conflict lines and
coalitions, societal interactions and networking, and shifting loyalties
and solidarity within and across the European space. We welcome pro-
posals from across the spectrum of Political Sociology and Political
Science, on dimensions of citizenship; political attitudes and values;
political communication and public spheres; states, communities, gover-
nance structure and political institutions; forms of political participation;
populism and the radical right; and democracy and democratization.
More information about this series at

http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14630
Jennifer Shore
The Welfare State

and the Democratic
Citizen
How Social Policies Shape Political
Equality
Jennifer Shore
Mannheim Centre for European Social Research
University of Mannheim
Mannheim, Germany

ISBN 978-3-319-93960-5 ISBN 978-3-319-93961-2 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93961-2
Library of Congress Control Number: 2018946640
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) under exclusive licence to Palgrave Macmillan, part of
Springer Nature 2019
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether
the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of
illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and trans-
mission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or
dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication
does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant
protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book
are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or
the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any
errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional
claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Cover image © Blend Images - Hill Street Studios
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Preface
This book is the culmination of what began as a graduate school applica-

tion and eventually developed into a broader research project and would
not have been possible without the support of my graduate advisors. I
would, therefore, like to first thank Ellen Immergut who oversaw my dis-
sertation project from day one. Her keen ability to see the forest from the
trees helped me to focus on the big picture and not get bogged down in
minutiae. I greatly benefited from her academic and professional experi-
ence as well as her feedback at all stages of the project. Bernhard Weßels
took particular interest in my research even before joining as my second
supervisor. Not only does he hold a wealth of knowledge on the subject
matter of my dissertation, he also provided me with a great deal of guid-
ance on the methodological and statistical aspects of my research. I am
also indebted to many other experts who helped me along the way:
Isabelle Stadelmann-Steffen and Staffan Kumlin—who happened to
organize a weeklong workshop on policy feedback, democratic citizen-
ship, and welfare states—provided me with many new sources of inspira-
tion as well as detailed, constructive feedback on my project. I would also
like to thank Markus Freitag, who, in addition to joining my committee,
helped me get to where I am today.
The Berlin Graduate School of Social Sciences (BGSS) at the Humboldt
University of Berlin provided an ideal environment for my doctoral stud-
ies. I am grateful for the funding from the German Research Foundation
v
vi Preface
that allowed me the freedom to fully pursue my academic interests. The

infrastructure and networks offered by the BGSS proved to be an
invaluable source of support throughout my graduate studies. Martin
Nagelschmidt, the academic manager at the BGSS, is an enthusiastic
advocate for all the doctoral students, one who always encouraged our
research and made sure the necessary resources were available. I would
also like to thank the staff at the graduate school for their unwavering
patience and help, in particular, Abenaa Adomako, Katrin Bauer, Sonja
Grossmann, Christoph Raiser, Jana Rieckmann, and Thomas Wosnitza.
The journey that the dissertation process entails can be a rather lonely
one at times, and I certainly could not have done it without the sup-
port of my fellow graduate students at the BGSS, in particular, the
members of my cohort. A few names deserve particular mention: Lisa
Anders, Priska Daphi, Alexander Horn, Christoph Jindra, Anne
Krüger, Andreas Schäfer, Katharina Rathmann, Anna Schlumbohm,
and Jan Ullrich. In addition to the ideas, offices, lunches, and beers we
shared, you helped me get through the more trying times of writing a
dissertation.
Though this book project has its roots in my doctoral work, I have
benefited from the support and input from numerous colleagues well
past turning in the dissertation, in particular, Jale Tosun, Felix Hörisch,
and Bettina Schuck at Heidelberg University as well as my new
colleagues at the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research. I am
also grateful to the team at Palgrave Macmillan for their guidance and
patience!
To my dear friends scattered all across the globe: your support, much
needed distractions, and friendship mean the world to me. Thank you,
Allison, for your keen editorial eye. I am particularly grateful to René.
Thank you for listening to me ramble about my research over the deli-
cious dinners you made, never failing to make me laugh, and reminding
me that there are things more important than university. Lastly, I am
forever indebted to my family, which now spans both sides of the
Atlantic. My parents, Susan and Kerry, instilled within me a sense of
curiosity and determination that has been crucial to starting and finishing
this research project. My sisters, Sarah and Traci, are both role models and
Preface
vii
wonderful friends. Although separated by an ocean, my family’s love and

support have always been a source of strength and encouragement. Special
thanks to the smallest (and forthcoming) family member for pushing me
to get this done. I know you would have been the first to own a copy, so
this book is dedicated to you, Dad.
Mannheim, Germany Jennifer Shore

Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 Democracies and Their Citizens 9
3 Why Context Matters: The Role of Public Policy 29
4 Empirical Approaches to the Study of Democratic Citizens

and Welfare States 53
5 The Impact of Social Policy on Democratic Citizenship 75
6 Consequences of Unequal Citizenship 137
Appendix 153
Index 163
ix
List of Figures
Fig. 4.1 Social expenditures on working-age adults and families (% of

GDP)64
Fig. 5.1 Income level and predicted turnout depending on welfare state
spending93
Fig. 5.2 Political interest in 26 OECD countries 102
Fig. 5.3 Income level and predicted political interest depending on wel-
fare state spending 109
Fig. 5.4 Trust in parliament across countries 114
Fig. 5.5 Income level and trust in parliament depending on welfare
state spending 121
Fig. 5.6 Satisfaction with democracy across 22 countries 123
Fig. 5.7 Income level and satisfaction with democracy depending on
welfare state spending 128
xi
List of Tables
Table 4.1 Disaggregated welfare state expenditures across countries

(% of GDP) 60
Table 4.2 Welfare spending categories 61
Table 4.3 Demographic needs adjustments by welfare policy category 63
Table 4.4 Summary statistics working-age and family benefits (OECD) 64
Table 5.1 Countries, years, and survey sources included in the analyses
of voting and welfare states 76
Table 5.2 Self-reported electoral participation and official turnout
rates80
Table 5.3 Self-reported voter turnout by income group 81
Table 5.4 Multilevel analyses of voting 87
Table 5.5 Multilevel analyses of voting with cross-level interactions 90
Table 5.6 Marginal effects of welfare policy on voting by income
category91
Table 5.7 Political interest by income group 103
Table 5.8 Multilevel analyses of political interest 105
Table 5.9 Multilevel analyses of political interest with cross-level
interactions107
Table 5.10 Marginal effects of welfare policy on political interest by
income category 108
Table 5.11 Political trust by income group 115
Table 5.12 Multilevel analyses of trust in parliament 117
xiii
xiv List of Tables
Table 5.13 Multilevel analyses of trust in parliament with cross-level

interactions118
Table 5.14 Marginal effects of welfare policy on trust in parliament by
income category 120
Table 5.15 Satisfaction with democracy by income group 124
Table 5.16 Multilevel analyses of satisfaction with democracy 126
Table 5.17 Marginal effects of welfare policy on satisfaction with
democracy by income category 127
Table 5.18 Marginal effects on satisfaction with democracy, various
welfare state indicators 129
Table 6.1 Marginal effects of welfare state spending on aspects of dem-
ocratic citizenship 138
Table A1 Voting: Variables, descriptive statistics, sources, hypothe-
sized direction of influence 153
Table A2 Interest in politics: Variables, descriptive statistics, sources,
hypothesized direction of influence 156
Table A3 Trust in parliament: Variables, descriptive statistics, sources,
hypothesized direction of influence 158
Table A4 Satisfaction with democracy: Variables, descriptive statistics,
sources, hypothesized direction of influence 160
Table A5 Alternative welfare policy specifications and satisfaction
with democracy 162
1
Introduction
Democracy, when boiled down to one person, one vote, explicitly

demands equality. When examining who votes and otherwise partici-
pates, however, we all too frequently encounter an unequal reality:
although modern democracies espouse the ideal of political equality, eco-
nomic inequality severely constrains an egalitarian exercise of political
rights. Both the level and the distribution of political participation and
democratic engagement vary widely across countries, leaving us wonder-
ing how some countries have achieved greater political equality than oth-
ers, and, more specifically, what role does the welfare state play in shaping
democratic citizenship? Can the welfare state, in addressing income-based
inequality, also alleviate the related political inequalities and thereby encour-
age political equality? These are the main questions I examine in this book.
Beyond the importance of individual resources, personality character-
istics, or political socialization, we must also consider the influence of
public policy on political engagement. This idea, known as the policy
feedback approach, emphasizes that policies impact recipients much like
formal political institutions do—they too can transmit norms and impose
rules and regulations—and can thereby transform politics itself. Why
should we expect welfare policies to impact democratic citizenship? First,
© The Author(s) 2019 1

J. Shore, The Welfare State and the Democratic Citizen, Palgrave Studies in European
Political Sociology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93961-2_1
2 J. Shore
they confer people with material benefits, that is, greater resources
enhance participatory capacity. Second, social spending can increase
political saliency and relevancy of politics for people’s everyday lives.
Third, strong welfare commitments send the message that citizens’ inter-
ests are protected and valued, thereby enhancing feelings of democratic
support and political efficacy.
In this book, I contribute to the extant literature on democratic politi-
cal engagement by examining the ways in which welfare state policies
impact individual political behaviors and attitudes. By looking at broader
sets of policies over a large and diverse group of countries, this study aims
to bridge the gap identified in the policy feedback literature regarding the
effects of policies on mass publics. While there are numerous works that
examine the effects of specific policies for smaller target groups in single
countries, fewer studies have applied the policy feedback framework to
larger populations. More specifically, I comparatively apply many of the
ideas that have been investigated primarily in the United States to a
diverse international setting. In doing so, I expand the literature that
tends to quite narrowly focus on the role of resources for political engage-
ment and systematically investigate the variety of ways in which the wel-
fare state context may modify this relationship. I examine the varied
responses democracies have developed to address social questions and
how these responses shape the quality of democracy in terms of demo-
cratic citizenship.
Although social stratification represents a mainstay in contemporary
social science research, analyses of democratic citizenship and political
inequality are often restricted to more theoretical and philosophical
accounts and are not subject to systematic empirical analysis. And while
many have examined the consequences of economic inequality on voter
turnout, finding, for example, that a higher Gini coefficient—a measure
of income inequality—is associated with lower turnout, particularly
among the less advantaged, these studies tell us very little about the
mechanisms behind these relationships. That resources play a role for
political participation is by no means a new finding; people with more
money or education or better networks participate far more frequently
than people with fewer. But what is it about inequality that is so detri-
mental to political participation and democratic support? By turning the
Introduction 3
attention to public policies, things with which people actually come into
contact or have personal experiences, I argue that we can get closer to
understanding just why inequality—or its mirror, a generous welfare
state—affects political behaviors and attitudes, in terms of both the over-
all level and the equality of the distribution.
In order for citizens to be interested and involved in democracy, they
must witness that their governments actually do something to serve their
interests. The fact that in many countries we find democratic citizenship
to remain very much tied to socioeconomic status tells us that perhaps
democracy could and should deliver more. This study aims to make two
main contributions: first, it empirically examines the relationship between
welfare states and democratic citizenship in advanced democracies. While
the relationship between income inequality and political participation
has been relatively well documented, far fewer studies approach political
inequality from the perspective of democratic quality, comparing what
democracies deliver to their citizens and how citizens respond to such
policy offerings. Drawing on the policy feedback literature, I compara-
tively examine how specific policy foci impact the ways in which indi-
viduals behave toward and think about their governments. Second, this
book goes beyond the procedural and purely institutional accounts of
political participation and looks directly at what a democracy is able to
deliver. At the end of their introduction to the edited volume Assessing the
Quality of Democracy, Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino (2005) ask
whether a quality democracy provides quality results, such as citizen sat-
isfaction, and whether improvements in quality can bolster people’s atti-
tudes toward and views of democracy. This book aims to provide some
answers to questions such as these. The goal is not to be able to say what
the perfect democracy looks like but rather to highlight how democratic
citizenship can be fostered through public policy.
Overview of This Book

In the chapter to follow, I introduce the concept of democratic citizen-
ship, its determinants, and correlates. Next, I provide an overview of the
literature on welfare states and their effects on individual behaviors and
4 J. Shore
attitudes. The main theoretical frame—the policy feedback approach—is

then introduced. This perspective states that policies can affect citizens
much like formal institutions do—they too can shape identities and fos-
ter participation. The effects policies have on their citizens “feed back
into political systems, producing spirals in which groups’ participatory
and policy advantages (or disadvantages) accrue. Citizens’ relationships
with government, and their experiences at the hand of government pol-
icy, help determine their participation levels and in turn, subsequent
policy outcomes” (Campbell 2011, 2). That policies themselves can play
a role in shaping the level and distribution of democratic engagement
gives us good reason to study them, given their impact on the fundamen-
tal mechanisms of the democratic process. Furthermore, since the distri-
bution of societal goods constitutes a basic function of democratic
governments, who gets what, how much, and how, as determined by the
design of policies, can weigh heavily on citizens’ capabilities and motiva-
tion for political participation.
The empirical chapters begin with a discussion of the analytical, theo-
retical, and epistemological issues of welfare state measurement and a
discussion of the statistical methods I employ. Due to the importance
that measurements remain consistent with theoretical concepts, I posit
that it is not appropriate to examine the welfare state through the lens of
aggregate social expenditures. As many others have argued (e.g., Castles
2008; Esping-Andersen 1990), public social spending varies with regard
to outcome depending on its object. For reasons I elaborate on in the
empirical chapter, I look at spending on working-age adults and families
when linking the welfare state to the democratic citizenship. In short, this
category of spending is arguably most closely aligned to what Esping-
Andersen (1990) refers to as the theoretical core of the welfare state.
After introducing the measurement of the welfare state employed in
this study and discussing the use of multilevel regression as a tool for
analyzing the effects of a policy context on the actions and attitudes of
individuals in a given country, I move on to the empirical analyses of
welfare spending on working-age adults and families on four central
aspects of democratic citizenship: electoral participation, interest in poli-
tics, political trust, and satisfaction with democracy. The individual-level
Introduction 5
data for these analyses come from the World Values Survey (WVS), the
European Social Survey (ESS), and the Comparative Study of Electoral
Systems (CSES).
What is revealed from these quantitative analyses is that, controlling
for both individual attributes and country-level factors, welfare spending
on working-age adults and families is indeed associated with higher voter
turnout, greater interest in politics, greater political trust, and satisfaction
with democracy. The results of the initial multilevel models provide sup-
port for a direct effect of the welfare state on democratic citizenship, that
is, we can observe higher levels of these democratic citizenship traits in
countries, which place a larger policy focus on their working-age popula-
tions. Introducing cross-level interactions to the models tests whether
this positive effect varies in strength or even direction depending on one’s
income level. Although income is not the only predictor of democratic
engagement, it is important to bear in mind that it is often the channel
through which political influence travels. Moreover, it is these income-
based inequalities that the institutions and policies of generous welfare
states seek to address.
When looking into the ways in which welfare policies may be able to
moderate the relationship between income and political participation
and attitudes, however, the results require more differentiation. While
the impact of additional welfare spending on the facets of democratic
citizenship is positive regardless of which income group one belongs to,
the effects differ in magnitude and degree of significance. For example, I
find similarly positive and significant effects of social spending on the
likelihood of voting for individuals in both the lowest- and middle-
income quintiles; although a positive effect is also found for people in the
highest-income quintiles, it is not significant. In terms of political inter-
est, regardless of income category, increased welfare state spending on
working-age adults and families exerts a positive and significant influ-
ence, with the largest and strongest influence being on the political inter-
est of persons with the lowest incomes. This first set of results suggests
that increased social spending lessens the importance of income for vot-
ing and interest in politics. In other words, although the levels increase
across all income groups, people with the fewest resources experience the
6 J. Shore
greatest boost from additional social expenditures. Those whose resources

would already predict a high level of political activity experience a more
moderate effect with regard to higher social spending, as is best illustrated
with the voting analysis.
In terms of political support attitudes—political trust and satisfaction
with democracy—I find a seemingly contradictory set of results. Similar
to the preceding analyses of political participation and interest, in coun-
tries where a greater amount is spent on working-age adults and families
(as a percentage of the gross domestic product—GDP), individuals are
more likely to be satisfied with the way democracy works as well as exhibit
higher levels of trust in their national parliaments. In terms of political
trust, however, I do not find that welfare state generosity exerts an equal-
izing effect; to the contrary, at the higher levels of spending, we find that
the gap between those with the lowest incomes and those with the high-
est incomes actually widens in terms of their political trust. Although
welfare spending positively shapes this form of democratic support, its
relationship to income-based resources is not muted by increased social
expenditures. The results from the final analysis of satisfaction with
democracy, however, reveal the opposite pattern: not only are people in
states where a larger policy foci is placed on the working-age segment of
the population more likely to be satisfied with the functioning of democ-
racy, but there are few discernible differences with regard to where one is
located along the income distribution. Following the empirical analyses,
I discuss the overall results, limitations, and conclusions of the study. I
also touch on some of the directions future research may take based upon
my findings, followed by a conclusion with some final remarks regarding
the implications that the findings hold for the health and legitimacy of
democratic states.
References
Campbell, Andrea Louise. 2011. How Policies Make Citizens: Senior Political
Activism and the American Welfare State. Princeton Studies in American
Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Introduction 7
Castles, Francis G. 2008. What Welfare States Do: A Disaggregated Expenditure

Approach. Journal of Social Policy 38 (1): 45–62. https://doi.org/10.1017/
S0047279408002547.
Diamond, Larry, and Leonardo Morlino, eds. 2005. Assessing the Quality of
Democracy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. 1990. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
2
Democracies and Their Citizens
Democracy and Inequality
In his final book, On Political Equality, Dahl (2006) argues that despite
the advancements and spread of democracy, political equality has not
been achieved. Political equality is not only a desirable normative goal
but one which is necessary for the survival of democracy. Although it can
be argued that political equality is but an ideal, it is upon this ideal that
democracy rests. Inequality, as it expresses itself across multiple dimen-
sions of life, can therefore endanger democracy. Many of Dahl’s forerun-
ners, including Plato, de Tocqueville, and James Madison, also noted the
tenuous relationship between inequality and democratic stability
(Anderson and Beramendi 2008). Recent studies have provided an
empirical basis for the claim that inequality can erode democratic foun-
dations (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Boix 2003). Not only is inequal-
ity bad for those at the very bottom of the income distribution but for
democratic politics as well, as inequality affects “the choice of political
regime, the selection of fiscal structures, parties’ mobilization strategies,
and the decision to turn out to vote. Thus, inequality is political and
institutional not only in its origins but also in its consequences”
(Beramendi and Anderson 2008, 5).

10 J. Shore
More broadly, inequality has many implications for the legitimacy of

states. First of all, inequality is at odds with democratic norms of equality.
Additionally, although nearly all members of a society may enjoy the
procedural rights of democracy, if the costs of exercising those rights
become too dear for more less advantaged citizens, political influence
may be disproportionately limited only to those with greater resources,
for as I discuss at greater length in the coming sections, economic disad-
vantage is very closely linked to political disadvantage in many societies.
Moreover, this situation can create disincentives for policymakers to
design policies with their poorer constituents in mind, for they are not
the voters who could potentially punish them for not maintaining their
relative advantage. High-income inequality also implies a more heteroge-
neous polity, one with a more diverse spectrum of interests, which may,
in turn, exacerbate problems of accountability and agency. If it comes to
be that only the interests of the better off are being served, political legiti-
macy will indeed be harmed by inequality. While societal heterogeneity
need not necessarily imply negative consequences for a society, if there is
nothing, no common or shared interest that binds the different groups
together as a “demos,” we may witness decreased legitimacy as a conse-
quence of an eroded sense of community. Eroded legitimacy may have
the consequence of destabilizing a democracy, making it perhaps less
attractive as a form of governance. Politics that cater to the rich and fail
to address common interests is what Ferejohn (2009) refers to as “passive
corruption.” On the other hand, if a state is able to include interests of all
(or almost all) societal groups insofar as it is committed to universalistic
policies, all people, not just the better off, have a stake in what happens
in the political decision-making processes (Ringen 2007). Preserving the
democratic ideal, therefore, requires much more than simply granting
political rights. Democracy, in order to thrive and be considered as good,
demands “the continuing responsiveness of the government to the prefer-
ences of its citizens, considered as political equals” (Dahl 1971, 1).
Democratic citizens, in turn, “depend on democracy for freedom and
well-being.” At the same time, “democracy depends equally on them—
on their capacity to be citizens and on their beliefs about citizenship”
(Ringen 2007, 2). In other words, democracies need citizen participa-
tion, and citizens, in order to participate, need democracy. As I discuss in
Democracies and Their Citizens 11
the following section, not all democracies have been successful in guaran-
teeing political equality, as many have allowed an economic system to
interfere with these mutually dependent relationships.
Democratic Quality
Once preoccupied by the identification and categorization of authoritar-
ian and democratic regimes, political scientists are now confronted with
a new reality and, consequently, a new research agenda: democracy has,
as Larry Diamond puts it, “gone global” (2010, 93). Of the 195 countries
in the world, 88 can be labeled as a democracy of sort (Freedom House
2018). Democracy has witnessed a boom in attempts to conceptualize
and measure it. Indices such as those developed by Polity, Freedom
House, Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Barometer, and the
Bertelsmann Foundation are among the more prominent. While such
indices capture the more blatant differences between democracies and
non-democracies, they tell us little about the qualitative differences found
between the states with the now most common form of government in
the world (the Democracy Barometer is the clear exception here).
Although the autocracy versus democracy question garnered much atten-
tion during the 1990s, as has the question of procedural differences
between democracies, until recently, the matter of quality, or how good a
democracy actually is, has been notably overlooked. Much like parents
wanting to avoid playing favorites, many simply point out that democra-
cies have different ways of doing democracy and have different sets of
strengths and weaknesses. Few, however, have taken the seemingly nor-
mative leap of identifying some democracies as better than others.1 Stein
Ringen (2007), on the other hand, makes the impassioned plea that
social scientists need also to be concerned with measuring the quality of
democracies and not just their “democraticness” or procedural differ-
ences. This is not an altogether unproblematic undertaking, as it requires
the researcher to consider “basic questions of norms and legitimacy.” The
1
This would of course first entail defining what is meant by better—a task often left to philosophers
and the op-ed pages.
12 J. Shore
analysis of democratic quality is thus a “value-laden and […] controver-

sial subject” (Diamond and Morlino 2005b, ix). While it is not my inten-
tion to add another study on the measurement of democracy to the
ever-growing body of literature, it is important to first examine how we
conceive of democracy and to identify whether we are interested more in
the procedural aspects or the outcomes—that is, what democracies actu-
ally deliver to their citizens. An interest in the latter provides the main
framework for this study on welfare states and democratic citizenship.
Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address is frequently cited as a means of
identifying the different conceptions and purposes of democracy. In his
call to ensure the survival of the young American democracy, he empha-
sized a “government of the people, by the people, and for the people.” In
this formulation, one can identify different conceptions of democracy,
ranging from a minimalist-elitist formulation (of the people) to a medium-
participatory conceptualization (by the people) to a maximalist-social con-
ception of democracy (for the people) (Bühlmann et al. 2007). The
minimalist, or procedural conception of democracy is often accredited to
Robert Dahl, whose own formulation owes much to Joseph Schumpeter’s
definition of democracy as “that institutional arrangement for arriving at
political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by
means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (Schumpeter 1942,
269). Drawing on this idea, Dahl’s (1971) concept of polyarchy requires
inclusiveness (the right of most adults to take part in elections) and pub-
lic contestation. From such a perspective, little is asked of the electorate,
nor does such a conceptualization tell us much about the performance or
quality of a democracy. The participatory conception of democracy, how-
ever, views citizen participation and political engagement to be crucial for
a democracy, as such activities cultivate democratic attitudes and habits.
In contrast to procedural democracy, the participatory concept of democ-
racy requires a citizenry active in political life; nevertheless, like the mini-
mal view, it requires little of the state for the people. The maximalist
conceptualization of democracy, on the other hand, employs both the
procedural and participatory aspects of the other types and adds a social
dimension into the mix: not only are legal and civil rights of importance
but fair procedures and opportunities as well. The maximalist conception
is often neglected in democracy research, for defining social rights and
equality remains a matter of contention (Bühlmann et al. 2007).
Few would negate the statement “democracy is better than non-

democracy” (Ringen 2007, 13), but are there some democracies that are
better than other democracies? This question must be followed by another
question: what are good democracies? If we accept a maximalist under-
standing of democracy, we argue that democracy is for the citizens (in
addition to of and by them). Democracy, in operating in its citizens’
interests, must, therefore, provide them with something. Yet another
question arises: what is it that citizens want? The most concise answer to
this question would be a good life. In order to achieve this good life,
people need the resources and opportunities to be able to decide on and
pursue their visions of the good life. This turn toward the lives of people
in democracy research parallels a paradigm shift in political science
toward methodological individualism: “[A]ll social phenomena (their
structure and their change) are in principle explicable only in terms of
individuals—their properties, goals, and beliefs” (Elster 1982, 453). In
other words, by only examining the system, we are overlooking many
important aspects within the system. Ringen (2007) refers to this as
“double bookkeeping”—that is, no single measure of democracy is suffi-
cient. We should, therefore, not only be concerned with the differences
between democracies and non- or semi-democracies (which, incidentally,
have been well documented) but also with the differences between estab-
lished democracies and the situations of the people living in them. If we
rely on the conceptualization that democracy exists to serve the people, a
democracy must, therefore, deliver something to its citizens in order to be
considered good. In providing an answer to the question What Democracy
Is For, Ringen (2007) identifies the security of freedom (how well each
citizen’s freedom is ensured and protected) as the primary task of democ-
racy. In advanced democracies, the protection of freedom means some-
thing very different than it would in a developing country. Although
most people in established democracies need not worry about a military
coup or whether they will survive childbirth, not all have the freedom to
pursue their vision of the good life.2
In today’s democracies, we can observe marked differences in the qual-
ity of people’s lives. Another trend that can be easily observed is the dual
presence of democracy and capitalism. In theory, both systems espouse
For a more detailed discussion of the “good life” and the state’s role in its pursuit, see Chap. 3.
2
14 J. Shore
equality through their formal rules: markets require equal conditions for
fair and efficient competition; democracy champions the ideal of one
person, one vote. In reality, however, and perhaps through their
coexistence,3 they have produced inequalities, both economic and politi-
cal, and these inequalities can reinforce one another. With rising eco-
nomic growth, we have also witnessed an increase in the clout of economic
power. Although political power remains unchanged (one person, one
vote), increasing wealth begets greater economic power. The bulk of this
economic power, however, is concentrated in the hands of a few elites. A
further development has been increased economic liberalization, which,
consequently, has led to the increase of private capital in sectors once
under public control (e.g., hospitals, transportation, education systems).
Moreover, we have witnessed an increase in the weight of economic
power in politics: major political campaigns are nearly impossible with-
out sizeable private wealth or generous financial backing from private
investors. Nevertheless, it is often taken for granted that capitalism and
democracy go hand in hand. The challenge is, therefore, how to balance
democracy and capitalism so as to promote economic efficiency without
sacrificing economic democracy.
The primary response on the side of nation-states to the incompatibili-
ties that have arisen out of the partnership of democracy and capitalism
has been to implement welfare policies. At the time when many welfare
states came into existence (in post-war Europe), not only was poverty
much more widespread but the risk of falling into poverty was also acute.
Today, people are comparatively much better off than they were three-
quarters of a century ago. While this is a partnership that is unlikely to be
decoupled, some question whether political democracy can thrive with-
out economic democracy: “If we have democracy in political life but not
in economic life, and if the weight of economic power grows relative to
political power, then the citizens might have reason to question how
democratic their society really is and whether political democracy is really
of much relevance” (Ringen 2007, 48). Such a pessimistic view of the
relationship between democracy and capitalism predicts, among other
things, a decline in political interest and a rise in indifference, not to
See Iversen (2008) for an in-depth discussion on the coexistence of capitalism and democracy.
3
mention increased abstention from voting. Since high levels of political

interest and voter turnout are often viewed as indicators of democratic
vitality (Lijphart 2001), there are reasons to be concerned about the
effects of economic inequality on democracy. As Diamond and Morlino
(2005b, x) point out, when examining democratic quality, it is helpful to
think about the various qualities as part of the same system, “in which
improvement in one dimension can have diffuse benefits for others.” At
the same time, deficiencies in a given dimension can reinforce deficien-
cies along others. For example, while all democracies must grant formal
rights of political participation to their adult populations in order to be
labeled democratic, good democracies are those that ensure that all citi-
zens are able to exercise their political rights by ensuring equal social
rights.
This relationship, between what democracies are able to deliver to their
citizens and how the citizens respond and are they themselves shaped by
the offerings of their governments, is what I am interested in investigat-
ing in this book. While I certainly do not advocate we stop investigating
the ways democracies elect their officials, how their legislation gets passed,
or power is shared, I do, however, argue that if we are concerned about
the quality of democracies (as partially indicated by the degree of demo-
cratic citizenship), it is also necessary to examine what democracies pro-
vide for their citizens and how they ensure freedom for all members:
“Freedom and accountability, however they are understood, are necessar-
ily linked to accountability and responsiveness” (Diamond and Morlino
2005b, xiii; Rueschemeyer 2004). All these dimensions4 along which
quality of democracy can be measured—citizen participation, political
equality, and government responsiveness—are intimately connected and
cannot be viewed in isolation.
When addressing the question as to why, for example, fewer and fewer
are choosing to vote and citizen satisfaction with democracy is on the
decline, which are also qualitative indicators of democracy, we must look
beyond simplistic answers such as growing apathy or individualistic
4
This is not to say that these are the only dimensions. See, for example Bühlmann et al. (2007) or
Diamond and Morlino (2005a) for more nuanced and in-depth discussions on the various dimen-
sions of democratic quality.
16 J. Shore
societies and examine the ways in which political and social structures
subvert and constrain participation. Alienation from politics does not
occur because people stop caring about politics; more likely is the expla-
nation that some people have become alienated from the democratic pro-
cess because they do not feel that they get anything out of political
engagement—neither intrinsically nor materially. An elitist view sees citi-
zens to blame: “Citizens are said to be indifferent, unwilling to partici-
pate, unrealistic in demands and expectations, or victims of new values,
such as postmodern individualism” (Ringen 2007, 41). But perhaps this
trend of turning away from the political has more to do with the quality
of the democracy than with the quality of its citizenry. Low levels of
political interest may simply indicate that there is less for the citizen to be
interested in. If, however, states offer something to their citizens, here, in
the form of generous family and employment-related policies, citizens,
particularly those at the lower end of the income distribution, will not
only have greater resources at their disposal for participation, but politics
in general should have more meaning due to the saliency and relevance in
their daily lives. Lastly, policies can serve as messengers, providing citi-
zens with cues regarding their position in society and whether their inter-
ests are taken as valuable or rather ignored. How policies accomplish
these things and what implications they have for the relationships between
socioeconomic resources and political behaviors and attitudes are the
topics of the chapters to follow.
Democratic Citizens
For the remainder of this chapter as well as in the one that follows, I focus
on the theoretical groundwork for the empirical chapters, investigating
the relationships between aspects of democratic citizenship and the wel-
fare state. Both in the analytical chapters and in the sections to follow, a
particular focus is placed on the role of income, in terms of both how it
affects people’s propensity to participate and how the welfare state can
shape political behaviors and attitudes. As I illustrate, while one’s income
is certainly not the only predictor of political engagement, it serves as a
placeholder of sorts, and as discussed in the introduction, income
i nequality and the types of unequal participation it can produce, is indeed

a threat to democracies. While it is well established that income and other
resources are related to political participation and democratic support
(Brady et al. 1995) and there are many studies showing that income
inequality at the aggregate level depresses voter turnout (Dahl 2006;
Lijphart 1997; Solt 2008), less is known about the relationships at the
micro-level. In other words, although we know economic inequality
depresses political participation, the discussion hitherto has centered
largely on macro-level indicators such as the Gini index or measures of
economic growth or stagnation and much less has been done in terms of
public policies (which indeed play an important function in shaping
overall levels of income inequality). Policies, as I argue, are what people
come into contact with—not abstract indicators such as the Gini coeffi-
cient. How policies are designed and implemented are important for
people’s feelings of political efficacy and thus for the ways in which indi-
viduals engage in and think about the state and democracy.
Beginning with a brief overview of the historical and intellectual devel-
opment of the concept of democratic citizenship, I then discuss the role
of resources for political involvement. We then see that socioeconomic
resources by no means exist in a deterministic relationship to democratic
citizenship; rather, we must take the institutional and policy contexts
within which citizens are located into consideration as well, for institu-
tional settings and policy designs can play a major role in muting or
amplifying the connections between resources and political behaviors.
After discussing the theoretical origins of the welfare state and linking it
to a broader consideration of the role states have in people’s lives, I intro-
duce the policy feedback approach and discuss the types of effects public
policy can have on people’s propensity to retreat from or get involved
with politics.
Origins of Democratic Citizenship

Stripped of all adjectives, citizenship itself is a complex concept with a mul-
titude of meanings and temporally shifting ideals. The Aristotelian ideal
held that “a citizen is one who permanently shares in the administration of
18 J. Shore
justice and the holding of office” (Janowitz 1994). This model of “full-time
citizenship” makes no distinction between the individual’s public and pri-
vate identities. The Machiavellian approach, on the other hand, saw the
ideal citizen as the citizen soldier, whose personal life was of no significance
to the Prince. The traditional liberal approach to citizenship sees “part-time
citizenship” as the ideal, with the focus on self-realization and the individ-
ual pursuit of happiness. One’s private sphere trumps any sort of engage-
ment in the political sphere (Hernes 1988). By contrast, the republican
ideal comprises both a legal and an ethical dimension of citizenship.
Classical republicans, from Rousseau to Tocqueville, recognized “some-
thing enriching about public life” (Dagger 2008, 147), citing civic virtue as
the yardstick by which to measure the citizen. J.S. Mill even argued that
only by becoming civically engaged would the individual be able to meet
his5 full potential (Mill [1861] 1975).
Many of these approaches to the ideal citizen are very much tied to
normative understandings and set very high standards. Furthermore,
although they diverge in terms of the scope of the ideal citizen’s activity,
the classics tend to agree that “in order to be a citizen of a polis, in order
to be able to participate fully in public life, one needed to be in a certain
socio-economic position” (King and Waldron 1988). Aristotle, for exam-
ple, recognized that a large gap between the richest and the poorest citi-
zens would not be beneficial for democracy, for such an inequity would
be destabilizing (Saunders 2000; King and Waldron 1988). Throughout
the canon of classics, one repeatedly encounters the argument that
inequality undermines civic life and is furthermore not conducive to the
making of good citizens. More modern theorists, such as Lipset (1960),
continue to underscore the link between economic security or growth
and democratic orientations: “The more well-to-do a nation, the greater
the chances that it will sustain democracy” (Lipset 1960, 131). This the-
sis, originally put forth by Lipset in his seminal work Political Man, suc-
cinctly gets at the core of his modernization theory. Drawing on empirical
data from the 1950s, Lipset finds a clear link between stable democracy
and economic development, as well as between democracy and levels of
communication, education, industrialization, and urbanization. In other
Like his contemporaries, Mill’s ideal citizen was male.

5
words, democracy is positively correlated to indicators of modernity.

Aspects of modernization, such as increased education and industrializa-
tion, are associated with attitudes that support a democratic regime.
Economic development also impacts on values: citizens in more econom-
ically advanced countries tend to exhibit “orientations conducive to
democracy” (Lipset 1960). This is described as the “ego-enhancing” effect
of development. A higher degree of modernization entails an increased
sense of self-worth among the citizenry and higher levels of satisfaction,
trust, and efficacy. To this idea, King and Waldron (1988, 428) add that
economic disparity itself “blocks and interferes with the articulate and
deliberative reflection” needed for active participation in civic life,
echoing Maslow (1943), who posited that basic needs must be fulfilled
before the individual is able to take part in activities based on
self-actualization.
While the debate about what makes a democratic citizen is as old as
democracy itself, the concept has experienced varying levels of attention
through a variety of different lenses over the past 50 years. The political
culture movement of the 1960s (Almond and Verba 1963) saw political
support as crucial for democratic systems: there must be a relatively high
degree of public support of democracy and government in order for the
public to accept the public policies and in order to guarantee the persis-
tence of the system. For the civic culture scholars, dissatisfaction signaled
instability and a weak democracy (Almond and Verba 1963; Norris
1999), a notion that would be challenged in the 1990s (Klingemann
1999; Norris 1999). Almond and Verba (1963) further emphasize the
importance of informed citizens for the strength of democracies as well as
the link between high levels of democratic citizenship and the strength of
democracy. Participatory theorists of the 1980s, such as Pateman (2000)
and Barber (1984), viewed political engagement as the defining aspect of
the democratic citizen, which was in direct contrast to the classical liberal
view of democracy.6
Similar to Nie et al. (1996) approach, the characteristics of democratic
citizenship investigated in this study could also be divided into two com-
plementary dimensions: political engagement and democratic ethos.
6
A democracy “could function effectively even in the absence of an especially virtuous citizenry by
creating checks and balances” (Kymlicka 2002, 285).
20 J. Shore
The first dimension, political engagement, encompasses those attributes

of democratic citizenship having to do with political behaviors: voting in
elections and interest in politics. The second dimension, democratic
ethos, refers to citizenship attributes that reflect the “understanding of
and adherence to norms and principles of democracy” (Nie et al. 1996,
5–6). The democratic ethos attributes investigated in this study are politi-
cal trust and satisfaction with democracy. The authors do not see the citi-
zen’s relationship to the state in terms of homo economicus (driven by
individualism), nor as homo sociologicus (constructed purely by societal
forces); instead, Nie et al. (1996, 4) view homo democraticus in terms of
the transactions between the state and civil society, placing the most
emphasis on the intersection of private versus public interests.
nequal Citizenship: Participation

U
and the Role of Resources
Drawing from both the classical and contemporary definitions of citizen-
ship, it can thus be concluded that democratic citizenship refers to a set
of citizenship characteristics that are frequently seen as essential to mod-
ern democratic systems. Although contemporary social scientists no lon-
ger are as concerned with defining their decade’s prototype of the ideal
citizen, most would agree that “a well-ordered polity requires citizens
with the appropriate knowledge, skills, and traits of character” (Galston
2001, 217). Additionally, “good citizens” are not born that way; rather,
they are a product of their environments. It is not only academia, how-
ever, that has taken an interest in civic citizens. In the United States, civic
education courses, which once part of the standard curriculum, have
been reappearing in many high schools. Politicians, scholars, and the
media alike frequently bemoan an apparent growth in political apathy in
democracies all over the world. Although there are different interpreta-
tions of this trend and the normative character of democratic citizenship
makes measuring and defining it somewhat tricky, one cannot help but
wonder about the consequences of political disinterest for our societies
and democracies. Galston (2001, 220) summarizes these concerns as
f ollows, further emphasizing the deleterious effects of inequality of politi-

cal engagement:
Even if one rejects the philosophical proposition that active citizenship is

essential to human flourishing, or self-regarding pursuits, it is hard to avoid
the hypothesis that at some point the withdrawal from public engagement
endangers the healthy functioning of democratic polities. At the very least,
if the tendency to withdraw is asymmetrically distributed among popula-
tion groups, then the outputs of the political system are likely to become
increasingly unbalanced. And if those who withdraw the most are those
who have the least, the system will become even less responsive to their
political needs. Political engagement is not a sufficient condition for politi-
cal effectiveness, but it is certainly necessary.
That political engagement and democratic support are unevenly dis-

tributed within societies, and given the implications of this imbalance
for the legitimacy of democracies, the relevance of investigating the ori-
gins of democratic citizenship becomes even clearer. Nie et al. (1996)
outline two dimensions of how democratic citizenship is a necessary
condition for the maintenance of democracy. First, political engagement
signifies the capacity of individuals to engage in self-rule. Moreover, this
type of activity is necessary to identify, define, and pursue individual
interests and preferences. Second, political enlightenment demonstrates
the individual’s understanding and acceptance of the rules and norms of
democracy. Shklar (1991) describes the pursuit of democratic citizen-
ship as the “quest for inclusion.” To be sure, just and legitimate institu-
tions and regimes are a goal pursued by all democracies. As Janowitz
(1991, 206) notes, “a modern democratic society is a society in which all
strata have the potential of being democratic citizens.” In order for soci-
eties to reach this potential, their institutions also must be capable of
assuring that all citizens truly have this opportunity. It could, therefore,
be said that not all societies are modern in Janowitz’s terms, as democratic
citizenship tends to be unevenly distributed across the social milieu. As
I further expound upon in the chapters to follow, political activity tends
to follow structural cleavages, which, in turn, has many implications
for the representativeness and legitimacy of democratic governments.
22 J. Shore
This conclusion has also been underscored by a group of prominent

political scientists investigating the effects of inequality on the American
democracy: “Citizens with lower or moderate incomes speak with a whis-
per that is lost on the ears of inattentive government officials, while the
advantaged roar with a clarity and consistency that policy-makers readily
hear and routinely follow” (American Political Science Association Task
Force 2004, 651).
That political participation and democratic values continue to be more
widely practiced and held by the economically better off is by no means
a new topic of research. We know, for example, that those with more
education and higher incomes are also those who turn out to vote on a
more frequent basis than their less well-off counterparts. We also know,
however, that despite rising levels of education and wealth, voter partici-
pation has not kept pace (Berinsky and Lenz 2011; Persson 2010). A
near-canonical set of explanations as to why people do not get involved
in politics has been formulated by Sidney Verba and colleagues: “[B]
ecause they can’t; because they don’t want to; or because nobody asked”
(Verba et al. 1995, 265). The can’t is frequently given the most weight in
explaining individual participation, indicating a lack of resources: “time
to take part, money to contribute to campaigns and other political causes,
and skills to use time and money effectively” (ibid., 16).
The link between resources and participation is often thought to be
related to the concept of political efficacy. Put simply, political efficacy
refers to an individual’s perception of how much influence he or she can
have politically. Lane (1959) was one of the first to view political efficacy
as a twofold concept in terms of personal and communal influence, com-
monly referred to as internal and external political efficacy. Internal polit-
ical efficacy refers to people’s beliefs regarding their own capabilities to
understand and effectively participate in politics; external political efficacy
is the feeling that government authorities and institutions are responsive
to citizen demands. Political efficacy is generally understood as a descrip-
tion of citizens’ positive feelings about their own political capabilities and
standing vis-à-vis the state; the absence of efficacy can be thought of as
political alienation of subjective powerlessness (Hayes and Bean 1993).
People who are politically efficacious are much more likely to participate
in politics and be generally supportive of democratic norms and princi-
ples, as they see themselves as being sufficiently capable and competent to

understand politics and effectively participate. They hold the perception
that their governments and authorities will be responsive to their demands
and thus represent their interests and preferences. One of the most prom-
inent findings with regard to political efficacy is that it is “disproportion-
ately located among those with higher socio-economic status” (Hayes
and Bean 1993, 269–70; Almond and Verba 1963). And while it is clear
that education is certainly extremely beneficial to developing the cogni-
tive abilities and confidence related to internal political efficacy, and even
the feeling that government is responsive to one’s demands (Nie et al.
1996), the reality in many modern democracies is that the better edu-
cated also tend to be disproportionately located among the better
earners.
Citizens with fewer resources, for example, in terms of income, educa-
tion, or social networks, are also those who are the least likely to be
engaged with politics. Those who lack socioeconomic, cultural, and cog-
nitive capital are, therefore, at a much greater risk of experiencing disad-
vantages across various spheres of citizenship (e.g., Stadelmann-Steffen
2012). The trap of poverty is thus not constrained to economic disadvan-
tage but renders other forms of citizenship difficult to attain as well
(Shore 2014). This trend is particularly acute among many immigrant
groups who lack not only social citizenship rights but formal state mem-
bership as well. In many societies, however, there are groups who do have
formal political rights (in the form of legal citizenship) but who remain
at a definite disadvantage in terms of exercising those rights.
The consequences of interlinked dimensions of inequality are numer-
ous. If people from the upper socioeconomic echelons are those who are
most likely to make their political voices heard, the outcomes of such
unequal political input are indeed reason for concern. It is plausible to
question whether this would result in unequal representation of interests
in terms of both who gets elected and the types of policies that are imple-
mented. As a result, those underrepresented individuals, those who lack
social citizenship rights necessary to become active politically, will con-
tinue to be at a disadvantage: “Social citizenship becomes farther and
farther out of reach; political citizenship as process becomes limited to
fewer and fewer citizens. A vicious cycle has developed” (Simpson Bueker
24 J. Shore
2009, 426). The consequences for democracy that can arise from inequal-
ity and exclusion are many, and while democratic institutions are cer-
tainly necessary to achieve political equality, they do not appear to be
sufficient (Dahl 2006).
While we continue to witness that people with greater resources, be it
income, education, or, more frequently, the combination thereof (Verba
and Nie 1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980), participate more than
those with fewer resources, we are at the same time confronted with by
the reality that aggregate voter turnout rates have declined over the past
decades despite increasing economic growth and access to education.
Moreover, not only does the level and degree of social stratification of
political engagement vary across countries but the distributions of the
resources known to correlates of participation also markedly vary (Alber
and Kohler 2009; Lijphart 1997; Shore 2014; Solt 2008). Given this
state of affairs, the next question to ask involves how aspects of demo-
cratic citizenship are affected by the context and content of the political
environment in which one lives. Before, however, moving on to the theo-
retical and empirical policy feedback framework guiding this study of
welfare states and democratic citizens, it is useful to first provide an over-
view of what exactly is meant by a welfare state, what its origins are, as
well as some of the normative ideas it embodies.
References
Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2006. Economic Origins of
Dictatorship and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Alber, Jens, and Ulrich Kohler. 2009. The Inequality of Electoral Participation
in Europe and America and the Politically Integrative Functions of the
Welfare State. In United in Diversity? Comparing Social Models in Europe and
America, ed. Jens Alber and Neil Gilbert, 63–90. International Policy
Exchange Series. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba. 1963. The Civic Culture: Political
Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.
American Political Science Association Task Force. 2004. American Democracy
in an Age of Rising Inequality. Perspectives on Politics 2 (4): 651–666. https://
doi.org/10.1017/S153759270404040X.
Anderson, Christopher J., and Pablo Beramendi. 2008. Income, Inequality, and
Electoral Participation. In Democracy, Inequality, and Representation: A
Comparative Perspective, ed. Pablo Beramendi and Christopher J. Anderson,
278–311. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Barber, Benjamin R. 1984. Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New
Age. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Beramendi, Pablo, and Christopher J. Anderson. 2008. Income Inequality and
Democratic Representation. In Democracy, Inequality, and Representation: A
Comparative Perspective, ed. Pablo Beramendi and Christopher J. Anderson,
3–24. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Berinsky, Adam J., and Gabriel S. Lenz. 2011. Education and Political
Participation: Exploring the Causal Link. Political Behavior 33 (3): 357–373.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-010-9134-9.
Boix, Carles. 2003. Democracy and Redistribution. Cambridge, UK and
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Brady, Henry E., Sidney Verba, and Kay Lehman Scholzman. 1995. Beyond
SES: A Resource Model of Political Participation. American Political Science
Review 89 (2): 271–294.
Bühlmann, Marc, Wolfgang Merkel, Bernhard Wessels, and Lisa Müller. 2007.
The Quality of Democracy: Democracy Barometer for Established
Democracies. NCCR Working Paper (10). Accessed March 18, 2018. http://
opus.kobv.de/hsog/volltexte/2010/121/.
Dagger, Richard. 2008. Republican Citizenship. In Handbook of Citizenship
Studies, ed. Engin F. Isin and Bryan S. Turner. Repr., 145–157. Los Angeles,
CA: Sage.
Dahl, Robert A. 1971. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press.
———. 2006. On Political Equality. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Diamond, Larry. 2010. Why Are There No Arab Democracies. Journal of
Democracy 21 (1): 93–104.
Diamond, Larry, and Leonardo Morlino, eds. 2005a. Assessing the Quality of
Democracy. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
———. 2005b. Introduction. In Assessing the Quality of Democracy, ed. Larry
Diamond and Leonardo Morlino, ix–xliii. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
University Press.
Elster, Jon. 1982. The Case for Methodological Individualism. Theory and
Society 11 (4): 453–482. http://www.jstor.org/stable/657101.
Ferejohn, John. 2009. Is Inequality a Threat to Democracy? In The Unsustainable
American State, ed. Lawrence R. Jacobs and Desmond S. King, 34–57.
Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
26 J. Shore
Freedom House. 2018. Freedom in the World 2018. Washington, DC. Accessed

February 27, 2018. http://www.freedomhouse.org/reports.
Galston, William A. 2001. Political Knowledge, Political Engagement, and
Civic Education. Annual Review of Political Science 4: 217–234.
Hayes, Bernadette C., and Clive S. Bean. 1993. Political Efficacy: A Comparative
Study of the United States, West Germany, Great Britain and Australia.
European Journal of Political Research 23 (3): 261–280.
Hernes, Helga M. 1988. Scandinavian Citizenship. Acta Sociologica 31 (3):
199–215.
Iversen, Torben. 2008. Capitalism and Democracy. In The Oxford Handbook of
Political Economy, ed. Barry R. Weingast and Donald A. Wittman, 601–623.
Oxford Handbooks of Political Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Janowitz, Morris. 1991. On Social Organization and Social Control. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
———. 1994. Observations on the Sociology of Citizenship. In Citizenship:
Critical Concepts, ed. Bryan S. Turner and Peter Hamilton, 42–62. London:
Routledge.
King, Desmond, and Jeremy Waldron. 1988. Citizenship, Social Citizenship
and the Defence of Welfare Provision. British Journal of Political Science 18
(4): 415–443.
Klingemann, Hans-Dieter. 1999. Mapping Political Support in the 1990s: A
Global Analysis. In Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance,
ed. Pippa Norris, 31–56. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kymlicka, Will. 2002. Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lane, Robert Edwards. 1959. Political Life: Why People Get Involved in Politics.
Glencoe, IL: The Free Press.
Lijphart, Arend. 1997. Unequal Participation: Democracy’s Unresolved
Dilemma—Presidential Address, American Political Science Association,
1996. American Political Science Review 91 (1): 1–14.
———. 2001. Democracy in the 21st Century: Can We Be Optimistic?
European Review of Social Psychology 9 (2): 169–184. https://doi.org/10.1017/
S1062798701000163.
Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1960. Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics. Garden
City, NY: Anchor.
Maslow, Abraham H. 1943. A Theory of Human Motivation. Psychological
Review 50 (4): 370–396.
Mill, John Stuart. [1861] 1975. Three Essays: On Liberty, Representative
Government, the Subjection of Women. With the Assistance of R. (e.) Wollheim.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Nie, Norman H., Jane Junn, and Kenneth Stehlik-Barry. 1996. Education and
Democratic Citizenship in America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Norris, Pippa, ed. 1999. Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic
Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pateman, Carole. 2000. Participation and Democratic Theory. Reprint.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Persson, Mikael. 2010. An Empirical Test of the Relative Education Model in
Sweden. Political Behavior 33 (3): 455–478. https://doi.org/10.1007/
s11109-010-9138-5.
Ringen, Stein. 2007. What Democracy Is For: On Freedom and Moral Government.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Rueschemeyer, Dietrich. 2004. Addressing Inequality. Journal of Democracy 15:
76–90.
Saunders, Trevor J. 2000. Politics: Books I and II. Reprinted. Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
Schumpeter, Joseph Alois. 1942. Socialism, Capitalism and Democracy. 3rd ed.
New York: Harper and Bros.
Shklar, Judith N. 1991. American Citizenship: The Quest for Inclusion. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
Shore, Jennifer. 2014. How Welfare States Shape Participatory Patterns. In How
Welfare States Shape the Democratic Public: Policy Feedback, Participation,
Voting and Attitudes, ed. Staffan Kumlin and Isabelle Stadelmann-Steffen,
41–62. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Simpson Bueker, Catherine. 2009. The Limits of Political Citizenship. Society
46 (5): 423–428.
Solt, Frederick. 2008. Economic Inequality and Democratic Political
Engagement. American Journal of Political Science 52 (1): 48–60.
Stadelmann-Steffen, Isabelle. 2012. A Remedy for Unequal Participation? How
Welfare States Impact on Social and Political Engagement. In Professionalization
and Individualized Collective Action: Analyzing New ‘Participatory’ Dimensions
in Civil Society, ed. William Maloney and Jan W. van Deth, 139–156. Milton
Park and New York: Routledge.
Verba, Sidney, and Norman H. Nie. 1972. Participation in America: Political
Democracy and Social Equality. New York: Harper and Row.
Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Scholzman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. Voice and
Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
Wolfinger, Raymond E., and Steven J. Rosenstone. 1980. Who Votes. New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
3
Why Context Matters: The Role
of Public Policy
The welfare state, because of its very existence, influences policies and
politics. While many have studied welfare states in terms of their
determinants or policy outcomes, a rapidly growing subfield of com-
parative politics is focusing increasingly on the ways in which welfare
state institutions affect individual attitudes and behaviors (Crepaz
and Damron 2009; Rapp et al. 2017; Shore 2014; Kumlin and
Stadelmann-Steffen 2014; Gingrich 2014; Kumlin 2002, 2004;
Svallfors 2007). In this chapter, I examine how the welfare state can
shape attitudes and behaviors. Starting with new institutionalist per-
spectives and touching theoretical accounts of the role of the state, the
interconnectedness of rights is discussed with regard to the ways in
which the welfare state can hinder or encourage political engagement.
Drawing on the policy feedback approach, the chapter concludes with
a more targeted account of how the welfare state can shape demo-
cratic citizenship.

30 J. Shore
New Institutionalist Approaches

Do institutions matter? Not only is this question included in the titles of
numerous studies employing institutionalist approaches, this question
represents one of the more persistent quandaries in a variety of disci-
plines. Classical institutionalism has provided us with a preliminary
answer to this question. As most would agree that, yes, institutions do
matter, the question to follow must ask to what extent do they matter?
While political institutions are a major focus in the field of political sci-
ence, the term institution is rather ambiguous. Most agree that institu-
tions embody the “rules of the game.” What one defines as rules, however,
provides yet another source of ambiguity. The most common dichotomy
is the distinction between formal and informal rules. Informal rules are
less implicit and encompass non-formalized habits, routines, or proce-
dures that have become the norm or custom in a given society (Rothstein
1998b; March and Olsen 1989). Formal rules, with regard to political
institutions, are just that: “formal arrangements for aggregating individu-
als and regulating their behavior through the use of explicit rules and
decision processes enforced by an actor or set of actors formally recog-
nized as possessing such power” (Levi 1991, 405).
Viewing political phenomena through the lens of institutions is by no
means a recent approach. As Steinmo (2008, 118) points out:
“Institutional theory is as old as the study of politics.” The works of the
ancient Greek philosophers, such as Plato and Aristotle, are among the
first documentations of how institutions affect political behavior, incen-
tives, and normative values. The idea that political institutions are capa-
ble of shaping individual behaviors and attitudes finds its roots in new
institutionalism; however, like its name implies, there is also a classical
institutionalism. While the old institutionalism focused primarily on for-
mal rules and constitutions, new institutionalism represents an explicitly
empirical approach to analyzing the effectiveness and regulative power of
political institutions. Classical institutionalism takes a narrower spectrum
of varieties of democracy into consideration and frequently employs
more or less static typologies in their classifications. Moreover, the mode
of explanation is a structural one, looking at features of the institutional
setting such as “size, demography, socio-economic development, cultural
Why Context Matters: The Role of Public Policy 31
homogeneity, heritage from a former colonial empire or the place of a

country in the international political and/or economic system” (Kaiser
1997, 422). New institutionalism, on the other hand, centers its explana-
tions on actor-based models. With new institutionalism, we see a shift
from the classical view of institutions as a reflection of structural condi-
tions to a focus on actor-related explanations. New institutionalism
begins with the assumption that “preferences can only be understood in
the context of the institutionally generated incentives and institutionally
available options that structure choice” (Grofman 1989, 1).1
How does the welfare state fit into this discussion of institutions?
While the welfare state does not fall into the category of more traditional
or primary political institutions (such as the electoral or party system,
bicameralism or presidentialism), it can be considered as a secondary insti-
tution.2 Piven and Cloward (1977) point out that the welfare state as a
secondary institution must serve the economy, the political system, as
well as promote political legitimacy. Crepaz (2008, 137) notes that such
institutions are the “result of political movements that shaped particular
formal constitutional structures.” Once in place, the welfare state is capa-
ble of becoming an “instrument of establishing and constructing identi-
ties” (ibid.). The welfare state thus is able to influence individual attitudes
and behaviors much like the primary institutional setting.
In sum, the new institutionalist approach posits that the interactions
one has with his or her social surroundings can have a substantial impact
on individual choices, behaviors, and attitudes. Institutions encourage
some behaviors by means of incentive mechanisms and discourage oth-
ers through sanctions (Hall and Taylor 1996). With the new institution-
alist approach, there is the inherent assumption that macro-level
characteristics (institutional design) influence micro-level phenomena
(individuals’ actions and attitudes)—that is, the political-institutional
1
The contemporary social sciences generally differentiate between three new institutionalisms:
rational choice, sociological, and historical institutionalism (Hall and Taylor 1996). Referring spe-
cifically to historical institutionalism, although the same can be said of its other institutionalist
counterparts, Steinmo (2008, 118) remarks that it is “neither a particular theory nor a specific
method. It is best understood as an approach to studying politics.”
2
The term secondary institution should not be confused with Wilensky and Lebeaux’ (1958) con-
ception of the term: their description of the welfare state as a secondary institution refers to its role
relative to the family and market.
32 J. Shore
context functions such that it structures individual attitudes and behav-

iors (Anderson and Singer 2008). Immergut (1998, 26), however, points
out an important caveat that should be kept in mind when referring to
the institutionalist approach: “Institutions do not determine behavior,
they simply provide a context for action that helps us to understand why
actors make the choices that they do.” In other words, when studying
the effects of institutions, we might, for example, examine the ways in
which they may intervene or shape or moderate relationships at the
micro-level, such as the well-documented links between an individual’s
resources and political behaviors and attitudes.
What Should a Welfare State Do?

The type of effect the welfare state will have on democratic citizenship has
much to do with how one conceptualizes the role of democracy and fair-
ness. A generous, universal welfare state is thought to safeguard the rights
of social citizenship by guaranteeing social benefits to all. The less exten-
sive, minimalist welfare state represents a form of social insurance and
grants assistance based on means testing. Rothstein (1998a) provides a
detailed account of the competing views on the ways in which the univer-
sal welfare state affects individual autonomy. Put briefly, the positive view
of the welfare state sees it as solidaristic and just, as it espouses equal treat-
ment on the basis of equal rights and norms. Where coverage is broader,
more needs are able to be met. Furthermore, the state is seen to foster
individual autonomy, as it enables people to live their lives in the manner
they see fit. The other view, however, characterizes the advanced welfare
state as a sort of a “new Leviathan, a despotic master which orders citizens
about at will and severely limits the prospects for individual freedom and
self-determination” (Rothstein 1998a, 30). The welfare state, according
to its critics, promotes an institutionalized helplessness through an
unhealthy reliance of the citizens on social programs. Moreover, larger
welfare states have higher levels of spending and, therefore, must tax their
citizens at a high rate—something which some critics view as inhibitive
to individual autonomy. Both of these views ultimately arise from the
debate over what the proper role of the state is vis-à-vis its citizens.
The liberal response is that the state must remain neutral in order to
safeguard individual neutrality. Dworkin (1977, 180), drawing on the
Rawlsian theory of justice,3 believes that the state must treat people with
“equal concern and respect.” By this, he means that the state cannot
impinge on one’s freedom to choose and pursue his or her life as he or she
sees fit. Doing so would mean that the state is imposing its judgment or
a set of moral values on the individual. Ultimately, the state would regard
some “life projects” (Rothstein 1998a) as superior to others. This senti-
ment is reiterated by Kymlicka (1990, 207): “State neutrality is required
to respect people’s self-determination.” Political liberalism champions the
individual’s right to choose his or her conception of the “good life.” The
counter-argument to this view, labeled by some as communitarianism
(Rothstein 1998a), posits that a universal welfare state is also committed
to equality but does not imply equal treatment. For example, some may
require more medical treatment than others or choose to have more chil-
dren and therefore make greater use of the public education system.
Simply because someone receives social assistance does not mean his or
her life’s plan is superior to another’s. If the needy individual did not
receive the assistance he or she required in order to pursue his or her con-
ception of the good life, this suffering would outweigh any sort of nega-
tive feelings that someone not in need of assistance would experience.
The liberal view is also very wary of state intervention and protects peo-
ple’s right to make mistakes, as state intervention would again imply the
imposition of morals onto the people. The communitarian view, on the
other hand, promotes a positive perspective of certain collective moral
values and, consequently, does view some individual pursuits as superior
to others. Furthermore, it is the state’s duty to further certain social norms
through its actions and policies. Rothstein (1998a, 36) argues that the
ideals of liberalism and communitarianism need not oppose one another:
“[I]f the state is to remain neutral in respect to citizens’ choice of life
project, it must also create equivalent opportunities for citizens to realize
these varying choices.” Rothstein dismisses the notion that individual
rights block communitarian projects aimed at solidarity and equality:
3
Stated very simply, John Rawls’ theory of justice (2003 [1971]) conceives of justice as fairness. In
order for individual liberty and equality to be preserved, equal opportunities for all are necessary.
34 J. Shore
“The political content of the concept of rights is determined […] by what

kinds of rights the state guarantees to the individual” (ibid., 37). In other
words, in order to safeguard individual rights for all, the state must take
a stand, such as with the freedom of speech and expression, so that the
resources with which one can realize his or her rights must be secured;
otherwise, the risk arises that some individual goals are deemed to be bet-
ter than others. A revised view of the communitarian perspective would
then posit that while a state must represent a given set of values, they
need not be based on notions of moral supremacy.
Sandel (2008), for example, views the liberalist critique of communi-
tarianism as misguided, as even in the liberal society, communities and
collectivities play a role in crafting the individual personality. “If we
accept the proposition that our individual personalities are created
through the particular social and political contexts of which we are a part,
then the political order upon which we should agree reflect a particular
conception of the good life” (Rothstein 1998a, 39; emphasis in original).
Communitarianism, even in its revised form, remains unable to ade-
quately explain pluralist societies: as Rothstein (1998a) points out, sim-
ply because a group happens to be in the majority, it does not have the
right to impose its values of what is right on others. To say that the state
should promote citizen autonomy is not, however, to say that the state is
morally indifferent. From the Rawlsian (1993) perspective, political
institutions exist to ensure individuals have equal opportunities to pursue
and fulfill their lives’ projects (Rothstein 1998a, 43). The Rawlsian goal
is thus to devise just institutions that “shape the character and aims of the
members of society, the kinds of person they are and want to be” (Rawls
1980, 538; Rothstein 1998a; Rorty 1993).4
In other words, just, democratic institutions create citizens who also
value justice and democracy. From a normative stance, the welfare state is
thus thought to be capable of imparting its citizens with the tools neces-
sary to make well-informed decisions about their life choices—it does so
4
Rawls’ view has come under quite a bit of criticism, mainly by Amartya Sen (1982), who argues
that even in a state dedicated to the provision of equal opportunities (i.e., justice), inequality (injus-
tice) may still persist. An equal distribution of goods does not necessarily lead to equal opportuni-
ties, for there are some who are initially more disadvantaged than others and therefore require more
in order to pursue his or her life project. Sen thus argues that the state must consider one’s basic
capabilities as the basis for the provision of opportunities.
by ensuring that all, regardless of their capabilities, have equal access to

opportunity, certain basic resources, and, therefore, equal social rights.
This conception of the good life is not limited only to the things that
people want. In addition to the good life, people want their governments
to do something—to protect from dangers and risks and to be attentive
to grievances, all the while avoiding paternalism. People are more than
their economic resources and generally desire to live in a “society where
everyone has a reasonable chance to prosper and no one is consigned to a
life of poverty” (Ferejohn 2009, 38).
In the 1942 Beveridge Report, a comprehensive reform of social insur-
ance was outlined which would provide coverage from the “cradle to the
grave.” Its author, Sir William Beveridge, has consequently become
known as the father of universality (Jacobs 2008). Universality, it is polit-
ically argued, provides the only secure basis for social protection, for all
people included under its coverage and therefore all have “an interest in
supporting the system” (Ringen 2007, 74). Today, over 70 years later,
citizens most advanced democracies are no longer at such a great risk of
becoming poor. The common men and women have comparatively many
more resources—income, property, education—and therefore no longer
require the same types of protections offered by the paternalistic welfare
states that emerged in the post-war era. In most advanced democracies,
people are much more capable of self-autonomy than they were during
the mid-twentieth century. While we find ourselves today in an era of
comparative affluence, this affluence has not been extended to all mem-
bers. In a 1963 presidential speech, John F. Kennedy stated that a “rising
tide lifts all boats.” What we have witnessed, however, is that a rising tide
lifts some boats, while capsizing others. Although Beveridge dreamed
that with the rise of affluence and universal welfare schemes poverty
would be eradicated, this clearly has not occurred: “Advances in affluence
to benefit the mainstream may simultaneously cause more people to fall
outside of the mainstream” (Ringen 2007, 77). Not all are able to keep
pace with the rapidly advancing knowledge-based economy; the need for
social care has clearly not been eliminated. The problem with poverty is
not just that the impoverished are without sufficient material power, but
that this lack of economic resources so often translates into a lack of
freedom to live one’s life as one wishes. Material resources are what
36 J. Shore
enable individuals to “put power behind their demands” (ibid., 192).

Furthermore, the state, should it systematically abandon its most needy
members, serves to effectively exclude them politically as well.
The Interconnectedness of Rights

Examining the role and effects of welfare states serves to bridge the
debates on citizenship and the origins of democratic citizenship and its
inequalities. Put simply, the general purpose of a welfare state is to reduce
social risk and economic inequality. But does the reduction of economic
inequality correspond to the reduction of other inequalities, such as
inequalities of political participation? Furthermore, does a state that
delivers more to its citizens in terms of generous social policy create more
politically engaged citizens? Before looking into these questions, I briefly
introduce the concept of the welfare state as well as its origins in order to
provide a better understanding of why different welfare states may play a
role in producing different sorts of democratic citizenship outcomes.
While the modern welfare state began to take shape shortly after World
War II, its origins can be traced back to much earlier times (Briggs 1969).
For example, in his 1791 essay Rights of Man, Thomas Paine examined
the linkages between poverty, criminality, and unemployment. He recog-
nized the distorting effects of inequality and property and offers up a
draft of sorts for a system of welfare (Pierson and Castles 2006, 6). An
oft-cited example of a forerunner to contemporary welfare policies are
the English Poor Laws. Stemming from late medieval and Tudor laws, the
Poor Laws were a means of proving relief to the poorest members of
English and Welsh society. It was not until 1948 that these laws were
abolished with the passing of the National Assistance Act (Marshall
1950). These laws represented a recognition of inequality in society as
well as an attempt to remedy it, or, at the very least, to assist those whose
fates had been the most downtrodden. While these laws may have
appeared to be altruistic, those who had no choice but to go to the poor-
houses were stripped of their rights of citizenship.
T.H. Marshall was highly critical of this divorce of social from political
rights: “The Poor Law treated the claims of the poor, not as an integral
part of the rights of the citizen, but as an alternative to them—as claims

which would be met only if the claimants ceased to be citizens in any true
sense of the word” (Marshall 1950, in Pierson and Castles 2006, 33). In
Citizenship and Social Class (1950), Marshall presented a positive appraisal
of the welfare state as a reaction to modern economic development.
Alongside the civil rights (individual freedoms, liberty, justice) and politi-
cal rights (rights to participate) that citizens possess, he introduced a
third and equally important class of rights: social rights. Social rights
encompass economic welfare and security as well as the “right to share to
the full in the social heritage and to life the life of a civilized being accord-
ing to the standards prevailing in the society” (Marshall 1950, in Pierson
and Castles 2006, 30). Marshall saw state institutions, specifically, educa-
tion and social services, as the best way of securing these social rights. In
their safeguarding of social rights, such institutions have a socially inte-
grative function and are capable of fostering a sense of solidarity and
community. The objective of welfare institutions is, in the Marshallian
view, not to equalize incomes but rather to reduce risks and insecurities
and to perform some degree of equalization across more broader dimen-
sions of disparity—for example, the healthy versus the sick, employed
versus unemployed, or the fortunate versus the less fortunate.
Social rights are indeed integral for exercising other types of rights,
including political: “Without extending social rights to all, civil and
political citizenship as we conceive of it today cannot be fully realized”
(Simpson Bueker 2009, 423). Although Marshall (1950) outlined differ-
ent spheres of citizenship, demonstrating that first civil rights were
obtained, then political, followed lastly by social rights, he was highly
critical of this sort of sequencing, for not all members of society would be
able to take full advantage of all dimensions of citizenship. In other
words, in the absence of rights of social citizenship, it is very difficult to
take advantage of one’s political rights: “economic poverty translates into
political poverty” (Simpson Bueker 2009, 426).
For this reason, welfare state institutions are often seen as necessary in
order to extend social citizenship rights to all members of a society. Not
all welfare states, however, are equally capable of securing the rights of
social citizenship. For example, while the social democratic model (found
in the Scandinavian states) leads the way in reducing poverty and
38 J. Shore
“ provides the fullest development of social rights of citizenship” (Roche

2002, 77), liberal welfare states may in fact increase some inequalities by
extolling “free markets, which reward values and skills that are unequally
distributed in the population” (Schuck 2008, 140). These enduring
inequalities can have a delegitimating effect for states, an effect which is
multiplied when one considers that the most disadvantaged are also those
who tend to be most disengaged from the political sphere. Before moving
on to a more general discussion about the origins and effects of modern
welfare states, it is important to once again underscore the interconnect-
edness of the different spheres of citizenship and how an inequity in one
area is inherently linked to inequities in others:
Political citizenship influences civil citizenship. Social citizenship influ-

ences civil and political citizenship. When individuals and groups lack one
of these elements of citizenship, they essentially lack all three. Social citi-
zenship, rather than being the third phase of membership, needs to come
prior to or alongside political citizenship, otherwise political citizenship
will be nothing more than a false promise. (Simpson Bueker 2009, 427)
What we in effect witness are numerous spillovers in terms of inequali-

ties—that is, they do not remain confined to single areas of rights. The
question that now arises is whether policies that are designed to fight
economic inequality have a parallel spillover effect in terms of political
inequality. Is a state that is responsive and secures the social rights of its
citizens also one that is capable of rendering them, as Robert Dahl (1971)
stated, “political equals?”
he Impact of Public Policy: The Policy

T
Feedback Approach
Beyond influences of individual resources, personality characteristics, or
political socialization, we must also consider the role played by public
policy in shaping democratic engagement. This line of thought, known as
the policy feedback approach, can be traced to E.E. Schattschneider’s
(1935) hypothesis that “new policies create new politics.” In a later work
analyzing the withdrawal of the American public from politics,
Schattschneider (1960) confronted the prevailing sentiment that an apa-

thetic and uninformed citizenry was to blame for its lack of participation,
arguing that the reasons why the lower classes abstained from politics
were not due to any sort of moral or civic deficiencies; rather, the political
system itself was to blame, for it did not offer much to the public to
mobilize, engage, or even encourage political participation (Mettler and
Soss 2004). Other early works documenting policy feedback effects
include the studies by Lowi (1964) and Wilson (1973), who drew on
policy typologies to argue that political mobilization outputs were depen-
dent on different types of policies. What Schattschneider, Lowi, Wilson,
and their contemporaries emphasize is that policies can impact their
recipients much like formal political institutions do—they too transmit
norms and impose rules and regulations—and can thereby transform
politics itself (Mettler 2002). When examining the links between citizens
and how they think about and behave toward their states, we must recall
what it is that actually affects their behavior. Although we know that
political institutions structure and provide the rules of the game, it is social
policies with which people often come into regular contact and have per-
sonal experiences.
Citizens are all too frequently conceived of as “background actors in
politics” (Mettler and Soss 2004, 55); sociological, psychological, and
economic approaches to political behaviors and attitudes frequently
neglect the influence policies can wield. From the policy feedback per-
spective, however, political attitudes and actions are conceived of as the
result of the interaction between “state structures and institutions, politi-
cal actions, communication flows, mobilization and demobilization, and
the density and the patterning of political organizations” (ibid., 58). In
this regard, political behavior can be seen as a form of policy feedback.
Theda Skocpol (1992, 58) underscores two types of policy feedback
effects: first, new policies can “transform or expand the capacities of the
state”; and, second, “new policies affect the social identities, goals, and
capabilities of groups.” In terms of the first set of feedback effects,
Skocpol’s Protecting Soldiers and Mothers (1992) demonstrated how the
development of extensive public pensions in the United States was
stunted due to the corrupt pension system for Civil War veterans. Paul
Pierson’s Dismantling the Welfare State? (1994) showed how the “design of
40 J. Shore
the American Social Security System creates a barrier to privatized indi-

vidual accounts because of the ‘double payment’ problem: today’s payroll
tax receipts fund today’s benefits, and so there is no extra money to put
aside in individual accounts to accrue for the future” (Campbell 2012,
335). Most of the research in the field of public policy focuses on this first
type of effect (Pierson 1993); how public policies affect people’s attitudes
and behaviors remains “remarkably undertheorized” (Mettler and Soss
2004, 60).
By examining public policy’s effect on citizens’ political behavior and
attitudes, two schools within the discipline of political science come
together: public policy and political behavior. Not until recently have
these two silos of the field been studied under a single research agenda.
Scholars interested in political behavior tended to see public policy as
something far off; something that eventually could be influenced by
political action. Mettler and Soss (2004, 55) describe the division of pub-
lic policy and political behavior as “opposite ends of the political pro-
cess.” Campbell (2012) notes Schneider and Ingram’s (1993) Policy
Design for Democracy as one of the first works to cross the once well cor-
doned off areas in political science. In their book, the authors argue that
policy design wields substantial influence in terms of the “social construc-
tion of target populations.”
Pierson (2006, 115) argues that we can study the effects of policies
much like we study institutional effects: “policies are important instances
of political institutions.” Policies, however, have received much less atten-
tion than the institutions from which they originate due mainly to their
vast heterogeneity and their ephemeral character (unlike institutions,
they are much more prone to change). There are important reasons to
study policies as institutions, the first of which being their importance for
individuals. Although some political scientists might try and tell us oth-
erwise, policies are what people come into contact with on a daily basis—
not the formal institutions: “If policies as institutions matter for political
scientists, it is because the influence of policies on social actors—on who
they are, on what they want, on how and with whom they organize—is
such that it changes the way these actors engage in politics” (Pierson
2006, 116). At the macro-level, the policy regime literature has done
much to examine policy effects—with one of the most prominent works
being Esping-Andersen’s The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990).

At the micro-level, however, we are just beginning to examine the influ-
ence of policies on people’s behaviors and attitudes. Most of the works
here have been limited to group-specific studies for the United States; the
lack of comparative analyses incorporating policy feedback approaches
on individual behavior indeed represents a palpable gap in the literature.
Effects of Policies
We know that citizens’ participation can influence the outcomes of poli-
tics, but do the policy outcomes themselves have an impact on participa-
tion and the way people think about politics? Campbell (2012) argues
they do: policies can have both negative and positive effects on participa-
tion: first, and most obviously, they may distribute (and redistribute) the
resources needed for political involvement that might otherwise be lacking.
Depending on the actual size of the benefits, political participation may
be fostered due to an increase in the recipient’s capacity to participate (in
terms of time and money). For example, a policy aimed at a certain group
may supply that group with resources it needs for mobilization. Campbell
(2011) finds that low-income pensioners—those most likely to receive
social security benefits—in the United States are frequently voters and
policy-based activists. This group of senior citizens was not always an
active group: “In the 1950s, when Social Security benefits were modest
and covered only a fraction of seniors, the elderly participation at lower
rates than younger people” (Campbell 2011, 2). As mentioned, there
have been numerous studies that look at the resource effect from the
other side of public policies—that is, from the standpoint of policy out-
comes, such as inequality indicators. Redistribution and resources, how-
ever, only tell us half the story. Public policies can do many things beyond
redistribution.
Closely related to the resource effect, policies can also motivate people
to become interested in politics due to the personal stakes that policies can
create for people’s lives. Policies may pique interest in certain issues or
politics in general. For example, if a policy targets a program that directly
affects the individual, he or she may be more likely to engage in political
42 J. Shore
action due to one’s own personal stakes. An oft-cited example is the high
voter turnout rates of farmers in the United States: they have a personal
interest in the outcomes of agricultural policies and farm subsidies.
Additionally, policies may create opportunities for people to learn civic
skills (Marston 1993; Soss 1999) or foster one’s sense of obligation or
responsibility to the state (Mettler 2002).
Third, policies can have numerous cognitive effects on citizens (Pierson
1993). Policies may signal to the citizenry that they have rights to certain
benefits, goods, or services; these policies also may foster the expectation
that the government should, for example, address aspects of inequality
(Mettler and Soss 2004; Piven and Cloward 1983). The messages policies
send to people can relay information about where they stand in their
community (Schneider and Ingram 1997) or “whether the government is
responsive to their concerns, thereby encouraging engagement, passivity,
or even alienation” (Wichowsky and Moynihan 2008, 909; see also
Mettler 2002; Soss 1999). More concretely, the ways policies are designed
influence people’s personal and everyday experiences with their govern-
ments, which in turn shapes the way they think and feel about them. For
example, the responsiveness of the bureaucratic routines to the people’s
demands shape how they come to view their government institutions
(Kumlin 2004; Kumlin and Rothstein 2005; Moynihan and Soss 2014).
Policy design sends certain messages to the citizenry: “By shaping citi-
zens’ encounters with government, the design and implementation of
public policy constitute important forces shaping citizens’ orientations
toward the institutions and policies of government” (Mettler and Soss
2004, 62; see also Schneider and Ingram 1997).
Examples from the United States reveal that “welfare” recipients (social
assistance programs: Aid to Families with Dependent Children/
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families) feel stigmatized and socially
isolated through the processes of means testing. These negative and
degrading experiences lead to lower political efficacy among recipients
(Soss 1999). The universal social security program in the United States,
however, has the opposite effect: recipients report greater levels of politi-
cal efficacy, as recipients are viewed as deserving of benefits with legiti-
mate claims (Campbell 2011). In other words, how policies are designed
and implemented can affect perceptions of both deservingness and soci-
etal stigma.
Banting (1999) notes that the welfare state can also play a regionally
and nationally integrative role. Using the example of the incorporation of
Newfoundland into Canada in 1949, he describes how the extensive
Canadian welfare system was one of the most attractive selling points for
joining the Canadian state. Wanting to make their newest citizens feel
welcome, the Canadian government assured that the Newfoundlanders
received social benefits immediately after their incorporation. By grant-
ing social rights right away and effectively demonstrating that these new
members of its society were on an equal level with the rest of the prov-
inces, the Canadian welfare state was ultimately able to “make Canadians”
(see Crepaz 2008, 138). This highly effective response by the Canadian
government was able to integrate ethnically diverse groups. The most-
cited and notorious example of the integrative power of the welfare state,
however, can be found much further back in history: Otto von Bismarck’s
introduction of social insurance during the 1880s not only served to
quash the revolutionary potential of the socialists but also tied the “loyal-
ties of the individual directly to the monarchy or central state authority”
(Esping-Andersen 1990, 24). The class differences that were softened
with the development of the welfare state was only one of the results of
Bismarck’s actions; by centralizing the command over social insurance,
the diverse ethnic groups comprising the German Reich were able to be
brought together through their loyalty to the empire (Kuhnle and Sander
2010). Not only are welfare states designed to create cross-class solidari-
ties, but across territories as well, integrating regionally or ethnically
distinct territories into the borders of the nation state (see e.g., Moreno
and McEwen 2005).
As people who live in states with comprehensive and far-reaching wel-
fare systems come into frequent direct contact with these welfare policies,
they are bound to affect their perceptions. These perceptions are largely
affected by what is known in the field of psychology as procedural justice.
“This research has shown that people are concerned not only with the
final results of personal contacts with public institutions. (e.g., ‘Did I get
the allowance?’ ‘Was I convicted in court?’ ‘Am I satisfied with day care?’).
They are frequently at least as interested in whether the process that even-
tually led to the final result was fair” (Kumlin and Rothstein 2005, 347).
These questions raised by Kumlin and Rothstein hearken back to
Dworkin’s conception of justice—that is, that people, when coming into
44 J. Shore
contact with government institutions, must be treated with “equal concern

and respect” (Dworkin 1977, 180). If people perceive that they are indeed
treated with equal concern and respect, how does this affect their perceptions
of their governments? Kumlin (2004) and Soss (1999), for example, find
that a positive appraisal of procedural justice in terms of individual experi-
ences with welfare state institutions fosters satisfaction with democracy.
Testing these assumptions using Swedish survey data, Kumlin (2004) finds
that the degree of citizen empowerment institutional arrangements are able to
achieve is predictive of individual levels of satisfaction with democracy, trust
in politicians, and support for state social programs. Even when controlling
for individuals’ socioeconomic backgrounds, he finds that personal experi-
ences with the different welfare state arrangements within Sweden are crucial
to understanding people’s “broader political orientations” (ibid., 23).
To conclude, there are many ways in which public policies may poten-
tially impact people’s political attitudes and behaviors. Moreover, policies,
depending on design or administration, have the potential to promote
political equality or exacerbate exisiting inequalities (see e.g., Shore 2016).
Most of the work drawing on policy feedback approaches, however, has
been conducted for smaller groups within the United States. We lack stud-
ies of policy feedback that examine the effects of social policies on mass
publics and ones that do so comparatively. Moreover, although we have
plenty of evidence to demonstrate that income inequality and political
inequality are fundamentally linked, the precise mechanisms into these rela-
tionships and how social policy may intervene have received less attention.
L inking the Welfare State and the Democratic

Citizen
From the literature, we know that political participation and democratic
support are largely a function of political efficacy—the feeling that one
can capably and competently take part in politics, and that representa-
tives and authorities are responsive to citizen demands and preferences.
We also know that political efficacy is largely a function of resources, with
better-educated, well-connected, and higher-earning individuals more
likely to feel politically confident and represented in many societies. This
is a problem for democracy, for democracy not only requires citizen
participation but must allow for equal citizen participation in order to be

truly democratic. And although democracy is an increasingly common
and sought-after form of government, trends of rising income inequality
stand to threaten its legitimacy as such. Economic inequality, as numer-
ous studies tell us, distorts political equality, and while we know that why
people choose to participate or withdraw from politics is not always sim-
ply a function of one’s socioeconomic resources, a very unequal distribu-
tion of these resources is what structures the patterns of political behaviors
and attitudes in many of the world’s most advanced democracies.
Social policies, however, have the potential to assuage some of the
incongruencies that have arisen out of the relationship between democ-
racy and capitalism—both of which espouse equality of opportunity.
Over the past decade or so, an interest in the feedback effects of public
policies has emerged within political science scholarship, with most of
the work conducted in the United States. T.H. Marshall (1965) could be
considered a forerunner to contemporary policy feedback theorists: in his
evaluation of the English Poor Laws he criticized the divorce of social
from political rights. The emerging welfare states, responding to modern
economic upheavals, were a means of unifying the different spheres of
rights (civil, political, and social). Generous welfare structures and poli-
cies are thought to have an integrative effect, promoting the political
incorporation of all social groups (Alber and Kohler 2009). It can, there-
fore, be assumed that welfare states strongly committed to the reduction
of economic inequality across socioeconomic groups are also capable of
promoting higher and more equitable levels of political participation
because, in addition to the resources that they distribute and redistribute,
they enhance efficacy and saliency through social integration. Internal
efficacy is thought to be positively affected by the distribution and redis-
tribution of resources needed for political participation. Some cash ben-
efit schemes, for example, are able to hoist most people out of poverty,
enabling them to engage in political activities, something which may
have otherwise remained a luxury. External efficacy is fostered by gener-
ous welfare policies embodying norms of fairness and universality, which
may convey the message that the government is attentive and responsive
to the needs of the many and not just the better off. It can, therefore, be
expected that in states where the welfare focus is placed on the reduction
of economic inequalities, citizens will be more likely to take part in
46 J. Shore
olitics—including voting in elections and being interested in politics.

p
People in these types of welfare states are also expected to be more satis-
fied with the way democracy works and exhibit trust in political
institutions.
Redistributive policies may very well provide greater incentives to
some groups to participate than to others. For people whose socioeco-
nomic resources would predict an already high propensity to participate,
the effect of additional welfare state spending on their political behavior
would be smaller than the effect for lower-income groups. While it is
expected that generous welfare states will have an overall positive direct
effect on political participation and attitudes toward democracy, condi-
tional hypotheses regarding indirect effects can also be tested. Conditional
hypotheses touch on the ways in which social policy, in addressing income
inequality, can moderate political inequality.
In contexts where welfare policies are aimed at tackling economic
inequality, we can expect a weaker link between resources and democratic
citizenship. Drawing on what we know from the empirical work on pol-
icy feedback in the US context, generous and universally designed social
policies not only redistribute resources to poorer citizens, but they can
also provide them with a personal stake in political outcomes—thereby
fostering interest in politics—and have interpret effects, that is, the design
or focus of a policy may signal to citizens that they are valued and deserv-
ing members of a society. Due to the ways in which these kinds of policies
are expected to moderate the relationship between income and demo-
cratic citizenship, I hypothesize that they may be able to provide the
greatest participatory benefits to citizens with the fewest resources, as
government offerings may have a greater impact on their lives and well-
being than those from the upper-income categories. Because of the
increased relevance of politics accompanying more generous policies,
poorer individuals may also stand to also benefit most from the integra-
tive effects of welfare policies which convey to them that they too are
valued and represented members of the polity. Such messages may be
pivotal in mobilizing the vote, getting underrepresented groups to feel
their voices can be heard in other arenas, sparking an interest in politics,
as well as fostering positive attitudes toward democracy and the way it
works. Based on the literature on welfare states and social policies and
how income and political engagement are related, it is expected that the
positive effect of welfare state generosity on democratic political engage-
ment will be most pronounced for people with the fewest resources.
These expectations take into account that even in less generous welfare
state contexts, wealthier individuals already have a relative resource
advantage compared to their less well-off counterparts. In other words,
those who stand to benefit the most from increased resources, increased
political stakes, and messages regarding universality and fairness are the
members of society who have the least. In the chapter to follow, I put
these expectations about the welfare state—regarding its direct effects
and its indirect ones—to the empirical test in order to address the ques-
tion whether more extensive welfare states, in addressing income inequal-
ity, are also able to produce greater political equality.
References
Alber, Jens, and Ulrich Kohler. 2009. The Inequality of Electoral Participation
in Europe and America and the Politically Integrative Functions of the
Welfare State. In United in Diversity? Comparing Social Models in Europe and
America, ed. Jens Alber and Neil Gilbert, 63–90. International Policy
Exchange Series. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Anderson, Christopher J., and Matthew M. Singer. 2008. The Sensitive Left and
the Impervious Right: Multilevel Models and the Politics of Inequality,
Ideology, and Legitimacy in Europe. Comparative Political Studies 41 (4/5):
564–599.
Banting, Keith. 1999. Social Citizenship and the Multicultural Welfare State. In
Citizenship, Diversity, and Pluralism: Canadian and Comparative Perspectives,
ed. Alan C. Cairns, John C. Courtney, Peter Mackinnon, Hans J. Michelmann,
and David E. Smith, 108–136. Quebec: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
Briggs, Asa. 1969. The Welfare State in Historical Perspective. In The Welfare
State, ed. Charles Schottland, 29–45. New York: Harper and Row.
Campbell, Andrea Louise. 2011. How Policies Make Citizens: Senior Political
Activism and the American Welfare State. Princeton Studies in American
Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
———. 2012. Policy Makes Mass Politics. Annual Review of Political Science 15
(1): 333–351. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-012610-135202.
48 J. Shore
Crepaz, Markus M.L. 2008. Trust Beyond Borders: Immigration, the Welfare State,
and Identity in Modern Societies. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan
Press.
Crepaz, Markus M.L., and Regan Damron. 2009. Constructing Tolerance:
How the Welfare State Shapes Attitudes About Immigrants. Comparative
Political Studies 42 (3): 437–463.
Dahl, Robert A. 1971. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press.
Dworkin, Ronald. 1977. Taking Rights Seriously. London: Duckworth.
Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. 1990. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Ferejohn, John. 2009. Is Inequality a Threat to Democracy? In The Unsustainable
American State, ed. Lawrence R. Jacobs and Desmond S. King, 34–57.
Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
Gingrich, Jane. 2014. Visibility, Values, and Voters: The Informational Role of
the Welfare State. The Journal of Politics 76 (2): 565–580. https://doi.
org/10.1017/S0022381613001540.
Grofman, Bernard. 1989. The Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism:
An Overview. In The Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism, ed.
Bernard Grofman and Donald Wittman, 1–6. New York: Agathon.
Hall, Peter A., and Rosemary C.A. Taylor. 1996. Political Science and the Three
New Institutionalisms. Political Studies 44 (5): 936–957.
Immergut, Ellen M. 1998. The Theoretical Core of the New Institutionalism.
Politics and Society 26 (1): 5–34.
Jacobs, John. 2008. An Introduction to the Beveridge Report. In Understanding
Health and Social Care: An Introductory Reader, ed. Julia Johnson and Corinne
de Souza, 215–221. Los Angeles, CA and Milton Keynes: Sage and Open
University.
Kaiser, André. 1997. Types of Democracy: From Classical to New Institutionalism.
Journal of Theoretical Politics 9 (4): 419–444.
Kuhnle, Stein, and Anne Sander. 2010. The Emergence of the Western Welfare
State. In The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State, ed. Crancis G. Castles,
Stephan Leibfried, Jane Lewis, Herbert Obinger, and Christopher Pierson,
61–80. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kumlin, Staffan. 2002. Institutions-Experiences-Preferences: How Welfare State
Design Affects Political Trust and Ideology. In Restructuring the Welfare State:
Political Institutions and Policy Change, ed. Bo Rothstein and Sven Steinmo,
20–50. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
———. 2004. The Personal and the Political: How Personal Welfare State
Experiences Affect Political Trust and Ideology. Political Evolution and
Institutional Change. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Kumlin, Staffan, and Bo Rothstein. 2005. Making and Breaking Social Capital:
The Impact of Welfare-State Institutions. Comparative Political Studies 38 (4):
339–365.
Kumlin, Staffan, and Isabelle Stadelmann-Steffen, eds. 2014. How Welfare States
Shape the Democratic Public: Policy Feedback, Participation, Voting and
Attitudes. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Kymlicka, Will. 1990. Contemporary Political Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
Levi, Margaret. 1991. A Logic of Constitutional Change. In The Limits of
Rationality, ed. Karen S. Cook and Margaret Levi, 402–418. Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press.
Lowi, Theodore J. 1964. American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and
Political Theory. World Politics 16 (4): 677–715.
March, James G., and Johan P. Olsen. 1989. Rediscovering Institutions: The
Organizational Basic of Politics. New York: Free Press.
Marshall, Thomas H. 1950. Citizenship and Social Class. London: Pluto.
———. 1965. Social Policy. London: Hutchinson.
Marston, Sallie A. 1993. Citizen Action Programs and Participatory Politics in
Tuscan. In Public Policy for Democracy, ed. Helen M. Ingram and Steven
R. Smith, 119–135. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
Mettler, Suzanne. 2002. Bringing the State Back in to Civic Engagement: Policy
Feedback Effects of the G.I. Bill for World War II Veterans. American Political
Science Review 96 (2): 351–365.
Mettler, Suzanne, and Joe Soss. 2004. The Consequences of Public Policy for
Democratic Citizenship: Bridging Policy Studies and Mass Politics.
Perspectives on Politics 2 (1): 55–73.
Moreno, Luis, and Nicola McEwen. 2005. Exploring the Territorial Politics of
Welfare. In The Territorial Politics of Welfare, ed. Nicola McEwen and Luis
Moreno, 1–40. London: Routledge.
Moynihan, Donald P., and Joe Soss. 2014. Policy Feedback and the Politics of
Administration. Public Administration Review 74 (3): 320–332. https://doi.
org/10.1111/puar.12200.
Pierson, Christopher, and Francis G. Castles, eds. 2006. The Welfare State Reader.
2nd ed. Cambridge: Polity Press.
50 J. Shore
Pierson, Paul. 1993. When Effect Becomes Cause: Policy Feedback and Political
Change. World Politics 45 (4): 595–628.
———. 1994. Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher, and the Politics of
Retrenchment. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge, UK
and New York: Cambridge University Press.
———. 2006. Policies as Institutions. In Rethinking Political Institutions: The
Art of the State, ed. Ian Shapiro, Stephen Skowronek, and Daniel Galvin,
114–132. New York: New York University Press.
Piven, Frances Fox, and Richard A. Cloward. 1977. Regulating the Poor: The
Functions of Public Welfare. New York: Pantheon Books.
———. 1983. The American Road to Democratic Socialism. Democracy 3 (3):
58–69.
Rapp, Carolin, Jennifer Shore, and Jale Tosun. 2017. Not So Risky Business?
How Social Policies Shape the Perceived Feasibility of Self-employment.
Journal of European Social Policy. https://doi.org/10.1177/09589287177
11973.
Rawls, John. 1980. Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory: The Dewey
Lectures. The Journal of Philosophy 77 (9): 515–572.
———. 1993. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.
———. 2003 [1971]. A Theory of Justice. Rev. ed., 5th–6th printing. Cambridge,
MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Ringen, Stein. 2007. What Democracy Is For: On Freedom and Moral Government.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Roche, Maurice. 2002. Social Citizenship: Grounds of Social Change. In
Handbook of Citizenship Studies, ed. Engin F. Isin and Bryan S. Turner,
69–86. London: Sage Publications.
Rorty, Richard. 1993. Postmodernism and Democratic Theory. Philadelphia, PA:
Temple University Press.
Rothstein, Bo. 1998a. Just Institutions Matter: The Moral and Political Logic of the
Universal Welfare State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———. 1998b. Political Institutions: An Overview. In A New Handbook of
Political Science, ed. Robert E. Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingemann,
Sandel, Michael J. 2008. Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 2nd ed., 10th print-
ing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Schattschneider, Elmer E. 1935. Politics, Pressures and the Tariff. New York:
Prentice-Hall.
———. 1960. The Semi-Sovereign People: A Study of Free Private Enterprise in

Pressure Politics, as Shown in the 1929–1930 Revision of the Tariff. New York:
Rinehart and Winston.
Schneider, Anne, and Helen Ingram. 1993. Social Construction of Target
Populations: Implications for Politics and Policy. American Political Science
Review 87 (2): 334–347. https://doi.org/10.2307/2939044.
———. 1997. Policy Design for Democracy. Lawrence, KS: University Press of
Kansas.
Schuck, Peter H. 2008. Liberal Citizenship. In Handbook of Citizenship Studies,
ed. Engin F. Isin and Bryan S. Turner, 131–144. London: Sage.
Sen, Amartya. 1982. Choice, Welfare and Measurement. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
Shore, Jennifer. 2014. How Welfare States Shape Participatory Patterns. In How
Welfare States Shape the Democratic Public: Policy Feedback, Participation,
Voting and Attitudes, ed. Staffan Kumlin and Isabelle Stadelmann-Steffen,
———. 2016. Political Inequality: Origins, Consequences, and Ways Ahead. In
Understanding Inequality: Social Costs and Benefits, ed. Amanda Machin and
Nico Stehr, 247–265. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.
Simpson Bueker, Catherine. 2009. The Limits of Political Citizenship. Society
46 (5): 423–428.
Skocpol, Theda. 1992. Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of
Social Policy in the United States. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Soss, Joe. 1999. Lessons of Welfare: Policy Design, Political Learning, and
Political Action. American Political Science Review 93 (2): 363–380.
Steinmo, Sven. 2008. Historical Institutionalism. In Approaches and Methodologies
in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective, ed. Donatella Della Porta and
Michael Keating, 118–138. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Svallfors, Stefan, ed. 2007. The Political Sociology of the Welfare State: Institutions,
Social Cleavages, and Orientations. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Wichowsky, Amber, and Donald P. Moynihan. 2008. Measuring How
Administration Shapes Citizenship: A Policy Feedback Perspective on
Performance Management. Public Administration Review 68 (5): 908–920.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2008.00931.x.
Wilensky, Harold L., and Charles N. Lebeaux. 1958. Industrial Society and
Social Welfare. New York: Free Press.
Wilson, James Q. 1973. Political Organizations. New York: Basic Books.
4
Empirical Approaches to the Study
of Democratic Citizens and Welfare
States
Before turning to the empirical analyses of the relationships between the

welfare state and various aspects of democratic citizenship, this chapter
provides essential information concerning the setup of the analyses to
follow in Chap. 5. In order to investigate how the welfare state influences
citizens’ individual political behaviors and attitudes, I employ multilevel
models in order to take into account how different macro-level contexts
affect the people living within them. Before moving on to the concrete
analyses, I first describe the measurement of the welfare state used in the
models as well as some of the issues surrounding the not altogether
unproblematic task of measuring something so seemingly complex as the
welfare state.
In the discussion of the common research design framework used in all
of the empirical analyses, I begin with a more general discussion of the
method of multilevel modeling used in the analyses. In the chapter to
follow (Chap. 5), I look at the ways in which the welfare state impacts the
decision to vote, political interest, trust in parliament, and satisfaction
with democracy. These aspects of democratic citizenship are exactly
that—aspects of a rather broad concept. While these analyses by no means
represent an exhaustive investigation of democratic citizenship, these

54 J. Shore
individual attitudes and behaviors are arguably important components of

democratic societies. Furthermore, these aspects are the ones for which
we currently have the most data across a wide and varied sample of
countries.
perationalizing the Welfare State:

O
Theoretical and Epistemological Debates
The main independent variable, the welfare state, is by no means easily
operationalized, something which has been the subject of numerous the-
oretical and epistemological debates. The “dependent variable problem”
has become a common theme as well as stumbling block for many studies
examining welfare state change (Green-Pedersen 2004; Pierson 1994). As
one would infer from its name, the dependent variable problem is about
the definition of the phenomenon itself. Green-Pedersen (2004) con-
tends that this problem has more to do with the theoretical conceptual-
ization than the availability of data. In such a situation, one must first ask
what should be measured, given the theoretical definition. Drawing on
that answer, one can then move on to thinking about what can actually
be measured:
The first question is, however, more crucial in the sense that the question
about the most appropriate data can only be answered when one knows
exactly what to measure. The first question is theoretical since it can only
be answered in light of each researcher’s theoretical perspective and research
question. Thus, much of the disagreement about the dependent variable
originates from scholars having different theoretical perspectives and not
being always being fully aware of the implications of their theoretical
approaches to welfare state retrenchment. Part of the problem also originates
from disagreement about defining the welfare state notion in the first place.
(Green-Pedersen 2004, 6)
How one defines the welfare state has clear consequences for its
hypothesized effects. Before attempting to define this multifaceted and
theoretically contentious concept, it is perhaps fruitful to discuss the
Empirical Approaches to the Study of Democratic Citizens… 55
necessity of the close and careful alignment of concepts to theories, for

only by doing so will I be able to avoid a potential independent variable
problem.
As Goertz (2006, 95) points out, “when designing numeric measures
one needs to be concerned about how faithful the measure is to its theory
(i.e., concept),” something which he refers to as “concept-measure consis-
tency.” This idea, found in the opening paragraph of the chapter on
concept-measure consistency in his Social Science Concepts, is one which
is particularly relevant for anyone who wishes to investigate the welfare
state. To reiterate, I seek to comparatively examine the effects of welfare
state generosity on democratic citizenship (i.e., individual political atti-
tudes and behaviors). While this research agenda seems fairly straightfor-
ward, it is of utmost importance to utilize or develop an operationalization
of the welfare state that remains true to the theorized functions and out-
comes of the concept. Goertz underscores the importance that the
numerical or quantitative measurement adequately reflects the basic
structure of the concept. Without going into the details of his undertak-
ing, what we can take away from his and others’ works is that the type of
measurement we employ can have a significant impact on the outcomes
at which we arrive. More specifically, the measurement can influence the
variation of outcomes, may introduce a ceiling effect (e.g., when working
with necessary conditions), or increase the gray zones.
“Do the observations meaningfully capture the ideas contained in the
concepts?” (Adcock and Collier 2001, 529). Inherent in this question is
the idea of measurement validity. Unlike the validity of causal inference,
which can be subdivided into internal and external validity, measurement
validity has to do with connecting broader ideas to empirical facts. Similar
to Goertz (2006), Adcock and Collier (2001) also map out the relation-
ships between concepts and observations in four levels. The first level
contains the very basic and broad “background concept.” Moving along
the level of abstraction via the process of conceptualization, one arrives at
the “systemized concept.” This is an explicit definition that is employed
when referring to the broader concept. With the operationalization of
this definition, one arrives at the third level—the indicator level. “This
level includes any systematic scoring procedure, ranging from simple
measures to complex aggregated indexes” (Adcock and Collier 2001,
56 J. Shore
530). Finally, we have the scores for the individual cases at the fourth
level. One should strive for continuity between the levels; in other words,
the scores for the cases should be able to be meaningfully linked back to
the systematized concept. The welfare state as a background concept cov-
ers a variety of ideas. As it is so far reaching, to speak simply of a welfare
state does not provide us with many clues about what it is that we should
examine. Encompassed in the background concept of welfare states are
numerous systematized concepts—which systemized concept one ulti-
mately uses is based on the aspects of the background concept that the
research aims to address.
Measuring the Welfare State
As Esping-Andersen (1990, 19) famously stated in his Worlds of Welfare,

“not all spending counts equally.” For example, he points out that there
are certain types of spending that do not really constitute part of the wel-
fare effort—that is, social spending which is not aimed at or does not
result in the reduction of inequalities. High levels of spending for civil
servants’ benefits, “fiscal welfare for the middle class, disproportionate
spending on means-tested social assistance” (Castles 2008, 45), or spend-
ing necessitated by high levels of unemployment are examples of such
spending. These expenditures serve either to compensate people who are
already relatively well off or “stigmatize those in receipt of benefits or are
occasioned by the failure of the state to intervene in the first instance”
(Castles 2008, 45). This category of spending does not reflect the core
idea of the welfare state (Esping-Andersen 1990), which aims to guaran-
tee equal rights of social citizenship for all. That being said, the aim is
now to identify which types of spending are able to secure social rights for
all members of a polity.
Esping-Andersen’s (1990) remarks that unemployment spending and
social assistance are clearly more aligned to the theoretical core of the
welfare state constitute a clear critique of studies employing aggregate
measures of social spending to reflect welfare state effort. His answer to
this problem was the now-famous “de-commodification index” to mea-
sure the size and success of a welfare state. This index gives the most
weight to the manner in which welfare benefits are provided. In other

words, how individuals are determined to be eligible recipients of welfare
benefits is the most important aspect of the de-commodification
approach. Generosity, or what people actually receive, comes in second,
thereby taking spending levels into account. Esping-Andersen’s solution
indeed comprised an innovative and more theoretically sound way to
circumvent the problems inherent to aggregated measures of welfare
efforts; however, as Castles (2008) points out, this critique was made at a
time when disaggregated measures of welfare spending were simply not
available. “If aggregation is the main problem, then the solution could be
simply to avoid lumping together unlike categories in the first place or to
group only those categories where one can demonstrate that they have
significant things in common” (Castles 2008, 46). Today’s scholars have
much more nuanced and detailed data on social expenditures at their
fingertips. As a result, we are able to “ask meaningful questions about the
consequences of spending of particular types” (ibid.). For example, the
European System of Integrated Social Protection Statistics provided by
Eurostat and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development’s (OECD) Social Expenditure Database (SOCX) provide
detailed program-level data that distinguish between cash benefits and
services. What one sees when examining these types of disaggregated wel-
fare spending data is that high spending in one area (be it health, age-
related, or spending for working-age adults and families) does not
necessarily mean that spending will be equally high across all welfare
areas, thereby providing further support for the use of disaggregated
measures.
Castles (2008) is furthermore able to demonstrate that the determi-
nants of spending vary according to spending type. It thus seems logical
to assume that the effects of the different expenditures will also vary.
“Different expenditure types will differ in the extent to which they are
conducive to goals consonant with whatever is taken as being the ‘theo-
retical substance’ of welfare states” (Castles 2008, 57). Today, we are able
to empirically test Esping-Andersen’s (1990, 19) statement “not all
expenditure counts equally.” For example, some types of spending are
more closely linked to distributional outcomes than others: neither age
related nor health spending is significantly related to such outcomes.
58 J. Shore
Spending on working-age adults and families, on the other hand, is most

closely tied to distributional outcomes (e.g., in his analysis, Castles finds
that the correlation coefficients for the Gini index and population and
child poverty are over 0.8). Working-age spending even has a stronger
relationship than the de-commodification index or public social expendi-
ture tax incidence. Working-age spending thus “counts more toward alle-
viating poverty than other types of expenditures or other mechanisms of
redistribution” (Castles 2008, 59).
Although disaggregated measures of welfare state spending do constitute
an improvement over aggregated ones, the approach is certainly not with-
out its drawbacks. Drawing on Esping-Andersen’s de-commodification
index to create their own generosity index, Scruggs and Allan (2006) argue
that only by looking specifically at the programmatic aspects of welfare
states are we able to get a more complete picture of a state’s generosity and
commitment to its citizens’ social rights. Moreover, looking at a single year
of welfare state spending on working-age adults and families could be
argued to be but a snapshot of larger processes of change and retrenchment.
From the new institutionalist perspective, however, we should expect to see
welfare state change within certain bounds (Pierson 2001, 415). That is,
“while the notion of ‘path dependency’ allows for welfare spending/social
rights data to vary up and down, the more important expectation is that
each nation will remain within its existing cluster at each point in time”
(Kühner 2007, 12).
Despite the harsh criticism social expenditure data have been subjected
to in the past, there are, nevertheless, many good reasons to use it. First
of all, social spending has been shown to be highly related to redistribu-
tion; it is one of the biggest predictors of the redistributive capacity of
advanced industrial nations (Huber et al. 2006). Moreover, as many stud-
ies show a depressing effect on political engagement by inequality, it may
be exactly this redistributive aspect of welfare states that exerts the stron-
gest overall effect on democratic citizenship. In using social expenditures
as a predictor of democratic citizenship, I refrain from using a highly
aggregated spending measure, such as total spending, for such an approach
may include aspects which do not theoretically matter for many aspects
of democratic citizenship. Using data on disaggregated social spending
allows the researcher to both cover a broad geography and investigate
recent trends in welfare states.
lleviating Inequality: Welfare Policies Aimed

A
at Working-age Adults and Families
In measuring the welfare state, I model my approach largely after Castles

(2008), using a disaggregated measure of welfare spending, namely bene-
fits aimed at working-age adults and families as a percentage of the
GDP. This expenditure area also includes spending on Active Labor Market
Policies (ALMPs). Although not part of the traditional conception of the
welfare state per se, spending on such programs also constitute a commit-
ment to working-age populations and the reduction of inequality through
investments in employability and training programs. Countries vary
extensively across most welfare areas (except for health spending): while
states tend to spend more or less similar proportions of their GDPs on
health care, the same cannot be said for expenditures aimed at pensioners
and working-age adults and families. It is simply not true that countries
which spend a lot in one area automatically also spend an equally high
amount in others. There seems to be a trade-off in many countries with
regard to spending on the elderly and working-age populations. These
trade-offs can be seen in Table 4.1, which replicates Castles’ (2008) explor-
atory analysis for the countries and years used in the analyses to come.
Kuitto (2011) tested Castles’ (2008) rather descriptive claims, finding
that European welfare states do indeed tend to distinguish themselves not
only in terms of the overall levels of social spending but also in their
foci. Her cluster analysis reveals that while the continental European
countries tend to focus on citizens who have stopped working, the Nordic
countries exhibit comparatively higher levels of spending on the work-
ing-age population, reflecting a commitment to defamiliarization and
de-commodification. Additionally, Kuitto’s (2011, 361) analyses show
that welfare efforts do not tend to be “bifurcated in cash transfers and
services in the sense that these would build the main dimensions around
which welfare regimes cluster”; rather, we see clear priorities and political
responses to social risk at different points in the life cycle. For this reason,
I also include spending on benefits in kind in addition to the cash-
spending priorities Castles (2008) identifies. In sum, we see that some
states spend considerably more than others or make a “greater welfare
effort” (Wilensky 1975), and that different spending priorities clearly
exist (Kuitto 2016).
60 J. Shore
Table 4.1 Disaggregated welfare state expenditures across countries (% of GDP)

Country Total social expenditures Health Working age Old age
Australia 16.40 5.70 5.40 4.90
Austria 26.30 6.70 6.50 12.60
Belgium 26.00 7.00 9.20 9.00
Canada 16.80 7.00 2.90 4.10
Czech Republic 18.10 5.60 5.00 7.30
Denmark 26.50 6.70 11.00 7.30
Estonia 12.70 3.80 3.60 5.20
Finland 24.70 5.90 8.80 9.20
France 29.70 8.70 7.10 12.90
Germany 25.10 7.70 6.00 10.60
Greece 21.60 5.90 2.70 12.10
Hungary 23.00 5.20 7.10 9.80
Ireland 16.70 5.90 6.30 3.90
Israel 15.50 4.00 5.50 5.10
Italy 24.70 6.60 3.90 14.10
Netherlands 21.10 7.00 7.10 5.50
New Zealand 18.60 7.00 6.20 4.30
Norway 20.50 5.60 7.80 6.40
Poland 19.70 4.50 4.30 10.70
Portugal 22.70 6.70 5.00 10.80
Slovak Republic 15.70 5.20 3.90 6.20
Slovenia 19.50 5.60 3.60 9.70
Spain 21.30 6.10 6.40 8.40
Sweden 27.30 6.50 10.30 9.50
Switzerland 18.50 5.60 5.50 6.70
United Kingdom 20.40 6.90 6.30 5.90
United States 16.30 7.40 2.40 6.00
Mean 20.94 6.17 5.92 8.08
Std. Dev. 4.30 1.10 2.22 2.95
CV 20.56 17.83 37.55 36.53
Source: OECD SOCX Database. Public social spending (% of GDP)
Notes: Figures do not add up to total listed due to the omission of “other”
spending in this table (housing + other social policy areas). Old-age
spending = Cash and benefits in kind for pensions and survivors; Health: Health
expenditures; Working age: Cash and benefits in kind spending for incapacity,
unemployment, family, and ALMPs. Italic fonts indicate above average
spending in given column. CV: Coefficient of variation. Own calculations based
on Castles (2008)
The welfare state data used in the analyses come from the OECD’s
SOCX. The measure of the welfare state covers expenditures on working-
age adults and families, measured as the percentage of the GDP spent on
unemployment benefits, incapacity, families, and ALMPs. The OECD
identifies nine branches of social policy. Of the four branches included in
the welfare state measure (incapacity related, family, ALMP, and unem-
ployment), two branches include both cash benefits and benefits in kind
(incapacity related and family spending). Unemployment spending is
cash only; ALMP is simply spending and no differentiation between cash
or benefits in kind is made. Table 4.2 provides an overview of the expen-
diture types.
In addition to taking the different spending priorities and effects into
account, it is important to consider that the areas of spending included
in the measure are often driven by various structural and demographic
needs. In other words, it has been well documented that how much
money is spent and on which groups has a lot to do with who is in need
(Clayton and Pontusson 1998; Huber and Stephens 2001; Kangas and
Palme 2007; Kuitto 2011; Saunders and Klau 1985; Siegel 2007). Just as
a large share of retirees would likely result in greater spending on pen-
sions, high levels of unemployment, for example, are also likely to set off
increases in unemployment spending. Following Kuitto (2011), I control
for the varying needs’ structures by adjusting the welfare spending areas
by their respective targets. Unemployment benefits (cash and benefits in
kind) as well as expenditures on ALMPs are weighted by the unemployment
Table 4.2 Welfare spending categories

Branch Cash spending Benefits in kind
OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX)
Old age X X
Survivors X
Incapacity related X X
Health X
Family X X
ALMP
Unemployment X
Housing X
Other social policy areas X X
Categories used in the primary analyses are in bold
62 J. Shore
rate; cash spending on families is adjusted by the proportion of the popu-

lation under age 15 (Kangas and Palme 2007, 110); and family benefits
in kind, which primarily comprises daycare services, are thus weighted by
the share of the population aged 0–4.1 Kangas and Palme (2007) and
Kuitto (2011) employ life expectancy as a proxy for a population’s general
health status when looking at incapacity benefits; the idea here being that
when populations are healthier, less money is spent on sick leave. This,
however, is a very rough measure and, as Kuitto (2011, 353) points out,
is “prone to counterfactual argumentation.” I, therefore, refrain from
adjusting the incapacity spending. Although it is not altogether unprob-
lematic to use a measure where some components have been weighted
and others have not, in 2007, for example, the average amount spent on
incapacity programs was less than 2 percent of the GDP in OECD coun-
tries. Moreover, this spending does not comprise a major benefit category
and leaving it unweighted is likely to be less egregious than if one were to
fail to adjust some of the other major social policy categories, such as
unemployment. It must also be pointed out that all of the adjustments
are proxies of dependent populations. It is simply not possible to identify
the exact number of recipients or, in many cases, potential recipients of
the different types of benefits. These measures and their adjustments are
not, however, intended to capture precise numbers of recipients or
beneficiaries of social expenditures; rather, as discussed in the preceding
paragraphs, the measure is intended to capture the commitment a state
makes to its working-age populations and reducing economic inequality.
Table 4.3 provides an overview of the adjustments of the welfare policy
spending areas included.
The welfare state data refer to the expenditures on working-age adults
and families as a percentage of the GDP in the year prior to when the
respective social surveys were administered in order to ensure that cause
1
These population data are also available from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD). The weight perhaps underestimates the actual daycare need for families, as
in most countries, children have not entered into all-day school by the age of five. While this is
certainly a weakness of the data, it can, however, be considered as a rather minor limitation. The
adjustment for cash benefits (age 15) is also an approximation, as the age limits for child allowances
also vary widely across countries. That being said, although these weights are approximations, fail-
ing to include any sort of adjustment of population and structural needs would lead to artificially
high spending levels for many countries.
Table 4.3 Demographic needs adjustments by welfare policy category

Branch Cash spending Benefits in kind
OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX)
Incapacity related None None
Family % of population under age 15 % of population age 0–4
Unemployment Unemployment rate
ALMP Unemployment rate
indeed precedes effect (Davis 1985).2 For example, the WVS was
conducted in 2006 in the United States; the welfare spending data for the
United States, therefore, refer to the year 2005. Figure 4.1 provides an
overview of the welfare state expenditures used in the analyses.
As can be seen, Denmark leads the group of countries, spending an
amount equal to 10.4 percent of its GDP on social expenditures for
working-age adults and families. Not surprisingly, the other Scandinavian
countries follow closely behind. At the bottom of the group is the United
States, which spends only around 2.7 percent of its GDP on working-age
populations. The mean expenditure across the 26 countries is 5.6 per-
cent. Furthermore, the welfare state variable shows considerable varia-
tion, with a coefficient of variation of 38.5. Table 4.4 shows the summary
statistics across all countries.
tatistical Approaches: Bridging the Micro-

S
macro Divide
“The frontier where critical new insights are most apt to be found now
seems to be in the analysis of the linkages between macropolitical and
micropolitical phenomena” (Inglehart 1983, 431). While Inglehart’s
statement was certainly forward thinking and predictive of what was to
come, it probably would have been difficult for him to imagine the statis-
tical leaps that would accompany this paradigm shift (Anderson and
Singer 2008, 587). One of the consequences of looking at individual
2
I return to the matter of causes and effects in the discussion of the results of the quantitative
analyses.
64 J. Shore
Fig. 4.1 Social expenditures on working-age adults and families (% of GDP).

Source: OECD SOCX, various years. Country codes: AT: Austria; AU: Australia; BE:
Belgium; CA: Canada: CH: Switzerland; CZ: Czech Republic; DE: Germany; DK:
Denmark; EE: Estonia; ES: Spain; FI: Finland; FR: France; GB: United Kingdom; GR:
Greece; HU: Hungary; IE: Ireland; IL: Israel; IT: Italy; NL: Netherlands; NO: Norway;
NZ: New Zealand; PL: Poland; PT: Portugal; SE: Sweden; SI: Slovenia; SK: Slovakia;
US: United States
Table 4.4 Summary statistics working-age and family benefits (OECD)

Mean Standard deviation Coefficient of variation Range
5.61 2.16 38.50 2.24–10.47
patterns of behavior and attitudes through the institutional lens is the use
of new methods of analysis. Contextual effects—that is, the effect of one’s
environment—on behavior are nothing new to the field of comparative
politics. Sociology and the behavioral sciences are also quite well versed
in this approach: while they do not go so far as to replace country names
with variable names, they do seek to understand the effects of social pro-
cesses and structures on human behavior. Nevertheless, until the 1980s,
when large-scale cross-national survey projects began to emerge, political

behavior tended to be studied more from the individual-level perspective
than from the contextual. After this point, one could witness a shift in
the focus in the social sciences from the micro-, behavioralist approach to
an emphasis on macro-level differences and their implications for behav-
ior. Equipped with the tools needed to measure micro-level phenomenon
across a variety of macro-landscapes, new theories can be tested in a
greater number of settings (Anderson and Singer 2008).
The micro-macro relationship is rather simple and hearkens back to
the traditional approach used in social psychology research: person × con-
text (Lewin 1935).
The basic intuition is that people are nested in identifiable contexts—that

is, they form attitudes and make choices in variable macro-political (or
other) environments (or contexts). These environments come in the form
of formal institutional rules that govern people’s behavior or in the form of
differential economic, social, and political conditions that shape people’s
interpretations and actions. (Anderson and Singer 2008, 5)
While the institutions and structural conditions affect those who are
nested within them, they may do so in different ways depending on the
individual. In other words, “different kinds of people are affected differ-
ently by these environments” (ibid.). Therefore, we are faced with varia-
tions on two levels—on the individual and on the contextual level. The
underlying assumption behind the idea, that different people interact
with different contexts in different ways, is that the macro-environment
is exogenous—“that is, external to the individual political behavior under
investigation” (ibid., 6). Faced with heterogeneity across two levels of
abstraction, the social sciences have witnessed many advances in statisti-
cal methods. Multilevel modeling, which got its start in education
research, is a technique able to account for the hierarchical structure of
such theories and data.
As the research questions as well as the nature of the data imply hierar-
chical structures, I use multilevel analysis techniques to examine the
effect a given context (welfare state) exerts on individual political disposi-
tions and behaviors. Only by modeling the hierarchical structures in the
66 J. Shore
data (each individual-level attribute corresponds to one of the countries

in the sample) can both individual- and contextual-level aspects be taken
into account, thereby avoiding a number of statistical problems one
would encounter if the hierarchical nature of the data were to be ignored
(Steenbergen and Jones 2002). Such an approach assumes that individual
attitudes and behaviors vary across countries. In other words, it is assumed
that these individual aspects vary according to welfare state context.
Additionally, multilevel models enable specific macro-features, which
also vary from country to country, to be accounted for as well. Surveys
such as the ESS or WVS seem almost to have been designed with such an
analytical approach in mind. “The basic intuition is that people are nested
in identifiable contexts—that is, they form attitudes and make choices in
variable macro-political (or other) environments (or contexts)” (Anderson
and Singer 2008, 568).
he Statistical and Theoretical Case for Multilevel

T
Analysis
Why should one use multilevel models as opposed to pure macro-level

techniques relying on aggregated data from the individual level? First,
when individual-level data are aggregated, a great deal of information is
lost: “[D]ifferent data values from sub-units are combined into fewer val-
ues for fewer high-level units” (Hox 2002, 3). Relying on aggregated
analyses of democratic citizenship indicators and the welfare state would
mean that we would have around 26 pieces of information on democratic
citizens—one value for each country in the sample. Doing so would
result in a substantial loss of information and, consequently, the statisti-
cal analyses would likely have very little power. If we were, however, to
ignore the multilevel structure in the other direction, that is, disaggregate
the data entirely by assigning all country-level values to individuals, “the
result is that a few data values from a small number of super-units are
‘blown up’ into many more values for a much larger number of sub-
units” (ibid.). In the disaggregated example, it is assumed that the data
points (individuals) are independent of one another—something, which,
conceptually, makes little sense when considering that would mean that
individuals are assigned welfare state values according to the country in

which they live. The error terms for individuals in the same country are
also likely to be correlated, thereby violating a basic assumption of mul-
tiple regression (Luke 2004, 7). Moreover, given the inflated sample size
(with the N no longer referring to the number of countries included but
the number of individuals), one is also more likely to find very significant
results, that is, “significance tests that reject the null-hypothesis far more
often than the nominal alpha level suggests” (Hox 2002, 3) would result.
In other words, drawing on a wholly disaggregated sample would likely
result in spurious findings.
Theoretical and conceptual problems may also arise when ignoring the
multilevel structure of the data. For one, the researcher may run into an
ecological fallacy—that is, making conjectures about individuals based on
aggregate data. For example, by making a cross-level inference based on
macro-level data alone about individuals in various countries, we would
be failing to consider the fact that people within countries may vary. On
the other hand, when one draws conclusions about higher-level units (in
this case, countries) based on individual-level findings, one is at risk of
committing an atomistic fallacy, that is, we would be falsely assuming that
there is no sort of national clustering of citizens, and that their policy
environments play no role in shaping their political behavior. Multilevel
analysis, however, does not define one level or another as the correct level
of analysis; instead, this technique is able to acknowledge that reality
often comprises multiple levels—be it school children in classrooms
which are nested in schools or, in our case, individuals in national welfare
state contexts. Multilevel analysis, therefore, aims to (1) examine how
both higher-level and lower-level units are related to a given outcome as
well as to (2) investigate “if the explanatory variables at the group level
serve as moderators of individual-level relationships” (Hox 2002, 4).
Introduction to Multilevel Models
We are interested in the effects of varying macro-conditions (the extent

to which countries’ welfare policies reflect a commitment to working-age
adults and families) on individual political behaviors and attitudes. The
68 J. Shore
analyses in the following chapters make use of random intercept models,

which work on the assumption that individual political behavior or atti-
tudes vary across countries. These models are examples of basic two-level
models, with individuals nested in different country contexts. The build-
ing block of any multilevel model is the level one model:
Equation 1: Level 1 Model
Yij = b 0 j + b1 j X ij + eij , (4.1)

where Yij refers to a given outcome for individual i in context j. Unlike

a normal regression model, this model assumes that each higher-level
unit has a different intercept coefficient β0j and a different slope coeffi-
cient β1j. The residual errors eij are assumed as having a mean equal to zero
as well as a variance. Both the intercept and slope can thus vary across
higher-level units; in other words, we can consider both the intercepts
and the slopes as outcomes of higher-level units, here countries (Luke
2004, 10).
The first model shown in Eq. (4.1) shows us that the regression coef-
ficients βj have a mean and variance. In the models below in Eq. (4.2), we
can explain the variation in the coefficients β0j and β1j by adding predictor
variables at the second level. The Level 2 model thus shows how the Level
1 predictors are related to the Level 2 predictors as well as the
variability.
Equation 2: Level 2 Model
b 0 j = g 00 + g 01 Z j + u0 j
(4.2)
b1 j = g 10 + g 11 Z j + u1 j

β0j is the Level 1 intercept in the second-level unit j; γ00 represents the
mean value of the dependent variable at the first level when controlled for
the Level 2 predictor Zj; .u0j is the residual error term at the second level,
or the unmodeled variability for unit j. The second part of the Level 2
equation models the second-level effects on the slope of Xij, with β1j
r epresenting the slope of the Level 1 variable at the Level 2 unit j; γ10 is
the mean value of the Level 1 slope when controlling for the second-level
predictor Zj; γ11 represents the effect of the second-level predictor Zj; and
u1j is the residual error term for second-level unit j.
The models shown in Eqs. (4.1) and (4.2) can be expressed as a single
equation by substituting the second set of equations into Eq. (4.1), result-
ing in the following multilevel model shown in Eq. (4.3):
Equation 3: Multilevel Model
Yij = g 00 + g 10 X ij + g 01 Z j + g 11 X ij Z j + u1 j X ij + u0 j + eij (4.3)

The first part of the model, γ00 + γ10Xij + γ01Zj + γ11XijZj, is the fixed part

of the model; u1jXij + u0j + eij represents the random effects. The random
effects can be considered as “additional error terms or sources of variabil-
ity” (Luke 2004, 11). The starting point for most multilevel analyses is,
however, the empty or null model, which contains no explanatory vari-
ables, neither at the first nor at the second level. The null model only
contains an intercept and is used to produce an estimate of the intraclass
correlation or the proportion of the variance in the dependent variable
that can be attributed to differences between Level 2 units. Many scholars
suggest building up a multilevel model, first adding lower-level predictor
variables and then successively introducing Level 2 predictor variables,
random slopes, and interaction terms (see, e.g., Luke 2004; Hox 2002).
Modeling Binary Data
Many of the models in Chap. 5 examine attributes of democratic citizen-

ship which are expressed dichotomously. For example, when a survey
respondent is asked whether or not he or she cast a vote in the previous
national election, only two answers are of interest—yes or no. Due to the
binary nature of this kind of variable, modeling techniques must be cho-
sen that fit to this kind of data. It would be inappropriate to treat a binary
variable like a continuous one, as the regression assumption of normal
distribution cannot be fulfilled. As the dependent variable is d
ichotomous,
70 J. Shore
a generalized hierarchical linear model (GHLM) is needed: “GHLM

works by including a necessary transformation and an appropriate error
distribution for the dependent variable into the statistical model” (Luke
2004, 53). A dependent variable like voting is bounded by 0 and 1 and
is, therefore, not normally distributed but rather binomially distributed
with a mean of μ. The estimate of μ is p; p in this case would be the prob-
ability of voting. To transform a binomial model, a logit transformation
is typically used:
Equation 4: Logit Transformation
æ p ö
logit ( p ) = ln ç ÷ (4.4)
è1- p ø
We use a logit transformation because although p is bounded between

0 and 1, the logit of p is unbounded. Moreover, the logit transformation
gives us a density of p, which is much more normal. In terms of the mul-
tilevel logistic model, it looks quite similar to the linear model. The major
difference, however, is that with logistic multilevel models, we do not
have a term for the error variance at Level 1; instead, “variance is com-
pletely determined by the means, and thus is not a separate term to be
estimated” (Luke 2004, 55).
Equation 5: Logistic Multilevel Model
logit (p ij ) = g 00 + g 10 X ij + g 10 Z j + u0 j (4.5)

Summary
This very brief discussion of multilevel modeling provides but a brief look
into the techniques that can be used to examine the relationships between
individual political behaviors and attitudes and the country-level con-
texts in which they live. To review, as outlined in Chap. 3, we can expect
that more generous welfare state contexts will have an overall positive
effect on democratic citizenship aspects. Moreover, income, a well-known

predictor of democratic political engagement, should have a weaker rela-
tionship to political behaviors and attitudes in more generous welfare
states, as welfare policies are assumed to moderate the strength of this
relationship. So while we are likely to still observe a social gradient with
regard to behaviors such as voting even in contexts where there is a strong
welfare policy focus on working-age adults and families, the relationship
between political participation and income is expected to be weaker; in
other words, the slope of the line plotting political participation by
income would be much flatter in a more generous welfare state. (I discuss
this in more depth in the empirical analyses in the chapter to follow when
introducing cross-level interactions between welfare policies and income.)
Furthermore, as discussed, the intercepts for each country also vary.
Where the intercept is located on the y-axis has to do with characteristics
of the grouping variable—in this case, countries. Put differently, the level
of political participation is determined partly by welfare state generosity
as well as by other country-specific aspects, such as the electoral system.
In the chapter to follow, wherein I analyze aspects of democratic citizen-
ship across a variety of countries, the theoretical as well as mathematical
reasoning behind the multilevel models should become clearer.
References
Adcock, Robert, and David Collier. 2001. Measurement Validity: A Shared
Standard for Qualitative and Quantitative Research. American Political
Science Review 95 (3): 529–546.
564–599.
Castles, Francis G. 2008. What Welfare States Do: A Disaggregated Expenditure
Approach. Journal of Social Policy 38 (1): 45–62. https://doi.org/10.1017/
S0047279408002547.
Clayton, Richard, and Jonas G. Pontusson. 1998. Welfare-State Retrenchment
Revisited: Entitlement Cuts, Public Sector Restructuring, and Inegalitarian
Trends in Advanced Capitalist Societies. World Politics 51 (1): 67–98.
72 J. Shore
Davis, James Allan. 1985. The Logic of Causal Order. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage
Publications.
Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. 1990. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Goertz, Gary. 2006. Social Science Concepts: A User’s Guide. Princeton, NJ:
Green-Pedersen, Christoffer. 2004. The Dependent Variable Problem Within
the Study of Welfare State Retrenchment: Defining the Problem and Looking
for Solutions. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice 6
(1): 3–14.
Hox, Joop. 2002. Multilevel Analysis. Techniques and Applications. New York:
Taylor and Francis Group.
Huber, Evelyne, Francois Nielsen, Jenny Pribble, and John D. Stephens. 2006.
Politics and Inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean. American
Sociological Review 71 (6): 943–963.
Huber, Evelyne, and John D. Stephens. 2001. Development and Crisis of the
Welfare State: Parties and Policies in Global Markets. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Inglehart, Ronald. 1983. Changing Paradigms in Comparative Political
Behavior. In Political Science: The State of the Discipline, ed. Ada W. Finifter,
429–469. Washington, DC: The American Political Science Association.
Kangas, Olli, and Joakim Palme. 2007. Social Rights, Structural Needs and
Social Expenditure: A Comparative Study of 18 OECD Countries
1960–2000. In Investigating Welfare State Change: The “Dependent Variable
Problem” in Comparative Analysis, ed. Jochen Clasen and Nico A. Siegel,
Kühner, Stefan. 2007. Country-Level Comparisons of Welfare State Change
Measures: Another Facet of the Dependent Variable Problem Within the
Comparative Analysis of the Welfare State? Journal of European Social Policy
17 (1): 5–18.
Kuitto, Kati. 2011. More Than Just Money: Patterns of Disaggregated Welfare
Expenditure in the Enlarged Europe. Journal of Social Policy 21 (4): 348–364.
———. 2016. From Social Security to Social Investment? Compensating and
Social Investment Welfare Policies in a Life-Course Perspective. Journal of
European Social Policy 26 (5): 442–459. https://doi.org/10.1177/095892
8716664297.
Lewin, Kurt. 1935. A Dynamic Theory of Personality. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Luke, Douglas A. 2004. Multilevel Modeling. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Pierson, Paul. 1994. Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher, and the
Politics of Retrenchment. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics.
Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press.
———. 2001. Coping with Permanent Austerity: Welfare State Restructuring
in Affluent Democracies. In The New Politics of the Welfare State, ed. Paul
Pierson, 410–456. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Saunders, Peter, and Friedrich Klau. 1985. The Role of the Public Sector: Causes
and Consequences of the Growth of Government. Paris: Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development.
Scruggs, Lyle, and James Allan. 2006. Welfare-Decommodification in 18
OECD Countries: A Replication and Revision. European Journal of Social
Policy 16 (1): 55–72.
Siegel, Nico A. 2007. When (Only) Money Matters: The Pros and Cons of
Expenditure Analysis. In Investigating Welfare State Change, ed. Jochen Clasen
and Nico A. Siegel, 43–71. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Steenbergen, Marco R., and Bradford S. Jones. 2002. Modeling Multilevel Data
Structures. American Journal of Political Science 46 (1): 218–237.
Wilensky, Harold L. 1975. The Welfare State and Equality: Structural and
Ideological Roots of Public Expenditures. Berkeley and London: University of
California Press.
5
The Impact of Social Policy
on Democratic Citizenship
In this chapter, the theoretical arguments regarding the influence of the

welfare state on both the levels and distributions of democratic citizen-
ship are put to the empirical test. The quantitative analyses draw on sur-
vey data from the European Social Survey (2006, 2008), Comparative
Study of Electoral Systems (2015), and the World Values Survey
(Inglehart et al. 2014). The first set of analyses examines electoral partici-
pation across welfare states and provides detailed information about the
common research designs used in the subsequent analyses of political
interest, political trust, and satisfaction with democracy.
Voting
Of all the effects that the welfare state may have on democratic citizen-
ship, voting could very well be considered the most important, as it is the
primary channel through which citizens can exercise their political rights
and influence politics in a democracy. Moreover, all conceptualizations of
democracy, be it a very minimal proceduralist conceptualization or a
maximalist participatory one, underscore the importance of elections in
their formulations (refer to the discussion in Chap. 2). And because direct

76 J. Shore
democratic institutions exist at the national level in only a few countries,

voting in elections remains the act of political participation in contempo-
rary democracies. In the analyses to follow, I test the arguments laid out
in Chap. 3 on the ways in which welfare policies can impact citizens’
political behaviors and attitudes. Individuals are thought to be more
likely to take part in elections in countries where there is a large welfare
state policy focus on working-age adults and families. This positive effect
of the welfare state on turnout is presumed to be largest for individuals
with the fewest resources. In welfare states where there is a stronger focus
on working-age populations, the salience of politics is greater, for public
policy plays a greater role in people’s lives. This may be in the form of
increased employment protection or greater family benefits. Where poli-
tics are of greater salience, we expect to see higher turnout. People’s life
chances are more closely connected to policy outcomes, thereby creating
personal political stakes. Beyond the higher likelihood of voting, more
equal patterns of voting across socioeconomic groups should also be
observed in countries with more generous welfare contexts (Solt 2008).
The following analysis looks at the relationships between the welfare
state and the individual propensity to vote as well as the ways in which
the welfare state moderates the relationship between income and electoral
participation. The analysis examines electoral participation in 26 OECD
countries between the years 2005 and 2008. Table 5.1 provides an over-
view of the countries included in the analyses, the survey sources, as well
as the year in which the individual data on voting were obtained.
Some OECD members are not included due to reasons of data avail-
ability as well as comparability: Chile, Iceland, Japan, Luxembourg,
Mexico, New Zealand, South Korea, and Turkey. Respondents in New
Table 5.1 Countries, years, and survey sources included in the analyses of voting
and welfare states
Year Countries Survey
2005 Australia, Italy WVS
2006 Austria, Belgium, Canada, Ireland, Slovakia, United States ESS/WVS
2008 Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, ESS
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
United Kingdom
The Impact of Social Policy on Democratic Citizenship 77
Zealand were not asked whether or not they voted; other demographic
information, such as employment status, is also missing in the case of
New Zealand. While individual-level data on Iceland and Luxembourg
are available from the European Values Surveys, the question on voting
asks respondents about their intention to vote and not whether they par-
ticipated in the last election. In terms of Mexico and Turkey, I opted to
omit these countries because these states do not exhibit as high a degree
of democracy as the other member states. Practically speaking, I have
omitted countries from the sample that are not ranked by Freedom House
as “free.” Turkey is right on the cusp of the “free”/“partially free” place-
ment, and with a score of 2.5, scores considerably lower than the other
countries—of which the vast majority have received the highest ranking
of 1.0. Mexico is clearly not part of the group of “free” countries with its
score of 3.0. Mexico and Turkey, while both electoral democracies, are
categorized as partially free. Civil rights abuses, freedom of the press
issues, corruption, and so on, are all factors that could potentially influ-
ence voting behavior and people’s attitudes toward democracy. The
remaining non-Western omissions are based mainly on comparability
issues as well as failures to conform to the theoretical expectations that
resources foster political participation. For example, it has been shown
that corruption can substantially decrease electoral participation
(Stockemer et al. 2013), something which is indeed a problem in many
less developed democracies. While these cases are certainly of interest, it
is beyond the scope of this book to speculate as to why neither positive
nor significant correlations between individual resources and voter turn-
out are found in these countries. Finally, although case selection is cer-
tainly guided to a large extent by data availability, there are, nevertheless,
theoretical arguments for comparing a group of countries such as these.
First, we find a wide range of variation of voter turnout. Second, all coun-
tries are members of the OECD. Despite their shared commitment to
democracy and the market economy as OECD members, the states have
produced very different responses to the social question. There are also
reasons to restrict the investigation to advanced industrial states: the “par-
adox of the civil society argument,” as Michael Walzer (1992) calls it,
refers to the mutually reinforcing relationship between civil society and
democratic governance, wherein a “democratic civil society seems to
78 J. Shore
require a democratic state, and a strong civil society seems to require a

strong and responsive state” (Foley and Edwards 1996, 48).
The Decision to Vote
Data for the dependent variable, voting (yes/no), as all individual-level

variables come from various rounds of the ESS (2006 and 2008) and the
WVS (2005). Although there are some drawbacks to using multiple sur-
vey sources, due mainly to differing sampling procedures, these surveys
do, however, provide the advantage that they employ the exact same
question (identical wording and response options) on voting: Did you
vote in the last national election? While not all idiosyncrasies are elimi-
nated with this common question, country-specific error terms in the
models do, however, capture many of the differences that may result from
issues arising from the different survey designs.
The sample consists of 34,542 individuals of legal voting age1 or older
in the 26 countries. The average reported voter turnout rate across all
countries is 80.08 percent, ranging from 58.2 percent in the Czech
Republic to 95.6 percent in Australia. It must be emphasized that these
figures represent self-reported electoral participation and do not perfectly
correspond to official national turnout rates. For example, the officially
reported turnout rate in Germany for the 2005 parliamentary election
was 77.7 percent, 64.9 percent in Canada for the 2006 election, and
approximately 82 percent for the 2006 Swedish parliamentary elections.2
When comparing these rates to the average self-reported voting rates
found in the surveys, we find notably higher figures: 83 percent in
Germany, 74.7 percent in Canada, and 91.4 percent in Sweden. The fact
that self-reported voting rates are considerably higher than the official
rates is nothing new. Although voters are given the chance to answer no,
1
All individuals under the age of 18 have been omitted from the sample. While voting age in
Austria has been lowered to 16, at the time the survey was conducted, the legal voting age was still
18. In Slovenia the voting age is 16 for employed persons; there are, however, no employed 16-year-
olds in the sample.
2
Historical and cross-national official turnout rates are available from the International Institute for
Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA): https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/voter-turnout
(Accessed February11, 2017).
I did not vote, and many surveys attempt to frame the voting question in
such a way so as to assure respondents that it is acceptable to admit to not
having voted,3 survey data, nevertheless, tend to present overreported
voter turnout rates; put simply: “many more people voted than possibly
could have” (Highton 2005, 113). Inconsistencies such as these reflect
what is known in survey research as problems of social desirability,
wherein respondents report having voted because it presents them as a
“good citizen” (Belli et al. 1999). Another possible reason surveys tend to
overreport voting behavior has to do with memory: respondents simply
fail to correctly recall whether or not they voted (Abelson et al. 1992).
Despite downsides of using survey data to capture electoral participation,
it is important to keep in mind that the correlates of voting do not tend
to be as biased as reported turnout (Verba et al. 1995, 615–17), which is
why scholars continue to depend on survey data to investigate the deter-
minants of and changes in voting patterns. Moreover, as the focus of this
study lies more on the distribution and less on the overall levels of elec-
toral participation, the survey data provide an adequate means to analyze
who votes. Table 5.2 provides an overview of the mean self-reported voter
turnout as well as the actual official turnout rate. As the table shows, not
all countries have overreported voter turnout; some even have underre-
ported mean voter turnout. On the whole, however, voter turnout is
overreported on average by around 8 percentage points.
In addition to the differences we can see between the countries in
terms of the overall level of turnout, there are also marked differences
within countries with regard to turnout and income level. Furthermore,
in many countries, there appear to be much smaller gaps between levels
of participation across income groups than in others, as Table 5.3 illus-
trates. Across the 26 countries in the analysis, while individuals from the
lowest-income quintile go to the polls at an average rate of 74.7 percent,
their better-off counterparts in the highest quintile turn out to vote at an
average rate of 87.0 percent—a turnout rate that is more than
12 percentage points higher than that of the lowest-income group. The
middle-income group (comprising quintiles of 2–4) votes at an average
3
In the European Social Survey (ESS), for example, before being asked about voting, respondents
are first told, “Some people don’t vote nowadays for one reason or another” (European Social
Survey 2010).
80 J. Shore
Table 5.2 Self-reported electoral participation and official turnout rates

Country Self-reported (%) Official (%) % Difference
Australia 95.61 94.32 1.29
Austria 86.71 81.44 5.27
Belgium 92.44 91.63 0.81
Canada 74.71 64.94 9.77
Czech Republic 58.15 64.47 −6.32
Denmark 95.28 86.59 8.69
Estonia 67.37 61.91 5.46
Finland 83.51 74.05 9.46
France 77.94 83.97 −6.03
Germany 83.09 77.65 5.44
Greece 88.82 74.14 14.68
Hungary 80.26 64.39 15.87
Ireland 77.37 62.57 14.80
Israel 78.10 63.55 14.55
Italy 90.64 81.44 9.20
Netherlands 86.40 80.35 6.05
Norway 86.35 77.44 8.91
Poland 75.31 53.88 21.43
Portugal 70.91 64.26 6.65
Slovakia 71.34 54.67 16.67
Slovenia 73.61 60.64 12.97
Spain 81.74 75.66 6.08
Sweden 91.38 81.99 9.39
Switzerland 66.07 48.28 17.79
United Kingdom 71.61 61.36 10.25
United States 77.40 86.04 −8.64
Mean 80.08 71.99 8.10
Sources: Self-reported turnout: European Social Survey (rounds 3 and 4), World
Values Survey. Official turnout: IDEA
rate of 77.7 percent. The largest difference between the voting rates of the
highest- and lowest-income groups can be found in Germany (with a
21.4 percent difference), Switzerland (with a 19.6 percent difference),
and in Poland (with a 19.4 percent difference). Countries with more
equal levels of voter participation include Denmark (with a 3.4 percent
difference), a group of countries with compulsory voting—Italy4 (with
4.7 percent difference), Belgium, and Australia (each with a difference of
4
As Lijphart (1997) speculated and Hooghe and Pelleriaux (1998) show for Belgium, compulsory
voting is able to reduce some of the inequalities of voter turnout.
Table 5.3 Self-reported voter turnout by income group

Turnout Turnout Turnout Difference
lowest mid-level highest (highest vs.
Country quintile (%) income (%) quintile (%) lowest)
Australia 92.32 97.19 97.81 5.49
Austria 83.11 87.36 92.78 9.67
Belgium 89.52 88.73 95.01 5.49
Canada 65.04 75.39 78.56 13.52
Czech Republic 52.96 60.29 63.27 10.31
Denmark 93.10 96.05 96.48 3.38
Estonia 60.27 67.33 74.82 14.55
Finland 77.74 84.62 87.44 9.70
France 71.82 79.58 82.62 10.80
Germany 71.37 85.3 92.79 21.42
Greece 87.01 87.13 94.33 7.32
Hungary 74.68 83.52 80.54 5.86
Ireland 69.09 76.61 78.90 9.81
Israel 70.41 82.19 85.71 15.30
Italy 88.42 92.04 93.09 4.67
Netherlands 80.69 84.89 89.03 8.34
Norway 80.07 85.58 89.48 9.41
Poland 63.81 71.07 83.22 19.41
Portugal 65.61 71.00 81.69 16.08
Slovakia 66.47 72.19 75.00 8.53
Slovenia 70.15 73.86 78.81 8.66
Spain 80.30 80.38 88.49 8.19
Sweden 86.07 91.34 92.84 6.77
Switzerland 57.74 68.81 77.37 19.63
United Kingdom 67.52 72.83 75.05 7.53
United States 69.23 76.88 86.10 16.87
Mean 74.69 78.65 87.01 12.32
Sources: World Values Survey, wave 4; European Social Survey, rounds 3 and 4
5.5 percentage points between low- and high-income turnout)—and

Hungary (with a 5.9 percent difference between the highest- and lowest-
income groups’ self-reported electoral participation).
After first testing to see whether welfare spending on working-age
adults and families exerts an effect on people’s decisions to vote using
logistic multilevel models with random intercepts, I then examine
whether there are differential effects of welfare state generosity for differ-
ent income groups. To do so, I introduce to the multilevel model cross-
level interactions between one’s income category (high, medium, or low)
82 J. Shore
and the level of welfare spending. The cross-level interactions themselves,

however, are not able to tell us much about how welfare policies aimed at
working-age adults and families affect the three income groups; in order
to examine how the welfare state moderates or interacts with the relation-
ship between income and voting, it is necessary to calculate the marginal
effects of one variable when another changes (Brambor et al. 2006). After
calculating the marginal effects, it will be possible to determine whether
there are different effects for the different income groups. Income group-
specific effects are, therefore, present if one or both of the following con-
ditions are fulfilled: The marginal effect of welfare spending on working-age
adults and families is significant for some income groups and not for others.
In other words, we would find that such policies exert a substantive influ-
ence on the voting behavior of one or two of the income groups but do
not significantly impact the other group or groups. Alternatively, we may
speak of group-specific effects if we find that the marginal effect of welfare
spending on working-age adults and families varies significantly across income
groups. In order for this condition to be met, these welfare policies would
need to either significantly impact the voting likelihood or all income
groups or none of them. Given either one of these situations, the effect
size would also need to be significantly greater or weaker for one income
group.5
As is elaborated on in the section to follow, the cross-level interactions
model and the marginal effects derived therefrom help us to identify the
presence of group-specific policy effects. Whether political inequality can
be diminished by welfare state spending on working-age adults and fami-
lies is the subject of this chapter’s conclusion. Finally, by drawing on both
individual-level and macro-level data, a multilevel model with cross-level
interactions, this design is arguably less prone to the issues of endogeneity
that tend to plague aggregate analyses of political participation and the
welfare state or, more frequently, macro-level income inequality. For
example, if one can observe that inequality in participation decreases
between the income groups as welfare spending on working-age adults
and families increases, we can no longer say that we are only observing a
5
See Stadelmann-Steffen’s (2011) article on female labor market participation and family policy for
an excellent discussion on the identification and classification on group-specific policy effects.
level effect. Furthermore, arguments of endogeneity would be quite com-

plex ones to make. I, however, return to this discussion in greater detail
in the concluding chapter.
Multilevel Analysis of Voting
I examine the effect of a given context (the welfare state) on the individ-
ual decision to participate in an election and, as the research question and
the nature of the data (individuals nested in national contexts) imply
hierarchical structures, multilevel analysis is the most appropriate analyti-
cal technique. As the dependent variable, whether or not the respondent
voted, is dichotomous, logistic multilevel regression models are used.
A number of individual as well as contextual factors are controlled for
in the analysis. At the individual level, a person’s age,6 gender, level of
education, employment status, area of residence (urban or not), and
union membership are taken into consideration. These individual attri-
butes, which mainly correspond to the resources for participation one has
at his or her disposal, have been frequently identified in the extant litera-
ture as some of the most prominent covariates of voting (Brady et al.
1995). Income, which has been identified in the theoretical sections as a
key variable, is initially included in the models as a continuous variable
(covering all ten income deciles) to first show its overall impact on the
propensity to vote. The final two models include cross-level interactions
between income and spending on working-age adults and families. In the
first interaction model, income enters the interaction as a continuous
variable to provide an overall picture of the ways in which income and
welfare generosity interact; in the final model, I test for the group-specific
effects by interacting the welfare spending variable with dummies for
each of the income groups (low, medium, and high).
In additional to the main context variable, the welfare state, I also
include two additional institutional variables, as the design of the elec-
toral system has also been shown to impact the calculus of voting. Most
6
In the analysis, age is included both as an absolute value (age in years) and as a quadratic term in
order to allow for the possibility that the relationship between age and voting could be curvilinear
in nature. Both terms are centered around the grand mean (Hox 2002, 56).
84 J. Shore
prominently, numerous studies have found that highly disproportional

electoral systems tend to exert a dampening effect on electoral participa-
tion (Blais 2006; Franklin 1997; Jackman 1987; Jackman and Miller
1995; Lijphart 1997). For example, it has been repeatedly found that
turnout is lower in disproportional electoral systems where the transla-
tion of votes into legislative seats is highly distorted by the electoral rules.
In such systems, smaller parties must accumulate many more votes in
order to achieve legislative representation, which may cause their sup-
porters to abstain from voting altogether, as they do not wish to waste
their votes on nonviable parties. Disproportionality also exerts an influ-
ence on voters’ efficacy, as voters in highly disproportional systems are
more likely to perceive the system to be unfair and less likely to feel that
their vote matters (Karp and Banducci 2008).
Second, I control for the effect of compulsory voting laws on the indi-
vidual decision to vote. While the inclusion of such a variable may seem
like a rather obvious choice, it has been demonstrated that compulsory
voting rules only make a difference for voter turnout if penalties for non-
voting are both sufficiently severe and enforced (Blais and Carty 1990;
Blais and Dobrzynska 1998; Franklin 1999; Panagopoulos 2008; Singh
2011). I, therefore, abstain from using a simple dichotomous measure-
ment of the existence of compulsory voting and instead take cues from
measurement schemes such as those proposed by Panagopoulos (2008)
and Singh (2011), wherein both the severity and the enforcement of
sanctions are taken into consideration.
I further control for the possibility that the strength of the left parties
could be both drivers of increased social spending and a mobilizing
force for poor voters (Brady 2003; Hicks and Swank 1992; Ross 2000).
Information about the strength of left come from the Comparative
Political Data Set (Armingeon et al. 2011), measuring social demo-
cratic and other left parties as a percentage of total cabinet posts,
weighted by the number of days the government was in office in a given
year.
Finally, as we are dealing with a very diverse group of countries, not
only in terms of their social policy foci and spending records but also
with regard to their histories and experiences with democracy, I include
a control for the age of the current regime. Some of the democracies are
much older than others, and despite the fact that all countries included
in the analysis can be considered examples of advanced democracies,
citizens in newer democracies have simply had shorter experiences with
democracy. Despite the greater fluctuations in voter turnout experi-
enced in post-communist countries, it can be observed that overall
turnout in those countries tends to be lower, with many explanations
centering on a less well-developed democratic political culture or citi-
zen disenchantment due to “unfulfilled promises of democracy”
(Dalton 2000, 930; Pacek et al. 2009). Tavits and Annus (2006), how-
ever, argue that voters in young democracies have to first learn about
their new electoral systems and how to ensure they do not waste their
votes. In line with what we know about the design of electoral systems
and turnout, it could possibly be argued that older democracies may
witness weaker voter turnout, as voting is no longer a novelty and, in
highly disproportional systems, voters may have realized that voting
may not be worth it if they prefer a smaller, less viable party. While
these effects may not be as pronounced nearly 20 years after the disso-
lution of the Soviet Union, it is, nevertheless, important to account for
the marked differences in terms of regime age found in the sample. At
the same time, it can also be observed that turnout in the oldest democ-
racies has declined more over the past decades than in others. In addi-
tion to the argument that voters in the oldest democracy may have
quite simply grown tired of going to the polls, many have noted the
processes of de-alignment that have occurred in many established
democracies. That is, party identification has been on the decline in the
past decades, and thus has the mobilizing role parties can have, par-
ticularly with regard to peripheral voters, has also been reduced.
Moreover, the loosening of the ties between labor unions and labor
parties has certainly led to increasing difficulties in mobilizing organiz-
ing interests and, consequently, to a drop in turnout (Gray and Caul
2016). The age of democracy could therefore exert either a positive or
a negative influence on voting. A complete overview of all variables,
their sources, operationalizations, and summary statistics can be found
in the appendix.
86 J. Shore
Empirical Findings: Voting
In this section, I present the findings of the multilevel models.7 Beginning

with an empty model (Model 1), the models are presented in a stepwise
manner, with each successive model building on the last. Model 2 adds
the individual-level explanatory variables; Model 3 introduces the welfare
state variable; in Model 4, additional country-level predictors (compul-
sory voting and disproportionality of the electoral system) are included;
and in Models 5 and 6 (in Table 5.9), I add cross-level interaction between
income (first as a continuous variable and then as categories) and welfare
state spending. The final models allow us to test whether welfare state
policies aimed at working-age adults and families moderate the relation-
ship between an individual’s income and his or her propensity to vote.
From the model with the interaction terms between the income catego-
ries and welfare state spending, I then calculate marginal effects to inves-
tigate whether the effect of welfare state spending is uniform across all
income groups.
The first model (Model 1) is an empty, or null, model. Only a random
intercept is included. The highly significant intercept and variance com-
ponents at the country level lend support for multilevel analysis, as vot-
ing is indeed shown to vary significantly across countries. From the empty
model (in Table 5.4), we can say that the log-odds of voting in an “aver-
age” country is estimated at 1.525. The intercept for country j with
1.525 + uoj. In substantive terms, if we calculate the odds ratios from the
log-odds shown in Table 5.4, people are on average around 4.6 times
more likely to have reported voting than not to have voted. The propor-
tion of the variance in voting that comes from differences between coun-
tries is 0.125, that is, around 12.5 percent of the variance in voting
originates from differences found at the country level. An intraclass cor-
relation of this size provides further justification for continuing on to
multilevel models. The second value listed is the estimated standard devi-
ation of the random intercept, that is, the standard deviation at the
7
I describe and explain the models and procedures in much greater depth in the present analysis on
voting than in the subsequent analyses, as the basic structure of the models remains more or less the
same.
Table 5.4 Multilevel analyses of voting

Voted—yes/no
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant 1.525*** 0.230 −0.463 −0.239
(0.135) (0.142) (0.354) (0.379)
Fixed effects
Age 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035***
(mean-centered) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age squared −0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Union membership 0.199*** 0.197*** 0.196***
(ref. = non-member) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Employed 0.096*** 0.096*** 0.097***
(ref. = not employed) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Gender −0.017 −0.017 −0.017
(ref. = male) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Education level (0–5) 0.298*** 0.298*** 0.298***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Urban −0.072** −0.071** −0.070**
(ref. = non-urban) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Income decile 0.090*** 0.090*** 0.090***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Welfare effort: working-age 0.123** 0.098*
adults/families
(0.058) (0.053)
Compulsory voting 0.368***
(0.109)
Disproportionality −0.025
(0.028)
Age of democracy −0.000
(0.002)
Strength of left −0.002
(0.003)
Random effects
Rho 0.125 0.119 0.103 0.069
Context variance 0.685 0.668 0.615 0.495
N 34,542 (26) 34,542 (26) 34,542 (26) 34,542 (26)
Notes: Log-odds with standard errors in parentheses; Model 1: Empty model,
intercept only; Model 2: Individual variables only; Model 3: Welfare state
variable added; Model 4: Full model (individual and country-level predictors)
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1
88 J. Shore
c ountry level (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008, 249). From the likeli-
hood ratio statistic that tests the null hypothesis that ø̂ = 0 , we can
reject the null hypothesis. The test statistic of 2260.61 and its corre-
sponding p-value that is less than 0.000 provides us with strong evidence
that the between-country variance is non-zero.
In Model 2, individual-level determinants of voting are added to the
model. The first thing to be observed is the slight reduction in variance—
both in the contextual-level variance and the proportion of the total vari-
ance which comes from differences between the higher-level units. Not
surprisingly, all but one of the individual-level variables are highly signifi-
cant. When dealing with such a large number of cases—34,542 individu-
als—it is quite likely to find highly significant relationships at this level.
From this second model, the following conclusions can be drawn: the
likelihood of voting increases with age, as seen by the positive and highly
significant coefficient for age. The relationship between age and propen-
sity to vote is, however, slightly U-shaped—that is, one’s likelihood of
voting first increases and then tapers off slightly with increasing age.
Members as well as former members of trade unions are also more likely
to vote than non-members. This finding is a rather intuitive one, as union
members are likely to be exposed to political information and experience
mobilizing effects via membership. Increasing education also exerts a bol-
stering effect on one’s likelihood of voting. Compared to non-employed
individuals, people who hold a job are more likely to vote. People who
reside in urban areas are also more likely to be voters than people who live
in rural locations. Another strong effect can be seen with regard to the
relationship between income and electoral participation, thereby cor-
roborating the hypothesis and volumes of academic work showing that
resources matter for political participation. In terms of differences
between men and women, Model 2 shows that men are slightly more
likely to vote than women—a finding which echoes the extant literature
on voter turnout. This gender difference, however, is not found to be
statistically significant. Overall, we can say that people with greater
resources are more likely to be voters.
Models 3 and 4 in Table 5.4 include country-level predictors. In Model
3, the welfare state variable is added. In accordance with the hypothesized
relationship between voting and welfare state spending, this variable is
shown to exert a positive and highly significant (p < 0.05) direct effect on

the individual decision to vote: individuals are more likely to vote in
countries where a greater percentage of the GDP is spent on working-age
adults and families: one additional percentage point of spending amounts
to an increase in the odds ratio (not shown) of voting by 1.13. Compared
to the empty model, the proportion of the variance coming from the dif-
ferences between voting is reduced by around 17.6 percent.
When adding control variables (Model 4), the strength of the welfare
state variable is notably reduced but continues to remain significant at
the 10 percent level. While the effect of the level of disproportionality of
a national electoral system works in the hypothesized direction—greater
disproportionality is associated with a reduced likelihood of voting—its
effect is negligible. Compulsory voting, on the other hand, is found to
exert a positive and highly significant effect on one’s decision to vote. This
result is in line with the hypothesized relationship; moreover, a quick
glance at Table 5.6 shows that the countries with the most severe and
enforced compulsory voting legislation (Australia and Belgium) also have
very high rates of turnout. While the strength of left parties in govern-
ment seems to have a negative effect on one’s propensity to vote, this
effect is, however, negligible. The age of a democracy also does not appear
to impact vote likelihood. Models 3 and 4 have shown that a welfare state
policy focus on working adults and families positively and significantly
impacts the probability that an individual decides to vote, even when
controlling for other factors at both the individual and country levels.
Compared to the empty model, Model 4 reduces the variance at the
country level by around 28 percent and the proportion of the total vari-
ance, which comes from differences between countries by around
45 percent.
Up until now, the models have shown that welfare state spending on
working-age adults and families is able to contribute to the explanation
of the differences between individual voter turnout in the 26 countries.
Models 3 and 4 clearly show a direct effect of welfare state spending;
however, in order to test whether this type of welfare state policy focus
moderates the relationship between income and electoral participation as
well as whether the effects are uniform across groups and thus able to
promote political equality, it is necessary to include interaction terms
90 J. Shore
between the income (both as a continuous variable and as categories) and

the welfare state variable. The final models—Models 5 and 6 in
Table 5.5—test whether there are differential effects of welfare state
spending aimed at working-age adults and families across income groups
by including cross-level interactions. The added value of including these
interaction terms is that we are now able to take the micro-micro rela-
tionships between income and voting into account when looking at the
micro-macro relationship between individual voter turnout and welfare
state policies.
Table 5.5 Multilevel analyses of voting with cross-level interactions

Voted—yes/no
Model 5 Model 6
Constant −0.618 −0.243
(0.402) (0.393)
Fixed effects
Age 0.035*** 0.035***
(mean-centered) (0.001) (0.001)
Age squared −0.000*** −0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
Union membership 0.198*** 0.196***
(ref. = non-member) (0.034) (0.034)
Employed 0.115*** 0.113***
(ref. = not employed) (0.036) (0.036)
Gender −0.021 −0.020
(ref. = male) (0.029) (0.029)
Education level (0–5) 0.306*** 0.307***
(0.014) (0.014)
Urban −0.071** −0.070**
(ref. = non-urban) (0.032) (0.032)
Income (deciles) 0.398***
(0.063)
Income cat. (ref. = low)
Mid-level 0.423***
(0.113)
High 0.777***
(0.126)
Welfare effort: working-age 0.143** 0.124**
adults/families
(0.057) (0.055)
Compulsory voting 0.374*** 0.374***
(0.111) (0.112)
(continued)
Table 5.5 (continued)
Voted—yes/no
Model 5 Model 6
Disproportionality −0.026 −0.026
(0.028) (0.029)
Age of democracy −0.000 −0.000
(0.002) (0.002)
Strength of left −0.002 −0.002
(0.003) (0.003)
Welfare × Income −0.019*
(0.010)
Welfare × Mid-level income −0.014
(0.020)
Welfare × High income −0.036*
(0.021)
Random effects
Rho 0.071 0.072
Context variance 0.502 0.506
N 34,542 (26) 34542 (26)
Notes: Log-odds. Standard errors in parentheses
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1
Table 5.6 Marginal effects of welfare policy on voting by income category

Voted—yes/no Spending on working-age adults and families
Low income 0.020**
(0.009)
Mid-level income 0.015**
(0.007)
High income 0.011
(0.007)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Based on Model 6 in Table 5.5; other
values held at means
**p < 0.05
The coefficients of the individual-level variables in Models 5 and 6

remain almost entirely unaffected, save for the coefficients of the income
variables, which are part of the interaction terms. I refrain, however, from
further discussion of the control variables in the model, as they are pre-
cisely that—controls. In Model 5, with the interaction between welfare
spending and income as a continuous variable, we see that the overall
92 J. Shore
impact of resources declines as welfare spending on working-age adults

and families increases. Put another way, the importance of income for
one’s propensity to vote increases where the state spends less on these
groups.
In Model 6, interaction between welfare spending and the income cat-
egories are included. The coefficient for the single welfare state term rep-
resents the effect of welfare state spending on voting for the lowest-income
category (0.124). Here, we see a positive and significant effect at the
5 percent level. The interaction terms refer to the effects for the two
higher-income categories. Interpreting the effects of interaction terms,
however, is a notoriously thorny undertaking. When looking first to the
significance of the interaction terms, we get an idea about whether the
effect of welfare state spending on voting for the higher-income catego-
ries actually differs from the effect for the lowest category. Here, we can
tentatively say that the effects of the welfare state on voting are not sig-
nificantly different for the lowest group compared to the middle-income
category. The effect of the welfare policy variable on voting for people in
the highest-income category, however, does appear to be significantly dif-
ferent than the effects found for the lowest category, as indicated by the
single star denoting significance at the 10 percent level. As Brambor et al.
(2006) point out, although it is necessary to include the constitutive
terms of an interaction in addition to the interaction itself, they should
not be interpreted as unconditional marginal effects. In order to see
whether there are significant interaction effects for the income categories,
I, therefore, calculate the marginal effects for the respective groups. A
marginal effect estimates the extent to which the dependent variable is
expected to “increase or decrease for a unit change in an explanatory vari-
able” (Buis 2010, 305). As mentioned, the single welfare state variable
represents the impact of welfare state spending on working-age adults
and families on the voting behavior of individuals from the lowest-
income category.
Table 5.6 shows the marginal effects of welfare state spending on vot-
ing for each of the three income groups. These figures show that the effect
of welfare state spending on the propensity to vote does not affect all
groups of individuals in the same manner, indicating the presence of the
first condition—that the marginal effect of the welfare policy variable is
significant for some income groups but not for others. Although we see
positive effects of the welfare state on voting for all income groups, the
magnitude as well as the significance of the effects are not uniform.
Referring back to the regression Table 5.5, we see that although the effect
of the welfare state on the middle-income group is not significantly dif-
ferent from the effect for the lowest-income group, clear differences in
terms of effect size can be observed when comparing the highest- to the
lowest-income group. The largest effect of additional welfare state spend-
ing on one’s propensity to vote is found for the lowest-income group. In
other words, while we do observe an overall bolstering effect of the wel-
fare state on voter turnout, this effect is the greatest for the lowest-income
group, followed closely by the middle group. These differences are best
observed graphically:
Figure 5.1 illustrates that at the very lowest levels of spending on
working-age adults and families, electoral participation is highly strati-
fied. This stratification is seen to level off considerably when the higher
levels of spending are reached. As mentioned, the effects for the lowest-
and mid-level income groups are quite similar, as can be seen by the
.9
Probability of Voting
.85
.8
.75
.7
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
% of GDP Spent on Working-Age Adults and Families
Low Income Mid-Level Income High Income
Fig. 5.1 Income level and predicted turnout depending on welfare state spend-
ing. Notes: Based on model 6 in Table 5.5. All other values held at means
94 J. Shore
similarity in steepness of the lines for these two income groups. The
slope for the highest-income group, however, is clearly the least steep.
The effect of additional welfare spending on voting is the smallest for
individuals belonging to this highest-income category. In other words,
those people who already have ample resources are not as affected by
increases in working-age spending than people with fewer resources.
Nevertheless, we do still see an increase in the propensity to vote for
individuals from the highest-income category as well (even though this
effect does not reach conventional levels of significance). Despite the
fact that electoral participation remains stratified even in the more egali-
tarian countries, the degree of stratification is far less severe than in
countries that invest very little in their working-age populations. At the
upper end of the welfare spending scale, individuals from the lower-
income groups seem to be catching up to their wealthier counterparts.
These results do, however, require further testing. When dealing with a
relatively small number of countries, single Level 2 units can quickly
exert a large effect on country-level effects. Further analyses not pre-
sented here, wherein Model 6 was run repeatedly, each time excluding
one of the 26 countries, yielded results similar to those obtained with all
countries. Nor is the model sensitive to the inclusion of Israel, whose
status as an advanced democracy might be called into question. Moreover,
when omitting the variables age of democracy and left government
strength (separately and together), the model does not yield substan-
tially different results.
Voting Patterns in Welfare States: Conclusions
The previous analyses of individual voter turnout show two things: first,
that the welfare state policies focused on working-age adults and families
have a positive and significant direct effect on the individual likelihood of
having voted in an election in the 26 OECD countries under consider-
ation. This finding corroborates the hypothesis that increased welfare
state spending has a bolstering effect on electoral participation due to the
personal stakes such policies create and the increased overall salience of
politics associated with a larger welfare state. While such a finding by
itself is of course an interesting one, it is perhaps even more interesting to

examine the micro-micro relationships behind this micro-macro rela-
tionship. To do so, I examined the interaction between welfare state
spending and income to investigate whether the welfare state moderates
the link between monetary resources and one’s propensity to vote. In
other words, do we find higher levels of turnout in countries with more
generous welfare states because the wealthier are participating at overall
higher levels or does the overall higher level reflect that “a rising tide lifts
all boats?” The results of the logistic multilevel model with cross-level
interactions between the income categories and the welfare state variable
show the latter—not only does this bolstering effect span across social
milieu, but it functions most strongly for the lowest-income group. That
is, a strong commitment to working-age adults and families moderates
the strength of the relationship between income and voting. For those
individuals possessing greater socioeconomic resources, the effects of
additional welfare spending are much less pronounced.
It is, however, difficult to argue that we see this bolstering effect of
welfare spending on the turnout of low- and middle-income earners
because they are the recipients of such benefits, as in many societies, par-
ticularly the Nordic countries, cash allowances and benefits in kind are
allotted on a universal and not a means-tested basis. For low- and middle-
income individuals, however, welfare policies aimed at working-age
adults and families are likely to have greater importance and relevance for
their well-being daily lives, as it is precisely this type of spending that is
likely to lessen some of the financial burden of raising a family or
maintaining one’s standard of living during bouts of unemployment.
While spending on family and unemployment can of course also be ben-
eficial to high earners, it can be argued that it is less critical for their
chances in life than such expenditures would be for the lower portion of
the income distribution.
If we believe that high levels of political participation are necessary for
democratic health and vitality, not to mention matters of representation,
these analyses are, in general, able to report something positive—that
individuals in countries that invest in and spend more on working-age
adults and families are more likely to participate in elections. More
importantly, however, the results indicate that generous welfare states also
96 J. Shore
have lower political inequality by reducing the dependence of political

participation on individual economic resources. Despite this initial posi-
tive finding, we, nevertheless, see that resources, mainly in terms of
income, continue to play a crucial role for the individual decision to vote.
Although the participatory gap between rich and poor is narrower in
countries with high levels of social spending on families and their
working-age populations, it is clear that more can be done to alleviate the
political inequalities that all too often accompany economic inequalities.
Whose voices get heard and whose remain quiet is indeed a cause for
concern. Unequal participation and the resulting unequal representation
have the potential to undermine the legitimacy of electoral and legislative
outcomes. As the American Political Science Association’s Task Force on
Inequality and American Democracy pointed out a decade and a half
ago: “[c]itizens with lower or moderate incomes speak with a whisper
that is lost on the ears of inattentive government officials, while the
advantaged roar with a clarity and consistency that policy-makers readily
hear and routinely follow” (American Political Science Association Task
Force 2004, 651).
Political Interest
What Is Political Interest and Why Does It Matter?
Although we know that political interest is very important in explaining

numerous aspects of democratic engagement, political scientists have
shown relatively little interest in this topic (Macedo 2005, 35). Political
interest, more so than education or political knowledge, can explain why
people get involved in political activities (Verba et al. 1995). Moreover, it
is extremely important in explaining one’s level of political sophistica-
tion (Luskin 1990) and has been shown as the main predictor of voting,
party mobilization, and organizational involvement (Miller and Rahn
2002). In other words, political interest is an important precursor to a
number of political activities. While it is fairly straightforward how edu-
cation can enhance a person’s political interest—by enhancing one’s
political efficacy or the ability to understand what can at times be a very
complicated political world (van Deth 1990)—the ways in which income

is related to political interest and how welfare state policies may moderate
this relationship do require further investigation. In this section, I empir-
ically examine how welfare state policies can impact individuals’ interest
in politics. The research design of the following analyses essentially mir-
rors the voting analysis: I again draw on logistic multilevel models with
cross-level interactions to examine how the context of a welfare state
focus on working-age adults and families can moderate the relationships
between income and political interest in 26 OECD countries.
Political interest is frequently defined as “the degree to which politics
arouse a citizen’s curiosity” (van Deth 1990, 278) and implies attentive-
ness as well as some sort of willingness to participate (van Deth 2000,
119). Political interest is, however, often overlooked empirically or taken
as a given in the study of political behavior. The reasons to study political
interest, however, are manifold, not in the least because it is seen as the
necessary precursor to so many other forms of political engagement. At
the same time, although political interest is thought to be a prerequisite
to further, more demanding forms of political behavior, we cannot say
that a mere interest in politics is equivalent to other more active forms of
behavior. As Verba and Nie (1972) pointed out in their pioneering cross-
national study of political behavior, political participation indeed implies
something active beyond political attitudes and cognitive dispositions.
In other words, “taking an interest in something” and “doing something”
are clearly distinct activities (van Deth 1990; see also Macedo 2005; van
Deth 2000). Moreover, not all who are interested actually participate. At
the same time, voters may go to the polls on Election Day out of a sense
of civic duty and not because they are particularly interested in politics
(Campbell 2006). Nevertheless, political interest is an important ingre-
dient for a healthy, stable democracy: “Without a minimum level of
subjective political interest citizens would not even be aware of the polit-
ical process or of the opportunities to defend their well-being, to con-
tribute to collective actions, or to select a representative” (van Deth
2000, 119). In addition to political interest as curiosity or attentiveness,
there exist concepts relating political interest to political saliency or poli-
tics’ relative importance: “Even if political phenomena arouse curiosity
and concern among citizens, it is not obvious that politics is considered
98 J. Shore
to be importance or even relevant for their lives” (ibid.). These two con-
ceptions of political interest need not, however, be mutually exclusive; it
is entirely conceivable that political interest could reflect both a curiosity
in political matters and a feeling that politics are salient.
What is known about political interest is that it is strongly linked to
resources—both education and income (Brady et al. 1995)—and that
political socialization also plays a considerable role (e.g., Bennett and
Bennett 1989; Hooghe 2004). Experiences with politics that people have
prior to adulthood at home or in school partially shape how one thinks
about and engages with politics (Luskin 1990). As, however, Macedo and
his coauthors (2005, 35) point out, “pre-adult experiences” are not the
only determinants of people’s political interest: between the 1992 and
1996 US presidential elections, the percentage of Americans reporting
being “very interested” in politics dropped by 14 points; clearly, “pre-
adult” experiences cannot account for such a dramatic shift in political
interest. The political environment and the stimulation it provided (or
lack thereof ), they argue, must have also played a role. This observation
hearkens back to E.E. Schattschneider’s (1960) analysis of the American
withdrawal from politics. He confronted the prevailing sentiment that an
apathetic and uninformed citizenry was to blame for its lack of participa-
tion, arguing that the reasons why the lower classes abstained from poli-
tics were not due to any sort of moral or civic deficiencies; rather, the
political system itself was to blame, for it did not offer much to the public
to mobilize, engage, or even encourage political participation (Mettler
and Soss 2004).
In line with the discussions on policy feedback effects in Chap. 3, it
can be assumed that people will be more likely to be interested in politics
when politics actually has something to offer them. That is, when politi-
cal outcomes are relevant and meaningful for people’s lives, they will be
more likely to find politics to be salient and interesting. Generous welfare
policies are clearly not only relevant for many people because of the
implications for their own well-being and life chances, but they also have
an overall redistributive effect. In his study of income inequality and
political participation, Solt (2008, 49) argues that high levels of eco-
nomic inequality reduce political engagement across all income strata but
especially among poorer people due to power imbalances: “If a country’s
income and wealth are more concentrated, power within the country will
be more concentrated; that is, where rich individuals are richer relative to
poorer individuals, they will be more powerful relative to these poor indi-
viduals as well” (see also Goodin and Dryzek 1980). Not only should
overall political interest be higher in countries with welfare policies clearly
aimed at reducing economic inequality among working-age adults and
families but the interest differences between income groups should also
be reduced due to the fact that the issues affecting the less well-off citizens
actually reach the political agenda.
Generous welfare policies furthermore send a message to the citizenry
that their interests are valued and protected, as such policy foci tend also
to be universalistic and broadly inclusive in nature (e.g., Mettler and Soss
2004). If the interests of the less advantaged are not given space on the
political docket and thus remain underrepresented, it can be assumed
that poorer individuals may have little reason to be interested in politics.
Moreover, we may also witness a depressing effect in terms of wealthier
people’s political interest in societies where there is very little spent on
policies aimed at alleviating and/or preventing distress among the
working- age population: wealthier individuals may need to be less
involved or interested in politics because they do not have to defend their
interests against those of the lower socioeconomic status groups.8
In terms of the specific policies examined in the following analyses of
political interest, I assume that a direct effect of welfare state spending
may be found, as even the wealthier are (were) likely to be (or have been)
recipients of some sort of family benefits. Poorer- and middle-class indi-
viduals are more likely to depend on these types of benefits or services
and would, therefore, be interested in politics due mainly to importance
and relevance such policies have for their everyday lives. If an indirect
effect is to be found, further examination of the indirect effects (by means
of cross-level interactions between income groups and welfare state
spending) are needed. As mentioned, due to the already high levels of
resources that wealthier individuals have at their disposal, their predicted
8
This line of argumentation is highly speculative; Schattschneider (1960, 105–107), however,
added that even in the face of high inequality, the wealthier will continue to be motivated to par-
ticipate in politics because conflicts of interest among the upper classes remain (see also Solt 2008).
100 J. Shore
levels of political engagement are already relatively high. Additional wel-

fare state spending, therefore, may not substantially affect their already
high predicted levels of political interest. Individuals from the lower-
income groups, however, are expected to be positively affected by
increased welfare spending on working adults and families, as such poli-
cies are potentially very relevant and important for their lives and liveli-
hoods. Moreover, as this type of policy focus represents a commitment to
the social rights of all members of a society, it is assumed that politics will
embody something that is more inclusive and engaging and less alienat-
ing of weaker members. Finally, we know from a growing body of works
(e.g., Mau 2003; Rothstein 1998; Svallfors 2007), that depending on the
design of welfare policy, “welfare systems embody and create norms about
what is fair and just, and form citizens’ expectations and demands”
(Oskarson 2010, 5). In sum, where policies intervene in meaningful ways
in people’s everyday lives, we can expect greater political interest due to
the increased saliency of politics; where these intervening policies embody
norms of fairness and a commitment to alleviating economic-based
inequality, we can expect that the positive impact on political interest will
be the greatest for those who stand to benefit the most, that is, individu-
als at the lower portion of the income distribution.
Political Interest in 26 OECD Countries
To investigate the impact of welfare state policy on individual political

interest, I utilize the same basic research design as in the previous analyses
of voting: the same 26 OECD countries are included in the analysis, I
employ the same operationalization of the welfare state, and also rely on
multilevel logistic models. I, therefore, refrain from going through the
details of the research design again in this and in the subsequent analyses.
Data on political interest as well as the individual-level attributes also
come from the 2006 and 2008 waves of the ESS as well as from the 2005
WVS. The question gauging political interest, which is exactly the same
in both surveys, is: how interested would you say you are in politics?
Respondents are given four response options: 1—very interested; 2—some-
what interested; 3—not very interested; and 4—not at all interested. The
data have been recoded to form a binary variable, wherein people stating
that they are very interested and those who are somewhat interested were
assigned the value of 1; respondents who are not very interested and not at
all interested received the value of 0.
The sample consists of 36,274 adults in 26 democracies.9 When all
respondents in all countries are taken together, interest in politics is
nearly evenly split: around 50.1 percent responded that they are some-
what or very interested in politics; 49.1 percent tend toward political
disinterest. These aggregated figures do not, however, tell much of a
story. In Fig. 5.2, we see that the highest reported political interest can
be found in Denmark, with around 75 percent of respondents stating
an interest in politics. The Czechs appear to be the least interested, with
only about 19 percent of respondents indicating political interest.
Although political interest would at first appear to be evenly distributed
across all respondents, Fig. 5.2 clearly shows that there are vast differ-
ences between countries with regard to the proportion of respondents
who are somewhat or very interested in politics. There is a difference of
around 56 percentage points between the share of respondents in the
country with the highest reported political interest (Denmark) and the
country with the fewest individuals interested in politics (Czech
Republic).
In Table 5.7, we can see that levels of political interest are considerably
lower for individuals in the lowest-income quintile: 41.2 percent com-
pared to 60.6 percent in the highest-income group. Portugal, the country
with the third lowest overall levels of political interest, has the lowest level
of political interest in the lowest-income category: only 14.2 percent of
individuals reported being interested in politics. In all but one country—
Slovakia—greater income is associated with greater interest in politics.
The figures in the table and the comparisons of columns immediately
reveal some interesting patterns: For example, low interest is not always
associated with higher polarization between low- and high-income
groups, nor is high overall political interest always accompanied by lower
polarization.
9
Although the same data sources and countries are used for the voting and political analyses, the
number of respondents differs due to the varying number of missing values on the two outcome
variables.
102 J. Shore
DK 75
NL 68
DE 63
US 62
CH 61
AU 59
SE 59
GB 58
AT 53
FR 53
SI 51
CA 50
BE 50
FI 50
NO 49
IE 47
EE 47
IL 46
PL 45
IT 43
SK 40
HU 39
GR 31
PT 30
ES 27
CZ 19
Fig. 5.2 Political interest in 26 OECD countries. Notes: Percentage of respondents

indicating that they are either very interested or somewhat interested in politics.
Source: European Social Survey, rounds 3 and 4; World Values Survey, wave 4.
Country codes: AT: Austria; AU: Australia; BE: Belgium; CA: Canada: CH:
Switzerland; CZ: Czech Republic; DE: Germany; DK: Denmark; EE: Estonia; ES:
Spain; FI: Finland; FR: France; GB: United Kingdom; GR: Greece; HU: Hungary; IE:
Ireland; IL: Israel; IT: Italy; NL: Netherlands; NO: Norway; NZ: New Zealand; PL:
Poland; PT: Portugal; SE: Sweden; SI: Slovenia; SK: Slovakia; US: United States
A series of multilevel logistic models will help illuminate the differ-

ences in political interest across countries and between income groups
described earlier. As in the previous analysis, the first model, an empty
model with only a random intercept, allows us to see how much of the
total variance in political interest can be attributed to differences between
the countries. The successive models will first introduce individual-level
determinants of political interest, then the welfare state variable (public
spending on working-age adults and families as a percentage of the GDP),
further country-level variables, and finally, cross-level interactions
between the welfare state variable and income (both as a continuous and
as dummy-group variables) are introduced to test whether welfare poli-
cies moderate the relationship between income and the likelihood of
being interested in politics.
Table 5.7 Political interest by income group

Pol. Pol. Pol.
% Reporting interest interest interest Difference
political lowest mid-level highest (highest vs.
Country interest quintile income quintile lowest)
Australia 59.43 52.11 61.72 64.10 11.99
Austria 53.31 49.21 50.53 63.03 13.85
Belgium 50.03 31.90 42.10 57.21 25.31
Canada 50.18 45.76 46.81 55.13 9.37
Czech 19.11 17.81 19.45 23.53 5.72
Republic
Denmark 74.87 69.57 71.79 80.36 10.79
Estonia 46.57 40.94 47.93 49.32 8.38
Finland 49.85 45.47 49.55 54.26 8.79
France 52.74 42.07 50.35 65.76 23.69
Germany 63.37 51.01 64.40 78.90 27.89
Greece 31.38 26.18 29.22 42.76 16.58
Great 57.64 47.53 59.05 68.13 20.60
Britain
Hungary 38.59 31.99 39.53 45.49 13.50
Ireland 46.87 36.54 43.13 51.50 14.96
Israel 46.45 34.96 51.63 58.35 23.66
Italy 43.20 38.35 41.44 50.24 11.89
Netherlands 68.31 53.59 65.08 74.94 21.35
Norway 49.41 41.96 46.84 53.95 11.99
Poland 45.15 35.69 42.67 51.17 15.48
Portugal 29.94 14.20 32.20 41.89 27.69
Slovakia 40.30 31.29 42.66 30.77 -0.52
Slovenia 50.71 43.28 50.18 65.79 22.51
Spain 27.01 19.58 29.84 44.24 24.66
Sweden 59.40 51.17 59.59 61.62 10.45
Switzerland 61.25 53.11 62.58 74.13 21.02
United 62.03 57.34 58.43 75.00 17.66
States
Mean 50.01 41.16 47.69 60.61 18.99
Sources: World Values Survey, wave 4; European Social Survey, rounds 3 and 4
The individual-level variables included in the models are the same

as those in the voting model: age, union membership, employment
status, gender, educational level, area of residence, and income level.
At the country level, I furthermore control for the disproportionality
of the electoral system, age of the democracy (see previous chapter for
discussion), and strength of left parties. In terms of the first country
104 J. Shore
control—disproportionality—we can draw on the assumptions regarding

its effect on voter turnout and apply them to political interest. It has been
well documented that proportional representation (PR) systems produce
higher turnout (e.g., Blais 2006; Jackman and Miller 1995) due to the
efficacy-enhancing effects that a more proportional system creates.
Proportionality has also been shown to strengthen party preferences.
Because PR systems tend to produce a greater number of choices in terms
of interest representation, interest in politics is assumed to be higher in
countries with more proportional electoral systems (Karp and Banducci
2008). Including a country’s age as well as the strength of its left-govern-
ing parties allows us to control for further important differences that
could indeed affect interest in a way similar to voting. A complete over-
view of these variables, their operationalizations, summary statistics, and
sources can be found in the Appendix.
Political Interest in Welfare States: Empirical Results
In this section, I present the findings of the logistic multilevel models.

Beginning with the empty model (Model 1 in Table 5.8), we see that the
proportion of the variance in the probability to be interested in politics
that can be attributed to differences between countries is around 8.3 per-
cent. Adding the individual-level variables (Model 2), the variance at the
country level drops (from 0.546 to 0.480), as does the intraclass correla-
tion—from 8.3 percent to 6.5 percent. The patterns of individual-level
predictors of political interest are quite similar to those in the voting
analysis. Political interest first increases with age and then drops slightly
after a while, indicating a curvilinear relationship of age to political inter-
est. Union members are not only more likely to be voters, but they are
also much more likely to show some degree of political interest as com-
pared to non-union members. Living in an urban area as well as increases
in education are also strongly and positively linked to an increased likeli-
hood of being interested in politics. Likewise, increasing income exerts a
highly significant impact on political interest. The results of the individual-
level model differ from the voting analysis in two main ways: first, we
find a significant gender effect on political interest. Whereas gender was
Table 5.8 Multilevel analyses of political interest

Political interest
Constant −0.043 −1.367*** −1.646*** −1.815***
(0.108) (0.104) (0.269) (0.287)
Fixed effects
Age 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022***
(Mean-centered) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age squared −0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Union membership 0.207*** 0.206*** 0.206***
(ref. = non-member) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Employed −0.063** −0.063** −0.064**
(ref. = not employed) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Gender −0.535*** −0.535*** −0.534***
(ref. = male) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Education level (0–5) 0.228*** 0.229*** 0.229***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Urban 0.379*** 0.379*** 0.378***
(ref. = non-urban) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Income decile 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.064***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Welfare effort: working-age 0.050 0.075*
adults/families
(0.044) (0.039)
Disproportionality −0.019
(0.021)
Age of democracy 0.000***
(0.000)
(0.002)
Random effects
Rho 0.083 0.065 0.062 0.041
N 36,274 (26) 36,274 (26) 36,274 (26) 36,274 (26)
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1
a non-significant factor in the individual-level voting model, being

female is a clear and significant depressor of political interest. This gen-
der gap in political interest is in line with previous findings that show it
to be a rather persisting difference (Bennett and Bennett 1989; Burns
2002). The second major difference to the voting analysis regards the
106 J. Shore
effect of employment. In terms of the propensity to vote, being employed

was positively related; here, however, the status of being employed has
significant negative effect on the tendency to be interested in politics.
Adding the single welfare state variable to Model 3, we see slight
decreases in the overall variance. The effect of spending on social policies
benefiting working-age adults and families is positive, albeit not signifi-
cant at traditional levels. Before, however, declaring that there is no sub-
stantial effect of welfare state spending on political interest, it is necessary
to also test this variable against other country-level controls in order to
account for the many differences found within this group of countries. As
Model 4 depicts, when controlling for the level of disproportionality of
the electoral system, the age of democracy, and the strength of left parties
in government, the strength of the positive relationship between the wel-
fare policy variable and the likelihood of being interested in politics
increases. With these country-level attributes included in the model, we
moreover see a moderately significant (p < 0.1) effect of social spending
on working-age adults and families. Disproportionality exerts a negative
effect on the probability of being politically interested and thus is in line
with the theoretical expectations; this coefficient is, however, non-
significant. The age of a democracy is furthermore positively and signifi-
cantly related to the probability of being interested in politics. Strength
of the left does not have any substantive effect on political interest.
The final models (5 and 6 in Table 5.9) introduce cross-level interac-
tions between the welfare state variable and income categories, first as a
continuous variable and then with the income decile categories. As in the
voting analyses, these cross-level interactions capture the micro-micro
relationships: does welfare spending aimed at working-age adults and
families moderate the strength of the relationship between economic
resources and political interest? In Model 5, the single coefficient for the
welfare state policy variable is significant for one’s propensity to be politi-
cally interested, as is the interaction with income (p < 0.1), albeit more
modestly. The interaction coefficient is negative, indicating that the
strength of the relationship between income and political interest is lower
at high levels of welfare spending, and vice versa. Looking to Model 6,
which tests whether the moderating effect of the welfare state on the rela-
tionship between income and political interest, we see that the single
Table 5.9 Multilevel analyses of political interest with cross-level interactions
Political interest
Model 5 Model 6
Constant −1.976*** −1.756***
(0.305) (0.296)
Fixed effects
Age 0.022*** 0.022***
(mean-centered) (0.001) (0.001)
Age squared −0.000*** −0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
Union membership 0.206*** 0.206***
(ref. = non-member) (0.027) (0.027)
Employed −0.047 −0.047
(ref. = not employed) (0.029) (0.029)
Gender −0.538*** −0.539***
(ref. = male) (0.023) (0.023)
Education level (0–5) 0.230*** 0.229***
(0.025) (0.025)
Urban 0.385*** 0.385***
(ref. = non-urban) (0.010) (0.010)
Income (deciles) 0.223***
(0.047)
Income (ref. = low)
Mid-level 0.235***
(0.090)
High 0.451***
(0.095)
Welfare effort: working-age 0.090** 0.087**
adults/families
(0.043) (0.041)
Disproportionality −0.020 −0.020
(0.021) (0.021)
Age of democracy 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
(0.002) (0.002)
Welfare × Income −0.004*
(0.002)
Welfare × Mid-level income −0.009
(0.015)
Welfare × High income −0.010
(0.015)
Random effects
Rho 0.042 0.042
N 36,274 (26) 36,274 (26)
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1
108 J. Shore
welfare state coefficient, which is the effect of welfare state spending on

political interest for individuals in the very lowest-income category, is
positive and significant at the 5 percent level. Compared to individuals
in the lowest-income decile, the effect of additional welfare state spend-
ing on working-age adults and families on political interest is smaller
for people in both the middle- and upper-income groups. The coeffi-
cient of the interaction term comprising welfare state spending and
mid-level income is insignificant, indicating that the effect on the mid-
dle earners’ political interest is not significantly different from the effect
found for people with the lowest incomes. The same pattern can be
identified with regard to the effects of welfare spending on high earners’
political interest compared to their countrymen and women with lower
incomes. In other words, we see from Model 6 that there do not appear
to be income group-specific effects concerning the moderating effect of
welfare spending aimed at working-age adults and families on the pro-
pensity to be interested in politics. As in the previous analyses, I calcu-
late the marginal effects of welfare state spending on political interest
for each of the income groups, as the interaction terms cannot be inter-
preted as such.
Recall that marginal effects estimate the extent to which the dependent
variable political interest is expected to change, given a unit increase in
the explanatory variable spending on working-age adults and families
(Buis 2010). From Table 5.10, we can more clearly observe that there is a
positive effect of social spending for all three income groups. Although
Table 5.10 Marginal effects of welfare policy on political interest by income

category
Political interest—yes/no Spending on working-age adults and families
Low income 0.087**
(0.041)
Mid-level income 0.078*
(0.041)
High income 0.077*
(0.041)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Based on Model 6 in Table 5.9; all other
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1
we know from Model 6 that the effects are not substantively different
from one another, it is clear that not only is the impact of welfare spend-
ing on political interest highest for people in the lowest-income group,
this relationship is more significant (p < 0.05) among those between the
middle- and high-income groups, respectively (p < 0.1).
Figure 5.3 provides the clearest illustration of these effects. At the very
lowest levels of welfare state spending, the probability of being interested
in politics is also at its lowest. The lines for all three groups rise steadily as
social spending increases. The gap between income groups also appears to
narrow, ever so slightly, as can be seen from the minimally steeper slope
for the line representing persons with the lowest incomes. In other words,
while we do see a slight degree of convergence of the lines at the upper
levels of spending, it is to a far lesser degree than we saw in terms of vot-
ing. Although political interest is less stratified in more generous welfare
states and is overall greater, it remains clearly tied to income. These find-
ings were furthermore confirmed when the models were re-run an addi-
tional 25 times, each time excluding one of the 26 countries in order to
determine if the results were sensitive to a single case—something which
.7
Probability of Political Interest
.6
.5
.4
.3
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
% of GDP Spent on Working-Age Adults and Families
Low Income Mid-Level Income High Income
Fig. 5.3 Income level and predicted political interest depending on welfare state
spending. Notes: Based on model 6 in Table 5.9; all other values held at means
110 J. Shore
can easily occur with such a low number of Level 2 units. In particular,
the exclusions of Israel and Slovakia (where a negative correlation between
income and political interest exists) did not change the parameter
estimates.
Political Interest: Conclusions
This section examined a vital, yet oft-overlooked aspect of democratic

citizenship: political interest. Political interest is considered a necessary
antecedent to more active and demanding forms of political participa-
tion; at the same time, it is clearly something distinct and separate from
activities such as voting. It can be thought of as a curiosity about or atten-
tiveness to politics; it is the sentiment that politics represents something
salient or relevant in one’s life. Welfare state policies aimed at working-
age adults and families have been shown to have a positive direct effect on
political interest. This seems to correspond to the literature wherein we
find an increased relevance of politics in countries where the state is more
prevalent in one’s daily life. Because of the important role of policies such
as family allowances or unemployment benefits, people seem to more
likely display some level of political interest, and this appears to hold true
for people across all income levels. Although we do see higher levels of
political interest at higher levels of social spending, this does not, how-
ever, result in a substantial reduction with regard to the socioeconomic
stratification of interest in politics. While all income groups have higher
levels of political interest in more generous welfare state settings, and the
effect for the lowest earners is indeed the greatest and reaches the highest
level of significance, we cannot really speak of an effect that is substan-
tively different from the effects found for the middle- and highest-income
earners.
While much of the discussion here has been on the consequences of
alienating less well-off citizens and the ways in which social policies may
draw them into the political sphere, it is important to remember that
wealthier individuals are also paying the largest share of the taxes that
fund these programs, and, in universal systems, they too are the recipients
and beneficiaries of generous family policies. Lastly, we can speak of pol-
icy feedback effects of a less tangible nature: policies that represent a clear
commitment to working-age adults and families, by reducing income

inequality and representing the interests of society’s less well off, send
messages to citizens. By embodying norms of fairness and universality,
people are sent the message that the political arena is not just for the rich
but rather something that all can be interested in, as political outcomes
do in fact benefit all members of society.
Political Attitudes
In addition to the various behaviors one can study when looking at dem-
ocratic citizenship, numerous surveys have also supplied us with informa-
tion on people’s attitudes and dispositions toward the state and democracy
in general. Looking first at the ways in which the welfare state can shape
people’s trust in parliament—the main decision-making institution in
contemporary democracies—I analyze whether democracies that place a
larger policy focus on working-age adults and families also have citizens
who tend to exhibit greater political trust as well as whether trust has a
more equitable distribution. Moving on to satisfaction with democracy,
this analysis looks at whether and how the welfare state impacts the level
and distribution of how satisfied people are with the way democracy in
their country functions. As with the political participation sections, the
investigations to follow do not constitute an exhaustive body of political
attitudes but are two indicators of democratic support for which we have
widely available data. Moreover, these two aspects on the attitudinal side
of democratic citizenship tap into the ways in which people think and
feel about democracy in their state. While not entirely unrelated, trust in
political institutions and satisfaction with democracy reflect different
types of evaluations and attitudes, as I explain in the following sections.
emocratic Support: Trust in Parliament

D
and Satisfaction with Democracy
More so than trust in other political institutions, trust in parliament has

received a great deal of attention. A parliament is the central decision-
making institution in a democracy, and as it is the body that creates the
112 J. Shore
rules of the society, and since people are required to follow those rules,
how much confidence citizens have in their parliament is indeed some-
thing worth studying. Because parliaments are long-standing and non-
ephemeral parts of democracy, “[a]n erosion of confidence in the major
institutions of society, especially those of representative democracy, is far
more a serious threat to democracy than a loss of trust in other citizens or
politicians” (Newton and Norris 2000, 52). In other words, by looking at
trust in parliament, we may be able to get a good picture of how citizens
generally feel about their democracies. Satisfaction with democracy, on
the other hand, does not generally gauge whether people disagree with
the principles of democracy but instead measures people’s support for
how a democratic regime works. While trust has been found to tap into
people’s ideas about whether democratic norms are desirable, satisfaction
with democracy questions whether those norms are being fulfilled and
whether political processes are aligned to the principles and norms of
democracy. Satisfaction with democracy thus taps into people’s percep-
tions of regime performance—whether the practice of democracy, policy
outputs, and their implementation function in accordance with the
beliefs about democracy (Klingemann 1999, 55–56; Linde and Ekman
2003; Miller and Listhaug 1999, 205). And although people may not
particularly like a party currently in government or the types of policies
pursued, their trust in parliament and satisfaction with democracy cor-
respond to what Easton (1975) termed “diffuse support”; that is, the nor-
mative expectations about democracy as a political system. And although
one could think of trust in parliament as a long-term confidence in the
political system and satisfaction with democracy as based more on short-
term evaluations of regime performance in accordance with democratic
principles and ideals, it can be argued that a persistent dissatisfaction
with how democracy works in practice could very well chip away at sup-
port for democracy as a regime type and form of government (Klingemann
1999; see also Schäfer 2013).
Thinking back to how we might define democracy, although many
conceptualizations exist, at the core of even the most minimalist idea is a
notion of political equality. Should, however, a democracy be perceived
to not be representative of all citizens or fail to promote the democratic
ideal of political equality, there is good reason to believe that support for
democracy will be lower, particularly among citizens with fewer resources,

as it will be those citizens who will see the least representation in their
regimes. The experience of poverty, or less severe economic hardship, is
likely to depress confidence in political institutions and support of
democracy, in general. If, however, policies exist that offer generous sup-
port to individuals and families who would otherwise be caught in the
trap of poverty, the sentiment that a government is responsive to and
representative of the needs of the many may arise, thereby increasing
trust in democratic institutions and fostering the feeling that democratic
norms exist and function. If constituents feel that the system outputs
demonstrate that their voices are heard and their needs are addressed,
they are more likely to have a supportive view of that system, with regard
to both trust in parliament and satisfaction with democracy. Recall that
the effect of greater welfare state spending on working-age adults and
families is hypothesized to foster political support overall and, at the same
time, provide the greatest boost to individuals whose relative economic
position would otherwise predict less support, as economic disadvantage
and its spillover into political disadvantage is likely to be conducive of
less favorable views of both regime performance and, consequently, to
declining support of a political system which may not appear to have the
interests and needs of all at heart. The following analyses of political trust
and satisfaction with democracy put these hypotheses to the empirical
test.
xamining the Effects of the Welfare State on Political

E
Trust
Data on trust in parliament come from the ESS and includes 31,235
individuals in 22 European countries.10 Respondents were asked to indi-
cate on a scale of 0–10 (with 0 indicating “no trust at all” and 10 “com-
10
The World Values Survey (WVS) asks a question about confidence in political institutions,
including parliament. Not only is the wording of the question quite different, but the question also
relies on an ordinal measurement scale. In order to ensure comparability across countries, I only
include responses from the European Social Survey, as it covers the greatest number of countries
with uniform question wording.
114 J. Shore
DK
FI
CH
NO
SE
NL
AT
ES
IE
DE
BE
FR
SI
SK
GB
IL
EE
GR
PT
CZ
PL
HU
0 2 4 6 8 10
Average level of trust in parliament
Fig. 5.4 Trust in parliament across countries. Notes: 0 = No trust at all; 10 = Trust
completely. Source: European Social Survey, rounds 3 and 4. Country codes: AT:
Austria; BE: Belgium; CH: Switzerland; CZ: Czech Republic; DE: Germany; DK:
Denmark; EE: Estonia; ES: Spain; FI: Finland: FR: France: GB: Great Britain; GR:
Greece; HU: Hungary; IE: Ireland; IL: Israel; NL: Netherlands; NO: Norway; PL:
Poland; PT: Portugal; SE: Sweden; SI: Slovenia; SK: Slovakia
plete trust”) how much trust they have in their country’s national
parliament. The average score across all countries on the 0–10 scale is
relatively low—at 4.64. Looking to mean trust in parliament in individ-
ual countries, we see some familiar patterns, with the Danes and the
Finns indicating the highest levels, with scores of 6.55 and 5.96, respec-
tively, and the Hungarians and the Poles having the least trust in parlia-
ment (2.67 and 3.0, respectively). Figure 5.4 shows the mean political
trust scores across all countries; Table 5.11 breaks down the average polit-
ical trust by income group.
From Table 5.11, we see that in all but one country (Ireland), average
trust in parliament is higher among individuals with higher incomes
than people with lower incomes. Despite this overall trend, the table
does not reveal many discernible patterns with regard to income and
political trust. In terms of variance, however, there is a greater spread of
Table 5.11 Political trust by income group

Average Political Political trust Political Difference
political trust lowest mid-level trust highest (highest
Country trust quintile income quintile vs. lowest)
Austria 4.99 4.77 5.04 5.35 0.58
Belgium 4.53 4.15 4.22 4.76 0.61
Czech Republic 3.15 2.82 3.30 3.43 0.61
Denmark 6.55 6.11 6.47 6.92 0.81
Estonia 3.89 3.77 3.76 4.35 0.58
Finland 5.96 5.57 5.95 6.34 0.77
France 4.56 4.08 4.33 4.95 0.87
Germany 4.58 3.98 4.62 5.39 1.41
Greece 3.58 3.59 3.46 3.80 0.21
Great Britain 4.24 3.93 4.19 4.69 0.76
Hungary 2.67 2.48 2.70 2.85 0.37
Ireland 4.82 4.98 4.71 4.91 −0.07
Israel 4.00 3.80 4.09 4.17 0.37
Netherlands 5.48 4.94 5.21 5.78 0.84
Norway 5.78 5.54 5.57 5.99 0.45
Poland 3.00 2.64 2.74 3.32 0.68
Portugal 3.52 3.04 3.56 4.08 1.04
Slovakia 4.31 4.34 4.31 4.37 0.03
Slovenia 4.33 4.04 4.34 4.79 0.75
Spain 4.92 4.82 5.00 5.07 0.25
Sweden 5.74 5.20 5.56 5.94 0.74
Switzerland 5.80 5.61 5.82 6.09 0.48
Mean 4.64 4.38 4.36 5.21 0.83
Source: European Social Survey, rounds 3 and 4
Notes: Trust in national parliament (range 0–10; with 10 indicating complete
trust)
responses within the lowest-income category compared to the highest:

6.43 versus 5.33. Whether these differences across countries and
between income groups are systematic in nature is the subject of the
following analyses.
Examining Political Trust in Europe
As in the previous analyses, there are many individual attributes and

demographic characteristics that should be taken into consideration
when examining the impact of context on trust in parliament. In
116 J. Shore
addition to the individual-level covariates of regime support, corre-

sponding to the findings that both political trust and satisfaction with
democracy increases with one’s level of resources, there are also insti-
tutional and contextual factors that have been shown to influence
democratic support. First, the age of a regime has been shown to
impact trust in parliament (van der Meer 2010). Increasing familiar-
ity with democratic traditions has been shown to be conducive to
trust and confidence in democratic institutions (McAllister 1999).
Rose (1994) furthermore argues that it takes time for trust to develop
(or redevelop) following experiences with non-democratic regimes,
such as in the countries of the former Soviet Union. Second, I control
for the effects of disproportionality of the electoral system. Although
it might be argued that highly proportional systems are detrimental
to political trust because they are the less accountable systems (Powell
2000) and the delineation of responsibility is less visible (Aarts and
Thomassen 2008), studies have shown that political trust is in fact
higher in PR systems than in majoritarian systems (Magalhaes 2006;
van der Meer 2010). More proportional systems stimulate political
trust because they are able to represent a larger share of the electorate
and thus a broader spectrum of interests and political preferences (see
also Karp and Banducci 2008). Lastly, I take the share of left parties
in government into consideration, as not only do stronger left govern-
ments promote social spending on working-age adults and families,
but, particularly when we are concerned with poorer constituents’
attitudes, it is important to control for the existence of parties that
may be more aligned to their preferences.
The measure of the welfare state—percentage of the GDP spent on
working-age adults and families—remains the same. The analyses of trust
in the parliament draw on hierarchical linear modeling techniques, as the
trust variable, with responses from 0 to 10, does not need to undergo any
transformation. The models in Table 5.12 provide us with an overall look
at how welfare state spending influences political trust; Models 5 and 6 in
Table 5.13 examine whether the relationship between income and politi-
cal trust is muted by increased social spending on working-age adults and
families.
Table 5.12 Multilevel analyses of trust in parliament

Trust in parliament
Constant 4.561*** 3.358*** 1.514*** 2.077***
(0.221) (0.141) (0.408) (0.525)
Fixed effects
Age 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age squared 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Union membership 0.002 −0.002 −0.002
(ref. = non-member) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Employed 0.049 0.049 0.049
(ref. = not employed) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032)
Gender −0.112*** −0.112*** −0.112***
(ref. = male) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Education level (0–5) 0.196*** 0.195*** 0.195***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Urban 0.190*** 0.191*** 0.191***
(ref. = non-urban (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Income (decile) 0.079*** 0.078*** 0.078***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Welfare effort: working-age 0.309*** 0.215***
adults/families
(0.064) (0.079)
Disproportionality −0.079**
(0.039)
(0.004)
Age of democracy 0.010**
(0.004)
Random effects
Rho 0.175 0.072 0.069 0.079
Individual variance 2.248 2.214 2.214 2.214
N 31,235 (22) 31,235 (22) 31,235 (22) 31,235 (22)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1
118 J. Shore
Table 5.13 Multilevel analyses of trust in parliament with cross-level interactions

Trust in parliament
Model 5 Model 6
Constant 2.466*** 2.479***
(0.557) (0.537)
Fixed effects
Age 0.003*** 0.003***
(mean-centered) (0.001) (0.001)
Age squared 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
Union membership −0.004 −0.004
(ref. = non-member) (0.029) (0.029)
Employed 0.045 0.068**
(ref. = not employed) (0.032) (0.032)
Gender −0.114*** −0.120***
(ref. = male) (0.025) (0.025)
Education level (0–5) 0.195*** 0.204***
(0.011) (0.011)
Urban 0.194*** 0.195***
(ref. = non-urban) (0.028) (0.028)
Income (deciles) 0.010
(0.017)
Income (ref. = low)
Mid-level −0.088
(0.108)
High 0.105
(0.117)
Welfare effort: working-age 0.151* 0.179**
adults/families
(0.084) (0.081)
Disproportionality −0.079* −0.079**
(0.041) (0.039)
Age of democracy 0.010** 0.010**
(0.004) (0.004)
(0.004) (0.004)
Welfare × Income 0.011***
(0.003)
Welfare × Mid-level income 0.044**
(0.017)
Welfare × High income 0.059***
(0.017)
(continued)
Table 5.13 (continued)
Trust in parliament
Model 5 Model 6
Random effects
Rho 0.086 0.081
Individual variance 2.213 2.215
N 31,235 (22) 31,235 (22)
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1
Results: Political Trust
We start out with a considerable amount of the total variance in political

trust that can be attributed to differences between countries. Model 1,
with an intraclass correlation of 0.175, reveals that 17.5% of the variance
in individual political trust can be traced back to differences between
countries. As in the previous analyses, we see the usual suspects in terms
of the individual variables: those with more education, older individuals,
employed people, urbanites, men, and people with greater levels of
income have significantly greater trust in their national parliament.
Although union members and employed persons also are found to exhibit
greater political trust than non-members and non-employed, these effects
are not significant.
Adding the welfare state variable, we see that it too has a positive and
highly significant impact on individuals’ confidence in parliament, which
also holds when further country-level controls are added in Model 4 in
Table 5.12. As predicted, higher levels of disproportionality exert a damp-
ening effect on trust, and individuals are more trusting of their national
decision-making body in older democracies. The strength of left parties
in government does not add to the explanation of trust in parliament.
Moving from the empty model to the full model results in a reduction in
the proportion of the variance in political trust stemming from differ-
ences between countries from 17.5 percent to 7.9 percent.
Models 5 and 6 in Table 5.13 introduce cross-level interactions between
income (first as a continuous variable and then between the income cat-
egories—high, medium, and low) and welfare spending. In Model 5, we
120 J. Shore
Table 5.14 Marginal effects of welfare policy on trust in parliament by income

category
Trust in parliament Spending on working-age adults and families
Low income 0.179**
(0.081)
Mid-level income 0.223***
(0.080)
High income 0.238***
(0.080)
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05
see that, contrary to the hypothesized conditional hypothesis, increased

social spending on working-age adults and families interacts with income
in a positive and highly significant manner. Here, we see that the strength
of the trust-income relationship is stronger in countries where welfare
spending on the aforementioned segment of the population is higher.
Model 6 demonstrates that there are positive and significant effects for all
individuals regardless of income quintile. This effect is smallest for per-
sons in the first and second quintiles and increases, as shown in Model 5,
with income category. The effects of social spending on trust in parlia-
ment furthermore differ according to income category, as indicated by
the significant interaction terms.
The marginal effects in Table 5.14 indeed reveal that increases in wel-
fare state spending on working-age adults and families positively affect
political trust for all income groups, with the largest effects found for
people in the top-income quintile, followed by people in the middle-
income group. These two marginal effects are significant at least at the 1
percent level; the marginal effect for people in the lowest-income group
is the smallest. These findings deviate from the conditional hypothesis
predicting the greatest boost in political trust for individuals with the
lowest incomes. Despite the direct effect that welfare policies aimed at
reducing economic inequality have on people’s trust in parliament, we
cannot speak of an equalizing effect, as illustrated in Fig. 5.5.
In Fig. 5.5, a modest fanning out can be observed: while at the
lower end of the welfare state spending scale, the lines for individuals
Fig. 5.5 Income level and trust in parliament depending on welfare state spend-
ing. Notes: Based on model 6 in Table 5.13; all other values held at means
in the middle- and lowest-income groups converge, the lines for the
highest and middle groups seem to increase at a fairly equal rate, with
the line for the lowest-income earners lagging behind. Altogether,
while greater welfare state spending increases individuals’ trust in par-
liament, it does so at slightly different rates depending on income, as
observed by the fanning out at the highest levels of spending. We
return to these seemingly counterintuitive results together with the
findings from the analyses of satisfaction with democracy in the over-
all discussion of findings.
The Welfare State on Satisfaction with Democracy
In analyzing satisfaction with democracy, I draw on individual-level

data from CSES—Module 3, which allows one to examine micro-
macro links between political institutions and people’s perceptions and
evaluations of democracy. The question gauging satisfaction with
democracy is: “On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not
122 J. Shore
satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in [your
country]?” While earlier versions of the ESS also include a question on
democratic satisfaction, to avoid looking once again at only European
states, CSES data are used in the following analyses. These question-
naires were administered directly, following elections between 2005
and 2011. The 18,443 respondents hail from the following 22 coun-
tries: Australia, Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden,
and Switzerland. The question on satisfaction with democracy has been
recoded as a dummy variable, such that the value of 1 indicates that the
respondent tends to be satisfied with democracy (including the “very
satisfied” and “fairly satisfied” responses) and a 0 indicates a tendency
of dissatisfaction (including the “not satisfied” and “not at all satisfied”
response categories).
Overall, 67.72 percent of respondents are fairly satisfied or very satis-
fied with the way democracy works in their country. Within countries,
we again see some rather familiar patterns: 93.55 percent of Danes and
87.12 percent of Norwegians tend to be satisfied with democracy; only
21.11 percent of Slovenians and 26.95 percent of Greeks tend to be satis-
fied with democracy. Figure 5.6 furthermore illustrates the rather large
differences in satisfaction with the functioning of democracy across coun-
tries. Furthermore, there are considerable differences within countries as
well, as depicted in Table 5.15.
In general, satisfaction with democracy is higher among people with
higher incomes. Across all countries, the highest earners report being
satisfied with democracy at a rate 11.72 percentage points higher than
people in the bottom-income quintiles. A brief glance at the table also
reveals that not only are there two cases where higher income is not
associated with higher aggregate satisfaction but the middle income
category does not always have a score between the lowest- and highest-
income groups. In other words, unlike in the analysis of voting, the
percentage of respondents indicating that they are satisfied with the
functioning of democracy in their countries does not monotonically
increase with income.
DK 93.55
NO 87.12
AU 86.75
CH 81.85
SE 81.77
ES 81.55
IE 80.71
NL 80.39
FI 75.59
IS 71.51
AT 70.78
NZ 66.67
FR 65.03
PL 58.82
DE 54.39
CZ 49.30
EE 48.63
PT 41.29
SK 37.37
IL 34.22
SI 27.11
GR 26.95
% of respondents satisfied with how democracy functions
Fig. 5.6 Satisfaction with democracy across 22 countries. Source: CSES, Module 3.
Country codes: AT: Austria; AU: Australia; CH: Switzerland; CZ: Czech Republic; DE:
Germany; DK: Denmark; EE: Estonia; ES: Spain; FI: Finland; FR: France; GR: Greece;
IE: Ireland; IL: Israel; IS: Iceland; NL: Netherlands; NO: Norway; NZ: New Zealand;
PL: Poland; PT: Portugal; SE: Sweden; SI: Slovenia; SK: Slovakia
Satisfaction with Democracy in Welfare State

As in the previous analyses, it is important to take individual-level char-
acteristics and demographic attributes into consideration when examin-
ing satisfaction with democracy. In these analyses, I introduce an
individual’s self-placement on a left-right scale of 0–10, with smaller val-
ues indicating a more leftist political leaning, and higher values a more
rightist one, as those with more extreme political ideologies are likely to
feel less represented and therefore less satisfied. The other individual-level
variables mirror those in the previous analyses, with the assumption that
individuals with greater resources tend to be more satisfied with how
democracy works (Singh 2014). Due to the way income is coded in the
original CSES dataset, income is only included as a categorical variable
124 J. Shore
Table 5.15 Satisfaction with democracy by income group

% Satisfaction Satisfaction Satisfaction
Reporting with dem. with dem. with dem. Difference
satisfaction lowest mid-level highest (highest
Country with dem. quintile income quintile vs. lowest)
Australia 86.75 85.16 86.91 88.70 3.54
Austria 70.78 60.61 72.18 77.0 16.39
Czech 49.30 42.17 50.22 55.56 13.39
Republic
Denmark 93.55 93.48 93.25 94.59 1.11
Estonia 48.63 49.33 44.26 67.16 17.83
Finland 75.59 78.02 74.07 81.00 2.98
France 65.03 57.11 68.57 71.55 14.44
Germany 54.39 49.24 52.73 67.70 18.46
Greece 26.95 25.75 27.47 28.57 2.82
Iceland 71.51 67.01 71.46 71.51 4.5
Ireland 80.71 74.19 79.13 92.47 18.28
Israel 34.22 35.82 33.33 37.17 1.35
Netherlands 80.39 84.62 78.22 84.39 −0.23
New 66.67 69.72 63.49 72.60 2.88
Zealand
Norway 87.12 80.95 88.07 87.12 6.17
Poland 58.82 50.24 59.32 66.33 16.09
Portugal 41.29 35.09 42.70 26.32 −8.77
Slovakia 37.37 33.33 39.52 33.33 0
Slovenia 21.11 20.83 27.51 43.48 22.65
Spain 81.55 86.54 81.71 75.47 −11.07
Sweden 81.77 81.01 80.96 85.21 4.2
Switzerland 81.85 76.56 85.37 78.03 1.47
Mean 67.72 63.12 67.64 74.84 11.72
Source: CSES, Module 3
(and not additionally as a continuous one). More information about the

variables included in the analyses of satisfaction with democracy can be
found in the Appendix.
Furthermore, there has been a considerable amount of research about
the effects of institutions on satisfaction with democracy. Lijphart (1999),
for example, states that people in consensus democracies are much more
satisfied than people living in majoritarian systems. The link between the
type of democracy and satisfaction is thought to work through how peo-
ple see their government in terms of representation and accountability
(Anderson and Guillory 1997; Bernauer and Vatter 2012). Aarts and
Thomassen (2008) find that satisfaction with democracy is much more

strongly linked to people’s views of representation than accountability,
that is, in countries where people perceive their governments as represen-
tative, they were more likely to be satisfied with democracy.
Representativeness, in turn, is a trait of proportional representation sys-
tems; majoritarian systems are seen as more accountable. For this analy-
sis, it is, therefore, necessary to control for the effects of electoral
disproportionality, as highly disproportional systems have been shown to
produce lower levels of democratic satisfaction. Moreover, studies have
found that the age of a democracy also matters for satisfaction with
democracy, with representation perceived as lower in new democracies
than in older ones (e.g., Aarts and Thomassen 2008). Furthermore, I
control for the strength of the left, not only to account for its influence
on social spending and constituency of poorer voters but, as Anderson
and Singer (2008) find, left-leaning voters are much more dissatisfied in
countries with high levels of income inequality.
Results: Satisfaction with Democracy
From the empty model (Model 1 in Table 5.16) including only the ran-
dom intercept, we first see that the proportion of the variance in satisfac-
tion with democracy stemming from difference between countries is
quite large—nearly 23 percent. After introducing individual-level explan-
atory factors in Model 2, this proportion of the variance drops only
0.4 percent. Of particular note are the large and significantly positive
effects of income on satisfaction with democracy. Younger persons,
women, the better educated, and people with more right-leaning political
views are also more likely to be fairly or very satisfied with the way
democracy works. While the employed and city dwellers also indicate a
larger likelihood of satisfaction with democracy, these effects are not
significant.
When adding the single welfare state variable (Model 3), the variance
proportion at the country level drops considerably—from 22.4 percent
to 10.4 percent. The coefficient for the welfare state variable is moreover
positive and highly significant. Of the country controls, only the age of
Table 5.16 Multilevel analyses of satisfaction with democracy
Satisfaction with democracy
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Constant 0.682*** −0.476** −2.750*** −2.920*** −3.015***
(0.211) (0.229) (0.436) (0.520) (0.533)
Fixed effects
Age −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(mean-centered) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age squared 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Employed 0.063 0.063 0.062 0.063
(ref. = not (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
employed)
Gender 0.098*** 0.097*** 0.097*** 0.097***
(ref. = male) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Education level 0.080*** 0.079*** 0.077*** 0.077***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
Urban 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004
(ref. = non-urban (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Political ideology 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.071***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Income
(ref. = low)
Mid-level 0.239*** 0.239*** 0.241*** 0.366**
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.160)
High 0.418*** 0.419*** 0.421*** 0.550**
(0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.227)
Welfare effort: 0.393*** 0.356*** 0.373***
working-age
adults/families
(0.070) (0.069) (0.072)
(0.003) (0.003)
Age of democracy 0.007** 0.007**
(0.003) (0.003)
Disproportionality 0.019 0.018
(0.043) (0.043)
Welfare × Mid- −0.022
level
Income (0.027)
Welfare × High −0.023
income
(0.038)
Random effects
Rho 0.228 0.224 0.104 0.083 0.083
Context variance 0.985 0.975 0.619 0.546 0.546
N 18,443 (22) 18,443 (22) 18,443 (22) 18,443 (22) 18,443 (22)
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1
democracy shows any substantial effect, with citizens in older democra-

cies exhibiting higher satisfaction than those in newer ones. Neither dis-
proportionality nor strength of left parties seems to contribute much to
the explanation of individual satisfaction with democracy. The cross-level
interactions are introduced in Model 5 and test the conditional hypoth-
esis that additional welfare spending on working-age adults and families
are predicted to be the highest for individuals in the lowest-income cat-
egory. The coefficient for the single welfare state variable reveals that there
is a significantly positive effect to be found for people in the lowest-
income quintiles with regard to their propensity to be satisfied with
democracy. While the interaction terms both have negative coefficients,
indicating that the effects for people with greater incomes are weaker
than the effect for the poorest respondents, these effects cannot be con-
sidered to be substantially different than the aforementioned effect. The
marginal effects in Table 5.17 present a similar picture: For individuals in
all three income groups, satisfaction with democracy is positively
impacted by increase in welfare spending. This relationship is highly sig-
nificant at least in the 1 percent level. Although the marginal effects for
each group are not substantively different from one another, the low-
income group does, however, seem to reap the greatest benefits from
increases in welfare generosity with regard to their satisfaction with the
way democracy works.
We also see in Fig. 5.7 that this slightly greater marginal effect for indi-
viduals from the lowest-income quintile results in an equalizing effect,
Table 5.17 Marginal effects of welfare policy on satisfaction with democracy by

income category
Satisfaction with democracy Spending on working-age adults and families
Low income 0.073***
(0.013)
Mid-level income 0.066***
(0.013)
High income 0.063***
(0.013)
***p < 0.01
128 J. Shore
Fig. 5.7 Income level and satisfaction with democracy depending on welfare
state spending. Notes: Based on model 5 in Table 5.16; all other values held at
means
with barely any discernible stratification by income for the probability of

being satisfied with democracy in states where a greater percentage of the
GDP is spent on working-age adults and families. Furthermore, we see
much steeper slopes for all three income groups than in the previous
analyses, as also indicated by the comparatively larger marginal effects.
Political Support and the Welfare State
These findings, which conform to the hypothesized relationship between

greater social expenditures on working-age adults and families and
increased support for democracy, resonate with the literature on satisfac-
tion with democracy and representativeness: in countries where we find a
greater effort made to reduce economic inequality by means of more gen-
erous expenditures for working-age populations, we also find higher and
more equitable levels of satisfaction with democracy. This could very well
indicate that in those states people respond positively to the increased
offerings by their governments, offerings which, in line with the policy
feedback literature, should have integrative effects. Not only is social citi-
zenship expanded to include all social milieu, but by doing so, people feel
their needs and concerns are being addressed by the state. Furthermore,
as satisfaction with democracy also taps into people’s satisfaction with
policy outputs, what these findings may very well indicate is that expen-
ditures aimed at working-age adults and families make people more satis-
fied with regime performance.
One might, nevertheless, argue that people in states tend to be more
satisfied with democracy where overall levels of social spending is higher,
such as in the Nordic countries, where we not only find a strong commit-
ment to working-age populations but overall higher levels of social spend-
ing (see Table 4.1 in Chap. 4). For example, people might simply be more
satisfied with policy outputs because of the general system of social wel-
fare offered in generous universal welfare states. To test this possibility, I
reran the final model (Model 5 in Table 5.16) with the cross-level interac-
tions between income categories, substituting working-age and family
expenditures with total social expenditures as a percentage of the GDP. I
also tested the findings using health expenditures and old-age expendi-
tures as other possible drivers of citizen satisfaction. As can be seen from
the marginal effects in the table below, there does not seem to be empiri-
cal support for the argument that satisfaction with democracy is simply
part of an overall large welfare state. Table 5.18 presents the marginal
effects of different types of welfare spending on the satisfaction with
democracy for individuals in the three income categories.
Table 5.18 Marginal effects on satisfaction with democracy, various welfare state
indicators
Total social Health Old-age
Satisfaction with expenditures expenditures expenditures
democracy (% of GDP) (% of GDP) (% of GDP)
Low income 0.012 0.046 −0.015
(0.007) (0.037) (0.012)
Mid-level income 0.013* 0.046 −0.009
(0.007) (0.035) (0.012)
High income 0.013** 0.054 −0.008
(0.007) (0.034) (0.012)
**p < 0.05; *p < 0.1
130 J. Shore
The findings in Table 5.18 resonate with what Kuitto (2011) in essence

describes as worlds of spending. As discussed in Chap. 4, high spending in
one area does not necessarily correspond to high spending across all areas.
Moreover, this analysis suggests that there are differential outcomes of the
different spending categories not only with regard to the reduction of
economic inequality, but that these different pillars of the welfare state
also bring about different effects in terms of satisfaction with the way
democracy works in a given political context. While total social expendi-
tures, which of course also include spending on working-age adults and
families, do have a positive effect on satisfaction with democracy for all
income groups, the total spending does not do anything to combat the
social gradient. Furthermore, these marginal effects are weak at best.
Health expenditures also have positive effects on satisfaction with democ-
racy but are all insignificant. Lastly, expenditures related to old age even
have a negative effect on satisfaction with democracy (albeit insignifi-
cant), perhaps providing further evidence to the argument that welfare
states do indeed have clear spending priorities, and that there are often
trade-offs with regard to age and where in the life cycle the social policy
focus can be found. The additional models from which these marginal
effects were derived can be found in the Appendix.
References
Aarts, Kees, and Jacques Thomassen. 2008. Satisfaction with Democracy: Do
Institutions Matter? Electoral Studies 27 (1): 5–18. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
electstud.2007.11.005.
Abelson, Robert P., Elizabeth F. Loftus, and Anthony Greenwald. 1992.
Attempts to Improve the Accuracy of Self-reports of Voting. In Questions
About Questions: Inquiries into the Cognitive Bases of Surveys, ed. Judith
M. Tanur, 138–153. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
in an Age of Rising Inequality. Perspectives on Politics 2 (4): 651–666. https://
doi.org/10.1017/S153759270404040X.
Anderson, Christopher J., and Christine A. Guillory. 1997. Political Institutions
and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Cross-National Analysis of Consensus
and Majoritarian Systems. The American Political Science Review 91 (1):
66–81. https://doi.org/10.2307/2952259.
564–599.
Armingeon, Klaus, David Weisstanner, Sarah Engler, Potolidis Panajotis,
Gerber Marlène, and Philipp Leimgruber. 2011. Comparative Political
Data Set 1960–2009. Berne: Institute of Political Science, University of
Berne.
Belli, Robert F., Michael W. Traugott, Margaret Young, and Katherine
A. McGonagle. 1999. Reducing Vote Overreporting in Surveys: Social
Desirability, Memory Failure, and Source Monitoring. The Public Opinion
Quarterly 63 (1): 90–108. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2991270.
Bennett, Linda, and Stephen E. Bennett. 1989. Enduring Gender Differences in
Political Interest: The Impact of Socialization and Political Dispositions.
American Politics Quarterly 17 (1): 105–122.
Bernauer, Julian, and Adrian Vatter. 2012. Can’t Get No Satisfaction with
the Westminster Model? Winners, Losers and the Effects of Consensual
and Direct Democratic Institutions on Satisfaction with Democracy.
European Journal of Political Research 51 (4): 435–468. https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2011.02007.x.
Blais, Andre. 2006. What Affects Voter Turnout? Annual Review of Political
Science 9: 111–125.
Blais, Andre, and R. Kenneth Carty. 1990. Does Proportional Representation
Foster Voter Turnout? European Journal of Political Research 18 (2): 167–181.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.1990.tb00227.x.
Blais, Andre, and Agnieszka Dobrzynska. 1998. Turnout in Electoral
Democracies. European Journal of Political Research 33 (2): 239–261. https://
doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.00382.
Brady, David. 2003. The Politics of Poverty: Left Political Institutions, the
Welfare State, and Poverty. Social Forces 82 (2): 557–588. https://doi.
org/10.1353/sof.2004.0004.
Brady, Henry E., Sidney Verba, and Kay Lehman Scholzman. 1995. Beyond
SES: A Resource Model of Political Participation. American Political Science
Review 89 (2): 271–294.
Brambor, Thomas, William Roberts Clark, and Matt Golder. 2006.
Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses. Political
Analysis 14 (1): 63–82.
Buis, Maarten L. 2010. Stata Tip 87: Interpretations of Interactions in Non-
linear Models. The Stata Journal 10 (2): 305–308.
132 J. Shore
Burns, Nancy. 2002. Gender: Public Opinion and Political Action. In Political
Science: State of the Discipline, ed. Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner,
462–487. New York: Norton.
Campbell, David E. 2006. Why We Vote: How Schools and Communities Shape
Our Civic Life. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Dalton, Russell J. 2000. Citizen Attitudes and Political Behavior. Comparative
Political Studies 33 (6–7): 912–940. https://doi.org/10.1177/
001041400003300609.
Easton, David. 1975. A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support.
British Journal of Political Science 5 (4): 435–457. https://doi.org/10.1017/
S0007123400008309.
ESS Round 3: European Social Survey Round 3 Data. 2006. Data file edition
3.6. NSD—Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway—Data Archive
and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC.
ESS Round 4: European Social Survey Round 4 Data. 2008. Data file edition
4.4. NSD—Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway—Data Archive
and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC.
European Social Survey. 2010. ESS Round 4 (2008/2009): Final Activity Report.
London: Centre for Comparative Social Surveys: City University London.
Foley, Michael W., and Bob Edwards. 1996. The Paradox of Civil Society.
Journal of Democracy 7 (3): 38–52.
Franklin, Mark N. 1997. Electoral Participation. In Comparing Democracies:
Elections and Voting in Global Perspective, ed. Lawrence LeDuc, Richard
G. Niemi, and Pippa Norris, 216–235. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Publications.
———. 1999. Electoral Engineering and Cross-National Turnout Differences:
What Role for Compulsory Voting? British Journal of Political Science 29 (1):
205–216. http://www.jstor.org/stable/194302.
Goodin, Robert E., and John Dryzek. 1980. Rational Participation: The Politics
of Relative Power. British Journal of Political Science 10 (3): 273–292.
Gray, Mark, and Miki Caul. 2016. Declining Voter Turnout in Advanced
Industrial Democracies, 1950 to 1997. Comparative Political Studies 33 (9):
1091–1122. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414000033009001.
Hicks, Alexander M., and Duane H. Swank. 1992. Politics, Institutions, and
Welfare Spending in Industrialized Democracies, 1960–82. The American
Political Science Review 86 (3): 658–674. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1964129.
Highton, Benjamin. 2005. Self-Reported Versus Proxy-Reported Voter Turnout
in the Current Population Survey. Public Opinion Quarterly 69 (1): 113–123.
https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfi003.
Hooghe, Marc. 2004. Political Socialization and the Future of Politics. Acta
Politica 39 (4): 331–341. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500082.
Hooghe, Marc, and Koen Pelleriaux. 1998. Compulsory Voting in Belgium: An
Application of the Lijphart Thesis. Electoral Studies 17 (4): 419–424.
Hox, Joop. 2002. Multilevel Analysis: Techniques and Applications. New York:
Taylor and Francis Group.
Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano,
M. Lagos, et al., eds. 2014. World Values Survey: Round Five—Country-Pooled
Datafile Version: www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV5.jsp.
Madrid: JD Systems Institute.
Jackman, Robert W. 1987. Political Institutions and Voter Turnout in the
Industrial Democracies. The American Political Science Review 81 (2):
405–424. https://doi.org/10.2307/1961959.
Jackman, Robert W., and Ross A. Miller. 1995. Voter Turnout in the Industrial
Democracies During the 1980s. Comparative Political Studies 27 (4): 467–492.
Karp, Jeffrey A., and Susan A. Banducci. 2008. Political Efficacy and Participation
in Twenty-Seven Democracies: How Electoral Systems Shape Political
Behaviour. British Journal of Political Science 38 (02): 311–334. https://doi.
org/10.1017/S0007123408000161.
Kuitto, Kati. 2011. More Than Just Money: Patterns of Disaggregated Welfare
Expenditure in the Enlarged Europe. Journal of Social Policy 21 (4): 348–364.
Lijphart, Arend. 1997. Unequal Participation: Democracy’s Unresolved
Dilemma—Presidential Address, American Political Science Association,
1996. American Political Science Review 91 (1): 1–14.
———. 1999. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in
Thirty-Six Countries. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. http://www.gbv.
de/dms/sub-hamburg/254385370.pdf.
Linde, Jonas, and Joakim Ekman. 2003. Satisfaction with Democracy: A
Note on a Frequently Used Indicator in Comparative Politics. European
Journal of Political Research 42 (3): 391–408. https://doi.org/10.1111/
1475-6765.00089.
Luskin, Robert C. 1990. Explaining Political Sophistication. Political Behavior
12 (4): 331–361.
Macedo, Stephen. 2005. Democracy at Risk: How Political Choices Undermine
Citizen Participation and What We Can Do About It. Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution Press.
134 J. Shore
Magalhaes, Pedro C. 2006. Confidence in Parliaments: Performance,

Representation and Accountability. In Political Disaffection in Contemporary
Democracies: Social Capital, Institutions and Politics, ed. Mariano Torcal and
José R. Montero, 190–214. Routledge Research in Comparative Politics 13.
London: Routledge.
Mau, Steffen. 2003. The Moral Economy of Welfare States: Britain and Germany
Compared. Routledge/EUI Studies in the Political Economy of Welfare 5.
London and New York: Routledge. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/alltitles/doc-
Detail.action?docID=10097518.
McAllister, Ian. 1999. The Economic Performance of Governments. In Critical
Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance, ed. Pippa Norris,
Mettler, Suzanne, and Joe Soss. 2004. The Consequences of Public Policy for
Democratic Citizenship: Bridging Policy Studies and Mass Politics.
Perspectives on Politics 2 (1): 55–73.
Miller, Arthur, and Ola Listhaug. 1999. Political Performance and Institutional
Trust. In Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance, ed.
Pippa Norris, 204–216. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Miller, Joanne M., and Wendy Rahn. 2002. Identity-Based Feelings, Beliefs,
and Actions: How Being Influences Doing. Presented at the annual meeting
of the International Society of Political Psychology, Berlin, Germany.
Newton, Kenneth, and Pippa Norris. 2000. Confidence in Public Institutions:
Faith, Culture, or Performance? In Disaffected Democracies: What’s Troubling
the Trilateral Countries? ed. Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam, 52–73.
Princeton, NJ and Chichester: Princeton University Press.
Oskarson, Maria. 2010. Social and Political Marginalization in Hard Times.
APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper.
Pacek, Alexander C., Grigore Pop-Eleches, and Joshua A. Tucker. 2009.
Disenchanted or Discerning: Voter Turnout in Post-Communist Countries.
The Journal of Politics 71 (2): 473–491. https://doi.org/10.1017/
S0022381609090409.
Panagopoulos, Costas. 2008. The Calculus of Voting in Compulsory Voting
Systems. Political Behavior 30 (4): 455–467. https://doi.org/10.1007/
s11109-008-9058-9.
Powell, G. Bingham. 2000. Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian
and Proportional Visions. New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press.
Rabe-Hesketh, Sophia, and Anders Skrondal. 2008. Multilevel and Longitudinal
Modeling Using Stata. College Station, TX: Stata Press.
Rose, Richard. 1994. Postcommunism and the Problem of Trust. Journal of

Democracy 5 (3): 18–30. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.1994.0042.
Ross, Fiona. 2000. ‘Beyond Left and Right’: The New Partisan Politics of Welfare.
Governance 13 (2): 155–183. https://doi.org/10.1111/0952-1895.00127.
Rothstein, Bo. 1998. Political Institutions: An Overview. In A New Handbook of
Political Science, ed. Robert E. Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingemann,
Schäfer, Armin. 2013. Liberalization, Inequality, and Democracy’s Discontent.
In Politics in the Age of Austerity, ed. Armin Schäfer and Wolfgang Streeck,
169–195. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Schattschneider, Elmer E. 1960. The Semi-Sovereign People: A Study of Free
Private Enterprise in Pressure Politics, as Shown in the 1929–1930 Revision of
the Tariff. New York: Rinehart and Winston.
Singh, Shane. 2011. How Compelling is Compulsory Voting? A Multilevel
Analysis of Turnout. Political Behavior 33 (1): 95–111. https://doi.
org/10.1007/s11109-010-9107-z.
———. 2014. Not All Election Winners are Equal: Satisfaction with Democracy
and the Nature of the Vote. European Journal of Political Research 53 (2):
308–327. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12028.
Solt, Frederick. 2008. Economic Inequality and Democratic Political
Engagement. American Journal of Political Science 52 (1): 48–60.
Stadelmann-Steffen, Isabelle. 2011. Dimensions of Family Policy and Female
Labor Market Participation: Analyzing Group-Specific Policy Effects.
Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions
24 (2): 331–357.
Stockemer, D., Bernadette LaMontagne, and Lyle Scruggs. 2013. Bribes and
Ballots: The Impact of Corruption on Voter Turnout in Democracies.
International Political Science Review 34 (1): 74–90. https://doi.org/
10.1177/0192512111419824.
Svallfors, Stefan. 2007. Introduction. In The Political Sociology of the Welfare
State: Institutions, Social Cleavages, and Orientations, ed. Stefan Svallfors,
1–29. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Tavits, Margit, and Taavi Annus. 2006. Learning to Make Votes Count: The
Role of Democratic Experience. Electoral Studies 25 (1): 72–90. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.electstud.2005.02.003.
The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. 2015. CSES Module 3 Full
Release. [dataset]. December 15, 2015 version. https://doi.org/10.7804/cses.
module3.2015-12-15.
136 J. Shore
van der Meer, Tom. 2010. In What We Trust? A Multi-level Study into Trust
in Parliament as an Evaluation of State Characteristics. International
Review of Administrative Sciences 76 (3): 517–536. https://doi.org/10.1177/
0020852310372450.
van Deth, Jan W. 1990. Interest in Politics. In Continuities in Political Action: A
Longitudinal Study of Political Orientations in Three Western Democracies, ed.
M.K. Jennings, 275–312. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
———. 2000. Interesting But Irrelevant: Social Capital and the Saliency of
Politics in Western Europe. European Journal of Political Research 37 (2):
115–147. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.00507.
Verba, Sidney, and Norman H. Nie. 1972. Participation in America: Political
Democracy and Social Equality. New York: Harper and Row.
University Press.
Walzer, Michael. 1992. The Civil Society Argument. In Dimensions of Radical
Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship, Community, ed. Chantal Mouffe, 89–107.
London: Verso.
6
Consequences of Unequal Citizenship
he Effects of the Welfare State of Democratic

T
Citizenship
The previous chapter’s analyses of democratic citizenship across OECD
states clearly show a positive effect of welfare state spending on working-
age adults and families. I tested the hypotheses that individuals who live
in welfare states who spend more on working-age adults and families are
more likely to vote, be politically interested, exhibit greater trust in their
parliaments, and be more satisfied with the way democracy works in their
country. Based on the policy feedback literature, I furthermore hypothe-
sized that the positive effects of this type of social spending would be
greatest for individuals with lower incomes due to the fact that social
expenditures aimed at working-age adults and families have been found
to be most closely aligned to reductions in economic inequality. Inequality
and poverty, in turn, are not limited to economic consequences: in many
countries, there is a very strong link between economic and political dis-
advantage. On the other hand, where the state is committed to social
rights and offers its citizens generous social policies, I argue that citizens,
all across the income distribution, would have greater reason to be
involved in politics and support democracy.

138 J. Shore
Across some of these aspects of democratic citizenship, equalizing

effects of welfare state spending were found. The effects of additional
social spending are greatest for individuals in the lowest-income quintile
with regard to voting, political interest, and satisfaction with democracy.
In terms of trust in parliament, while social spending is shown to increase
the overall levels across all income categories, it does so while clearly pre-
serving a pattern of social stratification. Table 6.1 provides an overview of
the results from all analyses of democratic citizenship.
The figures in bold-faced type in Table 6.1 show the effects that are
significantly different from the effects found for incomes in the lowest-
income category. These refer back to the regression tables with the cross-
level interactions between income groups, wherein significant interactions
between the welfare state variable and middle and high income, respec-
tively, indicated an effect for that group which is significantly different
from the coefficient of the single welfare state variable—that is, the effect
for individuals in the lowest-income quintile. The effects of expenditures
aimed at working-age adults and families on the individual propensity to
vote are the greatest for people with the least income, followed closely by
the middle class. While people with the highest incomes are also posi-
tively affected by increased spending on working-age adults and families,
this effect was not found to be significant. These individuals, people with
the greatest incomes, are also those who are likely to have higher levels of
Table 6.1 Marginal effects of welfare state spending on aspects of democratic

citizenship
Interest in Trust in Satisfaction
Voting politics parliament with democracy
Low income 0.020** 0.087** 0.179** 0.072***
(0.009) (0.041) (0.081) (0.013)
Mid-level 0.015** 0.078* 0.223*** 0.066***
income (0.007) (0.041) (0080) (0.013)
High income 0.011 0.077* 0.238*** 0.062***
(0.007) (0.041) (0.080) (0.013)
Notes: Based on the cross-level interaction models for the respective analyses;
standard errors in parentheses. Bold-faced type indicates an effect that is
significantly different from the effect found for individuals in the lowest-
income category
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1
Consequences of Unequal Citizenship 139
education and better social networks; they tend to also have the loudest
political voices and are not in any danger of underrepresentation. Their
propensity to vote is already so high that additional social spending does
not have a significant effect on their electoral participation. We find simi-
lar patterns regarding interest in politics and satisfaction with democracy,
although here the effects for the top earners are also significant. So while
the effects for the top earners are smaller, we continue to see a context
effect for this group in terms of comparatively higher levels of democratic
citizenship in countries that spend more on their working-age popula-
tions and families. This could, in part, be due to the fact that high-income
earners are likely to also benefit from generous social policies aimed at
working-age adults and families, as in the states where the greatest por-
tion of the GDP is spent on this policy area, benefits tend to be universal
in nature.
With respect to the individuals with the lowest incomes, these are the
people whose resources would predict a low likelihood of taking part in
an election, low interest in politics, and less support of democracy in
terms of trust in parliament and satisfaction with democracy. These are
also the people who are most likely to benefit the most from working-age
and family welfare policies for their own well-being. By creating this per-
sonal stake, these types of policies seem to have the ability to mobilize the
people with more modest incomes to vote and pique their interest in
politics. Satisfaction with democracy, which is a measure of support for
democratic performance, is also greater in more generous welfare states.
While this effect spans all income groups, it is largest for those with the
lowest incomes. Furthermore, as higher levels of cash benefits and bene-
fits in kind in this policy area tend to be universal, and not determined
by means-tested criteria, poorer individuals in more generous welfare
states are less likely to have experienced degrading and processes of apply-
ing for benefits. Targeted programs tend to be associated with greater
bureaucratic hurdles and frequently convey stigma for recipients (Mettler
and Stonecash 2008). Universal programs, however, have been shown to
foster both political efficacy and user empowerment (Bruch et al. 2010;
Kumlin 2004; Kumlin and Rothstein 2005; Wichowsky and Moynihan
2008; Moynihan and Soss 2014; Watson 2015). The feeling that one’s
needs are being met are likely to increase satisfaction with democracy, as
140 J. Shore
positive spillover effects can accrue from positive experiences with public
services (Ariely 2013; Christensen and Laegreid 2005).
Moreover, the redistributive effects of generous social policies may be
able to give the poor the extra economic push needed to get out of the
poverty trap, thereby enabling them engage with and participate in poli-
tics—something which may otherwise have remained an unattainable
luxury. The messages of inclusiveness and fairness that policies aimed at
working-age populations embody may reinforce the redistributive and
saliency effects. By signaling that not only the interests of the wealthy get
political attention, that the social rights of all members of society are
valued and to be protected, politics becomes something of importance to
all social milieu.
A further pattern that we can see in Table 6.1 is the significance of
welfare policies for the middle class with regard to democratic citizen-
ship. We can make similar arguments with regard to the effects found for
the poorest individuals. In this case, however, individuals in the middle-
income group have greater resources at their disposal to facilitate their
political engagement; for this reason, we tend to see slightly smaller
effects for this group. Nevertheless, we continue to see a context effect for
this group in terms of comparatively higher rates of participation and
interest. It can thus be said that welfare states in which there is a clear
focus on the well-being of working-age adults and families foster an over-
all inclusive political environment—one in which all citizens, regardless
of economic advantage, go to the polls at a higher rate, are more inter-
ested in politics, have higher levels of trust in their national parliaments,
and are more likely to be satisfied with the way democracy works.
Before moving on to a discussion of some of the challenges faced by
this study and other investigations of policy feedback effects, it remains
necessary to attempt to explain the rather counterintuitive results from
the analyses of trust in parliament. These results are particularly puzzling
when compared to the results found for the other aspects of democratic
citizenship, which would suggest not only a bolstering effect of increased
spending on working-age adults and families but an equalizing one as
well. Although individuals in countries that spend more on working-age
adults and families have higher levels of trust, such a welfare state focus
does not, however, promote more equitable levels of political trust. The
strongest effect on trust in parliament was found for the people with the
highest incomes, followed by the effect for people in income quintiles of
2–4. While a positive effect was still found for people in the lowest-
income group, it is both smaller and less statistically significant than the
effects found for their wealthier counterparts. Also puzzling is why such
large and equalizing effects are found with regard to satisfaction with
democracy but not for trust. It would seem plausible that people who are
satisfied with the performance of democracy would also be supportive of
general democratic norms and principles. And while the results do show
this to some extent, we must recall the fanning out of the lines at the
highest levels of social spending, indicating that at the lowest levels of
spending, while political trust is lower overall, it appears to be equally low
across groups.
Could these findings simply be an artifact of the data? Or perhaps the
rather tepid level of political trust across all countries (even in the more
generous welfare states) is more telling. Although the survey question on
trust in institutions designed by social scientists is supposed to tap into
people’s overall feelings about democracy, Grönlund and Setälä (2007,
405) point out that these institutions may lack significance for many
people. Because the data available from these large cross-national surveys
do not ask people about their specific personal experiences with various
agencies and bureaucracies as they pertain to social welfare services and
benefits, it may not be possible to really tap into the aspect of political
trust drawing only on information about the national parliament—an
institution which, although central to democracies, may be too far
removed and abstract for many citizens.1 Moreover, by relying on but a
cross-sectional snapshot, it is not certain whether the unequal levels of
trust in the more generous welfare states have to do with a particular
survey year or are indicative of long-term trends of decline and divide. Or
it could perhaps be the case that although political trust remains the
highest in countries where more is spent on working-age adults and
1
Staffan Kumlin’s (2004) approach in The Personal and the Political is much better suited to inves-
tigating political trust. Using survey data for Sweden, which inquired directly into people’s personal
experiences, their opportunities to voice opinions, and their experiences of responsiveness of service
agencies, he gets much closer to what political trust really means to people. Unfortunately, such
data are not available for a large number of countries.
142 J. Shore
f amilies, the downward trend in political trust could simply affect poorer
individuals first, despite their overall satisfaction with how democracy is
performing.
That political trust has been on the decline in advanced democracies
over the past decades is nothing new (Dalton 2004; Klingemann 1999;
Norris 1999), and while support for democracy’s arguably most impor-
tant institution is certainly desirable, a certain level of skepticism is also
not necessarily a bad thing either. Critical citizens may demand more
from their governments and keep a closer eye on decisions-makers (Norris
1999). Marien and Hooghe (2011) find that political trust does indeed
matter, in particular, for law abidingness. People who indicated less trust
in parliament (and thus less faith in the norms and principles of democ-
racy) are also more likely to be permissive of illegal acts, such as tax eva-
sion and social security fraud. Distrusters are more likely to be free riders
(Tyler 2006), forcing the state to invest greater efforts into crucial activi-
ties such as collecting tax revenues and ensuring the social security pay-
ments are correct (Marien and Hooghe 2011, 283). For now, however,
we can only say that political trust is significantly higher in welfare states
that invest more in working-age adults and families. Furthermore, overall
levels of political trust are rather unspectacular across all countries. In
order to further get at what may be driving the less equal levels of trust in
the more generous welfare states and whether perhaps changes in benefits
or other social policies may be to blame or if we are simply looking at a
small portion of a global trend, better survey data and longitudinal
designs are needed.
Limitations, Challenges, and Ways Ahead

There are numerous challenges for future studies of this kind to tackle.
First of all, we may ask whether reductions in social spending affect all
groups’ democratic citizenship in a similar manner? The intuitive answer
would be that the most-at-risk groups in society would also be the most
sensitive to cuts in benefits. But would reductions in social spending also
adversely affect the ways the middle and upper classes also think about
and engage with politics? Do people even notice such changes? Campbell
(2012, 347) argues that changing social and political conditions, such as
a financial crisis, could “interrupt” the feedback effects that we would
otherwise be able to document.
Another challenge for future studies of democratic citizenship and
social policy involves the role of mediating institutions. As we know, just
as welfare state contexts differ across countries, so too do interest group
organization, party structures, the media, and bureaucratic administra-
tion. Do these institutions matter for policy feedback mechanisms?
Moreover, social policies aimed at working-age adults and families do not
exist in a vacuum; they coexist with other social policies including pen-
sion, education, and health policies, as well as in conjunction with a wide
spectrum of nonsocial policies. To make matters even more complicated,
we see that individuals are nested not only in one single political context
but are subject to policies made at multiple levels of government. How
can we best capture what is most important and relevant to individuals?
Is it the national level, as investigated in this study, or rather more proxi-
mate, local levels? In-depth qualitative interviews that would comple-
ment the use of large-scale cross-national surveys would help to address
such questions.
Moreover, experiments could help the researcher know if the differ-
ences observed between groups’ democratic citizenship are really due to
policies and not to some other national idiosyncrasy. And while experi-
ments could clear up some of the issues surrounding causal inference,
they would not necessarily help us to determine the causal mechanisms
of policy feedbacks. As Campbell (2012, 345) points out, “identifying
the mechanisms that link public programs with individual attitudes and
behaviors remains a stubborn challenge.” Research designs like the pres-
ent, which draw on cross-national survey data are, at best, only able to
speculate about the actual causal mechanisms involved in the relation-
ships between aspects of democratic citizenship and welfare state policies.
Although three main mechanisms are identified, involving the resources
distributed and redistributed, the personal stakes created, and the mes-
sages and norms embodied by welfare policies aimed at working-age
adults and families, we cannot be certain if different mechanisms affect
different groups in various ways or even if welfare state policy relates to
different aspects of democratic citizenship through various mechanisms.
144 J. Shore
Although policy feedback effects are measured, one unfortunately cannot

state with absolutely certainty the mechanisms through which it works to
influence the aspects of democratic citizenship. In this case, in-depth
qualitative analysis may be needed to go beyond mere speculation about
the mechanisms at work. This is, however, a weakness of numerous stud-
ies of political behavior and policy feedback approaches. As Plutzer
(2010) notes in his study of food stamp coverage and young adults’ polit-
ical participation, he too is unable to say for certain if the positive effect
of inclusive US State food stamp policies on youth political participation
is due to the message sent by the policies or the tangible resources they
confer. Moreover, the mechanisms are not entirely independent of one
another, making the task all the more challenging. For example, generous
benefits for families not only confer resources necessary for political par-
ticipation, but in doing so, also increase the personal stakes and relevance
of politics as well as send a message of inclusiveness. All of these mecha-
nisms have a positive effect on people’s propensity to get involved with
politics, and while it may not be possible to completely and definitively
disentangle the mechanisms at work (nor may it be absolutely necessary
to do so), mixed methods and experimental designs may help us to do so.
Could it be argued that it is not generous welfare states that are causing
high levels of political participation and engagement, but that high and
equitable levels of participation were what influenced the institutional-
ization of such welfare states as we know them today? Despite transfor-
mations to the welfare state over the past decades, the core values of
Scandinavian welfare states—universalism, solidarity, and de-commodi-
fication—have persisted (Cox 2004; Huber and Stephens 2002; Rothstein
and Steinmo 2002). Broad class-cutting coalitions and alliances between
labor and socialist parties seeking to enact generous social programs
fought were guided by such values (Esping-Andersen 1990; Korpi 1989;
Pierson 1993). Why these core values have remained largely intact and
also why we continue to see more equitable levels of political engagement
can be traced back to the path-dependent nature of welfare institutions.
Owing to the historic mobilization of the working class and the influ-
ence that labor unions wielded during the development of the modern
welfare state, we have witnessed high rates of participation among the
working classes alongside the preservation of universally designed social
policies that serve wide swaths of the population. Mass public opinion
can help explain this path dependency that, once set in motion, policies
have the potential to generate feedback effects. Universal programs, for
example, can bolster political legitimacy (Rothstein 1998), “suggesting
that the vested interests that citizens develop in social democracies lead to
greater preference for public over private provision” (Brooks and Manza
2006, 478). Because many people stand to benefit from such public ser-
vices and benefits, program cutbacks and retrenchment are not without
electoral risks for policymakers. Akin to the “lock-in effects” of welfare
state development described by Pierson (1993), citizens also influence
the preservation and continuity of social welfare policies.
That being said, while the issue of reverse causality continues to loom
large over many studies of political participation and welfare states and/
or income inequality, the design of the analyses in this contribution—
accounting for variation both on the individual and on the country level
and including interaction effects between individual income and social
spending on working-age adults and families—provides some defense.
The multilevel design with cross-level interactions allowed us to look
beyond aggregate-level effects, by examining the ways in which welfare
policy can intervene in the relationships between resources (here, income)
and the aspects of democratic citizenship, the matter of equalizing effects
could also be analyzed. In other words, for many of the dimensions, it
would be rather difficult to make the argument that an endogenous rela-
tionship is at work, as group-specific effects were found and inequality of
participation decreased. The relationships found here in terms of the way
the welfare state can shape democratic citizenship are thus not simple-
level effects: greater social spending on the working-age segment of the
population is indeed associated with a more equitable exercise of political
voice.
Lastly, the question of causality, however, remains a challenge for most
studies of policy feedback on political behavior, particularly ones like the
present that rely exclusively on cross-sectional research designs. While
efforts have been made to make sure that cause does potentially precede
effect (in measuring social spending prior to when the surveys were con-
ducted), to more confidently rule out the possibility of endogeneity of
welfare states to political behavior, a longitudinal design would be of
146 J. Shore
some help. Even with such data (which we do not have for a long range
across many aspects of democratic citizenship), policies, like institutions,
are often slow to change. Pierson (1993, 610) posits that we would need
a comparative case where lock in has not occurred in order to study the
effects of policy feedback, most likely rendering a large N study drawing
on a broad set of public policies (such as the present) less suitable. To
conclude and as highlighted in the policy feedback literature, there are
good reasons to believe that these are cases in which cause and effect exist
in a mutually reinforcing relationship. Since there is evidence that the
welfare state and democratic citizenship appear to interact, research
designs that take time trends and change are needed, as are in-depth case
studies that are better equipped to capture the nuanced effects of policy
change on democratic political engagement and support.
Conclusions
In asking the question about the quality of democracies, I have been able
to show that citizens in advanced liberal democracies do indeed respond
to what their governments offer them. Beyond the procedural and insti-
tutional accounts of the ways democracies do democracy, I have argued
that democratic quality is intrinsically related to how citizens behave
toward and think about their governments. Moreover, democratic quality
is also about equality. In many states, however, democracy has been pro-
ducing some very inequitable and possibly undemocratic outcomes.
Rather than taking the view that an apathetic and uninterested citizenry
is to blame for the trends of political withdrawal across many nations, I
posited that in order for citizens to be interested and engaged with poli-
tics and support the ideals and principles of democracy, their democracies
need to offer them something. The offerings I investigated were social
welfare policies aimed at working-age adults and families.
While many have documented the deleterious effects of income
inequality on electoral participation, I approached this relationship in a
different way, one that allows us to think more precisely about the causal
mechanisms involved in the links between resources, inequality, and
political participation. Although inequality is certainly a product of fiscal
and social policies, I argued that public policies are the things with which
people actually have contact and personal experiences—not abstract
macro-indicators such as the Gini index. Public policies, as advanced by
policy feedback scholars, have the potential to produce feedback effects
on mass publics. For example, much like formal institutions, policies can
shape people’s incentives for political participation. Looking first at the
well-documented links between resources and democratic citizenship, I
then moved on to discuss the ways in which public policy can affect
political attitudes and behaviors. For one, policies distribute and redis-
tribute the resources needed for participation. They also can create per-
sonal stakes and pique one’s interest in politics. Lastly, public policies can
serve as messengers: depending on design and generosity, policies can
inform people about where they stand in society, whether they are seen as
a deserving and integral part of the polity, or whether their status as a
recipient signifies social stigma. I hypothesized that where social policies
place a clear focus on reducing economic inequality, political inequality
should be lessened as well.
To test the assumptions of the policy feedback approach—which hith-
erto have tended to be confined to single countries (in particular, the
United States) and also to smaller constituencies—I examined five aspects
of political behaviors and attitudes in OECD countries: voting, alterna-
tive political participation, interest in politics, trust in parliament, and
satisfaction with democracy. The policies I looked at furthermore consti-
tuted an improvement to previous studies drawing on either highly
aggregated measures of welfare state spending or less tangible indicators
of inequality. In particular, public policies that influence one’s economic
well-being have a greater likelihood of stimulating or stunting demo-
cratic citizenship. For this reason, I chose to examine the effect of social
policies aimed at working-age adults and families on the dimensions of
democratic citizenship, showing that this group of policies is both theo-
retically and empirically most closely aligned to redistributive outcomes
and the welfare state’s theoretical core.
Not only do the overall levels of democratic citizenship tend to be
higher in more generous welfare states, but the distributions of these
aspects are also much more equitable. While wealthier individuals in all
countries under consideration vote at higher rates than their less well-off
148 J. Shore
fellow citizens, we can, however, witness a much smaller gap between the
rich and the poor in welfare states that spend more on their working-age
adults and families. Alternative forms of political participation also have
a more frequent and equitable practice in more generous countries.
Furthermore, political interest and satisfaction with democracy are not
only more likely in nations where the state has a clear policy focus on the
reduction of economic inequality, but they are also more equitably dis-
tributed across income groups. Finally, while trust in parliament—an
indicator of one’s overall confidence in democratic political institutions—
is higher in more generous welfare states, we cannot speak of a more
equal incidence of political trust within the population. One possible
reason for the continued dependence of trust on income could be the
overall lower levels of political trust across countries. It could perhaps also
be that what we are observing is part of a larger trend in declining trust
levels, one that perhaps reaches the poorest citizens sooner and with
greater force.
“Citizens with lower or moderate incomes speak with a whisper that
is lost on the ears of inattentive government officials, while the advan-
taged roar with a clarity and consistency that policy-makers readily hear
and routinely follow” (American Political Science Association Task
Force 2004, 651). The attention in this book has been on the feed part
of policy feedback effects; the implication the previous statement, how-
ever, touches on the back element—that is, the policies that result from
unequal participation and representation. While several studies have
investigated how policies, their design, and their administration can
affect political participation and democratic citizenship, the policy
results or outcomes (i.e., what comes back out) have received far less
empirical attention. Where propensity to vote is strongly tied to one’s
socioeconomic resources, we are likely to encounter an overrepresenta-
tion of certain interests (Verba et al. 1995, 493), leading to biased
outcomes.
The implications of unequal democratic citizenship are manifold, as all
conceptions of democracy rest upon the ideal that all citizens should have
equal opportunities to participate in political life. Furthermore, political
inequality has many implications for the responsiveness, health, and ulti-
mately the legitimacy and stability of democratic states (Schäfer 2015;

Gilens 2012). When, however, we witness that portions of the popula-
tion are being left out of democratic citizenship, we must ask why this is
so and, perhaps more importantly, what can be done to draw these groups
back in?
The present study offers further insights into the role of social pol-
icy for the distribution of democratic citizenship. Despite the draw-
backs of a cross-sectional study, inroads have been forged into further
examining and understanding the links between public policies,
inequality, and political participation for mass publics across a diverse
group of democracies. And while different types of designs are cer-
tainly needed to better identify what is feed and what is back in policy
feedback effects, recognizing that in some countries we are confronted
with virtuous cycles and in others vicious ones remain an important
finding. If citizens with greater resources are consistently and actively
engaging in political life while the less advantaged are withdrawing
from it, the consequences of unequal political input are clear. As the
policy feedback literature outlines, the outputs of previous demo-
cratic decision-making processes influence and shape the inputs of
future processes. Recent studies examining the representativeness of
public policy outputs or government composition have confirmed the
suspicions regarding the effect of unequal input across a variety of
states (e.g., Bartels 2008; Elsässer et al. 2017; Giger et al. 2012; Gilens
2005, 2012; Gilens and Page 2014; Peters and Ensink 2015; Rosset
2013).
While we must also accept the fact that not everyone will or can be
interested in and engaged with politics, the reality that political influence
remains disproportionality concentrated in the hands of the better off is
indeed cause for concern. As shown in this book, there are marked differ-
ences across countries in terms of whose voices are likely to get heard and
whose may be ignored. Uncovering these disparities is, however, only half
the story—what can be done to encourage political equality and more
equal representation remains a challenging but vital task for contempo-
rary democratic societies.
150 J. Shore
References
in an Age of Rising Inequality. Perspectives on Politics 2 (04): 651–666.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S153759270404040X.
Ariely, Gal. 2013. Public Administration and Citizen Satisfaction with
Democracy: Cross-national Evidence. International Review of Administrative
Sciences 79 (4): 747–766. https://doi.org/10.1177/0020852313501432.
Bartels, Larry M. 2008. Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New
Gilded Age. New York and Princeton, NJ: Russell Sage Foundation and
Brooks, C., and J. Manza. 2006. Social Policy Responsiveness in Developed
Democracies. American Sociological Review 71 (3): 474–494. https://doi.
org/10.1177/000312240607100306.
Bruch, Sarah K., Myra M. Ferree, and Joe Soss. 2010. From Policy to Polity:
Democracy, Paternalism, and the Incorporation of Disadvantaged Citizens.
American Sociological Review 75 (2): 205–226. https://doi.org/10.1177/
0003122410363563.
Campbell, Andrea Louise. 2012. Policy Makes Mass Politics. Annual Review of
Political Science 15 (1): 333–351. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-
012610-135202.
Christensen, Tom, and Per Laegreid. 2005. Trust in Government: The Relative
Importance of Service Satisfaction, Political Factors, and Demography. Public
Performance & Management Review 28 (4): 487–511. https://doi.org/10.108
0/15309576.2005.11051848.
Cox, Robert. 2004. The Path-Dependency of an Idea: Why Scandinavian
Welfare States Remain Distinct. Social Policy & Administration 38 (2):
204–219. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9515.2004.00386.x.
Dalton, Russell J. 2004. Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The
Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies. Oxford:
Oxford University Press http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0620/
2004300752-t.html.
Elsässer, Lea, Svenja Hense, and Armin Schäfer. 2017. “Dem Deutschen Volke”?
Die ungleiche Responsivität des Bundestags. Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft
27 (2): 161–180. https://doi.org/10.1007/s41358-017-0097-9.
Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. 1990. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton:
Giger, Nathalie, Jan Rosset, and Julian Bernauer. 2012. The Poor Political
Representation of the Poor in a Comparative Perspective. Representation 48
(1): 47–61. https://doi.org/10.1080/00344893.2012.653238.
Gilens, Martin. 2005. Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness. Public
Opinion Quarterly 69 (5): 778–796. https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfi058.
———. 2012. Affluence and Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power
in America. Princeton, NJ and New York: Princeton University Press and
Russell Sage Foundation.
Gilens, Martin, and Benjamin I. Page. 2014. Testing Theories of American
Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens. Perspective on Politics
12 (3): 564–581. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592714001595.
Grönlund, Kimmo, and Maija Setälä. 2007. Political Trust, Satisfaction and
Voter Turnout. Comparative European Politics 5 (4): 400–422. https://doi.
org/10.1057/palgrave.cep.6110113.
Huber, Evelyne, and John D. Stephens. 2002. Globalisation, Competitiveness,
and the Social Democratic Model. Social Policy and Society 1 (1): 47–57.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474746402001070.
Korpi, Walter. 1989. Power, Politics, and State Autonomy in the Development of
Social Citizenship: Social Rights During Sickness in Eighteen OECD Countries
Since 1930. Reprint Series/Swedish Institute for Social Research 245.
Stockholm: Stockholms University and Swedish Institute for Social Research.
Kumlin, Staffan. 2004. The Personal and the Political: How Personal Welfare State
Experiences Affect Political Trust and Ideology. Political Evolution and
Institutional Change. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Kumlin, Staffan, and Bo Rothstein. 2005. Making and Breaking Social Capital:
The Impact of Welfare-State Institutions. Comparative Political Studies 38 (4):
339–365.
Marien, Sofie, and Marc Hooghe. 2011. Does Political Trust Matter? An
Empirical Investigation into the Relation Between Political Trust and Support
for Law Compliance. European Journal of Political Research 50 (2): 267–291.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2010.01930.x.
Mettler, Suzanne, and Jeffrey M. Stonecash. 2008. Government Program Usage
and Political Voice. Social Science Quarterly 89 (2): 273–293. https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.1540-6237.2008.00532.x.
152 J. Shore
Moynihan, Donald P., and Joe Soss. 2014. Policy Feedback and the Politics of
Administration. Public Administration Review 74 (3): 320–332. https://doi.
org/10.1111/puar.12200.
Norris, Pippa, ed. 1999. Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic
Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Peters, Yvette, and Sander J. Ensink. 2015. Differential Responsiveness in
Europe: The Effects of Preference Difference and Electoral Participation. West
European Politics 38 (3): 577–600. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2014
.973260.
Pierson, Paul. 1993. When Effect Becomes Cause: Policy Feedback and Political
Change. World Politics 45 (4): 595–628.
Plutzer, Eric. 2010. Do Highly Exclusive Social Welfare Programs Increase
Political Inequality? A Comparative Analysis of the 50 US States. Social
Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) Working Paper No. SP (2010-01).
Rosset, Jan. 2013. Are the Policy Preferences of Relatively Poor Citizens Under-
represented in the Swiss Parliament? The Journal of Legislative Studies 19 (4):
490–504. https://doi.org/10.1080/13572334.2013.812363.
Rothstein, Bo. 1998. Just Institutions Matter: The Moral and Political Logic of the
Universal Welfare State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rothstein, Bo, and Sven Steinmo, eds. 2002. Restructuring the Welfare State:
Political Institutions and Policy Change. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Schäfer, Armin. 2015. Der Verlust politischer Gleichheit: Warum die sinkende
Wahlbeteiligung der Demokratie schadet. Schriften aus dem Max-Planck-
Institut [MPI] für Gesellschaftsforschung, Köln Band 81. Frankfurt am
Main: Campus Verlag.
Tyler, Tom R. 2006. Why People Obey the Law. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
University Press.
Watson, Sara. 2015. Does Welfare Conditionality Reduce Democratic
Participation? Comparative Political Studies 48 (5): 645–686. https://doi.
org/10.1177/0010414014556043.
Wichowsky, Amber, and Donald P. Moynihan. 2008. Measuring How
Administration Shapes Citizenship: A Policy Feedback Perspective on
Performance Management. Public Administration Review 68 (5): 908–920.
Appendix
Table A1 Voting: Variables, descriptive statistics, sources, hypothesized direction

of influence
Dir.
Dependent variable
Electoral Shares: Dummy: Voted in last national
participation Yes: 80.19 election
No: 19.81 1 = Yes; 0 = No
Source: WVS, wave 4; ESS, rounds 3
and 4.
Individual-level variables
Educational level Shares: Completed level of education: +
0: 2.46 0 = Did not complete primary
1: 11.28 1 = Primary or 1st stage of basic
2: 21.54 2 = Lower secondary/ 2nd stage of basic
3: 34.02 3 = Upper secondary
4: 7.51 4 = Post-secondary, non-tertiary
5: 23.19 5 = First stage of tertiary
Gender Shares: Dummy: 0 = male; 1 = female −
Male: 46.48
Female: 53.52
(continued)

Political Sociology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93961-2
154 Appendix
Table A1 (continued)
Dir.
Union membership Shares: Dummy: Respondent is or was a +
Members: member of a trade union
39.98 1 = Yes; 0 = No
Non-
members:
60.02
Age Mean: 49.30 Age in years of the respondent +
SD: 17.50
Min.: 18
Max.: 105
Employment status Shares: Dummy: Respondent has reported +
Employed: doing paid work within the last
56.56 seven days
Unemployed: 1 = Yes; 0 = No
43.44
Income level Shares: Reported income quintiles +
Low: 15.73 Low = first quintile; mid = second to
Mid: 65.79 fourth quintiles; high = fifth quintile
High: 18.48
Country-level variables
Welfare state: Mean: 5.83 Total benefits for working-age adults +
Working-age SD: 2.10 plus expenditures for Active Labor
benefits Min.: 2.24 Market Policies as a proportion of
Max.: 10.41 the GDP.
Source: OECD Social Expenditure
Database.
Expenditures have been adjusted for
structural and demographic
pressures: Unemployment benefits
and ALMP by the unemployment
rate; family cash spending by the
proportion of the population under
age 15; and family benefits in kind
spending by the proportion of the
population ages 0–4.
Source: OECD.
(continued)
Appendix
155
Dir.
Compulsory voting Shares: Degree of compulsory voting with +
0: 86.96 regard to severity and enforcement,
1: 6.43 ranging from 0 to 4: 0 = non-
2: 0.00 compulsory voting; 1 = low sanctions
3: 3.13 and enforcement; 2 = moderate
4: 3.48 sanctions; low enforcement;
3 = either high sanctions or high
enforcement; 4 = both high
sanctions and enforcement.
Source: IDEA (International Institute
for Democracy and Electoral
Assistance) and own calculations
based on Singh (2011) and
Panagopoulos (2008).
Disproportionality Mean: 5.36 Gallagher Index of disproportionality. −
of electoral SD: 4.15 Source: Armingeon et al. (2011),
system Min.: 0.35 Comparative Political Data Set.
Max.: 16.63
Age of democracy Mean: 61.37 Age in years of present democratic +/−
SD: 46.56 regime at time of survey. Variable
Min.: 8 measures the number of years since
Max: 197 the most recent regime change.
Source: Armingeon et al. (2011),
Comparative Political Data Set.
Squared term included in the
models.
Strength of left Mean: 35.94 Social democratic and other left-wing +
parties in SD: 37.06 parties as a percentage of total
government Min: 0 cabinet posts, weighted by number
Max.: 100 of days government was in office in
given year.
156 Appendix
Table A2 Interest in politics: Variables, descriptive statistics, sources, hypothe-

sized direction of influence
Dir.
Dependent variable
Interest in politics Shares: Respondent indicated some level of
Yes: 50.09 interest in politics. Recoded from
No: 49.91 original political interest variable
with 4 categories: not at all
interested and hardly
interested = No (0); quite interested
and very interested = Yes (1)
Source: WVS, wave 4; ESS, rounds 3
and 4.
Gender Shares: Dummy: 0 = male; 1 = female +
Male: 47.27
Female: 52.73
Union membership Shares: Respondent is a member or former +
Members: member of a union. Dummy:
42.51 0 = Non-member; 1: Member
Non-
members:
57.49
SD: 17.41
Min.: 18
Max.: 105
Urban Shares: Dummy: Respondent lives in an urban +
Urban: 35.06 area. 0 = No; 1 = Yes.
Non-urban:
64.94
Employment status Shares: Respondent has reported doing paid +
Employed: work within the last seven days.
58.06 Dummy: 1 = Yes; 0 = No
Unemployed:
41.94
(continued)
Appendix
157
Dir.
High: 18.41
Database.
pressures: Cash and benefits in kind
for unemployment by the
unemployment rate; family cash
population under age 15; and family
benefits in kind spending by the
proportion of the population ages 0
to 4.
Source: OECD.
Disproportionality Mean: 5.34 Gallagher Index of disproportionality. −
system Min.: .35 Comparative Political Data Set.
Max: 16.63
Age of democracy Mean: 62.09 Age in years of present democratic +/−
Squared term included in the
models.
Strength of the left Mean: 36.21 Social democratic and other left-wing +
SD: 37.06 parties as a percentage of total
Min: 0 cabinet posts, weighted by number
Max.: 100 of days government was in office in
given year.
158 Appendix
Table A3 Trust in parliament: Variables, descriptive statistics, sources, hypothe-

sized direction of influence
Dir.
Dependent variable
Trust in parliament Mean: 4.64 Dummy: Respondent indicated
SD: 2.45 participating in a non-
Min.: 0 institutionalized political activity
Max.: 10 (contacting a politician and/or
signing of a petition) 1 = Yes;
0 = No.
Source: ESS, rounds 3 and 4
Male: 47.41
Female: 52.59
Urban residence Shares: Respondent lives in an urban area. +
Urbanites: Dummy: 0 = Rural/non-urban; 1:
33.02 Urban
Non-urban:
66.98
SD: 17.53
Min.: 18
Max.: 105
Union membership Shares: Dummy: Respondent is a past or +
Union: 45.46 present union member.
Non-union: 1 = Yes; 0 = No
54.54
Employment status Shares: Dummy: Respondent has reported +
Employed: doing paid work within the last
45.50 seven days
Unemployed: 1 = Yes; 0 = No
54.50
(continued)
Appendix
159
Dir.
High: 18.80
Database.
pressures: Cash and benefits in kind
for unemployment by the
population under age 15; and family
benefits in kind spending by the
to 4.
Source: OECD
Age of democracy Mean: 53.17 Age in years of present democratic +
Source: Armingeon et al.
(2011), Comparative Political Data
Set. Squared term included in the
models.
parties SD: 36.82 parties as a percentage of total
Min.: 0 cabinet posts, weighted by number
Max: 100 of days government was in office in
given year.
Disproportionality Mean: 5.06 Gallagher Index of disproportionality. +/−
Max: 16.63
160 Appendix
Table A4 Satisfaction with democracy: Variables, descriptive statistics, sources,

hypothesized direction of influence
Dir.
Dependent variable
Satisfaction with Shares: “On the whole, are you very satisfied,
democracy Yes: 67.72 fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or
No: 32.28 not at all satisfied with the way
democracy works in [COUNTRY]?”
Fairly satisfied; very satisfied = yes
(1); not very satisfied; not at all
satisfied = no (0).
Source: CSES, module 3
Educational level Shares: Education of respondent +
1: 0.46 1 = None
2: 1.91 2 = Incomplete primary
3: 21.29 3 = Primary completed
4: 15.25 4 = Incomplete secondary
5: 27.18 5 = Secondary completed
6: 33.91 6 = Post-secondary; trade or
vocational school completed
Male: 51.14
Female: 48.86
Urban residence Shares: Respondent lives in an urban area. +
Urbanites: Dummy: 0 = Rural area or small
51.22 village; small- or middle-sized town
Non- 1: Suburbs of large town or city; large
Urban:48.78 town or city
SD: 17.09
Min.: 18
Max.: 100
Union membership Shares: Dummy: Respondent is a union +
Union: 25.12 member
Non-union: 1 = Yes; 0 = No
74.88
Employment status Shares: Dummy: Current employment status +
Employed: of respondent
55.72 1 = Employed: Part-time or full-time
Unemployed: 0 = Unemployed; not in labor force
44.28
(continued)
Appendix
161
Dir.
Left-right Mean: 2.44 “Where would you place yourself on +
placement SD: 5.29 this scale?” Scale ranges from 0 to
Min.: 0 10, with lower values indicating a
Max.: 10 left-leaning position; higher values
a right-leaning political position
High: 14.82
Working-age SD: 1.77 and families + ALMP expenditures
benefits Min.: 2.45 as % of GDP.
Max.: 10.41 Source: OECD SOCX.
Expenditures adjusted for structural &
demographic needs: Cash & benefits
in kind for unemployment by
spending by proportion of the
population under age 15; and
family benefits in kind spending by
to 4.
Source: OECD
Age of democracy Mean: 63.45 Age in years of present democratic +
Comparative Political Data
Set. Squared term included in the
models.
parties SD: 32.20 parties as a % of total cabinet posts,
Min.: 0 weighted by number of days
Max: 100 government was in office in given
year.
Disproportionality Mean: 4.22 Gallagher Index of disproportionality. +/−
Max: 13.69
162 Appendix
Table A5 Alternative welfare policy specifications and satisfaction with democracy
Satisfaction with democracy
Old-age Health Total social expenditures
Constant −0.330 −2.177* −2.166**
(0.719) (1.143) (0.919)
Fixed effects
Income (Ref. = low)
Mid-level 0.022 0.153 0.024
(0.118) (0.256) (0.207)
High 0.157 −0.026 0.074
(0.162) (0.353) (0.296)
Welfare expenditures −0.077 0.236 0.061
(0.064) (0.195) (0.195)
Strength of left −0.001 −0.003 −0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Age of democracy 0.011** 0.011** 0.013***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Disproportionality −0.024 −0.049 −0.040
(0.063) (0.061) (0.059)
Welfare × Mid-level 0.027 0.014 0.010
income
(0.013)** (0.041) (0.009)
Welfare × High income 0.033 0.073 0.016
(0.019)* (0.057) (0.014)
Random effects
Rho 0.165 0.159 0.151
Context variance 0.807 0.790 0.764
N 18,443 (22) 18,443 (22) 18,443 (22)
Notes: Log-odds, standard errors in parentheses. All additional individual
variables included in models but not shown.
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1
Marginal effects for income groups and respective welfare indicators can be
found in Table 5.18.
Index1
A Comparative Study of Electoral

Age of democracy, 85, 87, 91, 94, Systems (CSES), 5, 121–124
105–107, 117, 118, 125, Compulsory voting, 80, 80n4, 84,
126 86, 87, 89, 90
Almond, Gabriel, 19, 23 Context, 2, 4, 17, 24, 29–47, 65–68,
American Political Science 70, 71, 76, 83, 91, 97, 115,
Association Task Force, 22, 96, 130, 139, 140, 143
148 Cross-level interaction, 5, 71, 81–83,
86, 90–91, 95, 97, 99, 102,
106, 107, 118–119, 127, 129,
C 138, 145
Campbell, Andrea Louise, 4, 40–42,
97, 143
Castles, Francis, 4, 36, 37, 56–60 D
Causality, 145 Dahl, Robert, 9, 10, 12, 17, 24, 38
Causal mechanisms, 143, 146 De-commodification, 56–59, 144
Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

Political Sociology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93961-2
164 Index
Democratic citizenship, 1–5, 12, Inequality, 1–3, 9–24, 36, 38, 41,
15–21, 24, 29, 32, 36, 46, 42, 44–47, 58–63, 82, 96,
53–71, 75–130, 137–149 98–100, 99n8, 111, 120, 125,
Democratic support, 2, 6, 17, 21, 128, 130, 137, 145–149
44, 111–113, 116 Ingram, Helen, 40, 42
Disproportionality, 84, 86, 87, 89, Interaction, 31, 39, 69, 83, 86,
91, 103–107, 116–119, 89–92, 95, 106, 108, 120,
125–127, 149 127, 138, 145
E K
Egalitarian, 1, 94 Kuitto, Kati, 59, 61, 62, 130
Equality, 1, 3, 9, 10, 12, 14, 33, Kumlin, Staffan, 29, 42–44, 139,
33n3, 45, 112, 146, 149 141n1
Esping-Andersen, Gøsta, 4, 41, 43,
56–58, 144
Europe, 14, 115–119 L
European Social Survey (ESS), 5, 66, Legitimacy, 6, 10, 11, 21, 31, 45, 96,
76, 78, 79n3, 80, 81, 100, 145, 149
102, 103, 113–115, 113n10, Lijphart, Arend, 15, 17, 24, 80n4,
122 84, 124
Expenditures, 4, 6, 56–64, 95, Logistic regression, 70, 81, 83, 95,
128–130, 137, 138 100, 102, 104
H M
Hox, Joop, 66, 67, 69, 83n6 Macro-level, 17, 31, 40, 53, 65–67, 82
Marginal effects, 82, 86, 91, 92, 108,
120, 127–130, 138
I Marshall, T.H., 36, 37, 45
Income, 1–3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 16, 17, Measurement, 4, 12, 53, 55, 84,
22–24, 35, 37, 41, 44–47, 71, 113n10
76, 79–83, 86–111, 114–130, Mettler, Suzanne, 39, 40, 42, 98, 99,
137–141, 145, 146, 148 139
Individual-level, 4, 65–67, 77, 78, Multilevel analysis, 65–67, 69,
82, 86, 88, 91, 100, 102–105, 83–85, 90–91, 105, 107,
116, 121, 123 117–119, 126
Index
165
N Ringen, Stein, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16,

New institutionalism, 30, 31, 35
31n1 Rothstein, Bo, 30, 32–34, 42, 43,
Norris, Pippa, 19, 112, 142 100, 139, 144, 145
O S
Organisation for Economic Satisfaction with democracy, xiv,
Co-operation and 4–6, 15, 20, 44, 53, 75,
Development (OECD), 57, 111–113, 116, 121–130, 138,
60–64, 62n1, 76, 77, 94, 97, 139, 141, 147, 148
100, 102, 137, 147 Schäfer, Armin, 112, 149
Schattschneider, Elmer E., 38, 39,
98, 99n8
P Schneider, Anne, 40, 42
Pierson, Paul, 37, 39, 40, 42, 54, 58, Social rights, 12, 15, 32, 35, 37, 38,
144–146 43, 56, 58, 100, 137, 140
Policy Social spending, 2, 4–6, 56, 58–60,
feedback, 1–4, 17, 24, 29, 38–41, 84, 96, 106, 108–110, 116,
44–46, 98, 110, 129, 137, 120, 125, 129, 137–139, 141,
140, 143–149 142, 145
output, 112, 129, 149 Socio-economic resources, 16, 17,
Political 45, 46, 95, 148
efficacy, 2, 17, 22, 23, 42, 44, 45, Solt, Frederick, 17, 24, 76, 98,
96, 139 99n8
interest, xiv, 5, 14–16, 53, 75, Soss, Joe, 39, 40, 42, 44, 98, 99,
96–111, 137–140, 147, 148 139
Stadelmann-Steffen, Isabelle, 23, 29,
82n5
Q Stakes, personal, 41, 42, 94, 143,
Quality of democracy, 2, 3, 11, 15, 144, 147
146 Strength of the left, 84, 106, 125
R T
Redistribution, 41, 45, 58 Trust, 4–6, 19, 20, 44, 46, 53, 75,
Representation, 23, 84, 95, 96, 104, 111–121, 137–142, 141n1,
113, 124, 125, 148, 149 147, 148
166 Index
Turnout, 2, 5, 15, 17, 24, 42, 76–81, W

78n2, 80n4, 84, 85, 88–90, Welfare
93–95, 104 policy, 1, 2, 5, 14, 36, 43, 45, 46,
59–63, 67, 71, 76, 82, 86,
89–92, 94, 95, 97–100, 102,
U 106, 108, 110, 120, 127, 139,
Unemployment, 36, 56, 60–63, 95, 140, 143, 145, 146
110 priority, 59, 130
United States, 2, 20, 39, 41, 42, spending, 4–6, 32, 46, 56–59,
44–46, 60, 63, 64, 76, 80, 81, 61–63, 81–83, 86, 88–95, 99,
98, 102, 103, 144, 147 100, 106, 108, 109, 113, 116,
Universalism, 144 119–121, 127–129, 137, 138,
147, 148
state, 1–6, 12, 14, 16, 17, 24, 29,
V 31–39, 31n2, 43–47, 53–71, 75,
van Deth, Jan, 97 76, 81–83, 86–90, 92–97, 99,
Verba, Sidney, 19, 22–24, 79, 96, 100, 102, 104–111, 113–115,
97, 148 119–125, 127–130, 137–148
Vote, 1, 9, 12, 14, 15, 22, 46, Working-age adults and families,
53, 69, 76–86, 79n3, 88, 4–6, 57–59, 61–64, 67, 71,
89, 92–96, 106, 137–139, 76, 81–83, 86, 89, 90, 92–95,
148 97, 99, 102, 106, 108, 110,
Voting, xiv, 5, 6, 15, 20, 46, 70, 71, 111, 113, 116, 120, 127–130,
75–80, 78n1, 79n3, 80n4, 137–143, 145–148
82–97, 83n6, 86n7, 100, World Values Survey (WVS), 5, 63,
101n9, 103–106, 109, 110, 66, 76, 78, 80, 81, 100, 102,
122, 138, 147 103, 113n10

(Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology) Jennifer Shore - The Welfare State and The Democratic Citizen-Springer International Publishing - Palgrave Macmillan (2019) PDF

Transféré par

Informations du document

Titre original

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

(Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology) Jennifer Shore - The Welfare State and The Democratic Citizen-Springer International Publishing - Palgrave Macmillan (2019) PDF

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology

The Welfare State and

More information about this series at

The Welfare State

Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018946640

Cover image © Blend Images - Hill Street Studios

This book is the culmination of what began as a graduate school applica-

that allowed me the freedom to fully pursue my academic interests. The

wonderful friends. Although separated by an ocean, my family’s love and

Mannheim, Germany Jennifer Shore

2 Democracies and Their Citizens 9

3 Why Context Matters: The Role of Public Policy 29

4 Empirical Approaches to the Study of Democratic Citizens

5 The Impact of Social Policy on Democratic Citizenship 75

6 Consequences of Unequal Citizenship 137

Fig. 4.1 Social expenditures on working-age adults and families (% of

Table 4.1 Disaggregated welfare state expenditures across countries

Table 5.13 Multilevel analyses of trust in parliament with cross-level

Democracy, when boiled down to one person, one vote, explicitly

© The Author(s) 2019 1

Overview of This Book

attitudes. The main theoretical frame—the policy feedback approach—is

greatest boost from additional social expenditures. Those whose resources

Castles, Francis G. 2008. What Welfare States Do: A Disaggregated Expenditure

© The Author(s) 2019 9

More broadly, inequality has many implications for the legitimacy of

analysis of democratic quality is thus a “value-laden and […] controver-

Few would negate the statement “democracy is better than non-­

mention increased abstention from voting. Since high levels of political

i­ nequality and the types of unequal participation it can produce, is indeed

Origins of Democratic Citizenship

Like his contemporaries, Mill’s ideal citizen was male.

words, democracy is positively correlated to indicators of modernity.

The first dimension, political engagement, encompasses those attributes

 nequal Citizenship: Participation

f­ ollows, further emphasizing the deleterious effects of inequality of politi-

Even if one rejects the philosophical proposition that active citizenship is

That political engagement and democratic support are unevenly dis-

This conclusion has also been underscored by a group of prominent

ples, as they see themselves as being sufficiently capable and competent to

Freedom House. 2018. Freedom in the World 2018. Washington, DC. Accessed

© The Author(s) 2019 29

New Institutionalist Approaches

homogeneity, heritage from a former colonial empire or the place of a

context functions such that it structures individual attitudes and behav-

What Should a Welfare State Do?

“The political content of the concept of rights is determined […] by what

by ensuring that all, regardless of their capabilities, have equal access to

enable individuals to “put power behind their demands” (ibid., 192).

The Interconnectedness of Rights

part of the rights of the citizen, but as an alternative to them—as claims

“­ provides the fullest development of social rights of citizenship” (Roche

Political citizenship influences civil citizenship. Social citizenship influ-

What we in effect witness are numerous spillovers in terms of inequali-

 he Impact of Public Policy: The Policy

Schattschneider (1960) confronted the prevailing sentiment that an apa-

the American Social Security System creates a barrier to privatized indi-

being Esping-Andersen’s The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990).

contact with government institutions, must be treated with “equal concern

L inking the Welfare State and the Democratic

participation but must allow for equal citizen participation in order to be

­ olitics—including voting in elections and being interested in politics.

Mannheim, Germany Jennifer Shore

2 Democracies and Their Citizens 9

3 Why Context Matters: The Role of Public Policy 29

4 Empirical Approaches to the Study of Democratic Citizens

5 The Impact of Social Policy on Democratic Citizenship 75

6 Consequences of Unequal Citizenship 137

Overview of This Book

Few would negate the statement “democracy is better than non-

i nequality and the types of unequal participation it can produce, is indeed

Origins of Democratic Citizenship

nequal Citizenship: Participation

f ollows, further emphasizing the deleterious effects of inequality of politi-

New Institutionalist Approaches

What Should a Welfare State Do?

The Interconnectedness of Rights

“ provides the fullest development of social rights of citizenship” (Roche

he Impact of Public Policy: The Policy

L inking the Welfare State and the Democratic

olitics—including voting in elections and being interested in politics.

perationalizing the Welfare State:

Measuring the Welfare State

lleviating Inequality: Welfare Policies Aimed

tatistical Approaches: Bridging the Micro-

he Statistical and Theoretical Case for Multilevel

Introduction to Multilevel Models

Modeling Binary Data

The Decision to Vote

Multilevel Analysis of Voting

Empirical Findings: Voting

Voting Patterns in Welfare States: Conclusions