G.R. Nos. 164302-03. January 24, 2007.

SANTA ROSA COCA-COLA PLANT EMPLOYEES UNION, Donrico V. Sebastian, Eulogio G. Batino,
Samuel A. Atanque, Manolo C. Zabaljauregui, Dionisio Tenorio, Edwin P. Rellores, Luis B. Natividad,
Myrna Petingco, Feliciano Tolentino, Rodolfo A. Amante, Jr., Cipriano C. Bello, Ronaldo T. Espino,
Efren Galan, and Jun Carmelito Santos, petitioners, vs. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC.,
respondent.

Labor Law; Strikes; Administrative Law; The settled rule is that the factual findings and conclusions of
tribunals, as long as they are based on substantial evidence, are conclusive on the Supreme Court;
Whether the employees staged a strike or not is a factual issue.—It bears stressing that this is a finding
made by the Labor Arbiter which was affirmed by the NLRC and the CA. The settled rule is that the
factual findings and conclusions of tribunals, as long as they are based on substantial evidence, are
conclusive on this Court. The raison d’etre is that quasi-judicial agencies, like the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC, have acquired a unique expertise since their jurisdictions are confined to specific matters. Besides,
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the factual issues raised by the petitioner are inappropriate in a
petition for review on certiorari. Whether petitioners staged a strike or not is a factual issue.

Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The fact that the conventional term “strike” was not used by the
striking employees to describe their common course of action is inconsequential, since the substance of
the situation, and not its appearance, will be deemed to be controlling—the term “strike” encompasses
not only concerted work stoppages, but also slowdowns, mass leaves, sit-downs, attempts to damage,
destroy or sabotage plant equipment and facilities, and similar activities.—Article 212(o) of the Labor
Code defines strike as a temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of
an industrial or labor dispute. In Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 619 (1997), the Court ruled
that “the fact that the conventional term ‘strike’ was not used by the striking employees to describe their
common course of action is inconsequential, since the substance of the situation, and not its appearance,
will be deemed to be controlling.” The term “strike” encompasses not only concerted work stoppages,
but also slowdowns, mass leaves, sitdowns, attempts to damage, destroy or sabotage plant equipment
and facilities, and similar activities.

Same; Same; Same; Picketing; As applied to a labor dispute, to picket means the stationing of one or
more persons to observe and attempt to observe; The purpose of pickets is said to be a means of
peaceable persuasion.—Picketing involves merely the marching to and fro at the premises of the
employer, usually accompanied by the display of placards and other signs making known the facts
involved in a labor dispute. As applied to a labor dispute, to picket means the stationing of one or more
persons to observe and attempt to observe. The purpose of pickets is said to be a means of peaceable
persuasion.
Same; Same; Same; Same; “Labor Dispute,” Defined.—A labor dispute includes any controversy or matter
concerning terms or conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment,
regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Mayor’s Permits; What is definitive of whether the action staged by the
employees is a strike and not merely a picket is the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
situation, and the bare fact that they were given Mayor’s permit is not conclusive evidence that their
action/activity did not amount to a strike.—The bare fact that petitioners were given a Mayor’s permit is
not conclusive evidence that their action/activity did not amount to a strike. The Mayor’s description of
what activities petitioners were allowed to conduct is inconsequential. To repeat, what is definitive of
whether the action staged by petitioners is a strike and not merely a picket is the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the situation.

Same; Same; Same; A strike is the most powerful of the economic weapons of workers which they
unsheathe to force management to agree to an equitable sharing of the joint product of labor and
capital—it is a weapon that can either breathe life to or destroy the Union and its members in their
struggle with management for a more equitable due to their labors; The right to strike as a means of
attainment of social justice is never meant to oppress or destroy the employer; Since strikes cause
disparity effects not only on the relationship between labor and management but also on the general
peace and progress of society, the law has provided limitations on the right to strike.—A strike is the
most powerful of the economic weapons of workers which they unsheathe to force management to agree
to an equitable sharing of the joint product of labor and capital. It is a weapon that can either breathe life
to or destroy the Union and its members in their struggle with management for a more equitable due to
their labors. The decision to declare a strike must therefore rest on a rational basis, free from
emotionalism, envisaged by the tempers and tantrums of a few hot heads, and finally focused on the
legitimate interests of the Union which should not, however, be antithetical to the public welfare, and, to
be valid, a strike must be pursued within legal bounds. The right to strike as a means of attainment of
social justice is never meant to oppress or destroy the employer. Since strikes cause disparity effects not
only on the relationship between labor and management but also on the general peace and progress of
society, the law has provided limitations on the right to strike. For a strike to be valid, the following
procedural requisites provided by Art. 263 of the Labor Code must be observed: (a) a notice of strike filed
with the DOLE 30 days before the intended date thereof, or 15 days in case of unfair labor practice; (b)
strike vote approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned
obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose, (c) notice given to the DOLE of the results
of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike. These requirements are mandatory and the
failure of a union to comply therewith renders the strike illegal. It is clear in this case that petitioners
totally ignored the statutory requirements and embarked on their illegal strike.

Same; Same; While a worker merely participating in an illegal strike may not be terminated from
employment, and that it is only when he commits illegal acts during a strike that he may be declared to
have lost employment status, union officers may be terminated from employment by their act of
knowingly participating in an illegal strike or participating in the commission of illegal acts during a
strike.—On the second and third issues, the ruling of the CA affirming the decisions of the NLRC and the
Labor Arbiter ordering the dismissal of the petitioners-officers, directors and shop stewards of petitioner
Union is correct. It bears stressing, however, that the law makes a distinction between union members
and union officers. A worker merely participating in an illegal strike may not be terminated from
employment. It is only when he commits illegal acts during a strike that he may be declared to have lost
employment status. For knowingly participating in an illegal strike or participates in the commission of
illegal acts during a strike, the law provides that a union officer may be terminated from employment.
The law grants the employer the option of declaring a union officer who participated in an illegal strike
as having lost his employment. It possesses the right and prerogative to terminate the union officers from
service.

Shop Stewards; Landrum Griffin Act of 1959; Shop stewards are officers of the union.—The contention of
petitioners Elenette Moises, Almira Romo, Louie Labayani, Ricky Ganarial, Efren Galan and Jun
Carmelito Santos who were appointed as shop stewards of the Union that they were mere members and
not the officers of petitioner Union is barren of merit. We agree with the observation of respondent that
under Section 501(a) and (b) of the Landrum Griffin Act of 1959, shop stewards are officers of the Union:
Admittedly, there is no similar provision in the Labor Code of the Philippines; nonetheless, petitioners
who are shop stewards are considered union officers. Officers normally mean those who hold defined
offices. An officer is any person occupying a position identified as an office. An office may be provided in
the constitution of a labor union or by the union itself in its CBA with the employer. An office is a word
of familiar usage and should be construed according to the sense of the thing.

Same; Words and Phrases; A shop steward is a union official who represents members in a particular
department—his duties include the conduct of initial negotiations for settlement of grievances.—A shop
steward is appointed by the Union in a shop, department, or plant serves as representative of the Union,
charged with negotiating and adjustment of grievances of employees with the supervisor of the
employer. He is the representative of the Union members in a building or other workplace. Black’s Law
Dictionary defines a shop steward as a union official who represents members in a particular department.
His duties include the conduct of initial negotiations for settlement of grievances. He is to help other
members when they have concerns with the employer or other workrelated issues. He is the first person
that workers turn to for assistance or information. If someone has a problem at work, the steward will
help them sort it out or, if necessary, help them file a complaint. In the performance of his duties, he has
to take cognizance of and resolve, in the first instance, the grievances of the members of the Union. He is
empowered to decide for himself whether the grievance or complaint of a member of the petitioner
Union is valid, and if valid, to resolve the same with the supervisor failing which, the matter would be
elevated to the Grievance Committee.

Same; Like the officers and directors of the Union who joined the illegal strike, the shop stewards also
deserve the penalty of dismissal from their employment.—It is quite clear that the jurisdiction of shop
stewards and the supervisors includes the determination of the issues arising from the interpretation or
even implementation of a provision of the CBA, or from any order or memorandum, circular or
assignments issued by the appropriate authority in the establishment. In fine, they are part and parcel of
the continuous process of grievance resolution designed to preserve and maintain peace among the
employees and their employer. They occupy positions of trust and laden with awesome responsibilities.
In this case, instead of playing the role of “peacemakers” and grievance solvers, the petitioners-shop
stewards participated in the strike. Thus, like the officers and directors of petitioner Union who joined the
strike, petitioners-shop stewards also deserve the penalty of dismissal from their employment.

G.R. No. 170351. March 30, 2011.*

LEYTE GEOTHERMAL POWER PROGRESSIVE EMPLOYEES UNION – ALU – TUCP, petitioner, vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL OIL COMPANY—ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
respondent.

Labor Law; Labor Contracts; Labor contracts are placed on a higher plane than ordinary contracts; these
are imbued with public interest and therefore subject to the police power of the State.—Article 280 of the
Labor Code, as worded, establishes that the nature of the employment is determined by law, regardless of
any contract expressing otherwise. The supremacy of the law over the nomenclature of the contract and
the stipulations contained therein is to bring to life the policy enshrined in the Constitution to “afford full
protection to labor.” Thus, labor contracts are placed on a higher plane than ordinary contracts; these are
imbued with public interest and therefore subject to the police power of the State.

Same; Project Employees; The litmus test to determine whether an individual is a project employee lies
in setting a fixed period of employment involving a specific undertaking which completion or
termination has been determined at the time of the particular employee’s engagement.—The litmus test to
determine whether an individual is a project employee lies in setting a fixed period of employment
involving a specific undertaking which completion or termination has been determined at the time of the
particular employee’s engagement. In this case, as previously adverted to, the officers and the members
of petitioner Union were specifically hired as project employees for respondent’s Leyte Geothermal
Power Project located at the Greater Tongonan Geothermal Reservation in Leyte. Consequently, upon the
completion of the project or substantial phase thereof, the officers and the members of petitioner Union
could be validly terminated.

G.R. No. 170830. August 11, 2010.*

PHIMCO INDUSTRIES, INC., petitioner, vs. PHIMCO INDUSTRIES LABOR ASSOCIATION

(PILA), et al., respondents.
Labor Law; Appeals; Basic Approach in the Review of Court of Appeals Decisions in Labor Cases.—In
Montoya v. Transmed Manila Corporation, 597 SCRA 334 (2009), we laid down the basic approach that
should be followed in the review of Court of Appeals (CA) decisions in labor cases, thus: “In a Rule 45
review, we consider the correctness of the assailed CA decision, in contrast with the review for
jurisdictional error that we undertake under Rule 65. Furthermore, Rule 45 limits us to the review of
questions of law raised against the assailed CA decision. In ruling for legal correctness, we have to view
the CA decision in the same context that the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was presented to it; we
have to examine the CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or
absence of grave abuse of discretion in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) decision before
it, not on the basis of whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was correct. In other words, we
have to be keenly aware that the CA undertook a Rule 65 review, not a review on appeal, of the NLRC
decision challenged before it. This is the approach that should be basic in a Rule 45 review of a CA ruling
in a labor case. In question form, the question to ask is: Did the CA correctly determine whether the
NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling on the case?

Same; Strikes; A strike is the most powerful weapon of workers in their struggle with management in the
course of setting their terms and conditions of employment; To be legitimate, a strike should not be
antithetical to public welfare, and must be pursued within legal bounds; The right to strike as a means of
attaining social justice is never meant to oppress or destroy anyone, least of all, the employer.— A strike
is the most powerful weapon of workers in their struggle with management in the course of setting their
terms and conditions of employment. Because it is premised on the concept of economic war between
labor and management, it is a weapon that can either breathe life to or destroy the union and its
members, and one that must also necessarily affect management and its members. In light of these effects,
the decision to declare a strike must be exercised responsibly and must always rest on rational basis, free
from emotionalism, and unswayed by the tempers and tantrums of hot heads; it must focus on legitimate
union interests. To be legitimate, a strike should not be antithetical to public welfare, and must be
pursued within legal bounds. The right to strike as a means of attaining social justice is never meant to
oppress or destroy anyone, least of all, the employer. Since strikes affect not only the relationship
between labor and management but also the general peace and progress of the community, the law has
provided limitations on the right to strike. Procedurally, for a strike to be valid, it must comply with
Article 263 of the Labor Code, which requires that: (a) a notice of strike be filed with the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE) 30 days before the intended date thereof, or 15 days in case of unfair
labor practice; (b) a strike vote be approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining
unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose; and (c) a notice be given to
the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike.

Same; Same; Appeals; Despite the validity of the purpose of a strike and compliance with the procedural
requirements, a strike may still be held illegal where the means employed are illegal; In the instant case,
the Court intervenes and rules even on the evidentiary and factual issues of this case as both the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and the Court of Appeals (CA) grossly misread the
evidence, leading them to inordinately incorrect conclusions, both factual and legal.—Despite the
validity of the purpose of a strike and compliance with the procedural requirements, a strike may still be
held illegal where the means employed are illegal. The means become illegal when they come within the
prohibitions under Article 264(e) of the Labor Code which provides: “No person engaged in picketing
shall commit any act of violence, coercion or intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the
employer’s premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares.” Based on our examination of
the evidence which the LA viewed differently from the NLRC and the CA, we find the Phimco Industries
Labor Association (PILA) strike illegal. We intervene and rule even on the2

evidentiary and factual issues of this case as both the NLRC and the CA grossly misread the evidence,
leading them to inordinately incorrect conclusions, both factual and legal. While the strike undisputably
had not been marred by actual violence and patent intimidation, the picketing that respondent PILA
officers and members undertook as part of their strike activities effectively blocked the free ingress to and
egress from PHIMCO’s premises, thus preventing non-striking employees and company vehicles from
entering the Phimco Industries, Inc. (PHIMCO) compound. In this manner, the picketers violated Article
264(e) of the Labor Code.

Same; Same; Picketing; Words and Phrases; To strike is to withhold or to stop work by the concerted
action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute, which work stoppage may be
accompanied by picketing by the striking employees outside of the company compound; While a strike
focuses on stoppage of work, picketing focuses on publicizing the labor dispute and its incidents to
inform the public of what is happening in the company struck against; Protected picketing does not
extend to blocking ingress to and egress from the company premises, and, the fact that the picket was
moving, was peaceful and was not attended by actual violence may not free it from taints of illegality if
the picket effectively blocked entry to and exit from the company premises.—We disagree with this
finding as the purported “peaceful moving picket” upon which the National Labor Relations

Commission (NLRC) resolution was anchored was not an innocuous picket, contrary to what the NLRC
said it was; the picket, under the evidence presented, did effectively obstruct the entry and exit points of
the company premises on various occasions. To strike is to withhold or to stop work by the concerted
action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. The work stoppage may be accompanied
by picketing by the striking employees outside of the company compound. While a strike focuses on
stoppage of work, picketing focuses on publicizing the labor dispute and its incidents to inform the
public of what is happening in the company struck against. A picket simply means to march to and from
the employer’s premises, usually accompanied by the display of placards and other signs making known
the facts involved in a labor dispute. It is a strike activity separate and different from the actual stoppage
of work. While the right of employees to publicize their dispute falls within the protection of freedom of
expression and the right to peaceably assemble to air grievances, these rights are by no means absolute.
Protected picketing does not extend to blocking ingress to and egress from the company premises. That
the picket was moving, was peaceful and was not attended by actual violence may not free it from taints
of illegality if the picket effectively blocked entry to and exit from the company premises.

Same; Same; Same; Pickets may not aggressively interfere with the right of peaceful ingress to and egress
from the employer’s shop or obstruct public thoroughfares—picketing is not peaceful where the sidewalk
or entrance to a place of business is obstructed by picketers parading around in a circle or lying on the
sidewalk.—With a virtual human blockade and real physical obstructions (benches and makeshift
structures both outside and inside the gates), it was pure conjecture on the part of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) to say that “[t]he non-strikers and their vehicles were x x x free to get in
and out of the company compound undisturbed by the picket line.” Notably, aside from non-strikers who
wished to report for work, company vehicles likewise could not enter and get out of the factory because
of the picket and the physical obstructions the respondents installed. The blockade went to the point of
causing the build up of traffic in the immediate vicinity of the strike area, as shown by photographs. This,
by itself, renders the picket a prohibited activity. Pickets may not aggressively interfere with the right of
peaceful ingress to and egress from the employer’s shop or obstruct public thoroughfares; picketing is not
peaceful where the sidewalk or entrance to a place of business is obstructed by picketers parading around
in a circle or lying on the sidewalk.

Same; Same; Same; According to American jurisprudence, what constitutes unlawful intimidation
depends on the totality of the circumstances; Force threatened is the equivalent of force exercised.—
Article 264(e) of the Labor Code tells us that picketing carried on with violence, coercion or intimidation
is unlawful. According to American jurisprudence, what constitutes unlawful intimidation depends on
the totality of the circumstances. Force threatened is the equivalent of force exercised. There may be
unlawful intimidation without direct threats or overt acts of violence. Words or acts which are calculated
and intended to cause an ordinary person to fear an injury to his person, business or property are
equivalent to threats. The manner in which the respondent union officers and members conducted the
picket in the present case had created such an intimidating atmosphere that non-striking employees and
even company vehicles did not dare cross the picket line, even with police intervention. Those who dared
cross the picket line were stopped. The compulsory arbitration hearings bear this out.

Same; Same; Same; The services of an ordinary striking worker cannot be terminated for mere
participation in an illegal strike—proof must be adduced showing that he or she committed illegal acts
during the strike; The services of a participating union officer, on the other hand, may be terminated, not
only when he actually commits an illegal act during a strike, but also if he knowingly participates in an
illegal strike; In all cases, the striker must be identified.—We explained in Samahang Manggagawa sa
Sulpicio Lines, Inc.-NAFLU v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., 426 SCRA 319 (2004), that the effects of illegal strikes,
outlined in Article 264 of the Labor Code, make a distinction between participating workers and union
officers. The services of an ordinary striking worker cannot be terminated for mere participation in an
illegal strike; proof must be adduced showing that he or she committed illegal acts during the strike. The
services of a participating union officer, on the other hand, may be terminated, not only when he actually
commits an illegal act during a strike, but also if he knowingly participates in an illegal strike. In all cases,
the striker must be identified. But proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required; substantial evidence,
available under the attendant circumstances, suffices to justify the imposition of the penalty of dismissal
on participating workers and union officers as above described.
Same; Same; Same; Termination of Employment; Due Process; Article 277(b), in relation to Article 264(a)
and (e) of the Labor Code recognizes the right to due process of all workers, without distinction as to the
cause of their termination, even if the cause was their supposed involvement in strike-related violence
prohibited under Article 264(a) and (e) of the Labor Code.—Under Article 277(b) of the Labor Code, the
employer must send the employee, who is about to be terminated, a written notice stating the cause/s for
termination and must give the employee the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. We
explained in Suico v. National Labor Relations Commission, 423 SCRA 633 (2004), that Article 277(b), in
relation to Article 264(a) and (e) of the Labor Code recognizes the right to due process of all workers,
without distinction as to the cause of their termination, even if the cause was their supposed involvement
in strike-related violence prohibited under Article 264(a) and (e) of the Labor Code. To meet the
requirements of due process in the dismissal of an employee, an employer must furnish him or her with
two (2) written notices: (1) a written notice specifying the grounds for termination and giving the
employee a reasonable opportunity to explain his side and (2) another written notice indicating that,
upon due consideration of all circumstances, grounds have been established to justify the employer’s
decision to dismiss the employee.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the notice given the union officers did not specifically inform
them of the charges against them and did not give them the chance to explain and present their side, as
well as notice to the union members which did not give them an ample opportunity to be heard and to
defend themselves, the same is not sufficient compliance with the due process requirements that the law
guards zealously—such constituted mere token recognition of the due process requirements was made,
indicating the company’s intent to dismiss the union members involved, without any meaningful resort
to the guarantees accorded them by law.—In the present case, Phimco Industries, Inc. (PHIMCO) sent a
letter, on June 23, 1995, to thirty-six (36) union members, generally directing them to explain within
twenty-four (24) hours why they should not be dismissed for the illegal acts they committed during the
strike; three days later, or on June 26, 1995, the thirty-six (36) union members were informed of their
dismissal from employment. We do not find this company procedure to be sufficient compliance with the
due process requirements that the law guards zealously. It does not appear from the evidence that the
union officers were specifically informed of the charges against them and given the chance to explain and
present their side. Without the specifications they had to respond to, they were arbitrarily separated from
work in total disregard of their rights to due process and security of tenure. As to the union members,
only thirty-six (36) of the thirty-seven (37) union members included in this case were notified of the
charges against them thru the letters dated June 23, 1995, but they were not given an ample opportunity
to be heard and to defend themselves; the notice of termination came on June 26, 1995, only three (3) days
from the first notice—a perfunctory and superficial attempt to comply with the notice requirement under
the Labor Code. The short interval of time between the first and second notice speaks for itself under the
circumstances of this case; mere token recognition of the due process requirements was made, indicating
the company’s intent to dismiss the union members involved, without any meaningful resort to the
guarantees accorded them by law.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Where evidence sufficient to justify the penalty of dismissal has been
adduced but the workers concerned were not accorded their essential due process rights, the employer
must pay the dismissed workers nominal damages as indemnity for the violation of the workers’ right to
statutory due process.—Under the circumstances, where evidence sufficient to justify the penalty of
dismissal has been adduced but the workers concerned were not accorded their essential due process
rights, our ruling in Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission, 442 SCRA 573 (2004), finds full
application; the employer, despite the just cause for dismissal, must pay the dismissed workers nominal
damages as indemnity for the violation of the workers’ right to statutory due process. Prevailing
jurisprudence sets the amount of nominal damages at P30,000.00, which same amount we find sufficient
and appropriate in the present case.

G.R. No. 194192. June 16, 2015.*

DAVAO CITY WATER DISTRICT, represented by its General Manager, RODORA N. GAMBOA,
petitioner, vs. RODRIGO L. ARANJUEZ, et al., respondents.

Administrative Agencies; Civil Service Commission; The Supreme Court (SC) finds that the Civil Service
Commission (CSC), the agency directly concerned, the ruling of which was upheld by the Court of
Appeals (CA) on review, correctly exercised jurisdiction over respondent’s appeal from the decision of
petitioner Davao City Water District (DCWD), thereby ruling against, if sub silentio, the argument of
petitioner that the appeal should be dismissed for lack of proof of payment of appeal.—We find that the
Civil Service Commission, the agency directly concerned, the ruling of which was upheld by the Court of
Appeals on review, correctly exercised jurisdiction over respondent’s appeal from the decision of
petitioner DCWD, thereby ruling against, if sub silentio, the argument of petitioner that the appeal
should be dismissed for lack of proof of payment of appeal. The Civil Service Commission and the Court
of Appeals considered the procedural issue raised by petitioner as a surmountable bar to the resolution of
the main issue of respondents’ constitutional right to free expression as amplified with specificity by their
guaranteed right as workers to peaceful concerted activity and their entitlement to security of tenure.

Government Employees; Prohibited Concerted Mass Actions; The time and place of the activity are not
determinative of the prohibition. Whether done within government hours, a concerted activity is allowed
if it is without any intent at work stoppage.—DCWD argues that since the concerted or mass action was
done within government office hours, such act was not permissible, therefore prohibited. Otherwise
stated, a concerted activity done within the regular government office hours is automatically a violation
of Section 6 of the Resolution. Notably, however, a prohibited concerted mass action is defined not in Sec.
6 of Resolution No. 021316 but in Sec. 5 thereof. Thus: Section 5. Definition of Prohibited Concerted Mass
Action.—As used in this Omnibus Rules, the phrase ‘‘prohibited concerted activity or mass action’’ shall
be understood to refer to any collective activity undertaken by government employees, by themselves or
through their employees organizations, with the intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption
in order to realize their demands of force concession, economic or otherwise, from their respective
agencies or the government. It shall include mass leaves, walkouts, pickets and acts of similar nature.
(Emphasis ours) The operative phrases are “any collective activity” and “work stoppage or service
disruption.” Without the intent at work stoppage or service disruption, the concerted activity is not
prohibited. The time and place of the activity are not determinative of the prohibition. Whether done
within government hours, a concerted activity is allowed if it is without any intent at work stoppage.

Same; Same; It is clear that the collective activity of joining the fun run in t-shirts with inscriptions on
Collective Negotiation Agreement (CNA) incentives was not to effect work stoppage or disrupt
the service.—It is clear that the collective activity of joining the fun run in t-shirts with inscriptions on
CNA incentives was not to effect work stoppage or disrupt the service. As pointed out by the
respondents, they followed the advice of GM Gamboa “to be there” at the fun run. Respondents joined,
and did not disrupt the fun run. They were in sports attire that they were allowed, nay required, to wear.
Else, government employees would be deprived of their constitutional right to freedom of expression.
This, then, being the fact, we have to rule against the findings of both the CSC and Court of Appeals that
the wearing of t-shirts with grievance inscriptions constitutes as a violation of Reasonable Office Rules
and Regulations.

Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Freedom of Expression; It is correct to conclude that those who enter
government service are subjected to a different degree of limitation on their freedom to speak their mind;
however, it is not tantamount to the relinquishment of their constitutional right of expression otherwise
enjoyed by citizens just by reason of their employment.—It is correct to conclude that those who enter
government service are subjected to a different degree of limitation on their freedom to speak their mind;
however, it is not tantamount to the relinquishment of their constitutional right of expression otherwise
enjoyed by citizens just by reason of their employment. Unarguably, a citizen who accepts public
employment “must accept certain limitations on his or her freedom.” But there are some rights and
freedoms so fundamental to liberty that they cannot be bargained away in a contract for public
employment. It is the Court’s responsibility to ensure that citizens are not deprived of these fundamental
rights by virtue of working for the government.

Same; Same; Office Memorandums; In line with the civil service rules and jurisprudence, the Supreme
Court (SC) concludes that a violation of an office memorandum, which was issued as an internal rule to
regulate the area for posting of grievances inside the office premise, is only a light offense punishable by
reprimand.—Under Section 52(C)(3), Rule IV of Resolution No. 991936, violation of reasonable office rules
and regulations is punishable with reprimand on the first offense and suspension ranging from one to
thirty days for the second offense. In Re: Failure of Various Employees to Register their Time of Arrival
and/or Departure from Office in the Chronolog Machine, 631 SCRA 316 (2010), the charged court
employees were penalized for violation of reasonable office rules and regulations due to their violation of
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 36-2001 requiring all employees to register their daily
attendance, in the Chronolog Time Recorder Machine (CTRM) and in the logbook of their respective
offices. Following Resolution No. 991936 that violation of reasonable rules and regulations is a light
offense, the Court penalized its erring employees with the penalty of reprimand. Thus, in line with the
civil service rules and jurisprudence, we conclude that a violation of an office memorandum, which was
issued as an internal rule to regulate the area for posting of grievances inside the office premise, is only a
light offense punishable by reprimand.

Same; Penalties; As distinguished by the law, if the imposed suspension exceeds thirty (30) days or the
fine imposed is in an amount over 30-day salary, the decision will only attain finality after the lapse of
the reglementary period in the absence of any motion for reconsideration or appeal. Penalties within the
30-day threshold are immediately executory penalties.—As distinguished by the law, if the imposed
suspension exceeds thirty days or the fine imposed is in an amount over thirty-day salary, the decision
will only attain finality after the lapse of the reglementary period in the absence of any motion for
reconsideration or appeal. Penalties within the 30-day threshold are immediately executory penalties. In
this case, the members and officials, except the casual employees who were not meted with penalty as the
renewal of their employment was held in abeyance, were sanctioned with penalties ranging from
suspension of work from one (1) month and one (1) day to dismissal from service. Evidently, the finality
and execution of the judgment did not take place after the lapse of the reglementary period because as
previously discussed, the members and officials were able to file their consolidated appeal in lieu of
notice of appeal. As clear as the provision on the finality of decisions is Section 42 of Resolution No.
991936 on the effect of motions for reconsideration. Thus: Section 42. Effect of Filing.—The filing of a
motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days shall stay the execution of
the decision sought to be reconsidered.

Statutory Construction; If the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity as the quoted provision,
there is no room for construction or interpretation.—The first and fundamental duty of the Court is to
apply the law. If the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity as the quoted provision, there is
no room for construction or interpretation. The letter must be taken to mean exactly what it says and the
court has no choice but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed.

Leonen, J., Concurring Opinion:

Constitutional Law; Freedom of Expression; View that freedom to express one’s views enjoys a level of
primacy among our constitutional guarantees, but it has never been considered to be absolute and
immune from reasonable regulation.—Freedom to express one’s views enjoys a level of primacy among
our constitutional guarantees, but it has never been considered to be absolute and immune from
reasonable regulation. However, there is always a higher degree of judicial review of regulation that
affects speech to ensure, among others, that it does not amount to a disguised form of censorship or that
its exercise does not burden the same exercise of the same rights by others. Even civil service regulations
should hew closely to the parameters of the freedoms guaranteed in our Constitution. Exercising one’s
right to air grievances in relation to employment in the public sector, as in this case, should also be given
protection but with the added requirement that the exercise of the guarantee of freedom to express does
not unduly deter the government agency’s primary functions.
Same; Government Employees; Right to Organize; View that Executive Order (EO) No. 180 was enacted
in June 1, 1987 entitled Providing Guidelines for the Exercise of the Right to Organize of Government
Employees, Creating a Public Sector Labor-Management Council, and for Other Purposes. This order
“applies to all employees of all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or -con-trolled corporations (GOCCs) with original
charters.”—Executive Order No. 180 was enacted in June 1, 1987 entitled Providing Guidelines for the
Exercise of the Right to Organize of Government Employees, Creating a Public Sector Labor-Management
Council, and for Other Purposes. This order “applies to all employees of all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or -controlled
corporations with original charters.” Also enacted in 1987, our present Constitution provides that “the
right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees[,]” and the state “shall guarantee
the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful
concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law.” The Constitution’s Bill of Rights
also provides that “[n]o law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition government for redress of
grievances.” We read this constitutional provision on the right to freedom of expression together with the
other constitutional provisions, laws, jurisprudence, and implementing rules and regulations that reflect
the state’s policy on the different government employees’ right to peaceful concerted activities and to self-
organization for purposes of collective bargaining.

Same; Same; Freedom of Expression; View that freedom of expression is guaranteed in its fullest outside
government but, perhaps, more regulated when one assumes the role of a public officer.—Freedom of
expression is guaranteed in its fullest outside government but, perhaps, more regulated when one
assumes the role of a public officer. The right to speech is inherent. However, the act of joining a
government office should be construed as an understanding that the individual’s exercise of this basic
right is subsumed by the necessity of providing public services to the greater majority. The limits are
inherent in the nature of governance. The Constitution states that “[p]ublic officers and employees must
at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.”

Same; Same; Same; View that GSIS v. Villaviza, 625 SCRA 669 (2010), involving Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) employees held that “[n]ot all collective activity or mass undertaking of
government employees is prohibited[;] [o]therwise, we would be totally depriving our brothers and
sisters in the government service of their constitutional right to freedom of expression.”—GSIS v.
Villaviza, 625 SCRA 669 (2010), involving Government Service Insurance System employees held that
“[n]ot all collective activity or mass undertaking of government employees is prohibited[;] [o]therwise,
we would be totally depriving our brothers and sisters in the government service of their constitutional
right to freedom of expression.” This court explained that “[i]t would be unfair to hold that by joining the
government service, the members thereof have renounced or waived this basic liberty. This freedom can
be reasonably regulated only but can never be taken away.” Thus, “CSC’s Resolution No. 02-1316
defining what a prohibited concerted activity or mass action has only tempered or regulated these
rights.”

Same; Same; Same; View that employees of government-owned and -controlled corporation can freely
exercise their right to freedom of expression, subject to law, including Civil Service Commission (CSC)
issuances that prohibit mass actions causing work stoppage.—Employees of government-owned and -
controlled corporation can freely exercise their right to freedom of expression, subject to law, including
Civil Service Commission issuances that prohibit mass actions causing work stoppage. Government
employees must uphold their commitment to public interest and act in accordance with the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officials and Employees. This level of limitation or regulation
also applies to governmental financial institutions, often grouped with government-owned and -
controlled corporations.

Same; Same; Same; View that law-making involves deliberating on political questions, thus, the extent
of freedom of speech appears wider for those in Congress.—Some hold public office based on popular
vote such as elected Senators and Representatives of Congress. These public officials are in the position to
pass laws for better employment benefits for all government employees. Law-making involves
deliberating on political questions, thus, the extent of freedom of speech appears wider for those in
Congress. The Constitution even provides that “[n]o Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in
any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.”

Same; Same; Same; View that judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief,
association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such a
manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the
Judiciary.—Members of the judiciary must maintain independence, integrity, impartiality, propriety,
equality, competence, and diligence. “Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression,
belief, association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in
such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of
the Judiciary.” Thus, they must “refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or
dispute pending before another court or administrative agency.” “Judges shall not knowingly, while a
proceeding is before or could come before them, make any comment that might reasonably be expected
to affect the outcome of such proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the process.” These standards
present a more limited freedom of expression for judges.

Same; Same; Same; View that the strictest limitation applies to those in the military and the police. They
maintain peace and prevent crime.—The strictest limitation applies to those in the military and the police.
They maintain peace and prevent crime. Those in the military are subject to Commonwealth Act No. 408
known as the Articles of War. Article 96 provides that “[a]ny officer, member of the Nurse Corps, cadet,
flying cadet, or probationary second lieutenant, who is convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman shall be dismissed from the service.”
Same; Same; Same; View that the constitutional right to freedom of expression belongs to all. But its
exercise may be reasonably regulated.—The constitutional right to freedom of expression belongs to all.
But its exercise may be reasonably regulated. Those who chose public service embraced the public’s
interest with a priority higher than their own. Their oaths signify a commitment to public accountability.
This obligation necessarily imposes more regulation of the exercise of their freedom of expression. The
extent of this regulation and its parameters will need to be more clearly defined in a more appropriate
case.

G.R. No. 211526. June 29, 2016.*

PMI-FACULTY AND EMPLOYEES UNION, petitioner, vs. PMI COLLEGES BOHOL, respondent.

Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or
delay, but rather to facilitate and promote the administration of justice.—After a careful study of the
records, we find that the relaxation of the rules of procedure in this case was the more prudent move to
follow in the interest of substantial justice. Rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder
or delay, but rather to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid
application which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice must always be eschewed. Procedural rules were conceived to aid in the attainment of justice. If
the stringent application of the rules would hinder rather than service the demands of justice, the former
must yield to the latter.

Labor Law; Statutory Construction; Under Article 4 of the Labor Code, “all doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and
regulations (IRR), shall be resolved in favor of labor.”—It is well to stress that under Article 4 of the
Labor Code, “all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code,
including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor.” In Peñaflor v.
Outdoor Clothing Manufacturing Corporation, 618 SCRA 208 (2010), the Court reiterated that the
principle laid down in the law has been extended by jurisprudence to cover doubts in the evidence
presented by the employer and the employee. As discussed earlier, the Union has raised serious doubt on
the evidence relied on by the NLRC. Consistent with Article 4 of the Labor Code, we resolve the doubt in
the Union’s favor.

G.R. No. 156635. January 11, 2016.*

THE HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION, et al.,
petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and THE HONGKONG &
SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION, LTD., respondents.

Labor Law; Strikes; Right to Strike; The right to strike as a means for the attainment of social justice is
never meant to oppress or destroy the employers.—The right to strike is a constitutional and legal right of
all workers because the strike, which seeks to advance their right to improve the terms and conditions of
their employment, is recognized as an effective weapon of labor in their struggle for a decent existence.
However, the right to strike as a means for the attainment of social justice is never meant to oppress or
destroy the employers. Thus, the law prescribes limits on the exercise of the right to strike.

Same; Same; Same; Requisites of a Valid Strike.—The procedural requirements for a valid strike are,
therefore, the following, to wit: (1) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE at least 30 days before the
intended date thereof, or 15 days in case of ULP; (2) a strike vote approved by the majority of the total
union membership in the bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that
purpose; and (3) a notice of the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike given to
the DOLE. These requirements are mandatory, such that noncompliance therewith by the union will
render the strike illegal.

Same; Same; Article 264(e) of the Labor Code expressly enjoined the striking workers engaged in
picketing from committing any act of violence, coercion or intimidation, or from obstructing the free
ingress into or egress from the employer’s premises for lawful purposes, or from obstructing public
thoroughfares.—The petitioners could not justify their illegal strike by invoking the constitutional right of
labor to concerted actions. Although the Constitution recognized and promoted their right to strike, they
should still exercise the right within the bounds of law. Those bounds had been well--defined and well-
known. Specifically, Article 264(e) of the Labor Code expressly enjoined the striking workers engaged in
picketing from committing any act of violence, coercion or intimidation, or from obstructing the free
ingress into or egress from the employer’s premises for lawful purposes, or from obstructing public
thoroughfares. The employment of prohibited means in carrying out concerted actions injurious to the
right to property of others could only render their strike illegal. Moreover, their strike was rendered
unlawful because their picketing which constituted an obstruction to the free use of the employer’s
property or the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, when accompanied by intimidation, threats,
violence, and coercion as to constitute nuisance, should be regulated. In fine, the strike, even if justified as
to its ends, could become illegal because of the means employed, especially when the means came within
the prohibitions under Article 264(e) of the Labor Code.

Same; Same; As a general rule, the mere finding of the illegality of the strike does not justify the
wholesale termination of the strikers from their employment.—As a general rule, the mere finding of the
illegality of the strike does not justify the wholesale termination of the strikers from their employment. To
avoid rendering the recognition of the workers’ right to strike illusory, the responsibility for the illegal
strike is individual instead of collective. The last paragraph of Article 264(a) of the Labor Code defines the
norm for terminating the workers participating in an illegal strike, viz.: Article 264. Prohibited
Activities.—x x x x x x x Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of any
unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full backwages. Any union officer who
knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in
the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status:
Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for
termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful
strike. (emphasis supplied) Conformably with Article 264, we need to distinguish between the officers
and the members of the union who participate in an illegal strike. The officers may be deemed terminated
from their employment upon a finding of their knowing participation in the illegal strike, but the
members of the union shall suffer the same fate only if they are shown to have knowingly participated in
the commission of illegal acts during the strike. Article 264 expressly requires that the officer must have
“knowingly participated” in the illegal strike.

Same; Insubordination; For insubordination to exist, the order must be: (1) reasonable and lawful; (2)
sufficiently known to the employee; and (3) in connection to his duties.—The petitioners’ refusal to leave
their cause against HSBC constituted neither insubordination nor abandonment. For insubordination to
exist, the order must be: (1) reasonable and lawful; (2) sufficiently known to the employee; and (3) in
connection to his duties. None of these elements existed in this case.

Same; Abandonment; The petitioners unquestionably had no intention to sever the employer-employee
relationship because they would not have gone to the trouble of joining the strike had their purpose been
to abandon their employment.—As to abandonment, two requirements need to be established, namely:
(1) the failure to report for work or absence must be without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) there must
be a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship. The second element is the more decisive
factor and must be manifested by overt acts. In that regard, the employer carries the burden of proof to
show the employee’s deliberate and unjustified refusal to resume his employment without any intention
of returning. However, the petitioners unquestionably had no intention to sever the employer-employee
relationship because they would not have gone to the trouble of joining the strike had their purpose been
to abandon their employment.

Same; Due Process; Regardless of their actions during the strike, the employees remain entitled to an
opportunity to explain their conduct and why they should not be penalized.—While Article 264
authorizes the termination of the union officers and employees, it does not remove from the employees
their right to due process. Regardless of their actions during the strike, the employees remain entitled to
an opportunity to explain their conduct and why they should not be penalized. In Suico v. National
Labor Relations Commission, 513 SCRA 325 (2007), we have reiterated the need for the employers to
comply with the twin-notice requirement despite the cause for the termination arising from the
commission of the acts prohibited by Article 264, thus: Art. 277(b) in relation to Art. 264(a) and (e)
recognizes the right to due process of all workers, without distinction as to the cause of their termination.
Where no distinction is given, none is construed. Hence, the foregoing standards of due process apply to
the termination of employment of Suico, et al. even if the cause therefor was their supposed involvement
in strike-related violence prohibited under Art. 264(a) and (e). Consequently, failure of the employer to
accord due process to its employees prior to their termination results in illegal dismissal.

Same; Backwages; The award of backwages is subject to the settled policy that when employees
voluntarily go on strike, no backwages during the strike shall be awarded.—Agabon v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 442 SCRA 573 (2004), involved the second type of dismissal, not the first type to
which the 18 employees belonged. The rule for employees unlawfully terminated without substantive
and procedural due process is to entitle them to the reliefs provided under Article 279 of the Labor Code,
that is, reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages,
inclusive of allowances, and other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time the
compensation was withheld up to the time of actual reinstatement. However, the award of backwages is
subject to the settled policy that when employees voluntarily go on strike, no backwages during the strike
shall be awarded.

Same; Reinstatement; Separation Pay; The lapse of twenty-two (22) years since the strike now warrants
the award of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, the same to be equivalent of one (1) month for every
year of service.—As regards reinstatement, the lapse of 22 years since the strike now warrants the award
of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, the same to be equivalent of one (1) month for every year of
service. Accordingly, Fermin who did not participate in the strike, should be paid full backwages plus
separation pay of one (1) month per year of service, while petitioners Isabelo Molo, Samuel Ellarma,
Rebecca Fajardo, Melo Gaba, Nelia Deriada, Manuel Herrera, Rosalina Juliet Loquellano, Mercedes Paule,
Blanche Motus, Antonio del Rosario, Maida Militante and Daisy Fagutao, who admitted their
participation in the strike, were entitled to backwages except during the period of the strike, and to
separation pay of one (1) month per year of service in lieu of reinstatement.

G.R. No. 207898. October 19, 2016.*

ERROL RAMIREZ, JULITO APAS, RICKY ROSELO and ESTE-BAN MISSION, JR., petitioners, vs.
POLYSON INDUSTRIES, INC. and WILSON S. YU, respondents.

Labor Law; Termination of Employment; To justify fully the dismissal of an employee, the employer
must, as a rule, prove that the dismissal was for a just or authorized cause and that the employee was
afforded due process prior to dismissal.—Due process under the Labor Code involves two aspects: first is
substantive, which refers to the valid and authorized causes of termination of employment under the
Labor Code; and second is procedural, which points to the manner of dismissal. Thus, to justify fully the
dismissal of an employee, the employer must, as a rule, prove that the dismissal was for a just or
authorized cause and that the employee was afforded due process prior to dismissal. As a
complementary principle, the employer has the onus of proving with clear, accurate, consistent, and
convincing evidence the validity of the dismissal.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; The Supreme Court (SC) is not duty-bound to delve into the
accuracy of the factual findings of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in the absence of
clear showing that these were arbitrary and bereft of any rational basis.—The Court finds no cogent
reason to depart from the above findings, which were affirmed by the CA. The Court is not duty-bound
to delve into the accuracy of the factual findings of the NLRC in the absence of clear showing that these
were arbitrary and bereft of any rational basis. In the present case, petitioners failed to convince this
Court that the NLRC’s findings that they instigated the slowdown on June 8, 2011 are not reinforced by
substantial evidence. Verily, said findings have to be maintained and upheld. This Court reiterates, as a
reminder to labor leaders, the rule that union officers are duty-bound to guide their members to respect
the law. Contrarily, if the officers urge the members to violate the law and defy the duly-constituted
authorities, their dismissal from the service is a just penalty or sanction for their unlawful acts.

Same; Evidence; Witnesses; As between the affirmative assertions of unbiased witnesses and a general
denial and negative assertions on the part of petitioners, weight must be accorded to the affirmative
assertions.—Petitioners question the credibility of Tuting and Visca’s claims contending that these are
self-serving and that they were merely used by the management to manufacture evidence against them.
However, there is nothing on record to indicate any ulterior motive on the part of Visca and Tuting to
fabricate their claim that petitioners were the ones who threatened or induced them not to work
overtime. Absent convincing evidence showing any cogent reason why a witness should testify falsely,
his testimony may be accorded full faith and credit. Moreover, petitioners’ defense consists of mere
denials and negative assertions. As between the affirmative assertions of unbiased witnesses and a
general denial and negative assertions on the part of petitioners, weight must be accorded to the
affirmative assertions.

Labor Law; Strikes; Slowdown; Words and Phrases; Jurisprudence defines a slowdown as follows: x x x a
“strike on the installment plan”; as a willful reduction in the rate of work by concerted action of workers
for the purpose of restricting the output of the employer, in relation to a labor dispute; as an activity by
which workers, without a complete stoppage of work, retard production or their performance of duties
and functions to compel management to grant their demands.—The Court agrees with both the NLRC
and the CA that petitioners are guilty of instigating their co-employees to commit slowdown, an
inherently and essentially illegal activity even in the absence of a no-strike clause in a collective
bargaining contract, or statute or rule. Jurisprudence defines a slowdown as follows: x x x a “strike on the
installment plan”; as a willful reduction in the rate of work by concerted action of workers for the
purpose of restricting the output of the employer, in relation to a labor dispute; as an activity by which
workers, without a complete stoppage of work, retard production or their performance of duties and
functions to compel management to grant their demands. The Court also agrees that such a slowdown is
generally condemned as inherently illicit and unjustifiable, because while the employees “continue to
work and remain at their positions and accept the wages paid to them,” they at the same time “select
what part of their allotted tasks they care to perform of their own volition or refuse openly or secretly, to
the employer’s damage, to do other work”; in other words, they “work on their own terms.”

Same; Same; Same; It is not necessary that any fixed number of employees should quit their work in order
to constitute the stoppage a strike, and the number of persons necessary depends in each case on the
peculiar facts in the case and no definite rule can be laid down.—The Court is not persuaded by
petitioners’ contention that they are not guilty of “illegal concerted activity” as they claim that this term
contemplates a “careful planning of a considerable number of participants to insure that the desired
result is attained.” Nothing in the law requires that a slowdown be carefully planned and that it be
participated in by a large number of workers. The essence of this kind of strike is that the workers do not
quit their work but simply reduce the rate of work in order to restrict the output or delay the production
of the employer. It has been held that while a cessation of work by the concerted action of a large number
of employees may more easily accomplish the object of the work stoppage than if it is by one person,
there is, in fact no fundamental difference in the principle involved as far as the number of persons
involved is concerned, and thus, if the act is the same, and the purpose to be accomplished is the same,
there is a strike, whether one or more than one have ceased to work. Furthermore, it is not necessary that
any fixed number of employees should quit their work in order to constitute the stoppage a strike, and
the number of persons necessary depends in each case on the peculiar facts in the case and no definite
rule can be laid down. As discussed above, petitioners engaged in slowdown when they induced two of
their coworkers to quit their scheduled overtime work and they accomplished their purpose when the
slowdown resulted in the delay and restriction in the output of Polyson on June 8, 2011.

Same; Termination of Employment; Procedural Due Process; Notice and Hearing; With respect to
procedural due process, it is settled that in termination proceedings of employees, procedural due process
consists of the twin requirements of notice and hearing.—With respect to procedural due process, it is
settled that in termination proceedings of employees, procedural due process consists of the twin
requirements of notice and hearing. The employer must furnish the employee with two written notices
before the termination of employment can be effected: (1) the first apprises the employee of the particular
acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the second informs the employee of the
employer’s decision to dismiss him. The requirement of a hearing is complied with as long as there was
an opportunity to be heard, and not necessarily that an actual hearing was conducted. In the present case,
Polyson was able to establish that these requirements were sufficiently complied with.

Same; Strikes; Illegal Strikes; The responsibility of the union officers, as main players in an illegal strike,
is greater than that of the members as the union officers have the duty to guide their members to respect
the law.—It cannot be overemphasized that strike, as the most preeminent economic weapon of the
workers to force management to agree to an equitable sharing of the joint product of labor and capital,
exert some disquieting effects not only on the relationship between labor and management, but also on
the general peace and progress of society and economic well-being of the State. This weapon is so critical
that the law imposes the supreme penalty of dismissal on union officers who irresponsibly participate in
an illegal strike and union members who commit unlawful acts during a strike. The responsibility of the
union officers, as main players in an illegal strike, is greater than that of the members as the union officers
have the duty to guide their members to respect the law. The policy of the State is not to tolerate actions
directed at the destabilization of the social order, where the relationship between labor and management
has been endangered by abuse of one party’s bargaining prerogative, to the extent of disregarding not
only the direct order of the government to maintain the status quo, but the welfare of the entire workforce
though they may not be involved in the dispute. The grave penalty of dismissal imposed on the guilty
parties is a natural consequence, considering the interest of public welfare.

G.R. No. 178501. January 11, 2016.*

NILO S. RODRIGUEZ, et al., petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., and NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, respondents.

G.R. No. 178510. January 11, 2016.*

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, vs. NILO S. RODRIGUEZ, et al., respondents.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Res Judicata; Judgments; Res judicata lays the rule that an existing final
judgment or decree rendered on the merits, and without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their
privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction
on the points and matters in issue in the first suit.—The 1st and 2nd ALPAP cases which became final
and executory on August 29, 2002 and September 9, 2011, respectively, constitute res judicata on the issue
of who participated in the illegal strike in June 1998 and whose services were validly terminated. The
Court expounded on the doctrine of res judicata in Spouses Layos v. Fil-Estate Golf and Development,
Inc., 561 SCRA 75 (2008): Res judicata literally means “a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or
decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment.” Res judicata lays the rule that an existing final judgment
or decree rendered on the merits, and without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction,
upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all
other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points
and matters in issue in the first suit.

Same; Same; Same; Granting that there is no absolute identity of parties, what is required, however, for
the application of the principle of res judicata is not absolute, but only substantial identity of parties.—
The elements for res judicata in the second concept, i.e., conclusiveness of judgment, are extant in these
cases. There is identity of parties in the 1st and 2nd ALPAP cases, on one hand, and the Petitions at bar.
While the 1st and 2nd ALPAP cases concerned ALPAP and the present Petitions involved several
individual members of ALPAP, the union acted in the 1st and 2nd ALPAP cases in representation of its
members. In fact, in the 2nd ALPAP case, the Court explicitly recognized that the complaint for illegal
lockout was filed by ALPAP on behalf of all its members who were returning to work. Also in the said
case, ALPAP raised, albeit belatedly, exactly the same arguments as Rodriguez, et al. herein. Granting
that there is no absolute identity of parties, what is required, however, for the application of the principle
of res judicata is not absolute, but only substantial identity of parties. ALPAP and Rodriguez, et al. share
an identity of interest from which flowed an identity of relief sought, namely, the reinstatement of the
terminated ALPAP members to their former positions. Such identity of interest is sufficient to make them
privy-in-law, one to the other, and meets the requisite of substantial identity of parties.

Same; Same; Same; In the 1st Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines (ALPAP) case, the Supreme
Court (SC) upheld the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Secretary’s Resolution dated June
1, 1999 declaring that the strike of June 5, 1998 was illegal and all ALPAP officers and members who
participated therein had lost their employment status. The SC in the 2nd ALPAP case ruled that even
though the dispositive portion of the DOLE Secretary’s Resolution did not specifically enumerate the
names of those who actually participated in the illegal strike, such omission cannot prevent the effective
execution of the decision in the 1st ALPAP case.—There is likewise an identity of issues between the 1st
and 2nd ALPAP cases and these cases. Rodriguez, et al., insist that they did not participate in the June
1998 strike, being on official leave or scheduled off-duty. Nonetheless, on the matter of determining the
identities of the ALPAP members who lost their employment status because of their participation in the
illegal strike in June 1998, the Court is now conclusively bound by its factual and legal findings in the 1st
and 2nd ALPAP cases. In the 1st ALPAP case, the Court upheld the DOLE Secretary’s Resolution dated
June 1, 1999 declaring that the strike of June 5, 1998 was illegal and all ALPAP officers and members who
participated therein had lost their employment status. The Court in the 2nd ALPAP case ruled that even
though the dispositive portion of the DOLE Secretary’s Resolution did not specifically enumerate the
names of those who actually participated in the illegal strike, such omission cannot prevent the effective
execution of the decision in the 1st ALPAP case. The Court referred to the records of the Strike and Illegal
Lockout Cases, particularly, the logbook, which it unequivocally pronounced as a “crucial and vital piece
of evidence.” In the words of the Court in the 2nd ALPAP case, “[t]he logbook with the heading ‘Return-
To-Work Compliance/Returnees’ bears their individual signature signifying their conformity that they
were among those workers who returned to work only on June 26, 1998 or after the deadline imposed by
DOLE. x x x In fine, only those returning pilots, irrespective of whether they comprise the entire
membership of ALPAP, are bound by the June 1, 1999 DOLE Resolution.”

Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Illegal Dismissals; Following latest jurisprudence, Jadie is
entitled to the following reliefs/awards for her illegal dismissal: (1) separation pay equivalent to one (1)-
month salary for every year of service in lieu of reinstatement; (2) backwages from June 9, 1998; (3)
longevity pay at P500.00/month for every year of service based on seniority date falling after June 9,
1998; (4) Christmas bonuses; (5) Jadie’s proportionate share in the P5 Million contribution of Philippine
Airlines, Inc. (PAL) to the Retirement Fund; and (6) cash equivalent of vacation leaves and sick leaves
which Jadie earned after June 9, 1998.—Following latest jurisprudence, Jadie is entitled to the following
reliefs/awards for her illegal dismissal: (1) separation pay equivalent to one-month salary for every year
of service in lieu of reinstatement; (2) backwages from June 9, 1998; (3) longevity pay at P500.00/month
for every year of service based on seniority date falling after June 9, 1998; (4) Christmas bonuses; (5)
Jadie’s proportionate share in the P5 Million contribution of PAL to the Retirement Fund; and (6) cash
equivalent of vacation leaves and sick leaves which Jadie earned after June 9, 1998. All of the
aforementioned awards shall be computed until finality of this Decision. Jadie is further entitled to
receive benefits due her even prior to her illegal dismissal on June 9, 1998, namely: (1) unpaid salaries for
June 1 to 8, 1998; and (2) productivity allowance, transportation allowance, and rice subsidy for May 1998
and June 1 to 8, 1998. All monetary awards due Jadie shall earn legal interest of 6% per annum from date
of finality of this Decision until fully paid.