Vous êtes sur la page 1sur 6

1. State Prosecutors vs. Muro [A.M. No. RTJ-92-876.

September 19, 1994]

FACTS:
1. The state prosecutors who are members of the DOJ Panel of Prosecution filed a complaint against respondent
Judge Muro on the ground of ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violation of the provisions in the
Code of Judicial Conduct.
2. The case at bar involves the prosecution of the 11 charges against Imelda Marcos in violation of the Central
Bank Foreign Exchange Restriction in the Central Bank Circular 960.
3. The respondent judge dismissed all 11 cases solely on the basis of the report published from the 2
newspapers (Inquirer and Daily Globe), which the judge believes to be reputable and of national circulation,
that the Pres. of the Philippines lifted all foreign exchange restrictions.
4. The respondent’s decision was founded on his belief that the reported announcement of the Executive
Department in the newspaper in effect repealed the CB 960 and thereby divested the court of its jurisdiction
to further hear the pending case thus motu propio dismissed the case.
5. He further contends that the announcement of the President as published in the newspaper has made such
fact a public knowledge that is sufficient for the judge to take judicial notice which is discretionary on his
part.
6. Hence, the complainants contend that the respondent judge erred in taking judicial notice on matters he
purported to be a public knowledge based merely on the account of the newspaper publication that the Pres.
has lifted the foreign exchange restriction.
a. It was also an act of inexcusable ignorant of the law not to accord due process to the prosecutors
who were already at the stage of presenting evidence (trial)thereby depriving the government the
right to be heard.
b. The judge also exercised grave abuse of discretion by taking judicial notice on the published
statement of the President in the newspaper which is a matter that has not yet been officially in
force and effect of the law.

ISSUE: Did the respondent judge commit grave abuse of discretion in taking judicial notice on the statement of the
president lifting the foreign exchange restriction published in the newspaper as basis for dismissing the case? YES

HELD:
It is a mandatory requirement that a new law should be published for 15 days in a newspaper of general circulation
before its effectivity. When the President’s statement was published in the newspaper, the respondent judge admitted
of not having seen the official text of CB circular 1353 thus it was premature for him to take judicial notice on this matter
which is merely based on his personal knowledge and is not based on the public knowledge that the law requires for
the court to take judicial notice of.

The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to take judicial notice is to
be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt
on the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative.

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites:

(1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;


(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and
(3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court.

The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can
be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety.
To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual form of evidence will
be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because the court assumes that the matter
is so notorious that it will not be disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge.
 The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized
to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known, the basis of his action.
Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which are “commonly” known.

Things of “common knowledge,” of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters coming to the knowledge of
men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted
by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally
known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided
they are of such universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the
common knowledge of every person.

In this case, respondent judge, in the guise of exercising discretion and on the basis of a mere newspaper account
which is sometimes even referred to as hearsay evidence twice removed, took judicial notice of the supposed lifting
of foreign exchange controls, a matter which was not and cannot be considered of common knowledge or of general
notoriety. Worse, he took cognizance of an administrative regulation which was not yet in force when the order of
dismissal was issued.
Jurisprudence dictates that judicial notice cannot be taken of a statute before it becomes effective. The reason is simple.
A law which is not yet in force and hence, still inexistent, cannot be of common knowledge capable of ready and
unquestionable demonstration, which is one of the requirements before a court can take judicial notice of a fact.

Hence, it was impossible for Judge Muro and was improper for him to have taken cognizance of the CB Circular No.
1353 when it was not yet in force at the time the improvident order of dismissal was issued

Camitan vs. Fidelity


G.R. No. 163684. April 16, 2008.

Facts:
 Camitan and Damaso filed a Petition for the issuance of another duplicate copy of Certificate of Title
before RTC Calamba – the owner’s duplicate copy was lost and cannot be found
o This was GRANTED – Register of Deeds was ordered to issue a second owner's duplicate copy of
the TCT, and declared void the first owner's duplicate copy.
 Fidelity filed a Petition for annulment of judgment and cancellation of title before the CA.
o It contends that it purchased the property which is the subject of the TCT.
o Fidelity argues that the RTC decision is null and void and it had no jurisdiction to issue the owner's
duplicate copy of the TCT was in their possession.
o It claimed that the petitioners perjured themselves before the RTC when they stated that the
duplicate copy of the TCT was lost and that they gave notice to all who had interest in the property,
because they failed to notify Fidelity despite knowledge of the latter's possession of the property.
 CA gave due course to the petition for annulment of judgment. A preliminary conference was set and
directed Fidelity to bring the owner's duplicate copy of the TCT.
o Fidelity’s counsel presented what was claimed to be the owner's duplicate copy of the TCT.
o Camitan and Damaso’s counsel examined the copy and admitted that it was the genuine copy.
o Fidelity manifested that they were no longer presenting evidence.
 In their memorandum, Camitan and Damaso retracted their counsel's admission on the genuineness of the
owner's duplicate copy of the TCT presented by Fidelity, citing honest mistake and negligence owing to his
excitement and nervousness in appearing before the CA. They pointed to some allegedly irreconcilable
discrepancies between the copy annexed to the petition and the exhibit presented by Fidelity during the
preliminary conference.
 CA ruled in favor of Fidelity - It declared that the RTC was without jurisdiction to issue a second owner's
duplicate copy of the title in light of the existence of the genuine owner's duplicate copy in the possession
of Fidelity, as admitted by Camitan and Lopez through counsel.
o According to the CA, a judicial admission is conclusive upon the party making it and cannot be
contradicted unless previously shown to have been made through palpable mistake or that no
such admission was made.
o It said that honest mistake and negligence, as raised by Camitan and Lopez in retracting their
counsel's admission, are not sufficient grounds to invalidate the admission.

ISSUE: W/N CA erred when it did not consider the counsel’s judicial admission as palpable mistake –
HELD: NO – Petition DENIED, in favor of Fidelity
RATIO:
 Camitan and Lopez argues that despite the existence of a judicial admission, there is still some leeway for
the court to consider other evidence presented.
 The case provides a transcript of the preliminary conference in which it was indubitably shown that counsel
for petitioners made a judicial admission and failed to refute that admission during the said proceedings
despite the opportunity to do so.
 A judicial admission is an admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings
in the same case, which dispenses with the need for proof with respect to the matter or fact admitted. It
may be contradicted only by a showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made.
 CA correctly ruled that such an admission may only be refuted upon a proper showing of palpable mistake
or that no such admission was made. Thus, the claim of "honest mistake and negligence" on the part of
the counsel due to his excitement and nervousness in appearing before the CA did not suffice.

NOTES:
May transcript sa full text na nakalagay na inamin ni Petitioner’s counsel na genuine copy of the TCT yung hawak ni
Fidelity.
On the issue of discrepancies – They are more imagined than real. Had these purported discrepancies been that
evident during the preliminary conference, it would have been easy for petitioners' counsel to object to the
authenticity of the owner's duplicate copy of the TCT presented by Fidelity. As shown in the transcript of the
proceedings, there was ample opportunity for petitioners' counsel to examine the document, retract his admission,
and point out the alleged discrepancies. But he chose not to contest the document.

Rule 130 Sec 1 – Object evidence


People Vs Rodolfo Manalo
Facts: Two separate complaint for Murder were filed against Respondent Rodolfo Manalo for the
death or Warlito Bonilla and Carlito Dimampo. When the victims Warlito Bonilla and Carlito
Dimampo were parking their motorcycle upon accompanying Carlos Lacbay to the latter’s home,
they were invited by the accused Manalo for a drink of wine, which they acceded.
When the victims were about to enter the house of the accused, The accused suddenly and
without any warning shot Diomampo on the head and then Bonilla once the template of the
distance was 3 meters from behind with a .45 caliber pistol. Lacbay who was standing a meter
behind the accused was shocked that he was unable to move. The accused told Lacbay that he
shot Diamampo and Bonilla because the former had impregnated his daughter(Dina Manalo).
Then after the accused asked Lacbay to dig but the latter refused, from which the accused
warned him not to leave the place for he would look someone to do the digging but Lacbay left
immediately after the accused had left him.

The Medico Legal examination conducted by Dr. Perez, who was the city health officer, after the
bodies of the victims were dugged up from a shallow pit under the banggerahan of the accused’s
house, revealed that both sustained gunshot wounds caused by a .45 caliber gun. The Accused
maintains that he was not responsible for the said act but rather he was a unwilling witness to the
horrible event perpetuated by persons unknown to him. RTC finds the Accused Rodolfo Manalo
guilty of two separate counts of murder.

Issue: W/N Accused Rodolfo Manalo should be found guilty of the crime of two counts of
murder despite the absence of physical evidence that accused fired a gun?
Ruling: Yes. Even if he subjected himself to paraffin test and the same yields a negative, it
cannot definitely conclude that he had not fired a gun as it is possible for one to fire a gun and
yet be negative for the presence of nitrates as when the hands are washed before the test. The
court even considered the possibility that that there will be no paraffin traces on his hands.
Lacbay who was the witness of the crime had emphatically and positively identified the accused
as the gunman from which deserves full merit and weight. His identification of the accused as
the gunman was positive and unshakeable. He had vividly testified in court on the time, the place
and the manner how the said killings were perpetrated by the accused. There was also an
extrajudicial statement made by the accused wherein he had admitted the killings but sought to
justify his acts by alleging that one of the victims tried to abuse his daughter.

There were also several letters sent by the accused to Marcelo Bonilla begging to agree to the
amount 14,000 as a settlement for the death of the two victims. He even asked for forgiveness for
the offense he had committed which was an admission that he had committed something wrong.
He also sent a letter to the fiscal requesting not to charge him for murder but only for homicide
for he did not have the intention to kill the victims but was only prompted to do so due to
circumstances beyond his control. RTC decision affirmed. Accused is Guilty

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE ENCARNACION


MALIMIT alias MANOLO, accused-appellant.
Facts: On April 15, 1991, around 8:00 in the evening, Batin the household boy, went to the store
of his employer to inform him that the dinner is ready. Upon entering the store Batin saw the
appellant with a bolo fleeing the store while his employer his laying in the floor bathing in his
own blood. Rondon on the other hand was on his way to store to buy fertilizer on his field when
he saw the appellant rushing out of the store with a blood-stained bolo.
Batin immediately went out of the store to seek help. Outside the store, he met Rondon. Wherein
they went to residence of the victim to inform them of the tragic incident. When they went back
to the store they noticed that the store’s drawer was opened and the victim’s wallet was stolen
from his Pocket. When the appellant was place under custody, it was discovered that he
possesses the wallet of the victim together with its content such as Malakis residence certificate,
his identification card and a bunch of keys As a defense, the appellant argued that such it was a
violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination hence, the wallet and its contents
were in admissible. The Trial Court found the appellant guilty hence, the appeal.
Issue: Whether the wallet and its content were inadmissible as evidence?
Ruling: Yes. The wallet and its contents are admissible. The right against self-incrimination
guaranteed under our fundamental law finds no application in this case. This right, as put by Mr.
Justice Holmes in Holt vs. United States x x x is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral
compulsion, to extort communications from him x x x.
It is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the [accused]s own lips, against his
will, admission of his guilt. It does not apply to the instant case where the evidence sought to
be excluded is not an incriminating statement but an object evidence. Infractions thereof
render inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial
investigation. The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue
and is not otherwise excluded by law or rules, is not affected even if obtained or taken in
the course of custodial investigation. Concededly, appellant was not informed of his right to
remain silent and to have his own counsel by the investigating policemen during the custodial
investigation. Neither did he execute a written waiver of these rights in accordance with the
constitutional prescriptions. Nevertheless, these constitutional short-cuts do not affect the
admissibility of Malakis wallet, identification card, residence certificate and keys for the purpose
of establishing other facts relevant to the crime. Thus, the wallet is admissible to establish the
fact that it was the very wallet taken from Malaki on the night of the robbery. The
identification card, residence certificate and keys found inside the wallet, on the other
hand, are admissible to prove that the wallet really belongs to Malaki.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LUCIANO JUMAMOY Y AÑORA,


alias "JUNIOR", accused-appellant.
FACTS: Two (2) separate informations for "Murder" and "Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm
and Ammunitions (sic)" were filed against accused Luciano Jumamoy. Appellant Luciano
Jumamoy and the victim Rolando Miel were once friends and belonged to the same 'barkada' until
sometime in 1970 when the former was stabbed by the latter on his left forearm. In the evening of
April 1, 1987, the victim and his younger brother Edgar, together with three other companions,
went to the Cultural Center of Inabanga, Bohol, where a 'disco' dance was being held. Upon
reaching the Center, the victim and his companions joined three other members of their 'barkada'
watching the disco outside. All of a sudden appellant appeared in front obliquely to the right of the
victim and fired three (3) successive shots at the latter. However, on his way to escape, appellant
passed by the victim's brother Edgardo and a companion. When appellant got near the two, the
former poked his gun at the victim's brother, and uttered, 'Unsa, laban ka?' ('What now, are you
taking sides?'). The trial court disregarded the accused's defense of alibi. The latter testified that
he had left Inabanga, Bohol for Cebu City on 29 March 1987 to look for employment. He recounts
that he stayed in the house of a friend, Feliciano Cenita, in Pasil, Cebu City from 1 April to 4 April
1987. In the evening of 4 April 1987, Jumamoy avers that he took a boat, the M/V Sweet Roro,
for Manila. The accused did not, however, present Feliciano Cenita as a witness despite his
(accused's) repeated manifestation of his intention to do so and the court's liberality in granting his
request for postponement for the said purpose. Instead, "out of the blue, the accused . . . presented
one Ramon Micutuan . . . to corroborate his claim that in the evening of April 1, 1987, he was in
Cebu City.

After trial, the court a quo promulgated its judgment finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes charged. One of the assigned errors is: “(T)he firearm alleged to have been
used by the accused in killing the victim was not presented in court during the trial. Its caliber and
make was (sic) never established by sufficient evidence, so that there is no basis to convict the
accused for illegal (sic) possession of firearm."

ISSUE: Whether or not it was indispensable for the prosecution to introduce and offer in evidence
the firearm which was used in the killing of the victim.

HELD: No. Nor can We agree with the accused that it was indispensable for the prosecution to
introduce and offer in evidence the firearm which was used in the killing of the victim. There is
no law or rule of evidence which requires the prosecution to do so; there is also no law which
prescribes that a ballistics examination be conducted to determine the source and trajectory of the

bullets. For conviction to lie it is enough that the prosecution establishes by proof beyond
reasonable doubt that a crime was committed and that the accused is the author thereof. The
production of the weapon used in the commission of the crime is not a condition sine qua non for
the discharge of such a burden for the weapon may not have been recovered at all from the
assailant. If the rule were to be as proposed by the accused, many criminals would go scot-free and
much injustice would be caused to the victims of crimes, their families and society. In the instant
case, it was established with moral certainty that the accused attacked, assaulted and shot the victim
Rolando Miel with an unlicensed firearm, thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple gunshot
wounds which caused his death. Such proof was all that was needed for the conviction of the
accused.