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Difference and Repetition

Gilles Deleuze
outline by Philip Turetzky – turetzky@colostate.edu

Chapter III: The Image of Thought

First Postulate: The Principle of the Cogitatio natura universalis pp. 129-132
The problem of presupposition in philosophy
The Cogitatio natura universalis
Second Postulate: The Ideal of Common Sense pp. 132-134
Thought and doxa
Third Postulate: The Model of Recognition pp. 134-137
Ambiguity and the Kantian Critique
Fourth Postulate: The Element of Representation pp. 137-148
Differential Theory of the Faculties
The Discordant Functioning of the Faculties: the violence and limits of each
Ambiguity of Platonism
Thinking: its Genesis in Thought
Fifth Postulate: The ‘negative’ of Error pp. 148-153
Problem of Stupidity
Sixth Postulate: The Privilege of Designation pp. 153-158
Sense and Proposition
The Paradoxes of Sense
Sense and Problem
Seventh Postulate: The Modality of Solutions pp. 158-164
The Illusion of Solutions in the Doctrine of Truth
Ontological and Epistemological Importance of the Category of Problems
Eighth Postulate: The Result of Knowledge pp. 164-167
What does it mean ‘to learn”?

Recapitulation of the Postulates as Obstacles to a Philosophy of Difference and

Repetition p. 167

The problem of presupposition in philosophy

Beginning = eliminating all presuppositions:
Science eliminates objective presuppositions by axiomatic rigor (objective
presupposition = concepts explicitly presupposed by a given concept)
Philosophy includes subjective (implicit) presuppositions contained in doxa
independent of concepts – everyone knows what is meant by self, thinking, &
being (instead of rational animal which presupposes concepts of rationality &
Beginning (Descartes, Hegel, Heidegger) tend to eliminate objective presuppositions
by assuming subjective presuppositions (self, sensible being, pre-ontological
understanding of being)
Therefore, there is no true beginning in philosophy (except difference which is already
repetition). It is always too simple to recover explicitly what was already there
implicitly (philosophy as Circle – Hegel [text]).
An implicit (subjective) presupposition has the form “Everybody knows…” (pre-
philosophically/pre-conceptually) what it means to think, to be…
“Everybody knows…” is the form/discourse of representation.
Philosophy has held nothing back here except this form of discourse.
This presupposition applies to both the ordinary man with his natural capacity for
thought (good will) Eudoxus & the man overfull with knowledge, perverted by
the generalities of his time Epistemon.
Isolated & passionate cries protest not managing to know what “Everybody knows…”
(not aristocratic prejudice)
Only someone with ill will, refusing representation, not thinking naturally or
conceptually, w/o objective/subjective presuppositions, untimely (neither
temporal nor eternal) can begin & repeat
First Postulate: The Principle of the Cogitatio natura universalis pp. 129-132
While many have an interest in saying what “Everybody knows…” representing others,
The Philosopher only proposes the form of representation/recognition in general
(what is meant by self, thinking, being) that thought is the natural exercise of a
faculty with an affinity for the truth,
With common sense = good will on the part of the thinker, & an upright nature on
the part of thought = Cogitatio natura universalis.
The importance of the presupposition lies especially w/philosophers who leave it
hidden as implicit themes understood pre-philosophically.
This is the Image of Thought borrowed from pre-philosophical common sense – a
dogmatic image of thought that remains even when a philosopher reacts against it
conceptually. Hence this is THE Image of thought.
It is Morality which persuades us that thought has a good will that grounds the
supposed affinity with the True (formally possesses & materially wants the true).
Hence, a philosophy that could truly begin must radically critique the Image of
thought, discovering thought w/o an Image: proceeding w/ only paradox as an
ally, renouncing the form of representation & the element of common sense.
Second Postulate: The Ideal of Common Sense pp. 132-134
We think only rarely & in response to a shock rather than a taste for thinking. But,
natural common sense & good sense are taken by, e.g., Descartes as an image of thought
in principle (not in fact). Sense can find itself universal & communicable in principle.

Hence, in order to apply thinking, one must have a explicit method. We must, then,
oppose the Image in principle.
The Image presupposes a transcendental model (a distribution between the
transcendental & the empirical – fact & principle).
The transcendental model is that of recognition = the harmonious exercise of all the
faculties on the supposedly same object, while each faculty has its own style
recognition locates the form of identity in the object.
Recognition relies on a common sense = concordia facultatum & so the form of
identity in objects relies on the unity of the thinking subject (Cogito as a
beginning = common sense become philosophical – Descartes & Kant)
Obj: we only confront this object specified by determinate contributions of the
Reply: Common sense = norm of identity (in principle) from the POV of pure Self
giving form of the Same to the unspecified object – Good sense = norm of
distribution from POV of empirical selves assigning contributions of the
faculties to qualified (kinds of) objects. We are supposed to know what it means
to think because common sense is not a faculty but their unity providing the
form of the Same in the model of recognition.
Thought and doxa
Philosophy cannot break w/orthodoxy (its project) since naturally upright thought, in
principle natural common sense, & transcendental model of recognition = an ideal
orthodoxy. Even though philosophy breaks with particular doxa it retains the form
of doxa, the element of common sense, & the model of recognition.
The image of thought = doxa universalized (raised to rational), but it only abstracts
from empirical content but retains the operation of the faculties & so thought
remains imprisoned & conforming.
Third Postulate: The Model of Recognition pp. 134-137
Philosophy needs common sense, but common sense doesn’t need philosophy. But, in
acts of recognition we don’t really think.
The critique of the image of thought is that it derives its supposed principle from by
extrapolation of some insignificant facts e.g. Recognition = everyday banality in
person. Kant, e.g., traces transcendental structures from the empirical acts of a
psychological consciousness etc. (Kant tried to hide this psychologism in B).
Recognition not merely a speculative model but serves values attached to objects
(functions in good sense’s distribution) – only established values get recognized.
Recognition “rediscovers” State & Church & all current values in the pure form
of the unspecified object. (Nietzsche’s new values (always beginning anew =
difference w/bad nature & ill will) differ formally & in kind from established values
(always already established) – not historical w/new becoming old – not struggles for
recognition [Hegel] which assume common sense & current values (honor etc.))
Ambiguity and the Kantian Critique
Kant substituted illusion internal error for external error, substituted for the substantial
self the self fractured by time leading God & self to a speculative death.
But Kant retained the Image of thought over the 3 Critiques multiplying common
senses (one for each interest of reason), making one faculty subject others to it
(understanding legislates cognition, Reason legislates practice, aesthetic common sense yielding
free accord of the faculties – all faculties collaborate in recognition, but differ in way of
collaborating re: object of recognition. Phenomenology adds a 4th common sense, passive
synthesis as Ur-doxa).

This multiplies common senses but still applies the model of recognition. Hence,
illusion is explained by the confusion of interests, & critique acts as tribunal.
So, even the speculative death of God & self receive a practical resurrection.
Fourth Postulate: The Element of Representation pp. 137-148
Representation =df identity re: concepts, opposition re: the determination of concepts,
analogy re: judgement, resemblance re: objects.
Identity of the unspecified concept constitutes the form of the Same re: recognition.
(relies on faculty of conception). (recognition)
Determination of concepts implies comparison between opposing predicates (double
series: remembrance/imagination aiming at rediscovery or re-creation). (relies on faculty of
remembrance/imagination). (distribution)
Analogy between determinate concepts or re: the highest determinable concept by
using the power of distribution in judgement. (relies on faculty of judgement).
The object of the concept relies on resemblance for perceptual continuity. (relies on
faculty of perception). (resemblance)
Each also established across faculties within common sense. The “I think” = the
most general principle of representation.
These subject difference to the (conceived) identical (recognition), the (imagined)
opposed (distribution), the (judged) analogous (reproduction), & the (perceived) similar
(resemblance), making difference an object of representation subject to
comparisons. Unable to conceive difference in itself, or repetition for itself.
Differential Theory of the Faculties
Objects of recognition only force us to think by employing all the faculties & in which
thought recognizes itself (its image) the more it recognizes things (e.g. a finger),
yielding only a local scepticism.
Likewise doubt about specific things presupposes good will of the thinker & the
good nature of thought. Likewise certainties (triangle & 3 sides).
Concepts only designate possibilities not necessities or strangeness & the violence
needed to provoke thought. There is only involuntary thought, trespass &
violence beginning w/misosophy.
1st: Thought requires a contingent fundamental encounter w/something that can only be
sensed (as opposed to recognition which bears on the senses in an object of the faculties in a
common sense).
The object that can only be sensed is not a quality but a sign, not a sensible being but
the being of the sensible (that by which the given is given). It is imperceptible re:
recognition (an object available to common sense). The sign is the limit of sensibility,
sensibility raised to a transcendental exercise (to the nth power). The sign enters
into discordant play.
The Discordant Functioning of the Faculties: the violence and limits of each
2nd: That which can only be sensed poses a problem (sign = problem, perplexing)
Plato: reminiscence = a transcendental memory where what can be recalled must be
empirically impossible to recall. Empirical memory: recover what has been grasped
before & what is forgotten cannot be grasped a 2nd time. Transcendental memory:
grasps what can only be recalled even the 1st time, forgetting is the nth power of
memory = memory at its limit, & forces thought to grasp what can only be thought.
Empirical sensibility & contingent imperceptibility contrast w/ transcendental

sensibility & essential imperceptibility (in the sense that it can only be sensed not reached by
common sense).
The violence that forces thought develops from sign to cogitandum unhinging
common sense & breaking with empirical doxa. Each faculty attaining the nth
power & paradoxical element in a transcendental exercise. Each faculty
concerned only with the presence of its own, a discord of the faculties, each
receiving only violence from the others.
Ambiguity of Platonism
In The Republic the essentially encountered (unrecognized) = object of a “contradictory
perception” – a finger calls for recognition, but the hard is also soft (large/small
one/many) = (unlimited) becomings = sign = coexistence of contraries. Recognition
measures & limits by relating quality to something (e.g. a qualitative opposition or
Obj: this confuses the being of the sensible with a sensible (qualitative) being. Re
reminiscence: is supposed to bear on something enveloped in the sign never-
seen & already recognized. This betrays: nature of the encounter difficult
recognition rather than opposed to all possible recognition – what can only be
recalled = form of similitude in reminiscence confusing being of the past w/a
past being invoking a mythical present when no empirical past moment can be
Reminiscence is better than innateness because it introduces time into thought
establishing an opacity of thought (testifying to a bad nature & ill will). Plato only
recognizes time as a physical cycle or a form saving thought’s supposed good
nature. Plato then also traces the operation of a transcendental memory from an
empirical exercise.
For Plato, that which can only be thought becomes Largeness which is only large,
Unity which is only one, etc. = essence as the form of a real Identity. This leads
to the principle of an affinity of thought with the true. A good nature & will
grounded in the form of analogy w/the Good. Plato 1st to erect dogmatic image
of thought subordinating the transcendental exercise of the faculties to
forms of opposition in the sensible, similitude in reminiscence, identity in
the essence, and analogy in the Good.
The transcendent form of a faculty grasps the world which concerns it exclusively, but
cannot be grasped by common sense & so cannot be traced from an empirical
exercise of the faculty (a superior empiricism).
Each faculty bears a violence that forces its exercise, a violence by what it is forced
to grasp, & a violence of its empirical ungraspability. (Here each faculty
discovers its difference & eternal repetition). Each faculty will have its limit (its
transcendent object) & what faculties there are is open ended.
Thinking: its Genesis in Thought
The Platonic determinations are unsatisfactory since they cannot carry the faculties to
their respective limits – in sensibility to pure difference = intensity; in memory to the
dissimilar in the pure form of time; in thought to the aleatory point – the I fractured
by the pure form of time – always Other in nature enveloping essences as
differentials of thought.
Thinking always begins in sensibility – thought comes to us by means of intensity –
because what forces sensation in an encounter = what can only be sensed, where
re: the other faculties what forces X is distinct from what can only be Xed.

The violence that carries a faculty to its limit in the communication between
disjointed faculties is always a free form of difference: difference in intensity,
disparity in the phantasm, dissemblance in the form of time, the differential in
thought. Identity, opposition, analogy, & resemblance are effects of these
presentations of difference.
The contingency (chance) on encounters guarantees the necessity of what it forces to
be thought (not an affinity for the truth).
Communication, a serial connection, is not enough to maintain a common sense because
it does not imply the same object or a subjective unity – rather forced connections
traverse dissolved selves & the form of the fractured I. This is a paradoxical
operation w/discordant harmony (e.g. the sublime). There are Ideas (problems) which
traverse the faculties but are the object of none in particular. Problems furnish the
conditions for a superior exercise of the faculties. They are not clear & distinct (like
the natural light – logic of recognition) nor innate (& do not save creationist theology – of common
sense). The Idea is obscure insofar as it is distinct.
Artaud & Riviere: Artaud destroys the Image of thought – his problem is not a factual
difficulty (de facto state of affairs) but in principle (de jure structure of thought) concern the
essence of what it is to think – to manage to think something – thought forced to
think its own limit. Nothing is innate in thought; it must be engendered – to think is
to create.
Fifth Postulate: The ‘negative’ of Error pp. 148-153
The dogmatic image of thought recognizes error as the only way thought goes astray –
error = the sole negative of thought = taking the false for the true. Error still
presupposes good will & good nature of thought. Error assumes common sense
since one faculty cannot be mistaken but two faculties in collaboration can
(Descartes). Error = false recognition arising from a false distribution (evaluation) of the
elements of representation. Error gives the form of the true to the false. As if error =
a failure of good sense within the form of a common sense which remains intact.
The proof of the dogmatic image by reductio from error fails because it operates in the
same element as the postulates it attempts to prove. (The Theatetus ends aporetically on
the problem of difference the Republic purports to solve).
The dogmatic image does recognize madness, stupidity, & malevolence as misadventures
of thought which are not reducible to error. It treats them as external forces (facts)
capable of subverting thought’s honesty. But this external factuality makes error the
effect of these forces on thought as if thought would function okay if not diverted
from outside.
But this diversion could not happen in principle were this outside not also in pure
thought. But how in principle? Different errors seem to respond to simple
questions w/independent propositions (Q/A quiz). This must be reversed. Error is
a fact arbitrarily projected onto the transcendental.
Philosophers have been aware of this & enriched error w/superstition, forgetting,
stultification, illusion internal to reason, alienation, vulgarity. These don’t get
developed on their own because they are seen only as complicating or
inconveniencing the Image of thought.
Problem of Stupidity
Stupidity is not only depicted by animals, but can be depicted by vegetables too. “A tyrant
institutionalizes stupidity, but he is the first servant of his own system & the first to installed within it.
Slaves are always commanded by another slave.” p. 151. Error cannot account for the unity of

stupidity & cruelty, grotesque & terrifying. These are not mere facts of character,
but structures of thought as such. Stupidity is a transcendental structure not merely
traced from the empirical – transcendental Q: how is stupidity possible? (“the
transcendental landscape comes to life”). Philosophers fail to see this because they adhere
to the concept of error. Literature is haunted by the problem of stupidity.
I & Self indicate species in that the species has reached an implicit state in man, so that I
can serve as a universal principle for recognition & representation which determine
species. While I is not species (since I contains the represented becoming of form) they have
the same fate.
Individuation has nothing to do w/the process of determining species, it renders the
process possible. Individuation involves fields of intensities beneath all forms; it
brings a pure ground to the surface w/neither form nor figure. The individual
distinguishes itself from this ground, but it does not distinguish itself. The
ground is the indeterminate which embraces determination.
Stupidity is neither ground nor individual, but the relation in which individuation
brings the ground to the surface w/o being able to give it form. Determinations
become cruel when grasped only by contemplation separated from their living
form & everything becomes violent [fascism]. (Madness sees itself in this free ground
but cannot tolerate it.) This faculty becomes a philosophy of mind when it leads the
other faculties to the transcendent exercise that make a violent reconciliation
between individual, ground & thought possible – where intensities take
themselves as objects of a transcendent sensibility, as the unthought, what can
only be thought in thinking.
Sixth Postulate: The Privilege of Designation pp. 153-158
Teachers know errors are rare in student work, instead one finds nonsense, banalities
mistaken for profundities, remarks w/o interest or importance, badly posed problems
(p. 153). Likewise w/ mathematicians.
Sense and Proposition
Sense =df the condition of the true. But, philosophers suppose it allows the possibility of
error, since a false proposition has sense. Non-sense is what can be neither true nor
The proposition expresses some content, & designates some object to which what is
said in the proposition applies – expresses Sense, designates truly or falsely. But
on this conception sense is indifferent to what it founds (truth). Then sense gets
referred to a psychological trait or logical formalism, & a value of non-sense
added to truth values (T & F) which are supposed to continue w/o change.
Too much is said here because the search for a ground should be a critique & inspire
new ways of thinking, not enough is said because this critique serves to justify
traditional ways of thinking. Referring the true & the false back to designation
is a 6th postulate: of designation or of the proposition (the logical form of
The condition must be of real not merely possible experience – intrinsic genesis
(production) not extrinsic conditioning (adequation). The grounded changes
w/grounding (sufficient reason = metamorphose) relates ground to groundless. The
relation between proposition & what it designates must be established in sense which
by nature points to object which is also constituted in the unity of sense. Sense is the
production of the true (which is the empirical result of sense).
The Paradoxes of Sense

Sense = what is expressed in the proposition, but expressed not referent nor state of
speaker. Significance re: concepts conditioned by representation. Sense is sub-
representative (like Idea).
The 1st paradox of sense is of infinite proliferation. We can never say both a
proposition & its sense (only nonsense words do this – “snark”). Sense in its empirical
operation cannot be said (except in its transcendental operation). The Idea cannot be
reduced to sense, but also includes non-sense. The Idea is constituted by
elements which have no sense (structure), but produce it (genesis).
While we cannot express the sense of what we say, we can designate it by another
proposition, of which we cannot say the sense etc. (infinite regress of names &
senses). This corresponds to the n power of language & its transcendental
Thought is therefore betrayed by the dogmatic Image of Thought & the postulate of
designation. No proposition (Cogito) can serve as a beginning (unless Cogito is a
name w/o a sense: I think that I think…).
The 1st paradox of infinite proliferation can only be avoided by a 2nd paradox (sterile
splitting) suspending the proposition by doubling it – extracting the ideal content
which then appears distinct from the proposition, the speaker, & the object: it
doesn’t exist outside the proposition so it doesn’t belong to subject or object, & it is a
logical attribute the statable or expressible complex theme so it differs from the
proposition itself. It is an ideal event (stated in infinitive or participle: being-blue of the sky)
that subsists or insists a quasi-being common to real, possible & impossible.
Problems: why don’t contradictory propositions have the same sense (affirmation &
negation are only propositional modes)? Impossible objects will have sense? Objects
will be transient, but their sense eternal? Proposition is true because its sense is
but the sense is true because the proposition is?
These problems arise because we’ve treated sense as a phantom limit of things &
words, as a logical sterile incorporeal entity w/o generative power (a smile w/o a
Sense and Problem
Exchanging the participial form for an interrogative form seems only to present the
question as a neutralized double of the proposition (something already given or already
distributed – good sense – among a community), but questions also open up new paths, not
just a response as a particular solution, but relating cases to a problem as a problem.
Sense is located in the problem. Sense = a complex theme = a set of problems &
questions to which propositions serve as elements of response & cases of solution.
But this only works if problems are not traced from propositions serving as responses
as required by the image of thought. If problems were only such traces, then they
would be ineffectual doubles. This fails to see problems as extra-propositional
differing in kind from propositions, & misses the act of genesis of thought (the
operation of the faculties).
Seventh Postulate: The Modality of Solutions pp. 158-164
The 7th postulate of the Image of Thought – of responses & solutions (T&F only qualify
The Illusion of Solutions in the Doctrine of Truth
It is a mistake to think that problems disappear in responses or solutions, that the
activity of thinking & truth/falsity begin w/the search for & only concern

Infantile prejudice that master sets problems & solutions accredited by a powerful
authority – that problems come from elsewhere is a social prejudice & interest in
maintaining us in an infantile state “telling us we have won simply by being able
to respond” (referenda, examinations, etc.) = be yourself = the self of others.
Problems are the most important thing not as provisional & to be dissolved in the
formation of knowledge, but as transcendental ideal = sense – T&F affect
problems – solutions only have truth re: their sense – solutions follow from
complete determination of problems. Problem = truth & genesis of derived truth
– nonsense relates to problems: false problems/sense. Stupidity is the faculty for
false problems, the inability to comprehend/determine a problem as such.
Philosophy dreams of applying test of T&F to problems
The error is to conceive that the truth of a problem lies in the possibility of its solution.
This models form of problems on the form of the possibility of propositions.
E.g. Aristotelian dialectics = art of problems & Qs – shows how to pose a question –
invents the subjects of syllogisms. While analytics solves problems by means of
syllogisms. But Aristotle then appeals to common sense, the opinions of all men
or of the wise to judge a problem. This returns to the philosophical illusion of
the 7th Postulate.
Philosophers conceive the form of possibility differently but retain the essential – tracing
problems from their solutions (from propositions).
Mathematical method e.g. geometry relegates genetic to inferiority to accomplished
theorems & proofs. Likewise re: algebra tracing problems from equations
(operating on unknown quantities as if they were known)
Other variations: empiricists invent a new form of possibility: probability = physical
possibility. Kant defined Critique in terms of testing T&F of problems, but still
appeals to transcendental form of possibility re: legitimate uses of a faculty guided
by its appropriate form of common sense.
2 aspects of the illusion: (1) the natural illusion: tracing problems from supposedly
pre-existent propositions (theorems, equations, hypotheses, judgments) (2) the
philosophical illusion: evaluating problems re: their solvability, i.e., according to
the extrinsic variable form of possibility of finding a solution – a vicious circle!
This all misses the internal imperative element of problems which decides T&F &
measures its genetic power = the differential. Problems as tests & selections –
the production of truth. Problems are the differential elements of thought &
genetic elements of truth. Solvability must be generated by the problem. (We
must revert to a Riemannian differential geometry which tends to generate discontinuity of the
basis of continuity.)
Ontological and Epistemological Importance of the Category of Problems
Solutions only make sense within Ideas capable of comprehending imaginary situations
& integrating an ideal continuity. Solving a problem is giving rise to discontinuities
on the basic of an Idea functioning as a continuity. This gives propositions their
universality – w/o the problem propositions fall back as particular designations &
consciousness reconstitutes the problem as a neutralized double of particular
propositions or the empty form of general ones. This loses the nature of the
universal & singular in hypotheticals and categories.
The universality of the problem is the distribution of singular points & distinctive
points which determines the problem’s conditions. Problems get defined in

terms of the order of ideal events & affections. Problematic Ideas are
multiplicities of relations & corresponding singularities.
Problems persist & insist in their solutions even though they do not exist outside their
solutions. Problems are at once Transcendent – consisting of a system of differential
relations between genetic elements -- & Immanent in their solutions – incarnated in
actual relations that don’t resemble the problems [Albert Lautman].
Problems are dialectical which becomes mere negative & oppositional when it
forgets its relations to Ideas & traces problems from propositions.
We must distinguish the problem as transcendental instance – the symbolic field in
which problems express their conditions (movement) – the field of solvability in
which the problem is incarnated & which defines the symbolic field.
Eighth Postulate: The Result of Knowledge pp. 164-167
Signs cause problems & are developed in the symbolic field. The paradoxical
functioning of faculties refers to Ideas which run through the faculties awakening
them. Idea = paradoxical functioning of faculty. Transcendental exercise of a
faculty = exploration of ideas.
What does it mean ‘to learn”?
Learning = Idea + exploration of Idea = subjective acts when confronted w/the
objectivity of a problem. Knowledge = generality of concepts & possession of
(rule enabling) solutions.
Monkey e.g.: The discontinuity of solutions generated by the continuity of the an
ideal apprenticeship (of the distribution of T&F re: a problem). The final truth emerges
as if it were a limit of the problem as completely determined & understood as
the outcome of a genetic series constituting sense.
To learn = to enter into differential relations & singularities constituting an Idea, e.g.
to learn to swim is to conjugate distinctive points of our body w/singular points
of an objective Idea (differential variations of the movement of the waves)
determining a threshold in which our real acts adjust to our perceptions of the
real relations. Ideas are the ultimate elements of nature & subliminal objects of
little perception.
The apprentice raises each faculty to its transcendental exercise: education of the senses
transmitted to the other faculties. We never know in advance how someone will
learn – there is no method for learning (anymore than for finding treasures). Method is a
means of knowledge regulated by common sense, good will, & premeditated
decision of the thinker. Culture, instead, is an adventure – a movement linking the
faculties by violence.
There is a tendency to extol learning but only as subordinated to knowledge as its result
Philosophers try to derive transcendental conditions of thought from knowledge,
when they should derive them from learning (= a transcendental movement). Knowledge
is only an empirical figure always falling back into experience. Learning is a
transcendental structure uniting difference to difference w/o mediation truly
introducing (the pure empty form of) time into thought (unlike Platonic reminiscence which
still subjects time & thought to resemblance & identity).
Knowledge is the 8th Postulate of the Image of thought recapitulating all the others in
the supposedly simple result.

Recapitulation of the Postulates as Obstacles to a Philosophy of Difference

and Repetition